U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

79–010 

" ! SENATE 115TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REPORT

2017

115–196 

Calendar No. 286 

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 

COORDINATION ACT 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 1869 

TO REAUTHORIZE AND RENAME THE POSITION OF 

WHISTLEBLOWER OMBUDSMAN TO BE THE WHISTLEBLOWER 

PROTECTION COORDINATOR 

DECEMBER 14, 2017.—Ordered to be printed 


E:\Seals\Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

JON TESTER, Montana 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire 

KAMALA D. HARRIS, California 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

GABRIELLE D’ADAMO SINGER, Chief Counsel 

CATHARINE A. BAILEY, Director of Governmental Affairs 

COURTNEY J. ALLEN Counsel 

MARGARET E. DAUM, Minority Staff Director 

STACIA M. CARDILLE, Minority Chief Counsel 

CHARLES A. MOSKOWITZ, Minority Senior Legislative Counsel 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

Calendar No. 286 

115TH CONGRESS SENATE REPORT " ! 1st Session 115–196 

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION COORDINATION ACT 

DECEMBER 14, 2017.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. JOHNSON, from the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 1869] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

to which was referred the bill (S. 1869) to reauthorize and rename 

the position of Whistleblower Ombudsman to be the Whistleblower 

Protection Coordinator, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill, as 

amended, do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Purpose and Summary .................................................................................. 1 

II. Background and Need for the Legislation ................................................... 2 

III. Legislative History ......................................................................................... 4 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis .......................................................................... 4 

V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact .................................................................. 5 

VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................ 5 

VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ........................... 6 

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

The purpose of S. 1869, the Whistleblower Protection Coordination Act, is to permanently reauthorize and change the name of the 

whistleblower protection program established by the Whistleblower 

Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA) from the Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman (Ombudsman) to the Whistleblower 

Protection Coordinator (Coordinator). The bill expands the role of 

the Coordinator to assist agency Inspectors General (OIG) with 

2 

1Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 112–199, 1117, 126 Stat. 1465, 1475 

(2012). 2 Id. 3S. Rep. 112–155, at 32 (2012). 

4Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, supra note 1. 5S. Rep. 112–155, at 32 (2012). 

6Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, supra note 1. 7Five Years Later: A Review of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act: Hearing Before 

the H. Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 115th 

Cong. (2017) [hereinafter House Hearing]. 8 Id (statement of Robert Storch, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available 

at https://oig.justice.gov/testimony/t170201a.pdf. 

handling and examining whistleblower disclosures and communications and coordination between the agency OIG and other offices 

investigating whistleblower disclosures and whistleblower retaliation. 

II. BACKGROUND AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION

In 2012, Congress created the Ombudsman in the WPEA.1 This 

law required each agency OIG to ‘‘appoint a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman who shall educate employees about prohibitions 

on retaliation for protected disclosures and who have made or are 

contemplating making a protected disclosure about the rights and 

remedies against retaliation for protected disclosures.’’ 2 Congress 

created the Ombudsman ‘‘to ensure that employees are aware of 

their rights under the [Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA)] and 

avenues for redress.’’ 3 The authority for the Ombudsman expired 

on November 27, 2017.4

The role of the Ombudsman at each agency OIG was to: 

provide the agency and the employees with an intermediary to ensure that supervisors and leaders within the 

agency, as well as employees, are aware of prohibited retaliatory actions and employee rights under the WPA. In 

this intermediary role, the ombudsman could also help 

provide recommendations for resolving problems between 

an individual and the employer before any prohibited personnel practices are taken in violation of the WPA.5

Congress expressly prohibited the Ombudsman from acting as ‘‘a 

legal representative, agent, or advocate for an employee.’’ 6

Government officials and whistleblower advocates recognize the 

Ombudsman as an important tool in whistleblower protection at 

Federal agencies and recommend its permanent reauthorization.7

According to the Department of Justice (DOJ) OIG Ombudsman: 

Ensuring that whistleblowers are comfortable, informed, 

and protected in coming forward is, therefore, entirely consistent with the OIG’s core mission of detecting and deterring waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption, and the OIG 

