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TERRORISM IN NORTH AFRICA: AN EXAMINATION 

OF THE THREAT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 29, 2017 

Serial No. 115–11 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

KATHLEEN CROOKS FLYNN, Deputy General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

MANDY BOWERS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

NICOLE TISDALE, Minority Staff Director/Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

WITNESSES

Mr. J. Peter Pham, Vice President for Research and Regional Initiatives, 

Director for The Africa Center, Atlantic Council: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Geoff D. Porter, President, North Africa Risk Consulting, Inc.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17 

Mr. Laith Alkhouri, Co-Founder and Director, Flashpoint: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 25 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 27 

Mr. Frederic Wehrey, Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 37 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 39 

APPENDIX

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for J. Peter Pham ...... 55 

Questions From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for J. Peter Pham ............ 56 

Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for J. Peter Pham ................... 56 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Geoff D. Porter .... 58 

Question From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for Geoff D. Porter ............ 58 

Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for Geoff D. Porter ................. 58 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Laith Alkhouri ..... 59 

Questions From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for Laith Alkhouri ........... 60 

Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for Laith Alkhouri .................. 61 

Question From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Frederic Wehrey .... 62 

Question From Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice for Frederic Wehrey .......... 63 

Questions From Representative Mike Gallagher for Frederic Wehrey ............... 63 

(1) 

TERRORISM IN NORTH AFRICA: AN 

EXAMINATION OF THE THREAT 

Wednesday, March 29, 2017 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Peter T. King (Chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Hurd, Gallagher, Rice, and 

Keating. 

Mr. KING. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security, 

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to 

order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from 

four experts on counterterrorism and terror groups in North Africa. 

I want to welcome Ranking Member Rice and any other Member 

of the subcommittee that appears this morning. I understand that 

several will be showing up. I express my appreciation to the witnesses who have all traveled to be here today. I recognize myself 

for an opening statement. 

During today’s hearing, we will focus on terror groups operating 

in and across North Africa, their intent to attack the United 

States, and their capability to do so. While Iraq and Syria are the 

current epicenter of the Islamist extremist movement, that certainly has not always been the case, nor will it be in the future. 

The threats posed by ISIS and al-Qaeda are dynamic and are expected to increase as ISIS loses ground in Iraq and Syria, and alQaeda seeks to reclaim its status as the leader of the global jihadi 

movement. In this context, North Africa, which sits on the edge of 

Europe, has emerged as an important theater in the war on terror. 

Al-Qaida and ISIS elements are increasingly active and competitive, and have both expanded their reach deep into the continent. 

Earlier this month, al-Qaeda factions in the Sahel reconciled their 

internal disputes and formed a single movement called the ‘‘Group 

for the Support of Islam and Muslims,’’ pledging their loyalty to 

AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel. 

Additionally, the emergence of ISIS in the Greater Sahara, which 

was informally recognized by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 

2016, confirmed the expansion of ISIS offshoots from Tunisia, 

Libya, and Sinai into the Sahel. Terror groups continue to reap the 

benefits of the permissive environment created out of political instability and large swaths of ungoverned space. 

2 

As of March 6 of this year, the State Department cautioned that 

terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and 

ISIS affiliates, are very active in North Africa, have demonstrated 

the ability to conduct attacks in the region. Tthe U.S. Government 

remains, ‘‘highly concerned about possible attacks against U.S. citizens, facilities, and businesses.’’ 

The Long War Journal reports that al-Qaeda affiliates launched 

over 250 attacks in the Maghreb and Sahel regions in 2016, a more 

than 150 percent increase from the reported 106 attacks in 2015. 

Some argue that terror groups in the region are nationalists and 

do not pose a threat to the United States. However, 3 months ago, 

the Pentagon confirmed that airstrikes on an ISIS stronghold in 

Libya were directed against, ‘‘external plotters, who were actively 

planning operations against our allies in Europe.’’ 

Additionally, the return of thousands of battle-hardened foreign 

fighters from Iraq and Syria to their home countries in North Africa will likely elevate the threat level in the region. 

The goals for today’s hearings are to get a status update from 

you experts on the activities of the various terror groups, and the 

possible threat they may pose to the United States in the present 

and the future. Also to solicit your expert advice on what is working in our counterterrorism strategy and what more needs to be 

done as the Trump administration is evaluating current efforts. 

I want to thank all of you for your work in this field, for appearing here today. I look forward to your testimony. 

[The statement of Mr. King follows:] 

STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN PETER T. KING

MARCH 29, 2017 

During today’s hearing, we will focus on terror groups operating in and across 

North Africa, their intent to attack the United States and their capability to do so. 

While Iraq and Syria are the current epicenter of the Islamist extremism movement, 

that certainly has not always been the case nor will it be in the future. 

The threat posed by ISIS and al-Qaeda are dynamic and are expected to increase 

as ISIS loses ground in Iraq and Syria and al-Qaeda seeks to reclaim its status as 

the leader of the global Jihadi movement. 

In this context, North Africa, which sits on the edge of Europe, has emerged as 

an important theatre in the war on terror. 

Al-Qaeda and ISIS elements are increasingly active—and competitive—and have 

both expanded their reach deep into the continent. Earlier this month, al-Qaeda factions in the Sahel reconciled their internal disputes and formed a single movement 

called ‘‘Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims,’’ pledging their loyalty to 

AQIM leader, Abdelmalik Droukdel. Additionally, the emergence of ‘‘ISIS in the 

Greater Sahara,’’ which was informally recognized by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2016, confirmed the expansion of ISIS offshoots from Tunisia, Libya, and the 

Sinai into the Sahel. 

Terror groups continue to reap the benefits of the permissive environment created 

out of political instability and large swaths of ungoverned space. As of March 6, 

2017, the State Department cautioned that terrorist groups, including AQIM and 

ISIS affiliates, are very active in North Africa, have demonstrated the capability to 

conduct attacks in the region, and the U.S. Government remains ‘‘highly concerned 

about possible attacks against U.S. citizens, facilities, and businesses.’’ 

The Long War Journal reports that al-Qaeda affiliates launched over 250 attacks 

in the Maghreb and Sahel regions in 2016, a more than 150% increase from the reported 106 attacks in 2015. 

Some argue that terror groups in this region are nationalist and do not pose a 

threat to the United States. However, 3 months ago, the Pentagon confirmed that 

airstrikes on an ISIS stronghold in Libya were directed against, ‘‘external plotters, 

who were actively planning operations against our allies in Europe.’’ 

3 

Additionally, the return of thousands of battle-hardened foreign fighters from Iraq 

and Syria to their home countries in North Africa will likely elevate the threat level 

in the region. 

My goals for today’s hearing are to get a status update from experts on the activities of the various terror groups and the possible threat they may pose to the United 

States in the present and future. And to solicit your expert advice on what’s working 

in our counterterrorism strategy and what more needs to be done as the Trump administration is evaluating current efforts. 

I want to thank you all for your work in this field and for appearing here today. 

I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. KING. Now I present the Ranking Member, my colleague 

from New York, Kathleen Rice. Miss Rice. 

Miss RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, 

and thank you to the witnesses for joining us here today. 

About 2 years ago I had the opportunity to travel to Africa on 

a Congressional delegation that was led by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, and we were able to meet with government leaders and security officials in Tunisia, Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, and Senegal. 

That trip was just a few months after I was sworn into Congress 

and joined this committee. It was an instructive experience for me 

because while groups like ISIS may have dominated headlines at 

the time, as they often do now, it is critical that we never lose sight 

of the fact that the threat of terrorism doesn’t start and stop with 

ISIS. 

That trip made it clear to me that the threat of terrorism emerging in Africa is very real and cannot be ignored or overlooked until 

it generates more headlines. We need to confront that threat head 

on, and our ability to do so depends heavily on the strength of partnerships with leaders who fight on the front lines against these terrorist groups every day. 

We don’t have to look far to see how serious a threat we are dealing with in Africa, particularly in North Africa. A truck bomb was 

detonated last year near a police training college in Libya killing 

60 policeman and wounding about 200 others. 

A commercial plane bombing in Egypt in October 2015 killed 224 

people. An attack at a tourist resort in Tunisia in June 2015 left 

38 dead, and of course the attack on the U.S. embassy and CIA 

annex in Benghazi, Libya, which left 4 U.S. citizens dead, including 

the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens. 

While ISIS has taken credit for many recent attacks, al-Qaeda 

operatives and other violent extremist groups have had a presence 

in North Africa for almost 2 decades. 

For example, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, had primarily operated in the northern coastal areas of Algeria and in 

parts of the desert regions of southern Algeria, but in recent years 

has expanded into Libya and Tunisia. 

AQIM claimed responsibility for many terror attacks in the region, and has been responsible for kidnappings for ransom and 

smuggling. Most concerning, according to U.S. officials, AQIM has 

focused on local and Western targets in North and West Africa, including U.S. interests and personnel by often urging supporters to 

target U.S. embassies and U.S. Ambassadors. 

Earlier this month, the head of the U.S. Africa Command testified before the Senate and characterized the instability in Libya 

and North Africa as potentially the most significant near-term 

threat to U.S. and allies’ interests on the continent. 

4 

Protecting our assets and people in this region is absolutely a 

National security priority for our country right now, but I am concerned that this administration doesn’t seem to recognize that. 

President Trump’s so-called America First budget seems to put 

Africa last, proposing deep budget cuts to the continent. In fact, 

many have speculated that confronting the threat of terrorism in 

Libya and throughout the region will be a low priority for this administration. 

By proposing to cut the Department of State’s international affairs funding by one-third, President Trump has signaled that he 

is not interested in maintaining long-standing international partnerships, which are crucial for U.S. diplomacy and development 

across the globe, including in North Africa. 

As I said, I believe that our success in confronting the threat in 

Africa depends on the success of our partners leading this fight on 

the ground. And while President Trump may not have a sophisticated understanding of the value of diplomacy, we cannot allow 

that to jeopardize the partnerships we have built in North Africa. 

The terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland since 9/11 has continued to evolve, and our counterterrorism policies must evolve as 

well. They cannot be singularly focused on prevention only within 

our borders. 

It is imperative that the United States works with our allies to 

improve counterterrorism and intelligence efforts in North Africa, 

as well as investing in education, economic development, and free 

and open civil societies in order to root out many of the drivers of 

violent extremism in the region. 

The level of U.S. funding, resources, and personnel dedicated to 

these efforts must continue, if not increase, in order to limit the 

risk and progress of terrorist groups in the region. 

Again, we cannot underestimate the value of building and 

strengthening local and international partnerships to combat terrorism and radicalization in North Africa. International cooperation 

and partnerships are the foundation of our counterterrorism efforts. 

I look forward to a robust discussion with our witnesses today 

about the threat of terrorism and radicalization in North Africa 

and how we can shape U.S. policy to support our partners and defeat our enemies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Rice follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER KATHLEEN M. RICE

MARCH 29, 2017 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And thank you to the witnesses for joining us today. 

About 2 years ago, I had the opportunity to travel to Africa on a Congressional 

delegation led by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, and meet with government leaders 

and security officials in Tunisia, Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, and Senegal. 

That trip was just a few months after I was sworn in to Congress and joined this 

committee, and it was an instructive experience for me. Because while groups like 

ISIS may have dominated headlines at the time, as they often do now, it’s critical 

that we never lose sight of the fact that the threat of terrorism doesn’t start and 

stop with ISIS. 

That trip made it clear to me that the threat of terrorism emerging in Africa is 

very real and cannot be ignored or overlooked until it generates more headlines. We 

5 

1 Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), National Counterterrorism Center, 

https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html. 2 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Murabitoun. Alexis Arieff & Tomas F. 

Husted. Congressional Research Service. 25 November 2015. 3 Id. 

4 Id. 

need to confront that threat head-on, and our ability to do so depends heavily on 

the strength of partnerships with leaders who fight on the front lines against these 

terrorist groups every day. 

We don’t have to look far to see how serious of a threat we’re dealing with in Africa, particularly in North Africa. 

A truck bomb was detonated last year near a police training college in Libya, killing 60 policemen and wounding about 200 others. A commercial plane bombing in 

Egypt in October 2015 killed 224 people. An attack at a tourist resort in Tunisia 

in June 2015 left 38 dead. And of course, the attack on the U.S. Embassy and CIA 

annex in Benghazi, Libya which left four U.S. citizens dead, including the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens. 

While ISIS has taken credit for many recent attacks, al-Qaeda operatives and 

other violent extremists groups have had a presence in North Africa for almost 2 

decades. 

For example, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb—AQIM—had primarily operated in 

the northern coastal areas of Algeria and in parts of the desert regions of southern 

Algeria, but in recent years has expanded into Libya and Tunisia.1 AQIM claimed 

responsibility for many terror attacks in the region and has been responsible for 

kidnappings for ransom and smuggling.2

Most concerning, according to U.S. officials, AQIM has focused on local and Western targets in North and West Africa, including U.S. interests and personnel, by 

often urging supporters to target U.S. embassies and U.S. ambassadors.3 4

Earlier this month, the head of the U.S. Africa Command, testified before the Senate and characterized the instability in Libya and North Africa as potentially ‘‘the 

most significant near-term threat to U.S. and allies’ interests on the 

continent . . .’’. 

Protecting our assets and people in this region is absolutely a National security 

priority for our country right now—but I’m concerned that this administration 

doesn’t seem to recognize that. 

President Trump’s so-called ‘‘America First’’ budget seems to put Africa last, proposing deep budget cuts to the continent. In fact, many have speculated that confronting the threat of terrorism in Libya and throughout the region will be low priority for this administration. 

By proposing to cut the Department of State’s international affairs funding by one 

third, President Trump has signaled that he is not interested in maintaining longstanding international partnerships, which are crucial for U.S. diplomacy and development across the globe, including in North Africa. 

As I said, I believe that our success in confronting the threat in Africa depends 

on the success of our partners leading this fight on the ground. And while President 

Trump may not have a sophisticated understanding of the value of diplomacy, we 

cannot allow that to jeopardize the partnerships we’ve built in North Africa. 

The terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland since 9/11 has continued to evolve, and 

our counterterrorism policies must evolve as well—they cannot be singularly focused 

on prevention only within our borders. 

It is imperative that the United States works with our allies to improve counterterrorism and intelligence efforts in North Africa—as well as investing in education, 

economic development, and free and open civil societies—in order to root out many 

of the drivers of violent extremism in the region. 

The level of U.S. funding, resources, and personnel dedicated to these efforts must 

continue, if not increase, in order to limit the risk and progress of terrorist groups 

in the region. 

Again, we cannot underestimate the value of building and strengthening local and 

international partnerships to combat terrorism and radicalization in North Africa. 

International cooperation and partnerships are the foundation of our counterterrorism efforts. 

I look forward to a robust discussion with our witnesses today about the threat 

of terrorism and radicalization in North Africa and how we can shape U.S. policy 

to support our partners and defeat our enemies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Ranking Member. 

6 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to 

have, as I mentioned before, a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. All the witnesses are reminded that their written statement will be submitted for the 

record. 

Our first witness is Dr. J. Peter Pham. Dr. Pham is vice president for Research and Regional Initiatives at the Atlantic Council, 

as well as director of the Council’s Africa Center. Prior to joining 

the council in 2011, Dr. Pham was a tenured associate professor of 

justice studies, political science, and Africana studies at James 

Madison University where he was director of the Nelson Institute 

for International and Public Affairs. 

He is the author of more than 300 essays and books. He contributes to a number of a publications and regularly appears as a commentator on U.S. and international broadcasts and print media. 

Dr. Pham served as head of Africa and Development Issues for 

the Presidential campaign of Senator McCain in 2008 and co-chair 

of the Africa Policy team for the Presidential campaign of Governor 

Romney in 2012. He currently serves as chair of the Africa Working Group of the John Hay Initiative. 

Dr. Pham has been a trusted advisor to this committee, and has 

testified several times on critical security issues in Africa. Dr. 

Pham, it is great to have you back, and you are now recognized for 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH AND REGIONAL INITIATIVES, DIRECTOR FOR THE 

AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. PHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I would like to begin by thanking you not 

only for the specific opportunity to testify before you today on the 

subject of terrorism in North Africa, but also for the sustained attention which the U.S. House of Representatives, and this panel in 

particular, has given to this challenge. 

In its oversight capacity, you have been very much ahead of the 

curve over the course of the last decade-and-a-half, and it has been 

my singular privilege to have contributed, however modestly, to 

this important effort. 

Since my esteemed colleagues will be delving deeply into the 

threat in North Africa posed by al-Qaeda, the so-called Islamic 

State and their affiliates, I will concentrate primarily on the threat 

from North Africa, focusing on the danger posed by these groups 

in and of themselves, as well as in their competition with each 

other. 

The continuing threat posed by the various jihadist groups operating in the Sahel is the result of their exploitation of local conflicts, including socioeconomic and political marginalization, as well 

as the fragile condition of the many states affected. 

In some cases, setbacks spur the extremists to adapt new strategies that result in renewed vigor. A good example being the fragmentation of AQIM’s organization in the Sahel in the wake of the 

French-led intervention in Mali, and the subsequent multiplication 

7 

of factions, some of which are organized along ethnic lines, that facilitate both the members blending into local populations, and their 

making further inroads among them. 

Arguably, the Sahel, rather than the Maghreb, where, with the 

exception of Libya, there are strong states that have shown their 

ability to resist al-Qaeda and ISIS encroachments, the Sahel is the 

region in Africa most at risk; especially if hordes of battle-hardened 

fighters return to the continent from the short-lived caliphate in 

the Levant and linked up with others of their ilk displaced from 

Sirte and other places on the Mediterranean littoral, and increasingly make their way into the Fezzan and other points south. 

It is no accident that the Sahel is, if not the poorest, certainly 

one of the poorest majority Muslim regions in the world. It is also 

home to the largest expanse of contiguous ungoverned spaces on 

the African continent. 

Many of the governments in the region are weak in their capacity to asset authority, much less provide real services beyond their 

capital cities and a smattering of urban centers is extremely limited. 

These fragile states present the jihadist both a vulnerability to 

exploit in the short term and an opportunity to create a new hub 

for operations in the long term, a characteristic shared not only by 

ISIS-aligned groups in Africa, like Boko Haram, but also al-Qaeda 

affiliates on the continent like AQIM and further afield, Somalia’s 

al-Shabaab, is their almost uncanny resilience founded in part on 

the flexibility with which they can put aside differences and join 

forces in ever shifting combinations. 

Moreover, apparent splits among the extremist groups can perversely lead to increased violence, heightening the threat. 

For example, the much-valued schism within Boko Haram, formally aligned with ISIS since early 2015, between those militants 

loyal to long-time leader Abubakar Shekau and those following Abu 

Musab al-Barnawi, whom ISIS appointed as the new Governor of 

its West Africa province last August may, as I saw in November 

when I traveled to the battle front in northeastern Nigeria with 

former AFRICOM commander General Carter Ham and others embedded within Nigerian armor units. 

That this may be contributing to the intensification rather than 

the diminution of violence as both factions try to outdo each other 

in staging attacks, with al-Barnawi’s faction gaining momentum, 

not only because of the defeats of Shekau’s faction suffered at the 

hands of Nigerian forces, but also because of foreign fighters and 

other resources flowing in thanks to the ISIS affiliation. 

A similar phenomenon may also be at work in the competition 

between al-Qaeda-linked groups and ISIS in the Sahel. In late October, for example, ISIS confirmed they had accepted the allegiance 

of Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, a one-time commander within AQIM’s alMurabitun, who along with a group of fighters pledged themselves 

to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who designated them his greater Sahara 

division. 

What is interesting is that al-Sahrawi first made bay’a to the 

self-styled caliph more than a year ago, but his oath of fealty was 

only accepted after he carried out a string of attacks in the border 

lands of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. 

8 

This broad survey permits us to draw a number of conclusions 

about U.S. response to terrorism in Africa and the possible threats 

posed to U.S. persons and interests abroad, as well as to the American homeland, especially from jihadists coming out of North Africa 

and penetrating Europe. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the subcommittee, there is no doubt that ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated 

groups in the northern part of Africa are poised to wreak considerable havoc across the continent as they seek to regroup in the 

ungoverned spaces of the Sahel, threatening not only the countries 

immediately impacted, but also affecting the interests and security 

of the United States and its allies across the region. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Members of the subcommittee for your attention. I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Pham follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM

MARCH 29, 2015 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rice, distinguished Members of the subcommittee: I would like to begin by thanking you not only for the specific opportunity to testify before you today on the subject of terrorism in North Africa, but 

also for the sustained attention the U.S. House of Representatives has, in general, 

given to this challenge. In its oversight capacity, the House has been very much 

ahead of the curve over the course of the last decade-and-a-half and it has been my 

singular privilege to have contributed, however modestly, to this important effort. 

It was at a 2005 briefing organized by the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the then-Committee on International Relations, that 

al-Shabaab was first mentioned as a threat not only to the security of Somalia, but 

also to the wider East Africa region and, indeed, the United States. The following 

year, a joint hearing of the same Subcommittee on International Terrorism and 

Nonproliferation and the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations was among the very first instances of public recognition by one 

of the two political branches of our government of the expanding crisis in the Horn 

of Africa occasioned by the takeover of Somalia by Islamist forces, including alShabaab. 

And, of course, it was this Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism of 

the Committee on Homeland Security that, in 2011, convened the very first Congressional hearing on Boko Haram. I also had the privilege of testifying on that occasion when, once again, the Legislative branch used its oversight prerogatives to 

shine a light on what was then a poorly understood threat. At that time, Boko 

Haram was considered so obscure that the all the participants at the event, held 

to discuss a bipartisan report by the subcommittee staff on the threat posed by the 

militant group, could have convened in the proverbial broom closet. Sadly, our analysis proved prescient and, rather than fading away as some dismissively suggested 

that it would, Boko Haram went on to pose an even greater menace, not only to 

Nigeria and its people, but to their neighbors in West Africa as well as to international security writ large. 

In each of these cases and, indeed, others that could be cited, there is a recurring 

trope that emerges time and again: Terrorism in Africa generally gets short shrift 

and, when attention is focused on specific groups or situations that appear to be 

emerging challenges, the threat is either dismissed entirely or minimized—until the 

‘‘unthinkable’’ happens and tragedy strikes. 

THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA AND THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND

ITS INTERESTS

In considering the dynamic threat posed by al-Qaeda, the so-called Islamic State 

(ISIS), their various affiliates, and other jihadist groups in Africa, it is worth recalling that Africa had been a theater for terrorist operations, including those directed 

against the United States, long before the attacks of September 11, 2001, on the 

homeland focused attention on what had hitherto been regions seemingly peripheral 

9 

1 The most recent iteration of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 

released February 6, 2015, by the previous administration couched U.S. strategic objectives in 

Africa largely in terms of broader development goals, rather than traditional security concerns 

which were emphasized in earlier documents: ‘‘Africa is rising. Many countries in Africa are 

making steady progress in growing their economies, improving democratic governance and rule 

of law, and supporting human rights and basic freedoms. Urbanization and a burgeoning youth 

population are changing the region’s demographics, and young people are increasingly making 

their voices heard. But there are still many countries where the transition to democracy is uneven and slow with some leaders clinging to power. Corruption is endemic and public health 

systems are broken in too many places. And too many governments are responding to the expansion of civil society and free press by passing laws and adopting policies that erode that 

progress. On-going conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 

the Central African Republic, as well as violent extremists fighting governments in Somalia, Nigeria, and across the Sahel all pose threats to innocent civilians, regional stability, and our National security.’’ 2 Jakkie Cilliers, ‘‘Terrorism and Africa,’’ African Security Review 12, no. 4 (2003): 100. 

to the strategic landscape, at least as most American policy makers and analysts 

perceived it. 

If one takes as a definition of terrorism the broadly accepted description offered 

by the United Nations General Assembly 1 year after the East Africa bombings— 

‘‘criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes’’—terrorism can 

be said to be wide-spread in Africa, although it has largely been a domestic, rather 

than transnational, affair. However, just because the majority of actors and the incidents they are responsible for are domestic to African countries does not mean that 

they cannot and do not evolve into international threats when, in fact, that is the 

trajectory many, if not most, aspire to and which quite a few have indeed succeeded 

in achieving in recent years. 

The first post-9/11 iteration of the National Security Strategy of the United States 

of America, released a year after the attacks on the American homeland, raised the 

specter that ‘‘weak states... can pose as great a danger to our National interests 

as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. 

Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to 

terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.’’1 Extremism, however, requires opportunity if it is to translate radical intentionality into terrorist effect. One 

leading African security analyst succinctly summarized the situation in the following manner: 

‘‘The opportunity targets presented by peacekeepers, aid and humanitarian workers, 

donors and Western NGO’s active in the continent are lucrative targets of subnational terrorism and international terrorism. Africa is also replete with potentially much higher-value targets ranging from the massive oil investments (often by 

U.S. companies) in the Gulf of Guinea to the burgeoning tourist industry in South 

Africa.’’2

Thus there is a very real terrorist risk to U.S. persons and interests—a risk that 

is increasing with time if one looks at its three constituent elements: Threat, the 

frequency or likelihood of adverse events; vulnerability, the likelihood of success of 

a particular threat category against a particular target; and cost, the total impact 

of a particular threat experienced by a vulnerable target, including both the ‘‘hard 

costs’’ of actual damages and the ‘‘soft costs’’ to production, the markets, reputation, 

etc. In short, the combination of these three factors—threat, vulnerability, and 

cost—ought to elevate not inconsiderably the overall risk assessment in Africa. 

And this last point is not lost upon those who wish us harm. Dating back to at 

least the period when Osama bin Laden himself found refuge in Sudan, the leading 

strategists of Islamist terrorism have speculated about the potential opportunities 

to establish cells, recruit members, obtain financing, and find safe haven offered by 

the weak governance capacities and other vulnerabilities of African states. In fact, 

it has been noted that al-Qaeda’s first act against the United States came several 

years before the embassy bombings when it attempted to insert itself in the fight 

against the American-led humanitarian mission in Somalia. Moreover, one of the 

most systematic expositions of the particular allure of the continent to terrorists 

came from al-Qaeda’s on-line magazine, Sada al-Jihad (‘‘Echo of Jihad’’). The June 

2006 issue of that publication featured an article by one Abu Azzam al-Ansari entitled ‘‘Al-Qaeda is Moving to Africa,’’ in which the author asserted: 

‘‘There is no doubt that al-Qaeda and the holy warriors appreciate the significance 

of the African regions for the military campaigns against the Crusaders. Many people sense that this continent has not yet found its proper and expected role and the 

next stages of the conflict will see Africa as the battlefield.’’ 

10 

3 See J. Peter Pham, ‘‘Foreign Influences and Shifting Horizons: The Ongoing Evolution of 

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,’’ Orbis 55, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 240–254; and idem, ‘‘The Dangerous ‘Pragmatism’ of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,’’ Journal of the Middle East and Africa 2, no. 1 (January–June 2011): 15–29. 

4 See idem, ‘‘Boko Haram: The Strategic Evolution of the Islamic State’s West Africa Province,’’ Journal of the Middle East and Africa 7, no. 1 (2016): 1–18. 

