MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY

MEDICAL TRAINING IN WORLD WAR II

Prepared and published under the direction of

Lieutenant General Richard R. Taylor

The Surgeon General United States Army

Editor in Chief

Colonel William S. Mullins, MSC, USA

Editor for Medical Training

Captain Robert J. Parks, MSC, AUS

OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON D.C. 1974
MEDICAL TRAINING IN WORLD WAR II

Advisory Editorial Board

Major General Thomas J. Hartford, MC, USA (Ret.), Chairman

Major General George E. Armstrong, MC, USA (Ret.)

Major General William E. Shambora, MC, USA (Ret.)

Major General Byron L. Steger, MC, USA (Ret.)

Major General Floyd L. Wergeland, MC, USA (Ret.)

Brigadier General George R. Callender, MC, USA (Ret.)

Brigadier General L. Holmes Ginn, MC, USA (Ret.)

Colonel Robert E. Peyton, MC, USA (Ret.) Colonel Joseph U. Weaver, MC, USA (Ret.)

Colonel Raymond E. Duke, MC, USA (Ret.)

Colonel Floyd W. Baker, MC, USA (ex officio)

Colonel William S. Mullins, MSC, USA (ex officio)

The Historical Unit, United States Army Medical Department

Colonel William S. Mullins, MSC, USA, Director

Charles J. Simpson, Executive Officer Hazel C. Hine, Chief, Administrative Branch

ErnestElliott, Jr., Chief, Editorial Branch

Roderick M. Engert, Chief, General Reference and Research Branch

Rose C. Engelman, Ph. D., Chief, Historians Branch

Geraldine B. Sites, Chief, Information Activities Branch

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-600173

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office,

Washington, D.C. 20402 Price: $8.50 Stock Number 0832-00046
MEDICAL TRAINING IN WORLD WAR II

by

Captain Robert J. Parks, MSC, AUS

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY

The volumes comprising the official history of the Medical Department of the

United States Army in World War II are prepared by The Historical Unit, U.S.

Army Medical Department, and published under the direction of The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army. These volumes are divided into two series: (1) The administrative or operational series; and (2) the professional, or clinical and technical, series.

This is one of the volumes published in the former series.

VOLUMES PUBLISHED

ADMINISTRATIVE SERIES

Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior

Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters

Medical Supply in World War II

Organization and Administration in World War II

Personnel in World War II

CLINICAL SERIES

Internal Medicine in World War II:

Vol. I. Activities of Medical Consultants

Vol. II. Infectious Diseases

Vol. III. Infectious Diseases and General Medicine

Neuropsychiatry in World War II:

Vol. I. Zone of Interior

Preventive Medicine in World War II:

Vol. II. Environmental Hygiene

Vol. III. Personal Health Measures and Immunization
Vol. IV. Communicable Diseases Transmitted Chiefly Through Respiratory

and Alimentary Tracts

Vol. V. Communicable Diseases Transmitted Through Contact or by Unknown Means

Vol. VI. Communicable Diseases: Malaria

Vol. VII. Communicable Diseases: Arthropodborne Diseases Other Than

Malaria

Vol. IX. Special Fields

Surgery in World War II;

Activities of Surgical Consultants, vol.

Activities of Surgical Consultants, vol. II

General Surgery, vol. II

Hand Surgery

Neurosurgery, vol.

Neurosurgery, vol. II

Ophthalmology and Otolaryngology

Orthopedic Surgery in the European Theater of Operations

Orthopedic Surgery in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Orthopedic Surgery in the Zone of Interior

The Physiologic Effects of Wounds

Thoracic Surgery, vol.

Thoracic Surgery, vol. II

Vascular Surgery

Miscellaneous:

Blood Program in World War II

Cold Injury, Ground Type

Dental Service in World War II

Physical Standards in World War II

Radiology in World War II

Veterinary Service in World War II

Wound Ballistics
Foreword

At the onset of World War II, problems of unprecedented size and scope

challenged the U.S. Army Medical Department simultaneously. These problems

ranged from mobilizing and housing personnel to receiving, storing, and shipping

supplies and equipment from constructing facilities to activating installations. None

was more demanding than the task of training thousands of men and women to

provide the fighting forces with the finest medical care in the history of warfare.

Companion volumes in this series set forth in great detail the achievements of the Medical Department in the fields of personnel, supply, and hospitalization

and evacuation in the Zone of Interior. This volume is historical account of

the success of the Medical Department in training thousands upon thousands of

civilian soldiers in the practice of field medicine.

The problem began with the mass induction of recruits upon general mobilization. It was aggravated by the need to train personnel for variety of duties—frontline combat service, support service in the theaters of operations, specialized and

convalescent services in installations in the Zone of Interior—on an accelerated

basis. It was compounded by the need to train medical personnel so they could

practice their skills in any climate or environment anywhere in the world—from

the tundra of Alaska to the jungles of Buna Gona, from the sands of North Africa

to the swamps of Guadalcanal.

While it is true that the principles of medicine and surgery are the same in

war and in peace, the application of these principles in thepractice of field medicine

is vastly different. To perform effectively, the soldier-physician must think in terms

of treating and caring for masses of patients, learn to make do with what is available,

and understand fully his role as member of team charged with the awesome

responsibility of conserving the strength of the fighting forces. No more formidable

task faced the Army Medical Department than that of turning civilian into an

effective member of military-medical team.

Although there was extensive study and planning for the expansion of the

Army Medical Department during the period of Limited National Emergency,

from the invasion of Poland in August 1939 to Pearl Harbor in December 1941,

little was actually done. The men who were inducted for year under the Selective

Training and Service Act of 1940 were given combat training in preference to

specialized or technical training. The Army Medical Department was also handicapped by lack of funds to construct troop housing and classrooms at the training

centers and to expand facilities at the technical and advanced technical training

schools. The shortage of instructors at the training centers and technical schools was

chronic problem. Training equipment had to be improvised or simulated. Irregular arrivals and unscheduled transfers of trainees resulted in vast fluctuations

in enrollments. During slack periods, supplies and equipment were underutilized or
FOREWORD

wasted. In contrast, heavy training loads taxed facilities and faculties and required

emergency shipments of food, supplies, and equipment.

In the initial stages of mobilization, the Army National Guard, the Organized

Reserves, and affiliated medical units from civilian universities provided the

trained physicians, nurses, and technical personnel. The rapid buildup required

additional manpower to activate much needed medical units. This was achieved

by stripping trained personnel from the medical training centers to make up cadres

to activate new units. Unit readiness was accelerated by conducting advanced

individual training in the units along with the unit basic and advanced training.

Individual and unit training programs had to be adjusted continually to meet

accelerated replacement requirements and deployment schedules. These problems

were compounded by divided responsibility for the training of medical personnel

after the reorganization of the Army in 1942. Although The Surgeon General

retained technical responsibility for all medical training, he lost control of all

training except that of the few units assigned directly to him.

This volume records the problems of training men and women for an Army

Medical Department which at peak strength numbered 700,000, or more than

three times the strength of the entire Regular Army in 1939. It is tribute to those

who were responsible for fulfilling the training requirements of Medical Department that had to care for the health of the Army and simultaneously prepare for

its role ofproviding combat medical support. It describes honestly and frankly the

errors and failures as well as the achievements of the dedicated men and women

who trained the physicians, dentists, nurses, others in professions allied to medicine,

and the enlisted personnel, all of whom made up the teams that cared for some 14

million patients during the Second World War.

It is hoped that this account of the training of U.S. Army Medical Department

personnel in World War II will be guide to the planners of the future.

Richard R. Taylor,

Lieutenant General,

The Surgeon General.
XI

Preface

This study is one of series dealing with the administrative history of the

U.S. Army Medical Department in World War II. As an account of the programs

developed in the Zone of Interior to train Medical Department personnel to operate

fixed medical installations and field units, it focuses on the organization and

administration of training, changes in scope and emphasis, the development of

doctrine and technique, and responses to personnel and supply problems. Other

volumes in the clinical and administrative series necessarily impinge to an extent

upon the subject matter of this study, just as this volume deals with problems of

organization and administration, personnel, and supply falling within the scope of

training. In this book, training is considered in the context of the Army and the

Medical Department over the period from 1938 to 1945, providing unified picture

of Medical Department training efforts.

The training volume itself has long and complex history. Work on the project

began duringWorld War II, when the Office of The Surgeon General was directed to

prepare manuscript history of its training activities to serve as source material for

projected history of training underthe Army Service Forces. Under the supervision

of Lt. Samuel M. Goodman, MAC, AUS, several young officers at the Office of The

Surgeon General were assigned to the project, and by the end of the war, these

officers completed 10-volume manuscript encompassing all phases of Medical

Department training conducted under the jurisdiction of the Army Service Forces.

Although these studies were of uneven value, they served as the foundation for all

subsequent versions of the training volume.

In 1946, shortly after work began on the administrative history of the Medical

Department in World War II, the project was assigned to Mr. Graves H. Wilson,

civilian historian employed by The Historical Unit. Although Mr. Wilson was

unable to complete more thanfragments of the study before leaving the unit in 1952,

he compiled an extensive file of verbatim notes to supplement manuscripts written

during the war.

Following the departure of Mr. Wilson, the training volume lay fallow until

1956, when it was reactivated under the aegis of an Advisory Editorial Board,

whose members are listed on preceding page of this volume. Key figures on this

board included Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, USA (Ret.), who acted as chairman

until his death in 1965, when he was succeededby Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hartford,

USA (Ret.). Determined to produce an exemplary volume, the board decided to tap

the skills of officers with extensive experience in training and apply technique of

group authorship that had been used with great success in Medical Department

clinical histories. After the board amended and adopted an outline prepared by the

Medical Field Service School, Col. Charles A. Pendlyshok, MSG, USA (Ret.), and

Lt. Col. John A. Ey, Jr., MSC, AUS (Ret.), were chosen as project officers. In

cooperation with the Advisory Editorial Board, these officers selected number of
PREFACE

individuals who had held important training positions during World War II to

participate in the creation of manuscript. Together, the project officers and the

individuals cited in the list of contributors overcame many problems. After Colonel

Pendlyshok left The Historical Unit for another assignment, Colonel Ey supervised

the completion of draft manuscript. By 1964, however, it had become apparent

that the technique of group authorship could not be adapted to the requirements of

the administrative series, and Colonel Ey’s retirement made it impossible for him to

undertake the necessary revisions.

Because staff replacements were not immediately available, the training volume

was put aside until 1966, when the project was assigned to Mr. William D. Shaver,

formerly of the Historians Branch. Working from revised outline prepared by

Dr. Charles M. Wiltse, formerly Chief Historian, Mr. Shaver began the process of screening documents but unfortunately left The Historical Unit before this phase

of the revision could be completed.

Shortly after Mr. Shaver’s departure, theproject was assigned to Capt. Robert

J. Parks, MSC, AUS, Reserve officer who had been called to active duty at The

Historical Unit. Captain Parks is graduate of Western Michigan University,

Kalamazoo, Mich., and completed the requirements for the M.A. and the Ph. D.

degrees at Michigan State University. Working under the direction of the undersigned, and using as guidelines valuable suggestions made by the Office of the Chief

of Military History, Department of the Army, he completed stylistic, organizational, and substantive revision of the training volume, making maximum use of all

previous versions of the manuscript.

If any one individual were to be singled out as author, it would have to be

Captain Parks, but so many others have made important contributions that it

would be unfair to give preeminent credit to any one of them. The entire list of

contributors and reviewers appears under Acknowledgments. Very special thanks

are due, however, to General Hawley and to General Hartford. Others who labored

long and diligently to make the book success are Mrs. Claire M. Sorrell of the

General Reference and Research Branch and Mrs. Marjorie G. Shears of the

EditorialBranch who did the editing and compiled the index. Thanks are also due to

Dr. Stetson Conn, formerly Chief Historian, Office of the Chief of Military History;

to Brig. Gen. John Boyd Coates, Jr., USA (Ret.), former Director of The Historical

Unit, who set the project in motion; and to Col. Arnold L. Ahnfeldt, MC, USA

(Ret.), and Col. Robert S. Anderson, MC, USA (Ret.), former Directors of The

Historical Unit; and to the present Director, Col. William S. Mullins, MSC, USA,

who sustained the project.

Rose C. Engelman.
Acknowledgments

The distinctionbetween “Contributor” and “Reviewer” is sometimes tenuous,

but, generally defined, contributor actually wrote draft manuscript which might

vary from few pages to one or more chapters, while reviewerread and commented

upon one or more of these drafts. It sometimes happened that the same man who

contributed to one part of the book also reviewed another part, so that few names

occur in both categories. It shouldbe pointed out, however, that the majority of the

contributors devoted long hours and much timeto thepreparation of their contributory manuscripts and, thus, if any distinction were to be made, it must be in their

favor. All names are listed here in alphabetical order, with grateful thanks to each

and every one.

Contributors:

Maj. Gen. George E. Armstrong, USA (Ret.)

Col. Francis O. Chapelle, MC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Douglas C. Chitwood, MSC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Raymond E. Duke, MC, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. John A. Ey, Jr., MSC, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Francis M. Fitts, MC, USA (Ret.) (deceased)

Col. Matthew Ginalick, MSC, USA

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hartford, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, USA (Ret.) (deceased)

Col. James A. Hazelrigs, MSC, USA

Col. Tyron E. Huber, MC, USA (Ret.)

Sidney Hyman, formerly Captain, MAC, AUS

Col. Glenn C. Irving, MSC, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Joseph Israeloff, MSC, USA

Harold P. James, formerly Lieutenant, MAC, AUS John B. Johnson, Jr., formerly Lieutenant, MAC, AUS

Richard B. Laughlin, formerly Lieutenant, MAC, AUS Brig. Gen. James B. Mason, AUS (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Myra L. McDaniel, AMSC, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Hortense E. McKay, ANC, USA (Ret.)

James R. McLarnon, formerly Lieutenant, MSC, AUS

Edward J. Morgan, formerly Captain, MAC, AUS

Lt. Col. John J. O’Hara, Jr., MSC, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Charles A. Pendlyshok, MSC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Robert E. Peyton, MC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Francis W. Regnier, MC, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. William E. Shambora, USA (Ret.)

William A. Shapard, formerly Lieutenant, MSC, AUS Brig. Gen. James B. Stapleton, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Byron L. Steger, USA (Ret.)

Col. Elias M. Throme, MC, USA

Col. Jack T. Walden, MSC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Raymond H. White, MSC, USA

Brig. Gen. Robert P. Williams, USA (Ret.) (deceased)

Col. Edward A. Zimmermann, MC, USA (Ret.)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Reviewers:

Maj. Gen. GeorgeE. Armstrong, USA (Ret.)

Brig. Gen. James E. Baylis, USA (Ret.)

Brig. Gen. Stanhope Bayne-Jones, USA (Ret.) (deceased)

Lt. Col. Hazel M. Davis, AMSC, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Guy B. Denit, USA (Ret.)

Col. Raymond E. Duke, MC, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. John A. Ey, Jr., MSG, AUS (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Boris Fredericks, AGC, AUS (Ret.)

Charles E. Grim, formerly Captain, MAC, AUS

Brig. Gen. August H. Groeschel, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Gunnar H. Hage, MSG, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hartford, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, USA (Ret.) (deceased)

Col. Inez Haynes, ANC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Tyron E. Huber, MC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Wilbur G. Jenkins, MC, USA (Ret.) (deceased)

Col. Harriett S. Lee, AMSC, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Pauline E. Maxwell, ANC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Howard S. McConkie, MC, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Myra L. McDaniel, AMSC, USA (Ret.)

Robert J. Moorhead, formerly Lieutenant Colonel, MC, Res.

Col. Charles H. Moseley, MC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Francis W. Regnier, MC, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Winifred G. Riley, AMSC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Ruth P. Satterfield, ANC, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. William E. Shambora, USA (Ret.)

Col. Daniel J. Sheehan, MC, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Agnes P. Snyder, AMSC, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Earle G. G. Standlee, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Byron L. Steger, USA (Ret.)

Col. Joseph U. Weaver, MC, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Wergeland, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. John M. Willis, USA (Ret.) (deceased)

Col. Edward A. Zimmermann, MC, USA (Ret.)
Contents

Page

FOREWORD ix

PREFACE xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiii

Chapter

Preparations for World War II

Training Between the Wars

Preparations for War 13

II Medical, Dental, Veterinary, and Sanitary Corps Officers 35

Period of Flux: 1939-41 35

The War Years: 1941-45 42

The Army Specialized Training Program 72

Educational Techniques and Problems 88

III The Medical Administrative Corps 97

Officer Candidate Schools 97

Advanced Training 119

IV The Army Nurse Corps 127

Prewar Programs 127

Basic Military Training 128

Chief Nurses 136

Nurse Anesthetists 137

Neuropsychiatric Nursing 141

Operating Room Nurses 143

Fever Therapy Nurses 144

Flight Nurses 145

The Senior Cadet Nurse Corps 146

Dietitians, Physical Therapists, and Occupational Therapists 151

Basic Military Orientation for Newly Appointed Personnel 151

Professional Training Programs 153

Acceleration and Emergency Training Plans 154

Appointments, Classifications, and Salaries of Trainees 166

Training Performance Reports 166

Maintenance of Educational and Professional Standards 167

Schools and Hospitals Conducting Training Courses for the Army 169

Results of Emergency Training Programs 169

Training Enlisted Physical Therapy Technicians 170

Course for Occupational Therapy Assistants. 170

VI Medical Replacement Training Centers 173

Training Centers 174

Mobilization Training Programs 189

Training Programs for Army Air Forces Enlisted Personnel 198

Output of Medical Replacement Training Centers 200

Training Procedures 201

Cadre and Staff Training 206
CONTENTS

Chapter Page

VII Enlisted Technicians 213

Prewar Expansion 213

Wartime Expansion 214

Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools 219

Program Guides 222

Technical Training 225

Enlisted Women 236

Educational Techniques and Problems 240

Selection, Quality, and Disposition of Trainees 242

VIII Medical DepartmentField Units 247

Command and Staff Responsibility for Training Medical Department Units.. 247

The Army Service Forces Unit Activation and Training Systems 251

Army Air Forces Systems 259

Army Ground Forces Systems 261

Program Guides and Training Literature 268

Personnel and Equipment 273

INDEX 279

Illustrations

Figure

Carlisle Barracks, Pa., home of the Medical Field Service School

Members of the 1st Medical Regiment, Medical Field Service School, load simulated 11

patients on an ambulance

Four-mule ambulances, Medical Field Service School. 12

Army School of Malariology, Fort Clayton, C.Z 64

Class in antimechanized defense, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943 105

Officer candidates participate inpreventive maintenance, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943 106

Class in identification of chemical warfare agents, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943 107

Activities at officer candidate school, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1944 110

Portable public address system, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943 112

10 Miniature battlefield, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943 113

11 Sanitary demonstration area, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943 114

12 Army nurses in training, Camp McCoy, Wis 133

13 Army nurses in training, Camp McCoy, Wis 134

14 Senior cadet nurses in training 148

15 Student dietitian discussing recipe with head cook 156

16 Enlisted student physical therapist, Fort Huachuca Station Hospital, Ariz 160

17 Apprentice physical therapists, Fletcher General Hospital, Cambridge, Ohio 161

18 Classes for occupational therapy apprentices, Battey General Hospital, Rome, Ga.-_ 165

19 Trainees from Camp Lee, Va., marching to Camp Pickett, Va 176

20 Tent housing used at Camp Pickett, Va 177

21 Troops at the Camp Pickett, Va., stadium on Memorial Day 178

22 Camp Barkeley, Tex., December 1941 184

23 Hutments used to house trainees at Camp Barkeley, Tex 185

24 Open-air classrooms, Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark 187

25 Trainees set up and operate an aid station, Camp Grant, 111 190

26 Class for clerk-typists, CampPickett, Va 191
CONTENTS

Figure Page

27 class for motor mechanics, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943 192

28 Unrated surgical technicians, Fort Lewis, Wash., 1944 193

29 Trainees negotiating obstacle course, CampPickett, Va 194

30 Trainees at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., learn to evacuate wounded men from

tanks 204

31 Medical Corps officer instructs in anatomy at Brooke General Hospital, 1942 226

32 Surgical Technicians, Letterman General Hospital, view demonstration of operating room techniques 227

33 Dental technicians study full dentures 228

34 Class in dental hygiene and prophylaxis 229

35 Practical training in the laboratory 230

36 Instruction in darkroom technique 231

37 Veterinary Corps officer instructs class at the Army Veterinary School, Army

Medical Center 233

38 Technician practicing use of portable optical equipment 234

39 Laboratory procedures 237

40 School of Aviation Medicine building, Randolph Field, Tex 260

41 Medical Department officers attend courses at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans 262

Tables

Number

Approximate strength of peacetime components of the U.S. Army Medical Department, 1939

Summary of Army Specialized Training Program demands, by arms and services,

January 1943-July 1944 77

The Army Specialized Training Program; Students of medicine, dentistry, and

veterinary medicine assigned, separated, discharged, and transferred through

curtailment of the program 81

Average monthly cost of professional training per trainee 85

Number of enrollees and graduates, MAC officer candidate schools, by month,

July 1941-October 1945 100

Attrition rates of trainees for Officer CandidateSchools, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1944. 116

Attrition ratesof trainees for Officer Candidate Schools, CarlisleBarracks, Pa., 1944. 116

Number and percentage of candidates who enrolled, and graduated or who failed to

complete the MAC Officer Candidate Course, Camp Barkeley, Tex., classes

1-40, inclusive, by Army component, age, race, source, and education 120

Basic training centers for Army nurses 131

10 Output of Medical Replacement Training Centers, 1942-45 199

11 Capacity of Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools, July 1941 214

12 Capacity of Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools, July 1942 215

13 Capacity of Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools, July 1943 216

14 Annual capacity, Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools, 1942 and 1943. 217

15 Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools operated during World War II... 221

16 Women’s Army Corps technicians trained in Medical Department Enlisted

Technicians Schools, July 1943-30 June 1944 238

17 Enlisted women trained in Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools, July 1944-30 June 1945 241

497-333 75 -2
CONTENTS

Charts

Number Page

Organization of the Medical Administrative Corps Officer Candidate School,

Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1942 103

Organization of the Medical Administrative Corps Officer Candidate School, Camp

Barkeley, Tex., 1942-43 104

Periods of training, Medical Replacement Training Centers, 1941-46 200

Length of training cycles, Medical Replacement Training Centers, 1940-46 201

Typical organization of Medical DepartmentEnlisted Technicians School, 1944 220
CHAPTER

Preparations for World War II

TRAINING BETWEEN THE WARS

Training facilities of the U.S. Army Medical Department in 1939 reflected adaptation to peacetime medical requirements. From World War peak of over

340,000, the Medical Department’s strength had been reduced to little over

11,500 officers and enlisted men by June 1939. Enlisted personnel had been reduced by the National Defense Act, as amended in 1920, from wartime concentration of

nearly 10 percent of the Army’s enlisted strength to statutory maximum of only

percent. Because all but fraction of the enlisted strength was needed to care for the garrison army, field training had been neglected. The five Medical Department

field units that existed were either understrength or skeleton organizations; trained

enlisted cadre could not have been provided in case of mobilization. Without

enlisted personnel to man units, officer training could be little more than

theoretical.

Peacetime Components of the Medical Department

Under the National Defense Act, as amended in 1920, the Army was divided

into three components: the Regular Army, the Reserves, and the National Guard.

The Regular Army consisted of officers and enlisted personnel who were continuously

on active duty. The Reserves were designed to meet immediate needs for manpower

in the initial stages of mobilization, and the National Guard was state organization

intended for use in an emergency or in actual hostilities. The Medical Department

was divided by function into seven basic components: the Medical, Dental, Veterinary, Sanitary, and Medical Administrative Corps, composed of officers of

commissioned rank; the Army Nurse Corps, whose members held relative rank;

and the enlisted personnel necessary to support the professional staff. These medical

elements were represented in each of the Army’s Reserve and Regular components,

with the exception of the Sanitary Corps, which was found only in the Reserves,

and the Army Nurse Corps, which was not organized in the National Guard.

In the peacetime Medical Department, technical duties were performed by

variety of personnel, including commissioned and enlisted members of the Regular

(1) Committee to Study the Medical Department, 1942, Testimony, pp. 1-2. (2) Smith, Clarence McKittrick:

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior. United States Army in World War II.

The Technical Services. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956. (3) Medical Department, United States

Army. Personnel in World War II. Washington; U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1963. (4) 41 Stat. 766.

41 Stat. 759.

See footnote (3).
MEDICAL TRAINING

Army, members of the Army Nurse Corps, and civilian specialists employed either

under civil service regulations or by The Surgeon General under special contract.

The commissioned Regular Army personnel consisted of physicians assigned to the

Medical Corps, dentists assigned to the Dental Corps, veterinarians assigned to the

Veterinary Corps, and nonprofessional administrative officers, who were assigned to

the Medical Administrative Corps. Regular Army enlisted men were not assigned to

corps but were utilized in administrative, clerical, training, and technical capacities

for which they were qualified by civilian experience or Medical Department

training. Civilians were employed at various installations, including hospitals,

laboratories, supply depots, and offices, in variety of positions, ranging from

laborers and trained artisans to highly skilled technicians, therapists, and dietitians.

The Surgeon General also employed small number of doctors under special

contract, usually for part-time duty at small posts.

To supplement these personnel in an emergency, the Army maintained

Medical Department Reserve. Commissioned members of the Medical Department

Reserve were assigned to five Reserve corps: the Medical, Dental, Veterinary,

Medical Administrative, and Sanitary Corps. Reserve officers in the first four of

these corps had the same professional qualifications as officers in the corresponding

corps of the Regular Army, and those in the first three corps were usually commissioned upon completion of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program at

civilian medical schools. The Sanitary Corps Reserve consisted of men with

experience and college training in technical fields allied to medicine, such as

chemistry, sanitary engineering, or hospital architecture. The Medical Administrative Corps Reserve consisted largely of World War officers with administrative

experience who continued in the Reserves after the war, senior active-duty noncommissioned officers who also held Reserve commissions, and, after 1936, graduates

of accredited pharmacy schools who applied for Reserve commissions. The number

of enlisted reservists was negligible. Reserve officers were required by law to attend

periodic meetings, and the law permitted the Government to call them to active

duty for weeks each year. War Department policy, however, was to call them for

such duty only upon their own application. Reserve officers were also required to

complete limited number of Army extension courses.

In contrast to the Medical Department Reserve, which emphasized the

training of individual officers, the Medical Department of the National Guard had

high level of enlisted strength and emphasized the training of field units (table 1).

In addition to providing organic medical support for regiments and smaller units,

the National Guard possessed number of independent medical units designed to be

attached to larger units. These included 19 regimental headquarters, 12 battalion

headquarters, 20 collecting companies, 45 motorized ambulance companies, 29

hospital companies, and number of veterinary and service companies. Taken

together, they possessed far greater capability for providing field medical service

than did units of theRegular Army. In 1939, The Surgeon General reported that the

National Guard had achieved the highest level of training in its history. Because of

TheArmy of TheUnited States, Senate Document No. 91, 76th Congress, 1st Session. Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940.
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II

Table 1.—Approximate strength of peacetime components of the U.S. Army

Medical Department, 1939

Source: (1) Annual Reports of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1940 and 1941. (2) The Army of the United States, Senate Document No. 91, 76th Congress, 1st Session. Washington:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940, p. 117.

their low professional strength, however, National Guard units were thought to be

better qualified in tactical training than in caring for the sick and wounded in the

field. Members of the National Guard were under the jurisdiction of corps area

commanders for training and were required to participate in weekly exercises, as

well as weeks of summer exercises.

Training Responsibility

Full control over the training of Medical Department personnel was not vested

in any single office. All training was under the technical supervision of The Surgeon

General, but not all of it was under the same degree of control. In common with the

other technical services, the Medical Department was an element of the War

Department Special Staff, and The Surgeon General had direct access to the Chief

of Staff. The Chief of Staff and the General Staff were responsible for coordinating

the separate arms and services. Each of the chiefs of the arms and services acted as

the immediate adviser to the General Staff in technical areas peculiar to his arm or

service. Thus, The Surgeon General advised G-3, Operations and Training Division,

on the technical training of Medical Department personnel and prepared master

program guides, manuals, and instructional aids. In sum, The Surgeon General

established the basic “doctrine” under which Medical Department troops were

trained, regardless of their location or level of technical skill.

The degree of control exercised by The Surgeon General over the training of

particular body of Medical Department troops, however, was determined both by

geographic location and by level of technical skill. The Surgeon General controlled

the basic, advanced, and professional training of officers, the advanced technical

training of enlisted men, and the routine training of enlisted personnel at thelimited

number of installations, known as exempted stations, under his direct control. The

most important of these, from the standpoint of training, were the Medical Field

Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1939. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940.

Component Regular Army Reserves National Guard

Medical Corps. 1,098 15,198 1,085

Dental Corps 221 5,063 234

Veterinary Corps ... __ 126 1,381 66

Medical Administrative Corps 64 1,243 145

Sanitary Corps 454

Army Nurse Corps 672

Enlisted personnel. 8,643 16 12,500

Total 10,824 23,355 14,030
MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 1.—Carlisle Barracks, Pa., home of the Medical Field Service School, about 1939.

Service School of Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (fig. 1), and the Professional Service Schools

at the Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C. At the professional schools in

Washington, officers and enlisted technicians were trained in medical specialties and

in the military aspects of medical, dental, and veterinary service. The MedicalField

Service School trained enlisted men and officers of all corps in the field aspects and

administration of the Medical Department. The routine and basic technicaltraining

of other troops was under the control of corps area commanders, except at the schools

and the named general hospitals classified as exempted stations.

Medical Department officers and men assigned to medical installations and

field units at posts, camps, and stations under corps area jurisdiction were no less

part of the Medical Department than those assigned to exempted stations, but

they were isolated from the Medical Department by several levels of command and

administration. Their numbers far exceeded those at exempted stations. Training at

corps area level was theresponsibility of the area commander, who usually delegated

the responsibility to the corps area surgeon. The surgeon, in his dual capacity as

local staff officer and technical representative of The Surgeon General, was then

responsible to the corps area commander for conducting training according to War

Department policies and to The Surgeon General for the technical content of

instruction. The same command relationship existed on lower level at posts,

camps, and stations. Except for about percent of the Reserve officers, who were

assigned to The Surgeon General in event of mobilization, both theReserves and the

National Guard were under corps area control. In peacetime, the tendency of corps
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II

and station commanders not to interfere in medical matters allowed local surgeons

considerable degree of autonomy.

Officer Training

The peacetime pattern for training Medical Department officers was designed

to meet the dual need for professional medical personnel capable of performing

command and staff functions in the operation of military medical installations and

for supplementing civilian professional training with instruction in specialties having

different emphasis in military medicine. As result of problems encountered

during World War I, training facilities were established to meet each of these needs.

In 1920, the Medical Field Service School was established at Carlisle Barracks to

conduct program of instruction designed to transform civilian doctors, dentists, and veterinarians into medical officers trained to assume command in medical

installations and units. Three years later, theArmy Medical Center was established

in Washington, D.C., to conduct postgraduate program of instruction in the

military aspects of medicine, dentistry, and veterinary service.

The Army Medical Center was multiple institution whose components

functioned as separate installations before 1923. These included the Walter Reed

General Hospital, the Army Medical School, theArmy Dental School, and the Army

Veterinary School. The three schools, usually referred to as the Medical Department

Professional Service Schools, had conducted training programs of their own long

before the center was established. Indeed, the Army Medical School had been

created as early as 1893. But the establishment of the Medical Field Service School

in 1920, and the Army Medical Center in 1923, marked thebeginning of two-phase

program designed to give comprehensive training to Medical Department officers in

both military and technical aspects of their profession. Facilities at the Army

Medical Center were not usually available to officers of the National Guard and

Reserve, but the Medical Field Service School offered special courses for their

instruction.

Regular Army officers.—The Medical Department basic training program

for Regular Army officers provided an academic year of postgraduate study in the

professional and military aspects of military medicine. Beginning in late August or

early September each year, 4-month courses known as “Basic Graduate Courses”

were offered at each of the three service schools at the Army Medical Center. These

programs were “basic” in that they presented essential professional knowledge required for the military practice of medicine, dentistry, or veterinary service, as

distinguished from the same practices in civilian life, and “graduate” in that students in the classes had degrees in their professional fields and were prepared to cope

with subject matter presented in manner characteristic of graduate schools at

(1) See footnote (2), p. 1. (2) Medical Department, United States Army. Organization and Administration in

World War II. Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.

(1) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1922. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1922. (2) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1924. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1924. (3) Hume, E. E.: Training of Medical Officers for War Duty. War Med., vol. I, September 1941.
MEDICAL TRAINING

civilian institutions. When these professional courses were completed in December,

students transferred to the Medical Field Service School for 5-month course of

military indoctrination. This course, which emphasized tactics, logistics, administration, field sanitation, and instructional methods, was designated the “Medical

Department Officers Basic Course,” to distinguish it from the basic graduate

courses at the Army Medical Center. After months of intensive training, the officer was considered ready to assume duties as member of the Regular Army

Medical Department. Unfortunately, peacetime requirements for professional

personnel made it impossible for each newly commissioned medical officer to participate in the basic training program, and the program was too cumbersome for

use during mobilization.

In addition to basic officer training, the Medical Department offered opportunities for continuing education. program of “Advanced Graduate Courses” at

the Army Medical Center allowed medical officers to receive months of training in

technical subjects. More intensive training could be pursued through “Professional

Specialists Courses,” individual courses in medical specialties corresponding to

residency at civilian hospitals, that varied in length from to years. Because of the

administrative burden of formal reports required by regulations, the professional

specialists courses were not formally offered in the closing years of the interwar

period. The program was carried on the books to comply with regulations, but in

practice, students were ordered to the Army Medical Center and became in fact,

if not in name, regular duty officers at Walter Reed General Hospital, where they

received informal training. Through these programs, the Medical Department

attempted not only to keep its personnel abreast of developments in medical

science but also to provide the specialists necessary for complex medical installations. At the Medical Field Service School, field grade officers were provided with

additional training in command techniques by 3-month “Advanced Course.”

To supplement training available through formal courses at the Army Medical

Center and the Medical Field Service School, the Medical Department offered

extension courses and subsidized study at civilian institutions. Correspondence

courses covering military and administrative subjects were prepared by the

Department of Extension Courses of the Medical Field Service School. Regular

Army officers were allowed to enroll in series of basic extension courses designed

for officers in Reserve components. The number of Regular Army officers taking

such courses was always small, totaling only 59 in the 5-year period preceding

1940.10 During the same period, 369 Regular Army officers completed the “Special

Extension Course for Medical Department Officers, Regular Army” for field grade

Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1936. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1936.

(1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. Charles B. Spruit, MC, Training Subdivision, Planning and Training Division,

OTSG, for Col. Albert G. Love, MC, Chief, Planning and Training Division, OTSG, 16 Apr. 1940, subject: Schedule

of Courses for Medical Department Special Service Schools, School Year 1940-41. (2) Annual Report of The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army, 1940. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941. (3) See footnote (3), p. 5.

10 (1) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1935. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1935. (2) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1937. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1937. (3) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1938. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1939.
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II

officers seeking promotion to grades of lieutenant colonel or colonel. 11 Completion

of this special extension course exempted officers from the portion of their promotional examinationconsisting of medicomilitary problem, which probably accounts

for the high level of participation. In addition, the National Defense Act, as amended

in 1920, allowed up to percent of the officers of the Regular Army to enroll in

courses at civilian institutions in subjects not taught at service schools but essential

to the efficient conduct of their duties. The number enrolled for such study varied

from year to year, as did the subjects, length of courses, and institutions involved.

In the 5-year period preceding 1940, 150 Medical Department officers participated

in this program. 12 Finally, limited number of Medical Department officers were

enrolled in service schools operated by other Army agencies, such as the Army War

College and the Army Industrial College, Washington, D.C., the Infantry School,

Fort Benning, Ga., the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth,

Kans., the Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, Md., and the School of

Aviation Medicine, Randolph Field, Tex. Most of these officers were being groomed

for high-level command positions, and the number was always small.

Other facilities for special training were offered by the School of Aviation

Medicine which had been established as Special Service School in 1921. In name

and function Medical Department school, it was funded by the Air Corps and,

exempted from corps area control, was under the command of the Chief of the Air

Corps. Courses were offered to qualify members of the Medical Corps assigned to

the Air Corps as flight examiners and flight surgeons and to train enlisted men as

flight surgeon’s assistants. The special school was formally justifiedby the need for

special physical standards for flight personnel and the need for special methods to

control disease in highly mobile command. In common with other Special Services

Schools, the School of Aviation Medicine offered extension courses for officers in

Reserve components. 13

Medical Administrative Corps officers in the Regular Army had neither the

need nor the background for the professional courses offered by the Medical

Department Professional Service Schools at the Army Medical Center. Commissioned and appointed to perform nonprofessional administrative duties, these

officers were at first drawn exclusively from the enlisted ranks after at least years

of service, and after 1936, from graduates of recognized pharmacy schools. Once

they had been commissioned, they were eligible to attend the basic course at the

Medical Field Service School. 14

National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps officers.—Reserve and

National Guard officers were qualified for appointment through variety of programs. For the Medical Department, the most important of these was the Reserve

Officers’ Training Corps, which had medical units in operation at the professional

schools of colleges and universities. To qualify for commissions in the Medical Department, students were required to complete 2-year basic course, 2-year ad11 See footnotes 5, p. 3; and and 10, p. 6.

i*41 Stat. 786. 13 See footnote (2), p. 5.

“41 Stat. 767.
MEDICAL TRAINING

vanced course consisting of hours of weekly instruction in military subjects, and

6-week summer encampment, as well as their professional training. Summer camp

training for students in Medical Department Reserve Officers’ Training Corps was

held at the Medical Field Service School and included indoctrination in sanitation

and the administration and deployment of medical field units, as well as basic

military instruction. Upon graduation, candidates were eligible for Reserve commissions or to compete for appointment to the Regular Army and were required to

complete years of Reserve duty. Another opportunity for commissioning was

offered by Citizens’ Military Training Camps. By attending four successive summer camps, each month in length, interested civilians could also qualify for Reserve commissions. Others, who had no previous military service, or who had not

attended military academies or colleges with Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

units, could qualify for National Guard commissions by successfully attending officer training camps. 15

Once commissioned, Reserve and National Guard officers could participate in

variety of training programs, in addition to regular drills. Instead of the 5-month

basic course for Regular Army officers at the Medical Field Service School, the basic

training of officers in the Reserve components of the Medical Department was

accomplished through combination of summer camps and correspondence courses.

2-week program, known as the Basic Summer Training Camp for Reserve

Officers, was conducted for junior officers each June. Approximately 200 officers

enrolled annually for instruction in basic military subjects, administration, field

sanitation, and the operation of medical detachments. In July, 2-week program

designated the "Unit Training Camp for Reserve Officers” was held for officers

assigned to medical regiments, squadrons, battalions, general hospitals, field

hospitals, and evacuation centers. Approximately 350 officers of the Reserve

components attended annually. To supplement camp training, the Medical Department offered series of extension courses in the fundamentals of military science and

tactics. With the retention of commissions and promotion providing incentives,

these correspondence courses played major role in the basic training of Reserve

and National Guard officers. In 1939, for example, 7,445 officers of Medical Department components completed 15,848 subcourses of the extension courses, representing

total of 223,121 hours of work.

Advanced training for field grade officers and senior captains of Reserve

components paralleled thatof Regular Army officers. When authorized, the Medical

Field Service School conducted 6-week counterpart to the 3-month advanced

course for Regular Army officers, known as the National Guard and Reserve

Officers Course, that was designed to develop commanding officers, executive

officers, and planning and training officers for medical field units. Eighteen officers

were authorized to attend the session held in the fall of 1939. Extension courses were

also part of the advanced training of officers in Medical Department Reserve

components, and promotion depended, in part, upon the completion of successive

series of subcourses.

Opportunities for professional training for officers in Reserve components were

15 (1) See footnotes 5, p. 3; and (3), p. 5. (2) 41 Stat. 781.
PREPARATIONSFOR WORLD WAR II

much less extensive than those in military subjects. course in forage inspection

was open to National Guard officers at the Army Veterinary School, and inactive duty training could be pursued at civilian medical centers under the “Skinner

Plan.” Under this plan, medicomilitary courses were offered by various institutions, in the interest of national defense, at no expense to the Government or the officers

attending. Reserve officers were not ordered to active duty while attending these

courses and did not receive pay. They were, however, given credit for course

completion. The pattern for inactive duty training was set by the Mayo Clinic,

Rochester, Minn., which offered two courses annually: one of to weeks’ duration

in the spring, and another of weeks, in thefall. During the morning hours, student

officers studied purely medical subjects, and during the afternoon, attention was

devoted to military subjects. The success of theprogram, both in keeping physicians

abreast of current medical developments, and in creating interest in military

medicine, encouraged the program’s expansion. By 1939, similar courses were offered

by medical groups in Cincinnati, Ohio, Cleveland, Ohio, St. Louis, Mo., Boston,

Mass., Kansas City, Mo., Chicago, 111., New Orleans, La., and Nashville, Tenn. 16

Regular Army Enlisted Personnel

Training programs for enlisted personnel of the Medical Department reflected

the critical shortage of personnel. To use personnel efficiently, the Medical Department neglected routine military and field training and relied on the specialization

and division of labor, supplemented by on-the-job training. Limited by statute to

5-percent strength allocation, barely adequate to provide routine medical care for

garrison army, the Medical Department found itself progressively squeezed

between the need for technicians to support the increasing tendency toward

specialization in medicine and the growing demands for medical service. In number

of installations, men served 12-hour shifts, and the rotation of duties was

suspended. 17

Enlisted soldiers in the Medical Department performed widevariety of duties,

in installations ranging in size and function from hospitals to dispensaries, laboratories, and medical supply agencies. Regardless of their assignment, all Medical

Department enlisted personnel were required to engage in training basic to the

trade of soldiering, such as dismounted drill, physical conditioning, military

courtesy, and army administration. In addition, the medical soldier required

instruction in the functions of the Medical Department and, depending upon his

assigned duties, technical training in skills ranging from simple emergency medical

treatment to complicated laboratory technique. Medical soldiers as group

required all the skills necessary for supplementing the professional services of

functioning medical installation. Responsibility for training the enlisted personnel

of any medical detachment or installation, regardless of its size or specific mission,

fell on the commanding officer.

16 Patterson, R. U.: The Medical Reserve Corps of the Army. Mil. Surg. 74 (5): 256-258, May 1934.

17 See footnotes 5, p. 3; and and 10, p. 6.
10 MEDICAL TRAINING

Skills were developed through on-the-job training. Training schedules were

established for drill and physical exercise periods and for lectures and demonstrations on military courtesy, military law, and technicalsubjects. The degree to which

such schedules were followed, however, depended upon the demands which routine

care of the sick and injured made upon the timeof instructors and students. Because

these demands were usually heavy, more technical training was accomplished in

wards, dispensaries, and operating rooms, where men could learn by ‘seeing and

doing,” than in classrooms. Since the length of peacetime enlistment was years,

and many men remained in the service for more than one term of enlistment, the

more enterprising oftenbecame highly skilled specialists through on-the-job training.

Those who desired technical ratings had to pass Armywide promotional examinations in both technical and military subjects. 18

limited number of courses for enlisted men were offered by the MedicalField

Service School, the Army Medical Center, and the School of Aviation Medicine.

The Medical Field Service School initiated an annual Noncommissioned Officers

Course in 1924 designed “to teach noncommissioned officers correct and effective

methods of instruction and the art of handling and training Medical Department

troops of the components of the Army of the United States.” 19 This 8-week course

included instruction in company administration, leadership techniques, logistics,

tactics, map reading, sanitation, control of communicable diseases, first aid, and

teaching methodology. It was particularly valuable to experienced enlisted men

preparing for annual promotional examinations, although it was not prerequisite.

Between 1935 and 1940, numbers enrolled ranged between 41 and 100. Extension

courses were offered to enlisted personnel through the Medical Field Service School

also, but the number of participants was always small. 20

In addition to the Noncommissioned Officers Course, four technical courses

were conducted by the Professional Service Schools at the Army Medical Center.

These included the X-ray Technicians Course and the Laboratory Technicians

Course at the Army Medical School, the Dental Technicians Course at the Army

Dental School, and the Veterinary Technicians Course at the Army Veterinary

School. All were courses of long standing, established before the organization of the

Army Medical Center, and army regulations required that they be offered annually.

The courses were months in length and could be offered twice yearly if enrollment

requests warranted. 21 In 1939, all courses, except the Veterinary Technicians

Course, were lengthened to 12 months, and 12-month courses for pharmacy

technicians and orthopedic appliance technicians were added to the program. Such

courses were designed to contribute to the quality of Army medical service and to

be of personal value to students who anticipated taking promotional examinations

for advanced technical ratings. They were not prerequisites for examination, and

between 1935 and 1939, enrollments were low. In no course did enrollments exceed

33, and in most, enrollments were below 12.22

18 Army Regulations No. 615-15, 25 May 1937. 18 Army Regulations No. 350-1030, 30 Dec. 1926.

20 See footnotes 5, p. 3; and 8, 9, and 10, p. 6. 21 See footnote (2), p. 5. 22 See footnotes 5, p. 3; and 10, p. 6.
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 11

The School of Aviation Medicine conducted 3-month “Flight Surgeons

Assistants Course.” Offered twice annually, the course was designed to train

students not only to prepare instruments used in examining applicants for flight

duty but also to assist in examinations by taking pulse counts, blood pressure

readings, and similar measurements. Enrollments were small, reaching peak of 44

in 1939.

Field Training

At the close of the interwar period, tactical training continued to be the

Medical Department’s most striking training deficiency. With the exception of the

men assigned to existing understrength field units, few medical soldiers received

actual training in tactical medical operations. These units, consisting of the 1st

Medical Regiment, which was used for demonstrations at Carlisle Barracks (fig. 2),

the 2d Medical Regiment at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., the skeleton 1st Medical

Squadron (Cavalry) at Fort Bliss, Tex., and the 11thand 12thMedical Regiments,

Figure 2.—Members of the 1st Medical Regiment at the Medical Field Service School,

Carlisle Barracks, Pa., load simulated patients on an ambulance at an ambulance loading post

set up by the collecting company of theregiment during field problem.
12 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 3.—Four-mule ambulances such as these were used in the training of Medical Department personnel at the Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., before World

War II.

in Hawaii and the Philippines, respectively, were the only units receiving what was

deemed adequate field training. Yet, on the field of battle, the mission of providing

aid stations, collecting stations, and clearing stations for thefirst and second echelons

in the chain of evacuation was basic to the Medical Department’s combat mission.

Soldiers assigned to these units received tactical and field training that could

not be given to members of the Medical Department assigned to duty in dispensaries

and hospitals. Their training included instruction in such subjects as emergency

medical treatment, first aid, litter carrying, ambulance service, and the establishment, movement, and operation of medical facilities in the field (fig. 3).

Opportunities for practicing actual field support were limited. The 1st Medical

Regiment, in addition to its training program, acted as demonstration unit at the

Medical Field Service School and for the training camps operated at Carlisle

Barracks for the Organized Reserves and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps units.

The 2d Medical Regiment, in addition to its routine activities, actively participated

in 1938 and 1939 in the experimental exercises and maneuvers of the newly streamlined infantry division in Texas. Shortages of personnel handicapped the training of

these units just as they handicapped the training of personnel in dispensaries and

hospitals; the four medical regiments were maintained at “peacetime” strength,

rather than mobilization strength, and the medical squadron was usually described

as “skeletonized.” As late as 1939, The Surgeon General reported that the “lack of

adequate enlisted strength from which to form the required regimental medical

detachments and Medical Department field units to be ready for use on M-day
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 13

presents problem as yet unsolved, in furnishing adequate medical service for units

in the protective mobilization plan.” Units scheduled for activation in fiscal year

1939 were deferred until the following year because of manpower shortages. In

sudden mobilization, the Medical Department would have been unable to care for

combat troops and, at the same time, to provide cadres for an expanding medical

field service. 23

Summary

Despite the effects of peace, disarmament, and depression on the machinery

for mobilization, some developments of the interwar period proved beneficial. The

Medical Department developed techniques and programs to train officers for their

role in technical service. In like manner, programs were set up for the advanced

training of enlisted technicians and noncommissioned officers. But, the Medical

Department’s training program was adapted to meet the needs of small garrison

army and would have to be restructured to function efficiently in period of mass

mobilization. Physical facilities, of course, would have to be expanded and, more

important, tempo accelerated. The luxury of an academic year of training for newly

commissioned officers, and full year for enlisted technicians, would have to be

abandoned to train service expanding more than proportionally with the Army

and to provide immediate medical care for mobilized troops. Skills acquired

informally through on-the-job training, or by gradual process of see-and-do, would

have to be taught by formal methods. Medical Administrative Corps officers, who

previously acquired their training through long years of enlisted service, would have

to be trained in great numbers to free the limited number of available physicians

from administrative duties. Had the Medical Department been confronted with

mobilization in the summer of 1939, theproblems of creating functioning organization capable of providing both routine health care and field medical support might

have proved insurmountable. The 2-year period that intervened provided an

opportunity to adjust the program for the crisis that lay ahead.

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

The gradual deterioration of internationalaffairs between 1939 and the attack

on Pearl Harbor allowed the Nation to mobilize gradually. Public opinion limited

U.S. involvement in the wars of Europe and Asia, but defensive reaction to the

deepening international crisis produced continuous buildup of forces. By July

1941, the strength of the Army was comparable to that projected by mobilization

planners for point in time monthsafter declaration of war. Expanding theArmy

from approximately 189,000 on July 1939 to 1,461,000 on July 1941, 24 required

not only restyling to adjust the training program for volume but also adjusting for

23 See footnote (2), p. 5.

24 (1) Annual Report of the Secretary of War to thePresident, 1939. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939. (2) Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1941. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting

Office, 1941.
14 MEDICAL TRAINING

the changing quality of new soldiers. In the Medical Department of theArmy, as in

the entire Defense Establishment, piecemeal response to the deterioration of world

affairs provided cushion against sudden mobilization, but the buildup was mixed

blessing.

Staff mobilization planning continued unabated throughout the interwar

period. Annual revisions of basic plans were required as part of normal staff

procedure, and periodic reassessments of basic planning were required by the

growing obsolescence of stockpiles, the aging of men who served in World War I,

and the changes in strength and diplomatic posture of foreign nations. Frequently,

basic changes in mobilization planning coincided with the appointment of new

Chief of Staff. Following the disarmament conferences of the 1920’s, staff planning

was little more than an academic exercise. By the mid-1930’s, growing international

tensions and the obvious degeneration of U.S. military power focused staff attention

on the need for more realistic planning.

The Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939

It was at this point that Gen. Malin Craig replaced Gen. (later General of the

Army) Douglas MacArthur as Chief of Staff in October 1935. Less publicized than

his predecessor, General Craig assumed command in period of moderate economic

recovery and slowly reviving concern about national defense. Distressed at commanding an Army ranking 18th among the world’s powers, General Craig directed

his staff to begin work on new Protective Mobilization Plan in December 1936.

General Craig’s anxieties, which he revealed in subsequent statements, focused on

the time necessary to trainand equip men to fight increasingly technological warfare.

He later wrote as follows:

This is an immensely rich nation, but all of its wealth, all of its industrial capacity,

all of its intelligent manpower, is helpless before the inexorable demands of time in manufacture

and training. The period has long passed when ineffectively armed or insufficiently trained men

can succeed in war. We know to day the time necessary to produce every item of armament

and equipment—the time it takes to train our military specialists. As an instance, the sums

appropriated this last year will not be fully transformed into military power for years. This

fact, that it takes years to resolve the will of the people into efficiently handled munitions of war,

must be remembered. The same persons who now state that they see no threat to the peace of

the United States would hesitate to make the same forecast through 2-year period. 26

As result of staff efforts, new Protective Mobilization Plan as formulated,

revised, and approved as the Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939, in December

1938.26

The Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939 was designed to mobilize balanced

Army of moderate size, consistent with limitations on the procurement of men and

materiel. At the beginning of hostilities, or on receipt of mobilization orders, the

plan anticipated creation of defensiveArmy of 400,000 men, designated the “Initial

25 Annual Report of the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of War. In Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the

President, 1939. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1939. 26 Kreidberg, Marvin A., and Henry, Merton G.: History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army,

1775-1945. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1955. (DA Pamphlet 20-212.)
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 15

Protective Force/’ consisting of the Regular Army, the Reserve, the National

Guard, and corps of volunteers who would act as fillers. Thirty days after the onset

of mobilization, this force of four Regular Army and 18 National Guard divisions

was to be ready to protect U.S. soil from attack. Once the Initial Protective Force

had been prepared for action, the Protective Mobilization Plan called for second

phase of troop activation designed to bring the U.S. Army to strength of approximately one million enlisted men, and the officer strength necessary to command

them. Assuming that Selective Service would be functioning by the second month

of mobilization, draftees and volunteerswere to be inducted as rapidly as equipment

could be supplied, and then trained by selected Regular Army or Reserve cadres

either as fillers for existing understrength units or as new units. Material shortages

limited the induction of personnel for new units to approximately 150,000 per

month, although an additional number of fillers requiring only the issue of personal

equipment could also be trained. serious handicap to the program’s success was

the shortage of Regulars and Reservists to fill cadre positions and command the

Initial Protective Force. Once the second phase was completed, some months

after M-day, it was assumed that superior trainees could be utilized as cadre, and

the process could be either continued or expanded until manpowerrequirements for

the particular emergency were satisfied.

To provide for the induction and training of new troops, the Protective

Mobilization Plan specified the location of reception centers, enlisted replacement

training centers, and unit training centers, and the location at which each unit

would begin and complete its training. Under the program, recruits were first

assigned to corps area reception center, where they would be processed, classified,

and issued basic clothing and equipment. Those assigned as fillers to understrength

units would then report directly to their units for additional training. Others would

be sent to enlisted replacement training centers for vigorous 90-day training cycle.

After period of training, these men would be shipped overseas as fillers, sent to new

units in training, or assigned for technical training at service schools or civilian trade

schools. In general, troops were to be trained in the traditional military manner,

beginning with the broad general problems of physical conditioning and discipline,

and progressing gradually to more specialized subjects.