Whistleblower Ombudspersons have played an important 

role in ensuring that they have the information necessary 

to enable this to occur.8

Furthermore, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) found the 

Ombudsman ‘‘has led to more collaboration and information sharing among the various Inspectors General and with OSC. Increased 

cooperation allows our related offices to share best practices for investigation techniques and training, and to identify and resolve 

3 

9 Id (statement of Eric Bachman, Deputy Special Counsel, U.S. Off. of Special Counsel), available at https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Bachman-OSC-Statement-Whistleblower-2-1.pdf 10 Id (statement of Tom Devine, Government Accountability Project), available at https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Devine-GAP-Statement-Whistleblower-2-1.pdf. 11 House Hearing, supra note 8. 12Ombudsman Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 

dictionary/ombudsman (last visited Oct. 19, 2017). 13 House Hearing, supra note 8. 14 Id. 15 Id. 

issues quickly and effectively.’’ 9 The Government Accountability 

Project considers the Ombudsman to be ‘‘an unqualified success.’’ 10

While the Ombudsman is fulfilling its intent of educating and assisting Federal employees on whistleblower protections, areas of 

improvement have been identified in the five years since its establishment. First, the DOJ OIG Ombudsman expressed concern that: 

[T]he work we do under the WPEA generally does not 

include much of what is often done by traditional ombudsmen, and indeed, some such things might be seen as inconsistent with our independent role and consideration of 

complaints as OIGs. Given the current title, there have 

been some concerns expressed that some employees may 

be confused and expect us to perform such functions, even 

though the WPEA specifically provides that the ombudsman shall not act as a legal representative, agent, or advocate.11

The word ‘‘ombudsman’’ is defined as ‘‘a government official appointed to receive and investigate complaints made by individual 

against abuses or capricious acts of public officials’’ or ‘‘one that investigates, reports on, and helps settle complaints.’’ 12 However, the 

role of the Ombudsman, as envisioned by the WPEA, is more educational than investigatory, so the name of the position may be 

misleading to whistleblowers. It is possible for Federal employees 

to have difficulty understanding the role of the Ombudsman due to 

the title of the position. 

According to the DOJ OIG Ombudsman, there have been growing 

numbers of whistleblower retaliation cases in OIG offices.13 The 

DOJ OIG Ombudsman explained that whistleblower retaliation investigations, as well as whistleblower protection educational activities and outreach, ‘‘are resource intensive, and our ability to fulfill 

these responsibilities and do so in a timely fashion is significantly 

impacted by the limitations on our available staffing and resources.’’ 14 He also predicted that whistleblower retaliation investigations increase ‘‘as [whistleblower] protections are expanded and 

made permanent, and as there is additional information disseminated by OIGs and others about whistleblower rights and protections.’’ 15 As investigations increase and OIG resources are 

stretched thin, it is even more important to ensure that whistleblowers have access to a dedicated coordinator who can explain 

their rights and help them understand the process for redress of 

their grievances. 

The Whistleblower Protection Coordination Act will make permanent this important role for whistleblower protection in agencies 

across the Federal government and address issues identified during 

the initial implementation of the Ombudsman role. The bill will 

4 

change the name of the Ombudsman to Coordinator in order to reduce confusion about the Coordinator’s authorities and responsibilities. The bill will also require the Coordinator to assist the agency 

OIG to timely and efficiently investigate whistleblower disclosures 

and whistleblower retaliation claims. The Coordinator will also be 

responsible for liaising between agency OIGs, OSC, Congress, or 

any other Federal entity that is investigating a whistleblower disclosure or retaliation claim in order to ensure the most efficient use 

of staff and resources. The bill also requires the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) to develop best 

practices for the Coordinator to follow in carrying out these responsibilities. 

The Committee notes that this bill seeks information on whether 

a settlement exists. It does not seek to publish any personal information or anything that would identify individuals involved in the 

matter or breach a confidentiality agreement. 

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

S. 1869, the Whistleblower Protection Coordination Act, was introduced on September 27, 2017, by Senator Charles Grassley, 

Ranking Member Claire McCaskill, Chairman Ron Johnson and 

Senator Ron Wyden. The bill was referred to the Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The Committee considered S. 1869 at a business meeting on October 4, 2017. 