With a certain analytical rigor, Abu Azzam then proceeded to enumerate and 

evaluate what he perceived to be significant advantages to al-Qaeda shifting terrorist operations to Africa, including: The fact that jihadist doctrines have already 

been spread within the Muslim communities of many African countries; the political 

and military weakness of African governments; the wide availability of weapons; the 

geographical position of Africa vis-a ́-vis international trade routes; the proximity to 

old conflicts against ‘‘Jews and Crusaders’’ in the Middle East as well as new ones 

like Darfur, where the author almost gleefully welcomed the possibility of Western 

intervention; the poverty of Africa which ‘‘will enable the holy warriors to provide 

some finance and welfare, thus, posting there some of their influential operatives’’; 

the technical and scientific skills that potential African recruits would bring to the 

jihadist cause; the presence of large Muslim communities, including ones already 

embroiled conflict with Christians or adherents of traditional African religions; the 

links to Europe through North Africa ‘‘which facilitates the move from there to carry 

out attacks’’; and the fact that Africa has a wealth of natural resources, including 

hydrocarbons and other raw materials, which are ‘‘very useful for the holy warriors 

in the intermediate and long term.’’ Abu Azzam concluded his assessment by sounding an ominous note: 

‘‘In general, this continent has an immense significance. Whoever looks at Africa 

can see that it does not enjoy the interest, efforts, and activity it deserves in the 

war against the Crusaders. This is a continent with many potential advantages and 

exploiting this potential will greatly advance the jihad. It will promote achieving the 

expected targets of Jihad. Africa is a fertile soil for the advance of jihad and the 

jihadi cause.’’ 

While much has been made by some academics about the supposed lack of appeal 

which the jihadist ideology and approaches of al-Qaeda and ISIS exercise among different African peoples and communities, it is my contention that this analysis 

underestimates the attractive power of the reputation of these jihadist movements, 

especially when the extremist doctrine—for which years of ample propaganda by 

missionaries funded from abroad has prepared the terrain, however intentionally or 

unintentionally is associated with the apparent battlefield success—as was the case, 

for example, early on for ISIS—and harnessed to local grievances. In fact, the 

conflation of local concerns and global narratives has been an important milestone 

in the evolution of various African militant groups, providing the leaders with a 

platform whereupon to seek support and legitimacy above and beyond the confines 

of the struggle they had hitherto been engaged. This has clearly been the case with 

the transformation of the Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour la Pre ́dication et le Combat (GSPC, ‘‘Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat’’) into al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM)3 and Boko Haram’s decision to pledge allegiance to ISIS and brand 

itself as Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi (‘‘[Islamic State] Province in the West Land 

of the Blacks,’’ or ‘‘Islamic State West Africa Province,’’ ISWAP).4

It was clearly a mistake for many a decade ago to have dismissed Abu Azzam’s 

analysis as devoid of operational effect and it would certainly be foolhardy to do so 

now. In fact, we are here today not only because this subcommittee has been commendably diligent in maintaining its vigilance, but because, in point of fact, Abu 

Azzam was very correct: Africa is indeed ‘‘fertile soil for the advance of jihad and 

the jihadi cause.’’ 

THE CURRENT THREAT FROM NORTH AFRICA

Since my esteemed colleagues whom the subcommittee has invited will delve 

deeply into the threat in North Africa posed by al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the affiliates, 

I will concentrate primarily on the threat from North Africa, focusing on the danger 

posed by these groups in and of themselves as well as in their competition with each 

other. 

With respect to North Africa itself, the Maghreb is home to some of the longestrunning terrorist campaigns on the African continent, a situation that has become 

all the more combustible in recent years with the emergence of ISIS ‘‘provinces’’ 

amid the disintegration of Libya, alongside preexisting groups like AQIM and still 

other Islamist bands which emerged in the wake of the collapse of Muammar 

Gaddafi’s dictatorship. The presence of jihadist entities on the very shores of the 

11 

5 Olivier Walther and Denis Retaille, Sahara or Sahel? The Fuzzy Geography of Terrorism 

in West Africa (Luxembourg: CEPS/INSTEAD, 2010), 11. 6 The rise in militancy among some Fulani is not limited to the Sahel proper. There is growing 

evidence of a significant acceleration in attacks in Nigeria’s Middle Belt. See 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten (2016), available at http:// 

www.standwithnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Nigeria-Fractured-and-Forgotten.pdf. 

Mediterranean Sea is not just happenstance but also serves to emphasize—as, no 

doubt, the terrorists intend to underscore—not only the threat posed to the vital, 

but narrow, sea lanes nearby, but also the proximity of the violence to Europe itself. 

It is certainly a point that America and the other top advanced economies, when 

they convene for the Group of Seven (G7) summit in May, which meeting is focused 

on Africa this year, would do well to recall—and not simply, as some of our European partners would like, discuss the challenges of migration. 

Fortunately, commensurate with the challenges in this region, the international 

community also has solid allies with which to work on not just combatting terrorism, but countering its extremist roots. Notable among these partners is Morocco, 

a long-standing ‘‘major non-NATO ally’’ of the United States, whose aggressive, 

multi-pronged approach to countering radical ideology and terrorism has much to 

commend it as does the kingdom’s efforts to assist other countries in North and 

West Africa in the same fight. The potential of the U.S.-Morocco Framework for Cooperation, signed during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in 2014 and aimed at developing Moroccan training experts as well as jointly training civilian security and 

counterterrorism forces with other partners in the Maghreb and the Sahel in recognizing a ‘‘triangular’’ approach, needs to be better appreciated and developed. 

Beyond the Maghreb itself, the Sahel, the belt connecting North Africa and West 

Africa, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and straddling ancient 

trade and migration routes, is an almost ideal environment for extremist groups 

with transnational ambitions, whether ISIS fighters smarting from defeats on the 

battlefields of Iraq and Syria or al-Qaeda militants seeking to reassert the preeminence of the organization within the global jihadist movement. The region is 

strategically important for several reasons, including its role as a bridge between 

the Arab Maghreb and black Sub-Saharan Africa as well as its important energy 

reserves, both renewable and non-renewable, and other natural resources. Moreover, 

the Sahel touches several countries—including Algeria, Nigeria, and Sudan—with 

serious security challenges of their own that could easily spill over their borders. 

In fact, some scholars have argued that the Sahara and the Sahel form ‘‘a single 

space of movement’’ which, for purposes of the geography of terrorism, ‘‘should be 

considered as a continuum, something that the territorial approach of states and 

geopolitics prevents us from understanding’’5—a point which policy makers and analysts would do well to take to heart. In point of fact, not only has the Sahel been 

for centuries literally the conduit over which arms, fighters, and ideologies have 

flowed back and forth across the Sahara, but it has clearly emerged in recent times 

as a battlespace in its own right. 

The continuing threat posed by the various jihadist groups operating in the Sahel 

is the result of their exploitation of local conflicts, including social, economic, and 

political marginalization, as well as the fragile condition of many of the states affected, which is often manifested both in low capacity to resist overall and a tendency toward ham-fisted responses that aggravate grievances. In some cases, defeat 

spurs the extremists to adapt new strategies that result in renewed vigor, a good 

example being the fragmentation of AQIM’s organization in the Sahel in the wake 

of the French-led intervention in Mali and the subsequent multiplication of factions, 

some of which, like the ethnic-Fulani (or Peul) Macina Liberation Front which freed 

nearly a hundred detained militants in a jailbreak in early December, are organized 

along ethnic lines that facilitate both the members’ blending into local populations 

and their making further inroads among them.6 In other instances, the manifest 

failure to achieve political settlements propel the resurgence of otherwise weakened 

militant groups. 

Arguably the Sahel, rather than the Maghreb where, with the exception of Libya, 

there are strong states that have shown their ability to resist not only al-Qaeda, 

but also ISIS, encroachments, is the region in Africa most at risk, especially if 

hordes of battle-hardened fighters return to the continent from the short-lived ‘‘caliphate’’ in the Levant and link up with others of their ilk displaced from Sirte and 

other places on the Mediterranean littoral and increasingly making their way to the 

Fezzan and other points south. 

It is no accident that the Sahel is, if not the poorest, certainly one of the poorest 

majority-Muslim regions in the world. It is also home to the largest expanse of contiguous ungoverned spaces on the African continent: Many of the governments in 

12 

the region are weak and their capacity to assert authority—much less provide real 

services—beyond their capital cities and a smattering of urban centers is extremely 

limited. These fragile states present the jihadists both a vulnerability to exploit in 

the short term and an opportunity to create a new hub for operations over the long 

term. 

In Mali, for example, what started in late 2011 and early 2012 as a rebellion by 

the disaffected Tuareg population led to the overthrow of state authority in the 

country’s three northernmost provinces with a combined territory the size of France 

and, following the marginalization of the ethnic separatists by their erstwhile allies 

from several jihadist groups, the entire area falling under the sway of AQIM. Only 

a timely French-led military intervention in early 2013 forestalled the total collapse 

of the Malian state, although again, the situation remains fragile as the fact that 

the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the country is the deadliest on-going 

blue-helmeted operation in the world underscores. Despite being mauled by Operation Serval and, subsequently, hounded by French and U.S. Special Operations 

Forces in the region, AQIM has bounced back to stage a series of deadly attacks 

last year, including spectacular hits on luxury hotels in two neighboring countries, 

Burkina Faso and Coˆte d’Ivoire, that had previously not been hit by terrorists. 

Burkina Faso suffered another attack in mid-December, with 12 members of the 

country’s special anti-terrorism unit killed in an assault on a military base near the 

Malian border. Even where they may not currently pose an existential threat to the 

states affected, these attacks from deep in the Sahel can nonetheless have a disproportionate impact on their fortunes. Coˆte d’Ivoire may be heralded as Africa’s 

new economic powerhouse, with a diversified economy and growth in 2016 of 8.5 

percent, the second-highest in the world, but more attacks like the one in last year 

by AQIM can still scare off foreign investors who are just beginning to discover the 

country’s potential. 

The stakes are even higher for country like Nigeria. Africa’s most populous country slipped into recession last year, losing the distinction it gained only 3 years ago 

as the continent’s biggest economy, and continued insecurity from jihadist threats 

certainly do not help. After years of ceding ground to Boko Haram, so much so that 

by 2014 the group had consolidated its hold over a territory larger than Belgium 

and proclaimed a self-styled ‘‘emirate,’’ the Nigerian armed forces adopted a new 

strategy and began fighting back. While the counterattack began in the waning days 

of former President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration, things really began to 

change after Muhammadu Buhari, a retired major-general and former military 

ruler, won a historic (and decisive) election victory over the incumbent in March 

2015, in part by promising to defeat the militants. Cashiering his predecessor’s military chiefs shortly after taking office, Buhari installed new commanders, including 

a chief of army staff, Lieutenant-General Tukur Yusuf Buratai, who is a native of 

Borno, the epicenter of the insurgency, and moved command headquarters close to 

the fighting. Since then, in concert with a multinational force from neighboring 

countries, the Nigerian military has pursued an aggressive strategy, combining an 

intensive air campaign with a surge of troops on the ground, that gradually pushed 

Boko Haram out of the towns it had previously occupied and, increasingly, in remote 

hideouts like ‘‘Camp Zero,’’ the base in the remote Sambisa Forest that fell to government forces 2 days before Christmas last year. 

Along the way, as I had the opportunity to witness first-hand last November when 

I toured the battlefront, the Nigerian army also took on the task of not only providing security to the populations it liberated from the militants’ dominion, but also, 

until aid groups and development organizations returned, providing humanitarian 

relief, medical assistance, and even education and livelihood training. For example, 

the civil-military operations carried out by battalion I spent time with in Pulka, a 

key crossroads town just a few kilometers from what were at the time Boko Haram 

positions in the Sambisa Forest, were critical not only to the well-being of the community, but served to rally the population to support the government’s push against 

the militant group. 

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the success of the military operations, Boko Haram 

remains a force to be reckoned with. In response to the military defeats it has suffered, the militants shifted tactics, expanding their use of suicide bombings, most 

of which have targeted the civilian population. Meanwhile, the schism within Boko 

Haram, formally aligned with ISIS since early 2015, between those loyal to longtime leader Abubakar Shekau and those following Abu Musab al-Barnawi, whom 

ISIS appointed as the new ‘‘Governor’’ (wali) of its ‘‘province’’ last August, may be 

contributing to the intensification, rather than diminution, of violence as both factions try to outdo each other in staging attacks. In fact, there are strong indications 

that Barnawi’s faction may be gaining momentum, aided not only by the defeats 

Shekau’s factions have suffered at the hands of Nigerian forces, but also by fighters 

13 

7 See J. Peter Pham, A Measured US Strategy for the New Africa, with a foreword by James 

L. Jones, Jr. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2016), available at http:// 

www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/a-measured-us-strategy-for-the-new-africa. 

and other resources flowing to it thanks to the ISIS affiliation. Furthermore, to the 

extent that the militants have been weakened in Nigeria, they have spilled into 

neighboring countries, causing Cameroon and Niger, for example, to rise in the 2016 

edition of the Global Terrorism Index to 13th place and 16th place, respectively. 

A characteristic shared not only by ISIS-aligned groups in Africa like Boko 

Haram, but also al-Qaeda affiliates on the continent like AQIM and, further afield, 

Somalia’s al-Shabaab, is their almost uncanny resilience, founded in part on the 

flexibility with which they can put aside differences and join forces in ever-shifting 

combinations. Just earlier this month, for example, several jihadist factions operating in Mali—Ansar Dine (‘‘defenders of the faith’’), the Sahara and al-Murabitun 

(‘‘people of the garrison’’) branches of AQIM, and the Macina Liberation Front—announced their merger and pledged their allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman alZawahiri. The new group, named Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (‘‘group 

for the support of Islam and Muslims’’), is to be headed by an ‘‘emir,’’ Iyad ag Ghaly, 

formerly leader of Ansar Dine and, before that, a leader in Tuareg rebellions against 

the Malian government going back to the 1980’s. A week later, al-Zawahiri issued 

a statement of ‘‘approval and blessing’’ on the new group and expressed his hope 

that it would constitute ‘‘an impregnable fortress against the enemies of Islam who 

have seen a reversal of the fortunes of the partisans of Islam and jihad.’’ 

While al-Qaeda-linked groups in the region have resisted ISIS incursions into territory they have long viewed as their own, there have been instances in which factions within the former have sought to align themselves with the latter. In late October 2016, for example, ISIS confirmed that it had accepted the allegiance of Abu 

Walid al-Sahrawi, a former commander within al-Murabitun, who, along with 40 of 

his fighters, pledged themselves to Abubakar al-Baghdadi, who designated them his 

‘‘Greater Sahara’’ division. What is interesting is that al-Sahrawi first made bay‘a 

to the self-styled caliph more than a year earlier, but his oath of fealty was only 

accepted after he carried out string of attacks in the borderlands of Burkina Faso, 

Mali, and Niger. Thus an increase in violence could be the result as al-Qaeda and 

ISIS literally compete to outdo each other in the Sahel in the hopes of attracting 

recruits and other resources. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE U.S. RESPONSE

This broad survey permits the drawing of several conclusions about the U.S. response to terrorism in Africa and the possible threats posed to U.S. persons and interests abroad as well as the American homeland, especially from jihadists coming 

out of North Africa. 

First, time and again, the mistake has been made to underestimate—if not to discount entirely the threat faced. Part of this is attributable to an analytical bias to 

limit future possibilities to extrapolations from the past, a hermeneutical choice 

which ignores the dynamic potential which many terrorist organizations, especially 

in Africa, have exhibited time and again. Another part of the explanation is even 

more basic: The sheer lack of resources for Africa-related intelligence and analysis 

across the whole of the U.S. Government. Given the geopolitical, economic, and security stakes, the failure to invest more in dedicated institutions, personnel, training, 

and strategic focus as well as materiel and other resources is incredibly shortsighted. 

Second, with the exception of the Department of Defense, across the U.S. Government there is an artificial division of the continent that, quite frankly, is rejected 

not only by Africans, but is also unhelpful, a point I have consistently made.7 If one 

looks, for example, at the North African States which are usually grouped with 

those in the Near East, there are few compelling geopolitical, economic, or strategic 

reasons to do so except perhaps for Egypt. In point of fact, the overwhelming majority of the regional political, security, and commercial links extending to and from 

the other four countries of the Maghreb go north-south across the Sahara, not eastwest toward the Levant. The adhesion of Morocco to the African Union earlier this 

year—itself the culmination of a long-time diplomatic effort and economic engagement—as well as the kingdom’s request to join the Economic Community of West 

African States (ECOWAS) further reinforce the case for treating Africa as a whole 

within the U.S. Government. The reorganization of the National Security Council 

in the current administration, with the transfer of responsibility for the Maghrebi 

countries to the senior director for Africa, is a commendable move that needs to be 

followed across the whole of government. 

14 

Third, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the geographic command responsible for implementing whatever military operations, including counterterrorism operations, are eventually deemed necessary on the African continent, whether by assisting African partners or taking direct action, has since its establishment been 

hampered to varying degrees by not-quite-adequate resources to carry out its ordinary assigned mission, to say nothing of extraordinary challenges which have arisen 

in recent years within its area of responsibility. While the successive AFRICOM 

commanders have stewarded what they had heroically, often adroitly juggling resources and priorities, clearly a more sustainable approach is required, even in the 

current challenging fiscal climate. 

Fourth, even accepting the necessary economies in areas other than military and 

homeland security as signaled in the administration’s recent budget blueprint, it is 

still nothing short of mind-boggling that in Nigeria there is no U.S. diplomatic presence north of the capital of Abuja, which is located in that country’s geographical 

center. Thus, the northern part of the West African country, home to more than 90 

million predominantly Muslim people who would, by themselves, constitute Africa’s 

third-most-populous country—and in the middle of the geopolitically sensitive Sahel 

region at that—has been entirely bereft of U.S. diplomatic presence (and the ongoing intelligence and other monitoring capabilities that come with such a mission) 

ever since the consulate in Kaduna was closed in 1991, the exception being on those 

rare occasions when, with appropriate security assured, ad hoc forays from the embassy are authorized. 

Fifth, closely related to terrorism is the danger posed by lack of effective sovereignty that bedevils many African governments. Often the challenge first manifests itself in criminality, whether in the form of piracy and other brigandage or in 

that of trafficking, human or material. Moreover, the Sahel has seen an explosion 

in narco-trafficking, both in terms of transshipments bound for Europe and other 

destinations and, even more worrisome, of deliveries for local consumption. For the 

United States, all this means that increasing vigilance against terrorism in Africa 

also requires greater investments in law enforcement capabilities focused on the 

continent, including enhanced analytical resources at home, more liaison personnel 

posted abroad, and stepping up efforts to build the capacity of our partners on the 

continent. 

Sixth, as America’s relationships—diplomatic, security, economic, and cultural— 

with Africa as a whole and the individual countries on the continent expand and 

deepen—a positive development to be sure—an unfortunate downside is that the potential risk to U.S. persons and interests as well as to the homeland necessarily increases. Quite simply, the threats are there and, by its very nature, more engagement also increases exposure and vulnerability. The answer is not to curtail engagement since there are clear strategic imperatives for seeking to build these links, but 

to ensure that adequate resources are mustered to cope with the meet the rising 

demand across a whole range of sectors from civil aviation to ports to customs and 

immigration, etc., for intelligence about and security against threats originating in 

this dynamic region. 

Seventh, the challenge of African terrorism, especially out of North Africa, and 

any derivative threat to the United States cannot be addressed except in an integrated fashion, with solutions that embrace a broader notion of human security writ 

large—encompassing social, economic, and political development—which, often 

enough, also must transcend national and other artificial boundaries. This obviously 

is not and should not be a task for the United States alone, but is one which it is 

in America’s strategic interest to play its part. 

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that ISIS—and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the northern part 

of Africa are poised to wreak considerable havoc across the continent as they seek 

to regroup in the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel, threatening not only the countries 

immediately impacted, but also affecting the interests and security of the United 

States and its allies across the region. 

Ironically, this comes at a time when the narrative on Africa in the United States 

has increasingly shifted toward a greater focus on the extraordinary opportunities 

on the continent. However, if this momentum is to be maintained and those opportunities grasped, the United States needs to redouble its own efforts and also work 

closely with its African partners to manage the challenges and overcome terrorism 

and other the threats to security which stand in the way to an incredibly promising 

future. As the President has repeatedly declared, halting the spread of radical 

Islamism and jihadist violence should be a cornerstone of the foreign policy of the 

15 

United States and that ‘‘all actions should be oriented around this goal, and any 

country which shares this goal will be our ally.’’ 

Mr. KING. Dr. Pham, thank you once again for your testimony 

and very much appreciate it. 

Now our second witness is Dr. Geoff Porter. Dr. Porter is the 

president of North Africa Risk Consulting, a political and security 

risk analysis firm specializing exclusively in North Africa. 

From 2013 to 2016, Dr. Porter was an assistant professor at the 

U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He has made more than 

three dozen trips to Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, as well as multiple trips to Libya before and after the 2011 revolution that resulted in the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi’s regime. 

Dr. Porter has also briefed U.S. Ambassadors to Algeria, Tunisia, 

and Libya regarding political and security developments in those 

countries prior to assuming their posts. 

Dr. Porter, welcome you today, and you are recognized for your 

testimony. Thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF GEOFF D. PORTER, PRESIDENT, NORTH 

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING, INC. 

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Chairman King. 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, distinguished Members 

of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before 

you today. It is an honor to share with you my analysis of the 

threat posed by North African terrorism to the homeland and to 

U.S. National interests overseas. 

Terrorism in North Africa in recent years is entirely salafi jihadi 

in nature, or jihadi salafi in nature depending on how you want to 

define that term. The goal of these jihadi salafi organizations is to 

oust the political frameworks and leadership in the nation-states in 

which they operate. 

In addition, they want to erode the influence of the United States 

and its European allies in North Africa. The persistence of jihadi 

salafi terrorist organizations in North Africa poses a direct threat 

to U.S. interests abroad and an indirect and longer term threat to 

the homeland here in the United States. 

Jihadi salafi terrorist groups in North Africa can be divided into 

two large rubrics. There are those allied with al-Qaeda and those 

that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. For al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and the Islamic State allies alike, the United States 

remains the enemy. 

With its on-going operations in Tunisia and its regroupment in 

the Sahara and the Sahel, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is now 

the strongest terrorist organization in North Africa and poses the 

greatest threat to U.S. National interests in the region. 

The Islamic State suffered a severe setback in North Africa due 

to the loss of its bastion in Sirte, Libya. There reportedly have been 

fewer squirters from the Sirte offensive than anticipated. Those 

that did escape are dispersed throughout Libya and northern 

Niger. In addition, there are Islamic State sympathizers in Morocco 

and Mali. 

Although North Africa and the Sahara are not strategic regions 

for the United States, jihadi salafi terrorist organizations threaten 

the United States in three ways. North African terrorist organizaVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
16 

tions will target the U.S. Government when they can. In addition 

to the U.S. diplomatic corps, the United States has soldiers, sailors, 

Marines, and airmen in North Africa who are high-value targets 

for jihadi salafi terrorists. 

In addition to government personnel, jihadi salafi groups threaten U.S. citizens in North Africa. AQIM and the Islamic State’s willingness to kill civilians is well-documented. It is due to a combination of vacationing patterns, limited U.S. foreign direct investment 

in North Africa, and sheer luck that more Americans have not been 

killed by salafi jihadi groups in North Africa. 

The operations of U.S. companies in North Africa are also vulnerable to jihadi salafi terrorism. Numerous U.S. companies have investments and activities in North Africa, particularly in the oil and 

gas sector, but also in petrochemicals, telecoms, defense, pharmaceuticals, and renewables. 

A terrorist attack, regardless of whether it directly targets a U.S. 

company or the private sector in general, disrupts commercial activity and erodes value of U.S. corporations. 

Nevertheless, the threat posed by North African terrorist organizations to Europe is greater than the threat they pose to the 

United States because of geographic proximity, colonial legacies, 

linguistic facility, and the commonality of dual nationalities among 

European and North African countries. 

Even so, like any other group around the globe, jihadi salafis are 

mobile. What this means is that even though jihadi salafi groups 

in North Africa may not pose a direct threat to the United States 

because they do not have the operational capacity to do so, or because it is not a strategic priority for them, individual North African jihadi salafis can contribute to the capabilities of other jihadi 

salafi groups outside North Africa that do have the capacity and 

the intention to target the United States. 

Moreover, if groups are left unmolested, they will evolve to the— 

and their capacity to plan and train will grow, potentially to the 

point where attacking the U.S. homeland is not out of reach. 

Since 2013, the United States has employed a new model for 

counterterrorism operations in North Africa that relies on logistical 

and ISR support to allies, BPC programs, and the limited use of 

SOF to advise, assist, and accompany local forces, and find, fix, and 

finish high-value targets. 

This approach’s constant pressure slows the evolution of terrorist 

groups and prevents them from gaining the capabilities that could 

ultimately allow them to target the homelands. Despite the new 

approach’s advantages, military solutions never eliminate terrorism. 

It is equally important to address the underlying conditions that 

lead to the emergence and continuation of terrorist organizations in 

North Africa. One of the fundamental drivers of jihadi salafi terrorism is the sense of injustice and the belief that the implementation of a salafi interpretation of Islam via jihad will ensure Muslim 

social justice. 

There is a justifiable and a quantifiable perception that the playing field in North Africa, the Sahara, and the Sahel is uneven. If 

injustice fuels the jihadi salafi narrative, then that narrative burns 

bright in North Africa. Considering its historical commitment to 

17 

1 Thomas, Dominique, ‘‘E ́ tat islamique vs. Al-Qaı ̈da : autopsie d’une lutte fratricide,’’ Politique e ́trange`re, N. 1, printemps 2016. 

justice and good governance, the United States should work 

through aid and development programs to reduce North African 

deficits in those areas. 

Removing terrorists from the battlefield downrange only retards 

the group’s evolution. To truly secure the homelands, the United 

States must address the underlying causes of North African terrorism, chief among of them injustice and lack of rule of law. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Porter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEOFF D. PORTER

MARCH 29, 2017 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name is 

Geoff Porter. I am the president of North Africa Risk Consulting, the political and 

security risk analysis firm specializing exclusively in North Africa. North Africa 

Risk Consulting provides analysis of evolving political and security contexts in Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia to private sector corporations and different U.S. Government agencies and departments. In addition, from 2013–2016, I 

was an assistant professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point in 

the Department of Social Sciences and an instructor with the Combating Terrorism 

Center. In my capacity as president of North Africa Risk Consulting and previously 

as a faculty member at West Point, I made more than three dozen trips to Morocco, 

Algeria, and Tunisia, as well as multiple trips to Libya before and after the 2011 

revolution that resulted in the overthrow of Col. Muammar Qadhafi’s regime. I have 

had the good fortune of having briefed U.S. Ambassadors to Algeria, Tunisia, and 

Libya regarding political and security developments in those countries prior to their 

assuming their posts. It is a privilege and an honor to share my analysis of the 

threat posed by terrorism in North Africa with you. 

TERRORISM IN NORTH AFRICA

Terrorism in North Africa in recent years is entirely jihadi salafi in nature. Although there are differences among jihadi salafi terrorist organizations, they all 

stem from an interpretation of Islam that argues that there is a very narrow canon 

from which Islamic tenets and duties should be derived and that among those tenets 

and obligations is the duty to confront by any means necessary non-Muslims or 

Muslims that these organizations deem to be insufficiently religious. The goal of 

these jihadi salafi organizations is inherently political. They want to oust the political leadership in the nation-states in which they operate because that leadership 

does not share their same interpretation of how political systems should operate. In 

addition, they want to erode the influence of the United States and its European 

allies in areas in which they operate. 