Officer training was to proceed along different lines. At the onset of mobilization, the Army War College and the Army Industrial College were to be closed, but

the Command and General Staff School would offer special courses shortened to

months. Special service schools, such as the Infantry School and the Medical Field

Service School, would offer short courses to refresh Reserve officers called to active

duty, and give specialist training. If the emergency continued for more than

months, Officer Candidate Schools would be inaugurated at both special service

schools and at other necessary locations. 27

The Protective Mobilization Plan had many flaws. In spite of the realization

that enlisted replacement training centers would not have enough Regular Army or

prior service personnel to man them, no attempt was made to provide cadres for

27 (1) See footnote 26, p. 14. (2) Watson, Mark Skinner: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Operations. United

States Army in World War II. The War Department. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1950.

497-333 75 -3
16 MEDICAL TRAINING

these centers. Operating under the assumption that troops would be hurriedly

trained in the South and shipped overseas for final training in manner similar to that used by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I, the plan did not

provide for the construction of adequate housing. Plans forreservations large enough

for division and corps maneuvers were neglected. Designed primarily for the

mobilization of combat elements of field armies, provisions for the training of

technical and support elements were admittedly inadequate. Plans for Zone of

Interior hospitalization were inadequate, and War Department planners made no

provision for the use of affiliated units, which had made important contributions to

medical care in World War I. Despite these defects, the program outlined in the

Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939 was more realistic than any offered before the

war.

The Surgeon GeneraPs Protective Mobilization Plan, 1939

The plan issued by the War Department was brief but specific and designed to

be supplemented by army regulations, mobilization regulations, and the progressively more detailed plans of subordinate units. Plans prepared by subordinate

agencies, such as the Medical Department, followed format parallel to that of the War Department and were more detailedonly in providing general outlines for their

specific areas of responsibility. Formulating plans for implementing the details of

these general outlines was the responsibility of specific commands within the

agency.

The War Department mobilization plan, within which Medical Department

plans had to be framed, severely limited the scope for discretionary action. The sites of replacement training centers and unit training centers were specified, as well as

the sites for unit activation, and the length and size of training cycles for both basic

and technical training. Cycle length was standardized at 90 days throughout the

Army. The Surgeon General’s Protective Mobilization Plan, issued on 15 December

1939, reflected these strictures.

Providing for the routine health care of an expanding army and creating the

support units for combat medical duty placed heavy burdens on the Medical

Department. Within 120 days after receiving mobilization orders, the Medical

Department was required to expand more than tenfold to strength of over

140,000 officers and enlisted men, and this figure did not include members of theAir

Corps and those assigned overseas. To achieve this strength, it was necessary to

strain facilities to the limit and, in some instances, to omit the luxury of formal

training and to rely on the assumption that men with suitable skills could be

channeled directly into their military occupations by induction centers. Other new

members of the Medical Department would be channeled through training

programs. 28

Officer training.—To meet requirements for officers, both for War Department overhead and for medical command, the Medical Department relied heavily

28 The Surgeon General’s Protective MobilizationPlan, 1939, with annexes.
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 17

on the Reserves. Because of prewar neglect of field training, efforts were concentrated on preparing officers for field medical service. Those officers required for

units mobilized before the 30th day of mobilization were to receive only refresher

course training in the troop schools of the unit to which they were assigned. Officers

required by units after that time were to attend 1-month refresher course at

Carlisle Barracks, and other installations, designed to prepare them for duty in

field medical units. Because officer candidate schools could be activated only with

War Department approval, and the selection of officer candidates was corps area

responsibility, no formal plans were announced. The Medical Field Service School,

however, was charged with the responsibility for preparing 3-month training program in the event of such authorization. The peakload of trainees for both of these

programs was estimated at 2,000 by the 60th day of mobilization.

Officers destined for duty outside field medical service units were to be trained

by variety of techniques. The ArmyMedical Center, charged with concentrating

available facilities on the training of enlisted specialists, made no provision for the

continuing training of incoming professional officers. General hospitals were charged

with the responsibility of training key administrative officers for general, surgical,

and evacuation hospitals. Medical supply depots were required to train officer

replacements for similar depots destined for both the Zone of Interior and theaters

of operations. Any officer not attending one of these facilities was toreceive refresher

training “in the troop schools of the units concerned. ,,

Enrollmentand classification

of nurses, dietitians, and highly trained technicians were responsibilities of the

American Red Cross, and these people were to be given only routine training.

Recruitment of nurses was responsibility of the commanders of corps areas. 29

Affiliated units.—The most serious defect of the War Department Protective

Mobilization Plan, from the viewpoint of the Medical Department, was its failure

to provide adequately for the creation of hospital professional staffs. On paper, the

Medical Department was required simply to mobilize 32 general, 17 evacuation,

and 13 surgical hospitals, in addition to the units required by corps, army, and

General Headquarters Reserve, but in practice, the creation of hospital required

more than the simple assignment of professional personnel and the allocation of

equipment according to tables of authorization. To carry out their mission, both

mobile and fixed hospitals were required to be completely integrated units, with

harmonious staff of competent physicians and surgeons who could function as

team. During World War I, the use of affiliated units, hospital staffs drawn from

single parent civilian medical institution, demonstrated its value in allowing the

Medical Department to avoid the time-consuming problem of solving the complicated equation of professional skills required by medical team. After the war, the

close relation between The Surgeon General and civilian institutions had continued,

but in 1924, as result of War Department policies requiring the decentralization

of Reserve affairs, affiliated hospitals were transferred to corps area control, and in

1928, the Medical Department lost control of personnel assignments to these organizations. Between 1928 and 1939, age and frustration with the obstacles created

29 See footnote 28, p. 16.
18 MEDICAL TRAINING

by corps area administration caused many key officers to resign or allow their commissions to lapse and many of the affiliated units disintegrated.30

The Surgeon General was convinced that the only possibility of developing

properly integrated peacetime reserve of medical units, particularly evacuation,

surgical, station, and general hospitals, suitable for mobilization under the War

Department Protective Mobilization Plan lay in the revitalization of affiliated

units. Despite the failure of that plan to specifically include such units, authority

for their utilization existed in War Department publication, MR (Mobilization

Regulations) 1-1, dated 14 August 1938, which stipulated that: “Procurement of

entire organizations, where advantageous to expedite their formation with trained

personnel or for other appropriate reasons, may be utilized for elements requiring

relatively large number of occupational specialists, as in the case of certain engineer,

signal, and medical units. When corps area commanders desire to provide such

procurement, they will request the authority of the War Department in each such

case.”

In March 1939, The Surgeon General recommended to the War Department

that selected medical institutions be invited to create or maintain affiliated

organizations. By October, after lengthy struggle over personnel policies, the War

Department authorized The Surgeon General to organize affiliated hospitals from

list of selected institutions and to appoint personnel. Planning for the organization

of affiliated units was still not completed by the end of 1939, when The Surgeon

General’s Protective Mobilization Plan was issued. At that time, activation of units

was corps area responsibility when directed by the War Department, while the

Medical Department retained control over organization and promotion. Few formal

plans were made for training after activation, because the period between activation

and utilization would be so short that performance depended heavily on the proper

prior selection personnel.31

Enlisted personnel.—Training enlisted men to perform the duties of the

Medical Department in mobilized Army presented serious problems. For practical purposes, there was no reserve pool of skilled manpower comparable to that

existing for Medical Department officers. The enlisted strength of National Guard

medical units was inadequate for the support of mobilized National Guard divisions, and the Enlisted Reserve did not exist in meaningful numbers. But enlisted

men were required for supporting duties ranging from the common specialties of

truck driving, cooking, and litter bearing, to the technical specialties of X-ray

technician, surgical technician, and dental assistant.

Under the prevailing system of War Department control, The Surgeon General

was directly responsible for the activation of named general hospitals and installations classified as exempted stations. The activation and administration of other

medical units, as well as the establishment of Medical Department Unit Training

Centers and Enlisted Replacement Training Centers, were corps area responsibilities. The Medical Department was responsible only for the technical supervision

30 Letter, The Surgeon General to The Adjutant General, 17 Mar. 1939, subject: Affiliation of Medical Department Units with Civil Institutions, and Appointmentand Promotion in Medical Corps Reserve. 31 See footnotes (3), p. 1; and 28, p. 16.
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 19

of training at these installations for the preparation and issue of training programs.

Enlisted training in the Medical Department followed lines laid down by the War

Department for the entire Army. After short period at corps reception centers,

devoted to discipline and physical conditioning, recruits were to be selected and

sent to branch replacement centers for initial training. Both Enlisted Training

Centers and Unit Training Centers for the Medical Department were to be opened

at Fort George G. Meade, Md., Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., and Fort Warren, Wyo.,

during the first 30 days of mobilization. Medical Department enlisted training was

restricted to basic subjects and military discipline, on the principle that success lay

“not in the actual technical training given the soldier, but in having suitable men

for such training properly selected from those with similar civilian vocational training.” Unit training centers, responsible for the training of nondivisional units,

and divisional units activated after the 30th day of mobilization, were to be

activated under similar controls.

Anticipating shortage of critical technical skills, plans called for the activation

of training facilities for nonprofessional enlisted specialists. Courses were to be

offered to qualify men as X-ray, medical, surgical, pharmacy, dental, sanitary, and

laboratory technicians. Installations charged with the responsibility for providing

facilities included the Medical Field Service School, the Army Medical Center, and

named general hospitals under The Surgeon General's direct control. Each installation was to be prepared to begin training on 10 days’ notice and to draft programs

of instruction to be incorporated in its own mobilization plan.

Mobilization cadres.—In addition to other requirements, the necessity of

providing cadres for newly activated units placed serious strain on the Medical

Department’s limited resources. During the first 30 days of mobilization, planners

had to rely heavily on the expedient of draining trained manpower from existing

units and installations. Three exempted installations alone—Army Medical Center,

Fitzsimons General Hospital, and Army and Navy General Hospital—were to

furnish 44 officers, 20 nurses, and 27 enlisted men during the first 30 days of mobilization. Other exempted installations and those under corps area command were to

provide corps area commanders with 2,201 officers and 829 enlisted men for cadre

duty during the same period. The following month, 1,070 officers and 1,122 enlisted

men would be required, but it was hoped that these could be selected from less experienced personnel who could receive additional training at Unit Training Centers

before being assigned to newly activated units. After this initial drainage, staff

planners expected to draw cadre from officers in training and enlisted graduates of

the replacement training centers.

The precipitous mobilization envisioned by staff planners would have severely

strained the manpower and facilities of the Medical Department. Unlike fighting

arm, which could usually count on an indefinite period after basic training and unit

training to improve its skill before being committed to combat, the Medical

Department had to care for the health of an expanding Army and simultaneously

prepare for its role in combat medical support. Peacetime experience had proved

that over 80 percent of the Medical Department’s statutory allocation of percent

of the enlisted strength of the Army was required in routine health care. But
20 MEDICAL TRAINING

mobilization plans called for the use of over 20 percent of theDepartment’s strength

for cadre duty alone, with an unspecified force required for War Department

overhead and training at special service schools. Fortunately, the precipitous

mobilization envisioned by staff planners never occurred.

Negro troops.—The use of Negro troops presented complex problem for

War Department planners. Failure to achieve racial balance in mobilization for

World War had resulted in bitter criticism, and top level planners were determined

to avoid repeating the mistake of discriminatory recruitment during the enlistment

period and the subsequent disproportionate drafting of Negroes required to restore

racial balance in later phases of mobilization. But, at the same time, fear that

public endorsement of policies favoring racial balance would result in criticism of

the disproportionately white peacetime Army led the War Department to keep its

policies secret from all but few top level planners. It was not until 1937 that new

plans for the utilization of Negro troops were incorporated into mobilization regulations, which were then in the process of revision. This step resulted in only limited

dissemination of policies because access to mobilization regulations was restricted

to few headquarters, including corps area commanders and the chiefs of the arms

and services. And even then, lag time in printing and the practice of issuing revisions in segments resulted in an unabsorbed and unfamiliar body of doctrine.

In theory, policies revealed in therevision of 1937 provided for the creation of

racially balanced, segregated Army. Negroes and whites were to be regarded as

separate, but almost equal. Negro manpower was to be incorporated into mobilization plans in ratio equal to their proportion of population of military age, and

corps areas were to provide manpower according to manpower ratios in their

respective geographical areas. Negroes and whites were to be utilized in representative proportions in both the arms and the services. Negro units could be commanded

by either Negro or white officers, preferably Negroes when qualified officers were

available. No decision was made concerning the level of commandat which separate

units would be organized.

On the eve of Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Army had failed to fully implement the

policies of 1937. Negro manpower was well below the 9-percent level regarded as

representative proportion, and Negroes were distributed unevenly within the arms

and services. Three-fifths of the entire number were almost equally divided between

infantry, engineer, and quartermaster units. In the Air Corps, Medical Department,

and Signal Corps, less than percent of all enlisted men were Negroes. 32

Within the Medical Department, plans for the utilization of Negro manpower

were limited. Citing mobilization regulations, The Surgeon General’s Protective

MobilizationPlan provided thatthe percentage of Negro manpower in installations

under his direct control would be at least equal to the percentage of Negroes in the total male population of military age. Specific provision for the mobilization of

Negroes at exempted installations was not incorporated into the plan, and openings

for Negroes in activities under corps area command, over which The Surgeon

General had only indirect control, were far below population ratios. 33

32 Lee, Ulysses: The Employment of Negro Troops. United States Army in World War II. Special Studies. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. 33 See footnote 28, p. 16.
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 21

It was not until 1940 that the Medical Department began to make plans for

utilization of its share of Negro manpower. In October 1940, Negro wards were

established at certain hospitals in the United States, and The Surgeon General

recommended the establishment of new type of unit to absorb most of the Negro

increment of enlisted personnel. In November 1940, this “sanitary company” was

authorized for the performance of unspecified general duties. At the same time, it

was clearly stated that the Medical Department would not willingly create mixed

detachments unless such policy was adopted by both the arms and the services.

Because The Surgeon General would not willingly adopt policy which forced

white soldiers to accept treatment by Negro physicians and personnel, further

decisions on the size and type of Negro units had to be postponed until the War

Department announced the size and type of Negro units the Medical Department

would be servicing. 34

The Limited Emergency

Within months after the publication of the War Department Protective

Mobilization Plan, and even before The Surgeon General was able to issue the

Medical Department’s subordinate plan, events were set in motion that began to

transform U.S. mobilization from the anticipated crash program to gradual

buildup of forces. The U.S. responses to the degeneration of world affairs in the late

1930’s had been cautious, and even after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, U.S.

response was limited. Between September 1939, whenBritain and France declared

war on Germany, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. mobilization was

carried out not as result of planning but in sporadic response to gradually

deepening world crisis. On September 1939, days after the beginning of World

War II in Europe, President Roosevelt responded with the declaration of limited

national emergency, the meaning of which was not entirely clear. In the same

proclamation, the President authorized an increase in the enlisted strength of the

Army from 210,000 to 227,000, and an increase of National Guard strength to

235,000 men. Despite the disappointment of Army planners, who had hoped for

authorization to increase the Army to its full peacetime enlisted strength of 280,000,

the emergency proclamation and the 17,000 increase in troop strength were not

without benefits. Limited emergency powers allowed the War Department to

increase the number of National Guard armory drills from 48 to 60 per year and to

increase the length of their summer camps to weeks. Immediately following the

President’s declaration, Gen. (later General of the Army) George C. Marshall,

Chief of Staff, issued orders reorganizing the Army from its three square divisions,

consisting of four regiments, to five new triangular divisions of threeregiments each.

The new divisions, together with the troop increase, allowed the creation of corps

and army headquarters to give higher commanders an opportunity to gain experience in the techniques of large-scale field operations. Late in the spring of 1940,

34 See footnote (3), p. 1.
22 MEDICAL TRAINING

some 70,000 Regular Army troops were assembled for the first corps and army

maneuvers since 1918.35

In the months following the fall of Poland, fiscal caution and the fear that

increased strength would lead to U.S. involvement in European war led Congress

to adopt noncommittal attitude toward further military expansion. It was not

until the German armies began the campaign on 10 May 1940 that by 22 June had

forced evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force and the surrender of France

that Congress was spurred to action. Within weeks of the renewal of the German

offensive, Congress surpassed Presidential recommendations in two separate bills

that brought the total authorized Army troop strength to 375,000 and increased

War Department appropriations to nearly $3 billion. Two months later, when

threatening German attitudes and the uncertain future of the French Fleet raised

the possibility that most of the Regular Army would have to be dispatched to

Latin America, leaving the Nation defended solely by raw recruits without adequate

cadre to train them. Congress again took the bit in its teeth. Despite both Executive

and General Staff restraint, Congress passed joint resolution on 27 August

authorizing the President to call the National Guard and Reserves to active duty

for year, and on 16 September, it passed the Burke-Wadsworth bill, authorizing

Selective Service for year. By two acts, Congress had, in effect, authorized the

strength of the Army to be temporarily increased to 1.4 million men. 36

Saddled with massive expansion, the Army turned its full attention to

inducting, training, equipping, quartering, and organizing its expanded forces.

During the next year, the Army managed to overcome difficulties that have since

become legend and organized ground force consisting of four armies of nine army

corps and 29 divisions, and an armored force of four divisions, including support

troops. By staggering inductions and the activation of National Guard units, the

Army was expanded sixfold during 1941. Even before expansion was completed,

however, the General Staff faced the threat of demobilization when the authorization for Selective Service and National Guard activation expired. In Congress,

more relaxed national attitude toward the war, prompted by the persistence of

British defenses and the diversion, of German offensive forces against Russia,

weakened the hand of interventionists and threatened the continuation of mobilization efforts. It was only at the last moment, and by narrow margin, that Congress,

on 12 August 1941, extended the service of men on active duty for year and voted

to continue Selective Service.37

By December 1941, when Japanese attacks ended debates over U.S. commitment, the Army was more thoroughly prepared for the outbreak of war than ever

before in its history. Troop strength projected for the third phase of the Protective

Mobilization Plan of 1939 had already been reached, and 36 divisions, with their

support troops, had been activated. Many of these units were admittedly understrength, poorly equipped, and manned by recruits with limited training. It would

36 (1) Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, July 1939 to 30

June 1941. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941. (2) See footnote 26, p. 14, (3) Weigley, Russell F.:

History of The United States Army. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967. 36 See footnotes 26, p. 14; and 35 (1) and (3). 37 See footnote 35 (3).
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 23

be many months before the Nation could do more than assume the defensive and

minimize the loss of outlying possessions but, at the same time, industry had begun

its retooling, supplies had been ordered, the machinery for induction and traininghad been established, and the cadre for expansion was being created. As inadequate

as these preparations would appear, once war had begun, mobilization was accomplished less painfully than it could have been from the troop base of 1939.

In the months preceding Pearl Harbor, the Medical Department expanded

even more rapidly than the Army as whole, sharing in common its problems and

growing pains. Between June 1939 and December 1941, Medical Department

enlisted strength grew from less than 10,000 to over 107,000, increasing proportionally from less than percent to 6.4 percent of the strength of the entire army.

Officer strength increased similarly from 6.1 percent to over 7.7 percent of the

strength of the officer corps. This more than proportional expansion, made necessary

by the requirement to create field medical units as well as administer routine

medical care, began in 1940, when Congress lifted the statutory strength limitation

of the Medical Department from to percent, and authorized the President to

make further increases in the event of hostilities. 38 By June 1941, all tactical units

attached or assigned to field forces had been activated at table-of-organization

strength, including the organic medical units below division level; 34 divisional

medical battalions, regiments, and squadrons; nine corps level medical battalions;

and seven army level medical regiments.

The activation of so many new units would have been difficult task, even had

large number of field medical units existed from which trained cadres might have

been drawn. As it was, hospitals assigned to the field forces had to be activated on

the basis of one-half enlisted and nominal officer strength. Numbered general

hospitals, for example, were activated with five officers and 250 enlisted men, when

their table of organization entitled them to 73 officers, 120 nurses, and 500 enlisted

men. These units, including 22 station hospitals, 22 general hospitals, 17 evacuation

hospitals, and eight surgical hospitals, were activated in the belief that their limited

strength would provide trained nucleus of enlisted personnel for the activation of

affiliated units if and when called to duty and to train the cadre for additional units.

Finally, number of Medical Department installations, including nine named

general hospitals (750-2,000 bed), 10 supply depots, eight corps area laboratories,

and 175 station hospitals (50-2,000 bed) were fully staffed, equipped, and placed in

operation. The strain placed on the Medical Department, even by the comparatively gradual expansion of 1940-41, stretched its facilities to the limit and pointed

up the need for having medical facilities available before mobilization began. 39

Training the Expanding Army, 1939-41

With the passage of time, the problems of training the Army created between

1939 and 1941 have become legendary. Ideally, an army should be built from the

38 See footnote (3), p. 1. 39 (1) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1941. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office,

1941. (2) Wakeman, F. B.: Medical Department Training. Army M. Bull. 57: 46—49, July 1941.
24 MEDICAL TRAINING

bottom up, beginning with the conditioning and training of the basic soldier, and

progressing through unit tactics from the lowest to the highest level of field organization, in order to weld individuals into seasoned, efficient combat teams and to

develop the command leadership and staff techniques necessary for managing large

units on the battlefield. With the activation of the National Guard and the passage

of Selective Service legislation, manpower became immediately available. But the

timelag required between appropriations and the procurement of equipment and

facilities, in combination with the drainage of critical material through lend-lease,

forced the implementation of less than ideal training procedures.

During the year between the President’s declaration of limited emergency and

passage of the Selective Training and Service Act, training programs centered on

integrating the additional troops authorized in 1939 into the Army’s new triangular

divisions and field testing these divisions in large-scale maneuvers. During September and October, armory drills for the National Guard were increased by 12, and

additional days of summer field training were authorized. Five complete Regular

Army divisions and one cavalry division were assembled for intensive field training,

and corps area commanders were ordered to assemble their nondivisional troops for

similar training. In January 1940, the 3d Division, assembled at Fort Lewis, Wash.,

participated in amphibious exercises near Monterey, Calif. In April 1940, weeks

of corps maneuvers were heldat Fort Benning, Ga. During the same period, division

and corps troops maneuvered in eastern Texas, followed by weeks of corps against

corps maneuvers in the Sabine River area of Louisiana. The spring maneuvers of

1940 focused attention on the training weaknesses of the Army: lack of equipment,

poor minor tactics, lack of basic leadership in many units, and some inept command

leadership by senior officers. Such weaknesses could be corrected only by the tedious

process of basic, small unit training. Maneuvers reinforced the idea that training

must begin at the bottom and provide uniformand standardizedinstruction focused

on the fundamentals of soldiering. 40

Little could be done to correct deficiencies without additional appropriations.

Shortages of equipment and facilities were aggravated by the sudden decision to

federalize the National Guard and to inaugurate Selective Service. The original

request for National Guard federalization had been made in May, not only to gain

control of its manpower and equipment, but also to utilize summer camps while

preparing winter quarters. The prolonged debate that followed consumed most of

the summer, and resulted in theactivation of the National Guard, Selective Service,

and the prospect of having to give basic training to large number of raw recruits.

In contrast to World War I, in which newly activated units were given basic training

and shipped overseas, the Army now faced the unanticipated problem of housing its

expanded troop strength for protracted period, and providing large unit training

areas. Supply bottlenecks and the onset of winter forced planners to place the rate

of induction and activation below planned schedules and to pursue less than ideal

training programs.

Until replacement training centers could be completed, selectees were assigned

40 See footnote 26, p. 14; 27 (2), p. 15; and 35 (1) and (3), p. 22.
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 25

directly to Regular Army and National Guard units, where basic training and advanced unit training were conducted concurrently. Although the replacement

training center program was initiated immediately and 21 centers opened as rapidly

as construction could be completed, the majority did not begin operating until

March and April 1941 and did not reach maximum capacity until June. In the

meantime, an annual training cycle was prescribed that divided the year into three

4-month periods: The first devoted to individualand small unit training; the second,

to progressive combined arms training; and the third, to corps and army training.

After replacement training facilities became available, selectees and recruits were

subjected to basic training in their arm or service for period of 13 weeks before

being assigned to their units. The unit training centers called for in the Protective

Mobilization Plan were never activated. When Pearl Harbor thrust new demands on

the Army, the machinery for enlisted training was functioning. Tests conducted

during the fall maneuvers in 1941 did not produce entirely satisfactory results, but

the performance of units was well above that demonstrated in the spring of 1940.

Service schools.—During the initial phases of mobilization, service schools

followed the policies laid down in the Protective Mobilization Plan and mobilization regulations. The Army War College and the Army Industrial College suspended operations in June 1940, and the Command and General Staff School shifted

to short course program in November 1940. Special service schools discontinued

peacetime courses in June 1940, and initiated short courses designed to give refresher and specialist training to those Reserve and National Guard officers who

could be spared to attend. In most instances, refresher courses were designed not

only to provide basic instruction for company grade officers but also to teach them

in such manner that they would become capable instructors.

Because the pool of National Guard and Reserve officers was adequate for the

mobilization of an army of 1.4 million, the officer candidate program was postponed

through the 1940 phase of mobilization. Opposition to activating the officer candidate program was based on the fear that it would create surplus of officers who

would become personnel problem for the Army. After General Marshall became

convinced that the opportunity to earn commission would improve the morale of

selectees, the officer candidate program was activated on limited basis in July

1941. By the end of the year, officer candidate schools had graduated only 1,389

officers. Mass training was delayed until after Pearl Harbor. Had the program beer

delayed much longer, the time consumed in establishing programs and facilities

might have produced critical shortage of officers.

Doctrinal publications and training aids.—Among the lessons learned

from mass mobilization for World War had been the need for training literature.

Following the war, both the General Staff and the Army War College conducted

extensive studies on its preparation and use. By 1930, four types of War Department training publications were being issued—training regulations, technical

regulations, training manuals, and field manuals. In practice, field manuals were

most frequently used in military instruction. During the 1930’s, the volume of

training literature was expanded by the publication of new manuals and regulations designed to explain the use of new weapons and organizations. Finally, in
26 MEDICAL TRAINING

1938, the existing training literature was simplified by eliminating training regulations and replacing them with revised and expanded field manuals. Such revision

became necessary, in any event, when the far-reaching organizational changes of

1939-40 and the new weapons and materiel being furnished under the rearmament

program made nearly all field manuals obsolete. Revision of the old manuals was

well underway by the end of 1941, but for most of the emergency period, training

facilities had to either depend on obsolete manuals or create their own materials.

Responsibility for the revision of training literature was not vested in single

agency but was distributed among the service schools and special boards. Directives

for the revision of field manuals made it clear that simplicity was as important an

objective as bringing the material up to date; lecture-style writing, duplication, and

complexity were to be eliminated at all costs. Most of the actual writing was done

by the faculties of the Command and General Staff School and the service schools,

in thebelief that people who were experienced in teaching and instructional methods

would be able to write better training manuals than specialists in given subject.

Despite dissatisfaction at the slowness of the work, and the difficulty of coordinating

the work of different service schools to avoid duplication and contradiction, the

policy of decentralized preparation continued throughout the war.

Supplementingwritten manuals and doctrinal publications were wide variety

of training aids. After World War I, Army service schools had developed an

increasing number of devices, including charts, films, filmstrips, tables, mockups,

and models, and other aids to add depth to ideas created by written and spoken

words. Instructors in service schools had come to depend heavily on such devices,

but with manuals, they were often not readily available in the early stages of

expansion. When funds became available in increasing amounts after 1940, the

training aids program was expanded, and by the middle of the war, maps, films, and

filmstrips were available in ever increasing quantities. Eventually, the resources and

experience of the motion picture industry were harnessed to the production of

training aids. Throughout the war, however, many of the auxiliary tools of training

were produced by small units, either for special purposes or because of individual

inspiration on the part of unit commander, in training aids shops that were

established down at least as far as the regimental level.

Before 1940, training schedules did not conform to any rigid pattern. Small

units at company leveland above usually prepared master schedule for the entire

year that included mandatory training subjects, but the sequence and hours allotted

to them were left to the discretion of the unit commander and were subject to the

availability of time and facilities. The Protective Mobilization Plan, however,

included in its subsidiary plans provision for mobilization training programs,

which prescribed time allotments for training subjects in desired sequence. The

mobilization training programs, which were issued for each arm and service late in

1940, were rigid training schedules, allowing only such changes as were made

necessary by local conditions. Experiences of the war were reflected by successive

changes of the mobilization training programs and by changes in the length of the

training period. The overall length of the replacement training program, for instance,

varied from 13 weeks to 17, to 8, to 14, back to 13, and again to 17, usually to meet
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 27

heavy demand for replacements in theaters of operations. The mobilization training programs standardized training and were useful to inexperienced officers.

At times, however, they were not flexible enough to allow experienced officers to take advantage of their ingenuity and professional skill.

As teaching programs, mobilization training programs were in turn supplemented by subject schedules, which were, in effect, syllabus for subjects specified

in mobilization training programs. Prepared by thebranch schools, these schedules

consisted of an outline of the subject, instructions on how it was to be taught, and

lists of required training aids and equipment necessary or desirable for particular

lesson. Training programs were also supplemented by variety of devices by which

higher commanders could influence the conduct of training. War Department

training circulars were used to institute changes in training manuals until given

manual could be revised, and similar directives were published by subordinate

commands. Many of these communications established broad training policies,

emphasized current deficiencies, and prescribed special training. In sum, body of

regulations was created that not only outlined the training to be given but also

specified its conduct and content.

Although mobilization made on-the-job training impractical, the Army

continued to emphasize “learning by doing” in its training programs, disguised by

the cumbersome phrase “applicatory training.” In practice, methods of instruction

emphasized five basic principles: preparation, explanation, demonstration, application, and examination. The technique was efficient for mass transmission of limited

body of knowledge but was often limited by the availability of equipment and

training aids, particularly in the early stages of mobilization. To overcome this

handicap, training centers frequently had to pool resources and utilize training

committees composed of officers and noncommissioned officers specially trained for

some phase of instruction. Testing, at all stages of instruction, was used to measure

the effects of training.

The Administration of Training

Until the fall of France, the Army within the continental United States was

administeredthrough nine geographic divisions known as corps areas. Commanders

of corps areas not only controlled the “housekeeping” functions of the Army in the

Zone of Interior but also were responsible for the training programs of the arms and

services, except for those activities directly under branch control. In theory,

framework of four army areas was superimposed on this structure, which, in case

of hostilities, would become responsible for tactical training and operations. In the

event of mobilization, plans called for the activation of General Headquarters to

command the field forces in army areas.

The headquarters envisioned by Army planners was created and injected into

the Army command structure on 26 July 1940. When activated, General Headquarters consisted of Chief of Staff and small groupof officers selected to perform

its initial function—the supervision and training of tactical ground forces in the

continental United States. On August 1940, Brig. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Lesley J.
28 MEDICAL TRAINING

McNair was appointed to command General Headquarters. second step toward

wartime organization was taken in October 1940, when command of the four field

armies was separated from that of the corps areas.

In theory, responsibility for the several phases of training was clearly delineated

in the General Headquarters concept. Commanders of corps areas and the chiefs of

the arms and services continued to exercise their preemergency control of the basic

training of personnel in their spheres of responsibility and in the newly activated

replacement training centers. General Headquarters was designed to take over

when these commanders had completed their responsibility and to train the units

filled by graduates of replacement training centers. In garrison, troops remained

under the jurisdiction of corps area and post command, but in the field, command

and support became the responsibility of General Headquarters. Ideally, the

system should have created four independent field armies capable of prompt and

effective tactical movement, but in practice, the ideal was never achieved. Army

commanders were never fully liberated from the responsibility for post command,

the delegation of training responsibility remained incomplete, and General Headquarters remained subject to War Department General Staff, G-4, in matters of

supply. Until March 1941, when replacement training centers began to function,

newly activated units of the forces under General Headquarters command were

filled with selectees directly from civilian life. Much of General Headquarters energy

was consumed in training raw recruits, tactics, discipline, and the use of weapons,

instead of the advanced unit training for which it was intended.

The duties of General Headquarters were, for the most part, of general

nature. Seven officers were assigned to General Headquarters in August 1940, and

as late as June 1941, as few as 23 were on its staff. General McNair’s energy and

ability enabled him to translate the Chief of Staff’s strong views on the necessity

of step-by-step training into action, as well as the traditional Army view that

training should begin from the ground up. But aside from these accomplishments,

General Headquarters ambiguous position and limited strength made it difficulty

to function as intended. When the addition of command and planning responsibilities in the summer of 1941 brought it into conflict with the War Plans Division,

the War Department began to consider reorganization.41

The Reorganization of March 1942

The Army reorganization of March 1942, which served as the basis for Zone of

Interior administration throughout the war, was the product of conflicts produced

by overlapping responsibilities under the existing War Department structure and

the increasing administrative burden on the Chief of Staff created by Army expansion. After lengthy period of study, reorganization was effected by Executive order

on March 1942.42

41 (1) Greenfield, Kent Roberts, Palmer, Robert R., and Wiley, Bell I.: The Organization of Ground Combat

Troops. United States Army in World War II. The Army Ground Forces. Washington: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1947. (2) Millett, John D.: The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces. United States Army in

World War II. The Army Service Forces. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1964. 42 See footnote 41 (2).
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 29

Under the new organization, only limited number of officers had direct access

to the Chief of Staff, including the General Staff and the three chiefs of Zone of

Interior administrative agencies. The General Staff was to be composed of small

group of officers who would assist the Chief of Staff in strategic planning and

coordinate the activities of theater commanders with Zone of Interior agencies.

Zone of Interior administration would be accomplished through three commands

reporting directly to the Chief of Staff: Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and

Army Service Forces. The new air command had its own general and administrative

staffs and theresponsibility for training and equipping air units both for independent

operations and for combined exercises. Army Ground Forces became responsible for

organizing and training ground combat troops previously controlled by General

Headquarters and absorbed most of the functions controlled by the previously

semiautonomous chiefs of the combat arms. Army Service Forces was charged with

relieving the fighting arms of the problems of supply, procurement, and housekeeping administration. Because the Chief of Staff was determined that no more than

three commands in the United States would report to him, Army Service Forces

assumed all responsibilities which did not fit into the structure of Army Air Forces

and Army Ground Forces, including the technical services. The Medical Depart

ment, as one of the technical services, now reported directly to the Commanding

General, Army Service Forces, instead of to the Chief of Staff. 43

In addition to its mission of supply and procurement, Army Service Forces was

charged with routine administrative and housekeeping duties, including certain

Armywide functions, such as “premilitary training, manpower mobilization, and

labor relations; operation of reception centers, replacement training centers, and

training schools for the supply arms and services; technicaltraining of individuals,

basic training of service troops, and technical training of service units; and the

furnishing of ASF personnel to the Army Air and Ground Forces, theaters of

operations, and overseas forces .”44 To carry out this mission, Army

Service Forces was given control of those installations responsible for administrative

and housekeeping duties, including the corps areas, and many installations which

had previously been under the control of the chiefs of the arms and services. To

emphasize this change, the title of the corps areas was changed to Service Commands, Army Service Forces. To facilitate administrations, all Army field installations in the Zone of Interior were placed under four categories of control. Those

under the direct control of Army Service Forces, including supply and training

facilities, and all named general hospitals, except the Army Medical Center, were

categorized as class installations and placed under the commanding generals of

service commands. Class II installations were those where Army Ground Forces

units were stationed, and Army Service Forces dutieswere confined to housekeeping

and administration. Class III installations were those similarly occupied by Army

Air Forces units. Class IV installations were those that, because of their technical

nature, remained under the direct command of supply or administrative service.

43 Initially called SOS (Services of Supply), the name of the command was changed to ASF (Army Service Forces)

by War Department General Orders No. 14, 12 Mar. 1943. It is best known by this designation, which will be used

hereafter.

44 See footnote 41 (2), p. 28.
30 MEDICAL TRAINING

In this redistribution of authority, The Surgeon General not only lost direct control

of most of the Medical Department’s exempted installations but also lost great

deal of control over the activities of the Air Surgeon and the medical service he

commanded.45

The reorganization of 1942 placed capstone on the structure of command and

control which had gradually been evolving since the introduction of the General

Staff system. Throughout the interwar period, as part of the special staff, the chiefs

of the technical services had acted as technical advisers to War Department General

Staff, G-3, in matters of troop training. Well before 1939, The Surgeon General had

become established as the final source of technical doctrine for the training of medical troops, and the War Department had charged the Surgeon General’s Office with

the responsibility for developing programs for the individual and unit training of

all medical troops, as well as preparing Medical Department training materials for

publication. The Surgeon General continued to be the ultimate source of training

doctrine and official War Department training guides and materials for all medical

soldiers throughout the war. The War Department reorganization of March 1942,

which reduced the staff level of the chiefs of technical services and placed them

under the Commanding General of Army Service Forces, modified only administratively The Surgeon General’s responsibility for the formulation of Medical Department training doctrine, program guides, and instructional materials. Before the

reorganization, The Surgeon General discharged this responsibility as an agent of

the War Department; after the reorganization, he discharged it as an agent of the

Commanding General, Army Service Forces. 46

In contrast with the control of technical doctrine, The Surgeon General’s

command relationship to the staffs of installations training medical troops was

seriously modifiedby the reorganization of 1942. During the interwar period and the

first years of the emergency, direct command of thefacilities and staff for training

medical troops was divided between corps area commanders and The Surgeon

General. Corps area commanders had immediate jurisdiction over the training of

medical soldiers at all posts, camps, and stations that were not reserved for The

Surgeon General by War Department directive. At the beginning of the limited

emergency, the exempted stations consisted of the Medical Field Service School;

Army Medical Center, including Walter Reed General Hospital; the other four

named general hospitals; and medical supply depots.47 Commanding officers of

exempt installations were directly responsible to The Surgeon General for all

administrative and supervisory activities affecting training. They were responsible

to corps area commanders in matters of supply, communication, courts-martial, and

the discipline and military bearing of their troops. Because all service school courses

were conducted at either the Medical Field Service School or the Army Medical

Center, The Surgeon General had direct control over all such courses. Control of the

basic training of recruits was shared by The Surgeon General and the commanders

of corps areas; recruits at exempted stations were trained by their commanders, and

46 See footnote (2), p. 5.

46 Army Regulations No. 170-10, 10 Aug. 1942. 47 Army Regulations No. 170-10, 10 Oct. 1939.
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 31

497-333 75 -4

others were trained under corps area jurisdiction. As the Army expanded to meet

emergency and wartime needs, facilities for training medical troops were dramatically expanded. Changes in the command authority over Medical Department

training facilities were so frequent and diverse that they must be reviewed by

category to be meaningful.

Control of basic training.—In the interwar years, the initial training of

Medical Department recruit was usually accomplished on-the-job at the dispensary

or hospital to which he was assigned. Compared with basic training during the war,

little emphasis was placed on drill and field training. When Selective Service began

to bring large numbers of new men into the Medical Department, recruits were sent

from reception centers either to Medical Department field units, which were activated in increasing numbers after July 1940, or to the Medical Replacement

Training Centers, which began being activated in February 1941.48

The Surgeon General’s relationship to the Medical Replacement Training

Centers had checkered history. The first centers, established at Camp Lee and

Camp Grant in January 1941 and at Camp Barkeley in November 1941, were corps

area installations, 49 even though plans for the centers were developed in the Office

of The Surgeon General. In December 1941, these centers were designated exempt

stations and placed under command of The Surgeon General. 50 Camp Joseph T.

Robinson, Ark., established in January 1942, operated under different command

relationship to The Surgeon Generalfor period of months, being placed under the

control of the Chief of Infantry for administration and The Surgeon General for

training. 51

The War Department reorganization of March 1942 made no immediate

change in The Surgeon General’s relationship to the Medical Replacement Training

Centers at Camps Lee, Grant, and Barkeley, which were exempted stations, but the

center at Camp Robinson became an installationof the newly created Army Ground

Forces when that command absorbed the functions of the Chief of Infantry. In July

1942, the Surgeon General’s Office requested that the center at Camp Robinson be

placed on exempted status to eliminate the “long and circuitous procedure of

securing concurrences before ordering personnel in and out of this center.”52 The

request was not approved, and Camp Robinson remained under the administrative

control of Army Ground Forces until August 1942, when it became class

installation of Army Service Forces. 53 Meanwhile, in June, the Medical Replacement

48 See footnote 5, p. 3. 48 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, Second thru Ninth Corps Areas; Commanding

General, GHQ, Air Force; Commanding Officer, Edgewood Arsenal, Md.; and CommandingOfficer, Aberdeen Proving

Grounds, Md., 13 Jan. 1941, subject: Replacement Centers. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, Seventh and Eighth Corps Areas; Chief Signal Officer; The Surgeon General; and Chief of Infantry, 23 Oct. 1941,

subject: Activation of Replacement Training Centers. 50 (1) Telegram, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, Medical Replacement Training Centers, Camp

Grant, 111., Camp Lee, Va., and Camp Barkeley, Tex., 20 Dec. 1941. (2) See footnote (2), p. 5.

61 Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas, Infantry Replacement Training Centers; Chief of Infantry; and The Surgeon General, Jan. 1942, subject: Constitution

and Activation of Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark. 52 Memorandum,The Surgeon Generalfor Director of Training, Services of Supply, July 1942, subject: Exempted

Status Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark. 53 Memorandum No. W170-1-42, The Adjutant General, 22 Aug. 1942, subject: Status of the Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark.
32 MEDICAL TRAINING

Training Center at Camp Lee was transferred to Camp Pickett, 54 and, in August,

the exempted stations also became class installations under the newly created

service commands of Army Service Forces. 55

By this reorganization, the Medical Department lost direct command of the

Medical Replacement Training Centers and was required to exert its influence

through channels. Throughout the war, the formulation of doctrine remained

prerogative of The Surgeon General, along with the authority to draft training

programs. Doctrine and training programs could be forwarded to the Medical

Replacement Training Centers directly through the Commanding General, Army

Service Forces, who retained direct control over these areas. The selection, assignment, and relief of staff and faculty personnel were similarly retained by the

headquarters of Army Service Forces, and in December 1942, regulations were

loosened to allow direct communication between the chiefs of technical services and

training activities in matters of program, doctrine, and staff assignments. With the

exception of the responsibility for faculty and staff assignment, which was transferred to service command jurisdiction in April 1943, these policies remained in

effect until after the end of the war. 56

Control of units in training.—At the beginning of the limited emergency,

only five medicalfield organizations were in existence. Of these, only the 1stMedical

Regiment was under the direct command of The Surgeon General, and that because it was assigned to the Medical Field Service School as demonstration unit.

The other four units were responsible to the commanders of corps areas. Activation

of new medical field units did not get underway until the middle of 1940, following

the callup of National Guard units and the inauguration of Selective Service. Because these units were attached or assigned to corps, armies, and divisions for

training, they came under the control of General Headquarters. The exceptions to

this procedure were few numbered general hospitals activated at full strength.

Until the reorganization of 1942, The Surgeon General, as member of the War

Department Special Staff, was as responsible for the training of medical battalion or an evacuation hospital, which would later have been classified as an Army

Ground Forces-type unit, as he was with those later classified as Army Service

Forces-type units, such as numbered general or station hospitals. The Surgeon

General was frequently called upon for guidance by the commanders of both field

and support units, and his representatives inspected both types of units.57

The War Department reorganization of March 1942 radically modified this

supervision by placing certain types of medical units under Army Ground Forces,

others under Army Air Forces, and still others under Army Service Forces for

training. 58 Control was complicated by The Surgeon General’s new status, as far as

64 Radiogram, Commanding General, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Pickett, Va., to The Surgeon

General, 21 June 1942.

55 See footnote 46, p. 30.

66 Army Regulations No. 170-10, 24 Dec. 1942. 67 (1) See footnotes (2), p. 6; and 39 (1), p. 23. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals of

all Armies, Army Corps, Divisions, Corps Areas, and Departments; Commanding General, GHQ Air Force; Chief of

Staff, GHQ; Chiefs of Arms and Services; Chief of the Armored Force; and Commanding Officers of ExemptedStations,

14 Jan. 1941, subject: Organization, Training and Administration of Medical Units. 68 War Department Circular No. 59, Mar. 1942.
PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II 33

unit training was concerned, as an agent of the CommandingGeneral, Army Service

Forces, and the elevation of the Ground Surgeon and the Air Surgeon to the same

level of organizational hierarchy. Under the new system, the Office of The Surgeon

General retained as much influence over those units assigned to the Army Service Forces as it had in peacetime when these units were controlled through the War

Department or General Headquarters and corps area commanders, but its relationship to the training of medical units assigned to Army Ground Forces or Army Air

Forces became more remote. While The Surgeon General still formulated training

doctrine and official instructional materials for all medical units, he no longer

inspected units assigned to Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces. The War

Department reorganization of 1942 thus reduced the staff level on which The

Surgeon General functioned as training agent, and, in so doing, removed from his

control large numbers of medical troops during their unit’s training period.

The division of control of unit training among the three major commands did

not seriously affect The Surgeon General’s control of the basic training of medical

troops. Recruits and selectees assigned directly to Medical Department field units

between September 1940 and mid-1941, before the opening of replacement training

centers, received all the basic training they were likely toreceive before thereorganization. Their training was responsibility of either exempted units under direct

command of The Surgeon General or field units under corps area command and

General Headquarters. Although the Medical Replacement Training Center at

Camp Robinson was under the control of Army Ground Forces for short period,

it too was placed under Army Service Forces for the duration of the war in August

1942. Except for those men assigned directly to units in the initial stages of mobilization, all enlisted members of the Medical Department received basic training from

training camps administered as class installations of Army Service Forces, whether

they were ultimately destined for assignment to Army Service Forces or Army

Ground Forces. 59

Command of schools.—On July 1939, only two Medical Department installations provided academic training: the Medical Field Service School, and the

Medical Department Professional Service Schools, including the Medical, Dental,

and Veterinary Schools at the Army Medical Center. In the course of the war, the

number of schools was expanded heavily to meet requirements for technically

trained personnel. Throughout the war, Medical Field Service Schools and the

three professional service schools at the Army Medical Center remained under the

direct command of The Surgeon General. Mobilization plans called for the establishment of enlisted training schools at exempted installations, which would have

remained under direct control, and all but two of the 13 schools established between

April 1941 and July 1942 were, at their inception, directly administered by the

Medical Department. The exceptions were the Enlisted Technician’s School at

Station Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and the Army School of Roentgenology

at the University of Tennessee College of Medicine, Memphis, Tenn., neither of

which was located at an exempted station. In July 1942, the newly created service

commands, which superseded the older corps area commands under the Army

69 Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1943.
34 MEDICAL TRAINING

Service Forces, absorbed most of the Medical Department’s exempted stations and removed all but the Medical Field Service School and the Army Medical

Center from The Surgeon General’s direct control. Following the reorganization,

the Office of The Surgeon General continued to exercise direct control over training programs and doctrine but was unable to exercise jurisdiction over personnel

and administration at schools falling under the authority of the service commands.

Activities of the Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General

Within the Office of The Surgeon General, administrative authority over The

Surgeon General’s training responsibilities was delegated to the Training Division,

which developed all Medical Department training programs; supervised the

preparation of technical manuals, training films, and othertraining aids; formulated plans for Medical Department replacement centers and schools; supervised the

activation of training installations; and inspected schools, units, and training centers

for which The Surgeon General had supervisory responsibility. On July 1939, the

Training Division was actually subdivision of the Planning and Training Division,

staffed by one officer, as it had been since its creation in 1921. In spite of an increasing workload, growth of the subdivision was slow. It was not until January 1940

that the staff was increased to two officers, and when the United States entered

World War II, the subdivision was staffed by only three officers. In February 1942, the Training Subdivision achieved division status, but there was no change in

personnel until June 1942, when its staff was increased to five officers.

In August 1942, the Training Division was reorganized to parallel the structure

of the Army Service Forces Training Division. Originally it had consisted of an

Enlisted Branch, an Officer Branch, and Publication Branch. Thereafter, it

contained Replacement Training Branch, School Branch, Training Doctrine

Branch, and Unit Training Branch. The Replacement Training Branch and the

School Branch prepared plans for the inauguration of Medical Replacement

Training Centers and Medical Department schools, recommended overhead

personnel allotments and changes in the staff, wrote appropriate mobilization

training programs, and inspected the installations involved. The Unit Training

Branch was created to prepare programs for Medical Department communications

zone installations, which were an Army Service Forces responsibility, and, in

addition, recommended officer personnel for these units and evaluated their

proficiency. The Training Doctrine Branch supervised the preparation of technical

manuals, field manuals, training films, filmstrips, posters, and graphic training aids.

In May 1944, theReplacement Training Branch and the Unit Training Branch were

renamed the Regular Training Branch and the Readiness and Requirements

Branch to conform with terminology used in the Office of the Director of Military

Training, Army Service Forces, but the changes were in name only. The basic

structure created by thereorganization of August 1942remained in effect throughout

the war. 60

60 (1) See footnote (2), p. 5. (2) Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon

General, fiscal year 1944.
CHAPTER II

Medical, Dental, Veterinary, and Sanitary Corps

Officers

World War II did not produce radical changes in the pattern of training

Medical, Dental, Veterinary, and Sanitary Corps officers. Expanding activities

increased specialization and division of labor and intensified the specialization of

training. Programs were divided into components that could be expanded into

separate courses; other courses were shortened, and the pace of training was

accelerated. New courses were added to provide officers with skills that had been

traditionally acquired through informal training. Medical specialists required for the

treatment of wounds and diseases uncommon in peacetime medical practice also

required special training. When the increasing demand for physicians resulted in

transfer of nontechnical duties to MAC (Medical Administrative Corps) officers,

some areas of training were deleted from the program. Training facilities were

expanded from the Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and the

Army Aledical Center, Washington, D.C., to include general hospitals, medical

depots, civilian institutions, replacement training centers, and officer replacement

pools. Despite these changes, however, the division of training into tactical and

technical programs continued throughout the war; the addition of new facilities and

courses reflected the Medical Department’s expansion, and not change in direction.

PERIOD OF FLUX: 1939-41

Continuing the Peacetime Program: September 1939-September 1940

Regular Army training

Aside from increasing emphasis on field medical service, the first year of the

war in Europe produced few substantive changes in Medical Department training.

The expansion of the Army that accompanied the limited emergency proclamation,

and the conversion to triangular divisions that followed, allowed the Medical

Department to organize field medical detachments for four divisions, four medical

battalions, and an additional medical regiment. Activation of these units during the

winter of 1939-40was complicated both by the preponderance of recruits and by the

relative inexperience of many of the officers who had been detached from hospitals

to command them. At best, their performance in the spring maneuvers of 1940 was

described as ‘'creditable,” and led to the observation: “The inexperience in all

echelons of command in the use of these units showed the necessity of having in
36 MEDICAL TRAINING

being all of the tactical medical elements of mobile forces in order that all may be

trained in respective responsibilities and cooperative action.”

To provide basic field training for newly commissioned officers, and to complete

the basic training of Regular Army officers who had not yet attended the Medical

Field Service School, the Officers’ Basic Course was shortened from to months,

and offered twice annually. The change permitted modest expansion: in contrast

to the largest class in the preceding years, 81 officers who graduated in 1935,

111 student-officers completed the basic course in 1940.

An unusual opportunity to experiment with basic officer training developed in

1940, when the War Department directed the MFSS (Medical Field Service School)

students to participate in the spring corps and army maneuvers. To prepare the

basic officers’ class for maneuvers, Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Charles B. Spruit, MC,

recommended altering the course schedule to concentrate formal instruction in the

month preceding maneuvers. “I am firmly convinced that the experience these

officers would obtain by actual participation in the greatest peacetime

maneuver the Army has ever had, will be of far greater value to the service and to

them than the solution of any number of map problems or participation in the field

exercises at Indiantown Gap.”

After an initial period of instruction at Carlisle Barracks, students from the

Medical Field Service School participated in both corps and army exercises. During

the corps phase, at Fort Bcnning, Ga., half of the students were assigned to medical

battalions, and half to regimental medical detachments. To give students greater

understanding in all echelons of support, assignments were reversed during the army

phase of maneuvers, which were held in the Sabine River area of Louisiana. Eight

members of the faculty, assigned as special medical observers and control officers,

accompanied the class. Although reports on the performance of MFSS studentswere

enthusiastic, particularly when contrasted to that of medical unit officers who had

received no formal training, the maneuvers produced conflicting recommendations

for future training. The Surgeon General supported Colonel Spruit’s opinion that

“the sending of these two classes to the Army maneuver was justified.” The

Medical Field Service School, however, took the position that, despite the value of

the maneuvers, the time could have been better spent in independent medical

exercises at Indiantown Gap, Pa., within reasonable distance of Carlisle Barracks.

Five weeks had been too short to prepare students for field exercises, and the time

Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1940. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1941.

(1) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935.

(2) See footnote 1.

Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 25 Mar. 1940, subject:

Courses of Instruction at Special Service Schools, 1940—41.

Memorandum, Lt. Col. Charles B. Spruit, MC, Chief, Training Subdivision, Planning and Training Division,

Office of The Surgeon General, for Col. Albert G. Love, MC, Chief, Planning and Training Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, Jan. 1940, subject: Training at Carlisle as Affected by ComingCourse and Army Maneuvers in the

South.

(1) Letter, Lt. Col. Charles B. Spruit, MC, Chief, Training Subdivision,Planning and Training Division, Office

of The Surgeon General, to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 14 June 1940, subject: Third U.S. Army Maneuvers,

Army Phase. (2) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1941. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting

Office, 1941.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 37

spent on maneuvers was disproportionate. The school prevailed, and future

maneuvers were confined to facilities adjacent to Carlisle Barracks.

Aside from these experiments with basic field training, few other changes were

introduced into the training program for Regular Army officers. The basic graduate

courses at theArmy Medical Center were shortenedby month, but the number of

students remained constant. The advanced course at the Medical Field Service

School was lengthened by monthto provide special instruction in training methods for senior officers. In December 1939, advanced graduate courses at the Army

Medical Center, scheduled to begin in February 1940, were canceled because officers could not be spared to attend them. Revision of the MFSS extension courses,

instituted in 1939 as 4-year plan to concentrate efforts on preparing young

Reserve and National Guard officers for service in-grade, eliminated the special

extension course for Regular Army officers preparing for promotion to lieutenant

colonel or colonel. More elementary courses were still open to them, but only eight

Regular Army officers enrolled.

National Guard and Reserve officers The first year of thelimited emergency produced as few changes in the training

of Reserve and National Guard officers as it had in the Regular Army program.

Until both elements were called to active duty in the fall of 1940, summer training

camps and correspondence courses continued to provide the bulk of their training.