The Committee ordered the bill reported favorably by voice vote 

en bloc with Senators Johnson, Lankford, Daines, McCaskill, 

Tester, Heitkamp, Hassan, and Harris present. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE BILL, AS REPORTED

Section 1. Short title 

This section establishes the short title of the bill as the ‘‘Whistleblower Protection Coordination Act of 2017.’’ 

Section 2. Reauthorization 

This section reauthorizes, renames, and adds additional responsibilities for the whistleblower protection program under the Inspector General Act of 1978. 

Subsection (a) renames the Ombudsman to the Coordinator and 

requires the Coordinator to have direct access to the agency OIG. 

This subsection charges the Coordinator with informing employees 

of their available options to file a whistleblower retaliation complaint and of any available alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and potential relief. The Coordinator is also required to assist the agency OIG to timely and appropriately investigate whistleblower disclosures and retaliation complaints. This subsection 

also requires the Coordinator to assist the agency OIG in communicating and coordinating with the OSC, CIGIE, the agency, Congress, and any other relevant entity to timely and appropriately investigate whistleblower disclosures and retaliation complaints. 

Subsection (b) requires CIGIE to assist the Coordinator and to 

develop best practices for coordinating and communicating between 

agencies to timely and efficiently handle and investigate whistleblower disclosures, allegations of whistleblower retaliation, and 

5 

other matters in the implementation and administration of whistleblower protection laws. 

Subsection (c) adds requirements to the semiannual reports submitted by agency OIGs. This subsection requires these reports to 

include a detailed description of instances of whistleblower retaliation, any consequences imposed on the official determined to have 

committed the retaliation, and any settlement agreements the 

agency entered into with the official determined to have committed 

the retaliation. 

Subsection (d) is a technical change from ‘‘Ombudsman’’ to ‘‘Coordinator’’ in a different federal law that requires training on the 

handling of whistleblower complaints. 

Subsection (e) permanently reauthorizes the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator. 

V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has considered 

the regulatory impact of this bill and determined that the bill will 

have no regulatory impact within the meaning of the rules. The 

Committee agrees with the Congressional Budget Office’s statement that the bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

(UMRA) and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

VI. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

DECEMBER 5, 2017. 

Hon. RON JOHNSON, 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1869, the Whistleblower 

Protection Coordination Act. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew Pickford. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL. 

Enclosure. 

S. 1869—Whistleblower Protection Coordination Act 

S. 1869 would permanently extend the authority of all Inspector 

General (IG) offices to hire whistleblower protection ombudsmen. 

The specific authority to hire such employees has expired. Each of 

the 72 IG offices of the federal government currently have such an 

ombudsman. The bill also would create additional responsibilities 

for the ombudsmen and require additional reporting by IGs, agencies, and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). 

Information from CIGIE and some IGs indicates that most of the 

additional responsibilities and reporting requirements in the bill 

would not impose a significant administrative burden. In addition, 

CBO expects that much of the work of the ombudsmen (whose job 

title would change to whistleblower protection coordinator under 

6 

the bill) would be continued under current law. Therefore, CBO estimates that implementing S. 1869 would cost less than $500,000 

annually; such spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. 

Enacting S. 1869 could affect direct spending by agencies that 

are not funded through annual appropriations; therefore, pay-asyou-go procedures apply. CBO estimates, however, that any net increase in spending by those agencies would be negligible. Enacting 

the bill would not affect revenues. 

CBO estimates that enacting S. 1869 would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 

10-year periods beginning in 2028. 

S. 1869 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Matthew Pickford. The 

estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as 

reported, are shown as follows: (existing law proposed to be omitted 

is enclosed in brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and existing 

law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

UNITED STATES CODE 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE 5—GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 

AND EMPLOYEES 

* * * * * * * 

APPENDIX 

* * * * * * * 

INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 3. APPOINTMENT OF INSPECTOR GENERAL; SUPERVISION; REMOVAL; POLITICAL ACTIVITIES; APPOINTMENT OF ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING AND ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INVESTIGATIONS. 