The persistence of jihadi salafi terrorist organizations in North Africa poses a direct threat to U.S. National interests overseas and an indirect and longer-term 

threat to the homeland. For al-Qaeda affiliated groups and Islamic State allies 

alike, the United States remains the enemy. 

Jihadi salafi terrorist groups in North Africa can be divided into two large rubrics. 

There are those allied with al-Qaeda, which continues to be led by Ayman alZawahiri. And there are those who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State 

under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Tactical disagreements and different 

loyalties keep these two groups apart, but there is slippage between them and individuals and affiliates move back and forth.1

Defining North Africa 

The definition of North Africa can vary from one institution to another. For some 

U.S. agencies, North Africa includes not only the conventional Maghreb countries 

(Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia), but also Saharan and Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal). For the purposes of this 

examination of the threat posed by terrorism in North Africa, the definition of North 

Africa will be a hybrid of regional stakeholders’ own definition of North Africa as 

‘‘the Maghreb’’ and North African terrorist organizations’ definition of their area of 

18 

2 http://www.maghrebarabe.org/ar/. 3 Porter, Geoff D., ‘‘AQIM Ten Years On,’’ The Cipher Brief, 12 January 2017. 4 Tawil, Camille, Brothers in Arms: The Story of al-Qa‘ida and the Arab Jihadists (London: 

Saqi, 2011), trans. Robin Bray. 5 Hadjer Guenanfa, ‘‘Attaque contre le site gazier de Krechba: la piste d’un terroriste de la 

region,’’ Tout sur l’Alge ́rie, 22 March 2016. 6 Ould Salem, Lamine, Ben Laden du Sahara. Sur les traces du jihadiste Mokhtar Belmokhtar 

(e ́d. de La Martinie`re, 2014). 7 Statoil, In Amenas Investigation Report (2013). 8 Rogers, Mike, and Ruppersberger, Dutch, Investigative Report on the Terrorist Attacks on 

U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11–12, 2012, U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 21 November 2014. 9 Re ́mi Carayol, ‘‘Mokhtar Belmokhtar, le parrain du Sahelistan,’’ Jeune Afrique, 4 February 

2015. 10 Lacher, Wolfram, ‘‘Libya: A Jihadist Growth Market,’’ in Jihadism in Africa: local causes, 

regional expansion, international alliances, Steinberg, Guido and Weber, Annette, eds. Stiftung 

operations, which includes Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger.2 This definition accommodates the cross-border, transnational nature of terrorist organizations and of 

the diplomatic and military approaches adopted to combat it by the United States, 

France, and regional governments. 

Al-Qaeda and Affiliated Groups 

In January 2017, al-Qaeda’s regional affiliation, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, 

or AQIM, marked its 10th anniversary. AQIM emerged in moment of desperation 

out of a pre-existing salafi nationalist terrorist organization (the Salafist Group for 

Preaching and Combat, or GSPC) that was increasingly without a viable mission.3

The GSPC was dedicated to fighting the Algerian government allegedly in order to 

restore the aborted 1991 legislative elections. By 2004, the government and the Algerian population had moved on and were focused on restoring peace and stability. 

The GSPC’s leader in 2005, Abdelmalek Droukdel, initiated the process whereby the 

GSPC first became formally affiliated with al-Qaeda, and then in 2007 announced 

that it had become AQIM.4 Over the course of the last 10 years, AQIM’s strategy, 

tactics, and area of operations have evolved, responding to changes in the broader 

jihadi movement and to political and security developments in the region. 

Droukdel remains the organization’s leader, but it has expanded its operations beyond just Algeria to include a broad swath of North Africa. In fact, its operations 

in Algeria itself are curtailed and the group has struggled recently to remain relevant in the Algerian context. That being said, as evinced by the 18 March 2016 

attack against the In Salah Gas asset at Krechba, AQIM retains some domestic support in Algeria and still has the capacity to carry out episodic strikes against highvalue targets, especially far from urban centers where security measures are less 

rigorous.5

AQIM’s evolution has not been seamless and the organization has experienced 

schisms and leadership fracture. In particular, in 2012 Droukdel quarreled with one 

of his commanders in northern Mali, and that commander, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, 

quit AQIM to form his own organization, al-Mourabitoun, made up of AQIM fighters 

as well as fighters from the Movement for Unity in Jihad in West Africa or MUJAO 

(Fr. Mouvement pour l’unicite ́ et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest.)6 Four months after 

its formation, a heavily-armed platoon of al-Mourabitoun fighters attacked the 

Tigantourine Gas Plant at In Amenas in Algeria. The attackers originated in northern Mali, transited eastward across the country, passed through northeastern Niger, 

and entered southwestern Libya where they staged their operation. The attackers 

subsequently crossed Algeria’s border and attacked the gas facility. More than 3 

dozen expatriates were killed at the site, including 3 U.S. citizens.7

Following the In Amenas attack, al-Mourabitoun went to ground, possibly as a result of having lost so many men in the attack, but also because it was being doggedly hunted. From January 2013 to July 2014, France had deployed roughly 4,000 

troops as part of Ope ́ration Serval whose objective was to stabilize northern Mali 

in the wake of a jihadi salafi offensive. The French presence on the ground and its 

assets in the air hindered Belmokhtar and al-Mourabitoun’s movements. 

In the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan revolution, AQIM also tried to make inroads 

among jihadi salafi groups in Libya, including with Ansar al-Sharia, the jihadi salafi 

group involved in the attack against the U.S. compound in Benghazi.8 Belmokhtar 

was allegedly charged with initiating relations between AQIM and Ansar al-Sharia.9

While Belmokhtar’s overtures were likely well-received, they did not result in any 

operational coordination between AQIM and Ansar al-Sharia. Ansar al-Sharia itself 

has since been absorbed into other jihadi salafi organizations in Libya, including the 

Mujahids’ Shura Council Darna and the Mujahids’ Shura Council Benghazi.10

19 

Wissenschaft und Politik-SWP-Deutsches Institut fu ̈ r Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 

2015. 11 ‘‘al-Barghathıˆ; ’Daech’ yu’amalu ’ala ‘i’aˆda tajmu’a sufuˆfahu wa tamarkazaˆtahu fıˆ januˆ b 

lıˆbıˆyaˆ,’’ khabaˆ r lıˆbıˆyaˆ, 4 March 2017. 12 Me ́mier, Marc, ‘‘AQMI et al-Mourabitoun: Le djihad sahe ́lien re ́unifie ́’’ E ́ tudes de l’Ifri, January 2017. 13 Mohamed Fall Oume`re, ‘‘De la naissance d’un nouveau ‘djihadistan‘ au Sahel,’’ Le Monde, 10 March 2017. 14 Amin Muhammad ‘Amad, ‘‘ikhtiyaˆ r iyaˆd agh ghaˆlıˆ ’amıˆran li jamaˆ’a ’jamaˆ’a nusrah al-islaˆm wa al-muslimıˆn,’’ al-salaˆm al-yuˆm, 4 March 2017. 15 ‘‘iyaˆd agh ghaˆlıˆ ‘mullah ‘umar’ mantiqah al-saˆhil wa al-sahraˆ’,’’ al-’akhbaˆ r al-maurıˆtaˆnıˆyah 

6 March 2017. 16 Porter, Geoff D. ‘‘How Realistic is Libya as an Islamic State ‘Fallback’ ’’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 

9 Issue 3, March 2016. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Imene Brahimi, ‘‘RE ́ CIT. Abdelmalek El Gouri: trois mois de traque sans relaˆ che,’’ Tout sur 

l’Alge ́rie, 23 December 2014. 

Libya’s descent into civil war by late 2014 and the emergence of the Islamic State 

in Sirte in 2015 both undermined Ansar al-Sharia’s on-going viability. As a result, 

AQIM does not have a sustained presence in northern Libya. It is likely, though, 

that al-Mourabitoun continue to have a limited presence in southwestern Libya.11

While AQIM failed to maintain a presence in Libya, it has had greater success 

with its Tunisian affiliate, the Uqba Ibn Nafi Brigade, which was established by an 

emissary who had been sent to Tunisia by Droukdel in 2011. The Uqba Ibn Nafi 

Brigade is contained in western Tunisia along the border with Algeria and it closely 

adheres to AQIM’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, avoiding attacks on civilians 

and targeting Tunisian security services. 

In November of 2015, al-Mourabitoun rejoined AQIM, although a faction of alMourabitoun led by Abu Walid al-Sahraoui had earlier pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and created the Islamic State of the Grand Sahara.12 The return of alMourabitoun was a triumph for Droukdel and it reestablished AQIM’s prominence 

as the leading jihadi salafi organization in North Africa, the Sahara, and the Sahel. 

Droukdel has recently further consolidated AQIM’s position in Saharan and 

Sahelian countries. A communique on 2 March 2017 announced the regrouping of 

disparate but related jihadi salafi groups in North Africa. The announcement was 

made by Iyad Ag Ghali, the leader of Ansar Dine, a local front for AQIM in Mali. 

Ag Ghali was accompanied by AQIM commander Yahya Abu Hammam, alMourabitoun second-in-command Hassan al-Ansari, Amadou Koufa, the leader of 

the Macina Brigade (Ansar Dine’s Peul battalion), and Abderrahmane Sanhaji, an 

AQIM legal scholar.13 Ag Ghali declared that the group was now ‘‘Islam and Muslims’ Victory Group’’ and that it remained loyal to al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman 

Zawahiri and AQIM’s emir Abdelmalik Droukdel.14 With the regrouping, AQIM is 

able to reestablish its unified presence in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, 

Niger, and Tunisia.15

The Islamic State and Affiliated Groups 

In 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State, sent a mission 

to Libya to assess the possibility of establishing an Islamic State presence in the 

country.16 By 2014, a coalition of different jihadi salafi groups in Derna pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and by June 2015, the Islamic State controlled most 

of the central coastal city of Sirte.17 Reports regarding the number of Islamic State 

fighters in Sirte varied considerably with some sources citing 3,000 fighters and others as many as 12,000.18 While in control of Sirte, the Islamic State tried to impose 

its own perverse interpretation of Islamic law on the town’s population, but the Islamic State in Libya was never self-sufficient and remained dependent upon the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria for financial support.19

The Islamic State had also attempted to make inroads elsewhere in North Africa. 

In September 2014, a new group, the Caliphate’s Soldiers in the Land of Algeria, 

captured a French tourist in the mountains to the southeast of the capital Algiers. 

The group announced its allegiance with the Islamic State and declared that it 

would kill its hostage if its demands were not met. Algeria does not negotiate with 

terrorists and the group murdered the Frenchman. While Algeria has reckoned with 

AQIM for more than 10 years, it would not tolerate the emergence of an Islamic 

State ally within its borders. By December 2014, Algerian security services had 

largely eradicated the group, including eliminating its leader Khaled Abou 

Suleimane.20 There have been intermittent attempts to carry out attacks in subseVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
20 

21 Fayc ̧al Me ́taoui, ‘‘Attentat a` Constantine: Le terroriste abattu,’’ El Watan, 26 February 

2017. 22 ‘‘Tunisie: les terrorists auraient e ́te ́ forme ́s par le groupe El en Libye,’’ RFI Afrique, 20 

March 2015. 23 ‘‘l’Etat islamique revendique l’attentat contre la police en Tunisie,’’ Le Monde, 25 November 

2015. 24 Declan Walsh, Ben Hubbard, and Eric Schmitt, ‘‘U.S. Bombing in Libya Reveals Limits of 

Strategy Against ISIS,’’ The New York Times, 19 February 2016. 25 ‘‘Sahel: un chef d’Al-Mourabitoun preˆte alle ́gegance a` l’organisation de l’E ́ tat islamique,’’ 

France24, 15 May 2015. 26 Aziz M., ‘‘Urgent: L’e ́mir d’al-Mourabitoun gravement blesse dans des affrontements,’’ El 

Watan, 17 June 2015. 27 Imad Stitou, ‘‘Qui est Abou Walid as-Sahraoui qui menace de terroriser le Maroc,’’ Le Desk, 4 May 2016. 28 Dodwell, Brian, Milton, Daniel, & Rassler, Don, The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail, The Combating Terrorism Center 

at West Point, April 2016. 29 Ilhem Rachidi, ‘‘Mohamed Tozy: ‘Le Maroc a parie ́ sur une sorte de salafisme implicite’,’’ 

Le Desk, 22 July 2016. 30 Paul Cruickshank, ‘‘The inside story of the Paris and Brussels attacks,’’ CNN, 30 March 

2016. 

quent years by individuals and cells claiming to be Islamic State members, but 

these have been largely unsuccessful. The most recent attack in the eastern Algerian city of Constantine was foiled.21

There was also an uneven attempt to establish an Islamic State group in Tunisia 

which labeled itself the Caliphate’s Soldiers. In March 2015, three Islamic State 

gunmen attacked the Bardo Museum in Tunis.22 The Islamic State also claimed responsibility for an attack carried out by a lone gunman in June 2015 near the resort 

town of Sousse and for an attack on the Presidential guard in Tunis, Tunisia.23 In 

March 2016, there was a 3-day gun battle in the Tunisian border town of Ben 

Guerdane that seems to have been precipitated by the U.S. bombing of an Islamic 

State training camp in Sabratha, Libya.24 Tunisian members of the Islamic State 

in Libya had been planning to capture and hold Ben Guerdane but may have accelerated their attack in the aftermath of the Sabratha bombing. 

The battle of Ben Guerdane, however, underscores an important aspect of the Islamic State threat in Tunisia: Almost all Islamic State activities in Tunisia have 

had a Libyan component. Since the Ben Guerdane assault and the Islamic State’s 

subsequent loss of Sirte, Libya, the Islamic State’s activities in Tunisia have been 

more sporadic and the group’s capacity in Tunisia is diminished. Recent Islamic 

State attacks in Tunisia have focused on the Tunisian security services and Tunisia 

has not suffered a large-scale Islamic State attack in more than a year. 

At the same time, however, the Islamic State has expanded southward, at least 

in name. In May 2015, a former MUJAO leader in Mali, Adnane Abou Walid elSahraoui, who had joined al-Mourabitoun, split with Belmokhtar, pledged allegiance 

to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and formed the Islamic State in the Grand Sahara.25 In 

the following months, el-Sahraoui was quiet, some suspecting he had been wounded 

in a clash with al-Mourabitoun loyalists.26 El-Sahraoui re-emerged in May 2016, 

threatening to undertake attacks against Morocco and U.N. personnel stationed in 

the disputed territory of Western Sahara.27 No such attack ever transpired and over 

the last 6 months el-Sahraoui’s group has carried out only a handful of small-scale 

attacks against soft targets in Burkina Faso and Mali. 

El-Sahraoui’s inability to hit Morocco is all the more curious because there appears to be a deep well of sympathy for the Islamic State in Morocco. Moroccans 

constituted the third-largest nationality to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 

(smaller only than Saudi Arabia and Tunisia).28 At home, Moroccan security services have disrupted an Islamic State plot or arrested an alleged Islamic State cell 

almost once a month, every month for the last 2 years. Why there is so much support for the Islamic State in Morocco may be due to the monarchy’s overt effort to 

enforce a state version of Islam. Islamic State supporters bristle at a monarch who 

they view as corrupt claiming the mantle ‘‘Commander of the Faithful’’ and imposing an interpretation of Islam on them.29 The Islamic State’s Moroccan appeal extends beyond Morocco’s borders into Europe. The November 2015 Paris attacks and 

the March 2016 Brussels attacks, both claimed by the Islamic State, each had Moroccan elements.30

ASSESSING THE THREAT

Jihadi salafi terrorist groups in North Africa undoubtedly pose a threat to U.S. 

National interests overseas and, even though they pose no immediate risk to U.S. 

homeland, they could threaten the homeland over the longer term. Importantly, as 

21 

31 North Africa Risk Consulting, NARCO Analysis: Why the US bombed ISIS in Libya, 19 January 2017. 32 Op Cit., Ft. 7. 33 Chris Stephen, ‘‘Secret US mission in Libya revealed after air force posted pictures,’’ The 

Guardian, 17 December 2015. 34 Alex Horton, ‘‘Special Forces soldier dies in accident in Niger,’’ Stars and Stripes, 11 February 2017. 35 ‘‘Attentat de Marrakech: au moins six Franc ̧ais tue ́s’’ Le Monde, 29 April 2011. 36 Porter, Geoff D., ‘‘The Eradicateurs’’ Foreign Policy, 18 January 2013. 37 ‘‘RIP to a friend—MARSOC Marine’’ SOCNET, The Special Operations Community Network. 38 Frida Dahmani, ‘‘Attentat du Bardo: le muse ́e de l’horreur,’’ Jeune Afrique, 24 March 2015. 39 The Tunisia Inquests (2017). 

is true of all terrorist organizations, neither al-Qaeda allied groups nor Islamic 

State affiliates distinguish between civilian and official targets. U.S. Government 

personnel, U.S. citizens, and U.S. corporations are all seen as legitimate targets. 

The Threat to National Interests Overseas 

With its on-going operations in Algeria and Tunisia and its ‘‘regroupment’’ in the 

Sahara and Sahel, AQIM is now the strongest terrorist organization in North Africa 

with the biggest footprint and poses the greatest threat to U.S. National interests 

in the region. Its ‘‘regroupment’’ theoretically allows it to eliminate redundancies 

among formerly disparate groups, conserve and share resources, and coordinate 

training and planning. 

In contrast, the Islamic State suffered a severe setback in North Africa due to the 

loss of its bastion in Sirte. There have reportedly been fewer ‘‘squirters’’ from the 

Sirte offensive than anticipated and smaller numbers of Islamic State fighters managed to escape the city than was expected. Those that did escape are dispersed 

throughout Libya and northern Niger. Their current capabilities are uncertain, but 

they lost or expended a large amount of materiel in their campaign to defend Sirte 

and in subsequent airstrikes against training camps and other locations.31 In addition, it will take them time to establish networks in new local communities that will 

enable them to function more fluidly. That being said, there is no doubt that Islamic 

State fighters cling to jihadi salafi ideology and still harbor a desire to attack U.S. 

and U.S.-related targets. For the moment, though, Islamic State attacks in North 

Africa will be more opportunistic than calibrated. 

Although North Africa and the Sahara are not strategic regions for the United 

States, there are three main categories where U.S. National interest can be endangered by terrorist organizations: U.S. Government personnel, U.S. private citizens, 

and U.S. businesses. 

U.S. Government Personnel 

In 2012, Ansar al-Sharia participated in an attack in Benghazi, Libya that resulted in the deaths of four U.S. Government personnel.32 Although the circumstances around the attack are unlikely to be replicated elsewhere in North Africa, it was a sharp reminder that North African terrorist organizations will target 

the U.S. Government when they can. In addition to the U.S. diplomatic corps, the 

United States has soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen in North Africa who are 

high-value targets for jihadi salafi groups. The risks to U.S. service members were 

underscored in an episode in December 2015 during which a team of U.S. Special 

Forces was interdicted by a Libyan militia.33 The militia was not a terrorist organization and the team exfiltrated the country without further incident, but the confrontation could have easily ended very differently. Further to the south in Niger, 

a U.S. soldier died while supporting Nigerien counterterrorism operations.34

U.S. Citizens 

In addition to U.S. diplomats and members of the armed services, the on-going 

presence of jihadi salafi groups in North Africa threatens U.S. citizens in the region. 

AQIM and the Islamic State’s willingness to kill civilians is well-documented. In 

April 2011, a jihadi salafi bomber in Marrakech, Morocco killed 17 civilians, including 15 Europeans.35 In January 2013, 37 expatriates were killed, including three 

U.S. citizens, when al-Mourabitoun attacked the Tigantourine Gas Facility at In 

Amenas, Algeria.36 In January 2015, a U.S. citizen (and U.S. Marine veteran) was 

killed in an Islamic State attack in Tripoli, Libya.37 In March 2015, Islamic State 

gunmen killed 22 civilians, including 21 from Europe, Japan, and Latin America, 

at the Bardo Museum in Tunis, Tunisia.38 In June 2015, an Islamic State gunman 

killed 38 civilians and wounded 37 at Port El Kantaoui, Tunisia. The victims were 

predominantly from the United Kingdom.39 On 20 November 2015, AQIM and alVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
22 

40 ‘‘L’attentat de Bamako re ́veille le spectre de ‘l’insaisissable’ Mokhtar Belmokhtar,’’ France24 

23 November 2015. 41 ‘‘Ce que l’on sait de l’attaque terroriste a` Ouagadougou,’’ Le Monde 15 January 2016. 42 ‘‘Coˆte d’Ivoire: Aqmi de ́voile les objectifs de son attentat a` Grand-Bassam,’’ RFI, 15 March 

2016, 43 Porter, Geoff D., ‘‘Terrorist Targeting of the Libyan Oil and Gas Sector,’’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 

8, Issue 2, February 2015. 44 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Libya, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/ 

country.cfm?iso=LBY. 45 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Algeria, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/ 

country.cfm?iso=DZA. 46 Michael Stothard, ‘‘Gas find on Mauritania-Senegal border comes with challenges,’’ Financial Times, 15 April 2016. 47 Reinares, Fernando, ‘‘Avatares del terrorismo yihadista en Espan ̃ a,’’ Real Instituto Elcano, 

3 February 2017. 48 ‘‘AQMI menace ‘d’exporter la guerre en France,’’ alakhbar.info, 17 March 2017. 

Mourabitoun attacked a hotel in Bamako, Mali, killing 20 civilians, including a U.S. 

citizen.40 In January 2016, AQIM attacked a hotel and cafe ́ in Ouagadougou, 

Burkina Faso, killing 30 civilians, including one U.S. citizen.41 In March 2016, 

AQIM attacked a beachfront hotel in Grand-Bassam, Ivory Coast, killing 19 civilians.42 It is due to a combination of vacationing patterns, limited U.S. foreign direct 

investment in the region, and luck that more U.S. citizens have not been killed by 

jihadi salafi organizations in North Africa over the last decade. 

U.S. Corporations 

The operations of U.S. companies in North Africa are also vulnerable to jihadi 

salafi terrorism.43 Numerous U.S. companies have investments and activities in 

North Africa, particularly in the oil and gas sector. ExxonMobil has oil and gas assets in Libya and Chad. A consortium of three other prominent U.S. oil companies 

also operates in Libya.44 Still other U.S. energy companies have assets in Algeria.45

In addition, a U.S. energy company recently made a promising gas discovery in 

Mauritania.46 U.S. companies are also involved in other sectors throughout North 

Africa, including petrochemicals, telecoms, defense, pharmaceuticals, and renewables. 

Although the value of U.S. corporate activity in North Africa is dwarfed by that 

in Central America or South East Asia, North Africa is nonetheless an important 

market that creates value for American enterprises. A terrorist attack, regardless 

of whether it directly targets U.S. companies or the private sector in general, disrupts commercial activity and erodes value for U.S. corporations. There is the possibility of the loss of life and the destruction of hard assets. There are costs associated 

with lost productivity due to country evacuations in the wake of terrorist attack. Finally, the existence of a terrorist threat compels corporations to shoulder additional 

security and insurance costs. If the threat is deemed serious enough, costs become 

unsustainable and U.S. companies will abandon opportunities in North Africa. 

The Threat to the Homeland 

Threat posed by North African terrorist organizations to Europe is greater than 

the threat they pose to the United States. There are multiple reasons for this having to do with geographic proximity, colonial legacies, linguistic facility, and the 

commonality of dual-nationality among European and North African countries.47

No terrorist organization in North Africa currently has the capacity to undertake 

attacks in the United States. Jihadi salafi terrorist organizations in many senses 

are no different than any other organization, terrorist or otherwise. Jihadi salafi 

groups calculate the most effective ways to allocate finite resources with the greatest likelihood of success. In the case of North African terrorist organizations, this 

means that if they do intend to carry out attacks against targets outside their area 

of operations, then they are most likely to attempt attacks in Europe. In fact, given 

the target-rich environment in which they operate in North Africa and given the 

proximity of Europe, jihadi salafi terrorist organizations in North Africa are more 

likely to carry out attacks in North Africa and Europe than they are in the United 

States. 

Because of the historical legacy of colonial occupation by France, North African 

jihadi salafis from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia are likely 

to have greater familiarity with French than English and are more likely to be able 

to establish networks among North African diaspora communities in Europe than 

they are in the United States. In fact, in a communique commending the formation 

of ‘‘The Islam and Muslims’ Victory Group’’ earlier in March 2017, Abdelmalek 

Droukdel, the commander of AQIM, declared that ‘‘Muslims want to export war 

from their lands to France.’’48

23 

49 ‘‘Tres detenidos en Barcelona y Valencia en un Nuevo golpe contra el yihadismo,’’ El Paı ́s, 22 March 2017. 50 Peter Finn, ‘‘Al-Awlaki directed Christmas ‘underwear bomber’ plot, Justice Department 

memo says,’’ The Washington Post, 10 February 2012. 51 Wehrey, Frederic, Alrababa‘h, Ala‘, ‘‘Rising Out of Chaos: The Islamic State in Libya,’’ Carnegie Middle East Center, 5 March 2015. 52 Op. Cit. Ft. 16. 53 Allain Jules, ‘‘Boko Haram: re ́apparition de Abubakar Shekau qui accuse le Cameroun de 

‘mensonge‘,’’ mamaafrika.tv, 17 March 2017. 54 Wright, Lawrence, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 

2006). 55 Porter, Geoff D. and Sheehan, Michael, ‘‘The Future Role of US Counterterrorism Operations in Africa’’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 7, Issue 2, February 2014. 56 Eric Schmitt, ‘‘Using Special Forces Against Terrorism, Trump Seeks to Avoid Big Ground 

Wars,’’ The New York Times, 19 March 2017. 

Similarly, because of Italy’s colonial presence in Libya and the subsequent U.K. 

presence after World War II, Libyan jihadi salafis are more likely to have familiarity with and potential networks in Italy and the United Kingdom rather than in 

the United States. Last, because of its geographic proximity and because of the size 

of the Moroccan diaspora population, Moroccan jihadi salafis are also more likely 

to privilege Spanish over American targets.49

Nevertheless, like any other group around the globe, jihadi salafis are mobile. Individuals from one group in one region join another group in another region. The 

2009 plot to explode an airplane over Detroit, Michigan was undertaken by a Nigerian from Kaduna who had joined al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and 

was being directed by the American Anwar al-Awlaki.50 In 2012, Libyans who had 

traveled to Syria formed the Battar Brigade, which later pledged allegiance to the 

Islamic State. They subsequently traveled back to Libya where they were joined by 

an Islamic State delegation from Yemen and Saudi Arabia.51 Later in 2015 and 

2016, Iraqis and Saudis traveled to Libya to oversee the Islamic State’s activities 

there.52 A recent video from Abu Bakr Shekau, the embattled leader of Boko Haram 

in Nigeria, featured a French speaker in predominantly Anglophone Nigeria, suggesting that Boko Haram is recruiting in Francophone Sahelian countries.53 What 

this means is that even though jihadi salafi groups in North Africa may not pose 

a direct threat to the United States because they do not have the operational capacity to hit the United States or because it is not a strategic priority for them, individual North African and Saharan jihadi salafis could contribute to the capabilities 

of other jihadi salafi groups outside North Africa that do have the capacity and the 

intention to target the United States. 

