1

07-0612-pr Espinal v. Goord U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT

_______________________________ August Term, 2008 (Submitt ed: Dec ember

4, 2008 Dec ided: Fe bruar y 2, 2009 Amended: F ebrua ry 27, 2009)
Docke t No. 07-0612-pr

_______________________________ CESAR A. ESP I

NAL , Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. COMMI SSI ONER GL ENN S. GOORD, B RI AN F . MAL ONE, Inspector G ener al of the N ew York State De partment of Corr ectional Ser vices, CHRI STOPHER P . ARTUZ , For mer Superintendent of G ree n Have n Correc tional Fac ility , W. TOTTEN, Captain of Gr een H aven Correc tional Fac ility , COL EMAN S. WI L SON, Correc tional Serg eants of G ree n Have n Correc tional Fac ility , KENNET H G. HAF FORD, Corr ectional Ser g eants of G ree n Have n Correc tional Fac ility , J ERRY W . SURBER, Correc tional Office r of Gr een H aven Corr ectional Fa cility , FRASHER, Correc tional Office r of Gr een H aven Corr ectional F acility , ROSARI O, Correc tional Office r of Gr een H aven Corr ectional F acility , AYOTL E, Correc tional Office r of Gre en Ha

ven Corre ctional Fa cility , DANI ELF. MARTUCEL L O, Corre ctional Off icer of Gre en Haven Corre ctional Fa cility , B. RODA S, Correctional Medic al Providers of G ree n Have n Correc tional Fac ility , B. H EALY, Corre ctional Medica l Providers of Gr een H aven Correc tional Fac ility , CHAKRAVARTY, Corr ectional Me dical Providers of Gre en Haven C o r r e c t i o n a l F a c i l i ty, J O HN D O E 1
- 2 , i nth e i r p e r s o n a l an d

i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i ty, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.

_______________________________ Be fore : L EVAL , POOL ER, and PARKER, Circuit J udg es.

_______________________________2

Cesar Espina l, an inmate of the New Y ork State De partment of Corr ectional Ser vices (“D OCS”) who filed a

n action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, appeals the or der of the United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of NewYork (G eorg e A. Ya nthis, M.J .) g ranting summary judgme nt, in part, on the g round that Espinal fa iled to exhaust admini strative re medies
un de r t he Pr iso n L iti g atio n Re fo rm Ac t of 19 95 (“ PL RA ” ). Af

te r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

iss ue d it s order , the U.S. Supreme Court held in Jones v. Bock that e x haustion under the PL RA does not require a prisoner ’s g rieva nce to identify

the par ties responsible for

misconduct unless an identification re quirement is provided in the state ’s g rieva nce pr ocedur es. 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2 00 7) . T he Ne w Y or

k D OC S’ g ri e va

nc e pr oc e dure s d o n ot r e qu ir e an inmate to s pe c if ic a lly
name r esponsible par

ties. Acc ording ly , Espinal did not fail to ex haust his administrative
reme dies by

omitti ngthe names of

defe ndants from his prison g rieva nce. We ther efor e REVERSE the gr ant of summary judgme nt on this ground. We also REVERSE the dismissal of Espinal’s re taliation claims, and AF FI RM the denial of Espinal’s motion for a new tria l. AF F I RME D i n p art , RE VE RSE D a nd REM AN DE D i n p art .

__________________________

CES AR A. ESPI NA L , p ro se , f

or Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt, MARI ON R. BU CHBI

NDER, Assistant Soli citor Ge nera l, (BA RBARA D. UN DE RWOO D, Sol ic ito r G e ne ra l, B EN JAMI N N . G UT MA

N, De puty Sol ic ito r G e ne ra l, A ssi sta nt S oli c ito r G e ne ra l, o n th e br ie f) , f or AN DREW M
. CUOMO, Attorney

Gene ral of the State of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, NY, for De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.

__________________________The pa rties conse nted to have a

mag istrate judg e conduc t all proce eding s pursuant to 28 1 U.S.C. § 636(c). 3 POOL ER, Circuit J udg e: Cesar A . Espinal, an inmate of the New York State De partment of Corr ectional Ser vices (“D OCS”), filed a

lawsuit, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York, a lleg ing, inter alia, that the de fenda

nts used excessive forc e ag ainst him and denied him medica l treatment in violation of the Eig hth Amendment, that they did so in retaliation for Espinal’ s prior lawsuits, and that they conspired to a ssault him and deny him me dic a l c are in v iol atio n o f h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts . T he dis tr ic t c ourt (G e or g e A. Ya

nth is, M.J .) issued an or der, e ntere d on September 1, 2005, that gr anted in par t and denied in pa

rt the de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt dis mis se d a ll c la ims a g a ins t 1 twelve of the fourte en def

endants on the ground that Espinal fa iled to exhaust admini strative
re me die s, un de r t

he Pr iso n L iti g atio n Re fo rm Ac t of 19 95 , b y fa ili ngto n ame tho se de fe nd ants in his gr ievanc e. The district court g rante d summary judgme nt, in part, in favor of the two
rema ining de fenda

nts, Surber and F rashe r, bec ause Espina l failed to exhaust his administ rative
reme dies on the conspira cy claims and be cause there wer e no triable issues of mater ial fac t on the reta liation claims. The district court de nied summary judgme nt as to Espinal’s excessive for ce claims ag ainst Surber a

nd Fr asher . A jury

returne d a ver dict in favor of Surber a nd Fr asher

on the excessive for ce c laims. Espinal appea led the orde r g rantingsummary judgme nt in part and an orde r, made by

oral de cision and ente red on January 11, 2007, that denied his motion for a new tria l. Af te r t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r gra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt i n p art , th e U. S. Su pr e meAfter due conside ration of the State’ s petition for rehe aring , which wa s denied, we have 2 amende d our opinion. 4 Court held in J ones v. B ock that exhaustion under the Prison L itigation Refor m Act does not require a prisoner ’s g rieva nce to identify

the par ties responsible for

misconduct unless an identification re quirement is provided in the state ’s g rieva nce pr ocedur es. 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2 00 7) . B e c a

us e the Ne w Y or

k D OC S g ri e va

nc e pr oc e dure s d o n ot r e qu ir e an inmate to specific ally

name r esponsible par

ties, Espinal did not fail to ex haust his administrative reme dies by omitti ngthe names of

the def endants fr om his prison grie vance . We theref ore r ever se the g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt o n th is gro un d. We a lso re ve rs e the g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i n favor of Surber and F rashe r on the c onspiracy claims and the r etaliation claims. We aff irm the district court’s de nial of Espinal’s motion for a new tria l, and deny