In common with the Regular Army, Reserve components were trained with an

increasing emphasis on field medical service. In addition to the usual basic- and

unit-training camps held at the Medical Field Service School in the summer of 1939,

summer camp training in field sanitation was conducted for 79 officers at newly

constructed demonstration areas at Jefferson Barracks, Mo.; Camp Bullis, Tex.;

and Fort Ord, Calif. Previously, sanitary demonstration areas were available only

at Carlisle Barracks. To school National Guard units in theproblems of cold weather

operations, supplemental field training was required between October 1939 and

January 1940. Basic- and unit-training camps were again held in the summer of

1940. Field training was supplemented as usual by extension courses, which were

still in the process of being revised, and more than 11,000 officers of the Reserve and

National Guard enrolled in them between June 1939 and June 1940. During the

same period, one National Guard officer enrolled in the Army Veterinary School

course in forage inspection.

The program of extension courses for field grade officers, dropped from the

Regular Army program, continued to be available to senior officers in Reserve

components. The usual fall advanced course, offered between 15 September and 28

October 1939, was attended by 25 officers. The following May, 14officers in special

course for National Guard officers were unexpectedly given the opportunity to

participate in the Third U.S. Army maneuvers in Louisiana, where they were able

to gain practical experience as officers in various echelons of medical support.

Technical Report of Activities of the Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., fiscal year 1940.

Letter, Col. James E. Baylis, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General,

War Department, 27 Nov. 1939, subject: Advanced Course, Medical Department Professional Service Schools, School

Year 1939-40.
38 MEDICAL TRAINING

Schools outside the Medical Department

Between September 1939 and September 1940, two Medical Corps officers of

the Regular Army attended the Army War College, Washington, D.C.; one attended

The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.; three attended the Army Industrial

College, Washington, D.C.; and four attended the Command and General Staff

School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. One VC (Veterinary Corps) officer, Regular

Army, attended the Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, Md. The number

of Regular Army MC (Medical Corps) officers attending the School of Aviation

Medicine, Randolph Field, Tex., increased from 10 to 17, reflecting the emphasis at

the beginning of the limited emergency on expanding the Air Corps. Eight MC

Reserve officers also completed this course, and an additional 51 qualified for

entrance by completing required extension course. Twenty-eight Regular Army

officers attended variety of courses at 15 universities and foundations, and the

Reserve officers continued to attend civilian institutions under the Skinner Plan.

Growth and Transition: September 1940-September 1941

Activation of the Army’s Reserve and National Guard components, and passage of the Selective Training and Service Act, accelerated training in the Medical

Department as well as throughout the Army. Between September 1940 and the end

of the summer of 1941, when the tours of men called to active duty were extended

for an additional year, attention focused on providing maximumtraining within the

additional year. Because high proportion of Medical Department officers called to

active duty had previous training, distinctions between programs for Regular Army,

Reserve, and National Guard officers were eliminated, and schools concentrated on

refresher training designed to prepare them for special duties in the Army of the

United States. Existing special service schools were expanded, and new schools were

opened to provide specialized training. Officers completing resident courses of

instruction in the special service schools of the Medical Department and Medical

Corps officers completing courses of instruction at service schools other than

Medical Department schools for fiscal year 1941 are shown in the tabulation which

follows:

Schools Number

Special schools:

Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa 2,119

Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C 247

Army and Navy General Hospital, Hot Springs, Ark 62

Letterman General Hospital, San Francisco, Calif 44

Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo 94

William Beaumont General Hospital, El Paso, Tex 12

Station Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Tex 35

Veterinary Meat Inspection Course, Chicago, 111 114

Total 2,727

See footnote 1, p. 36.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 39

Schools (Continued) Number

Other schools:

School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph Field, Tex. 237

The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga

Army Industrial College, Washington, D.C 12

Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans 12

Total 261

Annual Report, Training Subdivision, Planning and Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1941, p. 16.

The expansion of medical officer strength, from approximately 2,000 to more

than 14,000 during the first year of partial mobilization, produced far-reaching

changes in Medical Department Special Service Schools. Based on the assumption

that previous training equipped officers from Reserve components for general duties, plans formulated by The Surgeon General called for establishment of refresher

courses to prepare officers for the assumption of special duties. All officers assigned

to tactical units were to receive 1-month refresher course at Carlisle Barracks.

Those assigned for duty at hospitals were-to attend schools set up at general

hospitals, under The Surgeon General’s direct control, and theremainder were to be

assigned to special courses offered at the Army Medical Center and other

installations.

To provide basic training for newly commissioned medical officers, the last

3-month basic course was offered at the Medical Field Service School in the fall of

1940, and 73 officers were graduated. 10Beginning in December, 1-month refresher

course for Reserve and National Guard officers was substituted for the regular

basic-training program. Because officers were needed to staff enlisted replacement

training centers, emphasis had to be shifted from the tactical training planned for this course by The Surgeon General’s Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939, to

preparing Reserve officers to serve as instructors for the increasing numbers of

enlisted men being brought into theArmy by selective service. Emphasis on training

instructors continued until April 1941, when theprogram was reoriented to tactical

training. During August, special 1-monthcourse for instructors was again offered,

followed by month-long course given at the replacement training centers, to

provide replacements for Reserve officers who wished to be relieved or rotated from

training assignments at the end of their year of active duty, and to provide instructors for the expansion of training facilities. By shortening courses and expanding

facilities, the Medical Field Service School was able to increase its training capacity

(1) Letter, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to The Adjutant General, War Department, Sept. 1940, subject:

Medical Department in Mobilization, inclosures thereto. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to The

Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 15 June 1940, subject: Courses at Special Service Schools. (3) Letter, Col. James E.

Baylis, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, 24

June 1940, subject: Courses at Medical Department Special Service Schools, inclosures thereto. 10 Goodman, Samuel M.: History of Medical Department Training, U.S. Army, World War II. Volume III. Report on theTraining of Medical Officers, July 1939-30 June 1944. [Official record.]
40 MEDICAL TRAINING

by June 1941, from approximately 100 officers the previous year to more than 500

officers each month. 11

In addition to transforming the basic officer training program, activation of the

Reserves and the National Guard produced other changes in the MFSS program.

Special courses previously offered to officers of Reserve components were dropped

from the program, including the advanced course offered for field grade officers.

Thereafter, officers of all components were eligible for the same courses. With the

exception of the summer camp held for ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Corps)

students in June 1941, all summer camps were eliminated.12

During the first year of mobilization, modifications in the programs of the

three Medical Department Professional Service Schools at the Army Medical

Center to meet demands for increased training produced transition to the installation’s wartimerole as center for technical training. The Army Medical School basic

graduate course, which had beenreduced from to months the previous year, was

shortened to single month in the fall of 1940, and subsequently discontinued. The

professional specialist courses, which had long provided on-the-job training in

clinical and laboratory procedures, were similarly eliminated after thelast class of 20

graduated. The advanced graduate course, which had not been offered the previous

year, was again suspended. These programs were replaced by series of refresher

courses, ranging in length to maximum of months, in surgery, clinical medicine,

ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology, roentgenology, and photoroentgenology.

The special graduate course at theArmy Dental School was again offered. The Army

Veterinary School conducted special graduate courses in clinical pathology, and

offered the usual courses in forage inspection. Both the Army Medical and Dental

Schools participated in the Medical Department’s administrative refresher training

program. By June 1941, the facilities of the Professional Service Schools at the Army

Medical Center had been expanded from capacity of 100 officers theprevious year,

to more than 100 officers each month. 13

Partial mobilization proved mixed blessing for the Medical Department,

simultaneously providing much needed manpower and increasing the demand for

medical services. As graduates of accredited professional schools, MC Reserve

officers were considered qualified both by training and by experience to care for the

sick and injured, but few of those who entered the Army, after September 1940, had

11 (1) The Surgeon General’s Protective MobilizationPlan of 1939, with annexes. (2) Annual Report, Training

Subdivision, Planning and Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1941. (3) Letter, Maj. E. D.

Liston, MC, Acting Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to The Adjutant General, War Department, 23 June 1941, subject: Additional Officers at Replacement Training Centers, inclosures thereto. (4) Letter,

The Adjutant General, War Department, to Chief of Staff, General Headquarters; Commanding Generals, First,

Second, Third, and Fourth U.S. Armies, 12 Dec. 1940, subject: Attendance at the Medical Field Service School, Carlisle, Pa. (5) Letter, Brig. Gen. Albert G. Love, Assistant Chief, Planning and Training Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, to The Adjutant General, War Department, 22 Jan. 1941, subject: Training of Officer Cadres for Medical

Replacement Centers, Camp Lee, Va. (6) Immediate Action Letter, Maj. E. D. Liston, MC, Acting Executive Officer,

Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to The Adjutant General, War Department, 23 June 1941, subject: Additional Officers at Replacement Training Centers, inclosures thereto. 12 (1) See footnote (2), p. 36. (2) Special Report of the Medical Field Service School; Personnel Trained—Graduates of School Courses, 1921-41. 13 (1) Annual Report of Technical Activities, Medical Department Professional Service Schools, Army Medical

Center, Washington, D.C., fiscal year 1940. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army, 31 July 1940, subject: Courses at Special Service Schools. (3) Annual Report of the Training

Subdivision,Planning and Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1941.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 41

any detailed knowledge of the administration of Army hospitals. Recognizing the

need for training Reserve officers in administrative procedures before assigning

them to hospitals, The Surgeon General authorized the Army Medical Center

(Dental and Medical Schools), each of the named general hospitals, including

William Beaumont, El Paso, Tex.; Army and Navy, Hot Springs, Ark.; Fitzsimons,

Denver, Colo.; and Letterman, San Francisco, Calif.; and Station Hospital, Fort

Sam Houston, Tex., to conduct refresher courses in hospital administration. Under

this program, 50 officers could be assigned monthly to each installation to understudy jobs to which they would subsequently be assigned. On-the-job training

would thusbe available to Reserve officers in positions ranging from forage inspector

and mess officer to commanding officer of general hospital. Maximum capacity

reached 300 per month when the program was placed in full operation on April

1941, but sometimes full utilization was not possible because officers could not be

spared from their duties to attend these schools.

By the end of June, about 340 officers, or slightly more than month’s capacity,

had graduated. The following year, facilities were expanded to include 14 named

general hospitals, with capacity of 700 officers per month. Shortly thereafter, when

the supply of Reserve officers had been exhausted, the refresher courses became

part of the Officer Pool Program and were offered to newly commissioned officers.

Even later, when MAC officers began to replace MC officers in administrative positions, many of them received pool training in administration. Despite its changing

title, its function remained the same, and 30-day period of on-the-job training in

hospital administration became permanent feature of the World War II program. 14

Except for this increase in size, other facets of the training program for MC

officers remained unchanged. The program for revising extension courses continued,

and 12,764 officers enrolled during the fiscal year. This was only slight increase

over theprevious year’s enrollment of 12,645, but its size is significant in view of the

number of Reserve and National Guard officers who had been called to active duty

during the year. At the same time, the facilities of civilian institutions continued to

be used for the advanced training of selected MC officers. Between July 1940 and

July 1941, 25 officers attended courses ranging in length from days to year at 10

civilian institutions. As result of priority placed on expansion of the Air Corps,

attendance at the School of Aviation Medicine increased more than tenfold in 1941.

In contrast to the 17 officers who graduated as flight surgeons in 1940, 237 graduated

in 1941. Attendance at the Army Industrial College and the Command and General

Staff School also expanded, and 12 Medical Department officers graduated from

each school. 15

14 (1) Smith, Clarence McKittrick: The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior.

United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956.

(2) See footnote (2), p. 36. (3) Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General,

fiscal year 1942. (4) Annual Report of Technical Activities, Medical Department Professional Service Schools, Army

Medical Center, Washington, D.C., fiscal year 1941. (5) Letter, Col. Larry B. McAfee, MC, Executive Officer, Office

of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to the Commanding General, Letterman General Hospital, San Francisco, Calif.,

Nov. 1940, subject: Training of Medical Department Personnel. (6) Letter, Col. Larry B. McAfee, MC, Executive

Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to The Adjutant General, War Department, 14 Dec. 1940, subject:

Allocation of Training Facilities at Special Service Schools.

15 See footnotes and (2), p. 36.
42 MEDICAL TRAINING

Additional opportunities for training were provided for VC officers by the

inauguration of course in milk and dairy hygiene at the Chicago Quartermaster Depot, Chicago, 111. Veterinary officers had traditionally inspected milk and meat

purchased locally as part of their regular duties, but late in 1940, Quartermaster plans for the establishment of market center program to insure steady flow of

perishable foods and cushion the impact of military demand on the market created

need for veterinary officers specializing in meat and dairy inspection. Following

discussions between Lt. Col. Will C. Griffin, VC, depot veterinarian at the Chicago

Quartermaster Depot, and Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Raymond A. Reiser, VC,

Chief, Veterinary Corps, permission was obtained on November 1940 for the

Veterinary Division to conduct classes at the depot.

Under the agreement, staff and equipment for the course were supplied by the

Medical Department, while classrooms and laboratory space were provided by the

depot. The first class of 17 officers convened on 25 November 1940, and classes

continued to be offered through 1946. By the end of 1946, the class had been

conducted 52 times, with 1,038 graduates, including more than 100 officers of the

Army Air Forces. Originally 4-week program, it was extended to weeks in

June 1944. After the reorganization of 1942, the school operated as class IV

installation of the Quartermaster Corps. 16

THE WAR YEARS: 1941-45

When the United States entered World War II, the program for training

medical, dental, and veterinary officers was accelerated. Because of changes made

necessary by the near depletion of thepool of officers with previous training, and the

decision to retain men called up after September 1940 for an additional year of

service, few discontinuities were produced by the transition to war. Basic training

was readjusted to prepare officers newly commissioned from civilian practice for

military service, and the officer pool program was expanded. Advanced military

instruction was provided by the addition of special cadre and medicomilitary

courses. On the assumption that civilian physicians were technically competent to

perform routine medical duties, the basic and advanced graduate courses at the

Army Medical Center, begun during the limited emergency, were suspended. In

their stead, the facilities of the Army Medical Center and number of civilian

medical schools were harnessed to retrain physicians with noncritical skills in

specialties essential to the war effort or to the rehabilitation of the wounded.

Through theASTP (Army Specialized Training Program), efforts were also made to

expand the supply of physicians available for military service by sending eligible

enlisted men to medical school.

16 (1) Medical Department, United States Army. United States Army Veterinary Service in World War II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961. (2) Risch, Erna, and Kieffer, Chester L.: The Quartermaster Corps;

Organization, Supply, and Services. Volume I. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 43

Basic Military Training

War brought vast numbers of new type of officer into the Medical

Department. Before the war, Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Corps officers were,

in most cases, career soldiers with varying lengths of service. Even after September

1940, when the Reserve and National Guard were called to active duty, members

of these corps had some degree of military training. By late 1941, the Medical

Department’s pool of trained reserves had been nearly exhausted. Yet between December 1941 and August 1945, the Medical Corps alone expanded from approximately 11,000 to nearly 47,000. 17 Those who were not drawn directly from civilian practices were recruited upon the completion of their internships, and few, if any,

had previous military experience. As result, the demand for basic-training facilities

mushroomed.

The disproportionate concentration of the Army’s wartime strength increases

in the first year of hostilities increased pressure on the Medical Department’s

basic-training facilities, and produced expedient measures that might have been

avoided by more uniform growth. Estimates of the troop strengthrequired to defeat

the Axis, formulated immediately after Pearl Harbor, projected need for over 200

divisions, or more than 10 million men, by mid-1944. The troop basis for 1942, approved by theSecretary of War on 15 January as guide for the organization and

activation of units, required the Army to bring its strength to 71 divisions with

total of 3.6 million men by January 1943. By September, the 1942 troop basis had

been increased to an even million men. Since estimates of total troop requirements

were later reduced, the troop basis of 1942 required well over half of the soldiers

mobilized during World War II to be trained during the first year of the war. 18

As its share of the troop basis, the Medical Department was required toraise its

strength from 16,219 officers in January 1942 to 39,894 by January 1943. 19 By the

end of 1942, the Medical Department had narrowly missed meeting the goals set by

the War Department. In the process, however, it was necessary to abandon the

prewar pattern of sending every newly commissioned officer to the Medical Field

Service School and to combine basic training with variety of military specialty

programs at many installations.

Where and how an individual MC, DC, VC, or SnC (Sanitary Corps) officer

was given basic training depended, in large measure, upon his ultimate assignment.

Because of The Surgeon General’s policy that, as far as possible, junior officers who

had not acquired medical specialty would be given basic tactical training and

assigned to the field forces, the facilities of the Medical Field Service School were

reserved for younger officers. Members of affiliated units, limited-service personnel,

and older, more highly specialized officers were usually trained at pools established

at installations, ranging from general hospitals and Medical Replacement Training

17 Medical Department, United States Army. Personnel in World War II. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting

Office, 1963. 18Kreidberg, Marvin A., and Henry, Merton G.: History of Military Mobilizationin the United States Army,

1775-1945. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1955. (DA Pamphlet 20-212.)

19 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, Assistant to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Chief, Operations

Service, for the Director of Training, Services of Supply, May 1942, subject: Study in Preactivation Training of

Commissioned Officers, inclosure thereto.
44 MEDICAL TRAINING

Centers to supply depots, and under the control of headquarters ranging from ASF

(Army Service Forces) service commands to AGF (Army Ground Forces) and AAF

(Army Air Forces) commanders.

Training facilities at the Medical Field Service School and the Professional

Service Schools were allocated by The Surgeon General, through the War Department, to the Army Service, Ground, and Air Forces, which in turn assigned officers

within their command. 20 As result, an MC, DC, VC, orSnC officer assigned to the

Air, Service, or Ground Forces might receive his basic training at medical pool

within that command or, if he was considered eligible for duty in tactical unit,

at the Medical Field Service School. medical officer assigned to the Army Air

Forces, for example, might receive his initial training at either the Medical Field

Service School or the pool established for medical units and installations of the Air

Forces at the Gulf Coast Air Corps Training Center, Randolph Field, Tex. Thus,

the basic military training given Medical Department officer included standard

body of military knowledge, but the location and type of installation at which it was

received were varied.

Medical Field Service School

Throughout the war, as in the prewar era, the Medical Field Service School

provided basic training for the largest single number of officers in the Medical,

Dental, Veterinary, and Sanitary Corps. Until the beginning of the limited

emergency, the standard period of training in medical field service and in the

functions of the combat arms had been months. To provide military training for

the large number of officers on active duty, who had previously been unable to

attend the course, and to meet the requirement to train small number of officers

added to the Medical Department after the eruption of war in Europe, the course

had been compressed to months, and offered twice year.

Following the activation of the Reserve and National Guard, the course was

condensed to single month of instruction, and facilities were expanded to offer

“refresher” training to large number of officers with previous military training.

Because of the exhaustion of reserve pools, refresher training was suspended after

the graduation of the Seventh Refresher Course, which was conducted between

and 29 August 1941, to train additional officers for duties at replacement training

centers. Beginning in September 1941, 2-month course, designated simply as the

“Officers’ Course,” was introduced to train newly commissioned officers in the

principles and methods of medical field service. 21

With variations in length, this condensed version of the 5-month, prewar

“Basic Course” continued to be offered throughout the war. On July 1942, the

course was shortened to single month, to take advantage of June graduations and

double the output of trained officers. The change was not welcomed by authorities

at the Medical Field Service School, who felt that minimum of weeks was

required for orientation to field medicine. Under 4-week program, too much time

20 Report on the Status of Training in the Medical Department, TJ.S. Army, 24 Sept. 1942. 21 Technical Report of Activities of the Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., fiscal year 1942.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 45

was spent in teaching subjects required by the War Department to standardize instruction at all special service schools. Six months later, when combined pressure

from the Air and Ground Forces for greater share of the school’s output resulted

in its being expanded, the course was lengthened to weeks. Beginning with the

19th class, on January 1943, the program was revised and quotas were rearranged

to allow new class of 500 to begin every weeks.

With three basic courses running concurrently, the capacity of the school was

increased to allow the graduation of 1,500 officers during every 6-week period. By

series of expedients, which included closing the MAC Officer Candidate School at

Carlisle Barracks on 27 February 1943, to provide housing for the expanded basic

course, the Medical Department was able to provide basic training for most newly

inducted officers, and to reduce the number of those inducted in 1942 without benefit of MFSS training. Even then, one special 6-week class had to be authorized

at the ASF Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., in January 1944, when the

demand for training exceeded existing facilities. Enrolled were 856 officers. With

this exception, the 6-week Officers’ Basic Course continued to be offered at Carlisle

Barracks until February 1945, when reduced demand for officers allowed the course

length to be restored to weeks. Between December 1940 and August 1945, when

the 69th course was completed, slightly more than 25,000 officers graduated.

Graduates of the Medical Field Service School Officers’ Basic Course for fiscal years

1921-45 were as follows: 22

Years Number

1921-40... 1,369

1940- 2,119

1941- 1,692

1942- 7,358

1943- 9,298

1944- 4,620

Officer pool training

The inability of Army Special Service Schools to provide basic training for all

officers in the event of mass mobilization, and the obvious need to reserve those

facilities for officers qualified for tactical duties, had long been matter of concern

to War Department planners. Early in 1941, the Medical Department arrived at

partial solution to the problem by activating refresher courses at general hospitals

that allowed Reserve officers, who had the equivalent of basic training when called

to active duty, to understudy their counterpart in hospital’s administrative

structure for period of month. Courses were offered at six hospitals, each with

22 (1) See footnotes 10, p. 39; 12 (2), p. 40; 19, p. 43; and 21, p. 44. (2) Annual Report, Medical Field Service

School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., fiscal year 1943. (3) Memorandum, Lt. Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Chief, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for the Personnel Division, Surgeon General’s Office, 22

May 1942. (4) Letter, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, to the Commanding

General, Services of Supply, 10 Apr. 1942, subject: Special Courses, Medical Field Service School. 1st indorsement

thereto, dated 11 Apr. 1942. (5) Annual Report, Medical Field Service School, CarlisleBarracks, Pa., 1945. (6) Annual

Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., fiscal year 1944. (7) Annual Report of The

Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1922. (8) Technical Report of Activities

of the Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., fiscal year 1944.
46 MEDICAL TRAINING

capacity of 50 students per month, but because of the urgent demand for the

technical and tactical service of medical officers, the program was never fully

utilized.

Within week after Pearl Harbor, however, the War Department turned its

attention to the problem of officer filler and loss replacement training. On 19

December 1941, orders were issued to the chief of each ground arm and service to

establish pool training for unassigned officers without delay at special service

schools, branch replacement training centers, and War Department overhead

installations under the direct control of the chief of the arm or service. These pools

were to be designed to provide “suitable preparatory training” to each individual

before permanent assignment and to furnish source of replacements for troop

units and training centers. 23

Early in 1942, plans were formulated by the Medical Department for the

establishment of officer replacement pools within the Zone of Interior at number

of installations and under variety of commands, including all named general

hospitals except Darnall, Danville, Ky., all medical replacement training centers,

medical supply depots, medical sections of general depots, and the Gulf Coast Air

Corps Training Center. Pools were assigned the threefold mission of providing

instruction to qualify officers for their first permanent assignment, of furnishing

officers qualified to attend courses training medical specialists at service schools and

civilian institutions, and of acting as the primary source of officer filler and loss

replacements. Officers destined for Medical Department tactical units (later

designated “AGE type” units) were assigned to either pool at one of the medical

replacement training centers, each of which had capacity for 100 officers, or the

Medical Field Service School, which was authorized pool of 150 officers. Officers

assigned to the Air Forces were sent to the Gulf Coast Air Corps Training Center,

which had pool of 200 officers; those assigned to professional units of the field

forces or fixed Zone of Interior installations (later designated “ASF type” units)

were trained in pools of 50 established at named general hospitals, which were the

successors to the administrative refresher courses established for Reserve officers in

1940. Pools for training 50 officers in medical supply and procurement were

established at medical supply depots and the medical sections of general depots.

Early plans directed that officers would be assigned to pools for minimum of

months, but these were soon changed to allow the period in pools to vary from an

extremely short period up to months. Formal course outlines were developed to

give newly commissioned officers basic knowledge of the Army and military

subjects, but most of the instruction was provided through on-the-job training.

Programs varied with the type of installation at which pool was located, and

commanders were instructed to integrate students in their commands and to train

them so that they could furnish either qualified pool officer or previously trained

23 (1) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, for

the Chief of Staff, 15 Dec. 1941, subject: Pool of Officer Replacements, inclosures thereto. (2) Letter, The Adjutant

General, War Department, to Chief of Each Ground Arm or Service; Chief of the Armored Force; and Chief of Staff,

General Headquarters, 19 Dec. 1941, subject: OfficerFiller and Loss Replacements for Ground Arms and Services. (3)

See footnote (2), p. 36.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 47

officer whom the student would replace within the command whenever filler or

replacement was requested. 24

Full use of officer pools was not possible until after June 1942, when large

number of young officers who had graduated from medical school in 1941, and spent

the intervening year in internships, were called to active duty. By the time these

officers became available, pools had been established with total capacity of 1,500 officers. Shortly after June 1942, an additional pool was established at the New York Port of Embarkation.

With varying size and location, pool training continued to be conducted

throughout the war. Its importance as primary source of basic training for

medical, dental, and veterinary officers declined late in the war, however, because

of the decreasing numbers of such officers available for military service, the

expanding capacity of the Medical Field Service School, and the increasing use of

MAC officers to perform nonmedical duties. The decentralized agencies that

administered pools frequently assigned officers for indefinite and varying periods,

sometimes assigned them there only for administrative purposes, and often failed to

distinguish between MC and MAC officers in annual reports; for these reasons, it is

not possible even to estimate the numbers of MC, DC, VC, and SnC officers who

received pool training. It is probable, however, that nearly every junior officer

passed through pool at some time during World War II, and in two areas, supply

and administration, it was the only source of training available.

The operation of pools is typified by the Medical Department Replacement

Pool which began operations on June 1942 at Camp Barkeley. Between that date

and 30 June 1943, the 4-week refresher course was conducted for 528 officers. After

completing this course, 359 officers were assigned to temporary duty in Medical

Department training battalions at CampBarkeley, pending permanent assignment

The program of instruction in the 4-week pool course included general study

of administration, field sanitation, and organization and operation of medical field

units. Two officers of the Medical Replacement Training Center cadre at Camp

Barkeley were assigned to supervise the pool, prepare schedules, conduct classes,

and make necessary reports. Regular classes conducted in the training battalions

and in the Officer Candidate School at the center were open to pool officers, wRose

schedules were arranged to allow them to take advantage of the varied activities

available at Camp Barkeley. Special classes were also conducted for pool officers by

instructors at the camp. During their period of temporary duty with medical

battalions, pool officers were given the opportunity to observe experienced instructors, and were assigned teaching duties. After June 1943, the number of officers

passing through the Camp Barkeley pool declined, as the supply of available

24 (1) Memorandum, Maj. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Chief, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for The Surgeon General, Jan. 1942, subject; Training of Officer Filler and Loss Replacements for

Ground Arms and Services. (2) Letter, Lt. Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General,

U.S. Army, to The Adjutant General, War Department, 15 Jan. 1942, subject; Officer Filler and Loss Replacements in

the Medical Department. 1st indorsement thereto, dated Feb. 1942. (3) Letter, Lt. Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to Commanding Generals, All Medical Replacement Training

Centers; Commanding Officers, All General Hospitals; and All Medical Supply Depots, 27 Feb. 1942, subject: Officer

Filler and Loss Replacements for the Ground and Air, Arms and Services.

497-333 75 -5
48 MEDICAL TRAINING

officers diminished. Only 99 officers received pool training, compared with 528 the

previous year. 25

An unusual curriculum, typifying the diversity of the officer pool program, was

the course in medical supply procedures at the St. Louis Medical Depot, St. Louis,

Mo. Between 1922 and 1924, the Medical Department had operated separate

Medical Supply Training School at the New York General Depot, New York, N.Y.

Thereafter, medical supply officers were usually assigned to 2-year tour at the

New York General Depot, followed by year in the Surgeon General’s Office, and

then completed their training with 1-year course at the Army Industrial College.

During the 1920’s, between three and five officers completed this training each year,

but during the 1930’s, only two medical supply officers were enrolled annually.

In response to wartime demand for an increasing number of medical supply

officers, separate Medical Department school was reestablished in April 1942.

Initially, this course consisted of weeks of informal, on-the-job training, organized

to give the student officer few days’ practical experience in the supervision of each

of the St. Louis Medical Depot’s divisions and branches. This drastic reduction in

course length was based on the assumption that supply officers would be drawn

from the ranks of civilians with medical supply experience, who would require only

token orientation to military procedures. Administration of the course was the

responsibility of the Officers’ Orientation School, established at the St. Louis

Medical Depot for that purpose. In August 1942, the course was lengthened to

weeks and given permanent status.

As the war assumed global proportions, it became increasingly apparent that

officers in charge of supplies needed more thorough orientation to the procedures

involved in transferring supplies from the Zone of Interior to combat areas. On

March 1943, the course was assimilated into ASF supply training programs

reorganized to provide months of training in three phases, and redesignated the

"ASF Depot Course.” The first phase of this new program was conducted at the

Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, Va., where officers received 30 days of orientation

to Army supply procedures. The 1-monthtraining program at the St. Louis Medical

Depot became phase II of the new program. Phase III consisted of 30 days of

practical work at one of several medical supply depots within the Zone of Interior.

Course capacity was expanded to 100 officers.

While these developments were taking place, other courses were established at

the St. Louis Medical Depot for Medical Department enlisted personnel. On June

1943, the administrative organization at the St. Louis Medical Depot, responsible

for supervising all of these courses, was formally designated the “Medical Supply

Services School,” and the Officers’ Orientation School was absorbed as the Officers’

Supply Division of the newly created school.26

Following this reorganization, the Medical Supply Services School continued to

provide training for the durationof the war without major changes in its curriculum.

25 (1) Annual Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., fiscal year 1944. (2) Circular

Letter No. 48, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 23 May 1942.

26 (1) Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1943. (2)

Annual Report, Army Service Forces, Medical Supply Services School, St. Louis Medical Depot, St. Louis, Mo., fiscal

year 1944. (3) Annual Report, Medical Supply Services School, St. Louis Medical Depot, St. Louis, Mo., fiscal year

1943. (4) Medical Department, United States Army. Medical Supply in World War II. Washington: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1968.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 49

The first class of officers to enroll in phase II of the new program entered the school

on April 1943, and before the end of June, total of 495 officers had completed

this phase. Between June 1943 and June 1944, total of 412 officers completed this

phase of instruction and were sent to the medical sections of ASF depots for phase

III of the ASF Depot Course. Thirty-eight officers completed courses in equipment

maintenance, and nine completed courses in optical repair, which had been inaugurated at the school. Between June and September 1944, when it was dropped

from the program, four officers graduated from the 6-week course for supervisors of

optical repair shops. By June 1945, 46 more officers had graduated from the 16-week

equipment maintenance course, and an additional 178 had graduated from phase II

of the depot course. 27 The tabulation which follows shows the total number of male

Medical, Dental, Veterinary, and Sanitary Corps officers graduating from service

school courses from July 1939 to August 1945.

Training Number

Officers Basic Course 25,972

Cadre Course (Special) 526

Medical and Field Sanitary Inspectors 888

Chemical Warfare Medical Dept. Officers Course 1,836

Quartermaster School, ASF Depot Course, Phase 516

ASF Depot Course, Phase II (Med) 1,195

ASF Depot Course, Phase III 42

Equipment Maintenance 93

Optical Repair 13

Meat and Dairy Hygiene 862

Clinical Pathology, Veterinary Officers (Special) 14

Forage Inspection 67

Tropical Medicine 1,708

Anesthesiology 292

Electroencephalography 48

Maxillofacial Plastic Surgery 233

Roentgenology 802

Military Neuropsychiatry 841

Operation of Red Cross Blood Donor Center. 46

alariology 260

Medical and Surgical Care of Battle Casualties in Forward Areas 179

Adjutant General’s School 276

Army Industrial College 15

Army War College

Command and General Staff School 246

Engineers School 52

Ordnance School 10

Food and Nutrition 145

(1) Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, Jan. 1948. (2) Goodman, Samuel M.; History of Medical

Department, Training U.S. Army World War II. Volume III. Report of the Training of Medical Officers, July

1939-30 June 1944. [Official record.] small number of MAC officers may be included in some courses.

27 (1) Annual Report Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1944. (2)

Annual Report, School Branch, fiscal year 1945. In Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office ol

The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1945. (3) Memorandum, Maj. Walter H. Potter, SnC, Chief, Specialties Branch,

Supply Planning and Specialties Division, Supply Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for the Chief, Operations

Service, Surgeon General’s Office, 28 July 1943, subject: Training of Opticians for Optical Repair Sections of Medical

Depot Companies. (4) Memorandum, Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, Operations Service,

Office of The Surgeon General, to Commandant, Medical Supply Services School, St. Louis Medical Depot, St. Louis,

Mo., 13 Aug. 1943, subject: Training of Medical Department Officers in Maintenance of Medical Equipment.
50 MEDICAL TRAINING

Pools also provided special instruction for groups which were difficult to fit into

the regular program. Women, for example, were not commissioned in the prewar

Army, and therewere no programs for training female Medical Department officers.

After Congress authorized the commissioning of women doctors in April 1943, 76

female physicians were commissioned in the Medical Corps. About one-third of this

group was placed on active duty without formal training. Beginning in October

1943, however, all newly commissioned women doctors were sent to the Medical

Department Replacement Pool at Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga., where

they received an orientation to military life. Fifty-five women, or approximately

two-thirdsof all women accepted in the Medical Corps, were trained at this pool. In

addition to pool training, three women doctors were sent to the Tropical Medicine

Course; four were sent to the School of Military Neuropsychiatry, at Lawson General Hospital; and six, to various courses in anesthesiology. 28

special pool for Negro officers was established at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., on

June 1943. This action was takenfollowing publication of War Department policy,

in January 1943, requiring Negro officers to be assigned in groups. Ostensibly,

officers assigned to the pool were to continue their technical training “until such

time as group assignment to Medical Department unit or installation” became

effective. Since the commandant of the Medical Field Service School, Brig. Gen.

Addison D. Davis, refused to allow more than 25 Negro officers to attend the school

at one time, the pool also proved useful for holding newly commissioned Negro

officers until they could be accepted under the quota. 29

Extension courses

Throughout the interwar years, the Special Service School extension program,

administered through corps areas, was major part of the Army’s training program

for Reserve and National Guard officers. This series of progressive subcourses, designed to expand the officer’s grasp of the fundamentals of military knowledge and

qualify him for promotion, was participated in by more Reserve and National

Guard officers than any other form of training. Even after September 1940, when

these officers were called to active duty, enrollment in extension courses offered

through the Medical Field Service School continued unabated. Revision of the

program to incorporate changes in doctrine and equipment, begun in the late 1930’s

and scheduled for completion in 1942, continued throughout 1941.

By the time the United States entered World War II, most of these revisions

had been completed, and the revised Army Extension Courses were thought to be

28 (1) See footnote 17, p. 43. (2) Goodman, Samuel M.: History of the Training of Medical Department Female

Personnel, July 1939 to 31 December 1944. [Official record.]

29 (1) War Department Circular No. 132, June 1943. (2) Annual Report, Office of the Director, Medical Division,

Fort Huachuca, Ariz., 1943. (3) Memorandum, Col. FrankB. Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, Operations

Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to Director of Training, Services of Supply, 10 Mar. 1943, subject: Training

Pool for Colored Medical and Dental Officer Personnel. (4) Memorandum,Lt. Col. Durward G. Hall, MC, Assistant

to Director, Reserve Division, Personnel Service, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, forCol.

Howard T. M. C. Wickert, Chief, Planning Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, 20 Mar. 1943.

(5) Memorandum, Maj. E. R. Whitehurst, MAC, Assistant to Director, Reserve Division, Personnel Service, Military

Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to the Chief of Military Personnel, Surgeon General’s Office, 16

Feb. 1943, subject: Assignment of Colored Medical and Dental Personnel.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 51

the most up-to-date source of information on doctrine, tactics, technique, and

procedure available. Because most Reserve and National Guard officers were on

active dutyby the end of 1941, the War Department General Staff, G-3, Operations

and Training, recommended, and received approval from the Chief of Staff, that

operation of corps area extension courses be suspended and that extension course

material be diverted to field force units for use in unit troop schools. Orders for the

suspension of corps area extension schools for the duration of the war were issued

early in February 1942, and all officers then enrolled in classes were required to

complete them by April. Special Service Schools were directed to continue their

revisions of course material.

By August, however, reports that unit troop schools were not using the

extension courses because they were too cumbersome for the accelerated pace of

wartime training were confirmed by training inspections of four newly activated

divisions, and G-3 decided to relieve the service commands from the burden of

directed use. In the future, G-3 declared, the War Department would handle

extension courses as ithandled other areas of training, confining itself to announcing

policies and outlines of broad objectives, and allowing the commanding generals of

the service commands to determine the manner in which the objectives would be

achieved. When poll of the service commands revealed that only the Army Air

Forces desired the continued preparation andrevision of extension course material,

the War Department directed the Special Service Schools to suspend theirrevision

of extension courses for the duration of the war. The service commands were

directed to continue their distribution of extension material until stocks were

exhausted, and to revise courses that might prove useful in training theirrespective

commands.

By the end of 1942, the prewar extension program was decentralized and, for

all practical purposes, suspended for the duration of the war. 30

Specialized and Advanced Military Training

The program of basic training provided at the Medical Field Service School and

replacement pools was supplemented by variety of programs, either sponsored by,

or available to, the Medical Department for training specialists qualified to protect

the health of the Army in the field, or qualified for duties requiring specialized

military skills.

30 (1) Letter, Lt. Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, for The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to the Commandant, Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Oct. 1941, subject: Revision of Army Extension

Courses for the 1942—43 SchoolYear. (2) War Department Training Circular No. 6, Feb. 1942. (3) Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to All Corps Area Commanders, Feb. 1942, subject: Suspension of Corps Area Extension School. (4) War Department Circular No. 198, 20 June 1942. (5) Letter, Col. C. H. Day, AGD, Assistant Ground

Adjutant General, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Aug. 1942, subject: Suspension of Preparation of Army Extension Courses. (6) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. I. H. Edwards, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, for the Commanding Generals: Army Ground Forces; Army Air Forces; and Services of Supply, 27 Aug. 1942, subject: Suspension of the Preparation of Army Extension Courses. (7) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. I. H. Edwards, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, for the

Commanding Generals: Army Air Forces; Army Ground Forces; and Services of Supply, 29 Oct. 1942, subject: Suspension of the Preparation of Army Extension Courses. (8) Memorandum,Brig. Gen. I. H. Edwards, Assistant Chief

of Staff, G-3, for The Adjutant General, 29 Oct. 1942, subject: Suspension of the Preparation of Army Extension

Courses, inclosures thereto. (9) War Department Circular No. 361, 31 Oct. 1942.
52 MEDICAL TRAINING

Medical field and sanitary inspectors

Mass mobilization, accompanied by the rapid expansion of existing facilities,

the creation of new military installations, and the induction of large numbers of men

unfamiliar with techniques for avoiding the potential hazards of garrison and field

life, produced threats to the health of the Army. By mid-1942, the problem was

serious enough to prompt the War Department to call the attention of commanders

of all grades to theirresponsibility for the enforcement of sanitary regulations, and

to observe: 31

The incidence of food poisoning, diarrhea, and dysentery among troops last year,

both in camps and on maneuvers, and the recurrence of similar outbreaks this year indicate that training in personal hygiene and sanitation has been neglected and that well established measures

for the control of such diseases have not been intelligently enforced. Commanders of all grades,

surgeons, and medical inspectors must realize that organizations which have difficulty controlling

endemic intestinal diseases during training will have greater difficulty in the field, and it follows

that the combat value of such units will be substandard. The recurrence of these diseases is indicative of inefficiency on the part of the responsible commanders and medical officers and lack

of discipline in the units.

In response to War Department concern, conference was held at the Medical

Field Service School on 20 August 1942, between the commandant of the school,

General Davis, and Lt. Col. (later Col.) Frank B. Wakeman, MC, the director of

training at the Office of The Surgeon General, and their assistants, to discuss

methods for improving sanitation in the Army. As result of this conference,

recommendations were sent to the War Department calling for the expansion of

division cadres and post staffs to include medical inspector, and the establishment

of special training program for such officers at the Medical Field Service School.

The request for special training program was argued on the grounds that majority

of Medical Corps officers were new to the service and not thoroughly trained in the

requirements of military sanitation. The block of instruction included in the basic

orientation course could not be expanded to qualify officers for duties as medical

inspectors without hampering their training in other military subjects. The course

proposed by the committee was to be month in length, with capacity of 50

officers each month, preferably senior captains of the Medical Corps, to begin in

November 1942. In response to these recommendations, the Medical and Field

Inspectors’ Course was authorized on September 1942, and classes began on

November.32

In general, the course established in the fall of 1942 followed the outlines

suggested by the Wakeman-Davis Committee. Of 192 hours of course work, 102

were devoted to military sanitation, including such diverse subjects as barracks

sanitation, insectborne diseases, food inspection, waste and rubbish disposal, water

31 War Department Circular No. 277, 20 Aug. 1942. 32 (1) Letter, Brig. Gen. Addison D. Davis, Commandant, Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Attention: Plans and Training Division, 29 Aug. 1942, subject: Medical Inspectors’

Course, Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (2) Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive

Officer to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, for the Director of Training, Services of Supply, Sept. 1942, subject:

Course of Instruction for Medical Inspectors. (3) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. C. R. Huebner, GSC, Director of Training, Services of Supply, for The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Sept. 1942, subject: Course of Instruction for Medical

Inspectors.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 53

and sewage treatment, and venereal disease control. The balance was devoted to

studying tactics and administration related to the duties of medical inspector.

Quotas were distributed among the service commands, defense commands, and Air

and Ground Forces. Courses continued to be offered throughout the war, with few

changes in content.

Standards of admission, however, were gradually eroded by the growing

shortage of physicians. Originally, only senior captains in the Medical Corps, who

had completed the MFSS Officers’ Basic Course, were to be admitted, but in time, the regulations were rewritten by authorities outside the Medical Department’s

control, and lieutenants, newly commissioned captains, SnC officers, and MAC

officers were sent to the course. In August 1943, the course was lengthened to weeks

to allow greater amount of basic training and field experience. Reports from the

field indicated thatSnC and MAC officers were being successfully utilized as medical

inspectors. By June 1945, at the completion of the 24th class, 892 officers had

graduated.33

Chemical IFarfare School

The development of formal course of instruction in chemical warfare was

one of the few radical innovations in the Medical Department officer training

program. Before the war, few officers had been sent to Edgewood Arsenal for

training each year, but for most officers, knowledge of defense against chemical

agents was confined to few hours of cursory instruction received in the MFSS

Officers’ Basic Course.

Early in 1941, The Surgeon General instructed the Medical Research Division

at Edgewood Arsenal to prepare tables of organization and equipment for gas

medical battalion that was to be activated to care for gas casualties. Seizing this

opportunity, the chief of the Medical Research Division, Lt. Col. (later Col.)

William D. Fleming, MC, reported that such battalion would be of little use unless

its medical personnel received more instruction in chemical warfare and chemical

warfare medicine than was currently available, and submitted one of the Medical

Research Division’s periodic recommendations for the establishment of formal

course of instruction.34 Work on course and text began, and almost year later,

the course outline was submitted to the Office of The Surgeon General. In August

1942, the Medical Corps Officers’ Course, to be given at the Chemical Warfare

School, was approved by the War Department, and classes began in September.

33 (1) See footnotes 22 (2) and (5), p. 45. (2) Essential Technical Medical Data, U.S. Army Forces, South Atlantic,

for April 1944, dated May 1944. (3) War Department Circular No. 99, Mar. 1944. (4) Letter, Col. R. W. Bliss, MC,

Assistant to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, as Chief, Operations Service, to the Director of- Military Training,

Army ServiceForces, Aug. 1943, subject: Training of Medical and Field Sanitary Inspectors. 1st indorsement thereto,

dated Aug. 1943. (5) Letter, Brig. Gen.Addison D. Davis, Commanding General, Medical Field Service School, Carlisle

Barracks, Pa., to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Attention: Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Training Division, 28 Apr.

1943, subject; Sixth Medical Inspectors’ Course, Medical Field ServiceSchool, CarlisleBarracks, Pa., inclosures thereto.

34 (1) Letter, Lt. Col. William D. Fleming, MC, Chief, Medical Research Division, Chemical Warfare Service,

Edgewood Arsenal, Md., to The Surgeon General, War Department, 25 Mar. 1942, subject: Special Training in Treatment of Chemical Casualties, inclosure thereto. (2) Letter, Lt. Col. WTlliam D. Fleming, MC, Chief, Medical Research

Division, Chemical Warfare Service, Edgewood Arsenal, Md., to The Surgeon General, War Department, 31 Mar.

1942, subject: Instruction of Medical Officers in Care of Gas Casualties.
54 MEDICAL TRAINING

This course of instruction to train Medical Department officers in the identification of chemical warfare agents, in decontamination, and in prevention and care

of chemical warfare casualties covered 4-week period. Originally, plans called for

five classes of 100 officers each, to begin on September 1942, but before the fifth

class had graduated, the course was extended indefinitely. Officers attending the

course were selected from the Army Service, Air, and Ground Forces, and from the

Office of The Surgeon General.

The teaching staff of the Chemical Warfare School provided technical instruction in agents, materiel, and weather factors, while members of the Medical

Research Division presented courses in the physiological effects of agents, pathology,

treatment, and medical service. Veterinary Corps officers enrolled in the course were

offered an alternate program in the protection, care, and treatment of animal

casualties, and the contamination and decontamination of food. similar adjustment in content was made in May 1943 for SnC officers, who were given special

instruction on the decontamination of water. In July 1944, the course was shortened

to weeks by the elimination of many hours devoted to basic military subjects.

Before the course was discontinued at the end of the 29th class in December 1944, approximately 2,000 officers received instruction at the Chemical Warfare School.

majority were MC officers, but the Sanitary and Veterinary Corps were well

represented, and'in 1944, the course was even attended by 48 naval officers.35

Special Cadre Course for divisional officers

Providing qualified officers with the ability to organize, activate, and train new

divisions was major problem for all of the arms and services. Prewar planners had

counted on being able to strip installations of their Regular Army personnel to

provide cadre for the first months of mobilization. At the end of months, it was

assumed they would be able to select cadre for future activations from among

superior trainees. During the limited mobilization following passage of selective

service, unit activations followed this pattern. It was not until after the outbreak

of war that formal training was provided for Medical Department officers by the

inauguration of the Special Cadre Course for divisional officers at the Medical Field

Service School. Under this program, it was planned that, approximately months

before the activation of division, maximum of 13 medical officers assigned to the

medical battalion and medical detachments supporting the division would be

enrolled in the Special Cadre Course for weeks of intensive training. The course

36 (1) Cochran, Rexmond C.: History of Research and Development of the Chemical Warfare Service in World

War II. Volume 30. Medical Research in Chemical Warfare. Historical Branch, Chemical Corps School, Edgewood

Arsenal, Md., Mar. 1947. [Officialrecord. Office of the Chief of Military History.] (2) Annual Report, School Branch,

fiscal year 1945. In Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year

1945. (3) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Alexander Wilson, C.W.S., Chief, Field Service, Chemical Warfare Service, to the

Commanding General, Services of Supply, 20 July 1942, subject: Chemical Warfare School, Medical Corps Officers’

Course. (4) Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Aug. 1942, subject: Chemical Warfare School, Medical Corps Officers’ Course. (5) Annual Report, Training Division, Operations

Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1943. (6) Memorandum, Lt. Col. Charles H. Moseley, MC, Deputy

Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Lt. Col. JohnR. Wood, Medical Research Laboratory,

Edgewood Arsenal, Md., 10 May 1943. (7) Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer to The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army, for Director of Training, Services of Supply, 29 Sept. 1942, subject: Chemical Warfare School,

Medical Corps Officers’ Course.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 55

was designed to instruct them in methods of training and administration, and in the

principles of first- and second-echelon medical support, to allow them to function

efficiently in their newly activated divisions and inform them of duties during unit

activation. The first Special Cadre Course began on 26 January 1942, and by the end

of June, 138 officers, representing 11 divisions, had graduated.

Included in this total were 22 newly commissioned Negro officers assigned to

the 93d (Negro) Infantry Division, and to the Station Hospital, Fort Huachuca,

who did not participate in the regular program of instruction. special outline of

instruction was designed for these officers, who attended the Medical Field Service

School between March and April 1942.36 The curriculum prepared for these

officers contained greater concentration on basic military subjects than that

prepared for regular cadre courses, procedure which was probably not necessary

for the Reserve officers assigned to the 93d (Negro) Infantry Division, but was

essential for the training of the cadre of the Negro station hospital, group of handpicked Negro physicians, which had already become the subject of national

controversy.

The controversy arose out of series of conferences held between representatives of the Office of The Surgeon General and the Negro counterpart of the

American Medical Association, the National Medical Association, beginning on 14

October 1940, as result of pressure by Negro professional and political organizations for integration and greater participation in the war effort. At this time, patients

at fixed Army hospitals were completely integrated, but professional service in these

installations was the exclusive prerogative of white physicians. Negro physicians

were confined to field installations providing first- and second-echelon medical

service for Negro units.

Among the demands of the National Medical Association was the complete

integration of professional staffs, to relieve greater number of Negro physicians

from duty as regimental surgeons (unflatteringly characterized as “first aid

surgeons’’ by the National Medical Association). Members of the association

demanded an equal opportunity to enhance their careers by participating in

advanced training programs and to gain the specialized medical and administrative

experience available to physicians assigned to station and general hospitals.37 While

sympathetic to demands for increased participation in higher echelon medical

service, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee opposed any integration of professional services

until integration of the Army became War Department policy, because professional

integration of military hospitals would result in white patients being forced to

accept treatment by Negro physicians. 38

No minutes were kept of the first meeting, but representatives of the Office of

The Surgeon General emerged believing that the National Medical Association

36 See footnote 21, p. 44. 37 (1) Press release, National Medical Association Incorporated, “Reply of the National Medical Association to

the Purported Press Release of the Honorable Secretary of War, USA, 20 Feb. 1942.” (2) Letter, Eleanor Roosevelt to

Maj, Gen. James C. Magee, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, dated Mar. 1943, inclosure thereto. (3) Memorandum,

Col. Albert G. Love, MC, Chief, Planning and Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Maj. Gen. James

C. Magee, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 14 Oct. 1940. 38 Minutes, Meeting, Re Use of Negro Doctors, Nurses, and Dentistsby Medical Department, Mar. 1941.
56 MEDICAL TRAINING

agreed that the use of Negro physicians in mixed wards was impracticable, and that

satisfactory substitute for professional integration could be provided by establishing segregated Negro wards in hospitals with large number of Negro patients, or

possibly, hospital devoted exclusively to Negro patients. 39 Following the conference, the Office of The Surgeon General began to consider establishing separate

Negro hospitals at Fort Huachuca; Savannah Ordnance Depot, Savannah, Ga.; and

the Wilmington Anti-Aircraft Firing Center, Wilmington, Del. Separate Negro

wards were established at Fort Bragg, N.C., and Fort Livingstone, La. The general plan of segregating Negro patients for the benefit of Negro physicians received War

Department approval. 40

Late in December 1940, Judge William H. Hastie, the dean of the Floward

University Law School, Washington, D.C., who had recently been appointed

Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War on Negro Affairs, was given the power to

comment or concur before final decision, on all matters of policy pertaining to

Negroes.41 Establishment of an all-Negro hospital was postponed until it could be

justified by the concentration of sufficient numbers of Negro personnel; in the

interim, members of the National Medical Association began to express discontent

with plans for Negro medical service.

At conference in March 1941, attended, among others, by Judge Hastie and

Dr. (later Colonel, MC) Midian 0. Bousfield, leading member of the National

Medical Association, Judge Hastie took issue with member of the National

Medical Association, who insisted thatthe association had not accepted the Medical

Department’s plan. As Judge Hastie explained it, the National Medical Association

was willing to concede the necessity of segregated wards in the South, where local

customs would be hostile to the integration of professional staff, but felt it would

be unfortunate if the practice were extended to other areas. Dr. Bousfield expressed

the opinion that anything short of complete integration would be inconsistent with

the concept of democracy.42

When plans for an all-Negro hospital were revived early in 1942, however, and

Dr. Bousfield was recommended by the Procurement and Assignment Service,

civilian agency, as the most qualified member of the National Medical Association

to recruit hospital staff, he accepted the responsibility. When his name was urged

upon the Medical Department by Judge Hastie’s office, he also accepted command

of the new hospital. 43 In letter to members of the National Medical Association,

39 (1) See footnote 37(3), p. 55. (2) Letter, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, toDr. A. N.

Vaughn, President, National Medical Association, 18 Oct. 1940. 40 (1) Letter, Col. Larry B. McAfee, MC, Executive Officer to The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General,

War Department, 25 Oct. 1940, subject: Plan for Utilization of Negro Officers, Nurses, and Enlisted Menin the Medical

Department’s 1940-41 Military Program. 1st indorsement thereto, dated 15 Nov. 1940. (2) See footnote 38, p. 55. 41 Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to the Chiefs of Arms and Services, and Divisions of War

Department General Staff, 18 Dec. 1940, subject: Policies Pertaining to Negroes.

42 (1) See footnote 38, p. 55. (2) Memorandum, William H. Hastie, CivilianAide to the Secretary of War, to The

Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 17 Mar, 1941, inclosure thereto.

43 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. Howard T. Wickert, MC, Assistant Chief, Planning Division, Operations Service,

Office of The Surgeon General, for General McAfee, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, 16 Jan.

1942. (2) 2d indorsement, Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, Assistant to The Surgeon General, Chief, Operations Service,

Office of The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, War Department, 19 Jan. 1942. (3) Informal Action Sheet,

Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, Assistant to The Surgeon General, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon

General, to The Adjutant General, War Department, May 1942.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 57

Dr. Bousfield announced 44

have just returned from conference in the Surgeon General’s Office in Washington. station hospital of 672 beds is to be organized immediately at Camp Huachuca, Ariz.,

with complete complement of Negro doctors. Except for being completely segregated unit, it

is victory for the protest against the exclusion of Negro doctors. Much more important, it gives

protection to our best physicians in two ways: It prevents them from being drafted into the ranks,

and gives great protection by being assigned to station hospital, which will not be disturbed unless the country is bombed or successfully invaded. The men will likely not see active service

with the fighting forces. complete division is to be trained at Huachuca.