Moreover, if groups are left unmolested, even if they do not presently pose a direct 

threat to the U.S. homeland, they will evolve and their capacity to plan and train 

will grow, potentially to the point where attacking the U.S. homeland is no longer 

practically infeasible. This was the case with al-Qaeda and Usama bin Laden in 

Khartoum, Sudan in the 1990’s and it is potentially the case today for al-Qaeda and 

Islamic State groups in North Africa, the Sahara, and the Sahel.54

CURRENT COUNTERTERRORISM APPROACHES

In counterterrorism, there is no ‘‘Mission Accomplished.’’ There is only ‘‘continuing 

to accomplish the mission.’’ There is no winning. There is only managing the risk 

to tolerable levels. Doing that is complicated, involving a continuum of military and 

non-military solutions. 

Military Counterterrorism Approaches in North Africa 

Since 2013, the United States has employed a new model for counterterrorism operations in North Africa and the Sahara and Sahel.55 The model relies on logistical 

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to U.S. allies, building 

partner capacity (BPC) programs, and the limited use of U.S. Special Forces to advise, assist, and accompany local forces and pursue high-value targets (HVTs).56

This approach has advantages and disadvantages. 

Among its advantages, it is less costly than large scale military deployments; it 

limits U.S. personnel exposure to risks on the ground; it allows for the wider projection of U.S. power; and it is potentially less diplomatically disruptive to the pursuit 

of other U.S. National non-security related interests. By training local partners, it 

builds a more enduring counterterrorism presence in the region. Perhaps most importantly, this approach does not aim to eliminate terrorism or defeat terrorist 

groups in North Africa: Its objective is to degrade them. The constant pressure that 

results from this approach slows the evolution of terrorist groups and prevents them 

24 

57 Price, Bryan C., ‘‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 

Counterterrorism,’’ International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 9–46. 58 Porter, Geoff D., ‘‘The Drone War Goes Awry in Africa,’’ Foreign Policy, 20 January 2016. 59 Porter, Geoff D., ‘‘Terrorist Outbidding: The In Amenas Attack,’’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, Issue 

5 (May 2015). 60 Powelson, Simon J., Enduring Engagement Yes, Episodic Engagement No: Lessons for SOF 

from Mali, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2013. 61 Nickels, Benjamin P., and Shorey, Margot, ‘‘Chad: A Precarious Counterterrorism Partner,’’ 

CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, Issue 4 (April 2015). 62 Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency, International Crisis Group, Report 

Number 245, 27 February 2017. 63 Carla Babb, ‘‘Friend or Foe? Doubts Plague US Military in Libya Training,’’ Voice of America, 18 May 2016. 

64 Turner, John A., Religious Ideology and the Roots of Global Jihad: Salafi Jihadism and 

International Order (New York: Springer, 2014). 65 Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, Transparency International, 25 January 2017. 

from gaining the capabilities that could ultimately allow them to target the homeland. 

Nevertheless, there is no counterterrorism silver bullet and the new model is not 

without its shortcomings. Although over the long run leadership decapitation of terrorist groups and eliminating HVTs quantifiably shortens a group’s life span, they 

also can have unintended consequences.57 For example, removing the leader of one 

group can result in the merger of two groups that had previously been hostile to 

one another, thereby creating a new group that has greater capabilities than either 

of the two pre-existing groups.58 Alternately, eliminating HVTs and leadership decapitation can result in schisms within terrorists organizations that can result in 

competition for prominence among factions, a phenomenon known as ‘‘outbidding.’’59

One of the ways in which outbidding can manifest itself is through an increased 

pace of terrorist attacks or more ‘‘spectacular’’ terrorist attacks. In short, eliminating HVTs or leadership decapitation can inadvertently increase the lethality of 

a terrorist organization in the near term. 

A second problem with the new approach to counterterrorism in North Africa is 

that BPC efforts need to be consistent and sustained in order for them to work. Ad 

hoc or intermittent training engagements with partner nations mean local forces retain some of the skills acquired through BPC programs for a period of time, but 

there is no long-term capacity improvement and the United States runs the risk of 

repeating efforts ad infinitum.60

Last, the United States needs to be mindful that political circumstances in partner countries may not be conducive to BPC. U.S. training of local militaries that 

have poor reputations in host countries or are politically problematic can contribute 

to broader animosity toward the United States and fuel the jihadi salafi anti-American narrative. For example, while U.S. efforts in Chad have increased Chadian 

forces counterterrorism capabilities, it has come at the cost of the United States 

being perceived as supporting President Idriss De ́by’s authoritarian regime.61 In 

Niger’s Diffa region, the local population blames the deterioration of the security environment as much on Boko Haram as on the abusive Nigerien forces combating the 

terrorist group.62 The problem is more difficult in Libya where, in the absence of 

a functioning government, it is hard to even identify the proper military units to 

be trained.63

Non-military Approaches to Countering Terrorism in North Africa 

Despite the new counterterrorism approach’s advantages, military solutions are 

never enough to limit the threat that terrorism poses to U.S. National interest 

abroad and to the homeland. It is equally important to address the underlying conditions that lead to the emergence and continuation of terrorist organizations in 

North Africa. Because terrorism is by definition political and because jihadi salafi 

terrorism is about destroying and reshaping political structures in predominantly 

Muslim parts of the globe, it is critical to engage regional political institutions to 

ensure that they are upholding the obligations inherent in the state-society relationship. Misunderstanding the political dimension or ignoring it entirely does a disservice to counterterrorism efforts. 

One of the fundamental drivers of jihadi salafi terrorism is the perception of injustice and the belief that the implementation of a salafi interpretation of Islam via 

jihad would ensure Muslims social justice.64

There is quantitative evidence that indicates that North African, Saharan, and 

Sahelian countries have a justice deficit. Excepting Tunisia, all the countries in the 

region fall in the bottom half of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 

Index 2016.65 Libya is ranked 170th of out 176 countries. Chad is 159th and Mali 

is 116. The World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 2016 ranked Tunisia 58th out 

25 

66 World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2016, The World Justice Project (2016). Algeria, Libya, Chad, Niger, and Mali were not included in the index because the World Justice 

Project was unable to conduct household polling. 67 A Decade of African Governance 2006–2015: 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Mo 

Ibrahim Foundation (October 2016). 68 Messner, J.J., and Haken, Nate, et al. Fragile States Index 2016: The Book (June 2016). 

of 113 countries. Morocco was 60th, Burkina Faso 79th, and Nigeria 96th.66 The 

2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance which ranks Africa’s 54 countries also 

indicates inadequate governance and rule of law in North Africa.67 For its ‘‘Overall 

Governance’’ ranking, Libya was ranked 51 out of 54 countries. Chad was 48, Niger 

27, Mali 25, and Algeria 20. There is a justifiable and overwhelming perception that 

the playing field in North Africa, the Sahara, and Sahel is uneven. If injustice fuels 

the jihadi salafi narrative, then the narrative burns bright in North Africa and the 

Sahara. 

There is also quantifiable evidence that North African and Saharan and Sahelian 

countries may not just be unwilling to ensure justice for their populations, but they 

may be unable to. Every country in the region is listed as being at risk according 

to the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index: Fragility in the World 2016.68 Even 

the most stable countries in the region—Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia—receive 

‘‘Elevated Warnings.’’ Chad’s status is categorized as ‘‘Very High Alert,’’ and Cameroon, Libya, Mali, and Niger are listed as ‘‘Alerts.’’ When states are fragile or they 

fail, they no longer have the capacity to provide services ranging from education to 

security for their populations. The collapse of governance, let alone implementing 

of good governance, creates space for jihadi salafi terrorist groups to act. 

Considering its historical commitment to justice and good governance, the United 

States should work to reduce North African deficits in those areas. Military approaches to counterterrorism can diminish existing threats but they cannot address 

the conditions that allow terrorist groups to emerge, sustain themselves, or revitalize themselves. Through aid and development programs, the United States can 

shore up fragile North African and Saharan States. Doing so is as vital a counterterrorism tool as are BPC programs and eliminating HVTs. 

Mitigating the threat posed by North African jihadi salafi terrorists to U.S. interests abroad and to the homeland requires a nuanced combination of military and 

non-military approaches. North African terrorist organizations do not presently pose 

a threat to the homeland. However, removing terrorists from the battlefield 

downrange only slows their groups’ evolution. To truly secure the homeland, the 

United States must address the underlying causes of North African terrorism, chief 

among them injustice and rule of law. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Dr. Porter. 

Our next witness is Mr. Laith Alkhouri, who is a co-founder and 

director of counterterrorism research at Flashpoint, which is a 

business risk intelligence company. He directs Flashpoint’s jihadist 

threat intelligence service and serves as the lead on all primary 

source research into deep and dark Web networks used by terrorist 

groups. 

He has researched and translated thousands of jihadist documents and videos, analyzing jihadi terrorist activities across the 

Middle East, North Africa, and central and Southeast Asia. Mr. 

Alkhouri has presented his findings to several Cabinet agencies, 

the Council on Foreign Relations, the New York City Police Department, and a number of academic institutions. 

Mr. Alkhouri, thank you for being here today, and you are recognized for your testimony. Thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF LAITH ALKHOURI, CO-FOUNDER AND 

DIRECTOR, FLASHPOINT 

Mr. ALKHOURI. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member 

Rice, and distinguished committee Members. 

Today, both al-Qaeda and ISIS operate in major parts of North 

Africa and pose a significant threat. They also pose a significant 

threat to Western civilians and interests. Throughout the past decVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
26 

ade, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has kidnapped and killed 

Westerners and attacked Western economic interests. 

Its record is heavy with such incidents starting as early as 2007, 

including at least 16 incidents of kidnapping Westerners at gunpoint, a number of whom were executed in Algeria, Mauritania, 

Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and other countries. 

AQIM poses a significant threat to gas and oil facilities and hotels, among other Western economic interests. The most notable example is the group’s January 2013 hostage crisis at the 

Tigantourine gas and oil extraction facility in Algeria’s In Amenas 

town where 3 Americans and over 2 dozen other Western nationals 

employed there were killed. Other attacks targeted hotels and 

killed Westerners in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast in 2016. 

Al-Qaeda has exponentially grown in North Africa and the Sahel. 

This March, AQIM unified jihadi factions in north Mali under its 

banner, effectively inflating its ranks across the Sahel and Sahara 

at a time when many believe that it has largely been diminished. 

The emergence and rise of ISIS, arguably today’s most significant 

global threat, has amplified the pre-existing sense of insecurity and 

instability. ISIS has captured significant territory and aggressively 

expanded across Sirte, has heavily operated in Derna, Benghazi, 

Tripoli, Misrata, and other cities amid a political turmoil in Libya. 

ISIS operates not only in Libya, but also in Algeria and Tunisia, 

and it has killed dozens of tourists. It has set up camps in Algeria 

in 2014 and networked with jihadist cells in Tunisia, dispatching 

operatives to kill tourists in Tunisia. Two of these attacks killed 

over 40 Westerners combined in March and June 2015. It has recently launched its first suicide bombing in Algeria. 

ISIS has orchestrated and inspired attacks in the West. It directed major terror attacks in Paris and Brussels and inspired the 

worst mass shooting in U.S. history at the Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida. 

Part of its M.O. is, yes, launching suicide bombing against security forces, but importantly, its leadership’s explicit threats to and 

orchestration of attacks in Europe and the United States are part 

of its branch in Libya’s agenda. 

Its branch in Libya has verbalized threats to the United States. 

It not only expressed threats to attack beyond the Mediterranean, 

but also vowed attacks in Washington and New York in its official 

propaganda. 

ISIS has exerted influence among jihadists in the West and incited them to launch attacks. The group has influenced radicals in 

the United States and Europe, who are encouraged to attack in 

their home countries instead of actually join the group on the 

ground. This has been explicitly encouraged by ISIS leaders in official propaganda. 

Libya is poised to become a launching pad for operations in the 

West. As ISIS struggles to maintain control of its territory in Iraq 

and Syria, it will likely up the ante in inciting and plotting external operations in the West. 

Its branch in Libya is poised to welcome many of its foreign 

fighters already in its ranks in the Middle East, which might turn 

Libya into the biggest ISIS camp for foreign fighters outside of Iraq 

27 

and Syria. Fighters from at least 10 nationalities so far have been 

fighting with ISIS in Libya, featured in its propaganda. 

Both groups seek to dominate the jihadi landscape with mutual 

focus on Westerners. AQIM and ISIS oppose each other. ISIS’ 

emergence has not only exacerbated the terror threats but also polarized the jihadi movement in the region, effectively creating a 

competitive landscape that raises the threat prospects against the 

West. 

AQIM has concentrated on condemning France. Each group seeks 

to reassert itself as the main jihadi leader in the region, and both 

groups see Westerners as enemy No. 1. 

ISIS has a more powerful recruitment strategy than AQIM. 

While both groups pose a threat to the West, ISIS appears to have 

developed a stronger radicalization and indoctrination agenda than 

its competitor. 

ISIS’ external operations facilitators appear to have developed a 

more inclusive and aggressive call to launch attacks by all means 

necessary, unlike AQIM, which has not heavily focused on calls for 

external attacks overseas. 

The returnees to the United States and Europe, those who have 

gained experience in militant tactics in ISIS camps, as well as selfradicalized individuals, likely pose the most significant jihadist 

threat to the West today. Thank you so much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Alkhouri follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAITH ALKHOURI

MARCH 29, 2017 

INTRODUCTION

North Africa has conventionally been the backyard of major al-Qaeda terror activity, predominantly al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—and to this day the 

group poses a significant threat to the region and to Western civilians and interests. 

The terror threats have created a sense of insecurity in major parts of the region, 

and AQIM has been the primary perpetrator. Indeed, it has a long record of bombing and kidnapping attacks against Westerners, extending its reach from Algeria to 

Tunisia, Mali, and other countries. 

The region has also witnessed the emergence of The Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL), further amplifying the preexisting sense of insecurity and instability, particularly in 

light of its seizure of a major territory in Libya. It has played the role of a de facto 

governing body in Libya’s Sirte City, affording it a comfortable launching pad for 

attacks across other Libyan cities, and transnationally in Algeria and Tunisia—and 

potentially in the West. 

ISIS and AQIM are highly adversarial toward the West in general and the United 

States in particular. They possess a long track record of issuing threats and carrying out attacks aimed at Western civilians and economic interests. Albeit both upholding the jihadist ideology, AQIM and ISIS are highly oppositional toward each 

other. Their potential competition for dominance drives each group to reassert its 

influence over the jihadi landscape in North Africa, which significantly raises the 

threat prospects against Westerners. 

In addition, these groups thrive on being in the spotlight, and targeting Westerners brings them considerable PR value. Looking at today’s jihadi landscape in 

North Africa and the record of these groups, I believe that they will continue to pose 

a significant threat to the West in the future, regionally and internationally. 

PICTURE OF THE THREAT

On March 6, 2017, al-Zalaqa Media Foundation, a jihadi media unit affiliated 

with al-Qaeda, released a video featuring the leaders of the Mali-based jihadi groups 

Ansar al-Dine, al-Murabitoune, Macina Liberation Front, and the Sahara Region. In 

the video, Iyad Ag Ghali, the top leader of Ansar al-Dine, announced the creation 

of ‘‘The Group for Support of Islam and Muslims,’’ a new jihadi collective encomVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
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1 https://justpaste.it/14mlp. 2 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/world/africa/libya-isis.html. 3 https://ia800408.us.archive.org/27/items/tawjehlayman/tawjehlayman.pdf. 

passing the aforementioned groups, declaring the new collective’s allegiance to alQaeda’s top leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Henceforth, these groups will be operating under the umbrella of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the terror 

group’s North Africa and Sahel faction. 

On March 19, al-Qaeda Central Command issued a statement accepting the 

pledge of allegiance, indicating that the new collective is: 

an extension to what Qaida’t al-Jihad [al-Qaeda] has taken as approach since its 

inception, in uniting the Islamic Ummah, unifying its ranks, to seek the establishment of Allah’s Sharia, upholding justice, and fighting injustice and tyranny; Allah 

has graced our brothers in the jihadi groups in Mali to unite under the banner of 

one group.1

The latest announcement constitutes a new milestone in the growth of al-Qaeda’s 

presence and operations at a time when the group behind the 9/11 attacks appears 

to have been significantly diminished. Although al-Qaeda has been mostly decimated in large parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, its North Africa and 

Sahel networks appear to have exponentially grown, increasing their tempo of terror 

attacks and establishing links in North and West Africa. 

Throughout most of its existence, AQIM operated in central-east and northern Algeria, but in the past several years it has expanded its operations to Tunisia and 

Mali, making AQIM one of the most active al-Qaeda branches. In Tunisia, the 

group’s faction ‘‘Uqba bin Nafae’ Brigade’’—designated a terrorist group by the Tunisian government—has carried out a number of attacks against security forces, most 

notably in the Chaambi Mountains, which overlook Kasserine City in west-central 

Tunisia. In Mali, its faction al-Murabitoune—a group affiliated with the notorious 

Mukhtar Belmokhtar’s ‘‘Signatories in Blood Brigade,’’ responsible for the 2013 hostage crisis in In Amenas, Algeria—as well as other jihadi groups, have merged 

under its leadership. On multiple occasions, al-Murabitoune has kidnapped Westerners and targeted Western economic interests. 

AQIM has demonstrated its will and intent to target Western nationals and interests. It has kidnapped and killed European and American civilians, and targeted 

Western gas and oil extraction plants. A number of the group’s hostage operations 

were kidnap-for-ransom, and reportedly brought the group significant sums of 

money. 

Over the past 3 years, North Africa has witnessed the rise of the Islamic State 

(ISIS/ISIL), most notably in Libya’s Sirte City, and to a lesser extent in the cities 

of Darna and Benghazi in northeastern Libya. ISIS has also established a small 

branch in Algeria and connected with jihadists in Tunisia. Unlike AQIM, whose attacks mostly consist of hit-and-runs, kidnappings, and bombing operations, ISIS has 

been able to capture territory and implement its form of governance in Sirte, recruiting from the population under its rule, and conducting beheadings in the largely arid Fezzan region in central Libya. 

ISIS in North Africa continues to operate mostly in Libya. Security forces have 

only recently succeeded in pushing the group to the outskirts of Sirte and recapturing many of its vital sites. However, recent reports suggest that ISIS is regrouping, and possibly gaining enough manpower to recapture Sirte.2

Both AQIM and ISIS’s Libya faction have launched significant operations in the 

past 2 years; such attacks garnered global attention and positioned both groups as 

leaders of global jihad. AQIM fighters have targeted multiple hotels and killed 

Western tourists and locals alike in Mali, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, ISIS has focused on targeting government forces and Christian laborers; it 

has conducted gruesome beheadings of Egyptian Coptic and Ethiopian workers, as 

well as multiple bombings in Tripoli. I believe that both groups pose a threat to the 

West: AQIM’s threat is directed at Western nationals and interests in its primary 

operational territories, rarely, if ever, targeting Western countries, while ISIS’s 

threat to Western homelands is significantly higher, via orchestrated and inspired 

attacks. 

WILL AND INTENT TO TARGET THE WEST

Al-Qaeda’s top leader Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri has indicated that al-Qaeda’s main 

focus remains targeting the United States—most notably in his 2013 manifesto, 

‘‘General Guidelines for Jihadi Work.’’3 Zawahiri’s manifesto laid out the military 

agenda for all al-Qaeda affiliates—indeed, all jihadists—around the world. In other 

29 

4 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-urges-more-attacks-on-westerndisbelievers–9749512.html. 5 http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/19/africa/libya-isis-executions-ethiopian-christians/. 

words, his document dictated the priorities jihadi groups are meant to follow, placing the United States at the top of al-Qaeda’s military targets. The document stated: 

The military work is to target firstly the head of global infidels America, and her 

ally Israel, and then her local allies who rule our countries. Targeting America aims 

at exhausting and hemorrhaging it, in order for it to end like the Soviet Union did, 

and isolate itself due to its military, human, and economic losses, and subsequently 

ease its grip on our countries, and its allies to begin falling one after another. 

ISIS leaders regularly and vocally urge the group’s followers to target the United 

States and Europe. Since 2014, the group has released a range of missives and videos urging jihadists in the West to kill Americans and Europeans. ISIS’s late 

spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, made this a focal point of his speeches: 

If you can kill a disbelieving American or European—especially the spiteful and 

filthy French—or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbelievers waging 

war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the 

Islamic State, then rely upon Allah and kill him in any manner or way.4

Moreover, ISIS features individuals in its propaganda who represent and parrot 

the group’s threats to the West and suggest that their goal is to strike beyond North 

Africa, to ‘‘conquer Rumiyah,’’ in reference to Europe and North America. In a February 2015 video released by ISIS media in Libya, an English-speaking masked man 

threatened: 

The sea you have hidden Sheikh Osama bin Laden’s body in, we swear to Allah, 

we will mix it with your blood.5

ISIS has inspired a number of attacks in the West—and capitalized on these attacks with its official propaganda releases designed to inspire even more attacks— 

including the Pulse Nightclub massacre in Orlando, Florida. Furthermore, ISIS has 

orchestrated a number of deadly attacks in Europe, including the November 2015 

attacks at the Bataclan theatre and the Stade de France in Paris, and the March 

2016 attack at Brussels’ Zaventem Airport, among others. 

ISIS AND AQIM ARE DIFFERENT

There are differences, however, between AQIM and ISIS, the most obvious of 

which is their proclaimed ideological differences—especially after Zawahiri disowned 

ISIS in February 2014. Organizationally, AQIM is more decentralized in its approach and sees North Africa and the Sahel as the primary geographic region for 

its operations. Quite rarely does the group invite foreign fighters or recruits from 

outside the Maghreb and Sahel regions into its ranks. Its political statements have 

largely focused on ‘‘tyrannical’’ regimes in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Mali and 

its aims are very much North Africa-centric. 

ISIS, on the other hand, including its branch in Libya, has specifically called on 

Muslims to migrate to territories under its control. Its ranks in Libya have swelled 

with the arrival of fighters from Sudan, Somalia, Ghana, and Mali, among other 

countries. It has operated in a more centralized fashion, consistently adhering to the 

language and methodology of ISIS central command in Iraq and Syria. Its messages 

mostly ignore the politics of North African countries, instead concentrating on illustrating jihad in North Africa as part of the overall structure of the proclaimed ‘‘Caliphate,’’ as provinces under ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s rule. These messages specifically urge jihadists to pledge allegiance to ISIS. When ISIS’s propaganda has focused on North and West Africa, it invites jihadists who are operating 

in al-Qaeda’s backyard to pledge allegiance to Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed ‘‘Caliph’’ of the Islamic State. 

AQIM’s rhetoric has largely focused on France as its primary nemesis, referring 

to the French invasion of Mali and France’s historical interest in North Africa. 

Meanwhile, ISIS’s enemies are lumped into one—what is referred to as ‘‘Fustat alKufr,’’ or ‘‘the party of infidels.’’ 

AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM)

AQIM was formally established in February 2007. Its predecessor, ‘‘The Salafist 

Group for Preaching and Combat’’ (GSPC), formally pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda 

30 

6 http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentarylbusiness/committees/houseloflrepresentativeslcommittees?url=pjcis/aqapl6%20terrorist%20orgs/report/appendix%20e.pdf. 7 http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentarylbusiness/committees/houseloflrepresentativeslcommittees?url=pjcis/aqapl6%20terrorist%20orgs/report/appendix%20e.pdf. 8 https://archive.org/details/Archieve-to-almagreb-mojahdeen. 9 https://archive.org/details/badrmagrib. 10 https://ia800408.us.archive.org/27/items/tawjehlayman/tawjehlayman.pdf. 

on September 11, 2006:6 it has sought the establishment of Islamic Sharia governance and the targeting of Western nationals and interests. 

GSPC’s declaration of allegiance to al-Qaeda not only appears to have transpired 

for the sake of relevancy; affiliating with al-Qaeda effectively placed the group in 

the spotlight as the leader of jihadi efforts across North Africa and the Sahel region. 

More importantly, GSPC declared that its allegiance to Usama bin Laden was ‘‘part 

of the international jihad’’7—in reference to al-Qaeda’s 1998 declaration of war on 

the United States. In other words, GSPC adhered to the ideology of al-Qaeda, positioned itself as part of the global jihadi movement, and as no longer exclusive to 

Algeria. 

Though it operates mostly in Algeria, AQIM portrayed itself as the top jihadi 

group for North African jihadists—a point that it addressed in numerous audio and 

video recordings. Led by Algerian national Abdulmalik Droukdel (also known as 

Abu Musaab Abdulwadoud), many of AQIM’s operations have specifically targeted 

Western nationals and interests, to include the kidnapping and killing of numerous 

Western victims. 

AQIM views North African governments as ‘‘an extension’’ of Western powers and 

interests. The group believes that there is a new type of imperialistic, ‘‘Crusader’’ 

campaign that aims at fighting and uprooting Islam. Thus, for AQIM, targeting the 

governments of Algeria and neighboring countries is in line with targeting U.S. and 

European interests. The West, according to AQIM, must be confronted—and if not 

directly, then through the targeting of its citizens and interests. 

In a 2009 audio release titled ‘‘A Message to Our Ummah in the Islamic 

Maghreb,’’ Abdulwadoud discussed these points, stating: 

I return briefy to show the danger of the new imperialistic attack, which is an extension to the old campaign, which aims to target our Ummah in its dearest of spiritual components and even its existential principles, and the principles of its continuity, and also to show the dirty role of these apostate and traitor regimes in our 

Maghreb countries for the interests of the countries that have imperialistic goals 

and expansionist interests like America, the European Union, and Israel, so perhaps 

that our Ummah would get ready and prepare to fight its inevitable existential battle, that, if it does not fight today, will inevitably fight it tomorrow.8

AQIM claims to fight the Algerian government because it views it as ‘‘part of the 

declared Crusader campaign,’’ in reference to the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and 

Iraq. In a 2010 video, AQIM indicated that the ‘‘evil government’’ of Algeria is a 

direct participant in the ‘‘Crusader war,’’ because it: 

confessed to occupying Iraq via diplomatic representation; [by] imprisoning and torturing the Muslim youths who join their brothers in Iraq, [and] participating in the 

war on Somalia by sending military supply aircraft in support of its Crusader 

masters . . . to appease the American master.9

Zawahiri later underscored these points in his ‘‘General Guidelines for Jihadi Work’’ 

manifesto, stating: 

In Algeria, where the American presence is small and unnoticeable, the struggle 

against the regime is for the sake of weakening it and to spread the jihadi influence 

across the Islamic Maghreb, the West African Sahel, and South Saharan countries, 

and in these regions the signs of [mujahideen] confrontation with the Americans 

and their allies have started... [sic] All the mujahideen brothers should consider 

targeting the Western Crusader Zionist coalition’s interests in any location in the 

world the most important of their duties, and to seek it to the best of their ability.10

Zawahiri sees Algeria, and North Africa in general, as a new front to weaken the 

United States, but not necessarily a launching pad for operations in the West. This 

is important because it underscores AQIM’s methodology: it is easier to target the 

West in AQIM’s operational reach than to train and dispatch operatives overseas. 

TARGETING WESTERN CIVILIANS AND INTERESTS

Although AQIM has not yet claimed responsibility for terrorist operations in the 

West, it has underscored that one of its goals is to target Western citizens and interVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
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11 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africal35798502. 12 https://telegram.me/AllAndalus. 13 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africal22637084. 14 https://justpaste.it/AlgerialAQMIl2016. 15 https://soundcloud.com/user-903507653/8cg8ayogbe4v. 

ests. Its narrative includes grievances such as the ‘‘French invasion of Mali,’’ which 

the group sees as part of the new ‘‘Crusader imperialism.’’ Indeed, of all the Western 

nations, France is AQIM’s primary adversary, a theme deeply rooted in North Africa’s history—and AQIM has expressed its grievances against France’s stance in 

North Africa since the group’s inception. AQIM’s rhetoric, nonetheless, is 

confrontational toward the West at large, as it views Western and ‘‘Zionist’’ influence as having negatively impacted Muslims, portraying them as persecuted, threatened, and targeted. Therefore, its selection of targets is not limited to nationalistic 

borders, and its threat is not limited to French citizens and interests. 