Espinal’s re quest for a temporar y restra ining or der. 2 BACK GR OUND Espinal makes the f

ollowing a lleg ations in his S ection 1983 complaint. On the mor ning of De cembe r 17, 1999, Espinal “g ot into a dispute” with another inmate , but was not harme d. He was then taken to the medica l clinic for a “fig ht exam.” Office r Will iams, who is not a defe ndant in this action, escorte d Espinal to the clinic. Espinal was a lleg edly confr onted by

Serg eant Wils on , c or

re c tio ns of

fi c e rs Sur be r, Ros ari o, F ra sh e r, Ayotl e , a nd se ve ra l a dd iti on a l of

fi c e rs , wh o b ro ug ht h im i nto the “ sic k- c a ll r oo m” of the c lin ic . Surb e r, Ayotl e , a nd F ra sh e r r e pe ate dly slammed Espinal into the wall. The of fice rs aske d Espinal whether he had be en in a f

ight. B e fo re Es pin a l ans we re d, Ros ari o “ tol d h im t o s hut- up ,” and Sur be r s tr uc k h im o n th e sid e of

his he a d. Th e of

fi c e rs the n in fo rm e d E sp ina l th at th e y wo uld hit him if he did no t ans we r t

he ir5

questions in the affir

mative. Surber a

nd Rosario alleg edly

punched E spinal sever al times on the side of the he ad whe n he did not respond to their que stions. When Office r Will iams returne d to ask whethe r Espinal wa s rea dy to be broug ht into the clinic, the def

endants infor

med Will iams that they

wer e “not f

inished with Espinal.” The of fice rs continued to hit Espinal and kicked him in his rig ht legwher e he w as pre viously injured by

a gun shot. Espinal was taken into the c linic at approximately 9:10 a.m. afte r a ha lf-hour be ating , and
wa s w arn e d n ot t o te ll a

nyon e wh at ha

pp e ne d. Es pin a l ha d p re vio us ly fi le d a laws uit a g a ins t
sever al DOCS defe ndants, including Surber, in June 1998. Espinal alleg es that he w as told by the offic ers dur ing the Dec ember 17, 1999 incident that “this is what happe ns to [ i] nmates whe n they submit l aw suits ag ainst us,” and that they threatened to kill him. At the clinic, Espinal wa s first seen by Nurse H ealy . Espinal informed He aly that the office rs ca

used his injuries, but Healy was told by

Surber that the injurie s resulted fr om the fig ht with the other inmate. Espina l was then see n by a doctor , defe ndant Dr. Chakr avar ty , who tried to examine Espinal, but Espinal refused tre atment bec ause Chakr avar ty ’s method of e x amination
was c ausinghim pain. Espinal would not sign a r efusa l-of-tre atment form a nd asked to be seen by another doctor. Chakr avar

ty denied the r equest. Espinal then a sked Serg eant Ha ffor d if he
c ou ld b e se e n b y

ano the r d oc tor

and be take n to the me nta l he a lthun it. Ha ff or d d e nie d th e se
re qu e sts be c a

us e Es pin a l’ s me dic a l c ha rt s sh ow e d th at he ha d r e fu se d me dic a l tr e atme nt a nd did not indicate any

mental hea lth problems. Espinal was then le ft in a room with Surber a nd Ayotle who ver

bally hara ssed him. Specifica lly , Surber thre atene d to kill Espi nal if Espinal did not attempt suicide. Espinal was taken ba ck to his cell at a round 10:30 a.m. Espinal aske d to go to e merg ency sick ca ll severa l6

times, but defenda

nt Martuce llo denied his reque sts. L ater that day , around 6:20 p.m., Espinal
was a g ain broug ht to the clinic and wa s ree valuated. An inmate injury repor t was pre pare d that listed injuries to Espinal’s head, right leg , and wr ists. S ubsequently , Espinal had seve ral appointments to be seen by the medica l depar

tment during Dec ember

1999, J anuar

y 2000, and F e br ua ry 20 00 . E sp ina l a lle g e s th at th e of fi c e rs and de fe nd ant R od a s d id n ot p e rm it h im t o attend those a

ppointments. Th e de fe nd ants de nie d E sp ina l’ s a lle g atio ns in t he ir ans we r, and

a sse rt e d f

a ilure to exhaust administ rative r emedies a s an af firmative de fense . The re cord c ontains two internal g rieva nces f iled by Espinal that are pertinent to this lawsuit. I n the first g rieva nce, f iled on Dec ember

17, 1999, Espinal claimed that, on that morning , in the “sick c all room,” he was