An immediate response will indicate the interest of the members of the National Medical Association in the control of an opportunities [sic] of additional training to be obtained in this

large hospital, as well as in this successful issue of our protests.

Neither the establishment of an all-Negro hospital nor Dr. Bousfield’s letter

was long in drawing hostile fire. An announcement by Secretary of War, Henry L.

Stimson, that the Fort Huachuca hospital was to be established, purportedly at the

request of the National Medical Association, was immediately repudiated by that

organization. In its formal reply to the Secretary’s press release, the association

stated that Dr. A. N. Vaughn, president of the National Medical Association,

refused to endorse the plan, and that they would not subscribe to any form of racial

segregation. 45 The Medical Department responded by informing the Secretary of

War, through The Adjutant General:46

The point at issue appears to be the purported statement that the Negro association officials specifically requested the present arrangement for the utilization of Negroes in the Medical Service. Actually they have consistently insisted on integration of Negro doctors with white

doctors. This had not been done. War Department policy for their use does not contemplate it.

However, through patient segregation it has been possible to broaden the Negro doctors’ service

in the Medical Department, and it has been the impression that the manner in which it was being

done, that is, separate departments in these hospitals in which the Negro patient population

would justify it and complete Negro staffed hospitals for Negro cantonments, was most satisfactory to the association officials, short of complete integration.

Despite the National Medical Association’s protests, it appears that the

Medical Department, limited by War Department policy on integration, had acted

in good faith to expand the professional activities of Negro physicians, even though

it meant changing previous policies of separating patients by disease and substituting segregation by race. Dr. Vaughn had been informed of this policy immediately

following the conference of October 1940, and Judge Hastie had endorsed the policy

of segregated wards for the benefit of physicians, at least in the South, in March

1940.47

44 Letter, Dr. M. O. Bousfield, Chairman, National Medical Association Procurement and Assignment Service, to

All State and Local Societies of the National Medical Association, 12 Mar. 1942.

45 See footnote 37 (1), p. 55.

46 (1) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, Assistant to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, War Department, 16 Mar. 1942, subject:

Secretary of War’s Press Conference on Use of Negro Doctors. (2) 2d indorsement, Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, Assistant to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Chief, Operations Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, War Department, Mar. 1942. 47 See footnote 39 (2), p. 55.
58 MEDICAL TRAINING

Subsequently, both Judge Hastie and Dr. Bousfield, an outspoken opponent of

hospital segregation, collaborated with the Medical Department in establishing the

Fort Huachuca Station Hospital. Dr. Bousfield was later censured by the National

Medical Association for his part in the affair, and his inappropriate recruiting effort

also drew expressions of resentment. Others expressed the fear that Dr. Bousfield’s

geographic origin would result in the choice of too many physicians from the

Middle West.48 In any event, the special course for the cadre of the 93d (Negro)

Infantry Division and the Fort Huachuca Station Hospital began on sour note.

Preparation of special outline was justified by the lack of prior experience and

training on the part of officers selected for the hospital. Apparently, the course

proceeded without incident, and all 22 officers were graduated with satisfactory

ratings. No further segregated Special Cadre Courses were held.49

Special Cadre Courses continued to be offered regularly until July 1943, when

the program was terminated. In April 1943, the capacity of the program was

expanded from 50 to 100, to allow cadres from nondivisional units to attend. During its more than years of operation, 560 officers graduated from the course. 50

Schools outside the Medical Department

In addition to courses already discussed at the Chicago Quartermaster Depot

and the Edgewood Arsenal Chemical Warfare School, number of courses were

available at Army schools not controlled by the Medical Department. Between

July 1941 and July 1942, 46 Medical Department officers were sent to the Command and General Staff School. Twelve MAC officers and three MC officers graduated

from the Adjutant General’s School, Fort Washington, Md., and few attended the

2-week Camouflage Course at Fort Belvoir, Va. The following year, 132 completed

courses at the Command and General Staff School, 81 completed courses at the

Adjutant General’s School, 43 completed the Camouflage Course, and four completed the Ordnance Automotive Maintenance Course at the Ordnance School,

Atlanta, Ga. Between July 1943 and the end of June 1944, 52 officers graduated

from the Command and General Staff School, 180 graduated from the Adjutant

General’s School, four completed the Camouflage Course, and six completed the

Ordnance Automotive Maintenance Course. After June 1944, no officers were

reported attending these courses. 51

48 (1) Letter, Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, Assistant to TheSurgeon General, U.S. Army, Chief, Operations Service,

Office of The Surgeon General, to Dr. S. H. Freeman, Secretary, Board of Trustees, National Medical Association,

Inc., May 1942. (2) Letter, Dr. W. Harold Branch to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Apr. 1942. (3) Letter,

Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, Assistant to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The

Surgeon General, to Dr. W. Harold Branch, 22 Apr. 1942. (4) Letter, Maj. Gen. J, A. Ulio, The Adjutant General, to

Dr. R. M. Hedrick, Chairman, Board of Trustees, NationalMedical Association, Inc., Mar. 1942. 49 (1) Letter, Maj. E. R. Whitehurst, MAC, Assistant to Director, Reserve Division, Personnel Service, Military

Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to the Commandant, Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 25 Nov. 1942, subject: Training of Negro (sic) Medical Officers. 1st indorsement thereto, dated 30 Nov.

1942. (2) Letter, Brig. Gen. Addison D. Davis, Commandant, Medical Field Service School, to The Adjutant General,

U.S. Army, Apr. 1942, subject: Special SchoolReport, Special (93d (Negro) Infantry Division) Course 1942, inclosure

thereto.

60 See footnote 22 (2) and (8), p. 45, 61 See footnote 14 (3), p. 41; 26 (1), p. 48; and 27 (1), p. 49.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 59

Specialized Technical Training

Training officers for tactical and administrative duties was serious problem,

but equally important was the task of providing physicians, dentists, and veterinarians with the specialized technical training required for medical support of an army

of million, employed in global war. The distribution of technical skills in prewar

medicine, geared to diseases common to the continental United States and small

number of industrial accidents, was inadequate to provide medical service for an

army beset with combat casualties and exotic diseases, and civilian population

whose industrial activities were accelerated.

Within the American medical profession, only handful of men had any

familiarity with tropical medicine, and the number of thoracic surgeons, neurosurgeons, and similar specialists was small compared to the number required for the

rehabilitation of war casualties. At the same time, such specialists as general

surgeons, obstetricians, and pediatricians were available in numbers greater than

the Army could use. To produce the specialists it needed, the Medical Department

instituted series of technical courses designed to retain physicians with redundant

skills. Facilities for these courses were provided by expanding existing programs,

establishing new service schools, and harnessing civilian institutions. In sum, the

redistribution of technical skills to meet wartime requirements was one of the

largest and most significant training problems encountered by the Medical Department in World War II.

Civilian institutions

The Medical Department had used the facilities of civilian institutions to

provide specialized training for selected officers since 1920. Throughout the interwar

years, the Medical Corps officers sent annually for specialized training had proved

invaluable in keeping the Medical Department in contact with professional trends.

Faced with the problem of training large numbers of officers in professional specialties at the beginning of the war, the Medical Department again turned to civilian

institutions for assistance.

On 23 January 1942, the Office of The Surgeon General asked the Division of

Medical Sciences of the National Research Council to recommend medical colleges

equipped to provide instruction in general surgery, orthopedic surgery, thoracic

surgery, maxillofacial plastic surgery, neurosurgery, clinical pathology, roentgenology, and anesthesiology. 52 The council was also asked to recommend the length

of each course, and to draft outlines of instruction. On 11 April 1942, the Office of

The Surgeon General requested that epidemiology, venereal disease control, tropical

medicine, and sanitary engineering be added to the list. 53

62 (1) Informal Memorandum, Maj. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Assistant to The Surgeon General, Chief, Training

Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to Lt. Col. Joseph R. Darnall, MC, Professional Service,

Surgeon General’s Office, 23 Jan. 1942. (2) Letter, Maj. Robert G. Prentiss, Jr., MC, Director, Technical Division,

Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to Dr. Lewis H. Weed, Chairman, Division of Medical Sciences,

National Research Council, 23 Jan. 1942. (3) 41 Stat. 786. 63 Letter, Lt. Col. Roger G. Prentiss, Jr., MC, Director, Technical Division, Operations Service, Office of The

Surgeon General, to Dr. Lewis H. Weed, Chairman, Division of Medical Sciences, National Research Council, 11 Apr.

1942.
60 MEDICAL TRAINING

Working in cooperation with the Office of The Surgeon General, committees

of the National Research Council accepted the project and estimated the number

of officers required in each specialty. The project was approved by the Army Service

Forces in June 1942, and before the end of the month, facilities were available at 22

civilian institutions for courses in eight specialties. Classes could not begin until

September 1942, however, because of shortage of officers available to attend

them.54 In the interim, 57 officers were sent to the Mayo Foundation, Rochester,

Minn., and to The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., for specialized

training. 55

By September 1942, the supply of officers had increased sufficiently so that it

was possible to begin most of the courses planned earlier in the year. On 28 September 1942, courses were opened in 12 specialties at 15 civilian institutions. On

January 1943, the program was expanded to include seven additional institutions.

By June 1943, 2,067 officers had enrolled, and 2,014 had graduated. 56

In the fall of 1943, most of the courses at civilian institutions were canceled. By

June 1944, training was confined to basic course in neurosurgery at the University

of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., and to courses in anesthesiology, general

surgery, internal medicine, physical therapy, and roentgenology at the Mayo

Foundation. Between June 1943 and June 1944, the number of officers completing

courses in civilian institutions was reduced to 944. 57 The following year, enrollment

in civilian institutions was reduced even further. In March 1945, the courses in

general surgery and internal medicine were canceled. Twelve-week courses in

neuropsychiatry at Columbia and New York Universities, located in New York,

N.Y., were used to supplement training at the Army School of Military Neuropsychiatry, Mason General Hospital, Long Island, N.Y. total of 381 officers

completed courses between June 1944 and June 1945.58

variety of factors were responsible for the abrupt reduction of training at

civilian institutions in the fall of 1943. Chief among these were renewed shortage

of medical officers and change in policies governing the use of civilian facilities. In

September, The Surgeon Generalreported that he did not have enough physicians

in the Army Service Forces to man hospital units scheduled for overseas movement

the following January, and the Medical Department began to study the possibility

of wider use of MAC officers in semiprofessional capacity.

The movement of hospitals to the overseas theaters dramatically reduced the

pool of officers available for advanced technical training. Coupled with this development was change in policies governing the use of civilian institutions. Early in

1943, the War Department began to insist on the maximum utilization of existing

64 (1) See footnotes 14 (3), p. 41; and 26 (1), p. 48. (2) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, Acting The

Surgeon General, for the Commanding General, Sixth Service Command, 22 Feb. 1943, subject: Medical Department

Training Facilities in the Sixth Service Command. (3) Letter, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer to The

Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to Dr. Lewis H. Weed, Chairman, Division of Medical Sciences, National Research

Council, 18 May 1942. (4) Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer to The Surgeon General, U.S.

Army, for the Director of Training, Services of Supply, 22 May 1942, subject: Attendance of Military Personnel at

CivilianEducational Institutions. 1st indorsement thereto, June 1942. 65 See footnote 14 (3), p. 41. 56 See footnote 26 (1), p. 48. 67 See footnote 27 (1), p. 49. 58 See footnote 35 (2), p. 54.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 61

schools, and the Medical Department began to emphasize the use of military

facilities. Officers in the Training Division were unhappy about this policy, but they

began to transfer programs to facilities under military jurisdiction.59 The Army

School of Malariology at Fort Clayton, C.Z., is case in point: one of the purposes

of establishing this school was to bring instruction completely under Army control.

Similarly, the course in anesthesiology was terminated at all civilian institutions except the Mayo Foundation, and transferred to named general hospitals. 60 The

only new courses at civilian institutions after September 1943 were added because

the urgentrequirement for military neuropsychiatrists overtaxed thefacilities of the

School of Military Neuropsychiatry at Mason General Hospital. Columbia and

New York Universities were therefore selected to conduct 3-month course

beginning in April 1944. The course was not repeated. 61

General hospitals

To supplement courses developed along National Research Council guidelines

at civilian institutions, special courses in anesthesiology and neurosurgery were

established at number of general hospitals. Five general hospitals began to offer

3-month course in anesthesiology in January 1943. Because these courses were

intended merely to increase the total number of specialists being trained, they

essentially duplicated those being offered at civilian schools. 62 The neurosurgical

program, however, was designed to supersede the original civilian course. Dissatisfaction with the programs at civilian institutions, particularly those at the

University of Illinois, Chicago, 111., and the Columbia University Neurological

Institute, resulted in the restructuring of the entire program. 63

The new two-phase course was established on 26 April 1943. Phase of the

program consisted of weeks of instruction at Columbia University, in the anatomy

and physiology of the nervous system, with emphasis on surgical application. During

the second phase, students were assigned, singly or in pairs, to neurosurgical centers

throughout the country for 60-day periods of practical training. In contrast with the

previous program, the practical phase was conducted entirely at military hospitals,

where apprentice neurosurgeons saw cases typical of those they would encounter in

military practice. On 17 January 1944, the theoretical phase of instruction was

shifted to the University of Pennsylvania. Itremained there until suspended early

in 1945, after the supply of general surgeons available for special training had been

58 See footnotes 14 (1), p. 41; and 17, p. 43. 60 (1) Annual Report, Army School of Malariology, Fort Clayton, C.Z., fiscal year 1944. (2) Letter, Col. F. B.

Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to the Director of

Military Training, Army Service Forces, 26 Nov. 1943, subject: Courses in Anesthesiology.

61 (1) Memorandum, Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The

Surgeon General, for Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, Mar. 1944, subject; Training of Neuropsychiatrists. (2) Memorandum,Brig. Gen. R. W. Bliss, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for

Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 21 Mar. 1944, subject; Training of Neuropsychiatrists.

62 (1) Memorandum, Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The

Surgeon General, to Director of Training, Services of Supply, 13 Nov. 1942, subject; Courses in Anesthesiology. (2)

Letter, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to the Commanding Officer, Tilton General

Hospital, Fort Dix, N. J., 20 Nov. 1942, subject: Training in Anesthesiology.

63 Personal Diary, Lt. Col. R. Glen Spurling, MC, Chief, Neurosurgical Section, Walter Reed General Hospital,

Washington, D.C., entry dated 15 Mar. 1943.
62 MEDICAL TRAINING

exhausted and the needs of the Medical Department had been met. Approximately

245 neurosurgeons were trained during the war, about half through the 3-month

program at civilian institutions, and half under the joint military-civilian program. 64

Army schools

Tropical and military medicine.—Before World War II, graduates of

American medical schools were seldom trained to cope with tropical diseases.

Recognizing this deficiency, the Subcommittee on Tropical Diseases of the National Research Council recommended, on May 1941, that the Army and the

Navy develop programs in tropical medicine. Specifically, they recommended that

the services send officers to the Tropics for special training, and that they utilize

the facilities of the Tulane University School of Medicine, New Orleans, La., and

the School of Tropical Medicine, San Juan, P.R. The subcommittee stood ready to

assist the services in developing facilities, and in preparing programs of instruction.65

Following meeting between representatives of The Surgeon General and the

Subcommittee on Tropical Diseases on 15 May 1941, the Medical Department

agreed to draw up an outline for course to be offered at the Army Medical Center

and to explore the possibility of conducting course at Tulane University, and

another in the Tropics. 66 Recommendations for the course at the Army Medical

Center were approved in June 1941, and classes began in August. The first classes

were of weeks’ duration, but by the end of the year, course length was extended to

weeks to permit the addition of basic subjects in military medicine, including

clinical and surgical medicine, preventive medicine, ophthalmology, otolaryngology,

roentgenology, dentistry, and veterinary medicine. The title of the course was

changed to Tropical and Military Medicine, and the course became, in effect,

substitutefor the suspended advanced graduate course, with heavy emphasis on

tropical diseases. 67 The Surgeon General justified these changes on the basis of

“insistent requests of station, corps, and army surgeons that some basic instruction

other than that in tropical medicine be given to the officers who had the opportunity

to attend the school.” 68

Courses were designed to provide both lectures and laboratory instruction in

tropical and parasitic diseases. Content was adjusted from time to time to prepare

officers for current or future areas of operation. Instructors were Medical Department officers from the Army Medical School, Walter Reed General Hospital,

Washington, D.C., and The Surgeon General’s office, as well as specialists from

other Government and civilian institutions. Lecturers were provided by the

64 Medical Department, United States Army. Surgery in World War II. Neurosurgery. Volume I. Washington:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958. 65 Minutes, Meeting, Subcommittee on Tropical Diseases, Division of Medical Sciences, National Research Council, May 1941.

66 Minutes, Meeting, Re Special Training in Tropical Diseases, 15 May 1941. [Between representatives of The

Surgeon General and the Subcommittee on Tropical Diseases, Division of Medical Sciences, National Research Council.]

67 See footnote 10, p. 39.

68 Letter, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to Lt. Col. Leon A. Fox, MC, Office of the

Division Engineer, Caribbean Division, New York, N.Y., 14 Oct. 1941.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 63

Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Public Health Service, the U.S. Navy, the

Rockefeller Foundation, and several universities.

Beginning with the 11th course, in January 1943, staff members of medical

schools in the United States and Canada were enrolled in the course under the

sponsorship of the American Association of Medical Colleges and financed by

grant from the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation. Seventy-two faculty members of colleges, graduates of this program, were prepared to present instruction to

students who might subsequently enter the armed services.

The course was originally designed for maximum of 30 students. By July

1942, the demand for officers with background in tropical medicine was intense,

and by November, enrollment had increased to 106 students. Peak enrollment of

222 was reached in January 1943. Courses continued throughout the war, ending

with the graduation of the 23d class in September 1945. final course of weeks

was given in October 1945, with special emphasis on tropical diseases in the Far

East. During the war, 1,882 students graduated. Of these, 1,741 were Medical Corps

officers, 25 were Sanitary Corps officers, and one was Women’s Army Corps

officer. Other graduates included 16 from the U.S. Public Health Service, six from

other U.S. Government services, and 83 officers from Allied Nations. 69

To adjust to the requirements of global war, the course in tropical and military

medicine was supplemented by programs emphasizing the control of tropical

diseases. During 1942, while the use of civilian institutions for teaching medicomilitary subjects was still in the planning stages, steps were taken to insure more

adequate emphasis on the control of tropical diseases. The course for medical and

field sanitary inspectors was inaugurated at the Medical Field Service School, and

course in tropical medicine at Tulane University similar to the one conducted at

the Army Medical Center was incorporated into plans for the utilization of civilian

institutions. Instruction on tropical diseases was incorporated into the courses in

clinical laboratory and in epidemiology that were to be part of the program at

civilian medical schools. 70

In June 1942, members of the Office of The Surgeon General and its civilian

consultants began to discuss the possibility of having the Tennessee Valley Authority conduct 2-week field course in malaria control at Wilson Dam, Ala. 71 Finally,

in December 1942, plans were developed for sending small groups of Medical

Department officers to hospitals, stations, and dispensaries along the Pan American

Highway in Costa Rica, for to months of practical experience in control of

tropical diseases. 72

Late in 1942, these plans began to be translated into programs. On 10 August

69 Annual Report, Technical Activities, Medical Department Professional Service Schools, Army Medical Center,

Washington, D.C., fiscal year 1946. 70 (1) See footnote 26 (1), p. 48. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to Commanding General,

Caribbean Defense Command, 19 Aug. 1943, subject: Army School of Malariology, Fort Clayton, C.Z., indorsements

thereto. 71 Letter, Lt. Col. Paul F. Russell, MC, Chief, Tropical Diseases and Malaria Control Section, Epidemiology Division, Preventive Medicine Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to Dr. W. A. Sawyer, Director, International

Health Division, the Rockefeller Foundation, July 1942. 72 Memorandum, Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to the Director of Training, Services of Supply, 29 Dec. 1942, subject: Applicatory Training in Tropical

Diseases.

497-333 75 -6
64 MEDICAL TRAINING

1942, the field course in malariology was inaugurated at the Tennessee Valley

Authority. This course was conducted until 31 October 1942, when it was replaced

by similar course of weeks’ duration, conducted by the Florida State Board of

Health, in cooperation with the International Health Service of the Rockefeller

Foundation, at Pensacola, Fla. By June 1943, 207 officers had graduated from these

field courses. Courses in epidemiology and in clinical laboratory began operation in

September 1942. In February 1943, the course in tropical medicine at Tulane

University was opened, and by June, it had graduated 42 officers. In March 1943, four officers were sent to Costa Rica for field work in malariology along the Pan

American Highway. 73

By mid-1943, it had become obvious that field programs in tropical diseases,

particularly malariology, were too widely scattered for efficient control and that no

site in the United States was completely satisfactory for field work in malariology. 74

In September, the Office of The Surgeon General proposed the establishment of

service school to provide instruction in malariology on the Pacific side of the Canal

Zone. The site was chosen because all types of malaria control were used in the area

Figure 4.—Army School of Malariology, Fort Clayton, C.Z.

73 (1) Report of the Activities of the Epidemiology Branch for 1942. In Annual Report of Activities of Preventive

Medicine Division for 1942. (2) Annual Report, Tropical Disease Control Division, Preventive Medicine Division,

1943. (3) See footnote 26 (1), p. 48. (4) Medical Department, United States Army. Preventive Medicine in World War

II. Volume VI. Communicable Diseases. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1963, pp. 22-24. 74 See footnote 73 (4).
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 65

and because it was close to such agencies as the Canal Zone Health Department and

the Gorgas Institute. 75

The Office of The Surgeon General recommended that the Army School of Malariology be activated on January 1944, but the opening was postponed until

late in the month because of construction delays and difficulties in acquiring

personnel. The 4-week course conducted by the school included instruction in

survey and reconnaissance, epidemiology, parasitology, entomology, engineering

principles of malaria control, larvicides and insecticides, malaria discipline and

individual protective measures, clinical malaria, and antimalarial drugs. Between

January and June 1944, 70 students graduated, and the following year, the course

was completed by 172 students. The field course in Florida was terminated when the

Army School of Malariology opened (fig. 4). 76

The Army School of Roentgenology.—Before the war, the subject of

roentgenology was included in several programs at the Army Medical Center. After

many of these programs were suspended in 1940 and 1941, roentgenology was

elevated to the status of formal course. The new 4-week course, designed to prepare junior grade MC officers to operate X-ray equipment, began on January

1942. Course capacity was 50 students each month.77

To make room at the Army Medical Center for an expansion of the course in

tropical and military medicine, the roentgenology course was transferred to

facilities leased in Memphis from the University of Tennessee, and established as the

Army School of Roentgenology in December 1942. The first class at the new

location enrolled early in January 1943. Class length was extended to weeks, and

course capacity was increased to 100. The course continued to be conducted

throughout the war. Peak enrollment was reached in 1943, and gradually declined

in following years. Course length increased as enrollment fell off, reaching 12 weeks

by April 1944, and members of the staff devoted more time to research. Between

January 1942 and June 1945, approximately 857 officers graduated.78

The School of Military Neuropsychiatry.—Psychiatry became permanent part of the practice of military medicine during World War I, but in common

with other medical specialties, it fell victim to the attrition of peace and depression.

In 1940, only 35 officers of the Regular Army Medical Corps were assigned to

psychiatric positions, and only four of these were certified by the American Board

of Psychiatry and Neurology. 79 Mobilization and war, however, produced constantly growing demand for specialists to screen inductees and treat the psychiatric

casualties of training and combat.

It was not until months after thebeginning of the war, in the face of mounting

patient loads, that the Neuropsychiatry Branch (later the Psychiatry Consultants

Division) of the Surgeon General’s Office became aware of the national shortage of

75 See footnote 70 (2), p. 63. 76 See footnote 35 (2), p. 54; and 60 (1), p. 61. 77 (1) Medical Department, United States Army. Radiology in World War II. Washington; U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1966. (2) See footnote 14 (3), p. 41. 78 (1) Annual Report, Army School of Roentgenology, Memphis, Tenn., fiscal year 1944. (2) Annual Report, Army

School of Roentgenology, Memphis, Tenn., fiscal year 1945. (3) See footnote 77 (1).

79 Medical Department, United States Army. Neuropsychiatry in World War II. Volume I. Zone of Interior.

Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.
66 MEDICAL TRAINING

trained psychiatrists, and the need for an intensive training program. Many MC

officers assigned to the psychiatric sections of hospitals had had no contact with

psychiatric patients since their internship, and even qualified psychiatrists required

specialized training to cope with the administrative aspects of military neuropsychiatry. All officers had to be acquainted with Army regulations governing

psychiatry, disposition procedures, and testimony before boards and courts-martial.

Most had to be prepared for practice under field conditions and the problems of

forward areas. 80

Early in September 1942, the Neuropsychiatry Branch recommended the

establishment of training program, and on October, the Office of The Surgeon

General officially requested the authorization for 4-week course in military

neuropsychiatry. Lawson General Hospital was suggested as the site because of its

large psychiatric service. The request was approved on 27 October 1942, and on

January 1943, the new service school began operation.81

The School of Military Neuropsychiatry, Lawson General Hospital, began

with staff of four MC officers in existing hospital buildings. The program, consisting of 187 hours of instruction, was designed to orient psychiatrists to the military

aspects of their speciality. About two-thirds of theprogram was devoted to lectures,

seminars, and clinical presentations in neurology and psychiatry, and the balance

was devoted to administration and military orientation. total of 308 students

graduated from the 11 courses conducted at Lawson General Hospital. 82

In October 1943, the school was moved to Mason General Hospital, which had

been designated as specialized treatment hospital for neuropsychiatric casualties.

In the spring of 1944, it became apparent that the shortage of trained psychiatrists

would continue indefinitely, and the program was redesigned to provide 12 weeks of

intensive training for medical officers who had no previous psychiatric experience.

With the exception of two “fill in” courses, all subsequent classes were subjected to

total of 600 hours of instruction with heavy emphasis on orienting physicians to

psychiatry. It was at this time that the program temporarily expanded to include

courses at Columbia and New York Universities. Both of these universities

conducted three such courses, and 227 officers graduated. The School of Military

Neuropsychiatry continued to offer classes until 22 December 1945, graduating 692

officers. The total graduates for the military school at both of its locations were

exactly 1,000, about two-thirds of whom had no previous background in

psychiatry. 83

The Professional Service Schools at the Army Medical Center.—Before

the war, Medical Department technical training was conducted almost exclusively

80 See footnote 79, p. 65.

81 (1) Menninger, Brig. Gen. William C.: Education and Training in Neuropsychiatry. [Official record.] (2) Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, forDirector of Training, Services of Supply, Oct. 1942, subject: Intensive Course of Instruction in Military Neuropsychiatry. (3) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. C. R. Huebner, GSC, Director of Training, Services of Supply, for the Commanding General,

Fourth Service Command, 27 Oct. 1942, subject: Establishment of School for Military Neuropsychiatry.

82 (1) Annual Report, School of Military Neuropsychiatry, Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga., fiscal year

1943. (2) Annual Report, School of Military Neuropsychiatry, Mason General Hospital, Long Island, N.Y., fiscal

year 1944.

83 See footnote 79, p. 65.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 67

at the Professional Service Schools at the Army Medical Center. Many courses

were suspended at the beginning of the war, and others, such as the course in roentgenology, were transferred to make room for expansion of the course in tropical

medicine. The few that remained throughout the war were usually conducted by

either the Army Dental School or the Army Veterinary School.

In the prewar era, training in plastic and maxillofacial plastic surgery was

provided by the Army Medical School through its professional specialists courses.

In August 1941, after these courses had been suspended, the Army Medical School

and the Army Dental School joined in cooperative efforts to organize 4-week

course to prepare medical and dental officers to serve on maxillofacial surgical

teams. The new course opened on September 1941, and continued to be offered

until September 1943, graduating 209 officers. Late in 1942, the length of the course

was extended to weeks. Between September 1942 and August 1944, training in

maxillofacial plastic surgery was also conducted at civilian institutions. 84

new 4-week course in the preparation of blood plasma and the operation of

plasma centers was inaugurated at the Army Medical Center in April 1942. The

program provided on-the-job training in laboratory techniques and the operation of

donor centers. The course continued to be given to small number of officers

throughout the war. 85

In 1941, the Army Veterinary School reported that some instruction in meat

and dairy hygiene was being given to officers of the Sanitary Corps undergoing

training for duty as nutrition officers. The program was designed to orient officers to

the production, preparation, and distribution of meat for military use. Instruction

was informal, consisting of weeks of conferences and demonstrations. Because of

space limitations, the Food and Nutrition Course was transferred to the Army

Medical School on 10 June 1942, where it remained until February 1945when it was

transferredto the Medical Nutrition Laboratory in Chicago. The number of officers

attending the course was always small and was not consistently reported. By the

end of the war, course length had been extended to weeks, and the capacity was

six officers.86

The course in forage inspection, described earlier, was one of the few peacetime

courses that continued for the duration of the war. The 1-monthRefresher Course

inForage Inspection was authorized on 31 July 1940, as substitute for the National

Guard officers’ course and partial substitute for the Basic Graduate Course for VC

officers. Temporarily suspended in June 1942, it was reestablished in March 1943

and continued until after V-J Day. It was conducted 21 times, and 66 officers

graduated.87

In June 1940, the Veterinary Division of the Surgeon General’s Office recommended the establishment of course in clinical pathology for officers assigned to

Medical Department laboratories. few months later, 3-month course designated

84 (1) Annual Report, Technical Activities, Medical Department Professional Service School, Army Medical

Center, Washington, D.C., fiscal year 1942. (2) See footnotes 26 (1), p. 48; and 27 (1), p. 49. (3) Medical Department,

United States Army. United States Army Dental Service in World War II. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting

Office, 1955.

85 See footnote 10, p. 39.

86 See footnotes 35 (2), p. 54, and 84 (1).

87 See footnote 16 (1), p. 42.
68 MEDICAL TRAINING

as the Special Graduate Course in Clinical Pathology was established. The course

included 454 hours of instruction and laboratory experience in bacteriology,

parasitology, serology, and food chemistry. 88

On-the-job training for specialized teams.—Early in 1942, the Medical

Department formally recognized the need to prepare specialized teams to operate

at medical field installations. Small groups such as surgical teams, composed of an

operating surgeon and his assistant, an anesthetist, nurse, and surgical technician, required practice to integrate their skills and function efficiently. Other

specialties in which the teams were required included treatment of shock, splinting, thoracic surgery, maxillofacial plastic surgery, and neurosurgery. On 27 February 1942, all hospitals with capacity of 500 or more beds were directed to establish team training programs before April. 89 Formal course outlines were not

required, and instruction was to be integrated with the routine duties of personnel

at the hospitals. Once the program was established, it became continuous feature

of hospital-level training, although statistics were not reported by the Medical

Department.90

The School of Aviation Medicine. 91—The priority placed on air defense

during the initial phases of the limited emergency brought with it an early expansion and acceleration of the training program at the School of Aviation Medicine. In May 1940, Gen. H. H. Arnold, chief of the Army Air Corps, estimated that

during the next year 50,000 physical examinations, in addition to routine examinations, would be required to screen the trainees needed for Air Corps expansion.

To train physicians to conduct examinations, he recommended, through The

Surgeon General, that the training program for the School of Aviation Medicine

under the Protective Mobilization Plan be put into effect on 15 July 1940. His

recommendation was approved, and in mid-1940, the basic course at the school

was shortened from months to weeks.

During the year it remained in effect, the accelerated course had mixedresults.

Designed to train Army medical officers as aviation medical examiners, the program

was confined to theoretical and clinical instruction in medical specialties, and

training time was increased from 43 to 50 hours week. Between July 1940 and

July 1941, approximately 240 medical examiners graduated. That number was

adequate, but instructors at the school believed that weeks was not enough time

to provide thorough training, and reports from the field confirmed this opinion. At

the end of the year, class length was restored to 12 weeks, and the capacity of the

school was expanded.

Beginning in April 1942, the course was split into two phases of weeks each.

During the first phase, students attended conferences, lectures, demonstrations, and

88 (1) See footnote 84 (1), p. 67. (2) Letter, Lt. Col. Ralph B. Stewart, VC, Director, Army Veterinary School,

Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., to the Assistant Commandant, Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C.,

Aug. 1940, subject: Special Course of Instruction in VeterinaryLaboratory Procedure, attachment thereto. 89 Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to the Commanding Generals of All Corps Areas, Chief of

the Air Force, and the Commanding Officers of All Named General Hospitals, 27 Feb. 1942, subject: Training of Auxiliary Surgical Groups.

90 See footnote 10, p. 39. 91 This section is based on Link, Mae Mills, and Coleman, Hubert A.: Department of the Air Force. Medical Support of the Army Air Forces in World War II. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1955.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 69

clinics at the School of Aviation Medicine. In the second phase, they were sent to

special branch schools established at Aviation Cadet Classification Centers for practical training. By assigning students to other stations for half of the course,

authorities at the school hoped to double its capacity, and to use students to conduct physical examinations during half of their training. During this period, classes

expanded from capacity of 100 to approximately 320.

Since the classification centers at which the second phase of the medical

examiners’ course was conducted were initially designed for the examination of

cadets, they were not ideally equipped for classes in medical, administrative, and

tactical procedures. Training was further complicated by lack of uniformity in

branch school programs. One school, for example, conducted 3-week course in

hospital administration similar to the refresher and pool courses at ASF hospitals.

To overcome these difficulties, the Air Surgeon directed committee to study the

training and torecommend standardized program of instruction, in mid-September

1942. The committee decided that the second phase should be divided into three

subcourses of weeks each. During one period, the student was to be assigned to

conduct physical examinations on the examining line, and rotated from station to

station in the line so that he performed .each part of the examination on aircrew

applicants. In the second period, he was to conduct psychological studies of aviation

cadets, and during the third, he was to be assigned to the station hospital to study

medical subjects. The schedule was put into effect in November 1942, but as late as

April 1943, branch schools had failed to achieve the desired level of standardization.

On October 1943, the Aviation Medical Examiners’ Course was shortened

from 12 to weeks, and the branch schools were closed. Between May 1942 and

October 1943, 1,020 students had graduated from the San Antonio, Tex., branch

school, 666 from the Santa Ana, Calif., branch, and 1,092 from the Nashville, Tenn.,

branch. After October 1943, all training for aviation medical examiners was

conducted at the School of Aviation Medicine. On 31 July 1944, the course was

lengthened to 11 weeks to permit the reestablishment of flight training, expand the

time devoted to medical studies, and provide students with free afternoon each

week.

During the course of World War II, the School of Aviation Medicine expanded

its curriculum to embrace many subjects which had previously been confined to

schools under the direct control of The Surgeon General. Traditionally, medical

officers assigned to the Army Air Corps had received their training in military

medicine, tactics, and administration at the Medical Field Service School, and then

attended the School of Aviation Medicine to be trained as aviation medical

examiners and eventually become flight surgeons.92 During 1941, when the course

was compressed into weeks of intensive training, main emphasis was placed on

conducting physical examinations at classification centers and on related subjects,

such as cardiology and physical diagnosis. After December 1941, mounting

criticism of the officers graduating from the course brought shift in emphasis

92 Aviation medical examiners became qualified as flight surgeons after specified period of time, usually year,

on duty with the Army Air Forces. The period needed to qualify varied during the war and could be modified by the

amount of flight time accumulated by an officer.
70 MEDICAL TRAINING

toward military medicine and administration. By March 1942, the commandant of

the school was able to report

The course at the School of Aviation Medicine has materially changed since October, as we are stressing the practical aspects of field duty more and more and the physical examination is only of material interest to those who are assigned to classification centers and replacement

centers. To be sure 64 examinations are made but they are few and far apart except at the centers

mentioned. We have added tropical medicine, field sanitation and hygiene, first aid, shock treatment, low pressure chamber work and other features to our curriculum. Furthermore, some

compulsory exercise and drill have been added.93

In November 1942, Department of Military Medicine was added to the

school and made responsible for instruction in the organization and functions of the

Army Air Forces, field sanitation and hygiene, chemical warfare, supply and

administration, and field exercises. By October 1943, 6-day bivouac had been

added. During the same period, training in medical specialties was increased, and

beginning in April 1944, policy of sending all MC officers assigned to the Army

Air Forces to theSchool of Aviation Medicine was adopted. Finally, after July 1944, officers eligible for service in theaters of operations were assigned to the Tactical

Unit Surgeon’s Course at the AAF School of Applied Tactics, Orlando, Fla., to be

trained in tactics, military aspects of medicine, and administration.

The trend toward incorporating tactical, medicomilitary, and administrative subjects into the curriculum of the School of Aviation Medicine paralleled developments in Special Service Schools and other ASF training programs. The course in

tropical medicine, for example, integrated administrative and tactical subjects into

the technical curriculum early in the war. Similar developments took place at the

Medical Field Service School itself, in the course for medical field and sanitary

inspectors, and in pools established at medical installations. The underlying cause

of this duplication of efforts lay in the inability of the Medical Field Service School

to provide basic training for all Medical Department officers as soon as they

reported for duty.

Programs for Negro flight surgeons were also problem. During the first year

of the war, theSchool of Aviation Medicine was able tokeep Negroes from attending

by enrolling them in extension courses. Three Negro officers enrolled in the extension

course graduated in February 1943. When this policy was brought to the attention

of theSecretary of War by Judge Hastie in January 1943, the policy was changed to

provide equal standards for admission. The first Negro officers graduated from the

course in March 1943.

Mid-War Additions to the Medical Department Program

By late 1943, the pace of unit activations had slowed and training efforts were

reduced in the main to providing replacements. At this point, planners began to turn their attention to adjustments in the training process, special courses for special

situations, and eventually, to planning for the cessation of hostilities. During the

last years of the war, series of courses was added to the program whose only

common denominator was being established to meet special needs.

93 See footnote 91, p. 68.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 71

Anesthesiology for portable surgical hospitals.—A special course in

anesthesiology for portable surgical hospitals was conducted from August to

September 1943. The object of this special course was to provide personnel trained

to use the limited anesthetic equipment allotted to portable surgical hospitals. The

course was conducted at Halloran General Hospital, Staten Island, N.Y., Nichols

General Hospital, Louisville, Ky., and the station hospitals at Fort Bragg and

Camp Breckinridge, Morganfield, Ky. total of 12 officers graduated.94

The Army Ground Forces refresher course.—In December 1943, the

commanding general of the Army Ground Forces requested that the Medical Department establish refresher course in medical and surgical treatment of battle

casualties in forward areas for officers assigned to medical detachments and divisional medical battalions. In response, the Office of The Surgeon General developed 4-week program of on-the-job training at named general hospitals. Fortyeight hours’ training time was devoted to each of four subject areas: Amputations

and fractures, neurosurgery and anesthesiology, neuropsychiatry and medicine,

and roentgenology and chest and abdominal surgery. The training consisted of

reviewing the case histories of battle casualties, making ward rounds with the

chiefs of hospital services, and participating in the weekly clinical conferences of

staff sections and the general staff of hospitals.

The first 4-week AGF Refresher Course in First and Second Echelon Medical

and Surgical Care was initiated on 29 April 1944 at the following general hospitals:

Bushnell, Brigham City, Utah; Percy Jones, Battle Creek, Mich.; Walter Reed;

Brooke, San Antonio, Tex.; and McCloskey, Temple, Tex. Courses continued until

November 1944, when the program was discontinued. 95

Electroencephalography.—In July 1944, 4-week course was established

at Walter Reed and Mason General Hospitals to train officers in the operation and

interpretation of electroencephalographs. Each course had capacity of four students. Subsequently, similar courses were established at Brooke General Hospital

and DeWitt General Hospital, Auburn, Calif. By the end of June 1945, total of

35 students had graduated.96

Orientation for female SnC officers.—In November 1944, 2-week course

was established at Billings General Hospital, Indianapolis, Ind., for newly commissioned members of the Women’s Army Corps (detailed to the Sanitary Corps)

as bacteriologists, biochemists, or serologists. By the time the course was terminated

in March 1945, 31 officers had graduated.

94 (1) Letter, Col. Charles H. Moseley, MC, Deputy Director, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The

Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to the Director of Military Training, Army ServiceForces, 21 July 1943, subject: Special

Course in Anesthesiology. (2) See footnote 27 (1), p. 49. (3) Letter, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to the Commanding Officer, Nichols General Hospital, Louisville, Ky,, 28 July 1943, subject: Special Training Course in Anesthesiology.

96 (1) Letter, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Dec.

1943, subject: Course of Instruction for Medical Officers, indorsements and inclosure thereto. (2) Memorandum, Col.

Floyd L. Wergeland, MC, Director, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army,

for Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, 13 Apr. 1944, subject; Refresher Course for Medical Corps

Officers of the Army Ground Forces, indorsement and inclosure thereto. (3) See footnote 35 (2), p. 54.

96 Memorandum,Lt. Col. Chas. H. Moseley, MC, Deputy Director, Training Division, Operations Service, Office

of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, 26 June 1944, subject:

Applicatory Training of Medical Corps Officers in Electroencephalography.
72 MEDICAL TRAINING

Refresher courses for Medical Department officers.—At the beginning

of World War II, many Regular Army officers had been transferred from professional duties to administrative posts, where their administrative skills and experience could be used to guide the Medical Department’s expansion. By late 1944,

large numbers of medical, dental, and veterinary officers had already served long

periods in administrative or semiprofessional assignments. When peace returned

and the Army was demobilized, many would be returned to clinical duties.

Plans for refresher training to bring Medical Department officers up to date

with developments in their specialties were approved in the fall of 1944, and on

17 November, “Guide for the Professional Refresher Training of Medical Corps

Officers” was approved. This guide was used as background material for 12 weeks

of on-the-job refresher training for MC officers in general medicine and general

surgery. By early 1945, 48 general hospitals were participating in the program. By

June 1945, 176 MC officers had completed the refresher course. In April and May

1945, guides for refresher training were approved for DC and SnC officers, and

courses were established for them at general hospitals.

THE ARMY SPECIALIZED TRAINING PROGRAM 97

Between 1943 and 1945, 29,730 enlisted men were assigned to ASTP (Army

Specialized Training Program) units at civilian schools to be trained as physicians,

dentists, and veterinarians, and approximately 4,900 enlisted men were assigned to

ASTP units at colleges and universities for preprofessional training. Before the

program was terminated in July 1946, 16,429 enlisted men graduated from professional schools and became available for appointment as officers in the Medical

Department. 98

World War Precedents

The World War II Army Specialized Training Program had antecedents in

World War I. Following the passage of the Selective Service Act of 1917, medical

schools sought to have students exempted from induction on the ground that their

value to the Armed Forces would be greater if their education were continued

through graduation. prolonged war might even produce serious shortage of

physicians. Medical students were not exempted, but by the end of August 1917,

the Army had made it possible for full-time medical, dental, and veterinary students

entering the service to be assigned to the Medical Enlisted Reserve Corps in an

inactive status to continue studies at their own expense. Students could retain their

inactive status through residency if their academic progress was satisfactory. The

program was placed under the supervision of The Surgeon General.99

97 Except as otherwise noted, this section is based on Fitts, Francis M.: Training in Medicine, Dentistry, and

Veterinary Medicine, and in Preparation Therefor, Under the Army Specialized Training Program, May 1943 to 31 Dec. 1945. [Official record.]

98 See footnote 17, p. 43.

99 The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War. Washington: Government Printing

Office, 1923, vol. I.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 73

By March 1918, 60 percent of the medical students in recognized schools of

medicine had entered the Enlisted Reserve Corps. Those not under military

jurisdiction consisted of aliens, the physically disqualified, registrants deferred because of dependents, overage students, and those who had not reached age 21.

Statistics are not available for dental and veterinary students. In August 1918, enlistments and transfers to the Enlisted Reserve Corps were discontinued because

SATC (Students’ Army Training Corps) was established. That fall, all members of

the Enlisted Reserve except those serving hospital internships were called to active duty and transferred to SATC units established at the schools in which they were

enrolled. Since these trainees were discharged shortly after the armistice, little

information on this experiment is available. Despite provisions for the voluntary

continuation of professional studies, the eagerness of that generation to participate

in the war effort resulted in serious reduction of the number entering or continuing

their studies.

Neither program made specific provisions for preprofessional students. Those

preparing for medical, dental, and veterinary schools had no protection beyond

general enrollment in theStudents’ Army Training Corps. Since theage of induction

was not lowered from 21 to 18 until 31 August 1918, failure to assure continuous

flow of students into professional schools created no serious military problems. Had

the war continuedfor several years, however, shortage of physicians, dentists, and

veterinarians might have developed.

National Emergency Programs

Between wars, little thought appears to have been given to providing uninterrupted training for professional and preprofessional students. It was not until

after the declaration of limited national emergency in 1939, when educators

became concerned that medical students who had earned Reserve commissions

outside the Medical Department as undergraduates might be mobilized as line

officers, that the question received formal consideration. 100

In April 1940, as result of study of medical officer procurement, the War

Department made it possible to transfer full-time medical, veterinary, and dental

students with Reserve commissions to the MAC Officers’ Reserve during mobilization. On 28 August 1940, the day after Congress authorized limited mobilization,

the transfer was put into effect by War Department directive. 101

Under the Selective Training and Service Act of September 1940, students

were exempted from the draft until July 1941, but residents and interns were

required to seek occupational deferments from their local boards. While such

100 Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to Each Corps Area and Department Commander; Each

Chief of Arm or Service, 17 Apr. 1940, subject; Special Mobilization Procedures for Procurement of Medical Department Reserve Officers Who Are Students in Approved Medical Schools.

101 (1) Letter, Col. James E. Baylis, MC, Executive Officer to The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General,

War Department, Aug. 1940, subject: Special Mobililization Procedures for Procurement of Medical Department

Reserve Officers Who Are Students in Approved Medical Schools. 1st indorsement thereto, Sept. 1940. (2) Letter,

The Adjutant General, War Department, to Each Corps Area and Department Commander; Each Chief of Arm or

Service, 28 Aug. 1940, subject: Special Mobilization Procedures for Procurement of Medical Department Reserve

Officers Who Are Students in Approved Medical Schools. (3) See footnote 100.
74 MEDICAL TRAINING

deferments were usually granted, they could not be guaranteed. In May and June

1941, the War Department authorized the appointment of full-time juniors and

seniors in approved schools of medicine to the Medical Administrative Corps, and

postponement of their call to active duty. year later, similar appointments were

authorized for students in the two lower classes and for students who had been

accepted for the next entering class. After completing their studies, these officers

were to be transferred to either the Medical, Dental, or Veterinary Corps.

By February 1943, when the program was discontinued, commissions in the

Medical Administrative Corps were held by 13,108 medical, 5,838 dental, and 1,116

veterinary students. The Navy provided similar program, and by March 1943,

when the National Selective Service recommended that local boards defer full-time

students in these fields, there were few physically qualified male students who had

not enrolled in the wartime Reserve. This change in policy by the Selective Service

proved of value, however, for it also extended deferments to preprofessional

students who were accepted for approved professional studies and would complete

their undergraduate work within 24 months. 102

Students in other fields had less extensive opportunities to continue their

education. In May 1942, the War Department authorized the voluntary enlistment

of college students in the Enlisted Reserve Corps, with the understanding that they

were to be exempted from active service as long as the military situation permitted.

Medical, dental, and veterinary students could not participate in this program, but

preprofessional students who had not yet been accepted by professional school

were able to take full advantage of it.103

The War Department Program 104

The decision to initiate the military college training program grew out of the

War Department’s recognition that lowering the selective service age to 18 would

cut off the supply of college-trained men. The armed services could not afford the

luxury of allowing large proportion of the Nation’s military manpower to spend

years engaged in studies not necessarily vital to the war effort, but neither could

they afford to destroy their source of college-trained men who could serve as officers

and technicians. Planners also had to consider the impact of reducing the draft age

to 18 on the Nation’s colleges and universities.

In January 1942, and again in July, representatives of the Nation’s colleges

met at conferences sponsored by the American Council on Education, to discuss the

effect of war on higher education. In both instances, statements were issued urging

the Government to make maximum use of college facilities, to grant Federal aid to

accelerate training, and to draft plans for using the resources of educational

institutions in the war effort. Anticipating that both industry and educators would

102 See footnote 17, p. 43. 103Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to Corps Area and Similar Commanders, 25 May 1942, subject: Preinduction Training in Colleges and Universities, inclosures thereto.

104 This section is based on “History of Military Training, Army Specialized Training Program, Army Service

Forces, From Its Beginning to 31 Dec. 1944, With Supplement to 30 June 1945.” [Official record.]
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 75

oppose reducing the draft age to 18, the War Department began to make plans for

an Army-Navy college training program.

On 25 September 1942, the Commanding General, ASF, was directed to

prepare detailed plan for an Army college training program. On 13 November, the

President signed an amendment to the Selective Service Act, reducing the draft age

to 18, and on 17 December, the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments

announced an Army-Navy college training program. The programs announced by

the two secretaries became the Army Specialized Training Program and the Navy

College Training Program commonly known as the V-12.

Basic policies guiding ASF planning for the Army Specialized Training Program

were developed during series of conferences between representatives of the War

Department and American colleges and universities. Guidelines for the program

were incorporated into the memorandum of 25 September 1942, directing the Commanding General, ASF, to develop detailed plans for the Army Specialized Training

Program. The number of men to be trained, and their fields of specialization, were

to be determined by the Army’s needs. Trainees were to be selected from the Army

at large, on the basis of previous academic training, the results of scholastic aptitude

and achievement tests, and the qualities of leadership demonstrated during military

service. Selection was to be preceded by basic military training. During their college

training, men assigned to the program were to be on an active-duty status,

organized, administered, and disciplined under cadet system. The curriculum, the

duration of training, and the number of men in each course were to be determined

by the Army.

In exceptional cases, cadets who were selected for service in nonmilitary

activities were to be transferred to the Reserve, for employment in civilian status,

subject to recall to active duty. Recommendations were also included for the kinds

and levels of instruction, the acceleration of academic training, and the selection

of trainees. The detailed plan based on these guidelines was developed by the

Personnel Division, ASF, after further conferences.

The final plan for the Army Specialized Training Program, released by the

Secretaries of War and Navy on 17 December 1942, modified many of the guidelines

in the memorandum of 25 September. Medical and dental students, and members of

the Enlisted Reserve Corps, were exempted from basic military training. Selection

was placed under the control of the War Department and was to follow the general

guidelines for selecting officer candidates. Enlisted men over the age of 22 were

eligible only for advanced training. Trainees were to be privates, seventh grade, and

given military training under cadet system, concurrent with their academic

training. Academic standards were to be formulated after consultation with the

U.S. Office of Education and the American Council on Education. Men in training

were to undergo continuous screening, and failing trainees were to be promptly

relieved and reassigned.

Graduates of the program were to be selected for further training at an officer

candidate school, recommended for ratings as technical noncommissioned officers,

orreturned to troops. Responsibility for the operation of the program was assigned

to the Army Service Forces. memorandum from the Secretaries, submitting the
76 MEDICAL TRAINING

plan for the President’s approval on December 1942, stipulated that not more than

150,000 men would be trained by the Army at any one time, of whom 40,000 would

be medical, dental, veterinary, premedical, and predental students.

Special provisions were included for members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps

and the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, and medical, dental, and veterinary

students who held Reserve commissions in the Medical Administrative Corps, to

insure that their previous training would be utilized, and that there would be no

discrimination against them. It was considered discriminatory to deprive them of

opportunities for further training, or to require them to continue at their own

expense. Premedical and predental students in the Enlisted Reserve Corps were to

be called to active duty at the end of the first full term beginning in 1943, and detailed to continue their studies. Medical, veterinary, or dental students commissioned in the Medical Administrative Corps were given the opportunity to

resign their commissions and enlist as privates to continue their studies at Government expense. Premedical students not in the Enlisted Reserve Corps, if inducted

through selective service, were to be placed on inactive duty until the end of the first

full term beginning in 1943, and were then to be called to active duty. Thereafter,

they could be assigned to the Army Specialized Training Program for further

medical or premedical training, or to other military duties.

Between its establishment late in 1942, and its termination in 1946, the Army

Specialized Training Program underwent continuous change. Of major importance

were fluctuations in the program’s size. At thebeginning, ceiling strength was set at

150,000. By September 1943, the Army Specialized Training Program had reached

strength of approximately 124,000 trainees and was still growing. On 16 September, however, the War Department let it be known that the program would

probably be reduced, and on November 1943, the Secretary of War directed that

total enrollment be reduced to 95,000 by 30 June 1944, and to 40,000 by the end of

December. The program reached peak strength of 140,000 in January 1944, when

plans for reduction to prescribed ceilings were put into effect. On 10February 1944,

the Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, sent strongly worded memorandum to the Secretary of War, recommending drastic reduction of ceilings to

maximum of 30,000. On 16 February, the War Department General Staff, G-l,

Personnel, informed the Commanding General, ASF, that ceiling of 30,000 ASTP

trainees would become effective on April. Those remaining in the program would

consist entirely of advanced technical, preprofessional, and professional trainees.

In response to this directive, plan, submitted on 25 February 1944, recommended that 25,000 professional and preprofessional medical, dental, and veterinary

trainees be retained in the program, and that an additionaCl,000 vacancies be

reserved for soldiers who held acceptances from professional schools but were not

yet enrolled in the Army Specialized Training Program. It also recommended that

the Army Specialized Training Program include 2,000 foreign area and language

trainees, 3,000 advanced engineering trainees, and small group of men in other

programs. Under this plan, total enrollment would have been reduced to 34,100.

With revisions thatreduced it to 30,000 trainees, theSecretary of War approved the

plan on 28 February 1944. As result of these decisions, medical, dental, and
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 77

Table 2.—Summary of Army Specialized Training Program demands, by arms and services,

January 1943-July 1944

Source: History of Military Training, Army Specialized Training Program, Army Service Forces, From Its Beginning to 31 December 1944, With Supplement to 30 June 1945. [Official record.]

veterinary students were the largest single groupof Army Specialized Training Program trainees after April 1944 as reflected in table 2.

Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Training

Army specialized training in medicine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine

differedfrom other Army specialized training in variety of ways. 105 Because study

in these fields led to professional degrees, the program was longer and followed the

regular curriculum of professional schools. Instead of adopting the standard

12-week ASTP cycle, many schools remained on the quarter or the semester.

Provisions for physical and military training were different, and because most

medical, dental, and veterinary students were on commutation of quarters and

rations, there were differences in local administrativeproblems. Since most students

in these fields had begun their professional or preprofessional training before the

establishment of the Army Specialized Training Program, most of them were

selected under other than ASTP procedures; and, while Medical Department

officers connected with the program were fond of repeatedly saying that trainees

were not “students in uniform” but “soldiers in college,” the differences between

standard Army specialized training and the Army Specialized Training Program in

medical specialties was so marked that, in May 1943, representative of the Army

Specialized Training Division told participants at an ASF conference that contracts

with medical schools fell into separate category from standard ASTP contracts

because “*

we are putting professional students into uniform, we are not

ms See footnote 97, p. 72.