AQIM sees its fight against the West as part of a larger battle; this point is highlighted in a number of its communique ́s. In March 2016, AQIM claimed responsibility for the armed assault on the Grand Bassam Hotel in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, 

which killed a number of Westerners, including German and French nationals. In 

its claim of responsibility, released after the attack,11 the group said: 

The goal from these [operations] include a reminder to the Crusaders that their continuous crimes against the Muslims and their Mujahideen brothers will beg a response of targeting the leaders of their crimes and their interests. Our message to 

the Western populaces is that our actions are a response to the crimes of your armies and governments against our Ummah in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, 

Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Mali, and Central Africa... you either leave us safe in 

our homelands, or we will spill your security and the security of your citizens.12

A THREAT TO ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Furthermore, AQIM poses a significant threat to Western economic interests, 

most notably gas and oil plants and facilities. In January 2013, Mukhtar 

Belmokhtar’s Signatories in Blood Brigade (also known as al-Mulathamin) attacked 

the Tigantourine gas extraction facility in In Amenas town, eastern Algeria, which 

is jointly operated by an Algerian national company and BP/Statoil. The ensuing 

hostage crisis lasted for over a day, and concluded with the death of over 30 hostages, including American, British, Norwegian, and French nationals, among others. 

Reports indicated that a number of the hostage-takers were Libyan and Malian 

fighters, suggesting a higher level of transnational coordination between AQIM’s 

affliates. 

A few months later, Belmokhtar’s group attacked the French Uranium mine 

Areva and nearby military barracks in Arlit town, in Niger’s northwestern city of 

Agadez. A spokesman for the group explained, ‘‘[we] attacked France, [as well as] 

Niger because of its cooperation with France,’’ further underscoring AQIM’s focus 

on targeting French interests.13

AQIM’s threat to Western gas and oil companies was further underscored in the 

March 2016 rocket attack on BP/Statoil facilities in Algeria’s In Saleh region. The 

group’s statement referenced the In Amenas attack 3 years earlier, and stated its 

will and intent to target Western interests in the future, saying: 

We chose the British Petroleum base in In Saleh area, and it is the same company 

that we targeted at Tigantourine compound, to send, through this operation, a number of messages . . . We announce to all the Western companies that are investing 

in rock gas that we will target you directly, and we will use every ability to repel 

you from these projects that harm our environment, rejected in our society.14

AQIM’s fixation on France came further into focus on March 17, 2017, when 

Abdulwadoud released an audio message in which he accepted the allegiance from 

‘‘The Group for Support of Islam and Muslims’’ and addressed France, suggesting 

that the mujahideen will seek to strike in France: 

[France’s] injustice and aggression against the populaces and tribes of the Sahel and 

Sahara will only increase these tribes’ brotherhood, coalescence, and 

unity... [they will] be determined to wage jihad and resist against the aggressors, and this will only add to the determination of Muslims to transfer the war 

from our land to her land and from our cities to her cities so it can live in fear that 

our people in the occupied lands are living.15

32 

16 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0119/AQIM-kidnappingand-murder-a-brief-history. 17 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/01/aqim-takes-australian-couple-hostagein-northern-burkina-faso.php. 18 http://www.gctat.org/analysis/29-ranoc/236-the-forgotten-three-the-fate-of-aqim-timbuktuhostages-and-their-captor-belkacemzouadi.html. 19 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/11693716/New-British-front-manfor-jihadist-videos-revealed.html. 20 http://af.reuters.com/article/maliNews/idAFL8N1500DA. 21 https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mali-al-qaeda-islamic-maghrebs-ransom-revenue. 

KIDNAPPING OPERATIONS 16 17 18 19 20

AQIM’s primary source of funding and influence is the kidnapping of Westerners, 

going as far back as 2007. Kidnapping operations not only provide major propaganda value, but also reportedly earn the group significant sums of money, which 

it uses to finance various other operations. 

The incomplete list of AQIM kidnapping operations provided below clearly demonstrates that the group is constantly pursuing Western nationals. Since its inception, AQIM has kidnapped Westerners in Mauritania, Niger, and Mali. The group 

has reportedly, at times, negotiated with foreign governments to release hostages 

in exchange for ransom sums. Some estimates indicate that by 2012, AQIM was 

making about $3 million USD per hostage released.21 In other instances, the group 

has demanded the release of militants from prison—a tactic that has likely helped 

swell its ranks. • On December 24, 2007, four French nationals were killed in Mauritania. The 

Mauritanian government charged and sentenced three AQIM members to death. • On February 22, 2008, Austrian citizens Wolfgang Ebner and Andrea Kloiber 

were kidnapped in Tunisia and transferred to an unknown location in Mali. 

They were reportedly released after a ransom was paid. • On December 14, 2008, Canadian diplomats Robert Fowler and Louis Guay 

were kidnapped in Niger, and later released on April 22, 2010. • On January 22, 2009, Edwin Dyer, Marianne Petzold, Gabriella Greitner, and 

Werner Greiner were kidnapped in Mali near the Niger border. AQIM killed 

Dyer on May 31 while reportedly releasing the others after alleged AQIM members were released from prison. • In June 2009, U.S. national Christopher Leggett was murdered in Nouakchott, 

Mauritania. • On November 14, 2009, AQIM attempted to kidnap U.S. embassy personnel in 

Tahoua, Niger. • On November 25, 2009, French citizen Pierre Camatte was kidnapped in Mali 

near the Niger border. Mali released four AQIM militants while AQIM released 

Camatte in return. • On November 29, 2009, Spanish citizens Albert Vilalta, Roque Pascual, and 

Alicia Gamez were kidnapped near Nouadhibou, Mauritania. AQIM later released Gamez after the Spanish government allegedly paid a ransom. AQIM released Vilalta and Pascual on August 22, 2010. • On December 18, 2009, Italian citizens Nicola Sergio Cicala and Philomen 

Kabouree were kidnapped in Mauritania. AQIM later released Cicala and 

Kabouree; it remains unclear whether a ransom was paid. 

• On April 19, 2010, French citizen Michel Germaneau was kidnapped in northern Niger and then moved to Mali. AQIM demanded the release of its members 

from prison. French and Mauritanian security forces raided AQIM members in 

Mali, killing six of them. AQIM announced it had killed Germaneau on July 25. 

• In September 2010, five French nationals were kidnapped in northern Niger. 

AQIM still holds them hostage to this day. 

• In January 2011, French aid worker Antoine De Leocour and French citizen 

Vincent Delory were kidnapped in Niger. De Leocour and Delory were killed 

during a rescue attempt. 

• In 2011, AQIM kidnapped Swedish national Johan Gustaffson and South African national Stephen McGowan. In 2012, they were featured in an AQIM video 

with another hostage, Dutch national Sjaak Rijke, who has since been rescued. 

In June 2015, the two other hostages appeared in an AQIM video in which a 

British-accented militant informed them that their governments were not negotiating for their release. 

• In December 2015, Swiss nun Beatrice Stockley was kidnapped from her residence in Timbuktu, Mali. Stockley was previously kidnapped and released in 

2012, but upon her return to Mali, AQIM militants from the Sahara faction took 

her hostage and accused her of conducting missionary campaigns. 

33 

22 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDwXDnoeJLc&feature=youtu.be. 23 https://shamikh1.info/vb/showthread.php?t=235486. 24 It is worth mentioning that this report does not discuss ISIS in Egypt. ISIS’s branch in 

Egypt’s North Sinai is a highly active group, and it has operated in that region for over five 

years (previously allegiant to al-Qaeda). Most of its attacks have targeted Israeli territories and 

Egyptian security forces. While the group does not appear to have hosted foreign fighters or dispatched operatives to the West, its targeting and downing of the Russian Metrojet Airliner in 

October 2015 spotlighted the group as a serious threat to tourists and the aviation industry. 

It is unlikely that ISIS in Egypt will be the next destination for fighters from the West; however, Western tourists and interests—especially in the North Sinai—are at risk from potential 

attacks in the future. 25 https://ia600405.us.archive.org/35/items/jamalalqudsylyahool20160530l1211/[...

].gov. 

26 https://ia801504.us.archive.org/28/items/rslta/r11.mp4. 27 Areas of ISIS operations in Libya: Fezzan (Phazania) region in south west Libya is mostly 

a desert region. Barqa (Cyrenaica) Province includes the cities of Darna and Benghazi. Tripoli 

denotes the capital Tripoli, Sirte, and Misrata. 

• In January 2016, an Australian couple—a doctor and his wife—was kidnapped 

by AQIM militants following the terror group’s attack on a hotel in Burkina 

Faso. They were reportedly kidnapped in the country’s north and brought into 

Mali across the border. 

UQBA BIN NAFAE’ BRIGADE IN TUNISIA

AQIM’s affiliate in Tunisia appears to have begun operating in the country in the 

summer of 2014. The group’s operations have primarily targeted security forces, 

namely in Kasserine City. In September 2014, 2 months after Uqba bin Nafae’ militants targeted security forces in Hanshir at-Talla in the Chaambi Mountains in 

west central Tunisia, a spokesman for the group threatened the Tunisian government in a video, stating: 

Without introductions . . . O tyrants of Tunisia, await glad tidings of what harm 

you, as the silence of the mujahideen of Uqba bin Nafea’ Brigade before your crimes 

will not last long.22

The group has since carried out a range of attacks against police and army units. 

Additionally, there is evidence to suggest a higher level of coordination between 

Tunisian and Algerian AQIM fighters. AQIM recently released the bio of one of its 

since-killed Algerian commanders who purportedly traveled between Tunisia and 

Algeria to coordinate with the group’s affiliates. 

Although the Chaambi Mountains appear to be the group’s main hideout, a jihadi 

media unit known as Efriqia Media released a statement in April 2015 indicating 

that Uqba bin Nafae’ Brigade has: 

cells and its soldiers are present on all the Tunisian soil and in its various provinces, and has history in jihadi work and in training a big number of Muslim youths 

and supplying weapons.23

Uqba bin Nafae’ Brigade poses a serious threat to Tunisia’s stability, and should 

be considered a threat to Western nationals traveling through inadequately governed areas of western Tunisia near the Algerian border. 

THE ISLAMIC STATE (ISIS/ISIL) IN LIBYA 24

Previously known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the Islamic State of Iraq and 

Syria (ISIS) is the evolution of what was once known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). 

After expanding into Syria and rebelling against al-Qaeda, ISIS shocked the world 

with scenes of brutality, including the videotaped beheadings of at least three Americans. The global terror group seized Raqqa, Syria and shortly thereafter took control of Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul. Over the course of several months, the 

group seized control of cities, towns, and villages in several Syrian and Iraqi provinces, and quickly expanded into the schismatic political atmosphere of Libya. 

In the spring of 2015, ISIS captured the city of Sirte, effectively establishing a 

North African stronghold where it is able to host fighters from other countries.25

26 The group established strong fighting fronts in Darna and Benghazi and launched 

attacks targeting Libyan Forces and rival rebel factions, as well as government 

buildings in Tripoli and Misrata. Moreover, ISIS attempted and temporarily succeeded in laying control over gas and oil plants. 

ISIS’s branch in Libya—comprising ‘‘Tripoli, Barqa and Fezzan’’ provinces27—is 

arguably one of its strongest and most reliable factions. The post-Qaddafi political 

turmoil in Libya has afforded ISIS a more fiexible environment in which to operate, 

especially prior to the creation of the Government of National Accord (GAN) in DeVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
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28 http://justpaste.it/jfg4. 29 https://dump.to/albayyinah. 30 https://archive.org/details/WilayatBarqahFromBarqahToParis. 31 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/world/middleeast/thousands-enter-syria-to-joinisis-despite-global-efforts.html?lr=0. 

cember 2015. Libyan Forces recently scored victories against ISIS in Sirte, but the 

group is quickly regrouping and maintains a wide network of operatives and large 

caches of weapons. 

THE WEST AS ADVERSARY

ISIS in Libya has not just been adversarial toward the Libyan Forces; it has sent 

a direct message to the ‘‘Crusaders’’ with its release of footage showing the grisly 

beheadings of 21 Egyptian laborers in southwestern Libya. Released in February 

2015, the video featured an English-speaking masked militant whose message 

echoes ISIS’s will and intent to strike beyond North Africa: 

You have seen us on the hills of al-Sham and on Dabiq’s plains, chopping off the 

heads of those carrying the cross who have been living a long time, filled of spite 

against Islam and Muslims. And today, we’re in the south of Rome, on the land of 

Islam, Libya, sending another message. O Crusaders, safety for you will be only 

wishes, especially when you’re fighting us altogether. Therefore, we will fight you 

altogether.28

In April 2015, the same English-speaking fighter appears in a video featuring the 

executions of two groups of Ethiopian Christian workers, directing a message to the 

‘‘nations of the Cross,’’ in reference to the West. His message was similar to the earlier one: 

To the nations of the Cross, we’re back again on the sands where the companions 

of the Prophet have stepped on before, telling you Muslim blood that was shed 

under the hands of your religion is not cheap. In fact, their blood is the purest blood 

because there is a nation behind them inherits revenge. And we swear to 

Allah... you will not have safety even in your dreams until you embrace Islam.29

Such threats to the West are in lieu of ISIS’s main external operations goals: To 

strike in the United States and Europe—goals that its leaders verbalized the intent 

to accomplish on multiple occasions. ISIS in Libya as an entity, however, does not 

appear to have succeeded in orchestrating attacks in Western countries—at least 

not yet. However, its operatives have targeted Western tourists, namely in Tunisia. 

Unlike AQIM, however, which operates in a more decentralized fashion, ISIS is 

highly centralized and the goals of its Libyan faction are not confined to North Africa. On a number of occasions, ISIS fighters have appeared in videos to threaten (or 

even celebrate) an attack and name other cities they wish to target. After the November 2015 attacks in Paris, ISIS in Libya released a video, titled ‘‘From Barqa 

to Paris,’’ featuring fighters who vowed more attacks against ‘‘Crusaders’’ in the future. One foreign fighter, whose country of origin was not specified, threatened: 

France was the beginning, and tomorrow it will be in Washington, New York, and 

Moscow... you will have no haven from our guns, bullets, and explosives; we will 

come to you.30

ISIS’s targeting of Christians—whom ISIS deems a part of the global ‘‘Crusade’’— 

is directly addressing the West and challenging Western countries to intervene. If 

ISIS’s operatives are unable to strike overseas, the group appears to be urging 

Western armies to bring to it a ground war—an action that would afford ISIS significant attention and amplify its recruitment efforts. ISIS has used this rhetoric 

since the U.S.-led coalition began its aerial campaign against the group in Iraq and 

Syria. 

ISIS IN LIBYA RECRUITS FOREIGN NATIONALS

ISIS has reportedly recruited from more than 80 countries around the world.31 Its 

branch in Libya brought in fighters from north, west, and east Africa, and from 

across the Sahel region. ISIS in Libya has featured fighters urging others to join 

its ranks, including those from Mali, Somalia, Ghana, Mali, Tunisia, Nigeria, Egypt, 

and Sudan. The group has also featured English-speakers, although their countries 

of origin remain unknown. 

In a video from its media office in Tripoli, ISIS featured fighters who addressed 

Muslims across Africa, urging them to pledge allegiance and join ISIS: 

35 

32 https://ia601301.us.archive.org/5/items/CopyOf001l20150910/Copy%20of%20001%20- 

%20[sic].ogv. 33 https://archive.org/download/KalemtSHabaan/kalemt%20SHa%60baan.mp3. 

Brothers, it is time to pledge allegiance to the state of the Caliphate; I say to the 

youths, jihad is obligatory in our current time, and I urge those from my brothers 

who have no excuse to depart for jihad.32

Another fighter delivered a message to ‘‘my brothers and sister everywhere: we 

are now in the Islamic State, and I call upon you to migrate to it.’’ He called upon 

the Tuareg tribe in North Mali—the tribe one of AQIM’s most senior leaders, Iyad 

Ag Ghali, belongs to—to ‘‘migrate to the Islamic State.’’ 

Nonetheless, for ISIS, it has remained of critical importance to strike in the West 

while simultaneously recruiting fighters to its ranks. ISIS leadership believes that 

inspiring so-called ‘‘lone wolves’’ to strike in the United States and Europe will generate higher propaganda value. For ISIS, attacks in the West are preferable; they 

turn the attention away from its losses in Iraq and Syria while maintaining the 

spotlight on the group. Abu Muhammad al-Adnani addressed this point in a May 

2016 speech, in which he called on jihadists in the West to launch operations in 

their home cities rather than migrate to ISIS territory: 

Open in their faces the door of jihad and return their deeds against them in regret, 

and the smallest action you carry out in their homelands is better and more favored 

by us from the biggest of actions in our midst; it is more successful for us and more 

brutalizing to them. And if one of you wishes and seeks to reach the Islamic State 

[i.e. here in the Middle East], one of us wishes to be in your location [i.e. in the 

West] to brutalize the Crusaders.33

To justify the targeting of civilians, Adnani added: 

We’ve heard that some of you cannot work [i.e. to attack] for being unable to reach 

military targets, and is hesitant from targeting the so-called civilians, avoiding them 

because he doubts the permissibility and legitimacy. Know that in the heart of the 

warring Crusaders’ lands there is no immunity of blood and no presence to the socalled innocents . . . at least from the notion of treating others in the same way; 

their aircraft do not distinguish between our armed or unarmed, man and woman. 

Know that targeting so-called civilians is more beloved to us... more brutalizing 

and painful to them and more repulsing. 

ISIS’S RESURGENCE IN ALGERIA

ISIS established a faction under the initial name of ‘‘Jund al-Khilafah in Algeria’’ 

in September 2014, now called ‘‘Algeria Province.’’ A week after declaring allegiance 

to Baghdadi, the faction kidnapped and beheaded a French national. The group is 

believed to be comprised of a few dozen members, and for the past 2 years it has 

remained mostly inactive. That changed on March 2, 2017, when the group 

launched its first suicide attack, targeting a police station in Bab el-Kantara area 

of Constantine City in northeastern Algeria. 

Although the faction remains in a fragile state and lacks organizational support 

and a programmatic agenda, ISIS fighters in Algeria—operating mostly in the vicinity of Tizi Ouzou—will likely attempt to strike again, as they appear to be re-organizing their ranks. The likely targets will continue to be security forces; however, 

Western nationals traveling in certain parts of northern and eastern Algeria could 

be easy targets for kidnapping operations. 

ISIS OPERATIONS IN TUNISIA A MAIN CONCERN

ISIS has failed to seize territory and establish a strong fighting front in Tunisia, 

though it has attracted many Tunisians to its ranks in Iraq and Syria. This is partly 

due to the Tunisian government’s crackdown on jihadists, even those who have no 

allegiance to any specific group, such as Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, which has been 

designated a terrorist group by the government. 

Two significant ISIS attacks in Tunisia that targeted Westerners took place in 

2015; in March, two ISIS operatives attacked tourists outside the Bardo Museum 

in Tunis City, killing a total of 22 people, including Italian, French, Spanish, British, and Belgian nationals, among others. The attacker, according to the Tunisian 

government, trained with ISIS’s branch in Libya, underscoring the threat ISIS in 

Libya poses to Western nationals. Three months later, an ISIS operative using an 

36 

34 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33304897. 35 https://twitter.com/menastream/status/651179105832955905. 36 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/11674616/TheUncatchable-one-eyed-jihadi-MokhtarBelmokhtar.html. 

automatic rifle killed over 35 tourists, most of them British, at a resort beach hotel 

in Port al-Kantaoui, north of Sousse City.34

While fairly infrequent, these operations generate significant media attention for 

the terror group; as ISIS continues to face challenges in its Middle Eastern strongholds, ISIS-orchestrated attacks against Westerners in Tunisia may be more likely 

in the future. 

TACKLING THE JIHADIST THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA

According to various media reports, the emphasis of U.S. and European counterterrorism operations in North Africa and the Sahel has been limited. U.S. special 

forces have reportedly conducted a number of air strikes and other operations 

against jihadists in Libya. 

Part of the issue appears to be that the United States is preoccupied with fighting 

ISIS in its main strongholds in Iraq and Syria, likely viewing ISIS’s Libya branch 

as a lesser threat vis-a ́-vis Western nationals and interests. Another reason may be 

that U.S. and European security forces see the greatest threat from ISIS to the 

West as directly emerging from its Iraqi and Syrian strongholds—where the group’s 

top leadership is in hideout. 

In other words, the conventional wisdom seems to be that ISIS directs external 

operations from Iraq and Syria. While that might be true today, there is a high likelihood that the group will decentralize its command-and-control in the future, and 

its branch in Libya is poised to become the main destination where many of its 

fighters will end up. There is a higher likelihood that ISIS in Libya will fund and 

direct external operations as its Syrian and Iraqi branches are under immense pressure to defend what remains of the territory under their control. 

For AQIM, its affiliates in North Mali have recently coalesced into one group; one 

of the new collective’s key goals is to continue fighting French forces in Gao and 

other places. 

AQIM’s Algeria faction—where its top leader Abdulwadoud is believed to be hiding—has faced a number of setbacks over the past 2 years, and its operations have 

been highly subdued. This is part of the reason for the increased activity from its 

factions in Mali and Tunisia. It is thus imperative that Western governments provide further military and intelligence support to Tunisian, Algerian, and Malian 

forces as they tackle the jihadist activity in their respective countries. 

CONCLUSIONS

Given AQIM and ISIS’s respective records of targeting Westerners, it is clear that 

both groups pose a significant threat. AQIM’s focus continues to be on targeting 

Western citizens and economic interests mainly in North Africa and the Sahel regions. There is a significant focus on France and its influence in North and West 

Africa, which may be a driving force for North African jihadists in France to launch 

attacks in the country on behalf of AQIM. 

Gas and oil facilities have been AQIM’s primary economic targets, especially given 

that many Westerners work at these plants. AQIM’s preferred methods of attack 

against such sites will involve suicide bombers, hostage taking, and rocket attacks. 

Though France appears to be AQIM’s primary adversary, the terror group has targeted various Western nationals, and, while the viability of AQIM attacks in the 

United States is low, its interest in targeting the U.S. homeland is high—especially 

given that al-Qaeda’s leadership has designated the United States as al-Qaeda’s primary target. 

Notorious AQIM commander Mukhtar Belmokhtar—who was reported to have 

been killed several times over the past 4 years—was confirmed killed by senior alQaeda Central leader Hussam Abdulra’oof in an October 2015 recording.35 Various 

reports indicate that he may have been killed as early as June 2015 in Libya.36 His 

reported presence in Libya is further indicative of transnational cooperation between AQIM affiliates across North Africa. 

AQIM never confirmed Belmokhtar’s death, but it is safe to say that the commander left behind a powerful faction in the Sahel capable of conducting attacks 

against Westerners for years to come. 

It is worth noting that al-Qaeda and ISIS oppose each other—not only ideologically, but also in their geographic areas of interest. This does not mean, however, 

that jihadists allegiant to both groups do not have room for cooperation. Indeed, 

37 

there is evidence to suggest that jihadists who are specifically inspired by both 

groups might find a cooperative environment provided they have the same enemy. 

The January 2015 attacks in Paris, France at the offices of the magazine Charlie 

Hebdo by pro al-Qaeda operatives, and at a Kosher deli by a pro-ISIS jihadist, pointed to some level of cooperation between the perpetrators, particularly in obtaining 

weapons. 

In light of the wave of ISIS-inspired and orchestrated attacks in the United States 

and Europe in 2015 and 2016, and given the on-going U.S.-led military mission in 

Iraq and Syria, the likelihood is that ISIS will continue to incite, inspire, and plot 

similar attacks against civilians and soft targets. Stabbing, ramming, armed assault, and bombing attacks will likely continue to be the methods of choice for future attackers. 

ISIS’s strongholds in Iraq and Syria are under siege. The group has lost significant territory and in the coming months, it is poised to lose Mosul and most of its 

control in Aleppo. Foreign fighters, including those from the West who may not wish 

to go home, may end up connecting with ISIS’s faction in Libya, invigorating the 

group’s North Africa ranks. Fighters from at least ten nationalities so far have been 

fighting with ISIS in Libya. 

Given Libya’s close proximity to Europe, ISIS fighters in Libya who wish to target 

the West may travel to European countries instead of the United States. 

Furthermore, ISIS has expressed on multiple occasions its will and intent to orchestrate attacks in the West, and its operations in Paris and Brussels denote the 

group’s ability to dispatch skilled fighters with the know-how to plot and strike. The 

group has also exerted influence among jihadists in the United States and Europe 

who are encouraged to attack in their countries on behalf of the group, rather than 

join ISIS’s ranks. 

Westerners traveling or residing in insecure areas of Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria 

will likely continue to face threats from ISIS-inspired and directed attacks. 

ISIS appears to have a more powerful recruitment and indoctrination strategy in 

the West than AQIM. ISIS’s external operations facilitators appear to have developed a more inclusive and aggressive call to target the West by all means necessary—unlike AQIM, which has not focused on calls for external attacks overseas. 

Returnees to the United States and Europe—those who have gained experience 

in militant tactics in ISIS camps—as well as self-radicalized individuals, likely pose 

the most significant jihadist threat to the West. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Alkhouri. 

Our final witness is Dr. Frederic Wehrey. He is a senior fellow 

in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He specializes in post-conflict transitions, armed 

groups, and identity politics with a focus on Libya, North Africa, 

and the Gulf. 

His commentary and articles appeared in numerous publications. 

He routinely briefs U.S. and European government officials on Middle East affairs. Dr. Wehrey is a 21-year veteran of the active and 

reserve components of the U.S. Air Force, with tours across the 

Middle East and North Africa. 

Dr. Wehrey, you are recognized for your testimony. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF FREDERIC WEHREY, SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. WEHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, committee Members, I 

am grateful for this opportunity to speak with you today about the 

extremist threat from North Africa. The challenge here is especially dire given the numbers of fighters who fought abroad with 

ISIS and al-Qaeda and who are now returning. 

But beyond the threat of returning jihadists, it is the weakness 

of states in the region that is the most important driver of extremism. Many states here are increasingly unable to meet the deVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
38 

mands of their citizens and are facing mounting economic pressures in an era of low oil prices. 

Faced with rising, expectations and diminished futures, some 

youth in the region have fallen prey to the appeal of jihad peddled 

by ISIS and al-Qaeda. Critiques of corruption, social injustice, and 

police abuses feature prominently in the jihadists’ appeal. 

Heavy-handed policies by North African governments have often 

fueled the very radicalism they purport to quash. Added to this are 

the region’s ungoverned spaces and porous borders where extremists have negotiated access with marginalized tribes or co-opted 

smuggling networks. 

Finally, a key enabler of jihadism is the outbreak of armed conflict. Any time there is an insurgency or civil war, we can expect 

to see transnational jihadists arrive, often with superior motivation, funding, and firepower. 

I will focus my remarks on Libya, a country that embodies many 

of these afflictions and that I visited repeatedly over the past several years, including Sirte last year. It is a failed state that presents the most immediate extremist challenge. 

