AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

Enduring Attraction

America’s Dependence On and Need to Secure

Its Supply of Permanent Magnets

JUSTIN C. DAVEY

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 63

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

October 2012
2

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other 

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. 

The Maxwell Papers are available electronically at the Air 

University Press website at http://aupress.au.af.mil.
3

Enduring Attraction: America’s Dependence on and Need 

to Secure Its Supply of Permanent Magnets

Lt Col Justin C. Davey, USAF

The United States is the world’s preeminent military power due in 

large part to its technological superiority. This lead in innovative 

technology supporting national security also includes advances in new 

and “green” energy applications. A common ingredient enabling the 

production of many of these applications is a group of minerals known as 

rare earth elements (REE).

Two REEs in particular, the refined metals neodymium and 

samarium, are key components in the manufacture of miniature high

temperature resistant permanent magnets. These magnets are essential 

to scores of high technology devices such as wind turbines, hybrid car 

engines, and computer hard drives. Moreover, they are critical for 

military applications including precision-guided munitions, tank 

navigation systems, and electronic countermeasures equipment.

The world’s demand for REEs is steadily increasing. 

Simultaneously, the supply of REEs is shrinking, or rather China, which 

annually produces 97 percent of the world market’s rare earth minerals

and controls some 37 percent of the planet’s known reserves,1 is steadily 

reducing its output. China dramatically restricted its exports by 72

percent in the last six months of 2010 to satisfy its rapidly expanding 

national appetite for REEs.2 China is also progressively acquiring the 
4

industrial base to manufacture permanent magnets and end-products at 

the expense of American businesses, which China systematically 

purchases and relocates within its borders. The entire supply chain of 

REE permanent magnets is now in China.3

As the American military and industrial sectors continue their 

move toward increased reliance on miniaturized high-performance 

electronics and strive to adopt more energy-efficient technologies, there 

are concerns that the United States may trade its reliance on Middle East

oil for dependence on REEs from China. This paper will illustrate how 

REEs have become a deeply ingrained need throughout the American 

economy and, in particular, how rare-earth magnets are now 

indispensible to the defense industry. It will explore how the United 

States should react to a threat to its lead in the technological innovation 

of military applications using permanent magnets. In order to break the 

pattern of dependence on China, the United States should reconfigure its 

national defense stockpile (NDS) to provide a buffer supply of REEs to 

meet defense needs for five years, while providing government incentives

such as tax breaks or loan guarantees to aid resurgent domestic REE 

mining and refining firms. It is critical for the government to be on guard 

against further sale and export of such US companies to China. 

Simultaneously, the United States should continue funding research into 

permanent magnets using alternative materials that could balance the 

demand for REEs.
5

Rare Earth Elements

REEs have been described as the “vitamins of modern industry”

because of their necessity and wide application across the fields of 

energy, defense, and computer technology.4 However, they are scarcely 

familiar to the general public. There are 17 minerals in the family of 

REEs, 15 from the chemical group known as lanthanides, plus scandium 

and yttrium.5 These elements share similar geochemical characteristics 

and are qualitatively somewhat comparable to the chemistry of 

aluminum.6

The term “rare earth elements” is not accurate. It persists due to a

combination of misunderstanding and indifference that characterizes 

public perception. REEs are actually relatively abundant throughout the 

earth’s crust, about the same as some major industrial metals (copper, 

zinc, and chrome) and even greater than several precious metals (gold, 

silver, and platinum).

However, slight variances in atomic structure between the 

REEs yields diverse optical, electrical, metallurgical, and magnetic 

properties lending themselves to a vast and growing number of uses. 

Since there are only minor differences in their chemical properties, REEs 

are commonly found clustered in mineral deposits, but in widely varying 

concentrations.

7 Nevertheless, these deposits are not concentrated, 

ranging up to a few hundred parts per million by weight. Although REEs 

are present in most massive rock formations and sources exist around 

the world, such low concentrations make the mining and recovery 
6

processes difficult and expensive. Nor can the industrial base required 

for production be created quickly. From the time a deposit is discovered, 

it takes 10 to 15 years of development and construction of the 

infrastructure needed to establish a full-scale REE recovery operation.8

Applications

Consequently, it will require long-term vision and immediate action to 

wean the United States from almost total dependence on foreign sources 

as world competition for REEs escalates.

REEs are vital to an ever-increasing number of industries. 