Arms and services 1943 1944

January April July October January April July

Army Air Forces

Army Ground Forces

Classified.

46,995

43,997

55,985

3,156

3,000

500

13,707

50

5,630

1,100

1,600

10,197

40,520

3,156

3,000

500

900

13,707

50

5,630

1,100

12,790

40,520

3,156

4,500

500

900

13,234

100

2,350

955

1,700

50

645

3,001

100

2,350

955

1,700

50

645

3,001

Corps of Engineers

Chemical Warfare Service

Ordnance ..

Signal Corps

Transportation Corps.

6,633

1,683

1,650

4,925

6,633

1,683

1,650

4,925

Surgeon General.

Adjutant General’s Office

Provost Marshal General

Total. ..

5,630

1,170

1,595

5,630

1,170

1,595

5,630 5,665 5,665

23,286 70,281 128,725 78,760 81,230 14,466 14,466
78 MEDICAL TRAINING

putting soldiers into medical colleges. most of these boys have had no

military training at all; we are merely going to put uniform on them and let them

keep right on doing what they have been doing all the time.” 106

The program in operation.—During the spring and summer of 1943, all

members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps, who had reached age 18, were called for

active duty. Upon completion of basic military training, they, and all other enlisted

men in the Zone of Interior (except loss replacements and those in alerted units),

were eligible for selection for the Army Specialized Training Program. Medical,

dental, and veterinary students in approved schools, who were called to active duty

as members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps or inducted through the Selective Service

System, were not required to receive basic military training before assignment, but

were processed through reception centers and immediately returned to the schools

in which they were enrolled as members of the school’s ASTU (Army Specialized

Training Unit). Members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps who had been accepted for

admission to 1943 or 1944 professional school freshman class were also exempted

from basic training and were granted the option of remaining on inactive status to

complete prerequisites for admission. Those who did not elect to remain on inactive

status were processed at reception centers and sent to STAR (Specialized Training and Reassignment) unit for verification of their admission to professional

schools, and for evaluation of their progress toward completing entrance requirements.

This information was forwarded to the Army Service Forces, which ordered

the trainee to an Army Specialized Training Unit to complete his preprofessional

training. Enlisted men with 1943 and 1944 acceptances, who had finished basic

military training without completing their preprofessional training, were also sent

to STAR units for classification and assignment. In short, the War Department did

everything possible not to interrupt the professional and preprofessional training of

potential physicians, dentists, and veterinarians.

Enlisted men who had completed their preprofessional training and been

accepted by professional school were assigned interim duties until they could be

enrolled in freshmen class. Such duties were performed on an “attached-unassigned” status at Medical Department installations within the service command

in which the professional school was located, or in which the trainee was then

stationed. The period of interim duties varied from to months.

By honoring the commitments of individual schools during 1943 and 1944, the

War Department, in effect, delegated responsibility for selecting trainees to

accredited medical, dental, and veterinary colleges. major factor in this decision

was the presence in theArmy of large number of enlisted men with premedical or

predental training who had either failed to apply for acceptance at professional

school, or failed to gain admission. To avoid selecting these men at the expense of

those already admitted, the Army agreed to accept the admissions of individual

schools for freshman classes beginning in 1943 and 1944.

106 Remarks of Lt. Col. Blake R. Van Leer, MC, at Army Service Forces Conference on Negotiation and Renegotiation Procedure for Training Unit Contracts for Securing Services and Facilities of Non-Federal Education Institutions, Omaha, Neb., 28 May 1943.
MO, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 79

The number of men accepted by individual schools for classes beginning in 1943

and 1944 was estimated to be adequate to meet the Medical Department’s 4946 and

1947 demand schedules. However, demand schedules for subsequent years could be

met only by selecting and assigning enlisted men for training in medicine and

dentistry. Satisfaction of the Medical Department’s annual demand schedule for

4,200 physicians, 1,100 dentists, and 150 veterinarians required the reservation of

3,600 freshman medical school and 825 dental school vacancies in each 9-month

cycle. Because of the disproportionately large number of enlisted men in veterinary

training, additional training in this field was not required. To guarantee these

vacancies, the War Department entered contracts with medical and dental schools

to reserve 55 percent of the freshman medical capacity and 35 percent of the

freshman dental capacity in each class beginning after January 1945. The schools

were advised that vacancies in 1945 freshman classes would no longer be filled by

honoring the selections of individual institutions. Instead, representatives of medical

and dental education would participate in the selection of enlisted men to fill

Army-reserved freshman vacancies.

To fill its reserved vacancies, the Army was required to provide an average of

400 medical and 100 dental trainees each month. This level of enrollment could be

maintained only by selecting trainees from those who had demonstrated their

academic competence by completing two or three terms of the basic ASTP curriculum. Courses required for admission to medical or dental school could then be

completed in three additional terms—a total period of 60 weeks. Assuming loss in

these three terms of only 15 percent, monthly input of 625 trainees into term of

the preprofessional curriculum was necessary to meet the contract obligations for the

utilization of freshman vacancies. While it was assumed that number of potential

candidates might be discovered in the Army at large, their numbers and qualifications were so uncertain that they could not be counted upon to furnish continuous

flow of trainees. Thus, plans for professional training after 1944 required continuation of the basic phase of theArmy Specialized Training Program at level sufficient

to provide choice of candidates for preprofessional training.

The basic phase of the Army Specialized Training Program was discontinued on

April 1944, and approximately 42,000 trainees enrolled in the basic program were

assigned other military duties. Only those who had been selected from basic ASTP

cycles ending in December, January, and February were transferred to the preprofessional program. On 18 April, ASF headquarters announced that the Army’s

share of classes entering medical schools during 1945 would be cut from 55 percent

to 28 percent, and for dental schools, from 25 percent to 18 percent; no commitments

were to be made for classes starting in 1946. 107

Meanwhile, the question of reducing the dental Army Specialized Training

Program became involved with that of discharging dentists already in the service.

In March 1944, the Dental Corps had reached its ceiling strength and was faced

with the prospect of having more graduates than it needed. On 18 July, the War

107 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. W. L. Weible, GSC, Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, for The

Surgeon General, 18 Apr. 1944, subject: War Department Policy Governing Training in Medicine and Dentistry under

Army Specialized Training Program.
80 MEDICAL TRAINING

Department announced that training would be terminated. Only those who were

seniors in July were able to continue, and the dental Army Specialized Training

Program came to an end when they graduated in April 1945.

In May 1944, The Surgeon General approved the terminationof the veterinary

phase of the Army Specialized Training Program. Apparently, the Veterinary

Division considered the program no longer necessary, since the Veterinary Corps

was near its authorized strength, and having little difficulty in recruiting veterinarians from civilian practice. 108

The future of the medical phase of the Army Specialized Training Program was

matter of more concern to The Surgeon General. The collapse of Japan raised the

problem of whether the Army should continue the program to meet civilian needs

for doctors. Some War Department authorities feared the Army would be criticized

for the lack of medical training during the war, while others believed that training

should be confined to meeting the future needs of the Army. Maj. Gen, (later Gen.)

Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, ASF, believed that the Army could

not justify continuing expenditures and recommended that medical courses be

terminated during the academic year 1945-46. The Surgeon General believed that

young medical officers who had received their education at Government expense

should be ordered to active duty as replacements for older medical officers with long

periods of service. 109

Two months after the defeat of Japan, the Medical Department recommended

thatthe program be continued as source of replacements. In light of past difficulties

in recruiting physicians for the Regular Army, it took dim view of the loss of

5,000 medical officers that wouldresult from terminating theprogram in June 1946.

The Chief of Staff did not agree, and in November 1945, the War Department

announced that the program would be terminated on July 1946. With specified

exceptions, those scheduled to graduate before July 1946 were to be retained for

service. Those scheduled for graduation after that date were to be separated from

the program in March 1946. Upon separation, they were transferred to the Enlisted

Reserve Corps in an inactive status and subject to recall if they failed to complete

their studies. Those who were unable to continue their studies were transferred to

other duties and discharged when they became eligible. The medical phase of Army

Specialized Training Program came to an end year after the dental and veterinary

phases and permitted the Army to solve many of its postwar personnel problems.

Total enrollment in professional courses, and their output, as result of the Army

Specialized Training Program, are summarized in table 3.

Peak enrollment was reached in March 1944, when 21,581 enlisted men were in

training: 14,042 in medicine, 6,143 in dentistry, and 1,396 in veterinary medicine.

Peak enrollment in preprofessional training was reached in April of the same year,

when 4,093 enlisted men were enrolled. Precise figures for total enrollment in

108 See footnote 17, p. 43.

109 (1) Letter, Maj. Gen. I. H. Edwards, GSC Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to Prof. Philip Lawrence Harrison,

Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pa., 23 Aug. 1945. (2) Memorandum, Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding

General, Army Service Forces, for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Sept. 1946, subject:Future of Army Specialized Training Program. (3) Letter, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to the HonorableL. Mendel

Rivers, House of Representatives, 16 Oct. 1945.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 81

Table 3.—The Army Specialized Training Program: Students of medicine, dentistry, and veterinary

medicine assigned, separated, discharged, and transferred through curtailment of the program

Note.—Figures in parentheses are subtotals.

Source: (1) Fitts, Francis M.: Training in Medicine, Dentistry, and Veterinary Medicine, and in Preparation

Therefor, Under the Army Specialized Training Program, May 1943 to 31 December 1945. [Official record.] (2)

Letter, Col. Francis M. Fitts, MC (Ret.), to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 15 Nov. 1955.

preprofessional courses throughout the life of the program are not available, but

approximately 3,500 were assigned to premedical, about 1,400 to predental, and an

unknown number to preveterinary studies.110

Curriculum.—The curriculum adopted for enlisted men in engineering and in area language studies was designed to meet specific requirements of the arms and

services. Many traditional college courses, oriented toward scientific or liberal arts

degrees, were modified in content, duration, or emphasis to provide soldiers with special skills in the shortest possible time. College credits and academic degrees

were secondary and had little military value. ASTP curriculums for medical,

dental, and veterinary students were the exception because graduation from

professional school approved by the War Department was prerequisite for commissioning. Since these schools had accelerated their programs by eliminating long

vacations and holidays before the establishment of the Army Specialized Training

Program, it was not even necessary to shorten the length of their programs. Contracts, therefore, merely stipulated that the ASTP trainees at these institutions

would follow the contractor’s standard curriculum under the accelerated program

recommended by the national professional association of which it was member.

Schools were unofficially requested to remain in session 48 weeks of each calendar

year, since no more than 30 days annual leave could be routinely granted to Army

trainees.

Since the Army had accepted the standards of professional schools for graduation, it had little choice but to accept their standards for admission. Success of the

preprofessional program, and in the long run, the professional program, depended

upon graduates being acceptable for advanced training. Despite these limitations,

the Army was able to make significant changes through standardization and

acceleration. Standards for admission to accredited medical, dental, and veterinary

110 See footnote 17, p. 43.

Student status Medicine Dentistry Veterinary

medicine

Assigned 20,336 7,734 1,660

Separated ______ 15,216 3,031 679

By graduation (13,373) (2.458) (598)

By failure. ..

(1,045) (472) (41)

For other reasons. (798) (101) (40)

Curtailment 5,120 4,703 981

Discharged (5,120) (4,651) (940)

Transferred (52) (41)
82 MEDICAL TRAINING

schools had been formulated by professional associations, college accrediting

associations, and the schools themselves, long before the establishment of the Army

Specialized Training Program. The requirement for admission to medical schools was

minimum of years of college work that included courses in English, physics,

biology, and general and organic chemistry. Three years of college were

recommended, and number of medical schools required years. few required the

degree of bachelor of arts or science. Schools were free to expand these requirements,

and beyond meeting minimum standards, professional school admission requirements varied widely. Requirements for admission to schools of dentistry and of

veterinary medicine were lower, but since only one preparatory curriculum could be

adopted for the Army Specialized Training Program, the program had to meet medical school standards.

By the time the Army Specialized Training Program was established, college

associations had already paved the way for standardization and acceleration by

recommending that professional schools contribute to the war effort by accepting

applicants who satisfied minimum requirements for admission. At therequest of the

Director, Army Specialized Training Division, The Surgeon General invited selected

representatives of medical, dental, and veterinary education to conference in

January 1943. This committee recommended that the professional program consist

of 30 term hours of required basic courses, and 60 term hours of electives. Required

courses were to include term hours of general chemistry, term hours of organic

chemistry, and term hours each in English, physics, and biology. Electives were

to be restricted to courses in qualitative and quantitative analysis, physical chemistry, comparative anatomy and embryology, psychology, economics, public

administration, and modern foreign language. Completionof the programrequired

six ASTP terms, or total of 72 weeks. 111 The recommendations of this committee

were accepted by The Surgeon General and were adopted by the Army Specialized

Training Division with only minor changes. The length of the program was reduced

to five terms, and basic course requirements were increased to hours in each

subject. 112

The War Department’s decision to compress premedical training into period

of 60 weeks (five ASTP terms) was controversial. The Association of American

Colleges contended that the curriculum was overaccelerated; it would result in

physical and mental exhaustion, and enter trainees in professional programs before

they had matured. Since the program could be completed in five terms if preprofessional students followed schedules comparable to those adopted for other ASTP

trainees, however, the War Department did not feel that it could justify adding

sixth term. Sixty weeks of ASTP instruction was considered to be the equivalent of

at least 64 weeks (2 academic years) of peacetime college work.

The sequence of courses under the Army Specialized Training Program was

marked departure from traditional patterns of training. Customarily, students in

111 Letter, Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, Acting The Surgeon General, to Officer in Charge of Army Specialized

Training Program, Jan. 1943, subject; Pre-Medical and Medical Education, inclosure thereto. Report of Advisory

Committee on Medical Sciences Part of the Army Specialized Training Program.

112 Army Service Forces Manual 108, Catalog of Curricula and Courses, Army Specialized Training Program,

March 1945.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 83

preprofessional programs began specializing as early as their freshman year, with no

assurance that they would eventually be admitted to school of medicine or

dentistry. There was no way to coordinate the number of preprofessional students

with the number of vacancies in professional schools, and as result, large numbers

of students who had completed premedical programs annually competed for

limited number of medical school vacancies. The training of unsuccessful candidates

was either wasted or adapted to other fields.

The Army attempted to avoid wasting talent and manpower by assigning all

trainees to common curriculum in which they studied English, physics, and

general chemistry. Candidates for preprofessional training were then selected from

among those who had proved their academic competence by completing thefirst two

or three terms of the ASTP basic curriculum, or year of college before entering the

service. 113 The number of trainees selected to complete the remaining course in the

preprofessional curriculum was limited by the number of professional school

vacancies reserved for the Army, with an allowance for dropouts and failures. Those

who were not selected for preprofessional training were allowed to continue in other

phases of the Army Specialized Training Program.

Selection of schools.—Selecting schools to participate in the medical phases

of the Army Specialized Training Program was never major problem, because the

choice was limited to those accredited by the American Medical Association. 114

By the time the Army Specialized Training Program was established, members of

the Officers’ Reserve Corps, the Medical Administrative Corps Reserve, and the

Enlisted Reserve Corps were attending all of these schools except the Woman’s

Medical College of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. Since the problems involved

in transferring the academic credits of these men to few select institutions were

considered insurmountable, the Army chose to make arrangements for contract

instruction at all approved medical, dental, and veterinary schools.

Race and religion presented special problems. Because of its policy of honoring

the admissions of schools which had accepted students for classes beginning in 1943

and 1944, the Army was unable to reject Negroes who had been accepted by

predominately white schools. This could be done only when the Army had full

control of freshman vacancies. At the same time, many schools were worried that

Army control of vacancies, and the Army procedure of assigning students by

number instead of by name, would lead to unwanted integration. Col. Francis M.

Fitts, MC, Director of Military Training, ASF, explained these problems and their

solution at The Surgeon General’s conference with chiefs of the medical branches of

the service commands in mid-1943:115

Negro trainees now accepted by Chicago or Harvard will be sent to those schools

by which they had been accepted. When Chicago and Harvard reserve for the Army certain

percentage of vacancies we will not send Negro trainees there. That has been the point which

has given some concern to some schools and is one which you cannot decide absolutely or say

that an order will not be made; but if it is made, it will berectified.

113 War Department Memorandum No. W350-112-43, Army Specialized Training Program Professional and Preprofessional Training General Information and Procedures for Selection of Personnel, 29 Apr. 1943.

See footnote 17, p. 43. ns Report of The Surgeon General’s Conference with Chiefs, MedicalBranch of Service Commands, Washington,

D.C., 14-17 June 1943.
84 MEDICAL TRAINING

As result of these policies, enrollment in medicine and dentistry at Howard

University and Meharry College, Nashville, Tenn., was limited exclusively to

Negroes, and Negroes were not selected for other colleges unless they had already

been admitted by the individual school. In any case, enrollment of Negroes was to

be limited, because the Medical Department did not plan to expand its use of these

officers, and needed only about 40 replacements year for those already on active

duty. With about 380 Negro medical students already enrolled in the Medical

Administrative Corps, the Medical Department had 10-year supply of replacements and believed it could not justify extensive training of this racial group.

small group of trainees were sent to Negro colleges late in 1944, but reservations for

1945 were canceled. Enrollment at the College of Medical Evangelists, Loma Linda,

Calif., Seventh-Day Adventist School, was similarly limited to members of

that faith. 116

The selection of colleges for preprofessional programs was more complicated.

Reports compiled by the Association of American Medical Colleges, on the performance of freshman medical students admitted from more than 500 colleges and

universities between 1931 and 1941, served as basis for evaluation. The names of

schools whose past performance and capacity indicated that they were capable of

acceptably training class of at least 50 preprofessional students were then submitted for clearance to the Joint Army-Navy Manpower Commission Committee

for the Selection of Non-Federal Institutions. Final selection for participation in the

preprofessional program required that total ASTP enrollment at the school, in all

programs, be sufficient to allow the formation of an Army specialized training unit

with strength of 200 to 250 trainees.

The number of schools at which preprofessional programs could be established

was limited by the number of students assigned to the program. Initial estimates

called for the enrollment of 8,000 students, and the selection of 90 institutions for

possible contracts. This estimate, however, was based on the assumption that

enlisted men would be enrolled for preprofessional studies during their first term.

The decision to enroll all ASTP trainees in common program until the end of their

second term reduced the number of men to be classified as preprofessional trainees

to 5,400. This level of enrollment, which would have been reached in September

1944, allowed the establishment of preprofessional programs at 52 institutions.

Contracts.—Government contracts with colleges and universities for ASTP

professional and preprofessional programs were negotiated through the service

commands. In contracts with medical and dental colleges, the Government agreed

to allow schools to continue training ASTP and Reserve students who were already

enrolled, or who had been accepted for enrollment in classes beginning before 1945.

In each class beginning in 1945 and subsequent years, the schools agreed to reserve

specified number of vacancies for Army trainees. By an agreement with the War

Manpower Commission, the combined enrollment of ASTP and V-12 trainees after

1944 was limited to 80 percent of incoming freshman classes: 55 percent to the

Army and 25 percent to the Navy. The remaining 20 percent was reserved for

116 See footnote 115, p. 83.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 85

women and men who were not eligible for military service. Thirty-five percent of

the capacity of dental schools was allocated to the Army, and 25 percent to the

Navy. No contracts were made for the reservation of freshman vacancies in veterinary schools. The Army was required to give 60 days’ notice if it was unable to

fill reserved vacancies.

In April 1944, when the basic phase of the Army Specialized Training Program

was discontinued, it became apparent that the Army would be unable to fill the

freshman vacancies it had reserved. The number of men selected for professional

training was only adequate to fill half of the vacancies reserved for 1945, and there

would be no new trainees in subsequent years. Contracts were therefore revised to

reserve only 28 percent of the capacity of medical schools, and 18 percent of the

freshman dental capacity. The number of institutions under contract remained

unchanged.

To compensate the school for the staff, facilities, equipment, and supplies it

provided, the Government agreed to pay the equivalent of nonresident tuition for

each trainee enrolled. Special provisions were made for small group of schools

whose normal tuition was significantly below the national nonresident average. The

Army also agreed to pay incidental fees normally paid by students. No payment was

made for registration fees, enrollment fees, and “good-faith” deposits. The

textbooks, instruments, and supplies required by trainees were purchased by the

Government and issued, or reissued, to trainees on receipt. Textbooks issued to

freshman trainees remained in their possession until the completion of training.

Instruments which could be obtained on rental basis, such as microscopes, were

not purchased. Instructional supplies and equipment which ere not standard

throughout the program were purchased for the Government through the contracting school, which was allowed small handling charge.

The average monthly cost of professional training per trainee is shown in

table 4.

Contracts for preprofessional training were similar to those for other ASTP

programs. Payment was made on cost basis computed for the rental and maintenance of facilities (classrooms, laboratories, dormitories, and messhalls) and for

proportional salaries of faculty members actually engaged in the instruction of

Army trainees. All contracts were subject to renegotiation each term.

The average monthly cost per trainee for instruction under the preprofessional

curriculum was $52.31.

Table 4.—Average monthly cost of professional training per trainee

Item Medical Dental Veterinary

medicine

Tuition and instructional fees $51.00 $38.00 $26.70

Textbooks and instruments 7.15 4.84 4.40

Instrument rental 4.32 18.26 2.40

Total $62.47 $61.10 $33.50
86 MEDICAL TRAINING

Preprofessional trainees were housed and messed by the contracting institution.

In most medical, dental, and veterinary medicine schools, however, group housing

and messing facilities could not be provided. Many medical and dental schools had

no university housing and were located in densely populated metropolitan areas

where common housing and messing were impractical. At other schools, the wide

dispersion of trainees for clinical training during their junior and senior years made

it undesirable. As result, most ASTP medical, dental, and veterinary trainees

were paid commutation allowances for quarters and rations. At schools in which

group housing and facilities were available, many regulations, including restrictions

on late study, had to be relaxed. 117

Academic standards.—When the program was established, the Army accepted all enlisted men then enrolled in approved professional schools. It similarly

accepted enlisted men who had been admitted to freshman classes entering approved schools in 1943 and 1944. Thus, for the first years of the program, standards for selection were set by individual schools. Many of these students could not

have been accepted under Army standards. The AGCT (Army General Classification Test) was given to all enlisted men when they came on active duty. minimum AGCT score of 115, plus graduation from high school, were the prerequisites

for assignment to the Army Specialized Training Program. When members of the

Enlisted Reserve Corps and Medical Administrative Corps Reserve enrolled or

accepted by medical, dental, and veterinary schools were called to active duty in

mid-1943, nearly percent of the Army trainees in medical schools, 22 percent in

dental schools, and 18 percent in veterinary schools failed to achieve the AGCT

score of 115. These percentages did not include students accepted by the two accredited Negro schools, where 35 percent of the medical students and over 60 percent of the dental students failed to achieve qualifying score. 118 Because of the

Army’s commitments, students accepted by individual schools for classes beginning in 1943 and 1944 had to be exempted from basic ASTP standards. Enlisted

men assigned for preprofessional or for professional training by the Army, however,

were required to meet minimum standards.

To remain in the professional program, trainees were required to meet the

individual school’s standards for continuation and graduation. Students were

permitted to repeat courses only if failure was explained by illness, injury, or official

Army orders. Failure in any subject, not satisfactorily explained by extenuating

circumstances, resulted in separation from the program. Trainees so separated were

ineligible for reassignment to the Army Specialized Training Program. The majority

of the medical, dental, and veterinary trainees separated from the program, other

than by graduation, were assigned to the Medical Department for further training

and for service as medical soldiers. 119 In setting standards for the preprofessional

program, the Army accepted the policy established at majority of the accredited

professional schools and required an overall “C” average.

117 Army Service Forces Manual 105, Army Specialized TrainingPrograms, Apr. 1944. 118 Compilation of thenumber of ASTP students at various universities who fell below the Army General Classification Test passing score of 115 by Medical Section, Curricula and Standards Branch, Army Specialized Training

Division, Sept. 1943. 119 See footnote 117.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 87

The selection of the enlisted men for assignment to vacancies reserved by the

War Department in classes beginning after 1944 required more elaborate procedures.

In general, candidates were chosen from trainees completing term and term of

the basic ASTP curriculum (B-l), who were then transferred to the preprofessional

curriculum for the completion of their premedical training. Applicants for admission

to the preprofessional program were required to pass preliminary screening test

known as the Aptitude Test for Medical Professions before they could be sent to unit classification boards for interviews. 120

The Aptitude Test for Medical Professions was prepared for the War Department by Drs. Fred A. Moss and Thelma Hunt under the direction of committee of

the Association of American Medical Colleges. Dr. Moss and this committee had

previously designed and administered the Scholastic Aptitude Test for Medical

Colleges (Medical Aptitude Test) which was used by theadmissions committees of

majority of medical schools. The applicant’s score on the Medical Aptitude Test had

served as basis for admission in conjunction with academic records, letters from

professors, and personal interviews. The test had not been used extensively in the

selection of dental students.

In the Army Specialized Training Program, the Aptitude Test for Medical

Professions was used primarily to limit the number of candidates who would be

presented to unit classification boards for interviews. Usually, minimum scores were

set at point thatrequired boards to interview three times the number of candidates

they would ultimately select. Representatives of contracting medical and dental

schools within each service command served as consultants, and conducted ASTP

classification board interviews to determine whether candidates were qualified and

acceptable. After being interviewed, candidates were assigned to one of four

categories: fully qualified and acceptable; acceptable, but not of the highest

qualifications; acceptable; or not satisfactory and not acceptable. As far as possible,

units were assigned from candidates classified as fully acceptable. Reports of

qualified candidates in excess of unit quotas were forwarded to theArmy Specialized

Training Division.

Since preprofessional trainees were selected before they had taken courses in

biology and in organic chemistry, second screening was required in the final term

(term 5) of the preprofessional curriculum. This second screening resulted in an

elimination from the program of 173 enlisted men, or 7.2 percent of the 2,401

previously selected for training in medicine.

Because of the abrupt termination of all but few special purpose programs in

early 1944, only four groups of candidates were able to take the Aptitude Test for

Medical Professions. Trainees in the first three groups tested were screened and

selected for professional training by routine procedures. Since it was impossible to

interview members of the group tested on 16 February 1944, before the basic

program was brought to conclusion, the 500 candidates with the highest scores

were arbitrarily transferred and interviewed during their first term in the preprofessional program. Those found unacceptable for medical or dental training were

offered the opportunity to study Japanese.

120 Herge, Henry C.: Wartime College Training Programs of the Armed Services. Washington:American Council

on Education, 1948.
88 MEDICAL TRAINING

Trainees who graduated in medicine and were commissioned in the Medical

Corps, AXIS, or the Medical Corps Reserve, were not called to active duty untilthey

had completed their civilian hospital training. This training, in an inactive-duty

status, consisted of months of hospital internship for all, an additional months as

assistant residents for maximum of one-third, and further period of months as

residents for one-sixth of the original group. When called to active duty, they were

assigned for weeks’ intensive field training at the Medical Field Service School,

Carlisle Barracks, and weeks of training in Army hospital procedures and

administration in general hospitals in the Zone of Interior.

In 1945, The Surgeon General recommended that, effective on April 1946, all

medical officers still in an inactive status be called to active duty from previously

authorized civilian hospital residencies and assistant residencies, and that those

serving hospital internships be activated upon the completion of 12 months of

intern training. This change in existing procedures was adopted, with the concurrence of the War Manpower Commission, to allow these positions to be filled by

veterans whose hospital training had been interrupted.

Military and physical training.—-All ASTP trainees, except those in medicine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine, were required to participate in hours of

military training and hours of physical training. For men in the professional program, the military training requirement was reduced to hours, and physical

training was eliminated. These exemptions were granted because it was difficult to

crowd an extra hours of training into the accelerated programs of professional

schools without using time needed by trainees for their studies. Moreover, almost

every medical, dental, and veterinary school lacked the gymnasiums and athletic

fields required for physical training program. In units where such facilities were

available, trainees were encouraged to engage in physical exercise. Military instruction outside the classroom was usually conducted in streets, vacant lots, and

parks.

At first, military instruction was based on the program previously used by

medical units of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. Later, it was modified to be

used both for enlisted men who had completed basic training and by those who had

been assigned directly to the Army Specialized Training Program. In July 1944,

program of branch immaterial training was established to allow students to be

trained by nonmedical officers.121 Under this program, branch training was given to

students in 6-week course at the Medical Field Service School, followed by

weeks of training at Zone of Interior hospital after they had been commissioned

and served their hospital internship.

EDUCATIONAL TECHNIQUES AND PROBLEMS

Despite their number and variety, Medical Department training programs

shared many common techniques and problems. Facilities and equipment had to be

121 (1) Army Service Forces Manual 107, Military Training Program for ASTP Trainees and ASTRP Students,

June 1944. Change No. 1, dated 17 July 1944. (2) See footnote 117, p. 86.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 89

provided, instructors had to be selected and trained, and educational techniques had

to be geared to an accelerated program.

Facilities and Equipment

The expansion and acceleration of officer training programs created corresponding need for an expansion of training facilities. At Carlisle Barracks, extensive construction was required to prepare the Medical Field Service School for its role in training commissioned and noncommissioned officers. During the first

half of 1940, barracks were built to house 125 men, and the school received an

appropriation of $375,000for the construction of new permanent school building. 122

The training area was expanded to include 220 tent platforms, 14 lavatories,

400-man messhall, and buildings for storage and administration. The following year,

construction began on 18 barracks (63-man), two temporary classroom buildings,

and variety of overhead buildings. Most of these were intended for use by officer

candidates, but were eventually used for student officers as well. 123 At the Army

Medical Center, construction was limited to two new officers’ barracks. 124

While helpful, this construction in no way prepared the service schools for the

expansion that lay ahead. By mid-1941, the Medical Field Service School had been

required to increase its capacity from approximately 100 officers to 6,000, and that

of the Army Medical Center increased from approximately 100 to 1,200.125 Construction did not expand space. To increase the output of schools, courses were

shortened, classes were staggered at intervals of as little as weeks, and year-round

use was made of existing facilities. During 1941, for example, classes at the Medical

Field Service School were conducted in the gymnasium while the new school was

under construction. 126 Both schools found it difficult to house their expanded

enrollment, and students were encouraged or required to five off-post. 127

Construction undertaken in 1940 and 1941 solved many of these problems, but

others persisted throughout the war. By mid-1942, the Medical Field Service

School was able to report that existing facilities were adequate for its program, 128 but

continued, even after 1942, to resort to expedients. The new classroom building, for

example, was designed to hold only 200 students at time, and it was necessary to

continue using the gymnasium as classroom and auditorium. 129 Both the Army

Medical Center and the Medical Field Service School had to terminate programs to

allow the expansion of others. 130 In some instances, it was necessary to establish new

special service schools, which usually encountered difficulties similar to those

experienced by the parent schools.

122 See footnote 1, p. 36.

123 See footnotes 6, p. 37; and 21, p. 44. 124 Annual Report, Headquarters, Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., calendar year 1940.

126 See footnote (2), p. 36. 126 See footnote 21, p. 44. 127 (1) See footnote 10, p. 39. (2) Annual Report, Commanding General, Headquarters, Army Medical Center,

Washington, D.C., 1942. 128 See footnote 22 (2), p. 45. 129 See footnote 50 (2), p. 58. 130 (1) See footnote 77 (1), p. 65. (2) Annual Report of The Surgeon General of the Army for the Commanding

General, Army Service Forces, fiscal year 1943.
90 MEDICAL TRAINING

Instructional Staff 131

Instructors in the Medical Department officer training program can be divided

into two categories: those concerned with the military aspects of medicine, and those

concerned with the technical phases of medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, and

related sciences. Instructors in the first category were necessarily graduates of the

courses they taught, while those in the second were usually men who had become

specialists through extensive study at civilian institutions. Each was selected by

different procedures.

Instructors in military subjects.—With minor variations, the pattern of

selecting and training instructors for military subjects at the Medical Field Service

School was typical of all military programs. Until supply of officers returning from

overseas became available, instructors were selected from among candidates who

had demonstrated leadership ability during their own training. Responsibility for

recognizing potential instructors among trainees at the school rested upon individual department heads, who interviewed promising candidates and selected

those who would remain at the school for further training. As overseas returnees

became available, fewer students were retained for teaching assignments, and

officers with combat experience were selected for faculty assignments.

Until 1944, the training of new instructors was almost exclusively departmental responsibility. Candidates were oriented through conferences with veteran

members of their department, by studying materials used by the department, and

by observing other instructors in the classroom and in the field. New teachers were

required to present lectures in front of experienced instructors before being allowed

in the classroom. When it was considered necessary to give them experience in

handling troops, they were temporarily attached to the demonstration battalion at

Carlisle Barracks.

In 1944, departmental indoctrination of new teachers was supplemented by an

instructor guidance course conducted by the Training Department. This course, established at all ASF training centers, was designed to familiarize new or potential

instructors with approved teaching techniques, and with procedures for selecting

materials and making lesson plans. At the Medical Field Service School, the

establishment of an instructor guidance program did little more than elevate

existing procedures to the status of formal requirements.

At the Medical Field Service School, as at other military training facilities, the

major staff problem was not selection and training, but retention. Between June

1942 and June 1944, for example, the annual rate of replacement at the school

exceeded 40 percent. This lack of stability in instructor assignments created need

for constant selection and training of new personnel. 132

Instructors in technical subjects.—Vacancies in technical teaching positions could not be filled through on-the-job training, or intensive short courses.

The specialized skills required for these positions could be acquired only through

extensive study or experience. Neurosurgery, for example, could be taught only by

131 See footnote 10, p. 39. 132See footnotes 22 (2) and (8), p. 45.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 91

qualified neurosurgeon, and the parasitology of tropical diseases could be taught

only by an expert in the field. Instructors in technical subjects had to be selected in much the same manner as instructors at civilian colleges. Instructors were selected by the Military Personnel Division of the Office of The Surgeon General according to the specific requirements for each position. In some instances, the commandants of schools were able to request specific individuals who had gained reputations in field as civilians, and preference was given to men who had been college

instructors before being commissioned. Once hired or assigned to position, instructors were indoctrinated through conferences with veteran members of the

staff at each school.

Each technical course or school had different requirements, and filled its staff

from different sources. At the Medical Supply Services School, for example, key

instructors in the Officers’ Supply Division were staff officers at the St. Louis Medical Supply Depot. Instructors in the Maintenance and Repair Division were

civilians who had been sent to the depot by large manufacturing firms and were

later commissioned and formally assigned to the staff. Instructors in the Optical

Division were opticians. Most of the instructors at the Army Medical Center were

staff officers who were assigned additional duties as teachers. As result, the Army

Medical Center also experienced difficulties in staff retention. 133

Educational Techniques

In training officers to perform the varied duties of the Medical Department,

wide variety of techniques were employed. Courses designed to provide trainees

with military skills usually employed standard military techniques. Those designed

to impart technical skills varied as widely as the skills themselves.

Class organizalion.—Class organization varied according to the number of

trainees enrolled, and the degree to which drill, road marches, and field problems

were part of the curriculum. In course such as the Officers’ Basic Course at the

Medical Field Service School, drill and field problems played large role, and

classes were organized into battalions, companies, and platoons. Faculty members

selected for their military ability were assigned as platoon leaders, class directors,

and battalion commanders. These officers usually supplemented the technical instruction given by the school’s academic departments with training in military subjects and were responsible for details such as messing, housing, and supplying units

under their command. 134

In courses involving purely technical subjects, class organization differed little

from that of typical civilian colleges. At the Army Medical Center, for example,

selected students were appointed as “monitors” and made responsible for details

such as keeping attendance records. Because of the relatively small numbers

attending such courses, formal organization into companies and battalions was not

considered practical. 135

133 (1) Annual Report, Technical Activities, Medical Department Professional Service Schools, Army Medical

Center, Washington,D.C., fiscal year 1941. (2) See footnotes 21, p. 44, and 22 (2), p. 45. 134 See footnote 21, p. 44. 135 See footnote 10, p. 39.
92 MEDICAL TRAINING

Teaching methods.—Service schools conducting courses for Medical Department officers followed approved military teaching techniques as closely as

possible. In general, these consisted of the lecture, the conference, the demonstration, and the practical exercise. The frequency with which any one method of

presentation was utilized varied with the content of the course.

Courses such as the Officers’ Basic Course, the Special Cadre Course, and the

National Guard and Reserve Officers’ Course used much the same techniques as

those employed by the MAC Officer Candidate School, and report by one of these

schools best illustrates their application. Courses emphasizing principles of command, organization, and administration relied heavily upon conferences, demonstrations, and practical exercises. Conferences and lectures were used solely to introduce

and develop subject matter, but practical exercises which emphasized learning by

doing rather than by listening were the preferred technique. Whenever possible,

demonstrations and practical exercises were used exclusively. The Medical Field

Service School, for example, had utilized demonstration troops since 1921.136 The

1st Medical Regiment was assigned to Carlisle Barracks as demonstration unit

until 1940, when it was replaced by the 32d Medical Battalion. The battalion was

used to demonstrate the operation of medicalfield installations and the employment

of specialized equipment used in emergency medical treatment and field sanitation. 137

In highly technical courses, lectures and conferences were used in conjunction

with practical exercises; such as, working in laboratories, participating in hospital

rounds, and assisting in operations. In neurosurgery, for example, academic reviews

of the anatomy of the nervous system were followed by neurological examination of

patients. In thoracic surgery, lectures and demonstrations on the fundamentals of

surgery were balanced by experience in assisting at operations and anatomical

dissections of the thorax. In surgery of the extremities, cadaver surgery was

practiced, with special emphasis on the surgical approaches to the treatment of

fractures. The course in anesthesiology consisted almost entirely of applied work. 138

The courses at the Medical Supply Services School, although different in

content, were conducted along similar lines. In the Officers’ Supply Division,

lectures and conferences on Medical Department supply functions were followed by

practical exercises on the methods of handling supplies. Instruction in the Maintenance and Repair Division of the school consisted largely of on-the-job experience

with X-ray equipment, sterilizers, gas anesthesia apparatus, oxygen therapy

appliances, and other technical equipment. In the Optical Division, courses were

essentially designed to provide experience in the operation of optical repair

equipment. 139

In sum, courses for Medical Department officers were designed to provide

them with skills that had immediate application in the operation of field medical

136 See footnote 22 (7), p. 45.

137 Hume, E.E.: Training of Medical Officers for War Duty. War Med. 1: 642-643, September 1941.

las Memorandum, Lt. Col. Sanford V. Larkey, MC, Chief, School Branch, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to Col. Frank B. Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

U.S. Army, 12 Mar. 1943, subject: Report of Inspection of Training Courses for Medical Department Officers at Civilian Institutions.

139 See footnote 26 (2), p. 48.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 93

installations. Courses stressed application, rather than theory, and were designed to

provide maximum of practical work. 140

Training aids.—Training aids played major role in converting theory into

applicable knowledge. Items classified as training aids ranged from pictures, films, and demonstration units to areas set aside for demonstrating field sanitary equipment, and infiltration courses. Drill fields, obstacle courses, and bivouac areas fell

into this category, as well as rubber moulages of wounds, scale model compasses,

and other devices used to provide visual assistance. 141

In military courses, audiovisual aids were used extensively. These included War

Department filmstrips, film bulletins, and training films. Most service schools operated auxiliary film libraries, to make them continuously available. 142 Charts,

diagrams, and posters were prepared for use in lectures and conferences. Some, such

as graphic portfolios on first aid and map reading, were prepared at higher echelons for distribution to all schools. Others were prepared at the schools for use in specific

lessons. The Medical Field Service School maintained an art department, and the

operations officer was made responsible for scheduling the use of aids, for having aids

on display, and for training and supplying projectionists. 143 Field manuals, training

manuals, and other War Department publications were used almost exclusively as

texts in military subjects.

Since technical courses covered broad range of subjects, the training aids and

equipment used in each course ere different. Just as sanitary areas and obstacle

courses were considered training aids in military courses, the laboratories, operating

rooms, and medical and surgical wards used to enhance training were considered

training aids for technical courses. The same definition was frequently applied to

cadavers used in surgical courses, and patients treated in medical courses. In the

Maintenance and Repair Course at the Medical Supply Services School, the

equipment used and items repaired fell into the same category. Visual aids used in

technical courses included anatomical charts and diagrams and pictures projected

on photographic screens. 144

Standard medical textbooks were assigned in most technical courses, but in

few, combination of War Department publications and special texts was used.

The Maintenance and Repair Division and the Optical Division of the Medical

Supply Services School used special texts prepared by the instructors in these

divisions to supplement material in War Department publications. The special

textbook issued for the Maintenance and Repair Course was issued in three volumes

totaling 2,200 pages, and the textbook for the Optical Course was volume of

approximately 300 pages. 145 These special textbooks were used for enlisted men, as

well as for officers, and were similar to those prepared in schools for enlisted

technicians.

Tests and critiques.—Written examinations were used as measures of student achievement, as instructional devices, and as means of checking the effec140 See footnote 138, p. 92. 141 See footnote 22 (8), p. 45. 142 See footnote 26 (2), p. 48. 143 See footnote 10, p. 39.

144 See footnote 138, p. 92. 145 See footnote 26 (2), p. 48.
94 MEDICAL TRAINING

tiveness of instruction. At most schools, the construction of tests was departmental responsibility. At the Medical Field Service School, test questions, prepared

by the instructors who presented the material in given class, were submitted to

department directors for approval or modification before being incorporated into

an examination. Schools relied almost exclusively on objective examinations, consisting of true-false, multiple choice, and completion questions. The same tests were

often used for succeeding classes and, therefore, were not returned to the student

for study and analysis. Instead, tests were reviewed in class, and doubtful points

were clarified. Students who failed were scheduled for conferences on their individual problems. When an unusually high number of students failed, the test was

reevaluated.

Supervision and inspection of instruction.—To insure continuing quality

of instruction, department heads or officers corresponding to department heads

were charged with responsibility for supervising the performance of instructors on

their staff. 146 The most widely used technique of supervision and evaluation was

personal visit to the classroom. There was no set schedule for observing instructors,

and periodic reports were not required on instructors doing satisfactory work. New

instructors were frequently visited, and reports on those whose performance was

inadequate were forwarded to the assistant commandant of the school. When necessary, instructors were relieved. From time to time, officers senior to the department

head visited classes to check on his evaluations.

Representatives of higher echelons periodically inspected special service schools

and civilian schools employed by the Medical Department. Inspection reports

included comments on the school’s facilities, teaching staff, methods of instruction, training aids, and trainees, and enabled higher echelons to compare schools and

maintain an Army-wide standard of training. 147

Trainee Quality

Schools conducting courses for medical, dental, and veterinary officers had the

good fortune of receiving trainees of consistently high quality. While marked

differences in background and ability existed between trainees, all were graduates

of approved professional colleges. Schools for such officers had to cope with few

of the problems confronting training centers established for other categories of

personnel.

Among medical, dental, and veterinary officers, attrition rates were low.

Samples taken during the first years of the war revealed gross attrition rate of

5.6 percent in professional courses and 4.9 percent in military courses. Studies of

these rates are incomplete, but available data indicate that at least half of the

trainees who failed in technical courses, and approximately 25 percent of those who

failed military courses, failed because they were recalled to their units before they

could complete enough work to be credited with passing the course.

146 See footnote 10, p. 39. 147 Army Service Forces Manual 4, Military Training, 20 Sept. 1944.
MC, DC, VC, AND SnC OFFICERS 95

In most other instances, age and inadequate background seem to account for

failure. study conducted in the Tropical Medicine Course revealed that students

over 40 years of age, who represented only 14 percent of the trainees enrolled,

accounted for 64 percent of the failures in the course. Older students, long removed

from intensive study, seemed to have found it more difficult to assimilate the

material presented in accelerated programs. second study of this program

uncovered high incidence of failures among graduates of less prestigious medical

schools. 148 Graduates of these schools frequently lacked skill in laboratory techniques

and the background to absorb highly technical subjects. Studies of failures in

military courses are less complete and do not isolate groups with high incidence

of failure.

Although the principles of medicine and surgery are the same in military and

civilian life, the conditions under which they are practiced are radically different.

The military physician and surgeon must be able to deal with mass casualties, often

under combat conditions. To perform on the field of battle, the surgeon requires an

understanding of evacuation procedures, the medical equipment and treatment

available at each stage in the chain of evacuation, and the limitations of field

medicine and surgery. He must also understand the relationship of field medical

service to the combat arm it serves, the tactical employment of medical units, and

the principles of medical supply. Administrative and tactical courses conducted at

the Medical Field Service School, and other service schools, were designed to provide

the Army physician with the basic knowledge required for field service. Other more

technical courses were designed to provide him with the skills needed to engage in

restorative treatment of battle casualties in rear echelons, or to combat the diseases

which have traditionally ravaged armies in garrison and in the field.

Three facts testify to the caliber of service provided by the Medical Department in World War II: The recovery of 97 percent of all hospitalized battle

casualties, the control of number of diseases which had caused high rates of

noneffectiveness in past wars, and the absence of major epidemics. 149

An important factor in the improvement of surgical care was the development

of new facilities and procedures for evacuation of casualties, and knowledge of how

to use them. Similarly, improved approaches to the treatment of neuropsychiatric

breakdowns and increased attentiontoreconditioning casualties returned many men

to duty who would have been lost to the Army in earlier wars. Improved immunizing agents, and techniques for controlling disease-bearing insects, were applied with

marked effect against such diseases as dengue fever, typhus, typhoid fever, and

malaria. These successes cannot be attributed solely to training; advances in

medical science and education played major role. But it was training in military

procedures that allowed members of the Medical, Dental, Veterinary, and Sanitary

Corps to apply their knowledge to military problems.

148 See footnote 10, p. 39.

148 Medical Department, United States Army. Surgery in World War II. Thoracic Surgery. Volume I. Washington:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.

497-333 75 -8

CHAPTER III

The Medical Administrative Corps

In December 1941, 1,470 MAC (Medical Administrative Corps) officers were

serving in the Medical Department. Of these, 77 were graduates of the MAC Officer

Candidate School. By August 1945, 17,072 officers had graduated from the MAC Officer Candidate School, and the Corps had expanded to 19,867. During the same

period, the ratio of the Medical Administrative Corps to the strength of the Army

grew from 0.87 to 2.48 per thousand. Such growth was more than simple response

to wartime expansion; it reflected the Medical Department’s continuous efforts to relieve physicians from the burdens of nonprofessional responsibility. Almost

without exception, officers assuming these responsibilities were graduates of MAC

officer candidate schools.

OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOLS

Prewar plans called for the establishment of officer candidate schools shortly

after the beginning of mobilization. Because the supply of Reserve officers was

adequate for the demands of the limited mobilization that began in September 1940,

however, programs for officer candidates were held in abeyance for nearly year.

In April 1941, The Surgeon General joined the chiefs of other arms and services in

requesting the establishmentof an officer candidate school. Through such school,

The Surgeon General hoped to train approximately 100 officers who were needed as

instructors at medical replacement training centers. Since these proposals had been

anticipated by the Chief of Staff, directive establishing officer candidate schools

for 3-month period was issued by The Adjutant General on 26 April 1941. Three

months later, on 28 July 1941, the schools were authorized to continue indefinitely.

The first class of 100 officer candidates began 12-week program of training at

Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa., on July 1941. Until the war accelerated training,

new classes enrolled every months. The second class had an enrollment of 200

candidates, and enrollment for the third was expanded to 250.

Except as otherwise indicated, this chapter is based on two manuscripts: (1) Goodman, Samuel M.: History of

MedicalDepartment Training, United States Army World War II. Volume II. Report of theHistory of the Medical

Administrative Corps Officer Candidate Schools, July 1939 to 30 June 1944, and Supplement for Period July 1944

to 30 June 1945. [Official record.] (2) Armstrong, George E., and Ey, John A.: Training in the Medical Department

DuringWorld War II. Chapter IX. Medical Administrative Corps Officer Candidate Schools. [Official record.]

Medical Department, United States Army. Personnel in World War II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.

Letter, The Surgeon General to The Adjutant General, Apr, 1941, subject: Officer Candidate Schools.

Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, All Armies, Departments, and Corps Areas, 26 Apr.

1941, subject: Officer Candidate Schools.

Memorandum,Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, for the Chiefs of Arms and Services,

28 July 1941, subject: Officer Candidate Schools.

Technical Report of Activities, Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., fiscal year 1942.
98 MEDICAL TRAINING

The United States entry into World War II produced rapid expansion of the

officer candidate program. Following the publication of the War Department

General Staff, G-3, troop basis in January 1942, it became apparent that the

Medical Department could not fill its requirements for administrative officers

without increasing the capacity of its officer candidate school. On 16 January 1942,

The Surgeon General was directed to formulate plans for expanding the MAC

Officer Candidate School at Carlisle Barracks to accommodate 750 trainees.

The capacity of the school at Carlisle Barracks was expanded by shifting from

consecutive to staggered scheduling. Beginning with the fourth class, on March

1942, new class of 250 candidates was enrolled each month. Since the program for

given class covered months, the new schedule resulted in the presence of three

classes with total of 750 candidates.

By the spring of 1942, it was evident that facilities at Carlisle Barracks would

be inadequate to meet the demand created by the rapid activation of numbered

medical units and installations and by the increasing use of MAC officers to replace

MC (Medical Corps) officers in nonprofessional assignments. Without further

expansion, the Medical Department was capable of training only 1,600 of the 2,450

MAC officers required by January 1943. On 11 April 1942, The Surgeon General

requested authority from the Commanding General, ASF (Army Service Forces), to

establish second school for officer candidates at Camp Barkeley, Tex. Permission

was granted on 15 April, 10 and on May 1942, the first class was enrolled. 11 Since

capacity was set at 750 candidates, and classes of 250 were enrolled monthly, the

school was scheduled toreach capacity with the enrollment of its third class. 12 The

officer candidate school at Camp Barkeley had been in operation less than month,

however, when the Medical Department began to consider expanding its capacity.

On June 1942, the Commandant, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp

Barkeley, suggested increasing enrollment to 1,000.13 The Surgeon General, in turn,

recommended thatfacilities be made available at Camp Barkeley for training 1,500 candidates. 14 On 25 June 1942, Army Service Forces approved his request. 15 By

September, the demandfor MAC officers had grown to the point that the school had

to be expanded for third time. Beginning on 28 September 1942, new class of 500

Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, for The Surgeon General, 16 Jan.

1942, subject: Increase in the Medical Administrative Corps Officer Candidate School.

See footnote 6, p. 97.

Letter, The Surgeon General to CommandingGeneral, Services of Supply, 11 Apr. 1942, subject: Officer Candidate School.

10 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Harold R. Bull, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Training Division, G-3, for

Commanding General, Services of Supply, 15 Apr. 1942, subject: Additional Medical Corps Officer Candidate School.

1st indorsement thereto, 23 Apr. 1942.

11 Letter, The Adjutant General to Each Commander listed in paragraph b, 17 Apr. 1942, subject: Quotas for

Medical Administrative Corps Officer Candidate School, Camp Barkeley, Tex., Class 1. 19 Memorandum, The Surgeon General to Commanding General, Services of Supply, 11 Apr. 1942, subject:

Officer Candidate School.

13 Letter, Brig. Gen. Roy C. Heflebower, Commanding, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley,

Tex., to The Surgeon General, June 1942, subject: Increase in Capacity of MAC Officer Candidate School. 1st in- dorsement thereto, 10 June 1942.

14 Letter, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, Director of Training, Services

of Supply, 18 June 1942, subject: Increase in Officer Candidate School Facilities.

16 Memorandum, Col. Walter L. Weible, GSC, Deputy Director of Training, Services of Supply, for The Surgeon

General, 25 June 1942, subject; Increase in Officer Candidate Facilities.
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 99

was enrolled every weeks, instead of every 4, bringing the capacity of the school to

3,000. 16 Peak enrollment was reached in July 1943, when 3,011 candidates were in

training. 17

On 27 February 1943, the officer candidate school at Carlisle Barracks, already

dwarfedby the officer candidate school at Camp Barkeley, was discontinued to make

room for an expansion of Medical Corps programs at the Medical Field Service

School. 18 The school at Camp Barkeley continued to operate at capacity for another

months before enrollment began to taper off. On July 1943, the training cycle

was lengthened from 12 to 17 weeks, with proportionate decrease in annual

capacity. Even with this reduction, representatives of the Military Training

Division, ASF, estimated that continuation of training at existing levels would

produce surplus of nearly 3,000 MAC officers by the end of the year. Late in July,

the school at Camp Barkeley was directed toreduce its capacity to 1,000 candidates

each cycle, beginning on October 1943.19

From then on, retrenchment was rapid. In August, the Assistant Commandant

of the Officer Candidate School, Camp Barkeley, was notified to anticipate

reduction in the capacity of the school to 250 candidates by January 1944.20 In

October, The Surgeon General was requested by the Director of Military Personnel,

ASF, to concur in recommendation for discontinuing the school. In reply, The

Surgeon General pointed out that the Medical Department was conducting study

on the practicality of using MAC officers to replace junior MC officers as battalion

surgeon’s assistants and might need the school to train additional officers. In

addition, he believed that discontinuation of the school would pose threat to the

morale of Medical Department enlisted men, and he asked that the school be

continued, if only for 50 men every 17 weeks. This proposal for token school was

approved by the Army Service Forces on 27 October 1943. 21 class of 106 candidates, the smallest in the history of the school, enrolled on 21 January 1944.

Between January and May, no further classes were scheduled.

In the spring of 1944, retrenchment gave way to new period of expansion. As

result of the Kenner Board’s 22 investigations into the utilization of Medical

16 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, GSC, Director of Training, Services of Supply, for The Surgeon

General, Sept. 1942, subject: Increase in Officer Candidate School Facilities. 17 Annual Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., fiscal year 1944, with parts and

2, thereto.

18 (1) Memorandum, Col. Russell B. Reynolds, GSC, Director of Military Personnel, Services of Supply, for The

Surgeon General, Nov. 1942, subject: Capacity of Medical Administrative Officer Candidate School for 1943. (2)

Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director of Military

Personnel, Services of Supply, 20 Nov. 1942, subject: Capacity of Medical Administrative Officer Candidate School

for 1943.