“ h an d c u f f e d an d b e ate ns e v e r e [l y ] t o th e h e a d , f a c e , an d b o dy , b y o f f ic e r Sur b e r , o f f ic e r F r a s h [e ]r and other countless sec urity

office rs, as they

[were] slurringrac ial comments and thre ats of killing me,” a

nd that the beating wa s “re taliation” ag ainst him. On Febr uary 3, 2000, defe ndant Christopher Artuz, then-Superintende nt of Gre en Haven Corre ctional Fa cility , denied the g rieva nce, f inding Espinal “ was not re fused medic al attention, rather, [Espinal himself] ref used medical a ssistance,” and ther e wa s “no evide nce to substantiate [Espinal’s] alleg ations of unprofe ssional conduct and thr eats.” On Fe bruar y 11, 2000, Espinal appea led, and on Apr il 5, 2000, his appea l was denie d. Inth e s ec o n d

gri ev an ce , d at edJ an u ary 1 9 , 2 0 0 0 , E s p i n al s t at edth ath e w as m ak i n g a complaint “ag ainst Gree n Have n’s Medica l Dept.” f or deliber ate indiffe renc e to his serious medical ne eds in conne ction with various “[m] andator y [c] linic [ a]ppointm ents,” a nd asser ted that “the c onduct of prison off icials and medic al per sonal [si c]” denied him ac cess to medica l7

car e. On Marc h 16, 2000, Artuz denied the g rieva nce, r easoningthat medical pe rsonnel had se en Es pin a l 31 tim e s si nc e Oc tob e r 1 99 9, and g ra nte d th e g ri e va

nc e to t he e xtent th at E sp ina l w ou ld continue to re ceive treatment as presc ribed. On Ap ri l 4, 20 00 , E sp ina l a

pp e a le d, and

on Ap ri l 26, 2000, his appea l was denie d. In October

2004, the def

endants moved f

or summary

judgme nt, arguing that (1) all of Espinal’s claims, except the e x cessive f orce and re taliation claims ag ainst Surber a nd Fr asher , should be dismissed for fa ilure to exhaust administ rative r emedies unde r the Prison L itigation Re fo rm Ac t; a nd (2 ) t he e xce ssi ve fo rc e and

re ta liatio n c la ims a g a ins t Surb e r a nd F ra sh e r s ho uld be dismissed beca

use Espinal ra ised no triable issues of material fa ct. The district c ourt found that Espinal failed to e x haust his administrative reme dies as to all def endants e x cept Surbe r and Fr asher beca use he ne ver spe cifica lly

named those de fenda

nts in his grieva

nces. The district court noted that Espinal’s g rieva nces r efe rre d to the “countless se curity office rs” involved in the Dec ember

17, 1999 incident, and to deliber ate indiffe renc e by “Gr een H aven’ s Medical De pt.,” “prison off

icials,” a nd “medica l personal [sic]” in connection with the alleg ed denia l of medica l
a pp ointme nts . B ut t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

c on sid e re d th e se re fe re nc e s in su ff ic ie nt t o e xha

us t c la ims ag ainst unnamed de fenda nts, “particula

rly g iven the fa ct that . . . [Espinal was] able to remember the name s o f t

he of fi c e rs he c la im[e d] to have take n p art in t he inc ide nts ” wh e n h e dr a ft e d h is
c omp la int in t his laws uit
. The district cour t also dismis sed the c onspiracy claims ag ainst Surber
and F ra sh e r b e c a

us e , inte r a lia , E sp ina l ne ve r a sse rt e d th e e xiste nc e of a c on sp ir a c y

to a ssa ult him or de ny him me dic a l c are in e ith e r o f h is gri e va nc e s. The district cour

t then turned to the re maining c laims ag ainst Surber a nd Fr asher . Espinal
a lle g e d th at th e be atin gby the of fi c e rs wa s p e rp e tr ate d in

re ta liatio n f

or a pr e vio us laws uit8

ag ainst sever al DOCS defe ndants, including Surber, that wa s filed in J une 1998 and w as dismiss ed on June 14, 1999. The district court found that Espinal’s reta liation claims did not raise a ny triable issues of material fa ct. The district c ourt consider ed the outcome of the g rieva nce he aringon the Dec ember 17, 1999 incident, Espinal’s history of misbehavior, a

nd the leng th of time betwee n the filing of the law suit and the incident (a y ear and a ha lf afte r filingthe lawsuit and six months after dismissal). The district c ourt deter mined, howeve r, that Espinal raised tr iable issues of mate rial fa ct on the excessive f orce claims ag ainst Surber a nd Fr asher
. The e x cessive f

orce claims wer e tried be fore a jury on October

30, 31, and Nove mber 1, 2006. Espinal was re prese nted by counsel at trial. The jury returne d a ver dict in favor of the defe ndants. Espinal’s counse l moved for a new tria l pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 59(a) . The district cour

t denied the motion for a

new tria l in an oral de cision. Espinal filed a timely

appea l of the September

1, 2005 order

g rantingsummary

judgme nt in part and the J anuar

y 11, 2007 order

denying the motion for a new trial. DI SCU SSIO N I. Exhau stion of

Adm inis trat ive Rem edies A. The Sc ope of t he P LR A E xha ust ion Re quir e m e nt The Prison L itigation Refor m Act of 1995 (“ PL RA”) state s that “[n] o action shall be broug ht with respec t to prison conditions under [42 U.S .C. § 1983] , or any other F eder al law, by a prisoner confine d in any

jail, prison, or other c orre ctional fa cility until such administrative
reme dies as ar e ava ilable ar e exhausted.” 42 U .S.C. § 1997e(a). The PL RA exhaustion require ment “applies to a ll inmate suits about prison li fe, whether they involve g ener al circ umstances or

particula r episodes, a

nd whether

they alleg e excessive f

orce or some other9

wrong .” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Prisoners must utiliz e the state ’s g rieva nce proce dures, r eg ardle ss of whethe r the re lief soug ht is offere d throug h those proce dures. B ooth v. Churner, 532 U .S. 731, 741 (2001). In Woodford v. Ng o, the Supreme Court he ld that “the PL RA exhaustion requirement require s proper

exhaustion.” 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). The pr isoner in Woodford ar g ued that administrative re medies we re una vailable onc e the pr ison rejec ted his g rieva nce a s untimely . I d. at 87. The Supre me Court reje cted this argument. The Court held that “ [p] roper exhaustion de mand s c omp lia

nc e wi th a

n a g e nc y ’s de a dli ne s a

nd oth e r c ri tic a l pr oc e dura l r ule s” a s a pr e c on dit ion

to f ili nga fe de ra l la ws uit . I d. at 90 . Wo od fo rd e xpla ine d th at c omp lia

nc e wi th state proc edura l rules is nece ssary to achieve “[t] he bene fits of exhaustion [ that] can be re alized only if the prison g rieva