According to the US Geological Survey (USGS), “these uses range from 

mundane (lighter flints, glass polishing) to high-tech (phosphors, lasers, 

magnets, batteries, magnetic refrigeration) to futuristic (hightemperature superconductivity, safe storage and transport of hydrogen 

for a post-hydrocarbon economy).”9 Two of the most common end uses 

for REEs in the United States are metallurgical applications and as 

catalysts in the petroleum refining and auto industries.10 Other widely

recognized end products include lasers, fiber optics, superconductors, 

rechargeable batteries, and fluorescent bulbs, as well as REE-enhanced 

phosphors in liquid crystal display television screens, cell phones, and 

laptop computers.11

Like a golden thread in a tapestry, these unique and indispensable 

minerals are woven through the fabric of American society and 

businesses. Their contribution to the quality of life and security of this 
7

country is considerably greater than expected considering their relative 

obscurity and decreasing availability. Exceptionally notable is how REE 

alloys revolutionized the magnet trade and subsequently enhanced the 

products of all other businesses relying on that industry, namely 

consumer electronics that are now considered commonplace and defense 

applications that are indispensable. Consequently, rare-earth permanent 

magnets comprise the widest use of REEs.12

Neodymium and Samarium

Neodymium and samarium are only a portion of the REE market, 

which is an even smaller part of the global metals market. These two 

metals have a disproportionate influence on all high technology 

businesses, especially the defense industry. They combine with other 

elements (specifically iron, boron, and cobalt) to make exceptional 

permanent magnets. Samarium-cobalt (SmCo) magnets have the highest 

known resistance to demagnetization.13 This capability, meaning the 

magnet has higher coercivity, allows them to function in hightemperature environments without losing magnetic strength—an 

essential attribute for most military applications. Similarly, neodymiumiron-boron (NdFeB) magnets are incredibly strong—the most powerful 

commercial magnet available. Compared to an equal mass of traditional 

ferrite magnet, an NdFeB magnet has over 10 times the magnetic energy 

product.14 Accordingly, a much smaller amount of magnet is required for 

any particular application. This attribute makes them ideal for 
8

miniaturization of motors, electronics, and electrical components, 

including possible nanotechnologies.15

Permanent Magnets

The advent of these tiny powerful 

magnets ushered in the era of the Sony Walkman, personal laptop 

computer, and more.

NdFeB and SmCo magnets are ingrained in the US’s commercial 

high technology, automotive, and energy markets. For instance, 

miniaturized multi-gigabyte disk and DVD drives, a mainstay in portable 

computers, are not possible without such magnets.16 These electronics 

are also used in automobiles for pollution-controlling catalytic converters 

and hybrid car engines—high-temperature environments where regular 

magnets would rapidly fail. Moreover, the use of REE magnets reduces 

the overall weight of a vehicle, making it more energy efficient. A typical 

Toyota Prius uses 2.2 pounds of neodymium, one tenth the mass of 

corresponding iron magnets.17 Americans will buy approximately 

180,000 Priuses this year, resulting in a 198 ton US consumption of 

neodymium merely for this one model of vehicle. NdFeB magnets are also 

increasingly in demand in the renewable energy market as more wind 

turbines come on line. The generators used in newer wind turbines 

require up to two tons of these magnets. However, neodymium magnets 

lack the extreme temperature resistance qualities of their SmCo 

counterparts and initially presented challenges in the larger turbine 

applications.
9

The answer: more rare earths. Scientists discovered the addition of 

other REEs (terbium or dysprosium) to the NdFeB alloy help to increase 

its coercivity. This makes for a better product, but is indicative of the 

United States’ increasing dependence on the availability of rare earth 

metals, especially from foreign sources. Nowhere is this trend more 

unsettling than in the field of national security.

Miniature high-temperature resistant permanent magnets are a 

key factor in developing state-of-the-art military technology. They 

pervade the equipment and function of all service branches, starting with 

commercial computer hard drives containing NdFeB magnets that sit on 

nearly every Department of Defense (DOD) employee’s desk. Precisionguided munitions depend on SmCo magnets as part of the motors that 

manipulate their flight control surfaces. Without these advanced tiny 

magnets the motors in “smart bombs,” like the joint direct attack 

munition (JDAM), would require a hydraulic system that is more 

expensive and three times as large. The generators that produce power 

for aircraft electrical systems also rely on samarium-cobalt magnets, as 

does the stealth technology used to mask the sound of helicopter rotor 

blades by generating white-noise concealment. Other permanent magnet 

applications include “jet engines and other aircraft components, 

electronic countermeasures, underwater mine detection, antimissile 

defense, range finding, and space-based satellite power and 

communications systems,” according to USGS.18
10

The Army relies on REE magnets for the navigation systems in its 

M1A2 Abrams battle tank and the Navy is developing a similarlydependent electric drive to conserve fuel for its Arleigh Burke-class

destroyers. The Air Force’s F-22 fighter uses miniaturized permanent 

magnet motors to run its tail fins and rudder. While REE applications, 

especially products dependent on NdFeB and SmCo permanent magnets, 

have given the United States a tremendous technological advantage, the 

increasing reliance on these metals coupled with dramatically decreased

domestic mining and the international export of American refining and 

manufacturing capability puts the United States in a precarious position.