18 (1) Memorandum, Col. S. V. Hasbrouck, GSC, Chief, Management and Separation Branch, Services of Supply,

for Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 26 July 1943, subject: Officer Candidate School Capacity. (2) Memorandum, Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, Office of

The Surgeon General, for the Commandant, Medical Administrative Corps Officer Candidate School, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 31 July 1943, subject: Officer Candidate School Capacity.

88 Letter, Capt. Thomas C. M. Robinson, MAC, Administrative Assistant, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Lt. Col. August H. Groesohel, MC, Medical Administrative Corps Officer Candidate School, Medical

Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 16 Aug. 1943.

21 Memorandum, Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, Deputy Surgeon General, to Director of Military Personnel, Army

Service Forces, 15 Oct. 1943, subject: Discontinuance of Medical Administrative Corps Officer Candidate School. 1st

indorsement thereto, 27 Oct. 1943. 22 On 16 Sept. 1943, The Surgeon General appointed committee of five officersunder Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.)

Albert W. Kenner to study the utilization of Medical Department personnel.
100 MEDICAL TRAINING

Table 5.—Numbers of enrollees and graduates, MAC officer candidate schools, by month,

July 1941-October 1945

Date

Carlisle Barracks Camp Barkeley Total

Enrolled Graduated Enrolled Graduated Enrolled Graduated

1941 July 100 100

August

September 77 77

October 196 196

November

December 169 169

1942 January 249 249

February

March 275 224 275 224

April 255 255

May 263 241 272 535 241

June 282 236 261 543 236

July

August

516 240

•238

266

539

238

226

782

539

478

464

September 306 242 1,110

1,168

232 1,416

1,728

1,091

806

474

October __ 560 221 480 701

November 244 1,091

545

487 731

December 261 248 928 1,176

1943 January 209 1,628

1,095

1,093

1,656

1,144

1,080

1,108

542

865 1,628 1,074

February -- 220 772 1,095 992

1,093

1,656

1,144

1,080

1,108

542

March. 758 758

April 633 633

May 593 593

June.. 646 646

July 629 629

August 681 681

September ___

746 641 746 641

October

November. 201 632 201 632

December 616 616

1944 January 106 106 106 106

February

March 88 88

April

May 255 52 255 52

June 248 248

July 252 918 1,170

1,328

304

August 253 1,075

September 304 178 178

October 208 248 248 208

November 192 547 540 547 732

December 485 165 688 485 853
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 101

Table 5.—Numbers of enrollees and graduates, MAC officer candidate schools, by month,

July 191+1-October 191+5—Continued

Department personnel, table-of-organization revisions published on March 1944

authorized officers in the Medical Administrative Corps to fill many positions

previously reserved for the Medical Corps, including battalion surgeon’s assistant,

medical inspector, hospital executive officer, and hospital registrar.23 Since the

number of unassigned MAC officers was inadequate to fill these positions, the officer

candidate schools at both Camp Barkeley and Carlisle Barracks were revived. On 26

May, class of 250 candidates was enrolled at Camp Barkeley, and month later,

the school at Carlisle Barracks was reactivated. 24

After June 1944, theprogram at Camp Barkeley expanded rapidly. Four classes

were enrolled between July and September, each with an authorized capacity of 500

candidates. In the following month, three classes with an authorized strength of 250

were enrolled. The 40th and final class of the war was enrolled on 17 November. From then on, enrollment at the school gradually declined. The school was closed on

15 March 1945, when the final class graduated.25 Between June 1944 and March

1945, 3,337 candidates were admitted to the program, of whom 2,105 were

commissioned.26

Training at Carlisle Barracks continued until October 1945. Between June 1944

and April 1945, 12 classes enrolled, each with an authorized capacity for 250

trainees. By August, all of these classes had graduated. The 13th class, containing

23 (1) See footnote 2, p. 97. (2) War Department Circular No. 99, Mar. 1944.

24 (1) See footnote 17, p. 99. (2) Special Report of Training Activities, Officer Candidate School, fiscal year 1944.

In Annual Report, Army Service Forces Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., fiscal year 1944.

26 (1) Memorandum, Col. Floyd L. Wergeland, MC, Acting Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 23 Feb. 1945, subject: Closing of Medical Administrative

Corps Officers Candidate School, Camp Barkeley, Tex. 1st memorandum indorsement thereto, Mar. 1945. (2) Army

Service Forces Circular No. 93, 15 Mar. 1945. 26 See footnote 17, p. 99.

Date Carlisle Barracks Camp Barkeley Total

Enrolled Graduated Enrolled Graduated Enrolled Graduated

1945 January 226 188 226 188

318

341

182

February __________ 480 318 480

March 368 150 191 368

April 322 182 322

May 298 298

June 34 186 34 186

July. 256 256

August 220 220

September

October .. _. 22 22

Total 5,931 4,688 18,998 12,406 24,929 17,094
102 MEDICAL TRAINING

34 candidates, continued after the war ended.27 On 17 October 1945, the training

program for MAC officer candidates came to close. statistical summary of

enrollment and graduation at the officer candidate schools is presented in table 5.

Organization and Administration

The MAC Officer Candidate School at Carlisle Barracks was established as

function of the Medical Field Service School. The chain of command ran from the

Commandant of the Medical Field Service School, through the Assistant Commandant, to the Officer Candidate School battalion commander, who was responsible

for the conduct of the course. The battalion commander, in turn, was assisted by

class directors who were responsible for the administration, housing, messing, and

training of officer candidates. For administrative purposes, candidates were

organized into companies and platoons. Courses in training, sanitation, military art, and administration were taught by Officer Candidate School instructors, under the

supervision of the corresponding academic departments at the MedicalField Service

School. Classes in logistics, field medicine and surgery, chemical warfare, infantry

and armored force tactics, and dental and veterinary medicine were taught by

regular Medical Field Service School instructors.

The MAC Officer Candidate School at Camp Barkeley was established as part

of the Medical Replacement Training Center, and the Commandant of the Medical

Replacement Training Center was also the Commandant of the Officer Candidate

School. Responsibility for the operation of the school was vested in an assistant

commandant, who reported directly to the Commandant, Medical Replacement

Training Center. Trainees were organized on battalion pattern, the number

varying in proportion to the total enrollment. battalion commander, assisted by

class directors, supervised the housing, messing, and administration of each battalion. In contrast with Carlisle Barracks, the academic and administrative departments were organized as an integral part of the school (charts and 2).

Program of Instruction

The MAC Officer Candidate School was designed to produce officers trained

for wide variety of duties in tactical units, hospitals, and other medical installations. By the end of 1944, the responsibilities of MAC officers had grown to the

point that they were expected to fill more than 60 nonprofessional positions.

Members of the Corps served in positions ranging from adjutant, supply officer, and

transportation officer, to hospital administrator, and battalion surgeon’s assistant.

Programs had to be broadly based and designed to include as many subjects as

possible. Specialized training was postponed until after commissioning.

The curriculum of the officer candidate school included variety of subjects,

some required by the War Department, and others related specifically to Medical

27 Special Report of Training Activities, Officer Candidate School, fiscal year 1945. In Annual Report, Medical

Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., fiscal year 1945.
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 103

SCHOOL

SUPPLY VETERINARY

DENTAL

Chart

1.

—Organization

of

the

Medical

Administrative

Corps

Officer

Candidate

School,

Carlisle

Barracks,

Pa.,

1943

OPERATION INFANTRY AND AIR FORCE

CHEMICALWARFARE SECRETARY BATTALION ADJUTANT

30

INSTRUCTORS OF

THE

OFFICER

CANDIDATE

SCHOOL

ALSO

ACT

AS

PLATOON

AND

ASSISTANT PLATOON

LEADERS OF

THE

15

PLATOONS MILITARY

ART

DEPARTMENT OF

EXTENSION COURSES

ASSISTANT

COMMANDANT SANITATION COMMANDANT DEPARTMENT OF

LOGISTICS

Source:

Annual

Report,

Medical

Field

Service

School,

Carlisle

Barracks, Pa.,

fiscal

year

1942.

DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION OF FIELD MEDICINE AND SURGERY

OFFICER

CANDIDATE

SCHOOL

BATTALION COMMANDING

OFFICER

TRAINING DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART

DEPARTMENT OF

SANITATION

-COMMAND

CHANNEL -ADMINISTRATIVE

CHANNEL

DEPARTMENT OF

ADMINISTRATION KEY:

DEPARTMENT OF

TRAINING
104 MEDICAL TRAINING

Chart 2.—Organization of the Medical Administrative Corps Officer Candidate School, Camp

Barkeley, Tex.,

COMMANDANT

MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTER

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF ACADEMIC GROUP OFFICER CANDIDATE COMMAND

GROUP

MESS ADMINISTRATION

1ST BATTALION

DETACHMENT CHEMICAL WARFARE LIAISON SECTION CLASS CLASS

SUPPLY COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY LOGISTICS

ADJUTANT

SANITATION 2D BATTALION

SECRETARY

OFFICER

CANDIDATE

SCHOOL

TACTICS CLASS CLASS

COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY

INFANTRY LIAISON

SECTION

PERSONNEL 3D BATTALION

TRAINING OPERATIONS CLASS CLASS

POLICE COMPANY UTILITIES COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY

Source: Annual Report, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., fiscal year 1943. Part 2.

Medical Administrative Corps Officer Candidate School.

Department activities. In general, subjects were in six major categories: Administration, tactics, logistics, training, sanitation, and chemical warfare. These categories

were usually divided into subcourses or blocks of related material. The subject of

administration, for example, was organized to provide candidates with detailed

knowledge of the forms, regulations, and procedures related to general, company,

and hospital administration, to the procurement and distributionof supplies, and to

military law.

The course in tactics was usually divided into four subcourses. One subcourse

provided trainees with basic knowledge of the organization of the Army; the

organization and functions of theater of operations; the organization and employment of combat arms (fig. 5); and the combat principles related to attack, defense,

security, and special operations. second was designed to give candidates

working knowledge of the organization of the Medical Department; the organiza-
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 105

Figure 5.—Class in antimechanized defense, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943.

tion, functions, and employment of medical units at all echelons; the medical

evacuation system in thefield and its relationship to the arm or service it supported;

and the functions of MAC officers within this system. The third subcourse dealt

withmaps and map reading; and thefourth consisted of field exercise and bivouac,

focusing on application of principles acquired in the first three subcourses.

Instruction in logistics was similarly divided into four subcourses. In the

subcourse on motors and motor maintenance, candidates acquired an understanding

of the Army system of preventive maintenance (fig. 6). second block of material

presented problems facing MAC officer planning troop movements for medical

units in the field, and third introduced the problems of field supply. As in the case

of tactical training, the final phase of instruction was practical exercise integrated

into the bivouac.

The course in training was designed to prepare candidates to serve as instructors. Of the 12 subtopics included under this heading, nine were basic to the training

of all military personnel: Military courtesy, ceremonial parades, unit inspections,

dismounted drill, tactical exercises, interior guard duty, marches and physical

training, first aid, and customs of the service. These subjects were presented from

the standpoint of both the instructor and the student. In addition, the program for
106 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 6.—Officer candidates participate in application and inspection of preventive maintenance, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943.

officer candidates was supplemented by three subcourses designed to prepare them

to become instructors. The first of these was subcourse in the techniques of

instruction, based on War Department Technical Manual 21-250, "Army Instruction/ dated 19 April 1943, which included practice teaching, lesson presentation,

selection of training aids, and use of testing devices. In the second, trainees were

given working knowledge of the construction of master and weekly training

schedules, and were familiarized with the documents governing Medical Department

training. The final subcourse, combat orientation, included study of combat

psychology, U.S. war aims, and methods of orientation instruction.

The block of materialrelated to sanitation was designed to orient candidates to

military sanitation under field conditions. One phase of the course was designed to

familiarize trainees with the control of respiratory, intestinal, venereal, and

insectborne diseases. second phase dealt with the selection of campsites and with

sanitary surveys,reports, and orders. Field exercises in the use of sanitary expedients

and the supervision of sanitation were conducted during the trainee’s bivouac.

The purpose of the course in chemical warfare was to qualify candidates to

serve as unit gas officers. Course topics included the characteristics, uses, and

factors determining the use of chemical agents; individual, collective, and tactical

protection; first aid for gas casualties; decontamination methods and materials;

chemical weapons and munitions; and chemical warfare tactics. In all phases,

special emphasis was placed on the methods of orienting enlisted men to chemical

warfare (fig, 7).
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 107

Figure 7.—Class in the identification of chemical warfare agents, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943.

The program for MAC officers was seldom static. War Department directives

continuously translated the lessons of combat into new training requirements, and

schools frequently adjusted the structure and substance of their own programs to

reflect the experience of medical units and the growing responsibilities of the Corps.

The 12-week course for MAC officer candidates established at Carlisle Barracks

in 1941 was an outgrowth of theprewar noncommissioned officer and Reserve officer

refresher courses conducted at the Medical Field Service School. Anticipating the

inauguration of school for officer candidates, the Commandant of the Medical

Field Service School directed school department heads to begin planning an officer

candidate program on 10 April 1941. On May 1941, the school was formally

authorized to prepare program, and on 28 June, the program received War

Department approval. 28

The initial program at Carlisle Barracks scheduled 561 hours of instruction. The

largest block of time, 218 hours, was allotted to the activities controlled by the

Department of Training. total of 150 hours was assigned to the Department of

Administration, making its single area of responsibility the most heavily weighted

subject in the program. The remaining hours were divided among the Departments

of Military Art, Sanitation, and Logistics.

During the first few months after the school began operation, the program

underwent series of changes. By 1942, however, version had been developed that

would remain stabilized until the school closed in February 1943. In its final form,

28 (1) Letter, Maj. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Assistant Chief, Training Subdivision, Planning and Training Division,

Office of The Surgeon General, to the Commandant, Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., May 1941,

subject: Officer Candidate Schools. (2) Letter, Maj. E. D. Liston, MC, Acting Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon

General, to the Assistant Commandant, Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 12 June 1941, subject:

Officer Candidate Schools. 3d indorsement thereto, 28 June 1941.
108 MEDICAL TRAINING

the program consisted of 576 hours of instruction. growing emphasis on tactics and

organization was accompanied by an increase in the time allotted to the Department

of Military Art from 81 hours to 110. By the same token, the time devoted to

logistics was increased from 34 to 48 hours. relative decline in the emphasis placed

on basic military training and sanitation was apparent in the reduction of the hours

assigned to the Department of Training from 218 to 162, and reduction of the

program of the Department of Sanitation from 72 hours to 55. The program in

administration was only slightly altered, declining from 150 hours to 139. Three

blocks of time were reserved for the professional departments: hours for the

Department of Field Medicine and Surgery, hours for the Department of Dental

Field Service, and hours for the Department of Veterinary Field Service. Other

innovations included 15 hours of instruction by Chemical Warfare Service

liaison officer and hours of training by British liaison officer.29

The program established by the Officer Candidate School at Camp Barkeley in

mid-1942 was essentially the same as the program already in effect at Carlisle

Barracks. When the school began, its administrative staff and training cadre were

recruited entirely from the instructional staff at Carlisle Barracks. Programs of

instruction, lesson plans, and instructional aids were transplanted from the parent

school with only slight modification. Minor variations developed as time passed,

but until mid-1943, the programs at Carlisle Barracks and Camp Barkeley were

nearly identical.

On July 1943, the programs at all officer candidate schools were extended

from 12 to 17 weeks. Since the school at Carlisle had been suspended in February,

the new program was put into effect only at Camp Barkeley. The addition of 190

hours of training made few basic alterations in the program. majority of the time,

approximately 100 hours, was allotted to activities controlled by the Department of

Training. Twenty hours were added to the bivouac, and 50 were divided among the

academic departments. The remaining 20 hours were reserved for company

activities.30

When the school at Carlisle Barracks was reactivated in May 1944, its program

was patterned upon the one already in effect at Camp Barkeley. With minor alterations, both programs remained in effect until the end of the war. During the final

year of the war, no major modifications were reported.

The allocation of hours to courses and subjects provides only crude index of

the trends and changes in the MAC officer candidate program. Substantive changes

were frequently masked behind the similarity of course titles and objectives.

Manuals were revised, lectures rewritten, and approaches changed, all with no

apparent alteration in the program. In January 1942, for example, group of

officers from the Medical Field Service School visited the headquarters of the

29 Program of Instruction, 12-Week Officer Candidate Course, 1942. Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 30 (1) Letter, Capt. Thomas C. M. Robinson, MAC, Administrative Assistant, Training Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, to Lt. Col. George E. Armstrong, MC, Assistant Commandant, MAC Officer Candidate School,

Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 21 May 1943. (2) Letter, Col. George E. Armstrong,

MC, Assistant Commandant, MAC Officer Candidate School, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley,

Tex., to Capt. Thomas C. M. Robinson, MAC, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, Army Service Forces,

U.S. Army, June 1943.
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 109

Armored Force at Fort Knox, Ky., to determine what could be done at Carlisle

Barracks to improve medical service supporting armored units. Until this time,

lessons at the school had focused on the square division and cavalry auxiliary troops,

with or hours allotted to discussion of the Armored Force. After school officials

toured Fort Knox, the curriculum was reorganized to feature the triangular division

and theArmored Force. request by the commandant for two tank hulls that could be used as training aids illustrates the responsiveness of school authorities to reports

from the field: 31

Since our conversation with the authorities at Fort Knox and our observations

there, particularly our observation of demonstration by trained medical soldiers of the evacua- tion of the wounded from tanks, other confirmatory evidence of the need for these tanks here has come to my attention. An officer of high rank of the Royal Army Medical Service has told me of

an instance in Libya where the body of dead soldier had to be dismembered before being removed from tank. He inferred that this horrible procedure could have been avoided. An officer of our

Army recently in command of tank regiment has told me that he had personal knowledge of an

incident where soldier of his regiment was killed in tank and that it required four hours to

get the body out.

It is obvious if such undesirable incidents as those described can be avoided by proper training in the field and proper teaching here that all the necessary aids shouldbe provided.

Later in the war, the subcourse in supply conducted by the Department of

Administration at Camp Barkeley was similarly adjusted when problems were

reported in transferring supplies from the Zone of Interior to the theaters of

operations.32 Neither of these adjustments resulted in reallocation of training

time, nor in change in course title.

Educational Procedures

Techniques of instruction.—At both Camp Barkeley and Carlisle Barracks, classes were conducted either by members of the school’s academic departments or by platoon leaders and their assistants. Usually, sessions attended by an

entire class were conducted by instructors from the academic staff, and platoon

leaders took over when the class was divided into sections for practical exercises

or review sessions. At both schools, platoon leaders conducted majority of the

classes in subjects such as map reading, first aid, drill and command, and physical

conditioning (fig. 8). Platoon leaders always taught under the supervision of the

academic staff, which was responsible for preparing the lesson outlines for practical

exercises as well as for selecting forms and other instructional aids. Outlines were

so detailed that they frequently included even diagrams to be drawn on the blackboard.

Classes at the schools were conducted according to approved Army training

doctrine. Demonstrations, conferences, and practical exercises were the favored

techniques. Lectures were deliberately held to minimum. study of the relative

31 Letter, Brig. Gen. Addison D. Davis, Commandant, Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., to

The Surgeon General, 30 Mar. 1942, subject: Request for Instruction Aids (Tanks).

33 Memorandum, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, The Surgeon General, for Commanding General, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 23 Apr. 1943, subject: Training in Medical Supplies.
MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 8.—Activities at officer candidate school, Camp Barkeley, Tex.,

1944. (Top) Field application of map reading techniques. (Bottom) Candidates negotiating water jump on obstacle course.
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 111

use of training methods in 502 scheduled hours of instruction at Camp Barkeley

revealed that 179 hours were spent in conferences, and 172 in practical exercises.

Demonstrations accounted for another 67 hours, and only 11 hours were used for

lectures. Lectures ere scheduled even less frequently than examinations, which

were allotted 24 hours.

Programs at the schools stressed observation and participation. medical

battalion had traditionally been assigned to the Medical Field Service School to

provide demonstrations. When the officer candidate school was activated at

Carlisle Barracks, the battalion had assumed responsibility for conducting demonstrations for officer candidates in much the same manner as the academic departments assumed the responsibility for their instruction. During its first year of

operation, the demonstrations for the officer candidate school at Camp Barkeley

were provided by men from the training battalions at the Medical Replacement

Training Center. The quality of demonstrations was difficult to maintain, however, because of frequent changes in the personnel of the units. The problem was resolved

by the establishment of special demonstration platoon. By mid-1943, when the

school had reached capacity of 3,000, the platoon had an authorized strength of 60

men. These units allowed the schools to provide demonstrations ranging from

dismounted drill to the deployment of medical units in the field.

Academic departments at both schools used practical exercises to supplement

classroom instruction. As part of the program in administration, candidates were

required to complete forms and records used by company headquarters, field

installations, messes, hospitals, military courts, and boards of officers. Field

exercises in the selection of sites for medical installations and the use of maps were

an integral part of the training provided by the Department of Tactics. To prepare

candidates for the possibility of gas attacks, the Department of Chemical Warfare

conducted gas mask drills and exercises in the use of chlorineand tear gas chambers.

Under the program of the Department of Training, students practiced teaching and

first aid, constructed course schedules, and participated in road marches and

dismounted drill.

Emphasis on practical exercises was particularly intense during the class

bivouac, highly organized 6-day exercise that had its origins in half-day

demonstration presented for officer candidates by units of the Medical Replacement

Training Center at Camp Barkeley. By stages, the exercise as extended to include

an overnight bivouac, bivouac, and finally, 6-day exercise. During

bivouac, candidates participated in field and map problems and practiced the skills

required for the operation of medical units in the field. Practical application of

classroom training in sanitation was provided, for example, by making selected

group of trainees responsible for sanitation in the bivouac area. Every phase of the

exercise was designed to translate some aspect of theory into working knowledge.

Training aids.—In addition to practical exercises, schools frequently used

audio, visual, and physical training aids to reinforce lessons and provide experience not readily available in the classroom. Both schools made maximum use of

training films, filmstrips, and slides provided by the War Department. At Camp

Barkeley, an officer assigned from the school reviewed all new films received by the

497-333 75 -9
112 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 9. —Portable public address system, one of the training aids used by the MAC Officer

Candidate School, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943.

Visual Aids Library of the Medical Replacement Training Center, and evaluated

their potential for use in the officer candidate program. War Department training

aids were supplemented by large-scale charts, maps, and diagrams designed for

specific lessons by the art departments at the Medical Field Service School and the

Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley.

Schools made use of almost any device that would aid in presenting material.

At Camp Barkeley, truck-mounted public address system was used to present

classes and demonstrations in the field (fig. 9). Both schools used installations such

as gas chambers, obstacle courses, and infiltration courses to supplement classroom

instruction, and at Camp Barkeley, the motor pool and maintenance shops were

used as training aids for the course in logistics.

To illustrate the echelons of medical support and to depict the chain of

evacuation from the frontlines to the Zone of Interior, the Department of Tactics at

Camp Barkeley constructed miniature battlefield that was approximately 60 feet

wide and 350 feet long (fig. 10).The first 212 feet of the demonstration area portrayed

the tactical deployment of an infantry division and its medical support. Roads,

buildings, medical installations, bridges, tanks, and ambulances were constructed to

scale. The remaining portion of the area contained miniature models of all medical
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 113

Figure 10.—Miniaturebattlefield depicts chain of evacuation from frontlines to Zone of Interior,

Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1943.

installations in the corps and army areas, the communications zone, and the Zone

of Interior, not necessarily constructed to scale. An artificial pond represented an

ocean separating the theater of operations from the Zone of Interior. second

demonstration area at Camp Barkeley housed sanitary exhibit containing

equipment used in the disposal of animal, human, and kitchen wastes; the sanitary

control of field messes; delousing; and mosquito control (fig. 11). Still another area

contained examples of hasty entrenchments.

Two- and three-dimensional training aids had important roles in the programs

of MAC officer candidate schools. At times, they became so extensive that the

distinction between observation and participation lost meaning.

Tests and critiques.—Tests and critiques were an important part of the

curriculum at all officer candidate schools. At both Medical Department schools,

tests were designed to serve three purposes: to evaluate student achievement, to

measure the effectiveness of the training program, and to reinforce training received in the classroom.

The construction and administration of tests at MAC officer candidate schools

were departmental responsibility. Instructors for each course or subject were

required to submit questions to the heads of their departments covering material

they had presented in class. Department heads, in turn, passed these questions to

review board that determined the validity of questions and approved the test in its

final form. Such boards usually consisted of the department head and at least one
114 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 11.-—Sanitary demonstration area, MAC Officer CandidateSchool, Camp Barkeley, Tex.,

1943.

representative of the Department of Training who was familiar with the theory of

testing. Schools relied almost exclusively on objective examinations consisting of

multiple-choice, completion, and true or false questions. On occasion, candidates

were required to complete forms used in Medical Department administration and to

solve problems requiring the use of mathematics, maps, and symbols.

To qualify for commissions, candidates were required to achieve grade of 75

in all subjects. When candidate failed tests in two subjects, his records were

automatically brought before board of officers, commonly referred to as the

Benzine Board, thatreviewed his status as candidate. Failure in the subjects of

map reading or administration could also bring candidate before the board.

Candidates considered unlikely to succeed were dismissed.

Since tests were also designed as training device, examinations were always

followed by period of review and discussion. Usually, the next class session following the test was set aside for discussion session. Trainees were provided with the

correct answers to questions they had missed and were allowed to discuss problems

they found difficult. Critiques were also scheduled at the conclusion of bivouacs

and field problems. 33

33 See footnote 17, p. 99.
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 115

Standards for Commissioning

The rate of attrition among candidates for commissions in the Medical

Administrative Corps was the second highest in ASF officer candidate schools. 34

Between July 1941 and October 1945, MAC officer candidate schools enrolled

24,929 candidates and graduated 17,094 with commissions. Thirty-one percent of

all candidates, or total of 7,835, failed to complete the course. Twenty-one percent

of the candidates enrolled at Carlisle Barracks were relieved before graduation, and

nearly 35 percent of the trainees at Camp Barkeley were either “washed out” or

allowed to resign. 35 year before the end of the war, the contrast between the two

schools was even more marked: 13.9 percent of the candidates at Carlisle Barracks

failed to graduate, while at Camp Barkeley, the rate was 34.1 percent. 36 In September 1944, the high rate of attrition at Camp Barkeley focused the attention of the

Medical Department and the Army Service Forces on the standards of selection and

retention for MAC officer candidates.

By November 1942,War Department procedures for selecting officer candidates

had been standardized in single regulation emphasizing leadership, ability, and

experience. 37 Local commanders were directed to encourage enlisted men with an

AGCT (Army General Classification Test) score above 110, who had completed

basic training and demonstrated capacity for leadership, to apply for officer

candidate school. Applicants for MAC Officer Candidate School were required to

have year of college training or year of experience in administrative or managerial positions. After preliminary testing and screening, applicants were selected by

reviewing boards appointed by commanders responsible for filling quotas. Since

many of the qualities required in an officer candidate were intangible, standards

were subject to varying interpretations, some more stringent than others.

After visit to Camp Barkeley in September 1944, the Director of the School

Division, ASF, notified The Surgeon General that he was dissatisfied with the

quality of trainees in the officer candidate school. Candidates were being selected on

the basis of applications submitted months earlier, when the school was operating

at reduced capacity. Many had since become technicians or noncommissioned

officers and had no desire to become officers. Candidates reporting from service

command installations, he observed, “had absolutely no military background for the

course.’'’ The Surgeon General was asked to determine the sources from which

improperly qualified personnel were being received.

In response, the Medical Department conducted study of five classes at

CampBarkeley and three at Carlisle Barracks. The gross rates of attrition at the two

schools, including several classes still in session, were 22 percent and percent,

respectively (tables and 7). The highest rate of failure was among candidates from

34 Memorandum, Capt. John M. Grade II, MAC, Executive Officer, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, forDirector of Training, Services of Supply, Sept. 1944, subject; Attrition of Officer Candidates. 36 (1) See footnotes 17, p. 99, and 27, p. 102. (2) Special Report of Training Activities of the Officer Candidate

School, fiscal year 1946. In Annual Report, Field Service School, Army Medical Department Schools, Army Service

Forces, Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, Tex., fiscal year 1946.

33 See footnote 34.

37 (1) Army Regulations No. 625-5, 26 Nov. 1942. (2) Army Regulations No. 625-5, 12 Sept. 1944.
116 MEDICAL TRAINING

Table 6.—Attrition rates of trainees for Officer Candidate Schools, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1944

Source: Memorandum, Col. A. W. Chilton, GSC, Director, School Division, Army Service Forces, for The Surgeon General, 19 Sept. 1944, subject: Selection of OfficerCandidates for the Medical Administrative Corps, 1st indorsement (Tab A), Oct. 1944, thereto.

the Army Air Forces, and the lowest was experienced by those from ASF training

centers.

Class 33 at Camp Barkeley, which had an attrition rate of 48 percent at the end

of the 12thweek of training, was thought to provide “a much truer picture than the

summary of all classes.” In this class, 63 percent of the failures were attributed to

lack of leadership, and candidates from the service commands accounted for 64

Table 7.—Attrition rates of trainees for Officer Candidate Schools, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1944

Source: Memorandum, Col. A. W. Chilton, GSC, Director, School Division, Army Service Forces, for The Surgeon General, 19 Sept. 1944, subject: Selection of Officer Candidates for the Medical Administrative Corps, 1st indorsement (Tab B), Oct. 1944, thereto.

Source Total enrollment Total

dropped Rate of failure

Army Air Forces 231 92

Percent

39

Service commands. ...

685 228 31

Foreign service _________ 192 46 23

Army Ground Forces and Defense

Commands 423 53 12

Army Service Forces Training Centers

(Med) 567 60 10

Ports of embarkation 20 10

Army Service Forces 55

Total 2,173 486 22

Source Total

enrollment

Total

dropped Rate of

failure

Army Air Forces

Percent

50

Service commands. 246 25 10

Foreign service 12 25

Army Ground Forces and Defense

Commands.. 42 12

Army Service Forces Training Centers

(Med) 434 24

Army Service Forces Training Centers

(other than Med) 17

Ports of embarkation ...

Miscellaneous.

Total. 751 61
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 117

percent of those dropped from the course. Candidates from the Army Air Forces, accounting for 25 percent of the enrollment, had already lost 58 percent of their

number.

The attrition rate at Carlisle Barracks was appreciably lower, but candidates

from the service commands still accounted for the bulk of the losses. Of the 751

students enrolled, only 61 had been dropped from the program. This relatively low

rate of attrition was attributed to basic difference in the interpretation of the

training mission at Carlisle Barracks:

Resignation accounts for 18 percent of the total dropped from the three classes.

All other students were dismissed; last time 20 percent of the total attrition was dropped for lack of leadership and approximately 50 percent failed in academic studies. The policy of “suggested

resignations” has not been pursued at the school at Carlisle, with the result that figures on these classes are not comparable to the Officer Candidate School at Camp Barkeley. Academic failure versus lack of leadership may be considered an indication of difference of emphasis between the

two installations. 38

Since the use of outdated applications had been eliminated by revised version

of the regulation governing officer candidates issued on 12 September 1944, the

Medical Department believed that there would be fewer disinterested candidates.

The major problem was the lack of leadership and military background prevalent

among candidates sent by the service commands, and the marked success of

candidates from ASF training centers, who had either served as cadre or attended

officer candidate preparatory schools, seemed to lead to solution. The rate of

attrition among candidates from the service commands could be significantly

reduced if men who had served for long periods in technical or administrative

positions were given preschool training in drill and command at service command

installations.

After reviewing the study submitted by the Medical Department, the Director

of Military Training, ASF, concluded that the contrast between the attrition rates

at Camp Barkeley and Carlisle Barracks was difficult to reconcile since both schools

operated under the same program of instruction and War Department doctrine and

received many students from the same sources. He directed the Officer Candidate

School, Camp Barkeley, and the Eighth Service Command to inspect the school

“to determine the reasons for the very high rate of attrition” and submit “report

of action taken to relieve the high attrition rate.”

In its reply, the Eighth Service Command focused on the standard of superior

performance set by platoon leaders at Camp Barkeley and concluded that “based

upon the high standards and superior performance of duties required of candidates

for graduation from the MAC Officer Candidate School, Camp Barkeley, that the

present rate of attrition is not high.” The school was determined to maintain these

standards and had little control over injudiciously and carelessly selected candidates

with inadequate backgrounds who used the privilege of resignation to escape the

rigors of training. Living conditions at Camp Barkeley were also cited as

38 Memorandum, Col. A. W. Chilton, GSC, Director, School Division, Army Service Forces, for The Surgeon

General, 19 Sept. 1944, subject: Selection of Officer Candidates for the Medical Administrative Corps. 1st indorsement,

Oct. 1944, with inclosures thereto; and 2d and 3d memorandum indorsements, 21 Oct. 1944 and 14 Nov. 1944.
118 MEDICAL TRAINING

contributing to trainee discontent. Recommendations for reducing theattrition rate

at Camp Barkeley included screening candidates more carefully, eliminating the

privilege of resignation, and establishing flexible quotas that would allow boards to

select only qualified applicants. On 22 November 1944, the Director of Military

Training, ASF, asked the Surgeon General’s Office to review the Eighth Service

Command’s report.

The Director, Training Division, Surgeon General’s Office, refused to endorse

the Eighth Service Command’s analysis. He agreed that candidates were

occasionally selected by hasty or haphazard methods but denied that selection

procedures had to be spelled out in greater detail. The standards defined in existing

regulations were adequate, and commanders who failed to meet theirresponsibilities

could be dealt with through command channels. Since The Adjutant General

allocated quotas on the basis of reports of availability submitted by local commanders, he believed that the flexible quotas suggested by the Eighth Service

Command would add little to the existing system. In any case, both schools

received candidates from the same sources, fact which led the Director, Training

Division, SGO, to believe that Camp Barkeley and Carlisle Barracks had different

philosophies of training:39

It is evident that gross discrepancy exists between the two MAC OCS which cannot

be lightly explained away by citing “exacting demands of platoon leaders and officer instructors for superior performance.” There is no evidence that graduates of the Medical Administrative

Corps Officer Candidate School, Camp Barkeley, are superior to graduates of the school conducted at CarlisleBarracks, and it is therefore considered presumptuous to state that the standards established at one institution are in any way superior to those of another. It can be

reasonably presumed that no less “exacting standards” are in force at the Medical Administrative Corps Officer Candidate School at Carlisle Barracks. The factor of the basic philosophy

involved at both institutions contributes materially to the rate of attrition. The high rate of

attrition leads to the belief that the philosophy employed at one installation is to “see how many

candidates can be kept from becoming officers” and, at the other, “to help as many get through

as possible.” Normal standards of performance of duties, commensurate with the demands of

military service, for officer candidates are desirable. Unattainable standards or standards set at

such level as to render their attainment by major group selected for the training involved are

considered wasteful of time, funds, and human energies.

While quarters and living conditions at Camp Barkeley did not equal those at

Carlisle Barracks, they were as good as those at many other officer candidate schools,

and the Director, Training Division, Surgeon General’s Office, did not think they

were responsible for therate of voluntary withdrawal at Camp Barkeley. He believed

that candidates withdrew because policy of suggested resignations had been

adopted by the school, and that candidates were under continuous pressure to

resign. In sum, he charged that the privilege of resignation had been abused by the

school, and not by the candidates.

Two weeks before the Director, Training Division, SGO, submitted his review,

the officer candidate school at Camp Barkeley as notified that it was to be phased

39 Transmittal Sheet, Office of the Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, to The Surgeon General;

Director, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, in turn, 22 Nov. 1944, subject: Selection of Officer Candidates for the Medical Administrative Corps. 1st indorsement, 11 Dec. 1944, with inclosures thereto.
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 119

out of the program.40 His review marked the end of official debate over the problem

of attrition at MAC officer candidate schools. In addition to providing insight into

the training program at Camp Barkeley, the debate demonstrated the degree to

which differing interpretations could alter the standards governing the selection, training, and commissioning of officer candidates.

Negroes

Negro students were enrolled at both MAC officer candidate schools. Between

1942 and 1945, total of 260 Negroes, or an average of seven per class, were enrolled

at Camp Barkeley (table 8). In the same period, 127 Negroes, or an average of five

per class, were enrolled at Carlisle Barracks. 41 Since enrollment was small, segregation was impractical, and Negro candidates were integrated not only into classes but also in barracks and messes as well.

Statistics compiled at Camp Barkeley indicated few differences in the performance of Negro and white officer candidates. As group, Negro candidates were

slightly less successful than white trainees: 60.8 percent of the Negro trainees

graduated from the course, compared with 65.4 percent of white candidates. By the

same token, however, Negro candidates were more often successful than were

candidates sent by the Army Air Forces, service commands, ports of embarkation,

and theaters of operations. Negro trainees were relieved for academic and physical

reasons more frequently than white trainees, and less frequently for lack of leadership. The rate of resignation was slightly below that of other candidates.

ADVANCED TRAINING

The MAC officer candidate program was designed to produce junior officers

capable of relieving doctors, dentists, and veterinarians from wide variety of

nonprofessional responsibilities. In many cases, members of the Medical Administrative Corps were assigned to positions requiring preparation beyond that provided at

officer candidate schools. As the war continued, MAC officers assumed an increasing

number of duties previously assigned to officers of the professional corps, and

opportunities for advanced training increased proportionally.

Many advanced training programs for the Medical Administrative Corps were

outgrowths of programs initially designed for medical, dental, and veterinary

officers. Frequently, training opportunities were provided for MAC officers by

integrating them into courses established for the officers they were replacing. MAC

officers who were assigned to medical replacement training centers, for example,

were trained in pools originally established for officers of the professional corps.

Those assigned to administrative positions at large hospitals were allowed to

40 Letter, Lt. Col. Wayne A. Starkey, MC, Chief, School Branch, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Lt. Col. John A. Nave, Assistant Commandant, MAC Officer Candidate School, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 28

Nov. 1944.

41 (1) See footnotes 6, p. 97; 27, p. 102; and 35 (2), p. 115. (2) Special Report of Training Activities, Officer Candidate School, fiscal year 1943. In Annual Report, Medical Field ServiceSchool, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., fiscalyear 1943.
120 MEDICAL TRAINING

Table

8.

—Number

and

percentage

of

candidates

who

enrolled

and

graduated or

who

failed

to

complete

the

MAC

Officer

Candidate

Course,

Camp

Berkeley,

Tex.,

classes 1-40,

inclusive,

by

Army

component, age,

race,

source, and

education

Category

Total

enrolled

Graduated and

commissioned

Candidates relieved

Reli

Deficientacademically eved

by

board ac

Lack

of

leadership

tion Physically disqualified

Resigned on

own request

Transferred to

later class or

CarlisleBarracks

Miscellaneous

Group

Class

NumPerPerNumPerPerNumPerNumPerNumber

Percent

Number

percent

percent

her

cent

Number

cent

ber

cent

Number

cent

ber

cent

ber

cent

Army

components

Regular

Army.....

3,783

19.9

2,300

60.8

18.5

166

4.4

266

7.0

28

0.7

869

23.0

132

3.5

22

0.6

National

Guard.

1,152

6.1

754

65.4

6.1

60

5.2

71

6.2

0.5

212

18.4

45

4.0

0.3

Special

Services.

13,960

73.5

9,306

66.6

75.0

545

4.0

1,243

9.0

120

0.9

2,256

16.1

434

3.0

56

0.4

Reserve Officers’

Training

Corps..

103

0.5

48

46.6

0.4

3.9

13

12.6

4.9

22

21.4

11

10.6

Age

Under

21

404

2.1

302

74.7

2.4

14

3.5

51

12.6

0.2

28

7.0

2.0

21-30.

14,751

77.6

10,196

69.0

82.2

542

3.7

1,146

7.8

112

0.8

2,279

15.4

436

3.0

40

0.3

31-40

3,594

19.0

1,813

50.4

14.6

204

5.7

381

10.6

42

1.2

970

27.0

163

4.5

21

0.6

41

years and

older

249

1.3

97

39.0

0.8

15

6.0

15

6.0

1.6

82

33.0

15

6.0

21

8.4

Race

White

18,725

98.5

12,240

65.4

98.6

736

4.0

1,580

8.4

155

0.8

3,318

17.7

615

3.3

81

0.4

Colored..

260

1.4

158

60.8

1.3

38

14.6

11

4.2

1.5

41

15.8

2.7

0.4

13

0.1

10

77.0

0.1

7.7

15.3

Source

Defense

Command

and

Army

4,479

23.6

2,969

66.3

24.0

203

4.5

337

7.5

26

0.6

798

17.8

124

2.8

22

0.5

Ground

Forces.

Service

Commands

3,406

18.0

1,925

56.4

15.5

145

4.3

319

9.4

50

1.5

811

23.8

134

4.0

22

0.6

Army

Air

Forces

2,870

15.1

1,501

52.4

12.1

156

5.4

271

9.4

29

1.0

798

27.8

101

3.5

14

0.5

Army

Service Forces

Training

5,681

30.0

4,576

80.4

36.8

148

2.6

368

6.5

28

0.5

436

7.7

108

2.0

17

0.3

Center. (Camp

Barkeley)

(1,891)

(10.0)

(1,660)

(87.8)

(13.4)

(32)

(1.7)

(57)

(3.0)

(7)

(0.4)

(100)

(5.3)

(27)

(1.4)

(8)

(0.4)

(Camp

Grant)

(721)

(3.8)

(601)

(83.3)

(4.8)

(12)

(1.7)

(54)

(7.5)

(1)

(0.1)

(43)

(6.1)

(8)

(1.1)

(2)

(0.2)

(Camp

Ellis)

(661)

(3.6)

(610)

(92.3)

(4.9)

(3)

(0.5)

(23)

(3.4)

(2)

(0.3)

(10)

(1.5)

(12)

(1.8)

(1)

(0.1)

(Fort

Lewis) ..

(1,631)

(8.6)

(1,249)

(76.6)

(10.0)

(59)

(3.6)

(134)

(8.2)

(9)

(0.6)

(149)

(9.1)

(29)

(1.8)

(2)

(0.1)

Ports

of

embarkation.

171

0.8

89

52.0

0.7

4.1

12

7.0

1.2

53

31.0

4.1

0.6

Foreign

Service

2,172

11.4

1,212

55.8

9.8

113

5.2

258

11.9

20

0.9

432

20.0

131

6.0

0.2

117

0.6

94

80.4

0.8

15

12.8

3.4

3.4

Programs.
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 121

Source:

Annual

Report,

Army

Service Forces

Training

Center,

Camp

Barkeley,

Tex.,

July

1944

to

April

1945. Part

2:

Medical

Administrative

Corps

Officer

Candidate

Miscellaneous School. _.

102

0.5

42

41.2

0.3

3.0

13

4.0

27

26.4

13

12.7

Education Grammar

895

4.7

410

45.8

3.3

81

9.0

4.6

0.3

328

36.6

26

3.0

0.7

High

school5,478

28.8

3,499

63.9

28.2

295

0.6

1,095

20.0

175

3.2

11

0.2

College

oO

6,333

33.4

4,209

66.5

34.0

247

8.1

1.2

1,033

16.3

217

36

0.5

College

graduate.

3.4

6,292

33.1

4,290

68.2

34.5

152

2.4

668

10.6

0.7

903

14.4

204

29

0.5

3.2

Pharmacists.

1,033

5.4

600

58.1

4.8

36

3.5

147

14.2

0.7

204

19.7

35

0.4

Warrant officers. ..

3.4

130

0.7

77

59.2

0.6

2.3

3.8

35

27.0

Verbal orders

214

1.1

171

80.0

1.4

1.4

14

6.5

21

9.8

2.3

Total..

18,998

100.0

12,408

65.3

100.0

775

4.1

1,593

8.4

159

0.8

3,359

17.7

622

82

0.4

3.3
122 MEDICAL TRAINING

participate in the job-understudy programs available through hospital training

pools. By the end of the war, members of the Medical Administrative Corps were

attending almost every nonprofessional course offered by the Medical Department,

including the Medical Field and Sanitary Inspector Course, and the courses in

supply and maintenance at the St. Louis Medical Depot, St. Louis, Mo. number

of officers also attended courses and schools outside the Medical Department,

including the Adjutant General’s School, Fort Washington, Md., and the Ordnance

Automotive Maintenance Course.

The first programs exclusively for members of the Medical Administrative

Corps were the courses in mess and motor management at the Medical Replacement

Training Center, Camp Barkeley. These courses, established at the suggestion of the

Commandant, MedicalReplacement Training Center, were designed to fill the need

of fixed installations and field units for administrative officers trained in these

fields. 42 The Mess Management Course, conducted at the Camp Barkeley Cooks and Bakers School, emphasized the management of hospital messes, mess sanitation,

purchasing methods, and the completion of forms used by mess officers. The Motor

Transport Officers’ Course was conducted at the center’s Motor Transport School

and provided training in the operation and maintenance of all types of vehicles used

by the Medical Department, theadministration of motor convoys, and the problems

of day and night driving under tactical conditions. Each month, group of officers

graduating from the Officer Candidate School at Camp Barkeley was selected to

attend these courses and retained at the center for an additional weeks of training.

Between June 1942 and April 1945, 278 and 289 officers graduated from the Motor

and Mess Management Courses, respectively. 43

In mid-1943, the Medical Department began developing series of special

training programs for the Medical Administrative Corps. On 11 June 1943, Army

Service Forces notified the chiefs of the administrative and technical services that

they were required to provide continuous training for all surplus officers held in

replacement pools. 44 Since the Medical Department anticipated surplus of MAC

officers by January 1944, plans for training them in special pools were submitted to

the Army Service Forces on July 1943.45 On 14 August, the service commands and

the Military District of Washington were provided with the names of station and

general hospitals that had been selected to conduct pool training. 46

The pools established for the Medical Administrative Corps, in the summer of

1943, were designed to supplement facilities already available at Medical Depart42 Letter, Brig. Gen. Roy C. Heflebower, Commanding General, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp

Barkeley, Tex., to The Surgeon General, June 1942, subject: Courses in Mess Management and Motor Transport

for MAC Officers. 43 See footnote 17, p. 99. 44 Army Service Forces Circular No. 39, 11 June 1943.

45 Memorandum, Col. R. W. Bliss, MC, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director of

Military Training, Army Service Forces, July 1943, subject: Replacement Pools for MAC Officers. 46 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. Charles H. Moseley, MC, Chief, Training Doctrine Branch, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of TheSurgeon General, and Capt. T. C. M. Robinson, MAC, AdministrativeAssistant, Training

Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, 19 July 1943, subject: Conference on Officer Pool Training, 19 July 1943. (2) Memorandum, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, The Surgeon General, U. S.Army, for Commanding Generals, First through Ninth Service Commands

and Military District of Washington, 14 Aug. 1943, subject: Replacement Pools for Medical Administrative Corps

Officers.
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 123

merit replacement pools. While awaiting assignment as fillers or replacements,

officers in the pools were provided with an opportunity to understudy members of

the staff in positions ranging from adjutant and registrar to medical detachment

commanders. Training was conducted under the pool program in hospital administration originally designed for officers in the Medical and Dental Corps. Since all

MAC officers were graduates of officer candidate schools, the program was modified

to eliminate basic training. 47

School for Battalion Surgeon’s Assistants

In the fall of 1943, The Surgeon General decided to replace one of the two

surgeons assigned to battalion aid stations with specially trained MAC officer who

would be known as the battalion surgeon’s assistant. Despite fears that such officers

might assume unwarranted diagnostic powers, The Surgeon General was confident

that with special training they could replace one physician and relieve the second

from many of the distractions of detachment administration and tactical

employment.

Fortunately, approximately 1,500 MAC officers were in replacement pools in

the Zone of Interior at the time The Surgeon General made his decision, and

beginning in January 1944, successive groups of these officers were ordered to report

to newly establishedSchool for Battalion Surgeon’s Assistants at CampBarkeley. 48

Between January 1944 and January 1945, approximately 2,000 officers graduated

from the course. The second class, which began late in February 1944, contained

more than half of the officers enrolled during the year that the school was in

operation. By March, replacement pools were empty, and the school began enrolling

recently commissioned officers. Each of the five classes enrolled between March

1944 and January 1945, when training was suspended, contained between 99 and

178 trainees.49

The 6-week course for battalion surgeon’s assistants focused on subjects that

would qualify nonprofessional lieutenant in the Medical Administrative Corps to

assume responsibility for battalion aid station and assist the battalion surgeon in

the treatment of casualties. total of 140 hours of training time, or almost half of

the scheduled 300 hours of instruction, were devoted to subjects related to field

medicine and surgery, including emergency medical treatment, treatment of

chemical casualties, transfusions, chemotherapy, and use of penicillin. Fifty hours

were devoted to the tactical use of battalion aid stations in the attack and retrograde

movements, and 42 hours were devoted to field sanitation. The balance of the time

was allotted to administration and military training. Two weeks of the course were

spent in field exercises. 50

Although designated as separate school, the School for Battalion Surgeon’s

Assistants was managed in conjunction with the MAC Officer Candidate School at

47 See footnote 46 (2), p. 122. 48 See footnote 2, p. 97. 49 See footnote 17, p. 99. 60 Training Program for Assistant Battalion Surgeons (Medical Administrative Corps Officers), Dec. 1943.
124 MEDICAL TRAINING

Camp Barkeley. The assistant commandant of the MAC Officer Candidate School

acted as theassistant commandant of the School for Battalion Surgeon’s Assistants,

and most of the officers teaching at the school were instructors at the Officer Candidate School. Classes in field medicineand surgery were conducted by members of the

Medical Corps who were assigned to the school by the War Department. 51

In May 1945, the Surgeon General’s Office decided to train 500 additional

battalion surgeon’s assistants for employment in the Pacific theater. Since training

at Camp Barkeley had already been discontinued, the course was shifted to the

Medical Field Service School, and the program was revised to reflect conditions in

active theaters. 52 On July 1945, class of 102 officers was enrolled, of which 100

graduated on August. second class of 100, enrolled on 11 August, was disbanded

after the military collapse of Japan. 53

Physical and Educational Reconditioning Officers

Plans for an Armywide program for reconditioning convalescent soldiers were

developed by the Surgeon General’s Office early in 1943, and by April, the program

was theoretically underway. Until early 1944, however, only few hospitals

established successful programs. Uncertainty continued until March 1944, when the

Army Service Forces issued tables of organization for reconditioning programs in

general hospitals and made the Army Reconditioning Program service command

responsibility. 54

At therequest of the Office of The Surgeon General, courses for educational and

physical reconditioning officers were established at the School for Personnel Services,

in April and May 1944. Both courses were placed under the control of newly

created Department of Reconditioning headed by Medical Department officer.

Outlines for the courses were developed at the Office of The Surgeon General by

members of the Reconditioning and Training Divisions. 55

The Physical Reconditioning Officers’ Course was 1-monthprogram focusing

on physical and neuropsychiatric disorders, kinesiology and physiology, remedial

exercises, developmental and adaptive exercises, and theadministration of theArmy

Reconditioning Program. In the 4-week course for educational reconditioning

officers, material on exercises was replaced by instruction in the philosophy and

methodology of education, guidance, and prevocational counseling. Educational

reconditioning officers were also oriented to recreational activities that included

dramatics, radio programs, and music.

61 See footnote 17, p. 99. 62 Letter, Brig. Gen. R. W. Bliss, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Director of Military Training, 31 May 1945, subject: Training of Medical Administrative

Corps Officer Candidate School Officers as Battalion Surgeon Assistants.

63 Goodman, Samuel M.: History of Medical Department Training. United States Army World War II. Volume

IX: Medical Department Training Activities, July 1945-2 September 1945. Supplement to Historical Monographs

and Supplements Covering the Period July 1939-30 June 1945. [Official record.]

64 Medical Department, United States Army. Organization and Administration in World War II. Washington:

U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1963. 66 Loughlin, Richard L.: The Medical History of the United States Army in World War II. Reconditioning. [Official record, 1946.]
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS 125

The table of organization for reconditioning programs included many officers in

addition to members of the Medical Administrative Corps. The program at each

hospital of 500 beds or larger was directed by Medical Department officer, and his

assistant for physical reconditioning could be either MAC officer or an officer with

the requisite background from any other corps in the Army. The position of

Educational Reconditioning Officer could be filled by an officer from any branch

of the Army who had experience in morale services. 56 Between June 1944 and

October 1945, total of 679 officers graduated from the course for physical reconditioning officers. In the period from May 1944 to October 1945, 635 graduated from

the Educational Reconditioning Course. 57

54 Army Service Forces Circular No. 73, 11 Mar. 1944. 47 See footnote 55, p. 124.

497-333 75 10

CHAPTER IV

The Army Nurse Corps

Before World War II, training programs for Army nurses were few and were

designed only to prepare nurses for clinical or functional assignments and not to

provide military training. Indeed, between 1920, when they were granted relative

rank as officers, and July 1944, when they received full commissions, nurses enjoyed only quasi-military status. Even membership in the Army’s Reserve components, authorized for all other Medical Department corps, was denied them.

Reasons offered for this peculiar arrangement in 1935 help to explain not only the

absence of Reserve corps for nurses, but also the quasi-military status of nurses

and their lack of military training:

The creation of formal Nurse Reserve Corps analogous to the Officers Reserve Corps would be difficult to defend The duties of nurse in military hospital do not differ in any

important particular from the duties in civil hospitals. Preliminary military training

is not essential therefore and active duty training periods *, similar to those held for

reserve officers, are not required. Marriage would terminate eligibility in too many instances and

inject an almost prohibitive obstacle to the maintenance of such corps. The War Department

in lieu of Nurse Reserve Corps relies almost entirely upon the American National Red Cross

Nursing Service for the supply of qualified nurses during an emergency. This is eminently proper

as the Red Cross recognizes thisresponsibility as one of its charter obligations and has the national

set-up for such mission.

Even more to the point was remark made by The Surgeon General, Maj.

Gen. James C. Magee, to members of the National Medical Association in March

1941, in attempting to quiet their fears that military recruiting would strip the

Nation of public health nurses: “After all there are 500,000 nurses in America and

we are only asking for to Yi percent.” Before the war, planners considered nurses

so plentiful that military requirements could be met without special programs or

incentives.

PREWAR PROGRAMS

As result of these attitudes, there were few opportunities for either basic or

advanced training during the interwar years. Peacetime appointments to the Army

Nurse Corps were made few at time, and nurses received only an informal

orientation to the Army at their first station. few Army hospitals provided limUnless otherwise indicated, this chapter is based on study entitled "History of the Army Nurse Corps,” by

Lt. Col. Hortense E. McKay, USA (Ret.). [Official record.]