nce sy stem is given a

fair oppor

tunity to consider the grieva

nce.” I d. at 95. In Jon e s v . B oc k, 54 9 U .S. 19 9 ( 20 07 ), the Sup re me Court wa s a g a in c on fr on te d w ith
se ve ra l qu e sti on s r e g ard ingthe sc op e of the PL RAe xha

us tio n r e qu ir e me nt. On e of tho se questions was whe ther a

prisoner f

ails to ex haust a c laim ag ainst a par ticular de fenda

nt by failing to name that def

endant in the inter

nal prison g rieva

nce. I d. at 205, 217. The Supre me Court
e xpla ine d th at Woo df

or d “ he ld t

hat to pr op e rl y

e xha us t a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s p ri so ne rs mus t ‘c omp le te the a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie w p ro c e ss i n a c c or da nc e wi th t he a pp lic a ble pr oc e dura l r

ule s’ – rules that ar e def

ined not by

the PL RA, but by

the prison g rieva

nce pr ocess itself.” I d. at 218 (q uo tin gWoo df

or d, 54 8 U .S. at 88 ) ( c itatio n o mitte d) . It f oll ow s, a s r e c og nize d b y

the Court , that “ [t]he le ve l of

de ta il n e c e ssa

ry in a g ri e va nc e to c omp ly

wi th t he g ri e va nc e pr oc e dure s w ill vary from sy stem to sy stem and cla im to claim,” beca use “it is the prison’s re quirements, and not10

the PL RA, that define the boundarie s of prope r exhaustion.” I d. The e x haustion inquiry

thus require s that we look at the state prison proce dures a nd the prisoner’ s g rieva

nce to de termine whe ther the pr isoner has c omplied with those procedur es. See Jone s, 54 9 U .S. at 21 8; Wo od fo rd , 5 48 U. S. at 88 -9 0. In Jon e s, a un anim ou s Su

pr e me Court , employing this appr oach, f ound that Michig an’s grieva nce pr ocedur es did not require the prisoner to spec ifically

identify in his grie vance those offic ials responsible for alleg ed misconduct, and only

offe red the g ener al guidance that prisoners should “be as spec ific as possible” and “ [b] e brie f and c oncise” in framingtheir g rieva nces. I d. at 218 (quotation marks omi tte d) . T he Court

a lso no te d th at th e inm ate g ri e va nc e fo rm s d id n ot p ro mpt pr iso ne rs to n ame the re sponsible parties. I d. Be cause PL RA exhaustion onl y mandates c ompliance with the state’s proc edura l rules and Michig an’s pr ocedur es “ma [de] no mention of namingparticula r officia ls,” there was no a

uthority for a court to impose such a

require ment. I d. The Court explained that the rationale for a n identification re quirement – notice to a par ticular off icial who
may late r b e su e d –

wa s n ot o ne of

the pr ima

ry “ be ne fi ts o f e xha

us tio n, ” wh ic h s e e ks to p ro mot e the ability of the prison sy stem to respond to complaints, to reduc e litigation, and to improve the
rec ord whe n litigation nonethele ss commence s in the courts. I d. at 219. The Court c oncluded that “exhaustion is not per se inadequa te simply beca use an individual later

sued wa s not named in the g rieva

nces.” I d. B. New York DOCS’ Inm ate G rievance P rogram The Sec ond Circuit has y et to addre ss the question prese nted in J ones as a pplied to New York DO CS’ I nmate Gr ievanc e Prog ram; that is, whether New Y ork DOCS’ Inmate Gr ievanc e Prog ram re g ulations require a prisoner , in a g rieva nce, to name par

ticular off icials who ar eThis section of the I GP regulations on the regular g rieva nce pr ocedur e is now codifie d at 3 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Reg s., tit. 7, § 701.5 (2008). This section of the I GP regulations on harassment grieva nces is now c odified at N.Y
. 4 Comp. Codes R. & Reg s., tit. 7, § 701.8 (2008). 11 alleg edly responsible for

misconduct, in order

to later bringsuit ag ainst those officia ls in feder al
c ourt . T he qu e sti on

is p re se nte d h e re be c a

us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d n on -e xha

us tio n a s to tw e lve of the fo ur te e n d e fe nd ants ba se d e xclu siv e ly on Es pin a l’ s f

a ilure to s pe c if

ic a lly name those defe ndants in either of his gr ievanc es. We look first to the New Yor k DOCS’ Inmate Gr ievanc e Prog ram (“ I GP”) proc edure s. The re levant re g ulations in thi s case are those that wer e in place during1999 and 2000 whe n Espinal filed the g rieva

nces at issue. Those I GP regulations were repe aled a nd new r egulations
wer e adopte d in 2006. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Reg s., tit. 7, § 701.1 et seq. Howeve r, as noted by the State in its brief, there are only “minor diffe renc es” be tween the former and the
c ur re nt r e g ulatio ns . Henc e, althoug h we c onsider the r egulations in place during1999 and 2000 when Espinal f

iled his gr ievanc es, we note that our a naly sis is equally

applicable to the
r e g u l at i o n s i np l a c e t o d ay. The I GP has a re g ular thre e-tier ed proc ess for a djudicatinginmate complaints: (1) the prisoner f iles a g rieva

nce w ith the I nmate Gr ievanc e Resolution Comm ittee (“ I GRC”), (2) the prisoner ma

y appea l an adve rse de cision by the I GRC to the superintendent of the fac ility , and (3) the pr isoner then may appea l an adve rse de cision by the superintende nt to the Central Off icer Review Committee (“CORC”). N .Y. Comp. Codes R. & Reg s., tit. 7, § 701.7 (1999). The I GP 3 also has an “ expedited” proc ess for ha rassment g rieva

nces, id. § 701.11 (1999) , which per tains 4 to “[e]m ploy ee c onduct meant to annoy , intimi date, or harm a n inmate,” id. § 701.11(a ). See12