Market Forces

The global economy currently consumes an estimated 134,000 

tons of REEs each year. However, worldwide annual mining production is 

only 124,000 tons. For the time being, the delta is bridged using 

materials stockpiled at various commercial mines around the world. This 

will not suffice for long (nor has the United States ever included REEs in 

its NDS requirements).19 By comparison, in 1998 total annual 

consumption was about 50,000 tons and there was no future availability 

concern.20 The explosive growth of the electronics and energy industries 

changed all of that. World demand is anticipated to rise to 180,000 tons 

per year by 2012 and surpass 200,000 tons annually in 2014.21

Although China’s production is expected to increase each year, it will not 
11

likely keep pace with demand. A shortfall of up to 40,000 tons per year 

may come about over the next five years.

China is the world’s principal provider of REEs. Its propensity to 

use this position as a diplomatic “stick” and element of economic power, 

combined with a growing domestic appetite for these elements, threatens 

to exacerbate the anticipated global shortage. In early 2010, following the 

disclosure of a multibillion dollar arms deal with Taiwan, several Chinese 

military news sources and blogs urged their government to completely 

ban the sale of REEs to US companies as a means of retaliation.22 This is 

not a hollow threat, as Japan, the world’s largest REEs importer, 

discovered in September 2010. Following a diplomatic clash with Tokyo 

over the detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain (who rammed his 

boat into two Japanese coast guard vessels in a disputed area of the 

South China Sea), China ceased nearly all REE exports to that country.23

Japan was left scrambling to patch relations with China and 

simultaneously began searching for alternative sources in order to 

restore the lifeblood that enables Japanese companies to manufacture 

products that are the cornerstone of its electronic and automotive 

industries. The embargo finally ended in late November, but the threat of 

future restrictions still looms.24 The United States does not want to 

suddenly find itself in a similar predicament.
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US Challenges

Neodymium and samarium are critical to the strength of the US’s 

national defense industry, but the current supply of these metals is 

entirely external to the country. Moreover, demand for permanent 

magnets is expected to increase 10–16 percent per year through 2012.25

Some industry experts are becoming more vocal about what they see as 

growing risks posed by the scarcity of domestic suppliers. For instance, 

the US Magnet Materials Association (USMMA), an alliance of firms from 

the aerospace, electronics, and medical materials fields, published a plan 

in February 2010 listing actions Washington can take to address what 

they see as the impending rare earth crisis.26

China is credited with holding 37–43 percent of the world’s known 

REE reserves, but the United States is not without. America is estimated 

to have 13 percent of known rare earth reserves. However, American 

mining operations essentially ceased in 2002 with the closure of 

California’s Mountain Pass mine due to environmental concerns and 

declining profitability as a result of low Chinese prices in the previous 

decade.

This group insists the 

current situation portends a serious threat to the economic well-being 

and national security of the United States.

27 Gareth P. Hatch, a REEs specialist with Technology Metals 

Research, commented he is “not sure [he] believe[s] there is a high 

probability of the United States losing access to the raw materials, semifinished and finished rare-earth products that its defense contractors 
13

need. . . On the other hand, should such a scenario occur, the effects 

would very likely be devastating, and I would argue that this is an 

unacceptable risk.”28

China has slowly reduced its REE exports since 2006, cutting 

them by 5–10 percent each year.29 This is due to increased internal 

development (China constitutes about 75 percent of global REE

consumption), but is also part of a persistent strategy to entice, if not 

force, foreign investment and manufacturing industry onto Chinese 

soil.30 The drastic 72 percent export cut imposed on the last half of 2010 

should serve as a wake-up call, highlighting how dependent the United 

States has become; import source data for 2005–2008 reveals 91 percent

of America’s REE imports came from China.31 China’s announcement led

some companies to increase the price of their permanent magnet 

products by an average of 20 percent.32 Continued restrictions will lead 

to a greater shortage of supplies which has industry leaders closely 

watching the situation. The price of neodymium is more than 2.5 times 

what it was in the summer of 2009 and the stock values of non-Chinese 

mining companies have jumped dramatically even more recently. Most 

notably, the closing price for shares of the western hemisphere’s sole rare 

earth oxide producer, Molycorp Minerals, is up 400 percent since July 

2010.33 Although Molycorp’s Mountain Pass processing facility produces

about 3,000 pounds of REE oxides per year, including neodymium, it 

does so from a residual stockpile of ore mined over eight years ago.34
14

Those oxides must still be sent to China for final processing because the 

United States lacks the necessary industry to produce rare-earth metals 

ready for end-use manufacturing. Changing this trend will be costly and 

time consuming.