(1) 41 Stat. 767. (2) 58 Stat. 324.

Medical Department, United States Army. Personnel in World War II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1963.

Rogers, J. A.: Reserve Nurses, Army M. Bull. No. 32, July 1935.
128 MEDICAL TRAINING

ited programs in anesthesia and other clinical skills. Most of this training was

tutorial, on-the-job training comparable to that provided for enlisted specialists,

and designed to meet the requirements of specific hospital. Early in 1933, The Surgeon Generalrequired six general hospitals to conduct course in “Medical Department Administration” for nurses with less than years’ service, and by the end of

June, 236, about third of the corps, had completed the program of 18 lectures.

This appears to have been “one-time-only” program for there is no evidence that

the series was ever repeated. Finally, funds available under the 2-percent clause of

the National Defense Act, as amended in 1920, were used to train Army nurses at

civilian institutions. Until 1933, these funds were used primarily to train instructors

for the Army School of Nursing. After the school was suspended, the funds were

used to train nurse-anesthetists.

Interwar programs left the Medical Department with fewer training precedents

than it had for enlisted men, or even MAC (Medical Administrative Corps) officers.

As the Army Nurse Corps grew from 672 on 30 June 1939 to 55,590 at the end of

August 1945, the need for training became increasingly obvious, and wartime training methods evolved gradually through trial and error.

BASIC MILITARY TRAINING

Traditional Orientation

In contrast to the months of postgraduate training provided for Medical

Corps officers before the war, Army nurses received little training to prepare them

for wartime nursing. The peacetime orientation of an Army nurse began with assignment to station in the continental United States “to afford her an opportunity

to become acquainted with military customs.” Much of this initial orientation was

spent in personal processing: obtaining uniforms, initiating records, and becoming

acquainted with the military post, Army hospitals, and nurses’ quarters. Instructing new nurses in regulations governing the Army Nurse Corps in “duties peculiar

to Army work” was the responsibility of the chief nurse.

Before World War II, the traditional techniques of orientation were reasonably

effective. Their most serious defect was the complete absence of training for operation under field and combat conditions. Under the stress of expansion between 1939

and 1941, with newly recruited nurses arriving at stations almost daily, informal

and tutorial methods became increasingly unsatisfactory. Chief nurses were heavily

taxed by the responsibility for supervising nurses in varying stages of orientation.

Individual nurses could not be assured of balanced and progressive basic training

to prepare them for unit training.

(1) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933.

(2) Adult Education in the Army Nurse Corps. Am. J. Nursing 34; 725, July 1934. (1) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940. (2) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939. (3)

Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington; U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1937. (4) Annual

Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1936.

See footnote 3, p. 127.

Army Regulations No. 40-20, 31 Dec. 1934.
ARMY NURSE CORPS 129

After entry of the United States into the war, the system suffered complete

breakdown. The Medical Department had planned to use affiliated units to support

combat units. After Pearl Harbor, the Medical Department found itself unable to

mobilize and equip them in time to accompany combat forces being shipped overseas. The problem as further complicated by the need of task forces for station

hospitals, an organization which had no counterpart among affiliated units. As

result, established hospital training units had to be shipped to the theater, and

with them, many of the Army’s most experienced nurses.

During 1942, numbered hospitals were usually activated at military posts where there was large station hospital or general hospital at which the unit’s officers and men could engage in parallel training. Under this system, members of

the unit participated in mixture of formal training and job-understudy designed

to prepare them for their positions when the unit ent into operation. If present

during this phase, the unit’s nurses were usually assigned to serve in the post

hospital, and they received military training only at the hospital commander’s

discretion.

As an increasing number of nurses entered the Army, there was even less opportunity to fit them into an organization. Hospitals were too pressed to provide

leisurely orientations, and many experienced nurses were being promoted and

transferred. Many chief nurses had been recruited only recently from comparable

civilian positions and had little more experience in military procedures than did

their trainees. In short, the prewar pattern of on-the-job training proved as unwieldy for mobilizing the Army Nurse Corps as it had for other components of the

Medical Department.

Program Guides

Despite these problems, formal guide for training Army nurses was not issued by the Office of The Surgeon General until late 1942. Numbered hospitals

training in the United States had guidelines for officers and enlisted men but none

for nurses. In September 1942, the Training and Nursing Divisions of the Office of

The Surgeon General recognized that hospitals destined for theater assignment

required guidance in training nurses. program was published in October that

provided weeks of instruction, including 16 hours of duty assignment in 44-hour

week for nurses in theater-of-operations units. Required instruction included military courtesy and customs; uniform regulations; dismounted drill; physical training

defense against chemical, mechanized, and air attacks; Army and Medical Department organization; military administration; first aid, field sanitation, and communicable disease control; ward management; and routine hospital procedures. 10

The limitations of this program soon became apparent. Nurses were frequently

on duty in active hospitals wdiile the rest of their unit was in training, unable to

join them in time to participate in unit training, or to be trained according to the

Smith, Clarence McKittrick: The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior.

United States Armyin World War II. TheTechnical Services. Washington; U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1956.

10 Mobilization Training Program No. 8-10, 29 July 1942.
130 MEDICAL TRAINING

program. The number of those who actually received military training before their

unit was shipped to the theater was further reduced when nurses assigned to

unit were withdrawn because of physical disqualification for overseas service or

other reasons.

To reduce these problems, the Nursing Division recommended in January

1943 that Army nurses under 50 years of age be trained while assigned to Zone of

Interior hospitals.11 This recommendation was approved by ASF (Army Service

Forces) on 30 May 1943, and commanding officers of all hospitals of 250-bed or

greater capacity in the Zone of Interior were directed to provide training under

MTP (Mobilization Training Program) No. 8-10 to all members of the Army Nurse

Corps under 50 years of age. 12 The guide published for this program late in June

reduced the age for such training to 45 and prescribed list of topics that were

nearly identical to those required under the earlier program. 13 Two months later,

this ASF directive was superseded by War Department directive which extended

the program to all hospitals, regardless of capacity, and added the “basic” to the

title. 14

Even with these changes, the program proved inadequate. Despite determined

efforts, patient care continued to take precedence over training. Nurses reported

to hospitals almost daily, making it difficult to fit them into the program. Training

at hospitals with capacity of less than 250 beds was still permissive, difficult to

administer, and frequently intermittent. Finally, it became obvious that new

approach to basic training was required if nurses were to function effectively within

the Medical Department. In the last half of 1943, the Training Division, Office of

The Surgeon General, recognized the advantages of providing basic training for

Army nurses before they were assigned to units with responsibility for patient

care. After proposal submitted to Army Service Forces in August for the establishment of single basic training center for nurses was disapproved, the Medical Department tried another tack that ultimately proved fruitful. 15

Basic Training Centers

Following the rejection of its request to establish centralized basic training

center, the Office of The Surgeon General countered with proposal to establish

centers within the service commands under standardized program of instruction.

In late July, Maj. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service

Forces, authorized the establishment of basic training center in each service command, and on 16 October, formal syllabus as published. The earlier, local train11 Memorandum, Col. Florence A. Blanchfield, ANC, for Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Chief of Training Division,

Surgeon General’s Office, 14 Jan. 1943, subject: Army Nurse Corps.

12 Memorandum, Col. R. T. Beurket, GSC, Executive Officer, Training Division, Army Service Forces, for The

Surgeon General, 30 May 1943, subject: Basic Military Training for Army Nurse Corps.

13Army Service Forces Memorandum No. S350-32-43, 23 June 1943, subject; Training of Army Nurses.

13 War Department Memorandum No. W350-233-43, 23 Aug. 1943, subject: Basic Training of Army Nurses.

16 (1) Memorandum, Col. R. W. Bliss, MC, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Aug. 1943, subject: Course of Basic MilitaryTraining for Nurses. (2) Memorandum, Col. R. T. Beurket, GSC, Executive Officer, Military Training Division, Army Service Forces, for The Surgeon General, Oct. 1943, subject: Course of Basic Military Training for Nurses.
ARMY NURSE CORPS 131

Table 9.—Basic training centers for Army nurses

Source; Completed AG ASF Forms R-5218, dated Nov. 1945. In Report—Flow of Trainees Thru Nurses Basic

Training Centers.

ing program was retained for nurses with more than 60 days’ service who had not

completed training under previous programs, but all newly inducted nurses were

required to participate in basic training. 16

Most service commands responded enthusiastically to the establishment of

basic training centers for Army nurses. Indeed, several service commands had already taken the initiative in establishing such centers as shown in table 9. Early

basic training centers were established at hospitals, where the chief nurse had

dual assignment as school commandant and hospital chief nurse. They had the advantage of close working relationship with the hospital but the disadvantage of

placing dual, and sometimes conflicting, responsibilities on those charged with the

program. Conditions at these pioneer centers were far from ideal. Later centers

were established as separate organizations to increase the efficiency of the program

in processing, outfitting, and training newly recruited nurses.

Army nurses assigned to small AAF (Army Air Forces) hospitals directly from

civilian life were provided training when 11 AAF nurse training detachments were

organized in November 1943. This type of training continued until 1944when nurses

16 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. Florence A. Blanchfield, Acting Superintendent, Army Nurse Corps,for Col. Francis

C. Tyng, MC, Chief, Finance and Supply Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 26 May 1943, subject: Army Nurse

Corps. (2) Letter, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, The Surgeon General, to Commanding General, Each Service Command, 30 July 1943, subject: Training Centers, Army Nurse Corps. (3) See footnote 15 (l),p. 130. (4) Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, First to Ninth Service Commands, 16 Oct. 1943, subject: Course of Basic

Military Training for Nurses.

Service

command Installation and location First class

enrolled

Last class completed Total graduates

First Fort Devens, Mass 19 July 1943 22 Sept. 1945 663 Second.._ Halloran General Hospital, N.Y 19 July 1943 15 Jan. 1944 545

England General Hospital, N.J Dec. 1943 30 Jan. 1945 1.440 Tilton General Hospital, N.J. _.

Feb. 1945 11 Aug. 1945 2,011

Third Fort George G. Meade, Md Sept. 1943 14 Apr. 1945 317

Camp Lee, Va .. Mar. 1945 Sept. 1945 1,252

Fourth CampRucker, Ala 10 Oct. 1943 13 Aug. 1945 080

Fifth Billings General Hospital, Ind Sept. 1943 July 1945 1,494

Fort Knox, Ky._ Feb. 1945 28 Aug. 1945 829

Sixth Camp McCoy, Wis 19 July 1943 25 Aug. 1945 4,120

Seventh Camp Carson, Colo 22 Nov. 1943... 25 Aug. 1945 2,538

Eighth Brooke General Hospital, Fort

Sam Houston, Tex. 19 July 1943 23 May 1945.... 1,391

Camp Swift, Tex 15 Mar. 1945 Aug. 1945 861

Ninth Madigan General Hospital, Fort

Lewis, Wash. 29 Nov. 1943... 31 Aug. 1945-... 2,739

Fort Huachuca, Ariz. (Negro

personnel). 10 July 1944 23 Sept. 1944... 50

Total.. 27,330
132 MEDICAL TRAINING

were no longer recruited directly by theArmy Air Forces. 17 basic training program

for Negro nurses was established at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., but was in operation

less than months. After training for women at Fort Huachuca was suspended,

most Negro nurses were sent to Camp McCoy, Wis., for training. 18

Program of Instruction

The initial program of instruction prescribed for Army nurses encompassed

period of 144 training hours, including basic military training, administration,

organization, military sanitation, and ward and clinic nursing. The largest single

block of hours was devoted to such basic military subjects as military courtesy,

care of clothing and equipment, dismounted drill, and physical training (fig. 12).

week was allowed for processing incoming students. With the passage of time,

course content was adjusted to provide nurses with broader and more balanced

program. Hours devoted to Army and Medical Department organization and to

the duties of the Army nurse were expanded. In response to reports from the field,

increased emphasis was placed on field training, map reading, tent pitching, efficiency reports, and obstacle and infiltration courses (fig. 13). In April 1945, instruction in malaria control and tropical diseases was added to prepare nurses for

duty in the Pacific theater. Hours devoted to hospital ward duty were gradually

decreased to provide for the inclusion of these subjects. Other changes in the conduct of training included an increase in the time devoted to outdoor training from

19 percent to approximately 35 percent by June 1944 and an increased use of “applicatory” training and training aids to provide more realism. 19 Training aids were

usually locally fabricated and assembled, and their quantity, quality, and use by

instructors improved as time passed.

Facilities and Techniques

After October 1943, when training centers were established on an Armywide

basis, the basic training program for nurses was better organized. Overhead personnel were authorized for administration and instruction, and tables of allowances

were established for supplies and equipment. At first, classrooms at some centers

consisted of converted hospital wards with space for 15 to 35 trainees. The program

grew to larger proportions late in 1944, when as many as 750 trainees were present

at one time, and plans were in process to train as many as 2,000 each month at

17 (1) Annual Report of Personnel Division, Air Surgeon's Office, fiscal year 1944. (2) Medical History of Second

Air Force, 1944. [Official record. U.S. Air Force, Research Studies Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.] (3) Link,

Mae Mills, and Coleman, Hubert A.: Medical Support of the Army Air Forces in World War II. Washington: U.S.

GovernmentPrinting Office, 1955.

18 (1) Telegram,Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell to Commanding Generals, First to Ninth Service Commands and

Military District of Washington, Sept. 1944. (2) Memorandum,Lt. Col. Charles H. Moseley, MC, Deputy Director,

Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Maj. Edna B. Groppe, ANC, 25 Sept. 1944. 19 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, First to Ninth Service Commands, 16 Oct. 1943,

subject: Course of Basic Military Training for Nurses. (2) Annual Report of Medical Department Activities, Headquarters, First Service Command, 1945. (3) Diary, Brig. Gen. Floyd L. Wergeland, 20 Sept. 1944 to 31 Dec. 1945,

entry for 15 May 1945.
ARMY NURSE CORPS 133

Figure 12.—Army nurses in training, Camp McCoy, Wis. (Top) Army nurses

engage in calisthenics. (Bottom) Army nurses crawl through an obstruction on the obstacle course.
134 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 13.—Army nurses in training, Camp McCoy, Wis. (Top) Army nurses

negotiate rope ladder during basic training. (Bottom) Army nurse negotiates the

simulated jungle river crossing.
ARMY NURSE CORPS 135

some centers. To cope with the increased training load, methods used in Army

Service Forces schools were adopted. Weekly schedules of instruction were published, lesson plans prepared, and instructor guidance programs instituted. Unfortunately, instructor guidance programs did not always include hospital ward

nurses responsible for ward teaching, most of whom were more concerned with

nursing service than with training. Inspections were instituted to point out strengths

and weaknesses in instructional methods and to allow comparison of training between centers.

The facilities provided at basic training centers in 1943 proved inadequate for

the training requirements of later years. Not only did the number of nurses in basic

training grow, but also in 1944, the training load was further increased by the assignment of dietitians and physical therapists to centers originally intended for

nurses. In all, 27,330 nurses received basic training between July 1943 and September 1945. To accommodate these trainees, some commands moved training

centers within or between installations or provided an additional center during

periods of heavy enrollment. When the number to be trained by one command exceeded its capacity, nurses were sent to other commands. The number of nurses

recruited and assigned to training centers varied so much from month to month

that high degree of flexibility was necessary. Only four nurse training centers did

not have to be relocated at some time during the war. Relocation was most often

necessary because early centers, established at general hospitals, did not have the

capacity to adjust to the 1945 training load. Plans were made in June 1945 to decrease the number of training centers, and by September, all centers were closed. 20

From time to time, other problems plagued the program. One was the degree

of realism and “ruggedness” to be injected into training. For time, trainees were

sent through infiltration courses, but this was later discontinued in the belief that

general physical conditioning was more valuable. 21 Other problems that were

eventually solved included an initial shortage of qualified instructors, shortages of

clothing, and inadequate training aids. At training centers, these problems were

more readily identified and resolved than they could have been at scattered hospitals.

The Contribution of Basic Training

Directives and letters issued early in the war, outlining basic training plans

for Army nurses, failed to realize their objectives. Initial directives required nurses

assigned to field medical units to possess satisfactory knowledge of basic military

subjects broader than that required for duty in fixed hospitals. Because of inadequate prewar programs, instructors were rarely available. Directives permitting

local program modifications, such as allowing nurses to spend half their basic training time in hospital wards, frequently weakened the program. This happened most

often when nurses were assigned to fixed hospitals, which did not require knowl20 (1) Army Service Forces Circular No. 300, Aug. 1945. (2) Army Service Forces Circular No. 323, 25 Aug. 1945.

21 (1) Army Service Forces Circular No. 90, 27 Sept. 1943. (2) Office Memorandum, Lt. David M. Campbell,

MAC,Training Division, Office of The SurgeonGeneral, Nov. 1943.
136 MEDICAL TRAINING

edge of field techniques to function effectively, and which frequently had patient

loads requiring 24-hour nursing service days week. Establishment of basic

training centers with fixed programs guaranteed uniform and continuous training.

Perhaps the most obvious advantage was the high morale developed during

basic training. Nurses graduating from such programs could be sure that they had

learned their duties and responsibilities as officers, that their personnel records and

immunizations were complete, and that they were correctly outfitted. Army nurses

were all volunteers, trained in their technical specialties. Yet, it was possible to

gain the maximum benefit from these skills only after nurses had become familiar

with the Army and the Medical Department and could be confident that they had

been trained to come to grips with the special problems of Army nursing.

CHIEF NURSES

Prewar Training

In the interim between World Wars and II, vacancies and promotions to

chief nurse were rare. Examinations were required for promotion to chief nurse,

and beginning in 1935, few chief nurses were assigned for short period to the

Nursing Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to supplement knowledge gained

in preparing for the examination with experience. Subjects included hospital administration, records administration, efficiency reports, personnel assignment,

disciplinary action, nurses’ rights and privileges, management of overseas nurse

rosters, and the function of The Surgeon General, The Adjutant General, and the

Inspector General. Such training was slow and limited to chief nurses who were

changing stations. As the Army Nurse Corps expanded during 1940 and 1941, the

authorization for chief nurses increased from 72 to 494. During 1941, 180 candidates selected for leadership and executive ability passed the qualifying examination. 22

Informal, on-the-job techniques satisfied the requirements of the Medical Department until 1942, when the mobilization of theater units thinned the ranks of

experienced nurses at fixed hospitals. At this point, the system broke down because

too many candidates were studying under inexperienced chief nurses. But until

late in 1942, on-the-job training remained the only technique available.

Wartime Training

Under pressure, stopgap methods were used to accelerate the training of chief

nurses. Early in 1942, the Superintendent of Nurses, Col. Julia O. Flikke, ANC, revised instructions for training chief nurses to incorporate essential information on

personnel procedures and administration. Training procedures were relaxed in

April, when written examinations for promotion to chief nurse were abandoned.

Commanders empowered to promote officers were authorized to promote nurses to

22 (1) See footnote (4), p. 127. (2) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941.
ARMY NURSE CORPS 137

the position of chief nurse to fill vacancies in units under their command and were

required only to report the promotion to The Surgeon General. After few months,

even the requirement for report was suspended. 23 Late in 1942, an effort was made

to give chief nurses short courses at four general hospitals, but because of patient

loads, only one program was successful. 24

Aside from this course, and one developed late in the war by the Army Air

Forces, formal training program for chief nurses did not evolve duringWorld War

II. Throughout the war, nurses at service command headquarters provided informal guidance through letters and visits, and some devised more detailed training. At the hospital level, chief nurses attempted to provide on-the-job training for

potential candidates, but the mounting pressure of patient loads limited training

to Army procedures at the expense of administrative principles and theory. Such

training was ostensibly for duty in the theaters, but the duties of chief nurses in

Zone of Interior hospitals were also emphasized. Nurses were selected on the basis

of civilian administrative experience and physical ability to serve overseas. Those

who had already been in the theaters and were qualified to return were also selected.

Army Air Forces established 4-week training course at Bowman Field, Ky., in

the autumn of 1944, and later transferred it to the School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph Field, Tex. 25

NURSE ANESTHETISTS

In contrast with basic military training, which could not be conducted efficiently in hospitals, the training of nurse anesthetists could be carried out only in

hospital with an active surgical load. The on-the-job training program for nurse

anesthetists that evolved during World War II demonstrated that prewar techniques could be adapted to wartime training conditions in technical fields requiring

high degree of supervised practice.

The Prewar Program

The Army began training and utilizing nurses as anesthetists during World

War I. Satisfied with the results, the Medical Department continued to use nurses

in this capacity throughout the interwar years. No quotas were set, and peacetime

training was limited to providing replacements, but in response to “occasion and

necessity,” few Army nurses were sent to civilian hospitals or the Army Medical

Center, Washington, D.C. 26

23 (1) War Department Circular No. 118, 23 Apr. 1942. (2) War Department Circular No. 202, 23 June 1942. (3)

Army Regulations No. 40-20, 15 Aug. 1942. 24 Blanchfield, Florence A., and Standlee, Mary W.: Organized Nursing and the Army in Three Wars, vol. 1, p.

362. [Official record.]

25 (1) Memorandum, Nursing Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Col. Arden Freer, MC, Chief, ProfessionalAdministrative Service, Office of The SurgeonGeneral, 15 Jan. 1945. (2) TheArmy Nurse 1:10, October 1944.

26 (1) Huntington, P. W.: Medical Department Professional Service Schools, Army Medical Center, Washington,

D.C. School Year 1934-35. Army M. Bull. No. 33, October 1935. (2) Stimson, Julia C.: The Army Nurse Corps. In

The Medical Department of the United States Armyin the World War. Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1927, vol. XIII, pt. 2. (3) See footnotes (1), (2), (3), p. 128.
138 MEDICAL TRAINING

Between 1939 and 1941, Army expansion increased requirements for trained

anesthetists. During this period, 15 nurses were sent to civilian hospitals, and 16

others were trained at general hospitals and the station hospital at Fort Sam Houston, Tex. 27 Despite these efforts, training failed to keep pace with expansion.

Wartime Programs

The outbreak of war increased and sustained the demand for anesthetists.

The first response of the Medical Department was to issue program guides that

did little more than continue local programs on an expanded scale. Courses were

authorized at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D.C.; Army and Navy

General Hospital, Hot Springs, Ark.; Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo.;

and Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga.; and at several station hospitals. 28

More courses were added as new hospitals opened. In the absence of standardized

program, significant variations in course length and content developed.

The first clear outline of the duties and training of nurse anesthetists was provided by The Surgeon General in directive issued to the service commands on 11

November 1943. Under this directive, course length was standardized at months,

and Zone of Interior training was limited to general hospitals. Administrators were

required to submit the names of students to The Surgeon General when they entered training. 29 Later, this stipulation was changed to require the names of nurses

completing the course, accompanied by statement of proficiency and the supervision they would require in their duties. The names of students failing the course

and the reasons for their failure were also required. 30 Nurses were to be trained to

administer inhaled anesthetics and to care for patients under all other types. They

were not expected to give intraspinal, intravenous, local, or endotracheal anesthetics, but were expected to be able to care for the instruments with which they

were administered. By mid-1944, about 100 nurses had completed the program.31

Until July 1944, nurse anesthetists were not listed in hospital tables of organization, and the Medical Department could make only rough estimates of its requirements. Their incorporation into tables of organization clarified requirements,

which in turn pointed out the need for formal program of instruction. Such program was prepared by the Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, and

approved by Army Service Forces on 17 August 1944 as “a general guide for the

balanced training of members of the Army Nurse Corps in general anesthesia.” 32

Included in the subjects required were the principles of anesthesia, pharmacology

in relation to anesthesia, the signs and stages of general anesthesia, and the effect

of anesthesia on the body. Both pre- and post-operative patient care was covered

27 See footnotes (1), p. 128; and 22 (2), p. 136. 28 Letter, Col. JuliaO. Flikke, ANC, Assistant Superintendent, to the Surgeon, Headquarters, Sixth Corps Area,

23 Mar. 1942, subject; Army Nurse Corps.

29 Letter, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to Commanding General, Each Service

Command, 11 Nov. 1943, subject: Course in Anesthesia. 30 Army Service Forces Circular No. 140, 13 May 1944. 31 (1) Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Army, for the Commanding General, Army Service Forces,

fiscal year 1944. (2) Memorandum, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to Commanding

General, Each Service Command, 15 Aug. 1944, subject: Nurse Anesthetists. (3) See footnote 29. 32 Army Service Forces Program of Instruction for Applicatory Training of Nurse Anesthetists, 17 Aug. 1944.
ARMY NURSE CORPS 139

in detail, as well as procedures in anesthetic emergencies and oxygen therapy. Instruction was also required in methods of obtaining medical supplies. The scope of

instruction, methods of presentation, and details of subject and sequence were prescribed, and only minor modifications could be made without the approval of The

Surgeon General. The staff and its methods were subject to inspection by Medical

Department consultants in surgery and anesthesiology. Reports of course capacity,

numbers enrolled, and course completion were closely supervised, and the practice

of holding students for service after they had completed their training was prohibited. By these techniques, the Medical Department was able to standardize and

control on-the-job training at large number of widely scattered hospitals.

Instructional Methods

Before the standardization of programs, courses prepared locally exhibited

marked differences in content and the time allotted to supervised practice. The

course developed by The Surgeon General in 1944 was intended primarily to develop competence in the administration of inhaled anesthetics. Ninety percent of

the course consisted of supervised practice. Students received highly individualized

instruction, usually in formal conferences, and observed instructors administering

anesthetics. Later, the student was allowed to practice partial, and then complete

application. Students were required to administer minimum of 100 anesthetics

under supervision before completing the course, and some Army hospitals required

minimum of 300 practice cases. Despite the urgent need for trained nurse anesthetists, the availability of patients suitable for student practice limited course enrollments to between two and six students.

Another factor limiting the number of students was the practice of retaining

qualified anesthetists in student status to provide service at the hospital. After this

practice came to the attention of The Surgeon General, it was discouraged by allowing inspecting officers discovering cases of excessive retention to recommend

the transfer of one of the offending hospital’s experienced anesthetists. When students were unable to gain enough clinical experience at hospital, The Surgeon

General was notified.

After January 1944, when the course was confined to general hospitals, an MC

officer was designated course director and was assisted by selected nurse anesthetists. The selection of instructional personnel was closely supervised by the Surgeon

General’s Office, and practicing anesthetists were encouraged to become course

directors.

Nurse anesthetists were also trained in theaters of operation, but programs

outside the Zone of Interior failed to achieve the standardization of those in the

continental United States. Nurses in the Mediterranean theater, for example, were

trained on continuing basis at four general hospitals. The program theoretically

required months in residence, but in practice varied from to months, depending on the time nurse could be spared from unit.33

33 MedicalDepartment, United States Army. Surgery in World War II. Volume II. General Surgery. Washington:

U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1955.
140 MEDICAL TRAINING

Selection of Students

Before World War II, the Superintendent of the Army Nurse Corps selected

student anesthetists from nurses who demonstrated aptitude and interest. After

the establishment of the Army Service Forces, responsibility for selection rested

largely on hospital commanders. Inequalities of supply and demand were resolved

by liaison at service command level. Selection procedures became more formal in

August 1944, when courses were standardized. Students were required to be volunteers from the Army Nurse Corps who had completed the basic training course.

Consultants to service command surgeons were encouraged to expand their activities to include selection. Consultants were encouraged also to check on the

progress of students they selected so as to overcome the conflict of interest created

by assigning students to facilities that were responsible also for patient care. 34

Strength and Utilization

Early in World War II, hospitals were not required to report nurses with

specialized training, and the training of nurse anesthetists was well underway before training requirements could be estimated. To determine the number of nurse

anesthetists actually serving in the Army, two surveys were conducted by The

Surgeon General in April 1943. The first requested service commands to list the

hospitals doing major surgical w’ork and the names of anesthetists at each station

with their grade and an evaluation of their ork. 35 As the need for anesthetists became increasingly acute, second survey was made by personal letters requesting

the names of nurses who had completed the anesthetists course and statement of

their proficiency. In September 1943, the Medical Department estimated that

2,495 nurse anesthetists would be needed for numbered units and Zone of Interior

installations. With only 273 reported on duty, 2,222 would have to be recruited or

trained. 36

Recruiting experience revealed that 3.7 percent of the nurses entering the

Army had postgraduate courses in the combinedareas of neuropsychiatry, operating

room procedures, and anesthesia, but there was no report of the number who were

qualified anesthetists. The Medical Department hoped to train 260 annually and

to recruit the remainder by assuring them of proper assignments on entry into the

Army. This goal was not even approached in 1944. Prospects were brighter in 1945

because of the pace set during the first months. It was estimated that 2,000

qualified nurse anesthetists were in the Army in July 1945. Approximately 220

completed training in Zone of Interior hospitals between December 1941 and

December 1945.37

34 Letter, Brig. Gen. Fred W. Rankin, Chief Consultant in Surgery, Office of The Surgeon General, to Lt. Col.

Bradley L. Coley, MC, Headquarters,Eighth Service Command, 24 July 1944. 35 Letter, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, TheSurgeon General, U.S. Army, to the CommandingGeneral,Each Service

Command, 27 Apr. 1943, subject: Assignment of Anesthetists.

36 Memorandum,Lt. Col. Sanford V. Larkey, MC, Chief, School Branch, Training Division, for the Director of

Training,.Surgeon General’s Office, 23 Sept. 1943, subject; Training of Nurse Anesthetists. 37 Completed AG ASF Forms R-5218, dated Nov. 1945. In Report—Flow of Trainees thru Nurses Basic

Training Centers.
ARMY NURSE CORPS 141

As result of the decentralization of training, withdrawals from the course

can only be estimated. For the short period in which records are available, the number was not excessive. In common with other programs, they rose sharply after

the surrender of Japan, even though courses were not suspended. Hospitals were

notified in September 1945 that courses in session would be completed but that

future courses would be canceled, and nurses were allowed to withdraw from the

course to separate from the service. 38

NEUROPSYCHIATRIC NURSING39

Before World War II, there was little need for trained psychiatric nurses in

the Army. Psychiatric cases were kept in Army hospitals only until arrangements

were made for them to be sent to either St. Elizabeths Hospital, Washington, D.C.,

or other institutions providing long term custodial care and treatment. At the outbreak of the war, there were no special training programs for Army nurses in neuropsychiatry and no plans for developing such programs. During the war, courses

were established at various Army hospitals, but the development of full-blown program was frustrated by the War Department’s refusal to authorize an Armywide

school. The problem persisted despite efforts by both the Nursing Division and the

Neuropsychiatry Consultants Division to convince other divisions of the Surgeon

General’s Office and the War Department that formal program was essential. In

common with most developments in psychiatry during World War II, each step

forward was limited victory for those attempting to educate higher authorities.

In the wake of the passage of the Selective Service Act, new hospitals were

built. Typical hospitals had closed neuropsychiatric wards designed to give maximum security. The nurses’ office was separated from the patient area by locked

iron grillwork, and patients were housed in wards behind this partition. Space and

facilities for anything other than custodial care were severely limited. Attempts

were made to screen incoming nurses for previous experience, but many chief

nurses questioned the need for nurses to care for patients who were neither physically ill nor confined to bed. The nurse, nominally assigned to psychiatric wards,

often spent much of her time in surgical wards or performing administrative tasks.

Little time was spent in locked-ward sections. This lack of recognition of the role

of psychiatric nursing resulted in patients being under the care of nurses with

variety of backgrounds; some nurses qualified neither by training, experience, nor

desire for their duties. Others, with desirable backgrounds, were malassigned.

Attempts to Establish Formal Courses

During the first year of the ar, the Medical Department attempted to satisfy

its requirements by drawing on nurses ho had received psychiatric training at

38 Memorandum, Col. Florence A. Blanchfield, Superintendent, Army Nurse Corps, to Col. Floyd L. Wergeland,

MC, Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 10 Sept. 1945.

39 Unless otherwise indicated, this section isbased on: Medical Department, United States Army. Neuropsychiatry

in World War II. Volume I. Zone of Interior. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.
142 MEDICAL TRAINING

civilian hospitals before entering the Army.40 When this proved inadequate, members of the Nursing and Psychiatric Consultants Division directed their efforts

toward establishing an Armywide training course. Planning for the course began

early in 1943, shortly after the establishment of the School of Military Neuropsychiatry at Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga.41 In the summer of 1943, the

officer in charge of preparing program guides for the course reported: “All plans are

made and we have nurses ready to send, but Army Service Forces had not approved it so we can’t go ahead until they do.”42 At least part of the difficulty in

gaining approval for theprogram arose from the inability to justify training on the

basis of tables of organization; even 1,000-bed general hospital for neuropsychiatric patients overseas was authorized only one neuropsychiatric nurse, the

same strength authorization approved for nonspecialized general hospital. 43 For

some reason, the Training Division of the Surgeon General’s Office also refused to

approve the program.44

In October 1943, the School of Military Neuropsychiatry was moved to Mason

General Hospital, Brentwood, N.Y., and plans were again made to conduct postgraduate course for nurses. Finally, in February 1944, 12-week program in neuropsychiatry established under the authority of the Second Service Command,

without Army Service Forces approval as an Armywide school. An overstrength

of 10 nurses was authorized for the hospital, and the hospital commander was

directed to give them “such didactic instruction as may be feasible with their duty

assignment.”45

Local Programs

In the absence of an Armywide school, hospitals began to establish local programs. Early in April 1944, Lt. Col. Ruth I. Taylor, ANC, Headquarters, First

Service Command, was informed that course in neuropsychiatric nursing had

been started at the Station Hospital, Camp Edwards, Boston, Mass. On June

40 (1) Letter, Maj. JuliaO. Flikke, Superintendent, Army Nurse Corps, to Capt. Ida W. Danielson, ANC, Assistant Superintendent, Headquarters, Sixth Corps Area, 28 Nov. 1941. (2) Letter, Capt. Ida W. Danielson, ANC, Assistant Superintendent, to Maj. Julia O. Flikke, Superintendent, Army Nurse Corps, Office of The Surgeon General,

13 Dec. 1941. (3) War Department Circular No. 34, Feb. 1943.

41 (1) Memorandum, Col. Florence A. Blanchfield, Superintendent, Army Nurse Corps, to Brig. Gen. Charles C.

Hillman, Chief, Professional Service, Office of The Surgeon General, 18 Jan. 1944. (2) Annual Report, Mason General

Hospital, Long Island, N.Y., 1943. 42 Letter, Capt. Kathleen N. Atto, Assistant Superintendent, ANC, to Lt. Col. Pearl C. Fisher, ANC, Headquarters, Sixth Service Command, Aug. 1943. 43 (1) War Department Table of Organization and Equipment No. 8-5508, 26 Oct. 1943. (2) War Department

Table of Organization and Equipment No. 8-550, July 1944. 44 In TM (Technical Manual) 12-406, “Officer Classification, Commissioned and Warrant,” 30 Oct. 1943, psychiatric nursing was recognized as specialized field of nursing and coded as MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) 3437.

In describing therequirements for awarding this MOS, TM 12-406 stated thatnursing experience in neuropsychiatric

ward was essential. It strongly recommended postgraduate training in psychiatric nursing but did not make such training mandatory.

45 (1) Memorandum, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, The Surgeon General, II.S. Army, for Commanding Officer,

Mason General Hospital, Feb. 1944, subject: Training in Neuropsychiatric Nursing. (2) Memorandum, Maj. Gen.

Norman T. Kirk, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, for Commanding Officer, Mason General Hospital, 13 Jan. 1944,

subject: Training in Neuropsychiatric Nursing. (3) TransmittalSheet, Lt. Col. Charles H. Moseley, MC, Deputy Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Col. Florence A. Blanchfield, ANC, Nursing Division,

Surgeon General’s Office, Feb. 1944, subject: Training in Neuropsychiatric Nursing.
ARMY NURSE CORPS 143

1944, Colonel Taylor informed The Surgeon General that 15 nurses would complete

the first course on 30 June 1944 and that, because of the reduced number of patients at Camp Edwards, the school would be transferred to Cushing General

Hospital, Framingham, Mass., on July. Colonel Taylor recommended that three

full-time nursing instructors be assigned to Cushing General Hospital and that the

school be approved by The Surgeon General so that an authorized certificate could

be presented upon satisfactory completion of the course.

On 16 June 1944, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk concurred with the establishment of course in the First Service Command, but added that he did “not deem

it advisable to authorize or approve neuropsychiatric nursing school.”46 While

The Surgon General did not object to the issuance of certificate of completion, he

advised that local certificate be used because the “Certificate of Proficiency,

Various Courses, Special Schools, U.S. Army” (MD Form 60e) was not to be used

for local courses.

In December 1943, authority was given to provide 3-month affiliation in

neuropsychiatric nursing at Fitzsimons General Hospital, for student nurses from

St. Joseph’s Hospital School of Nursing, Denver, Colo. In May 1944, Army and

cadet nurses were also accepted in the course. 47 In June, The Surgeon General

authorized official recognition for the course by issuing certificate to Army Nurse

Corps officer graduates.

Because of continued failure to obtain approval for an Armywide postgraduate

course, commands were encouraged to establish their own schools in the fall of

1944. By the summer of 1945, each service command had established at least one

course for nurses. total of 585 nurses and 296 cadet nurses completed these courses

in service command hospitals.48

OPERATING ROOM NURSES

The training of operating room nurses was seldom mentioned in hospital and

service command reports. All nurses received operating room training and experience in their basic program, but the number with advanced skills and experience

was below wartime requirements. On-the-job training was required to sharpen unused skills and to develop competence in specialized fields of war surgery.

formal course in operating room techniques was established at Cushing

General Hospital in August 1944 to prepare nurses for duty with surgical teams and

for overseas assignment. The course was initially months, and concentrated on

training nurses for general surgery, neurosurgery, and plastic surgery. Included were

75 hours of lectures, demonstrations, films, and discussions. The basic principles of

operating room technique were reviewed, and, under careful supervision, nurses

46 Letter, Lt. Col. Ruth I. Taylor, ANC, Chief, Nursing Service, Headquarters, First Service Command, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, June 1944, subject: Report of Neuropsychiatric Nursing School 3114 SCU,

FSC, Camp Edwards, Mass. 47 These were senior students from civilian schools of nursing who elected and were accepted to serve their final

monthsbefore graduation in Army hospitals. For discussion of the Cadet Corps Program authorized by Public Law

74, 78th Congress, see The United States Cadet Nurse Corps 1943-48. PHS Publication No. 38. Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1950.

48 See footnote 39, p. 141.

497-333 75 11
144 MEDICAL TRAINING

became experienced in the administration of blood and plasma and in scrubbing

and circulating duties. Training was also received in orthopedic, urological, and

vascular surgical procedures. 49 The course as increased to months in May 1945

to provide instruction in operating room administration. Thirty-six nurses completed the course. 50

The amount of operating room training conducted on-the-job at Zone of Interior hospitals and hospitals overseas is unknowm. No reporting procedure was

established, and courses were never standardized. Course length varied from 75

to 85 hours of classroom ork and from 295 to 420 hours of clinical experience. In

July 1945, the Office of The Surgeon General began preparation of an outline of

4- to 6-month course in operating room technique that included some 50 hours of

classroom instruction. The length of the clinical phase depended upon the facilities

available at the hospital conducting the course. 51 Work on the preparation of the

course stopped at the end of the war.

FEVER THERAPY NURSES

Fever therapy was one of the few specialties in which the Army Nurse Corps

was able to meet its training. In part, this was due to the priority given this treatment for sulfonamide-resistant gonorrhea early in the war, and in part, because

the advent of penicillin reduced the requirement for fever therapy. Until the effectiveness of penicillin in treating gonorrhea was demonstrated in 1943, fever therapy training was an important part of the postgraduate program for nurses.

At the beginning of World War II, there was wide disparity between the

recommendations of experts and the average care given patients with gonorrhea.

Beginning in June 1940, cooperative efforts by the Surgeons General of the Army

and the Navy, and the Subcommittee on Venereal Diseases, Division of Medical

Sciences, National Research Council, produced series of directives standardizing

treatment. Among the developments resulting from their efforts as the establishment of fever therapy centers at designated general hospitals in 1942 and an expansion of the program to other types of hospitals in 1943. 52

The first knowm training program for nurses followed the establishment of

Department of Fever Therapy at Walter Reed General Hospital in 1941. Eight

nurses were reported trained that year. 53 As fever therapy centers wure established,

nurses either were trained on the job or were sent to other hospitals for an unspecified period for training. After September 1942, The Surgeon General took an active

part in arranging for the training of doctors and nurses in this specialty. When

hospitals did not have trained personnel to operate fever therapy cabinets (hyper49 Poole, R.: Army Courses in Operating Room Technic. Am. J. Nursing 45: 270-271, April 1945. 60 (1) Annual Report, Cushing General Hospital, Framingham, Mass., 1944. (2) Annual Report, Cushing General Hospital, Framingham, Mass., 1945. 51 Memorandum, Col. Florence A. Blanohfield, Superintendent, Army Nurse Corps, for Chief, Training Division,

Office of The Surgeon General, 17 July 1945, subject: Outline for Course in Operating Room Technic. 62 Medical Department, United States Army. Internal Medicine in World War II. Volume II. Infectious Diseases.

Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963. 63 Annual Report, Walter Reed General Hospital, Army Medical Center, 1941.
ARMY NURSE CORPS 145

therms), they were required to submit the names of two nurses selected for training

to The Surgeon General. 54 Once program of fever therapy had been established

at hospital, replacements were trained as needed. The purpose of fever therapy training was to teach nurses to produce an artificial fever by the use of therapy cabinets. Skilled nursing was required during

all phases of therapy from preparation, through the induction of fever ranging

from 106° to 107° F., until post-fever recovery. Nurses had to be trained to detect

the signs of irreversible physiological reaction. Treatment time usually exceeded

hours, and one patient was treated daily. Medical officers were on call for emergencies. No reports were required, and no attempt was made to keep statistical records.

The absence of standardized training program produced wide variety of

courses. Some medical officers held the opinion that minimum of months in

busy clinic was required, while others defended the observation and treatment of

minimum of 25 cases. With special selection and careful supervision, course length

could be reduced to week. Courses established at Army hospitals varied from

week to months.

FLIGHT NURSES55

Before World War II, proposals for the training of flight nurses received an

unsympathetic response from both the Air Corps and the American Red Cross. At

the beginning of the war, air evacuation was not an accepted practice, and it was

not until terrain problems in Alaska, Burma, and New Guinea made it expedient

to transport patients by air that attention was focused on developing an evacuation

system.

On 18 June 1942, the Army Air Forces was assigned responsibility for developing an air evacuation system, and primary planning responsibility was delegated

to the Air Surgeon. As result of initial efforts, the 349th Air Evacuation Group,

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, was activated on October to control and train flight surgeons, flight nurses, and enlisted personnel for air evacuation. The table of organization, issued in November, set up the squadron as unit

composed entirely of medical personnel, having no planes assigned. The 349th consisted of three squadrons, each with headquarters section and four evacuation

flights. The headquarters section included the Commanding Officer, Chief Nurse,

and MAC officer. Each flight, headed by flight surgeon, consisted of six flight

nurses and six medical technicians, one nurse and one technician to team. On 30

November, an urgent appeal was made for graduate nurses with experience in aviation to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps and subsequent assignment to theAAF

Evacuation Service. On 18 February 1943, formal graduation ceremony was held

for the first 39 nurses to complete weeks of flight training.

The original 4-week course consisted of military indoctrination, air evacuation and tactics, survival, physiology, mental hygiene, and loading procedures. In

64 Circular Letter No. 86, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 18 Aug. 1942, subject: Fever Therapy in the

Treatment of Gonorrhea.

65 See footnote 17 (3), p. 132.
146 MEDICAL TRAINING

February 1943, after the graduation of the first class, the training period was expanded to weeks, and in November, it was lengthened to weeks. The additional

time allowed the inclusion of instruction on ward management, operating room

technique, sanitation, and patient care, and weeks of specialized training at

hospitals in Louisville, Ky. The amount of in-flight training depended upon the

availability of evacuation planes.

Flight nurse training remained under the control of the 349th Air Evacuation

Group until June 1943, when the AAF School of Air Evacuation was activated at

Bowman Field, Louisville, Ky. At that point, it was placed under the administrative control of the Commanding General, AAF, and the Air Surgeon was charged

with the responsibility for supervising curriculum and research. In October 1944, the School of Air Evacuation was absorbed into the School of Aviation Medicine,

Randolph Field, Tex.

At the time of its transfer to the School of Aviation Medicine, the course was

extended to weeks and divided into three equal phases. The first two phases consolidated material from the previous curriculum, and the last weeks were devoted

to participating in evacuation under the guidance of an experienced instructor.

Course content gradually expanded to include familiarization with the types of airplanes used in evacuation, methods of loading and unloading, and the use of supplies and equipment provided for in-flight care. Special instruction in aeromedical

physiology provided foundation for further training in the use of oxygen equipment in high-altitude flights. Because doctors did not usually accompany patients

in flight, nurses were prepared to treat shock, hemorrhage, and other emergencies

without the assistance of flight surgeon. Problems in the transportation of neuropsychiatric patients also received consideration. Course length did not change again

until 20 August 1945, when each of the phases was shortened to weeks to increase

the number of flight nurses available for deployment to the Pacific theater.

Because nurses accepted for flight training were volunteers who met rigid

standards, the rate of attrition was remarkably low. Under standards published in

December 1942, applicants were required to be members of theArmy Nurse Corps,

between 21 and 36 years of age, between 105 and 135 pounds in weight, and between

62 and 72 inches in height. Applicants had to certify their willingness to participate

in regular and frequent flights and to indicate previous flying experience.

Previous supervisors were required to certify the applicant’s professional qualifications, personality, and judgment. Later, months of experience in the Army

Nurse Corps was also made prerequisite. Between December 1942 and October

1944, 1,079 flight nurses graduated from the School of Air Evacuation at Bowman

Field. An additional 435 students graduated from the School of Aviation Medicine between November 1944 and June 1946. Only 15 students failed to graduate.

THE SENIOR CADET NURSE CORPS

The concept of Senior Cadet Nurse Corps first emerged during World

War I, when the Medical Department planned to train senior students from civilian

nursing schools to utilize their services and simultaneously prepare them for military
ARMY NURSE CORPS 147

service after graduation. The end of the war terminated theprogram before it could

be put into effect. 56 After the Army School of Nursing closed in 1933, the Army had

neither the facilities nor the personnel to train student nurses. Reestablishment of

the school was never seriously considered during World War II because experienced Army nurses were reluctant to take on the added burden of training students

when it had been demonstrated that civilian nurses could be utilized after brief

orientation to military life. As consequence, the Cadet Nurse Corps of World

War II was developed primarily to meet the needs of civilian hospitals. As the

Corps history states; “Perhaps the strongest case for the Cadet Nurse Corps was

the plea of hospital authorities that nursing care in civilian hospitals was in

desperate state. Since the military forces took only graduate nurses, it was not

expected that the Cadet Nurse Corps would directly or immediately aid the Army

and Navy, except in the use of advanced students they would help to

replace graduate nurses enlisting for military service.” 57 For its part, the Medical

Department hoped that an increased supply of civilian nurses would aid Army recruiting and that, in any event, senior cadets in Army hospitals would temporarily

ease the shortage of nurses. 58

Authority for the formation of the U.S. Cadet Nurse Corps was provided on

15 June 1943 by the Bolton Act which made the U.S. Public Health Service responsible for its administration. 59 The purpose of the program was to allow schools

of nursing to expand their primary training capacity by sending senior students

to Federal hospitals for their last months of training. At the same time, participating schools were required to accelerate their programs and provide student

nurses with their primary training within period ranging from 24 to 30 months.

Anticipating the passage of the Bolton Act, the U.S. Public Health Service

called representatives of the Federal nursing services together in early 1943 to

coordinate planning. On April 1943, Lt. (later Lt. Col.) Mary C. Walker, ANC,

was assigned by the Surgeon General’s Office to organize and supervise theprogram

in Army hospitals and coordinate plans with other agencies. 60 Broad policies were

formulated at series of conferences and disseminated through U.S. Public Health

Service regulations, guides, and bulletins. The Surgeon General sent the first specific

instructions to Army hospitals in November 1943.61

Under the program worked out through these conferences, schools and State

boards retained their traditional prerogatives, while Federal hospitals recruited

cadets and provided facilities. The U.S. Civil Service Commission acted as the

clearing house for Cadet Nurse Corps applicants. Students appointed to the U.S.

Cadet Nurse Corps were pledged to remain in essential military or civilian nursing

during the war, although the pledge was not binding.

56 See footnote 26 (2), p. 137. 57 See footnote 47, p. 143. 58 See footnote 3, p. 127. 88 57 Stat. 153.

60 Diary, Nursing Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1942-45, entry for Apr. 1943.

61 Letter, Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, Deputy Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to Commanding Officer, Station Hospital, Camp Edwards, Mass., 19 Nov. 1943, subject: United States Cadet Nurse Corps—Senior Cadet Period, Army

Hospital.
148 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 14.—Senior cadet nurses in training. (Top) Three senior cadet nurses, right, receive training in operating room procedures at the Station Hospital, Camp McCoy, Wis., Army Nurse

Corps officer, left, administers anesthesia. (Bottom) Senior cadet nurse, center, receives supervised on-the-job training in the dressing room on neurosurgical ward at England General

Hospital, Atlantic City, N.J., August 1944.
ARMY NURSE CORPS 149

The Program in Army Hospitals

The program began with survey to determine the quality and quantity of

facilities available to cadets. State boards of nurse examiners then used these surveys to evaluate the hospital nursing staff, clinical, educational, and recreational

facilities, and living conditions. Representatives of the State boards also visited

Army hospitals on invitation. State boards had the power to withhold approval

until the Army corrected conditions that did not meet their standards. Usually,

hospitals were cooperative, since it was estimated that each student would provide

services equal to 80 percent of those expected from graduate nurse.

The first senior cadets were assigned to Army hospitals on 15 June 1944. By

October 1945, the U.S. Civil Service Commission had submitted 9,891 applications to The Surgeon General, and 5,688 applicants had been accepted and

assigned to Army hospitals. Of these, 1,674 were still in training on October 1945, and all but 61 of the balance had completed the course. 62 total of 44 Army hospitals had participated in the program before the Medical Department withdrew in February 1946. 63

Techniques of Instruction

The assignment of cadet nurses within hospital depended upon the needs of

the hospital. At first, efforts were made to plan clinical instruction for individual

cadets (fig. 14), but this was discontinued. In the 6-month cadet period, about 120

hours of instruction were provided, including hours of ward teaching each week

and total of 70 hours of Army basic training. The time spent in basic training was

later reduced to 50 hours. Periods of instruction were included in 48-hour workweek, but physical training was done during off-duty time. Records were sent to the

home school when cadets completed their training, including summary of the

cadet’s instruction and clinical experience, record of illnesses, and an efficiency

report. 64

Results of the Program

Despite the quotas established for Army hospitals, the number of cadets assigned to them varied. Early estimates indicated that 50 percent of the senior cadet

nurses could be trained in Federal hospitals, but in practice, only 15 percent enrolled, and only 6.4 percent of these were assigned to military hospitals. The Army

trained 85 percent of those assigned to military hospitals, even though it participated for only 20 of the 64 months the program was in operation.65

For most purposes, the senior cadet program came too late to be of use during

World War II. Even after the Bolton Act was passed, cadets could not be assigned

62 See footnote 3, p. 127. 63 History of Nursing Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, June-30 Sept. 1945.

64 (1) Army Service Forces Circular No. 168, June 1944. (2) Army Service Forces Circular No. 292, Sept. 1944

(3) Army Service Forces Circular No. 75, 28 Feb. 1945. 65 See footnote 49, p. 144.
150 MEDICAL TRAINING

to Federal hospitals until Congress amended the Act to provide stipend. At the

beginning of the program, the Army optimistically agreed to train 1,500 senior

cadets every months and agreed to limit acceptance to 50 percent of each class.

Such precautions proved unnecessary because of the strong influence of nursing

schools on their students. Student interest increased only after the President proposed drafting nurses in January 1945. 66 Available evidence does not permit measurement of the program’s impact on civilian nursing, or on recruitment rates. Even

the number of students graduated is not measure of impact, because the senior

cadet’s promise to remain in nursing throughout the war was not legally binding.

Direct recruiting was not primary objective of the program, but the Medical

Department did make efforts to interest cadets in Army nursing. Despite efforts

to make them “feel part of it,” very few cadets were ultimately persuaded to remain in the service. There is no record of the number of cadets who accepted appointment, but only 93 had been commissioned by January 1945. 67

86 CongressionalRecord, vol. 91, pt. 1, p. 67. 79th Congress, 1st Session. 87 See footnote 3, p. 127.
CHAPTER

Dietitians, Physical Therapists, and

Occupational Therapists

Dietitians, physical therapists, and occupational therapists became part of the

Army’s medical program during World War I. As civilian employees, they served

not only in the United States, but also with the American Expeditionary Forces in

France and with the army of occupation in Germany. Because they were not

expected to enter hostile fire zones, they continued to perform their duties as

civilians in the years between World Wars and II. As such, they were entitled

neither to military pay and privileges nor to military training. Military status was

not authorized until the first year of World War II had demonstrated that civilian

employees of the Army serving overseas were subject to the same risks as military

personnel, with virtually no protection under international law. In December 1942, Congress approved military status with relative rank for physical therapists and

dietitians but excluded occupational therapists. It was not until June 1944 that

dietitians and physical therapists achieved full commissioned status. Occupational

therapists continued to serve as civilians throughout the war.

Wartime training programs in dietetics, physical therapy, and occupational

therapy were designed to accomplish two major objectives: to provide military

orientation of civilian-trained, and to increase the number of, qualified graduates

available for Army service. Physical and occupational therapists also conducted

training programs for enlisted technicians. Although they engaged in training

programs at different times and in various ways, their solutions to the problems of

training were similar.

BASIC MILITARY ORIENTATION FOR NEWLY APPOINTED PERSONNEL

Dietitians

In the early years of World War II, dietitians were expected to perform their

duties after brief period of on-the-job military orientation. From October 1940

until late 1941, all dietitians were sent to Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D.C., for military orientation. Upon completion of approximately months’

duty at the hospital, they were transferred to other Army hospitals to organize

dietetic departments. Special training in administrative procedures peculiar to

Unless otherwise indicated, this chapter is based on Army Medical Specialist Corps. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968.
152 MEDICAL TRAINING

military service was approved by theSurgeon General’s Office on 15February 1941.

This training was initiated at fixed Army hospitals from to weeks before dietitians

were to be transferred to newly constructed installations.