a lso He mph ill v. Ne w Y or k, 38 0 F .3 d 6 80 , 6 82 -8 3 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 4) . Aha

ra ssm e nt gri e va

nc e is sent direc tly

to the superintende nt. I d. § 701.11(b)( 2). I f the g rieva nce is a bona fide hara ssment issue, the superintende nt must i nitiate or re quest an investig ation, id. § 701.11(b)(3- 4), and rende r a de cision, id. § 701.11(b)(5) , afte r which the prisoner c ould then appea l to the CORC , id. § 701.11(b)( 7). Espinal’s g rieva nce w ith respec t to the Dece mber 17, 1999 incide nt was handle d throug h the expedited proce dure f or har assment g rieva

nces, where as the g rieva

nce c harg ing that Espinal was not allowe d to attend sche duled medica l appointments was addr essed through the regular thre e-tier ed proc edure
. Th e I GP r e g ula

tio ns pr ov ide that an inmate mus t su bmi t a c omp la int

on an Inmate Grieva nce Complaint For

m, or on plain pape r if the f orm is not readily

available . N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Reg s., tit. 7, § 701.7(a). The r egulations state that the “[c]ontent” of the g rieva nce should include the inmate’s na me, depa rtment identification number , housing unit, and pr og ram assig nment, id. § 701.7(a)( 1)(i), a nd space s for this information ar e included on the complaint fo rm . Th is p ro vis ion

fu rt he r s tate s th at “ the g ri e va nc e mus t c on ta in a

c on c ise , s pe c if

ic descr iption of the problem and the a ction reque sted and indicate what a ctions the g rieva nt has take n to re so lve the c omp la int .” I d. Th e c omp la int fo rm a lso pr ov ide s sp a c e s f

or the inm ate to include a “ [d] escr iption of [ p]roblem,” which is to be “a s brief a s possible,” and the “ [a] ction reque sted.” The Ne w York I GP regulations do not state that a prisoner ’s g rieva nce must name the responsible pa

rty . L ike the policy

in J ones, 549 U.S. at 218, the I GP regulations offer the g ener al g uidance that a g rieva

nce should “ contain a c oncise, spec ific desc ription of the problem,” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Reg s., tit. 7, § 701.7(a)(1) (i), and the complaint form does not instruct theIn the cur rent re g ulations, substantially simil ar la

ng uag e is included in the de finition of a 5 “dire ct par

ty .” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Re g s., tit. 7, § 701.2(i) (2008). 13 inmate to name the of

ficials alleg edly

responsible for

misconduct. The Supre me Court in J ones held that similarly

broad r egulatory

languag e in Michig an’s grieva nce pr ocedur es wa s insufficient to conve y

an identification requireme nt. 549 U.S. at 218. We find that New Yor k’s I GP also does not contain an e x press identification requireme nt. The scope of prope r exhaustion under the PL RA is determined by ref ere nce to the state g rieva

nce sy stem’s proce dural rule s. J ones, 549 U.S. at 218; Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88-90. B eca use Ne w York’ s I GP does not articulate an identific ation require ment, it is pl ain that a Ne w York state prisoner is not re quired to name re sponsible parties in a g rieva nce in or der to e x haust administrative re medies. The State a cknowledg es the Jones decision but does not meaning fully addre ss it. The State also has not pointed to any provision of the I GP regulations that constitutes an identification re quirement. It might have pointed us to the section of the N ew Yor k I GP regulations on harassment g rieva nces which states that “[t]he employ ee who alleg edly committed the misconduct shall be a direc t party

to [ the] grie vance .” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Re g s., tit. 7, § 701.11. A “dire ct par

ty ” is define d as “[a]n indivi dual so uniquely aff ecte d by the g rieva

nce 5 that fair pla

y dictates that he /she should be af forde d the opportunity

to provide input prior to any decision and a lso to appeal a ny dispositi on rende red.” I d. § 701.2(h). A dir ect pa rty , under the I GP regulations, is entitl ed to appe ar at hear ings, to pre sent information at he aring s, to rece ive notice of he aringdecisions, and to appe al adve rse de cisions. I d. §§ 701.7(a) (4)( i, iv, v), § 701.7(b), § 701.7( c), 701.11( b)(5)
. The “ direc t party” provision, howeve r, ca nnot be construe d as an ide ntificationBe cause we f ind that New Yor

k’s g rieva nce pr ocedur es do not contain a n identification 6 require ment, our holding essentially follows the J ones dec ision. W e ar e not pre sented with the question whether

a state’ s proce dural rule s could be so oner ous or imprac tical as to re nder administrative re medies unava ilable and PL RA exhaustion i napplicable . See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a ) (a

n inmate is only

require d to exhaust “such administrative re medies as a re a vailable” ); cf. H emphill, 380 F.3d at 686 (r ecognizi ngthat “the be havior of the defe ndants may rende r administrative re medies unava ilable,” a nd “the PL RA’s exhaustion requirement is inapplica ble” under those c ircumstance s). We note that this question would arise if the State we re to a dopt an identification re quirement without makingsome allowanc e for non-complianc e in circ umstances wh e n th e inm ate is una

ble to i de nti fy

the re sp on sib le pa

rt ie s. 14 require ment. Nowher e in the re g ulations does it say that the prisoner

must name ea ch dire ct pa rt y in t he ir g ri e va nc e . T o b e sure , th e State mus t be awa re of the ide nti ty

of a dir e c t pa rt y to inform the employ ee that a claim has be en made , that the employ ee is e ntitled to present information at a he aring , and that the e mploy ee ma y appea l adver se dec isions. But the
re gu l at i o n s d o n o tcl ea rl y i n d i ca t e t h atth e o nu s o f i d en t i fi ca t i o nl i es wi thth e p ri s o n er m ak i n g a g rieva nce. It is plausible that an identification re quirement is abse nt from the re g ulations beca use there are case s when a n inmate is unable to name responsible pa rties. Moreove r, as long
a s th e pr iso ne r p ro vid e s e no ug h in fo rm atio n a bo ut t he a lle g e d mi sc on du c t, whic h is a
re qu ir e me nt a lr e a dy

inc lud e d in

the I GP r e g ulatio ns , id . § 70 1. 7( a )( 1) (i ), the State wi ll n or ma lly be able to identify

any direc t party

to a g rieva

nce on its own through investigation. The pro se prisoner c annot be e x pecte d to infer the e x istence of an identification require ment in the absenc e of a proce dural rule stating tha t the g rieva

nce must include the names of the re sp on sib le pa

rt ie s. Whe re Ne w Y or

k’ s g ri e va nc e pr oc e dure s d o n ot r e qu ir e pr iso ne rs to identify the individuals responsible for a lleg ed misconduct, ne ither does the PL RA for exhaustion purposes. See J ones, 549 U.S. at 218. 6 C. Espi nal’s Grie vances15