Despite the successful Libyan-led campaign against ISIS in Sirte 

and other successes in the west and the east last year, the country 

remains at risk. Scattered ISIS members are regrouping in 

Sabratha near the Tunisian border, in cells in and around the capital of Tripoli, and in the south where they have easy transit into 

the Sahel. 

Also, some al-Qaeda-affiliated fighters who defected to ISIS are 

now returning back to a reconstituted and expanded al-Qaeda in 

the Islamic Maghreb. But more importantly, I want to emphasize 

that it is Libya’s worsening political crisis that has pushed it to the 

brink of open conflict, and this could create a vacuum for terrorists 

to reemerge. 

The recent campaign against ISIS has helped embolden General 

Khalifa Haftar and his forces in the east to push for national domination, capturing oil facilities, and threatening to topple the U.N.- 

backed government in Tripoli. If this were to happen, it would invariably throw the country into civil war, creating yet another vacuum for ISIS, al-Qaeda, or some new permutation of jihadism to 

emerge. 

It is a looming danger, Mr. Chairman, that demands a redoubling of diplomatic engagement by the United States. This could 

entail several efforts; first, deterring moves toward escalation by 

exerting pressure on the warring parties to include the threat of 

sanctions; second, brokering a dialog among regional and concerned 

states with interests in Libya. 

But beyond the task of forging a new political compact in Libya, 

the United States must stand ready to assist the capacity of whatever Libyan government emerges. 

This should focus on the following areas: Rationalizing the oildriven economy and diversifying to other sources of income; training the army and police; reforming defense institutions; and especially promoting the rule of law, especially in prisons, which we 

know are incubators of violent extremism. 

The United States also has an opportunity to re-engage with 

Libya society in areas like municipal governance, civil society orgaVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
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nizations, media, and education. But proposed cuts to American 

foreign aid programs on this front would deprive us of this opportunity. So, too, would a ban on Libyan visitors to the States. 

Counterterrorism efforts in Libya, whether ISR, border control, 

direct action, or training and equipping of local forces must always 

reinforce the building of inclusive, durable governance. 

The United States must also ensure that any counterterrorism 

engagement with local Libyan groups does not inadvertently worsen conflict by privileging one faction over another. 

Mr. Chairman, committee Members, my travels to Libya have 

left me with a strong appreciation for Libyans’ resilience. The political fissures that wrack the country are not unbridgeable. 

Contrary to some alarmist accounts, Libya has not fallen to extremism. But the United States needs to act now to avert a looming crisis that could have far-reaching effects for its interests beyond the country’s borders. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Wehrey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERIC WEHREY

MARCH 29, 2017 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, committee Members, I am grateful for 

this opportunity to speak with you today about the extremist threat from North Africa. 

At the intersection of the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, the countries of North 

Africa and the Maghreb comprise a vitally important region that casts a long shadow on surrounding areas and, especially, on the security of the Mediterranean 

basin. The extremist challenge from this region is especially dire given the numbers 

of fighters who went to Iraq and Syria to fight with the self-proclaimed Islamic 

State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda and who are now returning. 

But beyond the threat of returning jihadists, it is the weakness of states in the 

region that presents the most significant and long-term driver of extremism. Since 

the Arab uprisings in 2011, most states in the region are now significantly weaker, 

unable to meet the basic demands of their citizens, and facing mounting economic 

pressures in an era of sustained low oil prices. 

Beset by fraying social contracts, the dashed hopes of the Arab Spring, and diminished opportunities for employment, some youth of the region have fallen prey to 

the appeal of jihad peddled by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. The jihadists’ critiques of state-led corruption and the abuses of the judiciary and police have also 

resonated strongly; heavy-handed government policies have often fueled the very 

radicalism they purport to quash. Added to this are broad swathes of ungoverned 

land and porous borders, where extremists have established logistical hubs and 

training camps, often negotiating access with marginalized tribal communities or coopting existing smuggling networks. 

Finally, a key enabler of jihadism is state collapse and the outbreak of open 

armed conflict. Anywhere there is an established insurgency or civil war, we can expect the emergence of transnational jihadists who insert themselves among and 

within the warring parties and often recruit combatants to their ranks through superior funding, ideological motivation, and firepower. 

I will focus my remarks on Libya, a failed state that embodies a witches’ brew 

of these afflictions and that poses the most immediate extremist challenge. Despite 

the successful Libyan-led campaign against the ISIS stronghold in Sirte, along with 

other successes by different Libyan armed groups against ISIS pockets in the West 

and East, the country remains at risk. Scattered ISIS members are regrouping and 

al-Qaeda-affiliated fighters who defected to ISIS are now returning back to alQaeda-linked groups, more experienced and battle-hardened. Vast portions of its 

southern deserts remain a thoroughfare for the movement of fighters and arms to 

the Sahel and beyond. 

But more importantly, Libya’s worsening political conflict, fueled in part by regional meddling and a contest for oil resources, has pushed it to the brink of civil 

war. This disastrous outcome would provide yet another opening for ISIS, al-Qaeda, 

or some new permutation to arise. 

40 

To prevent such a scenario, Mr. Chairman, it is important the United States, 

working in tandem with the Europeans and regional states, redouble its diplomatic 

efforts to find a durable and inclusive political solution to Libya’s conflict. At the 

same time, it should be ready to assist on a broad array of functions, to include the 

rebuilding the security sector, diversifying Libya’s economy, advancing the rule of 

law, and supporting civil society. Any near-term counterterrorism (CT) actions inside Libya should reinforce the longer-term goals of political unity and inclusive governance, and great care should be taken to ensure that CT engagement does not 

inadvertently worsen factional conflict by privileging one group over another. 

My remarks draw from visits to Libya over last 2 years to areas of conflict marked 

by a jihadist presence: Sirte, Benghazi, Sabratha, Tripoli, and southern Libya. 

HOW JIHADISM GREW IN LIBYA

Libya has a long-standing tradition of jihadism stretching back to the Qadhafi era 

that saw waves of volunteers going to Afghanistan and then Iraq, where some developed ties to al-Qaeda and what would later become al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and ISIS. 

These migrations belie the popular notion that Qadhafi kept a lid on extremism: To 

the contrary, economic neglect and repression at home helped fuel radicalization 

among certain neighborhoods and communities, whose participation in jihad on foreign battlefields was in some sense a transference of their frustrations against the 

regime. 

In 2011 and 2012, scores of Libyan youths went to Syria and Iraq, some of whom 

returned to establish the nucleus of the Islamic State in the eastern city of Derna, 

displacing existing Islamist armed groups. From there, the group spread to the city 

of Sirte, in the oil-rich center of Libya and established cells in Sabratha to the west, 

Tripoli, as well as attaching itself to existing Islamist and jihadist combatants in 

Benghazi. It then set about implementing the draconian style of governance it had 

practiced in Raqqa and Mosul, assaulting oil facilities to hasten the demise of the 

State, and attacking the facilities of police and militias who posed a threat. The Islamic State’s leadership soon directed foreign aspirates to proceed directly to its 

North African outpost rather than Syria and Iraq. Foreigners played a crucial role 

in its expansion in Libya, especially jihadists from Tunisia (some of whom arrived 

to train for subsequent attacks against their homeland), the Mahreb and the Sahel, 

and military and governance advisors from Iraq and the Gulf. 

It is important to note two dynamics about the rise of ISIS in Libya that have 

strong implications for the future of jihadism in Libya. 

First, Islamist and jihadist communities after the 2011 revolution engaged in a 

series of fierce debates about strategies and priorities, to include whether to affiliate 

themselves with the post-Qadhafi State and to participate in elections, and whether 

and when to use violence. Developments in neighboring states, namely the closing 

of political space and military-led crackdown on political Islamists in Egypt, strongly 

influenced the outcomes of those debates in favor of more anti-state and radical actors. At home, a number of developments swayed the debate as well. The most important of these was the outbreak of open armed conflict in Libya in 2014 between 

the so-called Dawn and Dignity camp, abetted by opposing blocs of regional states 

(Turkey and Qatar for the former; Egypt, the UAE, and Jordan for the latter) provided further space for the rise of radical jihadists, especially the Islamic State, to 

expand. For nearly 2 years, the two opposing Dawn and Dignity factions were more 

focused on fighting each other than on dealing with the extremist menace that gathered in their midst. 

Second, the Islamic State in Libya won support among communities and tribes 

that had been politically marginalized in the post-Qadhafi political order or threatened by local rivals. This was especially apparent in Sirte, a city that had suffered 

after the revolution because of its affiliation with the Qadhafi regime. Here, members of historically loyalist tribes, the Warfalla and Qadhadhafa, welcomed the Islamic State as a form of self-protection against abuses from the neighboring city of 

Misrata, which had assaulted Sirte at the end of the revolution and exacted revenge 

against it inhabitants. Similarly, some local Islamist militias in Benghazi cooperated 

with the Islamic State on the battlefield because they faced a shared enemy, the 

self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) forces of General Khalifa Hifter. 

Finally, jihadists from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other groups based 

in the Sahel have exploited weak governance and dire economic conditions in 

Tuerag tribal areas of southern Libya for logistics and training. Their fighters draw 

upon a long history of local knowledge stretching back to Sahelian insurgencies of 

the 1990’s and Algeria’s civil war. After the revolution, these groups established 

links with local armed groups and jihadists in the north, particularly the northeast 

in Benghazi, Derna, and Ajdabiya. Ansar al-Sharia trained fighters loyal to the seaVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
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soned Algerian jihadist Mukhtar Belmokhtar, prior to their January 2013 attack on 

the Tiguentourine gas facility in Amenas, Algeria. 

Local sympathizers and collaborators in southwestern Libya have facilitated some 

of this transnational presence and movement. That said, the Tuaregs’ political and 

communal opponents in Libya have often exaggerated the depth and scope of extremist penetration, particularly in town of Ubari and farther west. The jihadist 

presence is mostly logistical and the result of weak administrative and police control 

in the south, rather than wide-spread support. Where jihadi relationships exist with 

local armed groups and smugglers, it is often transactional, resulting from a shared 

interest in keeping borders uncontrolled. Aside from this presence, the penetration 

of radical ideology into Libyan Tuareg communities or into the south’s social fabric 

more broadly is minimal. 

Taken in sum, these three dynamics underscore the fact that the radical jihadist 

current in Libya is neither constant nor immutable. It ebbs or expands according 

to the local economic and political conditions, government capacity, and conflict in 

the country. This is why American engagement with a broad range of tools is so 

important in denying jihadists the chance to remerge. 

RISKS OF RENEWED CONFLICT AND RESURGENT JIHADISM

Last fall, Libyan forces loosely affiliated to a U.N.-backed Government of National 

Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, backed by American airpower and Western special operations, scored a hard-won victory against the ISIS stronghold in the central city of 

Sirte. Elsewhere across the country, Libyans ejected ISIS cells and fighters from 

Derna and Benghazi in the east, from Tripoli, and from the town of Sabratha near 

the Tunisian border. 

Today, ISIS is no longer a territorial force in Libya in any meaningful sense. That 

said, its demise presents a number of dangers. 

First, remnants of ISIS could still reconstitute themselves and sow trouble. Already, fighters have fled to the desert valleys south of Sirte, where they’ve tried to 

regroup in small encampments like the one the United States bombed on January 

18 of this year. The group is said to have a residual presence around the western 

town of Sabratha, a long-time hub for Tunisian jihadists, and its clandestine cells 

are still capable of attacking in and around the Tripoli, already wracked by intramilitia fighting. This poses a potential danger for the return of foreign embassies 

and businesses to the capital. 

Beyond these specific threats, Libya remains an attractive host to jihadism, 

whether from ISIS, al-Qaeda, or some new variant. The conditions are ripe: A long 

legacy of jihad, economic despair, a governance vacuum, and worsening polarization 

that could leave some communities feeling as if they have no recourse but violence. 

Some tribes in Sirte, such as the Qadhadhafa and Warfalla, see the Misratan-led 

victory against ISIS as less of a liberation and more of a conquest—and it was their 

grievances against Misratan domination that gave ISIS its opening in the first 

place. 

Most importantly, though, the struggle against the Islamic State has given way 

to a renewed National-level conflict. Western diplomats had hoped that fighting 

ISIS could serve as a springboard for political unity among these warring camps. 

In fact, the opposite has happened. 

Local campaigns against ISIS across the country were pell-mell and carried out 

by disparate and hostile armed groups without any unifying government authority. 

For example, rival jihadists in Derna ejected the Islamic State, and in the western 

coastal town of Sabratha, local militias involved in migrant trafficking helped lead 

the campaign. In Sirte, the militias from the powerful city of Misrata that defeated 

ISIS were only loosely tethered to the GNA in Tripoli—and many in fact fiercely 

opposed it. Now that ISIS is gone, some have turned their guns on the GNA. 

In Benghazi, Hifter’s LNA has largely defeated ISIS and other jihadist groups 

but, in the process, it severely ruptured the city’s social fabric, displacing thousands 

of families and unleashing exclusionary forces such as tribalism and ultraconservative Salafism. Across the east, Hifter has replaced elected municipal councils with 

military governments and cracked down on civil society and freedom of the press. 

Disturbing evidence has surfaced of war crimes committed by soldiers under his 

command, such as the exhumation and abuse of enemy corpses and summary executions of both combatant prisoners and civilians. None of this is a recipe for enduring 

stability or success against radicalism. And indeed, Islamists evicted by his campaign have already waged attacks against his forces outside of Benghazi and in the 

oil crescent. 

Most ominously, though, the campaign against ISIS has helped embolden Hifter 

and his supporters to make a renewed push for National domination with the capVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
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ture of major oil facilities in Sirte (though not uncontested) and repeated threats 

to invade Tripoli. 

This looming danger, Mr. Chairman, demands immediate engagement from the 

United States. Having expended considerable military effort in helping Libyan 

forces wrest territory from the Islamic State last year, the United States should now 

turn its attention to ensuring the country does not slip into civil war and building 

a cohesive government, while at the same time dealing with residual and emerging 

jihadist pockets. 

WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES DO?

Sticking to the mantra of supporting the GNA in Tripoli, as Washington and 

Western governments have done over the past year, is no longer a viable option. 

But neither is the seemingly easy solution of backing a military strongman such as 

Hifter. 

Hifter has no realistic prospect of stabilizing Libya through military rule. His Libyan National Army is neither national nor an army. Even in the east, the bulk of 

the LNA’s forces are drawn from civilian fighters—militias of varying backgrounds 

that are increasingly disguised as formal army units. In the west and south, the 

LNA units have a distinctly tribal composition, provoking suspicion among neighboring communities that view them as little more than tribal militias. Because of 

their geographic concentration in the east, they are not useful partners in tackling 

the flow of migrant smuggling, which is mostly based along a western strip of coast 

stretching from Misrata to the Tunisian border. 

The idea that Hifter’s forces could take over Tripoli and rebuild the Libyan State 

is thus highly implausible. Indeed, encouraging Hifter to expand his reach toward 

Tripoli risks triggering a war over the capital that could drag on for years. With 

a third of the country’s population living in the greater Tripoli area, such a conflict 

could cause displacement and humanitarian suffering on a scale not seen to date 

in Libya. It would also offer opportunities for jihadist mobilization. Non-Islamist 

armed groups in Tripoli would join forces with Islamist-leaning fighters to confront 

Hifter. As in the case of Benghazi, the most extreme and irreconcilable jihadist elements would invariably rise to the fore. 

Even if Hifter were able to establish control over Tripoli, his rule would cause 

more, not less, radicalization. Like Egypt’s al-Sisi, Hifter makes no distinction between ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood (whose Libyan branch has supported the GNA’s formation). His stated goal of killing, jailing, or exiling Islamists 

of all types risks provoking moderate, pro-state Islamists into going underground 

and allying themselves with radical jihadists. Meanwhile, doctrinaire Salafis promoted and encouraged by Hifter—who preach absolute loyalty to a sitting ruler— 

would further extend their influence, and enforce their harsh interpretation of 

Sharia law more widely. 

In sum, unification through military action is not realistic in Libya. Instead, the 

United States, in conjunction with regional states, should support a renewed push 

for a political settlement. This requires a number of things. 

First, it necessitates the deterrence of any moves toward military escalation by 

exerting credible pressure on the warring parties, to include the threat of sanctions 

and exclusion from any future security assistance. 

Second, it requires rebuilding the negotiating architecture, with regional states 

taking the lead. The challenge will be brokering a common platform for dialog 

among states with vested interests in Libya. How to deal with an increasingly assertive Russia will pose a particular difficulty. Recent initiatives by regional states like 

Tunisia and Algeria should be encouraged, but they need to be transferred into a 

more coherent framework. A small group of states, closely coordinating with each 

other, could act as mediators and, eventually, witnesses and guarantors to an agreement. 

The U.S. role in such a process could be to provide strong and explicit support 

for the mediating consortium. Most importantly, it would require putting pressure 

on the regional states still backing Hifter like the Emirates and Egypt and, more 

recently, Russia. Every effort should be made to broker a deal that includes the general within the framework of a civilian-controlled military. But if Hifter proves recalcitrant, the United States must be willing to push his regional and international 

backers to end their support. 

Beyond the Herculean task of forging a political compact, the United States faces 

the enormous task of helping whatever new Libyan government emerges to succeed 

by delivering on basic services, security, and, especially, economic growth. 

An immediate priority is securing the capital of Tripoli, which means reaching an 

agreement among militias to remove their forces and heavy weaponry outside civilVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
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ian areas, and to make way for a protection force that can be built up over time 

with training and support from the outside. Another imperative is safeguarding key 

strategic assets like oil facilities, airports, and ports from factional conflict. Here, 

a number of options could be explored such as an agreement for de-militarization 

or protection by a neutral, third-party force. 

The new Libyan government will need enormous help on the economic front, in 

setting up an equitable and rational system for the dispersal of oil revenues to employees and to municipalities, while working to diversify to other sectors. The development of alternative livelihood sources is especially important in countering migrant smuggling, especially in the south, where young men are drawn into smuggling networks because of the absence of alternatives. 

The judicial sector is another key area of assistance, along with prisons, particularly with regard to captured Islamic State fighters and jihadists returning from 

abroad. Many are currently incarcerated in militia-run prisons with little or no judicial oversight, where they are reportedly tortured or subjected to religious rehabilitation programs that, by themselves do not prevent recidivism. Local communities 

and, especially, meaningful opportunities for employment or education provide the 

best hopes for post-prison reintegration. 

The challenge of rebuilding Libya’s police and army will likely be a multi-year and 

even decades-long investment, given the decrepit state of the regular army under 

Qadhafi’s long reign and the plethora of armed groups today. A training effort in 

2013–14 by the United States, Britain, Turkey, and Italy to build a national army— 

the so-called general purpose force—failed in part because the Libyan government 

was divided among itself, with some factions favoring militias and because there 

was no unified military structure or institutions for recruits to join. Those recruits 

that did complete the training returned to Libya and were either put on leave or 

melted back into militias. 

Future training programs risk repeating these mistakes, unless the new government agrees on a roadmap for building a unified and professional military, delineating its geographic divisions and functions, while at the same time formulating 

strategy for demobilizing and re-integrating militias. This requires a degree of political consensus, which Libya has hitherto lacked. Once that is reached, the United 

States can assist in helping Libyan defense institutions in such areas as planning, 

payroll, and logistics through an intense advisory effort, possibly under the auspices 

of an expanded Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI). 

Mr. Chairman, the United States also has an enormous opportunity to re-engage 

with Libyan society through assistance on municipal level governance, civil society, 

media, and education. These sorts of programs are an important corollary to the development of formal political, security, and economic institutions which, given their 

decrepit condition under Qadhafi, is likely to be a generational endeavor. And Libya 

possesses enormous human capital that could benefit from such engagement, itself 

a cause for guarded optimism: A literate and educated population, small in size, geographically concentrated, and largely lacking in the stark and sometimes existential 

ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic divides that afflict other Middle Eastern states. But 

proposed cuts to American foreign aid programs on this front would deprive us of 

this opportunity, with likely damaging results for future stability. 

On a similar note, I would like to add that the ban on the travel of Libyan citizens 

to the United States is not only morally reprehensible, but self-defeating with regard to goals in the country. It deprives the United States to opportunities for important engagements and exchanges with visiting scholars, students, officials, and 

citizens—engagements that are all the more important since Libya is closed off to 

American diplomats. But more importantly, it represents a profound betrayal of 

American values and of the hopes ordinary Libyans attached to America ever since 

the 2011 intervention. 

Mr. Chairman, in my repeated travels to Libya I’ve enjoyed the hospitality and 

protection of countless Libyans. In Sirte, Sabratha, Tripoli, and Benghazi, I’ve seen 

first-hand the sacrifices Libyan young men made in battling the Islamic State. Despite popular depictions, the vast majority of Libyans have rejected extremism in 

all of its forms. I therefore urge the immediate repeal of this law, for Libya and the 

other affected countries. 

Mr. Chairman, committee Members, I thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Dr. Wehrey. Appreciate it very much. 

I will begin with my questioning. Which of the groups do you 

think represents the most dangerous, long-term threat to the 

United States between ISIS and al-Qaeda? 

44 

Dr. Porter. 

Mr. PORTER. I have asked this question multiple times, and I 

also asked it to my cadets when I was teaching at West Point, and 

it comes down to the different strategies that the different groups 

employ, whether it is the Islamic State or its affiliates around the 

world or al-Qaeda. 

In my opinion, while the Islamic State is burning very brightly, 

it is also burning very quickly. Al-Qaeda has employed a more conservative, longer-term strategy and is likely to be more enduring 

of an organization than the Islamic State will be. 

It is more likely—Mr. Alkhouri mentions that there is a less rigorous recruiting process for al-Qaeda. I would argue that it is less 

aggressive in its recruiting because it is more selective in its recruiting. The membership of al-Qaeda, I think, is more capable 

than the membership of the Islamic State over the longer term. 

So in North Africa, the more enduring threat to the United 

States and to U.S. National interests overseas is without a doubt 

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and not the Islamic State. 

Mr. KING. Dr. Pham. 

Mr. PHAM. I would pick up where my friend, Dr. Porter, left off 

and say that I would agree with him. In the Sahel and parts south, 

what we see is al-Qaeda embedding itself within, picking up local 

grievances, local groups and multiplying, where necessary, local 

front groups that the identities shift. 

For example, the Peul or Fulani peoples of the region, who straddle the entire region, have increasingly seen and witnessed an alQaeda-linked group emerge, the Macina Liberation Front, which 

has now merged into this group that you cited earlier, Mr. Chairman, this group for the support of Islam and Muslims, but still also 

operates independently at times when convenient. 

Attacks not only in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, but we are seeing 

increasingly attacks in Nigeria and even parts farther south than 

the Boko Haram have, targeting largely predominately Christian 

communities in Nigeria. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Alkhouri. 

Mr. ALKHOURI. I believe both of them pose a significant threat. 

I think, though, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb poses a bigger 

threat to Western civilians and interests in the region, meaning in 

North Africa, the Sahel, and the Sahara. But I believe in the long 

term, ISIS’ message has really been extremely disseminated across 

the West a lot, a much more powerful message than AQIM. 

In 2015 alone, ISIS released between 750 to 800 videos, unlike 

AQIM which released only a couple of dozen of them. These videos 

have largely concentrated on indoctrinating individuals in the West 

and inciting them. These videos will continue to be a recruitment 

tool, an indoctrination tool for Westerners for decades to come. 

So I believe that ISIS, in the long term, its message is a lot more 

aggressive in targeting the West than al-Qaeda’s. 

Mr. KING. Dr. Wehrey. 

Mr. WEHREY. Well, just to second what was said, I think AQIM 

poses the more enduring threat, I think because of its focus on embedding in societies in this region and its focus on governance. But 

I would just caution that much of this is transactional. So, again, 

45 

I think its maneuverability is somewhat limited on what kind of 

groups it can co-opt. 

Certainly, it is a threat to American interests in the Sahel in 

West Africa. In Libya, at least, I would argue ISIS could try to 

stage a comeback through spectacular attacks, especially if there is 

any return of Western embassies or the United Nations to the capital. ISIS could try to make its presence known through attacks 

there. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. 

Again, I would ask the four of you, how significant is the recruiting on-line propaganda in this region? How would you compare 

what al-Qaeda is doing there and ISIS compared to on-line in the 

rest of the world, you know, as far as targeting? 

Mr. Alkhouri. 

Mr. ALKHOURI. I believe, as I mentioned earlier, ISIS has a much 

more aggressive call for attacks, and its operations on-line, essentially, I would say, when looking at AQIM’s operations on-line, it 

has only two channels that operate on-line. Their followers are only 

in the low hundreds. 

When I look at ISIS channels on-line, they have over 50 of them, 

and they operate, you know, across encrypted-messaging platforms 

as well as the deep, dark web. 

I have been following ISIS’ operations on-line since its inception. 

I would say that it has really dominated the internet, not only in 

its dissemination of propaganda, but actually its use of technology 

to incite others, provide them with advice on how to evade scrutiny 

and essentially operate very comfortably in the West. 

So I would say ISIS has a much more dominating presence online than al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 

Mr. KING. Anybody else want to comment? 

Dr. Pham. 

Mr. PHAM. I would agree with Mr. Alkhouri that on-line, but I 

would caution the subcommittee that on-line is just one dimension 

of media. Where al-Qaeda perhaps has an advantage as an ideology 

and its ideological roots is the fact that it is built on a matrix that 

has been developed over years of foreign money, foreign influence, 

mosques, and social networks. 

So in many respects, this is an area where on-line is one thing, 

but we have very low literacy rates as well. So access to the internet is lower and so there are other ways of social messaging that 

we should be aware of. 

Mr. KING. Dr. Porter. 

Mr. PORTER. In fact, Dr. Pham took the words right out of my 

mouth. I think, you know, when we think about the on-line recruitment among Islamic State or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 

North Africa, we have to bear in mind that internet penetration 

rates in the Sahel, and particularly in Niger, Chad, Mali, and especially in northern Mali and northern Niger, are low. 

That is going to be a natural or inherent barrier for Islamic State 

or al-Qaeda on-line recruitment methods in those regions. As Dr. 

Pham also pointed out, there are other mechanisms on the ground 

that these organizations can use to generate followers. 

Now conversely, internet penetration rates, despite the instability and turmoil in Libya, are fairly good. Likewise, internet penVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
46 

etration rates in Morocco are also very good, which comes part and 

parcel of Morocco’s economic development. 

So it poses a double-edged sword. On the one hand, you have economic opportunities generated by telecommunications developments, but on the other hand, you know, you have the risk posed 

by on-line communications and on-line recruitment. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. KING. OK. 

Dr. Wehrey. 

Mr. WEHREY. Just to echo what was said, I think the, you know, 

on-line penetration and also, you know, media in general can sort 

of sensitize people. But I think the ultimate recruitment, and this 

is stemming from a lot of the interviews I have done in Libya, is 

really based on social groups and sort of neighborhood influences. 

You look at al-Qaeda groups like Ansar al-Sharia, they were very 

effective in promoting a certain culture with youth camps, social 

works, and from there it was an easy path to armed jihad. 

Mr. KING. Thanks. 

Miss Rice. 

Miss RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Porter, I would just like to start with you. You had said in 

your testimony that the greatest threat in North Africa is injustice 

and the lack of rule of law, or, you know, or commitment to justice 

and the rule of law are foundations of any properly functioning government. 

All last year we heard a lot of America first, America first, and 

it has yet to be seen how that is going to translate from a campaign slogan to a governing party. But what effect is that going to 

have on how receptive people in North Africa are going to be to our 

intervention there in the various different ways that we intervene? 