The method of separating neodymium and samarium oxides from 

mined raw ore, then reducing those oxides to a usable metallic element is 

difficult. The industrial complex required to house thousands of stainless 

steel tanks, complicated arrays of chemical baths, extracting agents, and 

equipment needed for the process covers an area the size of a football 

field.35 Start-up costs of a separation plant are likewise overwhelming, 

ranging from $500 million to $1 billion, with construction expected to 

take at least eight years.36

Nonetheless, Molycorp is working to modernize and expand their 

Mountain Pass processing facility. Under the firm’s “mine-to-magnets” 

strategy, they have a goal of generating 20,000 tons of rare earth oxides

by 2012 and reestablishing their domestic magnet manufacturing 

business.

Consequently, no individual company is eager

to risk that much capital in a market where China’s state-owned mines 

have the influence and backing of an entire country to drive REE prices 

artificially low in order to crush the competition.

37 Equally important are plans to resume the mining of fresh 

ore having an approximate 12 percent content of neodymium and 

samarium.38 This development is encouraging, but makes it even more

disturbing to remember that this mine, perhaps the largest non-Chinese 
15

rare earth deposit in the world, was nearly purchased by China’s stateowned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) as part of their

bid for the oil company Unocal in 2005.39

Chinese Strategy

Unocal acquired Molycorp in 

1978, but this fact and its REE supply implications were overlooked 

during the Congressional uproar over the threat to US energy security, 

which drove the Chinese company to withdraw its bid. Such efforts by 

Chinese businesses to control international REE mining and oxide 

production are not isolated nor are they coincidental.

In China, there is little distinction between private industry and 

the government, making it increasingly difficult for US firms, which must 

remain profitable, to compete on an equal footing. An insightful student 

of China’s maneuverings observed, “the Unocal [purchase attempt] 

involved the provision of a soft loan from the Chinese government to the 

company [CNOOC]. This is not like a commercial loan. The Chinese 

government protects its state companies at home and supports them

financially overseas. But these companies are essentially expected to be 

an arm of national foreign policy in their foreign investment, rather than

to create value.”40 China’s growing population and modernizing economy 

are unquestionably in need of ever-increasing amounts of permanent 

magnets. Its expanding domestic wind-energy production could soon 

consume the world’s entire neodymium production.41 Those internal 

demands plus China’s aspirations to be a regional hegemon and world 
16

superpower drive its policies. To that end, China is apparently pursuing 

a two-fold strategy: corner the market on REEs, and obtain the 

manufacturing base to produce the unique high technology end products 

they enable.

China is methodically acquiring US companies that produce rareearth magnets, transferring that production technology to China, and 

then shutting down the plants in America. This was the fate of GA 

Powders, Environmental Laboratory, and Magnequench, Inc.42 The latter 

company was purchased by a China-based conglomerate in 1995. 

Magnequench’s NdFeB-magnet production line in Indiana was quickly 

duplicated in Tianjin, China. Once the Chinese company was sure its

new plant worked, the Indiana facility was shut down and some of its 

precision machine tools relocated to China. Magnequench was the last 

US company making rare-earth magnets. Moreover, thousands of those 

permanent magnets went into servos for the JDAM guidance system. A 

senior strategic-trade advisor for the DOD, Peter Leitner, recognized the 

paramount need to secure this kind of technology, noting that rare-earth 

magnets “lie at the heart of many of our most advanced weapons 

systems, particularly . . . precision-guided weapons” and that China is 

“trying to replicate the capabilities the United States has.”43

In addition to acquiring mines and manufacturing technology, 

China can undercut its global competition thanks to its weak 

environmental regulations and abundance of cheap domestic labor. Its
17

focused efforts in the 1990’s in this regard drove many non-Chinese 

firms out of business and left China with a disproportionate share of the 

market.44

Options

The longer China continues its export restrictions on REE 

oxides and refined metals, the greater the pressure on foreign industries 

to move their manufacturing operations to China, at least the portions 

that are dependent on REE raw materials. Conversely, China’s 

restrictions breathe new life into the market for alternative products and 

reinvestment in domestic production. If the United States expects to 

surmount China’s strategy, it needs to confront this challenge on 

multiple fronts.