Given the f

oreg oing a

naly sis of New Y ork’s g rieva nce pr ocedur es, Espinal wa s not
re qu ir e d to sp e c if

ic a lly ide nti fy the re sp on sib le pa

rt ie s in his g ri e va

nc e in o rd e r t o late r n ame them as def

endants in this lawsuit. Espinal only had to provide a

specific descr iption of the problem. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Reg s., tit. 7, § 701.7(a)(1) (i). We find that Espinal has complied with this requireme nt and exhausted his claims ag ainst the defe ndants. Espinal’s first g rieva

nce, in a ddition to allegingthe involvement of Surber , Fr asher , and “countless other

secur ity office rs” in the be ating , included the spe cific date, time, and location of the inc ide nt a

bo ut whic h h e c omp la ine d, and that he wa s b e ate n f

or re ta liator y re a so ns . Th e se alleg ations provided enough information to “‘a lert the prison to the nature of the wrongfor whic h redr ess [was] sought,’” Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F .3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)) (a lteration omitted), and to “a ffor d[] . . . time and op po rt un ity [fo r t he State ] to a dd

re ss [the ] co mpl a int [] inte rn a lly ,” id. (q uo tin gPor

te r, 53 4 U .S. at 524-25). T his is appare nt from the prison off icials’ initiation of an investig ation of Espinal’s complaint. The investig ator c laims to have conduc ted interview s with “all offic ers involved,” but does not specify

the names of

office rs other tha

n Surber a

nd Fr asher
. Whether this means that no other off

icer s were involved or that the investig ator omitted other of fice rs from the r eport is unknown. The point is that prison officials had the nece ssary information to investigate the complaints and the opportunity to learn which offic ers we re involved in the a lleg ed incident. Espinal’s g rieva

nce w as suffic ient to advanc e the “ benef its of exhausti on.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 219. We f

ind that E sp ina l e xha

us te d h is e xce ssi ve fo rc e and re ta liatio n c la ims a s to a ll de fe nd ants a lle g e dly

inv olv e d in

the De c e mbe r 1 7, 19 99 inc ide nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt se pa rate ly16

fo un d th at E sp ina l f

a ile d to e xha

us t a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s a s to his c on sp ir a c y c la ims be c a

us e he ne ve r a sse rt e d in

his g ri e va

nc e the e xiste nc e of

a c on sp ir a c y

to a ssa ult him
. We do not read the re quirement in the I GP that the g rieva nce de scribe the problem to imply that the prisoner must “articulate leg al theorie s.” See Johnson, 380 F.3d at 697 (quotingStrong, 297 F .3d at 650). Es pin a l di d n ot h ave to a sse rt the e xiste nc e of

a c on sp ir a c y

to e xha us t hi s c on sp ir a c y

c la im; it i s
su ff ic ie nt t hat hi s g ri e va

nc e a de qu ate ly

de sc ri be d th e a lle g e d mi sc on du c t. The State a

rgues that Espinal did not exhaust his claims ag ainst the defe ndants who
a lle g e dly de nie d me dic a l c are on

De c e mbe r 1 7, 19 99 . Wh ile Es pin a l’ s g ri e va nc e wi th r e sp e c t to the Dec ember

17, 1999 incident does not explicitl y discuss the misconduct by medical pe rsonnel which is alleg ed in the complaint, it is clear that the State consider ed these alleg ations when
re vie wi ngEs pin a l’ s g ri e va nc e . Su pe ri nte nd e nt Art

uz d e nie d th e g ri e va

nc e , in pa rt , b e c a us e Espinal “wa s not refuse d medical attention, [ but] rathe r [hims elf], . . . refuse d medical assistance .” Espinal thus ex hausted his claims with respe ct to the alleg ed denia l of medica l treatment on Dece mber 17, 1999. Es pin a l’ s se c on d g ri e va

nc e a lso e xha

us te d h is c la ims that he wa s d e nie d me dic a l c are in violation of the Eig hth Amendment’s prohibition on crue l and unusual punishment. The g rieva nce a lleg ed that Gr een H aven’ s Medical De partment, its medical pe rsonnel, and pr ison of fi c ia ls r e fu se d to a llo w E sp ina l to atte nd his sc he du le d me dic a l a

pp ointme nts . T his wa s a
su ff ic ie nt d e sc ri pti on

of the a lle g e d wro ng . T he State ’s a sse rt ion that th e g ri e va

nc e “ fa ile d to provide prison off

icials with sufficient notice of wrong doing to c ause the m to investigate any such cla im” cannot be square d with the conclusion of the inve stigator’s re port. The investig ator found that medica l personnel ha d seen Espina l thirty -one times since October 1999 and theWe h ave de sc ri be d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of a F ir st A me ndme nt r e ta liatio n c la im 7 differ ently

dependingon the fa ctual conte x t. Compare Gill, 389 F.3d at 381 (requir ing, in the prison context, that the prisoner re sponded to reta liatory conduct by

defe ndants “that would de ter a sim ila rl y sit uate d in div idu a l of

or din ary fi rmne ss f

ro m e xer c isi ng. . . c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts ” (quotation marks omitted)) w ith Curley v. Villag e of Suff