(a) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(d) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(A) * * * 

(B) * * * 

7 

(C) designate a Whistleblower Protection øOmbudsman 

who shall educate agency employees—¿ Coordinator who 

shall— 

(i) educate agency employees— 

øi¿ (I) about prohibitions øon retaliation¿ 

against retaliation for protected disclosures; and 

øii¿ (II) who have made or are contemplating 

making a protected disclosure about the rights 

and remedies against retaliation for protected 

disclosuresø.¿; including— 

(aa) the means by which employees may seek 

review of any allegation of reprisal, including 

the roles of the Office of Inspector General, the 

Office of Special Counsel, the Merit Systems 

Protection Board, and any other relevant entities; and 

(bb) general information about the timeliness of such cases, the availability of any alternative dispute mechanisms, and avenues for 

potential relief. 

(ii) assist the Inspector General in promoting the 

timely and appropriate handling and consideration of 

protected disclosures and allegations of reprisal, to the 

extent practicable, by the Inspector General; and 

(iii) assist the Inspector General in facilitating communication and coordination with the Special Counsel, 

the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 

Efficiency, the agency, Congress, and any other relevant entity regarding the timely and appropriate handling and consideration of protected disclosures, allegations of reprisal, and general matters regarding the 

implementation and administration of whistleblower 

protection laws, rules, and regulations. 

(2) The Whistleblower Protection øOmbudsman¿ Coordinator 

shall not act as a legal representative, agent, or advocate of the 

employee or former employee. 

(3) The Whistleblower Protection Coordinator shall have direct access to the Inspector General as needed to accomplish the 

requirements of this subsection. 

ø(3)¿ (4) For the purposes of this section, the requirement of 

the designation of a Whistleblower Protection øOmbudsman¿ 

Coordinator under paragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to— 

(A) any agency that is an element of the intelligence 

community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) ø50 U.S.C. 3003(4)¿; 

or 

(B) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof the principal functions of which is the 

conduct of foreign intelligence or counter intelligence activities. 

* * * * * * * 

8 

SEC. 5. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS; TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS; AVAILABILITY TO PUBLIC; IMMEDIATE REPORT ON SERIOUS OR 

FLAGRANT PROBLEMS; DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATIONAL 

DEFINITIONS. 

(a) * * * 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(20)(A) a detailed description of any instance of whistleblower retaliation, including information about the official 

found to have engaged in retaliation; and 

(B) what, if any consequences the establishment actually imposed to hold that official described in subparagraph (A) accountable; 

* * * * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(2) * * * 

(3) * * * 

(A) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(D) for which no final action has been taken by the end 

of the reporting period; øand¿ 

(4) whether the establishment entered into a settlement agreement with the official described in subsection (a)(20)(A), which 

shall be reported regardless of any confidentiality agreement relating to the settlement agreement; and 

ø4¿ (5) a statement with respect to audit reports on which 

management decisions have been made but final action has not 

been taken, other than audit reports on which a management 

decision was made within the preceding year, containing— 

(A) a list of such audit reports and the date each such 

report was issued; 

(B) the dollar value of disallowed costs for each report; 

(C) the dollar value of recommendations that funds be 

put to better use agreed to by management for each report; 

and 

(D) an explanation of the reasons final action has not 

been taken with respect to such audit report. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 11. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY. 

(a) * * * 

(b) * * * 

(c) * * * 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(5) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION.—The Council shall— 

(A) facilitate the work of the Whistleblower Protection Coordinators designated under section 3(d)(C); and 

(B) in consultation with the Office of Special Counsel and 

Whistleblower Protection Coordinators from the member offices of the Inspector General, develop best practices for coVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:21 Dec 16, 2017 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6603 E:\HR\OC\SR196.XXX SR196
9 

ordination and communication in promoting the timely and 

appropriate handling and consideration of protected disclosures, allegations of reprisal, and general matters regarding the implementation and administration of whistleblower protection laws, in accordance with Federal law. 

* * * * * * * 

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 

ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2012 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 117. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION OMBUDSMAN. 

(a) * * * 

(b) * * * 

ø(c) SUNSET.— 

ø(1) IN GENERAL.—The amendments made by this section 

shall cease to have effect on the date that is 5 years after the 

date of enactment of this Act. 

ø(2) RETURN TO PRIOR AUTHORITY.—Upon the date described 

in paragraph (1), section 3(d) and section 8D(j) of the Inspector 

General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) shall read as such sections 

read on the day before the date of enactment of this Act.¿ 

Æ