In order to stem the tide of dependence on China for permanent 

magnets, the United States should pursue several options: secure REE 

sources outside of China (preferably in the United States), establish a 

NDS to meet military needs for permanent magnets, develop suitable 

substitute materials, and employ DOD acquisition policies to improve the 

REE market situation for domestic suppliers.

Non-Chinese Sources

Prior to 1990, the United States was largely self-sufficient in 

meeting its REE and permanent magnet requirements. Mountain Pass 

was the dominant source and the only large ore deposit mined just for its 

REE content, having reserves of 20 million tons.45 Rekindling this and 

other domestic supplies would be ideal. As Molycorp prepares to restart 
18

mining at Mountain Pass, other American deposits being explored 

include North Fork, Idaho, where samples revealed neodymium 

concentrations up to 3.7 percent.46

Other nations having REE reserves include Australia (5 percent), 

India (3 percent), and several other countries with a combined total of 22

percent of earth’s known reserves.

According to the US Government 

Accountability Office, rare earth deposits also exist in Colorado, 

Missouri, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming.

47 Deposits in Canada, owned by Great 

Western Minerals Group (GWMC), show promise of having dysprosium 

and terbium (needed for increased magnet coercivity).48 GWMC also owns 

a magnet alloy producer in the United Kingdom and plans to construct a 

refinery near their Canada mine. GWMC just entered into partnership 

with the South African firm RareCo to purchase all of the output from 

their Steenkampskraal mine. The first deliveries are expected by late 

2012.49 This moves GWMC another step closer to becoming the first 

fully-integrated REE producer outside of China.50 There are REE mines 

in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo as well.51

REE industry expert Jack Lifton surmises that as production of 

neodymium and other rare earths come on line in Canada, South Africa, 

Idaho, and Montana in 2015 and beyond, by 2020 the world will be 

independent of China as its source of rare-earth metals.52 This is 

encouraging, but there are still uncertainties in the decade ahead. China 

could again flood the market with REEs in a short-term effort to devalue 
19

permanent magnets, therefore hobbling capitalist firms’ start-up 

ventures before they can become self sustaining.

In order to counter China’s direct control and funding of Chinese 

firms, the US government should provide incentives (tax breaks, contract 

preferences, etc.) for domestic companies striving to revive REE mining, 

refining of neodymium or samarium, or production of rare-earth 

magnets. The USMMA similarly urged the Department of Energy (DOE) to 

use $2 billion in grant and loan guarantees to spur reestablishment of 

US mining and refining operations, and increased government support of 

training and workforce development in the resurgent industry.53

National Defense Stockpile

Greater 

attention should also be accorded to the planned purchase of any US 

company involved in the production of permanent magnets. It was

through this legal avenue that America lost its REE independence. 

Resurgent domestic efforts must be more carefully guarded.

The United States has no REEs in its NDS, having sold off all such 

minerals by 1998, nor were they ever classified as strategic minerals.54 In 

their February 2010 proposal to Washington, the USMMA recommended 

stockpiling a five years’ supply of REEs to support the government’s 

critical needs while the domestic supply chain is rebuilt.55 Another 

recent report to Congress went beyond merely recommending the 

addition of these critical elements to the stockpile, but urged that the 

NDS be completely reconfigured to be the strategic material security 
20

program (SMSP).56

It would be wise to follow the National Defense Stockpile Center’s 

recommendation to reconfigure the NDS into an expanded and more

capable SMSP. However, this action will probably require some reworking 

of the government’s procurement bureaucracy to establish the necessary 

interaction of all affected government departments. Such a consolidation 

of REE-purchasing priorities promises the greatest long-term leverage of 

finances, but the system will take time to establish and fine tune. At 

present, Congress should classify neodymium and samarium as strategic 

minerals for the next 5–10 years, adding them to the NDS, while the 

domestic supply chain for permanent magnets is reestablished.

This newly proposed program would have the power 

to aggregate materials requirements across DOD and other cooperating 

federal agencies in order to establish long-term strategic sourcing 

measures. The SMSP could leverage the combined buying power of all 

participating government departments that share a dependence on REE 

imports. However, a firm commitment from these agencies and a 

consistent flow of funds is required to enable the SMSP to capitalize on 

favorable timing of markets.

Alternative Materials

According to George Hadjipanayis, co-inventor of the NdFeB 

magnet, “It’s been 28 years since the discovery of neodymium-ironboron, and we have not yet found a better magnet.”57 There are 

substitutes with similar properties available, but not as good with regard 
21

to weight or strength.58

DOD has research, development, science, and technology money

available to fund exploration of alternative materials.

Since 1983, US magnet development has been 

lackluster, but the search has received renewed emphasis in recent 

years.