ern, 268 F .3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (re quiring that a private citizen, who alleg ed he w as ar rested by public officia ls in retaliation for his un su c c e ssf

ul c ampa ig n to un se at th e Vi lla g e ’s may or , s ho w that he wa s “ a c tua lly c hil le d” in exercisinghis rights (quotation marks omitted)). See a lso W illiams v. Town of Gree nburg h, 535 F .3 d 7 1, 76 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ). Es pin a l a lle g e s r e ta liatio n in the pr iso n c on te xt. T he dis tr ic t c ourt , in its decision below, stated that “ [o] nly reta liatory

conduct that would de ter a simil arly situated individual of ordinary

firmness fr om exercising his or he r constitutional rig hts constitutes an adver se ac tion for a c laim of reta liation.” See Da wes, 239 F .3d at 493. We there fore find that the “or dinary

firmness” r equire ment applies her e. 17 s u p er i n t en d en td en i edth e gr i ev an ce b as edo nth i s fi n d i n g. Th is gri e va nc e e na ble d th e State to investigate Espinal’s cla im that he was de nied ac cess to medica l car e. Espinal has thus exhausted his Eighth Amendme nt claims. On re mand, the district cour t should consider whe ther Espinal’s c laims ag ainst the defe ndants prese nt triable issues of fa ct. I I . E s p i n a l ’s Re ta l i a ti o n Cl a i ms To prove a

First Amendme nt retaliation cla im under Section 1983, a prisoner must show that “ (1 ) t hat th e sp e e c h o r c on du c t at is su e wa s p ro te c te d, (2 ) t hat th e de fe nd ant t oo k a dv e rs e action ag ainst the plaintiff, and ( 3) that there was a causa l connec tion between the protec ted speec h and the a dverse action.” G ill v. P idly pchak, 389 F .3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Dawe s v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 ( 2d Cir. 2001), overr uled on other grounds, Swierkiew icz v. Sor e ma N. A. , 5 34 U. S. 5 06 (2 00 2) ). Th e re is n o d isp ute that E sp ina l’ s e arl ie r f e de ra l la ws uit , 7 filed in J une 1998 and dismissed in J une 1999, wa s a protec ted ac tivity . See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 ( 2d Cir. 1995) (holdingthat prison officia ls are pr ohibited from re taliating ag ainst prisoners who e x erc ise the rig ht to petition for redre ss of g rieva nces) . Whil e the districtThe State a rgues in its petition for rehe aringthat the jury verdic t rejec ting Espinal’ s 8 excessive forc e cla im forec loses a nec essar y element of

his First Amendment re taliation claim. We take no position on this questi on, leavingit to the dist rict cour t to decide in the f

irst instance on rema nd. 18 court a ppear s to have a ssumed that the alleg ed beating wa s an adve rse a ction for pur poses of
ana ly zingthe e xiste nc e of

a c a us a l c onne c tio n, we have no tr ou ble fi nd ingon

the re c or d in

thi s
c a se that th e re is a

tr ia ble iss ue of

fa c t a s to wh e the r a

se ve re be atin gby

of fi c e rs ov e r t

he c ours e of thirty minutes would deter a

person of “ordina ry firmness” f

rom exercisinghis rights. See Gill, 389 F.3d at 384. The rema ining que stion is whether the off icer s’ ac tion was ca

usally related to E sp ina l’ s f

ili ngof the e arl ie r l aws uit
. 8 A plaintiff ca

n establish a ca

usal conne ction that sug g ests reta liation by showing that protec ted ac tivity

was c lose in time to the adverse action. See Clar k County Sch. Dist. v. Br eede n, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001); a ccor d Gorman- Ba kos v. Cornell Coop. Ex tension, 252 F.3d 545, 554 ( 2d Cir. 2001). The district cour t found that Espinal failed to show a causa l
connec tion between the protec ted ac tivity of filinga lawsuit and a

ny adver se ac tion by

the of fi c e rs duri ngthe De c e mbe r 1 7, 19 99 inc ide nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt str e sse d th e le ng th o f t ime betwee n the filing of the law suit, the termination of the lawsuit, and the inc ident (a year and a half a fter f

iling the law suit and six months after dismissal). The district c ourt conc luded that the time period wa s “too leng thy and the tempor al re lationship too attenuated to establish a c ausal
connec tion” betwee n the offic ers’ action and E spinal’s protec ted ac tivity , and that ther e wa s no evidenc e F rashe r wa s even a war e of Espina l’s prior lawsuit. We have “ not drawn a

brig ht line to define the oute r limits bey ond which a te mporal relationship i s too attenuated to e stablish a causa l relationship betwee n the exercise of a fe dera l19

c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht a

nd an a lle g e dly

re ta liator y a c tio n. ” Go rm an- B ako s, 25 2 F .3 d at 55 4. Th is has allowe d our Court to exercise its judgme nt about the per missibl e infe renc es that ca n be drawn from tempora l prox imity in the context of particular case s. Compare Hollande r v. Americ an Cy anamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85- 86 (2d Cir. 1990) (f inding a lack of evidenc e that an adver se ac tion, taken three months after the plaintiff’s EEOC c omplaint, was in response to the plaintiff’s prote cted a ctivity) with Gra nt v. Be thlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 45- 46 (2d Cir. 1980) (f inding that the la

pse of e ight months betwe en an E EOC complaint and re taliatory act indicated a

causa l connec tion). Her e, we find that the passa g e of only six months between the dismiss al of Espinal’s laws uit and an a lle g e dly

re ta liator y be atin gby

of fi c e rs , o ne of

wh om ( Sur

be r) wa s a

de fe nd ant i n the prior law suit, is s ufficie nt to support an infere nce of a ca usal conne ction. See GormanBa kos, 252 F.3d at 555 (sug g esting the lapse of five months betwee n protec ted ac tivity and
re ta liatio n ma

y sh owa c a us a l c onne c tio n) . It is pla us ibl e that th e of

fi c e rs wa ite d to e xac t th e ir reta liation at an opportune time – a s when Espinal wa s involved in a fig ht with another inmate – in order to have a r eady

explanation for any

injuries suffe red by

Espinal. Moreove r, we cannot conclude that there is no evidence that Fr asher was a war e of Espina l’s prior lawsuit. View ing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to Espinal, as we must, it is a leg itimate infere nce that Fr asher , as a me mber of G ree n Have n’s emer g ency response team with Surber on D ece mber 17, 1999, lear ned of the prior lawsuit fr om Surber, who wa s a def endant in the e arlier

lawsuit, or from other

office rs awa

re of the lawsuit, and took ac tion in response to Espinal’s protec ted activity
. We reve rse the district c ourt’s dismissal of Espinal’s reta liation claims ag ainst Surber a nd20