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, ma’am. It is a very pertinent and, to be 

frank, difficult question. I think depending on the types of programs that the United States initiates overseas in, and particularly 

in North Africa, which is the subject of today’s subcommittee hearing, for the most part, U.S. engagement in the region is positively 

received. 

It is received well by the Chadian armed forces, the Nigerian 

armed forces, the Malian armed forces. So military aid is welcomed 

by those host countries, and I think that has yielded dividends in 

counterterrorism campaigns in North Africa and the Sahel. 

In addition, parallel to that, the United States aid programs and 

development programs through USAID and through State Department are also well-received. They pay dividends in a different way. 

I think, you know, one of the things that we should emphasize 

here today, and speaking more broadly about the current budgetary environments on the current foreign policy environment in 

Washington, is that, as I said in my testimony, there is no strictly 

military solution to counterterrorism. That removing terrorists 

from the battlefield only slows the group’s evolution. It does not 

eliminate the group. 

What eliminates the group is changing the conditions on the 

ground. The military does not do that, and nor should they. It is 

not their job. That job falls to State Department. I think this is as 

important a component of counterterrorism as the military is. 

Thank you very much, ma’am. 

47 

Miss RICE. So that leads to my next question, that the Trump administration has proposed a 28 percent cut to the State Department, which would devastate foreign aid programs. What say you 

about that? I mean what effect is that going to have on the nonmilitary programs that you were just talking about? 

Mr. PORTER. A negative one. 

Miss RICE. How do we address that? How do we make the point 

that—I mean there are members of the administration, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, who have talked about 

this. In what ways, how is this being received, if at all, by the 

countries that you are talking about that rely on foreign aid from 

the United States? What is their take on this? 

Mr. PORTER. To the best of my knowledge, ma’am, there is a 

sense of anxiety among North African capitals about what the retreat of U.S. State Department programs, USAID programs in their 

countries will have. In particular, there are concerns in Tunisia 

about the good governance programs that the United States is supporting there. 

There are concerns in Morocco. Morocco does have a constant 

battle against Islamic State supporters within their own borders. 

To Morocco’s credit, it is doing a very good job on the counterterrorism front, but it needs help on rule of law and good governance 

issues. Likewise, Algeria, and then the Sahel states even more so. 

So this will have a deleterious effect on the good governance rule 

of law environment, and I think it will aggravate the sense of social 

injustice that upon which salafi jihadi groups feed. Thank you, 

ma’am. 

Miss RICE. Thank you. 

Dr. Wehrey, a question for you. How valuable is a strong European Union, right? We are talking today about the threat not just 

to the United States, to the terrorism that is going on and growing 

in North Africa, but also to Europe. In your opinion, how important 

is a strong European Union? Or is it not to kind of combatting, 

doing their part to combat terrorism in the North African region? 

Mr. WEHREY. Thank you, ma’am. I think it is, you know, absolutely essential and especially in a place like Libya where the 

United States can’t bear the burden on its own. I mean, after the 

2011 revolution, the European countries had a number of, you 

know, programs to address various aspects of Libya’s governance 

and security. They are now engaged on the border issue. 

But I think, and this speaks to your previous question, I think 

they do require some U.S. leadership behind them. So the United 

States can lend certain capabilities here, which is why, to echo 

what Dr. Porter said, it is so important that we stay involved. But, 

no, I mean the European Union is absolutely essential. 

Miss RICE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Keating from Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You had mentioned before that this is more of a direct threat to 

Europe. Could you comment particularly on threats to Europe directly from this area, particularly southern Europe, where countries like Italy, most of the migration is coming from Northern Africa? 

48 

Could you really, any of you, or all of you hopefully, comment on 

what the nature of those threats are? What the United States and 

what our allies there can do to try and counter that? 

Mr. PORTER. Sir, thank you. Thank you for your question. As I 

said in my oral testimony, the threat posed by jihadi salafi organizations in North Africa to Europe is much greater than that posed 

to the United States simply because of geographic proximity. 

You know, when I brief the FBI or ICE, a couple throwaway 

facts, you know, the Strait of Gibraltar separating Morocco from 

southern Spain at its narrowest is 8 kilometers wide. A flight from 

Algiers, the capital of Algeria, to Marseille, which is the second 

largest French city, is about the same length and time as the New 

York-D.C. shuttle. 

So North Africa is in Europe’s backyard. That poses a grave concern for European countries, especially those on the shores of the 

Mediterranean. 

I do want to address what I think is a red herring, which is the 

fear that salafi jihadi terrorists will embed themselves with refugees or immigrants trying to cross the Mediterranean and illegally 

penetrate Europe’s borders. 

You know, on the one hand, Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb have sufficient resources not to have to throw 

themselves into a rickety dinghy and try and cross the Mediterranean. They can easily buy a plane ticket with a clean passport from 

a third-party country. There is no need to take the risk of trying 

to cross the Mediterranean. 

In addition, Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

have likely supporters in Europe. Many of those supporters, as we 

have seen in the case of the Paris attacks, the Brussels attacks, the 

Nice attacks, have connections to the North African diaspora in Europe. 

So the threat, I think, is substantial, even with the fluid movement of peoples back and forth across the Mediterranean, but not 

necessarily through illegal channels and more and more likely 

through legal channels such as airplane tickets, ferries, and car 

crossings. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. KEATING. Anyone else want to comment on that threat in 

Europe? 

Mr. PHAM. Sir, thank you for your question. I would add to what 

Dr. Porter said, also, highlight the threat to European interests 

and personnel, including military and diplomatic personnel 

throughout this region in the region itself. 

In particular, France has—our allies there have a tremendous 

network of business and other contacts in the region that are there. 

The French lead the peacekeeping efforts in Mali. 

There are German units, even Swedish units in Mali, which has 

turned into the bloodiest U.N. peacekeeping operation anywhere, 

the deadliest because of the on-going instability in the northern 

part of the country. 

So I would add that there is the threat there. Many of the victims in the al-Qaeda-linked attacks in Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, 

Mali were European citizens. So there is a threat to Europeans in 

that area. 

49 

One other low note I would add to that is there is the downside 

of the North African diaspora in Europe, but there is also the upside that some of the North African countries, Morocco in particular, have extraordinarily capable, not only counterterrorism but 

counter-radicalization programs driven not just by security services 

but by religious leaders and social networks, that help not only in 

their own country, but throughout this region, and increasingly, 

even reaching back to Europe as well. 

Mr. KEATING. OK. Just a comment that yesterday in the Foreign 

Affairs Committee we had a hearing regarding the budget, the foreign aid budget. I share a very optimistic view that the present 

budget will not be the budget that we will endorse or support here 

in the House. That is a bipartisan statement yesterday, and a very 

strong one. 

But what about the role with our kind of assistance on empowering women in these regions to a greater extent? We have found 

in many areas that that is more successful, the money gets where 

it should, goes to the health and goes toward children. Does anyone 

want to comment on how spearheading some of those funds empowering women to be more involved in that area could be successful? 

Mr. PORTER. I think it should be duly noted that you are asking 

a question about empowering women to an all-male panel. But—— 

Mr. KEATING. Well—— 

Mr. PORTER [continuing]. I will do my best. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, maybe that is part of the problem that—— 

Mr. PORTER. Roger that, sir. 

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. That we should be better prepared to 

answer those things as men. But go ahead. 

Mr. PORTER. Or there should be more women sitting on this side 

of the table. But, sir, thank you very much for your question. 

Yes, I think it is 100 percent correct, and I saw some information 

yesterday that there is a quantifiable decreased likelihood of terrorist attacks or the emergence of jihadi salafi groups in countries 

in which women are more fully integrated into the economic and 

public and government life of the country. I can get you further 

statistics to support that. 

Mr. KEATING. OK. 

Mr. PORTER. I just don’t have off the top of my head, sir. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes. We have some and I would appreciate any 

more. 

Yes, sir. 

Mr. PHAM. Just in the case of Libya, our support to women’s civil 

society groups after the revolution, and the support of other countries, I think, was absolutely essential in creating a sort of momentum against armed groups and a counterweight to violence. 

So you see a lot of the civil protests against militias, not necessarily against—against extremists, too, but against—militias 

were, in fact, led by women’s groups. So I think it is tremendously 

empowering. 

The other dimension is in a lot of these marginalized communities, especially in the south where young men fall prey to extremism or get involved in smuggling, I mean women’s, you know, 

roles can be incredibly useful, I think, in sort of curtailing that impulse. 

50 

Again, with returning jihadists, we can’t just throw them all in 

prison. There has to be some sort of integration program into their 

communities after justice is served. So there again I think women’s 

groups can play an essential role here. 

Mr. KEATING. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hurd. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you all for being 

here. This is an important topic. I actually only have one question, 

and it is a 30,000-foot view question, and I would love to hear 

everybody’s opinion on it. 

Dr. Pham, maybe we start with you and just go down the line? 

When it comes specifically to terrorism in North Africa, what day 

do we celebrate? What day do we get to raise our hands and say 

we won? 

Can we imprison and kill everyone? I don’t think so. So help me 

understand what is that end-point, that end-state that if we 

achieve we are going to say we solved the problem? Is that a fair 

question? 

Dr. Wehrey, you want to? It seemed like you are ready to answer. We can maybe start with you and go down the other way. 

Mr. WEHREY. Sure. I think it is an excellent question. I think we 

need to be very surgical and discrete in terms of identifying, you 

know, what groups really pose a threat to us because I think in a 

lot of these countries, you have traditions of religious conservatism. 

You have militancy. This has been going back decades. Now on top 

of that, you have these named terrorist groups, ISIS and al-Qaeda. 

You know, the question is these groups are very good at marbling into one another, and the question is how do we defeat those 

groups that matter to us? I think, you know, the question really is 

have we eliminated groups that have both the will and the capacity 

to threaten the interests of our allies, the economic interests, the 

personnel of our allies? 

Now, are we going to defeat, ‘‘extremism’’ in places like eastern 

Libya? We are not. Or are we going to completely, you know, eliminate illiberal extremist ideology in some of these places? We are 

not. 

So again, I don’t think there is ever going to be a day where we 

are going to declare, you know, victory. We shouldn’t widen the circle to the extent that we are involved in this sort of never-ending 

war. 

Mr. ALKHOURI. Thank you for the question. The question is 

whether we are tackling terrorist groups and the word terrorism, 

or are we talking about extremism, because I believe extremism is 

a much bigger issue. 

I think that terrorist groups really capitalize on the issue of extremism that they have a lot of people have been bred up with, you 

know, for many years, and it doesn’t take him long to get that extremism up and get these individuals to actually carry out acts of 

terrorism. 

But I think part of the solution, or at least the way I see it, that 

economic opportunities are a major part of the solution. I think 

that the region, North Africa and the Sahel at large, there is a high 

unemployment rate in many of these places, especially in Libya. 

51 

If we look at de-radicalization programs, they essentially do not 

exist. We are not only talking about de-radicalization programs, 

meaning individuals who have already been radicalized and you 

put them through programs, but also we are talking about the necessity for anti-radicalization programs, programs that should exist 

prior to individuals actually having gone to the, you know, off that 

threshold. 

We are also talking about society building, and I think that is 

extremely important because they don’t want to just see programs 

dedicated to, you know, to potential radical individuals, but also 

the society at large. 

If we are missing vital, you know, basic necessities in certain societies, then specific groups can capitalize on that, provide these 

necessities or these basic needs to the individuals in this society, 

and then, you know, take advantage of that, indoctrinate them and 

so on. 

Finally, I would say a major part of cutting off these groups is 

cutting off their finances. I think that the United States has succeeded in large part in cutting off the finances of al-Qaeda and 

ISIS. 

But also this is a problem that we keep seeing as individuals are 

dealing with digital currency, as individuals are still taking advantage of the banking system and taking advantage of fraud. We are 

seeing a nexus between jihadist terrorist groups and cyber-criminal 

groups. So that would be essential to tackle that problem. 

Mr. PORTER. Sir, thank you for your question. You know, as I 

said in my written testimony, you know, in counterterrorism there 

is no mission accomplished. There is just continuing to accomplish 

the mission. There is no winning. There is just mitigating the risk 

to what we consider to be a tolerable level. That is it. 

I mean, combatting terrorism is hard. Counterterrorism is hard. 

The solutions exist along a continuum of military approaches and 

non-military approaches. You know, I think, you know, we have 

seen some progress in some North African countries. The threat is 

not uniform across North Africa. 

I don’t think any country, and I don’t mean to be facetious or to 

treat your question glibly, but I don’t think any country, despite 

the successes that it is making in combatting terrorism, ever celebrates. I think a prime example of this is Algeria, which has struggled with terrorism since the 1990’s. 

During the 1990’s, terrorism was an egregious and horrible problem that left more than 150,000 dead. Today, when you travel to 

Algeria, especially in and around the capital, but also along the 

coast, you rarely think about terrorism. 

Now, is that celebratory, or is that cause for a celebration? No, 

but it is a satisfactory outcome. Does terrorism still exist in Algeria? Yes, to a severely mitigated extent. 

So I think, you know, it is a continuous and on-going and difficult process where there is no victory. There is just a satisfactory 

outcome. Thank you, sir, for your question. 

Mr. PHAM. Just very briefly, sir, I would make two points. First, 

I think we are not going to have success, as my colleagues have 

said, but what we can do successfully is to lower the risk by lowering first the threat, the frequency and likelihood of these events, 

52 

the vulnerability, the likelihood that when these events occur, they 

will be successful and lowering the costs of each event, even if successful, exerts. 

We can do that by helping our allies, which leads me to my second point, which is that I think one measure of a successful policy 

in the region is the extent to which we can have governments in 

place that are legitimate in the eyes of their people. 

Legitimacy does not mean necessarily, although it is often expressed as such, but not necessarily electoral, winning majorities at 

the ballot box. 

It is governments that are accepted by their people that provide 

basic security and services and can exert control to a large measure 

across their National territory. It is a long road to that, but it is 

certainly a significant step toward de-risking. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Gallagher. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to all our panelists for joining us today. One question 

that has come up with increasing frequency is the question of 

whether or not we designate the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as 

part of a broader strategy of getting tougher on terrorism. 

Obviously, the Muslim Brotherhood is not a monolithic organization, but it has goals that are antithetical to our own foreign policy. 

It espouses the establishment of a global caliphate. Its charter says 

that death in the way of Allah is the ultimate end for its members. 

Help us think through, sort-of, the second and third order effects 

of designation. Would that enhance our counterterrorism effort in 

Egypt and more broadly across North Africa and indeed the Middle 

East as well? For the entire panel? 

Mr. PORTER. Well, thank you for your question. Just to begin 

quite simply, if you increase the number of terrorists by designating people that were not previously terrorists, then you make 

your counterterrorism problem more difficult. 

But I think a more nuanced answer is that I am not entirely convinced that the threshold for designating a group a terrorist group 

is that they are antithetical to the U.S. foreign policy overseas. In 

addition, there is, as you also mentioned, the Muslim Brotherhood 

is a nuanced group that does embrace a range of ideologies and is 

engaged in a range of activities throughout North Africa. 

In terms of second and third order effects of designation of the 

Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization, I was 

speaking with a client yesterday, and I was speaking with another 

client last week who have businesses. These are U.S. companies 

with businesses in North Africa that employ foreign nationals on 

their staff and to whom they pay salaries. 

It is guaranteed in our conversations with these representatives 

of these companies, it is guaranteed that among their staff overseas are members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Designating the 

Muslim Brotherhood as an FTO would then leave these U.S. corporations vulnerable to accusations of material support for terrorism. 

In addition, it would raise the bar extensively for U.S. corporations doing business overseas in terms of KYC, again, running the 

risk of exposing U.S. corporations to material support for terrorism. 

53 

So I think the implications, particularly for U.S. foreign direction 

overseas are enormous, in addition to the fact that I don’t think the 

Muslim Brotherhood genuinely qualifies as a foreign terrorist organization. But thank you, sir, for your question. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. 

Can I go to Dr. Wehrey just because we had many a productive 

debate and discussion when I was but a lowly staffer on the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee on Tunisia and Libya? So I would be 

interested in your thoughts on the topic. 

Mr. WEHREY. Well, I think the second- and third-order effects I 

think would be, quite frankly, catastrophic, especially in a place 

like Libya where the Muslim Brotherhood is backing the U.N.- 

backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli, through which 

we are working to counter ISIS. 

I think designating it would create a whole new class of political 

losers in Libya, people that are shut out of the political process, 

and that is a prime recruiting pool for ISIS. So I think it would 

actually widen the circle of terrorists that we are trying to combat. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. 

Dr. Pham, quickly since my time is expiring and since I apologize 

for being late to the hearing, given your extensive work in Africa 

and given some conversations we have had at, you know, putting 

Africa in the front view versus the rearview mirror, has there anything that hasn’t been discussed today about terrorism in Africa, 

or an area that we are not paying enough attention to that you 

think we should pay more attention to on this subcommittee? 

Mr. PHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Gallagher, for that question. I think two things that we need to pay more attention to. One 

is the seamless nature and throughout this hearing, my fellow panelists and I have discussed how things have moved north-south 

from the Mediterranean shore down into Africa. 

Department of Defense treats all of Africa as a whole. Since 20 

of January, so does the National Security Council. It makes sense. 

Threats move north-south. Economics works in the same direction, 

but the rest of the whole of government still draws a line and a 

lot falls through that chasm in the middle. 

The second point I would make is that we would do well to work 

with partners. We have got effective partners in the region, but we 

don’t always work and coordinate. 

Morocco, for example, has a highly effective counterradicalization program. Mr. Keating earlier asked about women. 

Morocco trained—it is the only Muslim country that requires the 

training of a quota of women religious leaders and scholars. 

It has agreements with countries throughout the region to train 

imams in moderate forms of Islam as a counter to the Muslim 

Brotherhood or more radical forms. So working with them should 

be a part of our agenda. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. 

Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate your time. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher. 

Let me thank all the witnesses for their valuable testimony and 

the Members for their questions. The Members of this subcommittee may have some additional questions to the witnesses. I 

will ask you to respond to those in writing. 

54 

Miss Rice, do you have any—— 

Miss RICE. No. 

Mr. KING. OK. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing 

record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:09 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(55) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR J. PETER PHAM

Question 1a. Economic and political insecurity seems to be a common occurrence 

across North Africa. In your opinion, how does this regional and state fragmentation 

pose long-term challenges for the United States? 

Question 1b. How can the United States and its allies in the region disrupt the 

recruiting efforts of local al-Qaeda and the Islamic State affiliates that take advantage of this turmoil? 

Answer. The Maghreb and the adjacent Sahel are textbook examples of the threat 

that weak states can present to the international community in general and, more 

specifically, to the interests of United States and its allies. The region is an almost 

ideal environment for extremist groups with transnational ambitions, whether ISIS 

fighters smarting from defeats on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria or al-Qaeda militants seeking to reassert the preeminence of their organization within the global 

jihadist movement. The challenge posed by the various militant groups operating in 

the Sahel is directly linked to their ability to exploit myriad local conflicts, including 

social, economic, and political marginalization, as well as the fragile condition of 

many of the states in the region. 

As I noted in my prepared statement, the challenge posed by these jihadist groups 

and their efforts to recruit in this region cannot be countered except in an integrated fashion, with solutions that embrace a broader notion of human security writ 

large, encompassing social, economic, and political development. Moreover, to be effective, these solutions also must transcend national and other artificial boundaries 

that cut across the region. Obviously, this is not—and should not be—a task just 

for the United States, but is one which it is in America’s strategic interest to play 

its part and, indeed lead. 

Question 2. In your opinion, what is the most important base of the Islamic State 

and al-Qaeda in North Africa? 

Answer. The Sahel, rather than the Maghreb—where, with the exception of Libya, 

there are strong states that have shown their ability to resist not only al-Qaeda, 

but also ISIS, encroachments—is the most promising base for affiliates of both the 

so-called Islamic State and al-Qaeda, especially as fighters return to Africa from the 

Levant and link up with others of their ilk displaced from Sirte and other places 

on the Mediterranean littoral and make their way to the Fezzan and other points 

south. 

Question 3. How would you measure the extent of Islamic State and al-Qaeda 

fighters that have fled fighting zones in the Middle East to North Africa? 

Answer. The countries of the Maghreb, especially Tunisia, have contributed foreign fighters to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq at higher rates per capita than 

almost any others. Thus one can expect that the defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq 

will lead many of those militants who survive to make their way back to Africa and 

many of these will, in turn, find the Sahel a particularly opportune environment. 

The Sahel is one of the poorest majority-Muslim regions in the world. It is also 

home to the largest expanse of contiguous ungoverned spaces on the African continent: Many of the governments in the region are weak and their capacity to assert 

authority—much less provide real services—beyond their capital cities and a smattering of urban centers is extremely limited at best. These fragile states present the 

returning jihadists both a tempting vulnerability to exploit in the short term and 

a tantalizing opportunity to create a new hub for operations over the long term. 

Question 4. The United States spends a great deal on training and equipment for 

allies to help combat terrorism. In your opinion, which countries in the region 

should the United States be focusing most of its efforts on? 

Question 4a. Is this a more cost-effective option than deploying U.S. forces and 

limit the need for future U.S. intervention? 

56 

Answer. While compelling cases can be made for U.S. cooperation with almost 

every country in the region, two stand out for their strategic significance. Given its 

population (the largest in Africa, including both the continent’s largest Muslim and 

Christian communities) and its economic importance (the second-largest economy on 

the continent, having lost the No. 1 slot to South Africa last year due to a recession), 

Nigeria is without a doubt a pivotal country on whose security and stability not only 

the Sahel, but much of West Africa depends. 

Also important is Morocco, a long-standing ‘‘major non-NATO ally’’ of the United 

States. Morocco’s whose aggressive, multi-pronged approach to countering radical 

ideology and terrorism has much to commend it as does the kingdom’s efforts to assist other countries in North and West Africa in the same fight. The potential of 

the U.S.-Morocco Framework for Cooperation, signed during the U.S.-Africa Leaders 

Summit in 2014 and aimed at developing Moroccan training experts as well as jointly training civilian security and counterterrorism forces with other partners in the 

Maghreb and the Sahel in recognizing a ‘‘triangular’’ approach, needs to be better 

appreciated and developed. The North African country is an instance of where some 

resources can have a multiplier effect. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER KATHLEEN M. RICE FOR J. PETER PHAM

Question 1. What are your opinions on the President’s travel ban and its potential 

effects in North Africa? 

Answer. The only North African country affected by the travel ban is Libya, where 

the practical effects may be somewhat limited at the current time: The country has 

three self-styled ‘‘governments’’ competing for power as well as numerous other factions, without even counting the jihadist groups linked to ISIS or al-Qaeda. Even 

apart from the advisability or not of the travel ban as a policy, one question that 

needs to be asked is how in the very constrained circumstances of a country like 

that the consular functions, including the vetting of potential travelers, can even be 

carried out effectively enough to assure that anyone granted entry into the United 

States does not, in fact, pose a threat to our citizens and homeland. Much of the 

work done by the dedicated men and women of the Foreign Service is art, not 

science. And I wonder whether they have the access necessary to form correct judgments in cases where security limits their access to the community. 

Question 2. On March 9, 2017, General Thomas D. Waldhauser, head of U.S. Africa Command, acknowledged in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee that there have been signs of Russian security and political interference inside of Libya. In your opinion, how does this affect U.S.-led and U.S.-backed operations currently in Libya? 

Answer. I do not have access to the information that General Waldhauser has at 

his disposal, but clearly security and military interference by Russia—or any outside 

country not allied with us—further complicates an already fraught situation and, 

potentially, undermines both the leverage that the United States and our partners 

have as well as our overall strategic objectives. 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE MIKE GALLAGHER FOR J. PETER PHAM

Question 1a. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is our largest permanent military installation in Africa and is critical to our counterterrorism operations throughout Africa, as well as the Middle East. Just a few miles away, a Chinese naval base is 

being constructed and is slated for completion this summer. Publicly, Chinese officials maintain this base is strictly to aid their anti-piracy missions and is not a 

base, but rather a ‘‘logistical support facility.’’ During a briefing with reporters on 

March 27, AFRICOM Commander and Marine Corps Gen. Thomas Waldhauser 

said, ‘‘There are some very significant operational security concerns,’’ in response to 

a question about the new Chinese base. This is China’s first permanent overseas 

military outpost, which carries added significance. How can this new proximity to 

the Chinese affect our CT missions in the region? 

Question 1b. How will their foreign policy goals conflict with our own? 

Answer. Not only do I share General Waldhauser’s preoccupation about what he 

described diplomatically as ‘‘some very significant operational security concerns’’ 

about the Chinese ‘‘logistical support facility,’’ but I would go a step further and say 

that the placement of mainland China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti represents a strategic revolution in the country’s military posture in the region. Not 

only will the proximity of Chinese forces permit them to have a literal front-row 

seat to our counterterrorism and other operations out of Camp Lemonier—and those 

of our French allies nearby as well as the anti-piracy efforts of the Japanese SelfDefense Forces, also based in the vicinity—but the location also affords them significant advantages in the region. Consider, for example, the Shaanxi Y–8, the workVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
57 

horse reconnaissance aircraft deployed by Chinese forces, has an effective range of 

approximately 2,500 kilometers without refueling; from Djibouti, Chinese planes can 

cover the entirety of the Arabian Peninsula, almost to the Syrian and Iraqi borders 

with Turkey, to the northeast; all of Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, and most of eastern Libya, to the northwest; half of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the 

west and all the way to the Mozambique Channel to the south; and most of the 

western Indian Ocean to the east. 

Question 2a. AFRICOM has been partnering with Tunisian military and intelligence assets to improve their CT&I capabilities and help secure their borders. 

However, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, somewhere between 6,000–7,000 Tunisians have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join rebel 

and terrorist groups in those conflict zones. The Wall Street Journal reports that 

‘‘As many as 15,000 others have been barred from international travel because 

Tunisia’s government suspects them of planning to follow suit.’’ Another report, citing a U.S. CT official in Tunisia, says as many as 1,000 Tunisians are under domestic surveillance within the country. Given these numbers, how can we expect the 

Tunisians to adequately address these issues and implement a successful CT strategy? 

Question 2b. What more can we do to implement and improve upon AFRICOM’s 

existing partnership with Tunisia? 

Answer. Not only has Tunisia sent more fighters to join the so-called Islamic 

State than any other country, but Tunisians have also gone abroad to join al-Qaeda 

in the Islamic Maghreb and other jihadist groups. Moreover, these fighters have already begun to focus their attacks on their own homeland, with the country being 

hit by more than 50 terrorist attacks in the last 3 years, many coming from militants operating in Libya. While the Africa Command has been trying to build up 

the capabilities of our Tunisian partners, who were designated a ‘‘major non-NATO 

ally’’ in 2015, the military effort alone will not suffice for the scale of the challenge 

faced. The country’s police forces and judicial system also need strengthening. The 

government also lacks a comprehensive counter-radicalization program, to say nothing of mechanisms for deradicalization and reintegration. Here Tunisia may benefit 

from help from neighbors like Morocco, which have much more mature efforts in 

this regard. 

Question 3. The Libya-Italy migrant route was described in late 2016 as the major 

migrant route into Europe, surpassing the notorious path from Turkey to Greece 

that was used by approximately 850,000 migrants in 2015. In light of this, what is 

your assessment of the threat of ISIS or other extremists exploiting this heavilyused migrant route by blending in with the hundreds of thousands of refugees crossing the Mediterranean, and either launching an attack in Europe or travelling to 

the United States? 