59 Such efforts could 

also be done in concert with other agencies. For instance, the DOE’s

Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, which backs high-risk highreward projects, commissioned a $4.6 million research effort looking for 

a replacement for the NdFeB magnet. Hadjipanayis leads this search for 

a “next generation magnet.”60

The University of Nebraska is tasked with developing a permanent 

magnet without the use of REEs. The DOE’s Ames Laboratory is 

experimenting with combinations of rare earth, transition metals, and 

other minerals that have not previously been tried with magnets. The 

University of Delaware, where Hadjipanayis is a professor of physics, is 

working to fashion a new magnetic material that may possibly reduce the 

neodymium and samarium content by 30–40 percent, yet be double the 

strength of today’s NdFeB magnets.

The effort proceeds on three simultaneous 

fronts.

61

The United States’ immediate focus should be on reestablishing its 

domestic REE supply and permanent magnet production capabilities, 

Their timeline is ambitious, 

allowing three years for materials experimentation and assembly of a 

prototype magnet.
22

but not to the exclusion of pursuing better technology. This is a delicate 

balance. Funding should be appropriated for research into alternative 

materials. However, the government must then be careful not to mandate 

the use of a resulting product only for the sake of justifying its 

investment. The principles of free market capitalism must be honored, in 

harmony with the need for national security. Moreover, this manner of 

government support must be pursued collaboratively between private 

enterprise (having experience with the most efficient ways to pursue 

production) and the DOD (knowing best what the requirements are to 

support national security).

Department of Defense Policy

The DOD already has a regulatory framework established to 

initiate government action to preserve domestic industrial capabilities 

vital to national security. DOD Instruction 5000.60, Defense Industrial 

Capabilities Assessments, provides guidance for verifying the war-fighting 

utility of the industry in question, that the specific capability is unique 

and at risk, that there are no feasible alternatives, and that the intended 

action is the most mission and cost-effective.62

One way the DOD could influence the REE market is with limits 

imposed through the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation, such as

restricting the use of foreign-produced REE magnets in products it 

purchases in order to stimulate the resurgence of American industry and 

ensure the survival of those domestic suppliers. The criterion that must 
23

be met before enacting such direct intervention is an intentionally high 

standard. In addition to ensuring the most judicious use of limited DOD

resources (anticipating greater expenses due to imposed limits on

competition), stimulating industries in a capitalistic economy through

greater innovation which increases competition is always preferred over 

artificial market restrictions.

Conclusion

The United States is clearly dependant on REE permanent 

magnets to satisfy its demand for consumer electronics, fuel the

automotive and energy industries, and most importantly, maintain its 

lead in military high technology. Although America used to provide for its 

own permanent magnet requirements, this independence eroded over the 

past two decades and is now fundamentally gone. There are no active 

domestic REE mining operations or permanent magnet production lines

fully in country. The United States is entirely dependent on external 

sources, which essentially means dependence on America’s largest 

economic competitor and fastest-growing military challenger, China.

“There is oil in the Middle East; there is rare earth in China,” 

stated Deng Xiaoping, who ruled China from 1978 to 1997 and 

inaugurated China’s systematic campaign to dominate the world’s supply

of REEs.63 The significance of Deng’s observation has grown 

exponentially with the explosion of world demand for REEs and 

permanent magnet technology. China’s own hunger for REEs to feed its 
24

modernizing economy, combined with their demonstrated willingness to 

use their near-monopoly on global production as a political instrument,

portends greater conflict over this shrinking resource, relative to the 

demand for it.

Changing the United States’ trend of reliance on REE imports will 

be costly and time consuming, but is incomparable to the price of 

crippling national security. The probability of America’s losing all access 

to permanent magnets is relatively low, but the consequences of such a 

situation would be catastrophic. Fortunately, the limited supply of REEs 

as a result of China’s increased consumption and reduction of exports 

has made mining and refining operations potentially profitable again. 

There are several firms stepping out to reestablish their place in 

the market. However, these endeavors will take time and require great 

investment of capital. Molycorp’s recent efforts to revive their domestic 

magnet manufacturing process and restart mining operations at 

Mountain Pass are a move in the right direction. Similarly, there is 

potential for mining operations in six other states and established 

ventures in Canada and South Africa that promise to open new sources 

of neodymium and samarium in the next five years. This is a tenuous 

time, as the possibility of Chinese maneuverings to flood the market (as 

it did in the 1990s) and drive prices down threatens to swamp the 

reemerging competition. US government interposition to ensure the 

reemerging industry is not squelched by Chinese government-funded 
25

competitors will help hedge against this. Continued exploration of 

alternative materials and technologies will also balance America’s

dependence on rare earth elements.