Fr asher . The district cour t should consider on re mand whethe r Espinal also ra ises triable issues of fa ct with respe ct to other off icer s, if any , that wer e involved in the De cembe r 17, 1999 incident. Espinal also alleg ed in his complaint that medical pe rsonnel re fused him medica l treatment on Dece mber 17, 1999 in re taliation for his previous law suit ag ainst Surber a nd other office rs. The district c ourt did not consider whe ther the e vidence supported a c laim that the
a c tio ns of me dic a l pe rs onne l w e re in r e ta liatio n f or Es pin a l’ s f

ili ngof a laws uit . We le ave it t o the district court to addr ess this question in the first instance. C. Espin al’s Motion for a New Trial We reviewthe denial of

a motion for a ne w trial for abuse of discretion. Kosmy

nka v. Pol ari s Ind

us tr ie s, Inc ., 46 2 F .3 d 7 4, 82 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ). Es pin a l r a ise d th e fo llo wi ngargume nts in support of his motion: (1) he was we aringprison attire at trial which ca used him prejudice ; (2) his request to have his sist er te stify as a r ebuttal witness was imprope rly denied; (3) the district court should have g iven a c urative instruc tion to the jury when de fense counsel a sked Espinal on
cross-e x amination whether he had be en convic ted of murde r and r obbery ; and (4) the jury verdic t
was a g ainst the weig ht of the evide nce. T he district cour t rejec ted those ar g uments. We find no
err or in the district court’ s denial of Espinal’ s motion. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

re a so na bly de te rm ine d th at E sp ina l’ s c lot hin gdid no t c a us e him prejudice beca

use he w as we aringjeans a nd a swe atshirt which “looke d like civilian clothing.” It is highly unlikely that Espinal’s clothinghad an inf luence on the jury

verdic t. See Tesse r v. B d. of Educ. of

City Sch. Dist. of City

of Ne w York, 370 F .3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2004) (statingthat the g rant of a

new tria l depends on “ the likelihood that [ an] error aff ecte d the outcome of

the
case ” (quotation marks omitted)).21

The district cour

t acted w ithin it s discretion in prec luding the r ebuttal testimony of Espinal’s sister. Espinal soug ht to introduce his sister’s testimony to rebut def

endants’ te stimony reg ardingthe extent of Espinal’s injuries. I t was nec essar y , howeve r, for

Espinal to offer
e vid e nc e of

the e xtent of

his inj ur ie s in

his c a se in c hie f i n o rd e r t o s ho w that he wa s su bje c te d to a beating at the hands of the of fice rs. Espinal did so by

offe ringhis medical re cords whic h wer e
a lso re a d into e vid e nc e by de fe ns e wi tne sse s. The district cour t rea sonably

found that evide nce of Espinal’s injuries wa s alrea dy place d befor e the jury

and that the sister’ s testimony lacke d impeachme nt value. Cf. Pitasi v. St ratton Corp., 968 F .2d 1558, 1561-62 (2d Cir. 1992) ( finding exclusion of testim ony

err oneous whe n it was unnec essar y duringthe plaintiff’s c ase in c hief but materia l to the impeachment of defe nse witnesses)
. The district cour

t also acte d within his di scre tion in determining that defe nse counse l’s question to Espinal during c ross-examination, asking whether he wa s convicted of

murder a nd robber y , did not warra

nt a cur ative instruction or a new tria l. Espinal’s counsel a sked prospec tive jurors duringvoir dire a bout their thoug hts reg ardingEspinal’s murder conviction, and identified Espina l’s murder c onviction in his opening stateme nt to the jury . Def ense c ounsel
was a lso permitted to expl ore Espina l’s murder c onviction on cross-e x amination. The district court a ccur ately

char acte rized the ref

ere nce to a

robber y conviction as c ompara

bly “minor.” Also, the jury

was instructe d that questions are not evidence and Espinal neve r answe red the question. The re fer ence to the robber y did not create “undue prejudice or passion” a s to warr ant
a new trial. Matthews v. CTI

Container Tra

nsp. Int'l, Inc., 871 F .2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1989). Espinal’s claim that the jury verdic t was ag ainst the weig ht of the evide nce is not revie wable on a

ppeal. Stonewa ll I ns. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mg mt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 119922

(2d Cir. 1995), modified on other g rounds, 85 F.3d 49 ( 2d Cir. 1996). IV. Espi nal’s Request for a Tem porary Re straining Order Es pin a l r e qu e sts a

te mpo ra ry re str a ini ng

or de r a nd a tr ans fe r o f c us tod

y fo r t he fi rs t ti me on this appeal. We g ener ally will not consider ar g uments raised f or the fir st tim e on appe al. Un ive rs a l Chur c h v . G e ltze r, 46 3 F .3 d 2 18 , 2 28 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ). Es pin a l ma y re ne w this re qu e st
on rema nd. CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Espinal’s 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 c la ims on

the ba sis of

fa ilure to e xha

us t a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s; w e REV ERS E the district court’s dismissal of the re taliation claims ag ainst Surber a nd Fr asher ; we AF FI RM the district court’s de nial of the motion for a new tria l on the excessive forc e cla ims ag ainst Surber and F rashe r; we D ENY Espinal’s r equest for a tempora

ry restra ining or der; a

nd we REMAND for pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.