Answer. While I would not rule out the possibility that migrant routes, especially 

the Libya-Italy passage where the overwhelmed Italian authorities seem to have 

taken a laissez-faire attitude of passing the challenge onward, may be exploited by 

ISIS and other jihadist groups to infiltrate terrorists into Europe and beyond, I 

would be much more concerned about the reach that these extremists already enjoy 

in diaspora communities in Europe, from whence they have already recruited and 

to which fighters may be returning. 

Question 4. President Trump’s proposed budget includes significant cuts to the 

State Department as well as USAID. In his posture statement in early March before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, AFRICOM commander Gen. Waldhauser 

specifically praised these two arms of our non-military foreign policy, saying, ‘‘Diplomacy and development are key efforts, and our partnership with the Department 

of State and USAID is key to achieve enduring success.’’ As it specifically relates 

to North Africa, what programs have these two agencies put in place to aid our CT 

efforts in that region? 

Answer. Once again, General Waldhauser has succinctly made the point. While 

AFRICOM certainly needs adequate resources to meet the extraordinary challenges 

which have arisen in recent years within its area of responsibility, it can only do 

so as part of a whole-of-government approach with both diplomatic and development 

components. For example, as I noted in my prepared statement, it is still nothing 

short of mind-boggling that in Nigeria there is no U.S. diplomatic presence north 

of the capital of Abuja, thus leaving the northern part of the country—an area that 

is home to more than 90 million predominantly Muslim people who would, by themselves, constitute Africa’s third most-populous country—entirely without of an 

American diplomatic presence (and the on-going intelligence and other monitoring 

capabilities that come with such a mission). 

58 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR GEOFF D. PORTER

Question 1a. Economic and political insecurity seems to be a common occurrence 

across North Africa. In your opinion, how does this regional and State fragmentation pose long-term challenges for the United States? 

Question 1b. How can the United States and its allies in the region disrupt the 

recruiting efforts of local al-Qaeda and the Islamic State affiliates that take advantage of this turmoil? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. In your opinion, what is the most important base of the Islamic State 

and al-Qaeda in North Africa? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. How would you measure the extent of Islamic State and al-Qaeda 

fighters that have fled fighting zones in the Middle East to North Africa? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. The United States spends a great deal on training and equipment for 

allies to help combat terrorism. In your opinion, which countries in the region 

should the United States be focusing most of its efforts on? 

Question 4b. Is this a more cost-effective option than deploying U.S. forces and 

limit the need for future U.S. intervention? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTION FROM RANKING MEMBER KATHLEEN M. RICE FOR GEOFF D. PORTER

Question. What are your opinions on the President’s travel ban and its potential 

effects in North Africa? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE MIKE GALLAGHER FOR GEOFF D. PORTER

Question 1a. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is our largest permanent military installation in Africa and is critical to our counterterrorism operations throughout Africa, as well as the Middle East. Just a few miles away, a Chinese naval base is 

being constructed and is slated for completion this summer. Publicly, Chinese officials maintain this base is strictly to aid their anti-piracy missions and is not a 

base, but rather a ‘‘logistical support facility.’’ During a briefing with reporters on 

March 27, AFRICOM Commander and Marine Corps Gen. Thomas Waldhauser 

said, ‘‘There are some very significant operational security concerns,’’ in response to 

a question about the new Chinese base. This is China’s first permanent overseas 

military outpost, which carries added significance. How can this new proximity to 

the Chinese affect our CT missions in the region? 

Question 1b. How will their foreign policy goals conflict with our own? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2a. AFRICOM has been partnering with Tunisian military and intelligence assets to improve their CT&I capabilities and help secure their borders. 

However, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, somewhere between 6,000–7,000 Tunisians have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join rebel 

and terrorist groups in those conflict zones. The Wall Street Journal reports that 

‘‘As many as 15,000 others have been barred from international travel because 

Tunisia’s government suspects them of planning to follow suit.’’ Another report, citing a U.S. CT official in Tunisia, says as many as 1,000 Tunisians are under domestic surveillance within the country. Given these numbers, how can we expect the 

Tunisians to adequately address these issues and implement a successful CT strategy? 

Question 2b. What more can we do to implement and improve upon AFRICOM’s 

existing partnership with Tunisia? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. The Libya-Italy migrant route was described in late 2016 as the major 

migrant route into Europe, surpassing the notorious path from Turkey to Greece 

that was used by approximately 850,000 migrants in 2015. In light of this, what is 

your assessment of the threat of ISIS or other extremists exploiting this heavilyused migrant route by blending in with the hundreds of thousands of refugees crossing the Mediterranean, and either launching an attack in Europe or travelling to 

the United States? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. President Trump’s proposed budget includes significant cuts to the 

State Department as well as USAID. In his posture statement in early March before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, AFRICOM commander Gen. Waldhauser 

specifically praised these two arms of our non-military foreign policy, saying, ‘‘DiploVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
59 

macy and development are key efforts, and our partnership with the Department 

of State and USAID is key to achieve enduring success.’’ As it specifically relates 

to North Africa, what programs have these two agencies put in place to aid our CT 

efforts in that region? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR LAITH ALKHOURI

Question 1a. Economic and political insecurity seems to be a common occurrence 

across North Africa. In your opinion, how does this regional and state fragmentation 

pose long-term challenges for the United States? 

Answer. Socioeconomic and political insecurities contribute to the marginalization 

of many individuals in North Africa; regional and state fragmentation adds extra 

layers of uncertainty and creates mistrust between locals and governing bodies. Terror groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have capitalized on these factors, in many ways 

offering a sense of belonging to individuals who have suffered socioeconomic struggles and political marginalization. The concepts of brotherhood and connectedness 

around one goal are powerful images that ISIS exploits to recruit individuals who 

feel they do not have a purpose. When terror-affiliated networks take control of 

towns—running schools, traffic, and prisons—they are able to conduct grassroots indoctrination. ISIS’s Libya faction acted for 2 years as a de facto governing body until 

the recent victories of the Libyan government. 

Question 1b. How can the United States and its allies in the region disrupt the 

recruiting efforts of local al-Qaeda and the Islamic State affiliates that take advantage of this turmoil? 

Answer. The approach of the United States and its allies toward counter-terrorism 

in North Africa has largely relied upon regional governments with minimal direct 

intervention; however, it is not clear whether the current policy will pivot towards 

militarily addressing ISIS affiliates outside Iraq and Syria. On April 26, 2017, the 

United States conducted an operation against ISIS positions in Afghanistan, in 

which two U.S. soldiers were killed. The operation came 2 weeks after the United 

States dropped the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) on ISIS positions in the 

same district, Achin, in Nangarhar Province. This denotes a potential increase in 

operations against ISIS outside its Middle East territory. It remains to be seen 

whether this targeting might expand to include North Africa and the Sahel. 

Animosity toward the United States is at the epicenter of the terror groups’ campaigns in North Africa and the Sahel. Many among the youth that ISIS governed 

are at great risk of becoming extremists and committing violence against the United 

States or its interests abroad. Furthermore, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

(AQIM) poses a great threat regionally, especially towards soft targets. 

Question 2. In your opinion, what is the most important base of the Islamic State 

and al-Qaeda in North Africa? 

Answer. As ISIS has been struggling to maintain control over territory—having 

already lost several key cities, with more poised to fall—its central operations command likely moved to more secure territory. ISIS’s top spokesman, for example, was 

killed in Aleppo, Syria, while top aides to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were killed in 

Raqqa, Syria and Anbar, Iraq, among other places. Today, ISIS’s so-called ‘‘Euphrates Province’’—the group’s only transnational territory, spanning from al-Bukamal 

in eastern Syria to al-Qa’im in western Iraq—is a main route for fighter and weapons smuggling. It is likely that ISIS commanders, and possibly leadership, are 

present in that area. 

Question 3. How would you measure the extent of Islamic State and al-Qaeda 

fighters that have fled fighting zones in the Middle East to North Africa? 

Answer. It is likely that hundreds of ISIS foreign fighters have changed their positions, been killed in battle, or attempted—with a number possibly succeeding—to 

return home. North Africa has produced thousands of fighters for ISIS; some returnees, in my opinion, pose a significant risk to National security. The United States 

has a more sophisticated tracking system of potential returnees than many other 

countries; in a number of cases, U.S. law enforcement has prevented individuals 

who were in the process of joining ISIS from doing so. For example, in 2015, U.S. 

authorities stopped two men from a three-man cell in New York, namely Akhror 

Saidakhmetov and Abdurasul Juraboev, from joining ISIS prior to their departure. 

The higher risk stems from individuals who specifically return home with plans to 

fundraise, organize, or execute terrorist attacks. 

Question 4a. The United States spends a great deal on training and equipment 

for allies to help combat terrorism. In your opinion, which countries in the region 

should the United States be focusing most of its efforts on? 

60 

Answer. In my opinion, the United States should dedicate critical counter-terrorism aid to Libya, Mali, and Nigeria. These countries have struggled with the persistent threat of terror groups, which have, at various points, captured and controlled territory in these countries. 

Question 4b. Is this a more cost-effective option than deploying U.S. forces and 

limit the need for future U.S. intervention? 

Answer. While cost-effective analysis of interventionist engagement is outside my 

field of expertise, I’d add that U.S. military intervention in North Africa can and 

will create significant backlash from the regional populaces, which could in turn 

highly jeopardize U.S. relations with allies in North Africa. Joint intelligence and 

military tactics are avenues to better address certain terrorist threats, and incorporating anti-radicalization strategies may help diminish the effect of jihadist propaganda and lessen its influence. 

Question 5. In your testimony, you stated that the Islamic State has not been able 

to establish a strong presence in Tunisia due to the government cracking down on 

terrorist activity. In your opinion, what is Tunisia doing that could be equally applied to other countries in North Africa to deter and defeat the terror threat? 

Answer. After two ISIS attacks took place in Tunisia in 2015, killing and wounding dozens of tourists, the Tunisian government adopted a new strategy that aims 

to significantly diminish the threat of terrorism. This strategy involves prevention 

through intelligence gathering, amplification of the security and law enforcement 

apparatuses, and implementing a judicial process to swiftly prosecute suspected terrorists. In addition, al-Qaeda’s militants in the Chaambi Mountains appear to have 

been forced to significantly reduce the number of their attacks, given their confinement to a small area in central-west Tunisia. Although the long-term effects of the 

government’s strategy remain to be seen, in the short term, the country has experienced fewer terrorist plots and attacks from 2016 until today; for now, this framework appears to be working for Tunisia. In theory, Tunisia’s counter-terrorism strategy could be applied to other countries in the region; however, schismatic political 

environments, such as that in Libya, will create obstacles to implementing an effective strategy. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER KATHLEEN M. RICE FOR LAITH ALKHOURI

Question 1. What are your opinions on the President’s travel ban and its potential 

effects in North Africa? 

Answer. President Trump’s travel ban, in my opinion, does not have a positive effect on countering the threat of terrorism at home or abroad. In more ways than 

one, the ban has likely created regional distrust toward the United States as a 

world leader, and has likely contributed to the marginalization of regional governments who highly depend on U.S. leadership in foreign policy and military engagements. The ban sends a message of divisiveness to populaces who view—or once 

viewed—the United States as the country of immigrants, tolerance, and human 

rights. The ban can only add to the gap between the United States and regional 

countries and their populaces. Bridging this gap would require a tremendous leadership role by the current administration. 

Question 2. Several countries in North Africa have an abundance of resources 

such as oil reserves. Over the years, there have been reports of terror groups controlling oil fields and kidnapping or extorting engineers across the region. What security recommendations would you make to the United States and its allies to better 

protect foreign workers and economic interests from this common terror method? 

Answer. There are a number of procedures and measures that would likely contribute to countering the terror threat against foreign employees and economic interests in North Africa. I recommend the following: 

• Intelligence gathering and coordination with local and State security 

apparatuses. Information regarding the terror landscape in certain cities and 

towns, particularly in remote areas in which a number of gas and oil plants are 

located, is crucial to understanding which groups operate in which areas, and 

what their ideologies and goals are. This includes identifying gaps in preexisting security measures—whether increasing the number of guards, equipping security forces with new technology, and/or amplifying the number of confidential human intelligence sources. The latter is critical in gathering information on the plans and movements of terror networks. 

• Increase coordination with embassies and consulates in host countries. Coordinating with regional governments in regards to security gaps is imperative; it 

offers country representatives an idea of what sort of aid and military assistance regional forces need in order to prevent any potential attacks. 

61 

• Empowering and enhancing the capabilities of regional governments’ quick response teams—or Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs)—is essential to addressing terror incidents. There will likely be a lag time in U.S. security forces responding 

to terror incidents where Americans might be at risk. As such, local forces must 

be empowered and enabled to tackle terror incidents as they unfold, setting the 

stage for American and allied forces to swiftly intervene. 

It is vital to create trust, or bridge the trust gap, with locals and regional forces; 

in many ways, this can help QRFs in obtaining critical information prior to and in 

the early stages of terror incidents. 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE MIKE GALLAGHER FOR LAITH ALKHOURI

Question 1a. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is our largest permanent military installation in Africa and is critical to our counterterrorism operations throughout Africa, as well as the Middle East. Just a few miles away, a Chinese naval base is 

being constructed and is slated for completion this summer. Publicly, Chinese officials maintain this base is strictly to aid their anti-piracy missions and is not a 

base, but rather a ‘‘logistical support facility.’’ During a briefing with reporters on 

March 27, AFRICOM Commander and Marine Corps Gen. Thomas Waldhauser 

said, ‘‘There are some very significant operational security concerns,’’ in response to 

a question about the new Chinese base. This is China’s first permanent overseas 

military outpost, which carries added significance. How can this new proximity to 

the Chinese affect our CT missions in the region? 

Answer. China’s construction of its first naval base overseas suggests that its 

goals revolve around protecting its current and future economic interests; China has 

heavily invested in Africa at large, and thousands of Chinese workers are employed 

across North Africa and the Sahel region. The security concerns here revolve around 

intelligence gathering and military responses toward issues and incidents concerning both the United States and China, i.e., responding to incidents taking place 

in locations where American and Chinese workers might be present. This is a potential scenario in which conflicts may arise; however, looking at the larger picture, the 

likelihood is that U.S. counter-terrorism missions in the regions will not be impacted by the presence of the Chinese base, at least in the short term. The U.S. 

mission is more entrenched in the region due to its longer presence. In other words, 

the proximity to the Chinese will have very little to no effect on the U.S. mission 

at this time. 

Question 1b. How will their foreign policy goals conflict with our own? 

Answer. The new Chinese base is likely not the country’s last in the region. China’s military expansion in an area that is critical to the interests of the United 

States is somewhat disconcerting; it begs the question of whether Beijing aims to 

assert and advance Chinese military prowess in the region, and whether this could 

potentially overshadow U.S. missions. It also presents the question of whether the 

Chinese mission will in any way conduct counterintelligence and spy activities that 

might affect, or directly target, the U.S. mission. 

Question 2a. AFRICOM has been partnering with Tunisian military and intelligence assets to improve their CT&I capabilities and help secure their borders. 

However, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, somewhere between 6,000–7,000 Tunisians have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join rebel 

and terrorist groups in those conflict zones. The Wall Street Journal reports that 

‘‘As many as 15,000 others have been barred from international travel because 

Tunisia’s government suspects them of planning to follow suit.’’ Another report, citing a U.S. CT official in Tunisia, says as many as 1,000 Tunisians are under domestic surveillance within the country. Given these numbers, how can we expect the 

Tunisians to adequately address these issues and implement a successful CT strategy? 

Question 2b. What more can we do to implement and improve upon AFRICOM’s 

existing partnership with Tunisia? 

Answer. Tunisia’s counter-terrorism procedures since mid-2016 appear to have 

been successful at subduing the rise of jihadism and diminishing the number of terror plots and attacks. The terrorism threat facing Tunisia from jihadi returnees is 

likely going to be the country’s primary security concern over the next 6 months, 

due to both the high number of Tunisians who joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria, as 

well as the potential deployment of Tunisian terror operatives who joined ISIS in 

Libya back home. We can expect that terror suspects will slip through the cracks 

and possibly plot attacks in Tunisia. We should advise the Tunisian government to 

have the following steps in place to adequately address the terror concerns: 

62 

• Coordination with regional governments whose borders have been used as travel routes or crossing points into Iraq and Syria, such as Turkey, and soliciting 

updates on any Tunisian nationals traveling in and out of Turkey. • Enhancing border and customs apparatuses to intercept Tunisians who have 

spent considerable periods of time in Iraq and Syria and investigating the purpose of their trips; monitoring the activities of individuals inside Tunisia who 

have connected with Tunisians in Iraq and Syria; and legislation that would 

lead to the arrests and prosecution of suspects found to be providing material 

support to terrorist groups. • Coordination with North African governments, particularly Algeria and Libya, 

to secure borders through which terror suspects and operatives might cross. 

Question 3. The Libya-Italy migrant route was described in late 2016 as the major 

migrant route into Europe, surpassing the notorious path from Turkey to Greece 

that was used by approximately 850,000 migrants in 2015. In light of this, what is 

your assessment of the threat of ISIS or other extremists exploiting this heavilyused migrant route by blending in with the hundreds of thousands of refugees crossing the Mediterranean, and either launching an attack in Europe or travelling to 

the United States? 

Answer. Migrant routes are of immense interest to terror groups, but the threat 

from terror group operatives and extremists posing as migrants has been minimal. 

Part of the reason is that it takes a long period of time for migrants to prepare their 

papers, and they must pass through a stringent process before they can settle in 

Western countries. Terror groups do not appear to have developed such a nuanced 

strategy, instead relying on ad hoc attacks and self-radicalized individuals. This, 

however, does not mean that ISIS might not exploit these routes in the future. Reasonably, terror operatives might pass into the West undetected and potentially plot 

an attack, but the degree to which these routes could be exploited is insignificant 

when compared to ISIS-orchestrated and inspired attacks that partly rely on communication between ISIS apparatuses in the Middle East and potential Western 

radicals at home. The threat from the latter scenario is significantly higher. 

Question 4. President Trump’s proposed budget includes significant cuts to the 

State Department as well as USAID. In his posture statement in early March before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, AFRICOM commander Gen. Waldhauser 

specifically praised these two arms of our non-military foreign policy, saying, ‘‘Diplomacy and development are key efforts, and our partnership with the Department 

of State and USAID is key to achieve enduring success.’’ As it specifically relates 

to North Africa, what programs have these two agencies put in place to aid our CT 

efforts in that region? 

Answer. One of USAID’s main counterterrorism policies is the ‘‘The Development 

Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency,’’ which aims at identifying and 

tackling conduits of violent extremism. This policy includes educational programs, 

women and youth empowerment, and working with local communities to address approaches to better governance, among others. Part of the program is the MaghrebSahel Capacity Building for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), which in many 

ways helps in grassroots anti-radicalization efforts. USAID’s efforts will prove critical in areas where violent extremists have become entrenched; helping the local 

populations understand and ultimately reject violent extremist ideologies is critical. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR FREDERIC WEHREY

Question 1. In your testimony, you noted that the Islamic State in Libya no longer 

remains a territorial force, however, you believe that this presents us with many 

challenges. Can you further explain those challenges and how the Islamic State can 

still create acts of terror in Libya? How should the United States respond? 

Answer. The self-proclaimed Islamic State in Libya has dispersed to scattered 

‘‘pools’’ of militants in the country’s desert interior and in several Western cities. 

The possibility of these networks regrouping into operational cells and conducting 

attacks remains high. Specifically, the Islamic State may seek to demonstrate its 

continued presence and viability through a high-visibility attack. Such an attack 

would likely be aimed at eroding the already weak authority of the Government of 

National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, either by attacking the Government itself or a 

commercial entity. Police and military facilities, oil and energy infrastructure, and 

foreign commercial interests are all possible targets. Should Western diplomats and 

multilateral organizations return to the capital, those too would be at risk. Presently, the best strategy for disruption of such attacks by clandestine networks is one 

rooted in intelligence and investigation. The United States and its Western allies 

should provide assistance and training to GNA-controlled policing bodies. In tandem, robust and persistent surveillance of Libya’s vast interior and potential terVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
63 

rorist lines of supply or encampments can prevent the Islamic State from regrouping 

and reconstituting itself. 

Question 2a. Economic and political insecurity seems to be a common occurrence 

across North Africa. In your opinion, how does regional and state fragmentation 

pose long-term challenges for the United States? 

Answer. The United States should continue to adopt a holistic, whole-of-Government approach to counterterrorism that addresses the social and economic grievances fueling jihadism. A huge part of the jihadist appeal focuses on state-led corruption and abuses in the judicial sector—these areas need to be part of the United 

States and allied assistance effort. Train-and-equip programs and border security 

are only one part of the broader challenge. 

Question 2b. How can the United States and its allies in the region disrupt the 

recruiting efforts of local al-Qaeda and the Islamic State affiliates that take advantage of this turmoil? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. In your opinion, what is the most important base of the Islamic State 

and al-Qaeda in North Africa? 

Answer. The most important base for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb remains 

the southwest corner of Libya, Algeria, and Niger. This uncontrolled region has long 

offered the group a logistics pipeline, safe haven, and a space to train. The Islamic 

State’s North African presence was significantly degraded after the Libyan-led campaign last summer and fall and the U.S. strike outside of Sirte in January 2017. 

That said, Libya offers the Islamic State the most promising space to regroup. 

Question 4. How would you measure the extent of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda 

fighters that have fled fighting zones in the Middle East to North Africa? 

Answer. In key countries, my estimates based on official, host-country estimates 

and reliable open source reporting indicates roughly 200–500 returnees for Morocco 

and Libya and up to 1,000–1,500 for Tunisia alone. The number from Algeria is 

small—63 according to a 2015 Algerian government figure. I would assess the number of total returnees to be about 2,000–2,500 in total for the Maghreb, excluding 

Egypt. 

Question 5a. The United States spends a great deal on training and equipment 

for allies to help combat terrorism. In your opinion, which countries in the region 

should the United States be focusing most of its efforts on? 

Answer. Tunisia should be a focus given the numbers of Tunisian youth who have 

joined the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. In tandem, counterterrorism assistance to 

the Sahelian countries to the south—namely Chad and Niger—remains vital. This 

remains a cost-effective strategy, provided it is accompanied by broader efforts to 

reform host-nation institutions, rule-of-law, and especially address the economic and 

social grievances that fuel jihadism. Simply providing unit-level training and more 

weapons to local partners will not be enough: These states have serious problems 

at the level of ministries, interoperability, prisons, judiciaries, and, especially, in 

meeting the aspirations of their increasingly restive youth populations. 

Question 5b. Is this a more cost-effective option than deploying U.S. forces and 

limit the need for future U.S. intervention? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTION FROM RANKING MEMBER KATHLEEN M. RICE FOR FREDERIC WEHREY

Question. What are your opinions on the President’s travel ban and its potential 

effects in North Africa? 

Answer. Any attempt to ban travelers to the United States using blanket criteria 

such as country of origin or religion, or via excessive and intrusive vetting will have 

a counter-productive effect on the broader fight against terrorism. It deprives the 

United States access to vital sources of influence and information—the people of the 

region. It also plays into the hands of the jihadists’ narrative of an anti-Islamic 

West. 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE MIKE GALLAGHER FOR FREDERIC WEHREY

Question 1a. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is our largest permanent military instillation in Africa and is critical to our counterterrorism operations throughout Africa, 

as well as the Middle East. Just a few miles away, a Chinese naval base is being 

constructed and is slated for completion this summer. Publicly, Chinese officials 

maintain this base is strictly to aid their anti-piracy missions and is not a base, but 

rather a ‘‘logistical support facility.’’ During a briefing with reporters on March 27, 

AFRICOM Commander and Marine Corps Gen. Thomas Waldhauser said, ‘‘There 

are some very significant operational security concerns,’’ in response to a question 

about the new Chinese base. This is China’s first permanent overseas military outVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:41 Oct 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17CT0329\17CT0329.TXT HEATH
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post, which carries added significance. How can this new proximity to the Chinese 

affect our CT missions in the region? 

Question 1b. How will their foreign policy goals conflict with our own? 

Answer. The Chinese facility does not pose an immediate threat to American 

counterterrorism partnerships and missions in Africa, aside from operational security challenges. Insofar as the base represents another step in China’s expanding 

presence in Africa, it adds to growing concerns about Beijing’s mercantilist, blankcheck support for authoritarian rulers on the continent, which runs counter to the 

United State’s aim of promoting the rule of law, transparency, and accountability— 

all important facets of a holistic counterterrorism strategy. 

Question 2a. AFRICOM has been partnering with Tunisian military and intelligence assets to improve their CT&I capabilities and help secure their borders. 

However, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, somewhere between 6,000–7,000 Tunisians have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join rebel 

and terrorist groups in those conflict zones. The Wall Street Journal reports that 

‘‘As many as 15,000 others have been barred from international travel because 

Tunisia’s government suspects them of planning to follow suit.’’ Another report, citing a U.S. CT official in Tunisia, says as many as 1,000 Tunisians are under domestic surveillance within the country. 

Given these numbers, how can we expect the Tunisians to adequately address 

these issues and implement a successful CT strategy? 

Question 2b. What more can we do to implement and improve upon AFRICOM’s 

existing partnership with Tunisia? 

Answer. Tunisia desperately needs a broad-based strategy for addressing these returnees, which includes freeing up space in prisons and more importantly devising 

a rehabilitation program that relies on community influencers, family, and vocational training. AFRICOM’s existing programs have focused on five lines of effort: 

Air-ground capacity, counterterrorism, intelligence, border security, and defense institution building, to include the development of a National military strategy. Tunisia still needs more assistance in terms of joint cooperation among the different 

services, intelligence fusion, and de-confliction between the ministries of defense and 

interior. AFRICOM’s assistance should be closely synchronized with those of other 

agencies, whether under the framework of the Security Governance Initiative (SGI) 

or some revised, whole-of-Government framework. 

Question 3. The Libya-Italy migrant route was described in late 2016 as the major 

migrant route into Europe, surpassing the notorious path from Turkey to Greece 

that was used by approximately 850,000 migrants in 2015. In light of this, what is 

your assessment of the threat ISIS or other extremists exploiting this heavily-used 

migrant route by blending in with the hundreds of thousands of refugees crossing 

the Mediterranean, and either launching an attack in Europe or travelling to the 

United States? 

Answer. I believe it is unlikely that the Islamic State or other extremists will try 

to infiltrate the flow of migrants traversing the Mediterranean because of the extreme risks of the crossing and because most of their attacks in Europe and America 

have been conducted by home-grown extremists. 

Question 4. President Trump’s proposed budget includes significant cuts to the 

State Department as well as USAID. In his posture statement in early March before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, AFRICOM commander Gen. Waldhauser 

specifically praised these two arms of our non-military foreign policy, saying ‘‘Diplomacy and development are key efforts, and our partnership with the Department 

of State and USAID is key to achieve enduring success.’’ As it specifically related 

to North Africa, what programs have these two agencies put in place to aid out CT 

efforts in that region? 

Answer. USAID’s jobs training and matching program has been an effective tool 

addressing radicalization in Tunisia. Similar community-level outreach programs 

have been effective in Libya, especially municipal-level aid, entrepreneurship, and 

small-business development. Broader support to civil society forms an important deterrent and counterweight to the jihadists’ narrative and appeal. 

Æ