While the permanent-magnet cornerstone of the US defense and 

energy industries is at risk, recovery is not insurmountable. Realization 

of the existence and scope of the threat, plus application of the same 

creative thought and persistent action that put American in the forefront 

of this technology, will keep the nation there.

Notes

 

1. Nayantara Hensel, “China Produces 95%-97% of Rare Earth 

Minerals,” Economic Currents 2, no. 6 (2 December 2010): 4–5.

2. Marc Humphries, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 28 July 2010), 4.

3. “Rare Earths Deposits Listed as Most Important by USGS,” 

Mining Engineering, 1 March 2010, 

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5976/is_201003/ai_n5308265

0/?tag=content;col1.

4. Li Zhonghua, Zhang Weiping, and Liu Jiaxiang from 

“Applications and Development Trends of Rare Earth Materials in 

Modern Military Technology,” Hunan Rare-Earth Materials Research 

Academy [Chinese], 16 April 2006; cited in Cindy A. Hurst, “China’s Ace 

in the Hole, Rare Earth Elements,” Joint Forces Quarterly 59, 4th quarter 

2010: 122.
26

 

5. Humphries, Rare Earth Elements, 1. Lanthanides (atomic 

numbers 57 through 71) and scandium and yttrium (atomic numbers 21 

and 39, respectively).

6. Charles O. Bounds, “The Rare Earths: Enablers of Modern 

Living,” JOM 50, no. 10 (October 1998): 38.

7. Gordon B. Haxel, James B. Hedrick, and Greta J. Orris, Rare 

Earth Elements—Critical Resources for High Technology, Fact Sheet 087-

02. Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey, 2002 (modified 2005).

8. Humphries, Rare Earth Elements, 3.

9. Haxel, Hedrick, and Orris, Rare Earth Elements.

10. James B. Hedrick, Rare Earths. Mineral Commodity 

Summaries, US Geological Survey, January 2010, 128.

11. Humphries, Rare Earth Elements, 2.

12. Hurst, “China’s Ace in the Hole, 124.

13. Ibid., 123.

14. Jeremy Hsu, “Scientists Race to Engineer a New Magnet for 

Electronics,” TechNewsDaily, 9 April 2010,

http://www.technewsdaily.com/scientists-race-to-engineer-a-newmagnet-for-electronics-0416/.

15. “The History of Rare Earths,” JOM 50, no. 10 (October 1998): 

37.

16. Haxel, Hedrick, and Orris, Rare Earth Elements.
27

 

17. Hensel, “China Produces 95%-97% of Rare Earth Minerals,” 4–

5.

18. Haxel, Hedrick, and Orris, Rare Earth Elements.

19. John T. Bennett, “U.S. May Stockpile Rare Earth Minerals,” 

Defense News, 22 March 2010, 30.

20. Bounds, “The Rare Earths,” 38.

21. Humphries, Rare Earth Elements, 3.

22. Wang Dake, “Consider Banning the Sale of Rare Earth as 

Sanctions Against U.S. Companies,” Shanghai Dongfang Zaobao

[Chinese], cited in Hurst, “China’s Ace in the Hole,” 122.

23. Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Recycles Minerals from Used 

Electronics,” New York Times, 4 October 2010, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/business/global/05recycle.html?

_r=1&scp=1&sq=japan%20recycles%20minerals&st=cse (accessed 5 

October 2010).

24. Hensel, “China Produces 95%-97% of Rare Earth Minerals,” 4–

5.

25. Humphries, Rare Earth Elements, 3.

26. John T. Bennett, “U.S. Industry Pitches Rare Earth Minerals 

Plan,” Defense News, 15 February 2010, 16.

27. Hensel, “China Produces 95%-97% of Rare Earth Minerals,” 4–

5.
28

 

28. Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, 14 October 

2010, 8.

29. Ibid.

30. James Regan, “China’s Rare Earths Export Cut Spurs Trade 

Concerns,” CNBC.com, 29 December 2010, 

http://www.cnbc.com/id/40845122/.

31. Hedrick, Rare Earths, 128.

32. Shin-Etsu, “Shin-Etsu Announces Price Increase for Rare 

Earth Magnets,” 13 August 2010, 

http://www.shinetsu.co.jp/e/news/s20100813.shtml.

33. Regan, “China’s Rare Earths.

34. “Leading Permanent Rare Earth Magnet Expert to Direct 

Molycorp’s Magnet Manufacturing Business,” Business Wire, 30

September 2010, 

http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100930006724/en/Leadi

ng-Permanent-Rare-Earth-Magnet-Expert-Direct.

35. Bounds, “The Rare Earths,” 38.

36. Jeremy Hsu, “U.S. Sitting on Mother Lode of Rare Tech-Crucial 

Minerals,” TechNewsDaily, 8 March 2010, 

http://www.technewsdaily.com/us-sitting-on-mother-lode-of-rare-techcrucial-minerals-0281/.

37. “Leading Permanent Rare Earth Magnet Expert,” Business

Wire.
29

 

38. “Molycorp Minerals to Commence Rare Earth Exploration 

Program,” Business Wire, 1 March 2010, 

http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/home/permalink/?ndmViewI

d=news_view&newsId=20100301007056&newsLang=en. Haxel, Hedrick, 

and Orris, Rare Earth Elements.

39. Jeremy Hsu, “U.S. Military Supply of Rare Earth Elements Not 

Secure.” TechNewsDaily, 14 April 2010. 

http://www.technewsdaily.com/us-military-supply-of-rare-earthelements-not-secure-0430/.

40. Maria Kielmas, “China’s Foreign Energy Asset Acquisitions: 

From Shopping Spree to Fire Sale?” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly

3, no. 3 (2005): 29. Emphasis added.

41. Jeremy Hsu, “Shortage of Rare Earth Elements Could Thwart 

Innovation,” TechNewsDaily, 12 February 2010,

http://www.technewsdaily.com/shortage-of-rare-earth-elements-couldthwart-innovation-0206/.

42. Scott L. Wheeler, “Missile Technology Sent to China,” Insight on 

the News, 18 February 2003, 

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_5_19/ai_97874289/

?tag=content;col1.

43. Ibid.

44. Hensel, “China Produces 95%-97% of Rare Earth Minerals,” 4–

5.
30

 

45. Haxel, Hedrick, and Orris, Rare Earth Elements.

46. Jeremy Hsu, “Exclusive: Boeing Launches Search for Crucial 

Rare Earth Elements,” TechNewsDaily, 20 September 2010, 

http://www.technewsdaily.com/exclusive-boeing-launches-search-forcrucial-rare-earth-elements-1260/.

47. Humphries, Rare Earth Elements, 6. The report also identifies 

Russia with 19 percent of known reserves, but is not pursued as an 

alternative in this paper due to the same political uncertainty/instability 

that China presents.

48. Ibid., 7.

49. Irma Venter, “SA Mine May Make Small, but Significant, Dent 

in China’s Rare-Earths Market Dominance,” Mining Weekly, 17 

September 2010, http://www.miningweekly.com/article/a-canadiandeveloper-hopes-south-africas-steenkampskraal-mine-will-make-a-smallbut-significant-dent-in-chinas-rare-earth-market-dominance-2010-09-

17.

50. “Great Western Minerals Group Signs Agreement to Purchase 

100% of Rare Earths Production From Steenkampskraal Mine,” 10 

August 2010, http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/GreatWestern-Minerals-Group-Signs-Agreement-Purchase-100-Rare-EarthsProduction-From-TSX-VENTURE-GWG-1302648.htm.

51. Stephen Burgess, “Sustainability of Strategic Minerals in 

Southern Africa and Potential Conflicts and Partnerships,” Department of 
31

 

International Security Research Project (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War 

College, 2010), 9.

52. Jack Lifton's Instablog, “Is the Rare Earth Supply Crisis Due to 

Peak Production Capability or Capacity?” 6 September 2009,

http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/65370-jack-lifton/26386-is-therare-earth-supply-crisis-due-to-peak-production-capability-or-capacity 

(accessed 8 September 2010).

53. United States Magnetic Materials Association (USMMA), 

“Magnet Materials Supply Chain Players Propose Six-Point Plan to 

Address Impending Rare Earths Crisis,” 4 February 2010, 

http://www.usmagnetmaterials.com/press-releases/Six-Point-PlanLetter-2-04-10.pdf.

54. Humphries, Rare Earth Elements, 13.

55. USMMA, “Magnet Materials Supply Chain.”

56. Defense National Stockpile Center, Reconfiguration of the 

National Defense Stockpile (Washington, DC: Defense National Stockpile 

Center, April 2009), 18.

57. Hsu, “Scientists Race to Engineer a New Magnet.”

58. Hedrick, Rare Earths, 131.

59. Defense National Stockpile Center, Reconfiguration of the 

National Defense Stockpile, 14.

60. Hurst, “China’s Ace in the Hole,” 123.

61. Hsu, “Scientists Race to Engineer a New Magnet.”
32

 

62. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.60, Defense Industrial 

Capabilities Assessments, 15 October 2009.

63. Clint Cox, “Rare Earth May Be China’s Checkmate,” Anchor 

House, Inc, 10 October 2006, http://www.theanchorsite.com/2006/10

(accessed 21 January 2011).