In April 1942, The Surgeon General authorized establishment of training pools

for civilian dietitians with no experience in the Medical Department who were

designated for duty outside the continental United States. In addition, overseas

volunteers from the American National Red Cross, upon request, were assigned to

these pools for training. Instruction included lectures on organization of Army

hospitals, Army regulations, organization of the mess department, relationship of

dietitians with other personnel in the mess department and departments of the

hospitals, personnel records, hospital fund reports, and procurement of food.

Dietitians were given on-the-job experience in each section of the hospital mess so

they would be familiar with all phases of management; procuring, preparing, and

serving food, and planning special diets. Assignment to thesepools was discontinued

in December 1942 when military status was authorized.

Dietitians assigned to affiliated units scheduled for overseas service went on

active duty with their units at specified Army posts. They worked with the post

hospital dietitian to become familiar with procedures and methods and participated

in maneuvers to learn to work and live under field conditions. These maneuvers

made the dietitians conscious of ways to improve or improvise equipment and to

substitute various foods to relieve ration shortages. special 60-hour course,

“Cooking of Dehydrated Foods,” was made available to dietitians selected for

overseas service. The production of dehydrated foods, packaging and storing,

reconstituting, menu planning, and actual preparation of meals were studied.

Special training was given in the preparation of dehydrated food under field

conditions as well as in maintenance and operation of cooking equipment and

sanitation in field messes. These dietitians lived on dehydratedfoods or combination

of dehydrated foods and fresh rations for part of the course.

In October 1943, the Army Nurse Corps established basic training centers

throughout the country for new nurses going overseas. It was not until 1944,

however, that dietitians entering the Army or those assigned to overseas hospital

units were sent to the training course for nurses. To accommodate dietitians, the

nurses’ training course eliminated 23 hours of nursing subjects and substituted 23

hours of dietetic subjects. In 1945, 53 hours of instruction were deleted from the

nurses’ training course and other material was substituted for the basic training of

dietitians. This program provided 17 hours of lectures and demonstrations

conducted by dietitians and 36 hours of on-the-job understudy in hospital mess.

Physical Therapists

The training programs for physical therapists developed in pattern similiar to

thosefor dietitians. Many physical therapists joining affiliated units at the beginning

Unless otherwise indicated, sections on Army dietitians are based on Manchester, Katharine E.: History of the

ArmyDietitian. [Official record.]

CircularLetter No. 34, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 16 Apr. 1942.

Army Service Forces Circular No. 163, 27 Dec. 1943. War Department MobilizationTrainingProgram No. 8-7,16 June 1945.
DIETITIANS, PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPISTS 153

of the war had no previous Army experience. Training plans called for period of

observation and orientation thatincluded on-the-job training, instruction in customs

of the service, organization of the Medical Department, procurement of supplies,

and the organization and administration of physical therapy clinics in Army

hospitals. Orientation courses were to be established in 1942 at several hospitals,

but available evidence indicates that only Walter Reed General Hospital activated

program. Without supervision from the Surgeon General’s Omce, command

responsibility was confused and the program was poorly executed.

In 1943, after military status was achieved, newly appointed physical

therapists, who had not been trained in one of the Army physical therapy courses,

were included in courses for newly appointed nurses and dietitians. Hours scheduled

for the professional orientation of nurses and dietitians were replaced by special

instruction for physical therapists. Special topics included the organization and

administration of Army physical therapy clinics, theirrelationship to other hospital

activities, and the treatment of patients not normally seen in civilian hospitals.

Particular attention was given to the treatment of amputees and patients with

injuries of the central and peripheral nervous systems; muscle, sensory, and

electrodiagnostic tests; measurements of jointrange of motion; bandaging adaptions

of exercise apparatus; and the utilization of floor space. Following V-J Day, all of

these basic military training courses were terminated.

Occupational Therapists

Because occupational therapists did not have military status during World

War II, they could not be integrated into the basic military training programs

established for nurses, dietitians, and physical therapists.

In October 1943, 2-week indoctrination courses were established for newly

appointed occupational therapists at Lovell General Hospital, Ayer, Mass., Lawson

General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga., and Letterman General Hospital, San Francisco,

Calif. Of the 96 hours of instruction, 36 were devoted to on-the-job experience with

orthopedic and psychiatric patients, in convalescent shops, and on wards under the

direct supervision of experienced occupational therapists. The remaining hours were

devoted to lectures, conferences, demonstrations, and tours. The schedule avoided

solid blocks of time on any given subject. Students had access to the medical library

and sat in on roundtable discussions with members of the occupational therapy

staff. Orientation courses were discontinued in July 1944. By this time, majority

of chief occupational therapists had attended the course and could indoctrinate the

new personnel on their staffs.

PROFESSIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS

In contrast to the relatively simple matter of arranging short military orientation courses, far greater problem confronted the Medical Department: that of

See footnote 3, p. 152.

Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, First to Ninth Service Commands, Oct. 1943, subject: Orientation Course for Occupational Therapists, inclosure thereto.

Army Service Forces Circular No. 229, 22 July 1944.
154 MEDICAL TRAINING

providing the additional numbers of qualified occupational therapists, physical

therapists, and dietitians needed to staff Army hospitals. Neither the outbreak of

war in Europe nor the expansion resulting from the Selective Service Act brought

these specialists into military service in adequate numbers because most of them

were women and were not subject to compulsory military service. In any event, the

total number of qualified dietitians, physical therapists, and occupational therapists

in the United States was not sufficient to meet both civilian and military requirements if the Army was to fulfill its patient care responsibilities. Emergency training

programs for all three specialist groups were required.

ACCELERATION AND EMERGENCY TRAINING PLANS

Dietitians

The need for training student dietitians in Army hospitals was recognized

shortly after World War I. In 1922, course was established at Walter Reed

General Hospital for such purpose. Throughout the interwar period, enough

qualified dietitians graduated from the course to supply all Army hospitals authorized to employ them. The training program at Walter Reed General Hospital

provided theoretical instruction as well as on-the-job experience, and graduates

were qualified for duty in Army hospitals. In addition, students were given an

opportunity for staff experience by service in positions of responsibility. By August

1942, 211 dietitians had graduated from the course at Walter Reed General Hospital.

single course satisfied the needs of the peacetime Army but, to meet wartime

requirement, the program had to be accelerated and expanded to include other

hospitals. In civilian hospitals, the number of training courses increased from 38

to 60. Even this was not enough, and other plans had to be developed to meet the

increased demand for dietitians.

On 17 July 1942, meeting was held between representatives of the Surgeon

General’s Office, the American Dietetic Association, and the Civil Service Commis- sion. Two plans were recommended. Plan provided that the program conducted

in Army hospitals would be divided into two sections, the student dietitian course

and the apprentice dietitian course. Plan provided for the establishment of 6-month student dietitian program in approved civilian hospitals from which the

students would be transferred to an Army hospital for the 6-month Army hospital

apprentice course. combination of these plans was finally adopted. Minimum

educational qualifications were the same as those previously established for the

student dietitian program. The first class, 16 students appointed under Plan A,

reported to Walter Reed General Hospital on 24 August 1942.

Six-month Army hospital student course.—The 6-month curriculum established for student dietitians at Walter Reed General Hospital was used as

guide for setting up three additional Army hospital student dietitian training

courses, all approved by the American Dietetic Association. In May 1943, Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., started course under the direction of

Capt. Mildred G. Allbritton, AMSC. The course at Brooke General Hospital,
DIETITIANS, PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPISTS 155

Fort Sam Houston, Tex., started in July 1943, under the direction of Capt. Nell

Wickliffe, AMSC. The last student dietitian course was established at Lawson

General Hospital, in September 1943, under the direction of Capt. Hilda M. Lovett,

AMSC.

The abbreviated, 6-month course was designed to furnish thorough training in

the diet in health and disease and in the organization and administration of dietetic

department in an Army hospital. Over 200 hours of lectures were given in diet

therapy and administration. Dietetics for medical and surgical patients was taught

by Medical Corps officers and heads of dietary departments. On-the-job training in

therapeutics totaled 11 weeks and included writing special diets, diet instruction to

ward and clinic patients, supervision of ard kitchens, and participation in ward

rounds. minimum of w'eeks each was spent in the surgical cardiac, urological,

and pediatric ards, gastrointestinal and diabetic sections, and in the infantformula

room. Fourteen weeks were spent in administrative on-the-job training. comprehensive program afforded experience in all areas of administration: menu planning;

purchasing; ordering, preparing, and serving food; inventory and portion control;

cost accounting; and personnel management.

Six-month civilian hospital student course.—In September 1942, Miss

Nelda Ross, President of the American Dietetic Association, sent letter to the

director of each of the 60 approved civilian training courses for dietitians in an attempt to determine which civilian hospitals had facilities to cooperate with the

Army. In her letter, Miss Ross made it clear that students who successfully completed this program would meet the 1-year requirement for membership in the

American Dietetic Association. Response to her inquiry indicated that the plan

was generally acceptable to hospitals in which at least 10 students were enrolled.

At few hospitals, problems with staff and facilities made it impossible to participate. Some chief dietitians were afraid that the release of students after months

would further disorganize dietary departments, already plagued with excessive

wartime turnover of employees. Other chief dietitians, who had already rearranged

their training plan to provide for enrollment of student dietitians twice year, believed that it would be difficult to add still another program to their training schedule.

Under the program finally adopted, training in civilian hospitals included

weeks in special diet kitchen and ward service; weeks of private patient service;

weeks of pediatrics, including formula preparation; to weeks in outpatient

clinics; to weeks of administration, including purchasing, ordering, accounting,

and menu planning; as well as some work with personnel and preferably experience

in cafeteria or dining room. Lectures in diet therapy and infant feeding and

experience in teaching dietetics to student nurses were required.

Six-month Army hospital apprentice course.—Because of differences in

the civilian and military basic courses, the 6-month apprentice course in Army

hospitals had to be tailored to provide apprentices with the experience required to

qualify them for membership in the American Dietetic Association. Every effort

was made to establish appropriate programs at the 32 hospitals to which students

could be assigned for apprentice training (fig. 15).
156 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 15.—Student dietitian discussing recipe with head cook.

Throughout 1943, the apprentice training course followed program of

instruction outlined by The Surgeon General. subsequent program, published by

The Surgeon General on May 1944, provided more detailed guide for instructors.

These courses were adapted locally to meet the individual needs of apprentice

dietitians at each hospital.

The 26-week apprentice program emphasized practical experience by including

16 weeks in administration of food service sections, weeks in therapeutic phases of

food service activities, and weeks of lectures. To meet American Dietetic Association requirements for staff experience during dietetic internship, assignment in

supervisory capacity was scheduled during the last month of apprentice training.

Qualified experience apprentice entrance plan.—A final dimension was

added to the program when courses were adjusted to permit home economists with

bachelor of science degrees in foods and nutrition, or majors in institutional man-
DIETITIANS, PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPISTS 157

agement that contained specified courses, to substitute work experience for the

first months of hospital training. Early in 1943, an increasing interest in the

Army’s training program was expressed by home economists who possessed every

qualification for certification except internship or hospital work experience. When

it was determined that the number of home economists withfood service experience

interested in becoming dietitians was large enough to make special program practical, The Surgeon General won approval of the American Dietetic Association for

plan to substitute such experience for the Army or civilian hospital student

course, and admit experienced home economists directly into the 6-month apprentice

program. Between September 1943 and September 1945, 128 home economists received direct appointments to apprenticeship.

Several enlisted members of the Women’s Army Corps with backgrounds in

home economics also expressed an interest in the dietitian course. On March 1945,

the Surgeon General’s Office authorized the establishment of the first training

course for enlisted members of the Women’s Army Corps at McCloskey General

Hospital, Temple, Tex. Ten apprentices were authorized in each class, but only

five applied. Upon completion of the course, they were commissioned as Medical

Department dietitians. The course, which began on 15 June 1945 and was discontinued on January 1946, was the only dietitian course for enlisted women

given during World War II.

After V-J Day, study was made to determine postwar requirements.

Authority was subsequently granted to proceed with the training of students on

duty as of October 1945, and to commission them upon completion of the course.

Appointments for individuals who had not yet begun training were canceled. By

October 1946, all training courses for dietitians were terminated, except the one at

Brooke General Hospital.

Physical Therapists

In 1941, Central Physical Therapy Board was established in the Surgeon

General’s Office10 to work with the Subcommittee on Physical Therapy, National

Research Council, and the Federal Security Agency on problems associated with the

expansion of the physical therapy program in Army hospitals. Among the problems

presented to this board was the subsidization of civilian physical therapy training

courses. survey made by the American Medical Association’s Council on Medical

Education and Hospitals, early in 1942, revealed that civilian physical therapy

training courses requiring tuition were experiencing difficulty in maintaining full

enrollment. The Subcommittee on Physical Therapy recommended that the War

Department subsidize these courses. Because of the planned expansion of the Army

physical therapy training program, it was The Surgeon General’s opinion that the

subsidy of civilian training courses could not be justified.11 The Subcommittee on

War Department Circular No. 71, Mar. 1945. 10 Office Order No. 348, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 21 Nov. 1941. 11Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Office of The Surgeon General, for Chief of Staff, G-3, attention:

Colonel West, 10 June 1942.
158 MEDICAL TRAINING

Physical Therapy was similarly unable to persuade the Selective Service to defer

male physical therapists until completion of their training.

Expansion of the Army physical therapy training program was accomplished

by the establishment of courses directed to three groups: Civilian students who

would take all of theirtraining in Army hospitals; enlisted members of the Women’s

Army Corps who would take all of their training in Army hospitals or take the

apprenticeship phase of their training in Army hospitals after completing courses in

selected civilian institutions; civilian students who would take the apprenticeship

phase of their training in Army hospitals following the completion of courses in

civilian institution.

Civilian students.—Early in 1941, The Surgeon General proposed the establishment of an emergency training course. This course, consisting of months

of formal instruction followed by months of applicatory training, was to replace

the regular 9-month course conducted at Walter Reed General Hospital. The proposal was approved by the Council on Medical Education and Hospitals, which

also approved plan to allow civilian institutions to conduct months of theoretical

instruction, followed by months of supervised apprenticeship in selected Army

hospitals.

On July 1941, the first Army emergency course was initiated at Walter Reed

General Hospital. Every months, class of 10 students was authorized. The 26-

week program included intensive study in anatomy, physiology, pathology,

kinesiology, therapeutic procedures, and their application to military medicine.

Emphasis was placed on the treatment of patients with combat injuries. Additional

courses were established in October 1942 at the Fort Sam HoustonStation Hospital;

Army and Navy General Hospital, Hot Springs, Ark.; O’Reilly General Hospital,

Springfield, Mo.; and Fitzsimons General Hospital. All were conducted on the same

plan as the course at Walter Reed General Hospital.

Following this expansion, the number of civilians in Army physical therapy

training courses increased, but the authorized capacities of these courses could not

be maintained because college graduates with physical education background were

being offered increasingly attractive positions by industry and by the other military

services. series of meetings held in 1944, in San Francisco, Calif., Los Angeles,

Calif., Chicago, 111., Boston, Mass., and New York, N.Y., featuring talks and War

Department films, resulted in renewed interest in the Army physical therapy

training programs. In January 1944, there were only enough eligible civilian

applicants to fill one class of trainees, but the increasing number of certified

applicants in the succeeding months justified further expansion of the program.

Additional courses for civilian students were established at Bushnell General

Hospital, Brigham City, Utah, on 10 July 1944, and at Ashford General Hospital,

White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., on 10 August 1944.

Civilian students enrolled after August 1944 were required to meet the physical

standards for commissioned officers. This policy was recommended by the Physical

Standards Division, Surgeon General’s Office, toreduce the number of students who

could not meet the physical requirements for commissioning.

Military students.—In July and August 1943, the director of physical thera-
DIETITIANS, PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPISTS 159

pists initiated conferences between the Training Division and the Women’s Army

Corps to discuss the possibility of making Army physical therapy courses available

to enlisted women. Such program would not only assist in meeting the procurement requirements for physical therapists, but it would also offer these women an

opportunity for professional and military advancement. The program was approved in August 1943, 12 and Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif., the University

of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., and the D. T. Watson School of Physiotherapy,

Leetsdale, Pa., were selected to conduct the program. These courses began in

October 1943 and continued until October 1944 when the expansion of courses in

Army general hospitals enabled the Army to discontinue training at civilian institutions. While training was conducted at civilian institutions, the War Department paid tuition, room, and board, and provided textbooks and other teaching

aids. An officer in the Women’s Army Corps, assigned with each group of students,

was responsible for military administrative procedures. Army physical therapy

training was available to enlisted women who were under 44 years of age, who had

no dependents under 14 years of age, and who had an Army General Classification

Test score of 110 or over.

In December 1943, the Secretary of War authorized direct recruitment of

women qualified for theWomen’s Army Corps for the purpose of attending physical

therapy training courses, with the assurance of commission as physical therapist

upon completion of the course. 13 Women recruited for this specific program comprised more than half of the total military enrollment in these courses.

In June 1944, the maximum age for enrollment w’as reduced from 44 to 37

years. This change resulted from study which revealed that trainees in the upper

age group often experienced difficulty in adjusting to intensive academic study and

to living and working in close association with groups of younger women. similar

change was made in the age requirement for applicants for these courses from

within the ranks of the Women’s Army Corps.

The establishment of two all-Negro station hospitals in the United States and

the activation of three such hospitals for overseas duty raised the question of

supplying physical therapists for these hospitals. physical therapy training course

for Negro students was established at the Fort Huachuca Station Hospital, Ariz.,

on October 1943 (fig. 16). When the requirement for Negro physical therapists

was met by commissioning trainees in October 1944, the training of both military

and civilian Negro students at Fort Huachuca was terminated.

The enrollment for five courses conducted in Army general hospitals was

changed from civilian trainees to military trainees in January and February 1944.

Two additional courses for military trainees were established at Lawson General

Hospital and at Percy Jones General Hospital, Battle Creek, Mich. An additional

number of students were enrolled after July 1944 when concurrent classes at

quarterly intervals were authorized. This plan was put into effect in all general

13 War Department Memorandum No. W635-18-43, 22 Aug. 1943.

13 Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding General, First Service Command, Army Service Forces, 14

Dec. 1943, subject: Recruitment of Physical Therapy Aides.

497-333 75 12
160 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 16.—Enlisted student physical therapist adjusting infrared lamp in preparation for

treatment of patient’s left shoulder, Fort Huachuca Station Hospital, Ariz.

hospitals conducting courses except Percy Jones, where housing facilities were

inadequate.

All assignment to physical therapy training courses was terminated in October 1945.14 The 325 physical therapy students then enrolled were allowed to

complete their training.

Apprentice training program.—The program of apprentice training for

graduates of the 6-month civilian emergency physical therapy courses developed

slowly. Because civilian apprentices were assigned through the service commands

14 Memorandum, Maj. Emma E. Vogel, WMSC, Director of Physical Therapists, Office of The Surgeon General,

for Col. Floyd L. Wergeland, MC, Director, Training Division, Oct. 1945, subject: Termination of Physical Therapy

Training.
DIETITIANS, PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPISTS 161

Figure 17.—Apprentice physical therapists in training, Fletcher General Hospital,

Cambridge, Ohio. (Top) Civilian apprentice receives instruction in massaging scar

tissue. (Bottom) Enlisted apprentice learns to apply shortwave diathermy apparatus.

(Courtesy of National Library of Medicine.)
162 MEDICAL TRAINING

with the program, they were too often assigned on the basis of personnel requirements, with little consideration given to their need for continued instruction and

supervised practice. Management of this program improved when centralized control was vested in the Surgeon General’s Office late in 1942. 15

Subsequently, The Surgeon General directed that training would consist

primarily of supervised clinical practice in the treatment of patients, both in the

physical therapy clinic and in hospital wards (fig. 17). Emphasis was placed on the

treatment of combat injuries, such as peripheral nerve, brain, spinal cord, chest

and vascular injuries, and amputations. The program included attendance at conferences, participation in ward rounds, and at least hour daily of roundtable

discussion of treatment programs and current medical literature. Apprentices were

also trained in the administration of physical therapy clinic, the preparation of

records and reports, and the procedures for requisitioning supplies. For the on-thejob phase of training, enlisted apprentice physical therapists were assigned to 20

general hospitals and civilian apprentices were assigned to 31 other general hospitals.

After V-J Day, the directors of the civilian emergency physical therapy courses

were advised that the 6-month applicatory training in selected Army hospitals

would be terminated. Since the Army apprentice program for civilian students was

terminated, arrangements were made for students enrolled in the 6-month emergency

civilian course to have their apprenticeship experience elsewhere. On 10 October

1945, The Surgeon General wrote to the directors of civilian courses expressing his

recognition of the valuable contribution these schools had made to the war effort. 16

Although large number of emergency courses were conducted in civilian institutions, enrollment in these courses was far below expectations except in the two

schools where training was tuition free.

Experience in this program clearly demonstrated that in order to train

apprentice physical therapists in the treatment of patients with combat injuries,

clinical experience should be afforded in general hospitals where patients could be

observed in large numbers. Station and regional hospitals proved inadequate for this

training, and after 1943, there was decrease in use of station and regional hospitals

and greater utilization of general hospitals. It was demonstrated also that the

efficiency of the apprenticeship program depended not only on the clinical experience

available but also on the supervision exercised by the chief physical therapist and by

the Physical Therapy Branch, Surgeon General’s Office.

Occupational Therapists

At the outbreak of World War II, eight qualified occupational therapists and

four occupational therapy assistants were on duty in five Army hospitals. By V-J

Day, 899 occupational therapists and apprentices were working in 76 hospitals in

the continental United States.

15 Memorandum, The Adjutant General for Commanding Generals, All Service Commands, 24 Oct. 1942, subject: Dietetic and Physical TherapyPersonnel in Army Hospitals.

16 Letter, Col. Floyd L. Wergeland, MC, Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Dr. Frank

H. Krusen, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minn., 10 Oct. 1945.
DIETITIANS, PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPISTS 163

Recruitment problems.—The Surgeon General’s decision to appoint occupational therapists as civilian employees without commissions and to limit the

establishment of occupational therapy clinics to Army hospitals in the Zone of

Interior proved serious handicap to recruiting and training. 17 These decisions

made it clear that occupational therapy was considered more valuable for convalescent patients evacuated to the Zone of Interior than for patients with acute injuries and illnesses hospitalized in the Communications Zone.

Lack of recognition and lack of status, however, were the least of the Medical

Department’s recruiting problems. Far more serious was the close approximation

of the Army’s estimated need and the total number of registered occupational

therapists. By early 1944, so many new Army hospitals had been built or planned

for priority construction that the target for personnel was set at 1,000. 18 Yet, there

were scarcely 1,300 graduates in the professional registry. Since the Army could not

hope to recruit over 75 percent of the total civilian supply of occupational therapists,

the best solution seemed to be the establishment of an emergency training program.

Design and purpose of War Emergency Course.—The War Emergency

Course was outlined by the Occupational Therapy Branch of theSurgeon General’s

Office, in collaboration with the War Manpower Commission and the Committee

on Education of the American Occupational Therapy Association. The latter body

reviewed course plans at special meeting on 21 March 1944 and found that they

satisfied minimutn standards established by the American Medical Association.

Civilian schools had, for several years, qualified college graduates in an 18-month

course. Prerequisites for these courses included college degree with specified

number of hours in biology, psychology, and sociology. With this background,

schools were able to telescope the required professional curriculum into months

of academic work and months of supervised clinical experience.

In an effort to further shorten professional education, the Army singled out

skills and techniques as the most time-consuming part of the curriculum and added

these to the prerequisites for the War Emergency Course. The qualifications of

applicants thus became bachelor’s degree, with course in basic psychology, and

major in arts and crafts, industrial art, home economics, or fine or applied arts. 19

All were required to possess at least three manual skills and were required to be

citizens of the United States and between the ages of 21 and 35 years. The course

plan provided 4-month academic curriculum of medical subjects and occupational

therapy, followed by months of apprenticeship in Axmy general hospitals. By

raising admission standards, the academic phase of the emergency course was

shortened by months, and the clinical phase was reduced by month. Together,

these accounted for 6-month, or percent, reduction in course length.

The Surgeon General’s request to establish an emergency course to train 600

17 (1) Letter, Everett S. Elwood, President, American Occupational Therapy Association, to Maj. Gen. James C.

Magee, The Surgeon General, 20 Mar. 1940. (2) Letter, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, The Surgeon General,to Everett

S. Elwood, President, American Occupational Therapy Association, Apr. 1940. 18 Willard, Helen S., and Spackman, Clare S. (editors); Principles of Occupational Therapy, 1st edition. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1947. 19 Memorandum, The Surgeon General for Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 26 Apr. 1944, subject:

Occupational Therapists.
164 MEDICAL TRAINING

civilians yearly was approved by the Army Service Forces in May 1944.20 The

circular authorizing this course and specifying the civilian schools to participate

appeared month later.21 By the terms of contracts negotiated with civilian schools

participating in this Government subsidizedprogram, The Surgeon Generalretained

authority to prescribe curriculum, teaching methods, classroom materials, and class

schedules. Representatives of his office could inspect school facilities and courses at

any time and require periodic progress reports on each student. Schools were

required to remove any student from the course whofailed to maintain satisfactory

standing or who The Surgeon General, for any reason, desired withdrawn.

The War Emergency Course was accelerated from 18 to 12 months by the

requirement of additional prerequisites. Each applicant accepted for training was

required to have at least three manual skills, but the average possessed was even

greater because most of the candidates either had majored in art or home economics

or had supplementary experience in teaching creative and manual skills. The general

level of education allowed many courses to be eliminated from the academic phase

of the traditional curriculum. Over 90 percent of the students had bachelor’s

degrees, and over percent had master’s degrees. The average educational level of

nondegree students was 3.8 years beyond high school.

In contrast to the limited number of crafts was the time devoted to the sciences,

clinical conditions, and the theory of occupational therapy. Schools taught only two

of the major arts and crafts, which they selected to conform with their facilities and

the skills of their staff. The list of crafts drawn up by the Army was headed by

woodworking and printing, and most schools selected these subjects. Several schools

offered weaving or radio and electrical repair in lieu of printing. Science and

occupational therapy accounted for two-thirds of the total curriculum. Conspicuously absent from the wartime curriculum were psychology—a prerequisite—and

pediatrics. Weekly schedules included 24 hours of classes and 12 hours for visits,

field trips, collateral reading, and study. Upon completion of the academic phase of

training, The Surgeon General assigned trainees to selected general hospitals for

months of clinical affiliation.

The clinical program was designed to provide orientation to the Army and an

opportunity to apply the principles, processes, and techniques studied during the

4-month academic phase. Modifications of the standard program were permitted to

adapt it to localfacilities. Forty Army general hospitals were designated to conduct

the clinical phase. detailed program of instruction for the period of clinical

affiliation was published by The Surgeon General in October 1944. Eighty-seven

hours were devoted to craft activities to perfect or supplement skills learned in the

academic phase. Additional practice and exploration of craft techniques were

provided by work experience periods. In this way, time removed from the academic

phase was made up in the clinical phase.

In August 1944, the clinical portion of the War Emergency Course was opened

to students who had completed the equivalent of the academic portion of regular

20 Memorandum, William H. Kushnick, Director of CivilianPersonnel and Training, CivilianPersonnel Division,

Office of The Secretary of War, forOffice of The Surgeon General, thru Army Service Forces, Headquarters, Industrial

Personnel Division, May 1944, subject: Approval of Contract for Training of Occupational Therapists.

21 Army Service Forces Circular No. 189, 22 June 1944.
DIETITIANS, PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPISTS 165

Figure 18.—Classes for occupational therapy apprentices, Battey General Hospital,

Rome, Ga. (Top) Anatomy. (Bottom) Kinesiology.
166 MEDICAL TRAINING

civilian training courses. 22 Students who had satisfactorily completed some part of

the apprentice period in accredited civilian hospitals became acceptable for

completion of this period in selected Army hospitals. By extending subsidized

training to students in regular civilian courses, approximately 150 additional

apprentices were enrolled and employed in Army hospitals as graduate occupational

therapists (fig. 18).

APPOINTMENTS, CLASSIFICATIONS,

AND SALARIES OF TRAINEES

In February 1939, all civilian positions in Army hospitals, including student

dietitians at Walter Reed General Hospital, were brought into the Civil Service. 23

The Surgeon General’s Office was authorized to give classified status to the 10

student dietitians who entered training on September 1939and who were appointed

without civil service examinations. However, students remained ungraded for

another years. After deductions for quarters, subsistence, and retirement, takehome pay from salary of $420 was approximately $45 per annum.

In 1941, when the emergency training program in physical therapy was

initiated, physical therapy students were also classified in ungraded civil service

positions, received the same salaries as student dietitians, and were subject to the

same deductions. At this time, the Civil Service Commission authorized the

additional training position of apprentice physical therapist and provided for

reallocations from the position of student to that of apprentice and ultimately to

that of graduate without approval of examination by the Commission. The positions

of apprentice physical therapist and apprentice dietitian were subprofessional and

were designated SP-3. The salary for these positions was $1,440, less $180 for

quarters and subsistence.

By 1944, when the emergency course in occupational therapy was initiated,

classification and salary for Medical Department trainees had improved even

further. Ungraded students (dietitians, physical therapists, or occupational therapists) were changed to SP-3, at $1,440 per annum, and the position of apprentice in

each of these categories was upgraded from SP-3 to SP-4, at $1,620 per annum.

Both salaries were enhanced by 20-percent overtime pay for schedules in excess of

40 hours per week. However, both were still subject to deduction of percent for

retirement and $180 for quarters and subsistence. Civilian students and apprentices

were required to furnish their owm uniforms, textbooks, and incidentals. Uniforms

authorized for wear were the same as those for graduates.

TRAINING PERFORMANCE REPORTS

During the clinical phase of training, performance reports were required for all

apprentices. Reports on apprentice dietitians were completed month before the

end of the training period and forwarded to the Surgeon General’s Office. record

22 Army Service Forces Circular No. 263, 15 Aug. 1944. 23 Executive Order 7916, 24 June 1938.
DIETITIANS, PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPISTS 167

of final physical examination, photograph, and an application for appointment

accompanied the report. Final performance reports for physical therapy apprentices

were completed after the training period by the clinical supervisors and forwarded

to The Surgeon General. These reports provided information about the trainee’s

proficiency, the amount of clinical practice completed, personality traits, and

adaptability for commissioned military service and were retained as part of the

trainee’s permanent record. Reports on occupational therapy apprentices were

completed by the hospitals at periodic intervals during the 34-week program and

submitted to The Surgeon General. One copy was sent to the schools in which

apprentices received their academic instruction and from which they would be

certified eligible for registration on completion of the course. The Surgeon General

was authorized to separate an apprentice from course at any time for failure to

maintain satisfactory clinicalperformance, for inability to adjust to hospital service,

or for other cause.

MAINTENANCE OF EDUCATIONAL AND

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

Emergency training programs in dietetics, physical therapy, and occupational

therapy developed as result of cooperation between the Medical Department and

officials or committees of professional organizations. Courses met the minimum

educational requirements of the American Dietetic Association and, for physical and

occupational therapists, the Council on Medical Education and Hospitals of the

American Medical Association. Throughout the war, The Surgeon General maintained these educational standards. Each group, however, had its own problems.

In the fall of 1944, the Civil Service Commission questioned the need for the

strict educational requirements for student dietitians. The question arose because

of the Commission’s interpretation of provision in the Veterans’ Preference Act of

1944 which eliminated minimum educational requirements as qualification for

other than scientific, technical, or professional positions. The Civil Service Commission’s interpretation came as surprise to the Surgeon General’s Office. In

letter of protest, Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, Deputy Surgeon General, stated: 24

The dietitian in the Medical Department of the Army is commissioned officer. She assists

the medical officer by filling his diet prescriptions. It is, therefore, most important that the best

qualified individuals be obtained for training. Itis highly improbable that this type of personnel

could be secured if the educationalrequirements are discontinued.

favorable reply was received from the Commission:25

In certifying persons for the position of student dietitian, apprentice dietitian, student

physiotherapy aide and apprentice physiotherapy aide, only those eligibles will be certified who

meet the requirements prescribed by the War Department as necessary for commissioned officers.

24 Memorandum, Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, Deputy Surgeon General, to U.S. Civil Service Commission, 12 Sept.

1944, subject: Educational Requirements for Dietitians.

25 Letter, M. L. A. Mayer, Executive Director, Civil Service Commission, to Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, Deputy

Surgeon General, 24 Oct. 1944.
168 MEDICAL TRAINING

Occupational therapists had problems with both educational and physical

standards. Although the majority of applicants for the War Emergency Course were

qualified, small percentage was found unacceptable because of poor academic

records, physical conditions, or personality disorders. The Surgeon General’s struggle

to maintain professional standards was complicated by Civil Service Commission

policies giving preference to veterans, the disabled, wives, and widows, which

required the acceptance of several candidates neither physically nor educationally

qualifiedfor training. Another problem was created by extremely liberal substitution

of experience for education. Occasionally, The Surgeon General contested decisions

and won his argument against unqualified certifications. Too often, they had to be

accepted and disqualified later for failing to meet physical or academic standards.

The prerequisite of college degree in physical education for civilian students

taking the physical therapy course was established by the Medical Department as

the entrance requirement before 1941. In May 1944, the Medical Department

requested authority to change the educational requirement to include major field

in biology. This revision was not published until October, but it was informally

approved in the selection of students enrolled after August 1944.

Military applicants for the physical therapy course were required to have

completed not less than years in an approved college with satisfactory courses in

biology and other sciences. The term “satisfactory course in biology and other

sciences” was interpreted as minimum of 15 semester hours selected from

anatomy, bacteriology, biology, chemistry, hygiene, kinesiology, physics, physiology, psychology, and zoology. This departure from the established standards

roused fears that the Army would jeopardize professional standards. While the

Army did depart from its previously established prerequisites, it still conformed to

the minimum standards established by the American Medical Association.

In October 1944, the minimum requirement in science hours was increased

from 15to 26 semester hours, with hours as the minimumin biology. The remaining

hours were selected from courses in anatomy, bacteriology, chemistry, entomology,

hygiene, kinesiology, parasitology, physics, physiology, psychology (maximum

semester hours), zoology, or other courses in biology or natural science. This change

was necessary because many 2-year college students with only 15 hours in the

sciences were not academically prepared to cope with the Army’s intensive training

program. The number of students with 2-year college background constituted only

percent of the total number of enlisted students enrolled from October 1943 to

November 1945. The average number of college years for the overall total of these

students during this period was 3.7 years.

The training period (student and apprentice phases) for civilian physical

therapy students was 12 months, while training period for enlisted students was

months. The shorter training period for military students was justified by their

previous military orientation and the number of patients available for therapy in

Army general hospitals. During 1944, enlisted apprentice physical therapists were

given training far in excess of the 400 clinical hours required by the American

Medical Association.
DIETITIANS, PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPISTS 169

SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS CONDUCTING TRAINING

COURSES FOR THE ARMY

Emergency training programs to increase the number of dietitians, physical

therapists, and occupational therapists were established at educational institutions

and at civilian and military hospitals. Fifteen civilian hospitals conducted the

student phase for dietitians, 33 Army hospitals conducted the apprentice phase, and

Army hospitals conducted both phases. The first emergency course began in

August 1942. Civilian institutions completed their Army courses in 1945, and all

Army accelerated programs, except one, came to close in March 1946.

The 6-month academic phase of emergency physical therapy training was

conducted in 38 courses at 15 civilian institutions. In addition, 10 Army hospitals

conducted 33 emergency academic courses for civilian students and 28 for enlisted

students. The first emergency course was started in July 1941, but the courses in

civilian schools did not start until 1942. Emergency physical therapy training

programs were discontinued soon after V-J Day. However, Army hospitals conducting the academic phase continued classes until 10 February 1946 and hospitals

accepted these students for on-the-job training for another months.

Twenty-one emergency courses for occupational therapists were given at eight

civilian schools, while the clinical phase of this program was conducted at 40 Army

hospitals. School courses started in July 1944 and ended in November 1945. The

clinical phase of training extended months beyond the war. The last 51 apprentices,

scheduled to graduate in July 1946, were transferred to Veterans’ Administration

hospitals for pay and training.

RESULTS OF EMERGENCY TRAINING PROGRAMS

Without emergency training programs, the Army could not have recruited

enough qualified medical specialists to meet wartime requirements. Both dietitians

and physical therapists numberedapproximately 1,600at the peak of their strengths.

Only 21 percent of the Medical Department dietitians were trained through Army

programs, but Army training qualified approximately 55 percent of the physical

therapists. Occupational therapists, the smallest group numerically, trained 78

percent of their peak strength of approximately 900 through emergency courses. In

each instance, the professional group concerned thought that the apprentice phase

of training in military hospitals was valuable in familiarizing students with Army

procedures. Experience in treatment of war injuries was especially valuable for

physical and occupational therapists. Emergency training courses for dietitians,

physical therapists, and occupational therapists expanded educational programs for

the whole profession. The demand in all three of these health fields during the war

resulted in the number of civilian schools offering dietetic internships increasing from

38 to 60; in physical therapy, from 15 to 36; and in occupational therapy, from five

to 21.

Both during and after the war, the fear was expressed that lowering of
170 MEDICAL TRAINING

standards was inherent in the Army’s accelerated physical therapy training program. In 1945, Dr. Frances A. Hellebrandt, Medical Director, Baruch Center of

Physical Medicine, Medical College of Virginia, Richmond, Va., made careful

analysis of the 6-month academic phase of the Medical Department physical

therapy course. Doctor Hellebrandt, who had served as medical director of the

physical therapy training course for enlisted members of the Women’s Army Corps

conducted at the University of Wisconsin from October 1943 to October 1944,

concluded that:

Careful study of the scope and content of the WAC course suggests that inreality

it surpasses anything previously attempted by the average apprentice type of approved hospital

technician training school.

The Army has demonstrated that the essentials of subject matter in variety of technical

fields can be taught effectively by new methods which drastically shorten thelearning period.

We would be short sighted indeed if we failed to study the pedagogical experiments of the

war 26

TRAINING ENLISTED PHYSICAL THERAPY TECHNICIANS

The Medical Department had long recognized that trained enlisted assistants

were necessary in the operation of physical therapy clinic. Until late in the war, male enlisted assistants were trained on-the-job. Because of increasing patient loads

and the loss of male technicians to combat units, The Surgeon General directed the

service commands, in telegram dated 28 February 1945, to estimate theirrequirements for enlisted women trained as physical therapy technicians. On the basis of

this information, formal training program was established. Applicants for these

courses were required to have completed months of training at the Medical

Department Enlisted Technicians School. Those selected were carefully screened by

the staff of the school, the medical director of physical therapy, and the chief

physical therapist, Brooke General Hospital.

The program of instruction consisted of 4-week course (192 hours) in selected

physical therapy procedures and general orientation in this field of therapeutics.

To prepare enlisted women for hospital assignment as rapidly as possible, courses

were established in 13 general hospitals. Graduates were eligible for the classification

of enlisted physical therapy technician.27 The last class enrolled on July 1945. Four

hundred and thirteen enlisted women were trained in this program. 28

COURSE FOR OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY ASSISTANTS

If graduate occupational therapists could have been recruited in larger numbers

or if the War Emergency Course had begun earlier in the war, course for occupa26 Hellebrandt,F. A.: Analysis of theWAG Emergency Physical Therapy TrainingProgram. Arch. Phys. Med. 26;

607, 514, August 1945. 27 War Department Technical Manual12-427,12 July 1944; Change 1,12 Apr. 1945. 28 Memorandum, Maj. Emma E. Vogel, WMSC, Director of Physical Therapists, to Col. Harold C. Lueth, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, Aug. 1945.
DIETITIANS, PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPISTS 171

tional therapy assistants would have been unnecessary. However, in June 1944, only 180 occupational therapists were on duty in Army general hospitals, 29 and

more than year would elapse before graduates of the War Emergency Course

could be qualified for staff appointments. On October 1944, the director of the

Reconditioning Consultants Division, Surgeon General’s Office, reported to The

Surgeon General that program for training enlisted women as occupational therapy

assistants had been submitted to Army Service Forces. 30 The 1-month course was

approved by the Army Service Forces on 16 November 1944.31

In January 1945, recruiting for this course ended, and, during the remaining 10

months of its operation, students were drawn exclusively from the Women’s Army

Corps. Halloran General Hospital, Staten Island, N.Y., was selected and Capt.

Josephine E. Springer, WAC, chief occupational therapist at Tilton General

Hospital, Fort Dix, N.J., was transferred to Halloran General Hospital and placed

in charge of the program. The Surgeon General’s Office approved candidates,

allotted quotas to the service commands, and returned trainees to service commands

for assignment to hospitals. Applicants for training were required to have completed

basic military training and to have either civilian background of teaching

experience and some knowledge of handicraft or an expert ability in some handicraft plus high school education and an aptitude for teaching.

On December 1944, 14 students reported for the first class. By April 1945,

141 students had attended the course. That same month, the course was discontinued

because the training requirements for occupational therapy assistants had been met.

The following month, request for reestablishment of the course had to be submitted because enlisted assistants were needed for the expanding convalescent hospital

program. Army Service Forces approved The Surgeon General’s request. 32 The

promptness of Army Service Forces in approving the Medical Department’s request enabled classes to run consecutively until 27 October 1945, when the 11th class graduated and the occupational therapy assistants training course for enlisted

members of the Women’s Army Corps was discontinued. Of the 295 students

enrolled in this course, 278 satisfactorily completed requirements and were subsequently assigned to selected Army hospitals where they assumed much of the

burden of diversional activity programs.

29 Memorandum, Maj. Henry B. Gwynn, MC, for The Surgeon General, 17 June 1944, subject: Semimonthly Report of the Reconditioning Division for the Period 1-17 June 1944. 30 Memorandum, Col. Augustus Thorndike, MC, for TheSurgeon General, Oct. 1944, subject; SemimonthlyReport of the Reconditioning Consultants Division for the Period 16-30 September 1944. 31 Memorandum,Brig. Gen. R. W. Bliss, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General,for Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Nov. 1944, subject; Orientation Training for Occupational Therapy Assistants

(WAG), with 1st indorsement thereto, 16 Nov. 1944. 32 (1)Letter, Brig. Gen. R. W. Bliss, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to Commanding

General, Army Service Forces, attention; Director of Military Training, 13 Apr. 1945, subject: Orientation Training

for OccupationalTherapy Assistants (WAG), with 1st indorsement thereto, 23 Apr. 1945. (2) Letter, Brig Gen. R. W.

Bliss, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, attention: Director of Military Training, 28 May 1945, subject; Orientation Training for Occupational Therapy Assistants (WAG). (3) Transmittal Sheet, Col. S. M. Prouty, GSC, Executive, Office of the Director of Military Training,

Army Service Forces, to The Surgeon General, June 1945, subject: Orientation Training for OccupationalTherapy

Assistants (WAG), with inclosure thereto, 28 May 1945.

CHAPTER VI

Medical Replacement Training Centers

high quality of professional care for an army in the field can be provided

only when the skills of doctors, dentists, veterinarians, and administrators are supported by trained enlisted personnel. The training of particular Medical Department soldier varies with the demands placed upon him, but in all cases, it must

be detailed, intensive, and diversified. To train medical surgical, X-ray, laboratory,

pharmacy, dental, and veterinary technicians, schools were established at general

hospitals, military posts, civilian colleges, and commercial institutions. In addition, medical soldiers were also trained to work as part of unit or team, ranging

from an optical detachment of two enlisted men to 2,000-bed numbered general

hospital with 898 officers, nurses, and enlisted men. In short, men had to be trained

to perform special duties in multitude of medical units in chain of evacuation

stretching from the frontlines to general hospitals in the Zone of Interior.

This bewildering array of individual and team specialties was held together

by common bond of training designed to produce basic medical soldiers and administrative (or common) specialists. Regardless of later specialization, all medical

soldiers had to be acquainted with body of medical and military knowledge basic

to their duties. Because they might be stationed in Zone of Interior hospital or

frontline aid station, medical soldiers were trained to work either independently

or with group. First aid under fire, evacuation of the wounded over difficult terrain, and the recognition of wounds and disease were routine work. Despite their

status as noncombatants, medical soldiers had to be trained to protect themselves,

their units, and their patients. This common bond of training was provided by

Medical Replacement Training Centers.

Medical Department soldiers of World War II came from all walks of life.

Medical Replacement Training Centers, and those of other arms and services, applied the techniques of mass production to military training. In the image of the

industrial process, centers took raw material from reception centers, forged standardized product, and fed their output into medical units where the separate parts

were finished and linked into the working whole. The accent was on economy,

speed, uniformity, and volume production. The balance between factors such as

housing and classroom facilities, cadre ratios, training aids, the flow of trainees

from reception centers, and the rate of unit activations had to be continuously

adjusted. Bottlenecks at any stage in the process were immediately reflected

through the system.

Unless otherwise indicated, this chapter is based on: (1) Goodman, Samuel M.: History of Medical Department

Training, United States Army, U.S. Army World War II. Volume V. The Training of Replacements, Fillers, and

Cadres, 1939-1945. [Officialrecord.] (2) Zimmermann,Edward A.; Training in the Medical Department During World

War II, pt. I, ch. VII. Training of Enlisted IndividualFillers and Replacements. [Official record.]
174 MEDICAL TRAINING

The successful operation of replacement training centers required continuous

planning. Preparations for the establishment of Medical Replacement Training

Centers began almost immediately after the publication of The Surgeon General’s

Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939. In the spring of 1940, the Medical Department conducted studies of potential sites, training loads, construction costs, and

cadre requirements. In addition to sites at Fort Meade, Md., Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.,

and Fort Warren, Wyo., specified in The Surgeon General’s Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939, the Medical Department also considered sites at posts in Indiana,

New York, Missouri, Texas, Oklahoma, and California. In the fall of 1940, while

these studies were being conducted, the War Department issued specific instructions for the establishment of training centers. These instructions spelled out the

type, number, and size of buildings to be constructed for replacement training and

emphasized the need for rigid economy in construction programs.

In mid-October 1940, War Department and Medical Department training

policies werereviewed and discussed at conference of Corps Area Surgeons. Topics

included in the agenda drawn up by the Director of Training, Surgeon General’s

Office, ranged from methods of constructing plans for the operation of training centers to techniques for preparing Reserve officers to train conscripts. Participants

in the conference were briefed on the requirements of Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, which had been published on September, and oriented to policies

governing the training of officers and enlisted men for duties as administrative or

common specialists.

It was not until January 1941, however, that the War Department authorized

The Surgeon General to establish two Medical Replacement Training Centers

one at Camp Lee, Ya., and the other at Camp Grant, 111. third was authorized on

November of that year at Camp Barkeley, Tex. At this juncture, the Medical

Department began translating theory into practice.

TRAINING CENTERS

Camp Lee and Camp Pickett

When the Medical Replacement Training Center at Camp Lee was activated

in January 1941, on the site of World War training camp, little remained of the

The official title of Medical Replacement Training Centers changed several times during World War II. When

the centers were first established, they were most commonly referred to as medicaltraining centers. On 15 December

1941, they were designated as Medical Replacement Training Centers. In April 1944, the designation was changed

to ASF (Army Service Forces) Training Center. For the purpose of this study, only the last two designations will be

used.

(1) Memorandum, Maj. F. B. Wakeman, MC, for Col. Albert G. Love, 14 Sept. 1940, subject: Enlisted Replacement Centers. (2) Memorandum, Maj. Arthur B. Welsh, MC, to Brig. Gen. Albert G. Love, 11 Mar, 1941, subject:

MD ERC’s. (3) Memorandum, Maj. Arthur B. Welsh, MC, to Brig. Gen. Albert G. Love, 29 Mar. 1941, subject: Replacement Centers.

(1) Letter, The Adjutant Generalto Chiefs of Arms and Services, CommandingGenerals of All Corps Areas, and

Commanding Officers of Exempted Stations, 15 June 1940, subject; War Department Construction Policy. (2) Letter,

The Adjutant General to Chiefs of Arms and Services, Commanding Generals of All Corps Areas, and Commanding

Officers of Exempted Stations, Oct. 1940, subject: War Department Construction Policy Supplement No. 5.

Memorandum, Maj. F. B. Wakeman, MC, for Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, Oct. 1940,

subject: Agenda for Discussion at Meeting of Corps Area Surgeons, Week of 14 October 1940.

Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, Seventh and Eighth Corps Areas, Chief Signal Officer,

The Surgeon General, and Chief of Infantry, 23 Oct. 1941, subject: Activationof Replacement Training Centers.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 175

497-333 75 13

earlier center except some gunpits and few emplacements. The site, 25 miles from

Richmond, as relatively flat and partially ooded, ith few streams that could be

used to add realism to exercises, and the climate permitted year-round training.

Since the Medical Department shared the camp with Quartermaster Replacement Training Center, room for long term expansion as limited.

From the beginning, little went according to plan. When Lt. Col. (later Maj.

Gen.) Paul R. Hawley, MC, Lt. Col. (later Col.) Frank S. Matlack, MC, and S.

Sgt. (later Lt. Col.) Philip E. G. Fleetwood arrived to activate the center on

January 1941, construction as only partially completed. On 16 January 1941, the

center as officially activated as the 1308th Service Unit, Medical Department

Replacement Center, Camp Lee. The time between then and mid-March, when

the first trainees arrived, was used to organize and activate subunits, procure supplies, and receive personnel assigned to the center.

Officers were assigned to the center from Regular Army posts, private medical

practice, or civilian jobs, and the enlisted cadre came from posts scattered throughout the United States. Most of the officers assigned to the training battalions had

completed the monthlong refresher course at the Medical Field Service School, or

attended the Cooks and Bakers School at Fort Meade, Md. All lacked experience

in handling large groups of trainees.

The medical training center as designed to house seven training battalions

each containing approximately 1,000 men. The quarters provided for trainees ere

two-story, 63-man, cantonment barracks, grouped on battalion pattern. The barracks for twm companies of each battalion were alined side by side, facing the battalion’s remaining two companies. The battalion headquarters and supply buildings were separated from troop housing areas by road constructed through the

battalion area. Buildings designed as recreation halls and regimental headquarters

were converted into classrooms.

In common with other training centers during the first year of mobilization,

the medical training center at Camp Lee reported chronic shortage of training

equipment, and even simple housekeeping stores. At one point, Colonel Hawley,

the training officer, complained bitterly to the Surgeon General’s Office that “the

Quartermaster supply is little short of scandalous. There have been

times when we could not get enough food to feed our men *. There is no

soap, scrubbing brushes, other cleaning materials and toilet paper to be had at

this writing. Clothing is exhausted except in abnormal sizes. We have many selectees wearing nondescript civilian shoes because they cannot be fitted from Quar- termaster supply.” Training equipment as even more difficult to obtain and

often had to be improvised or simulated. The shortage of equipment and specialized

classrooms made it difficult to establish training program for common specialists, and the schedules set up in mobilization training programs often had to be

adapted to existing facilities.

Annual Report, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Pickett, Va., fiscal year 1942.

History of the Medical Replacement Training Center at Camp Lee, Va., and CampPickett, Va., From Activation in 1941 to Inactivation in 1943. [Official record.]

See footnote (1), p. 173.
176 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 19.—Trainees from Camp Lee, Va., marching to CampPickett, Va., to establish the new

Medical Replacement Training Center.

The training of specialists, as well as basic medical soldiers, was disrupted by

the irregular arrivals and departures of trainees. Fluctuations in enrollment led alternately to slack periods when supplies and equipment were underutilized or

wasted and heavy training loads taxed facilities and led to unnecessary requests

for expansion.

Early in February 1942, the War Department concluded that further expansion of both the Medical and Quartermaster Replacement Training Centers

would grossly overtax the resources of Camp Lee and decided to transfer the

Medical Department center to Camp Pickett. To avoid interrupting the program,

the War Department suggested moving the medical battalions one by one as they

completed their training cycles and turning the vacated areas over to the quartermaster center. Battalion cadre and overhead could then be sent to Camp Pickett to

begin training new complement of trainees.

Brig. Gen. William R. Dear, the Commanding General of the Medical Replacement Training Center at Camp Lee, objected to the War Department plan,

arguing that it would take 10 weeks to complete the transfer to Camp Pickett, and

during this period, his command would be divided and administrative complications wouldbe inevitable. As an alternative, he proposed that all medical battalions

be moved at the same time, regardless of their state of training. The troops could
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 177

Figure 20.—Tent housing used at Camp Pickett, Va.

be marched from Camp Lee to Camp Pickett, and the property of at least one battalion could be moved each day by truck. 10

The War Department accepted this alternative, and in mid-June, medical

trainees began 3-day march over the 42 miles separating the two camps. The

center at Camp Lee was officially closed at midnight on 19 June 1942 and reopened

minute later at Camp Pickett (fig. 19).11 To ease the transition, the Medical Replacement Training Center transferred all of its training aids, supplies, and equipment to Camp Pickett. 12 Even then, training was disrupted while new permanent

training aids, such as sanitary area, an obstacle course, mapping areas, and drill

fields, were constructed.

Camp Pickett, located near Blackstone, Ya., was initially the home of the 79th

Infantry Division and other Second U.S. Army units. The prevailing weather was

the same at both camps, but the terrain at Camp Pickett was better suited to

varied training program. The surrounding countryside was rolling and wooded,

with numerous lakes and streams. The soil was red clay that became quagmire

10 See footnote 8, p. 175.

11 (1) Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC,Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, to All Services,

Surgeon General’s Office, 22 June 1942. (2) See footnote 8, p. 175. 12 Letter, The Surgeon General to The Adjutant General, 26 Feb. 1942, subject: Movement of Medical Replacement Training Center From Camp Lee to Camp Pickett, Va.
178 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 21.—This gathering of troops at the Camp Pickett, Va., stadium on Memorial Day

illustrates the size of the Medical Department training effort.

after every rain. Initially, trainees were housed in new, improved type of cantonment barrack.

In June 1942, the War Department authorized the center to expand enrollment by 5,000 trainees per cycle. On August, the center was reorganized to absorb its new capacity. Negro trainees, who had previously been assigned to companies and of the 8th Medical Training Battalion, were organized in battalion strength, and four white battalions were added, bringing the total to one

Negro and 13 white battalions. Each battalion was placed under the control of one

of four newly activated training regiments. On 14 December 1942, one white battalion was converted to Negro battalion to accommodate the increasing number

of Negro trainees assigned to the center. 13 The five training battalions added on

August, however, had to be quartered in hutments and tents (fig. 20) winterized

with scrap lumber left over from the construction of the camp.

The training center at Camp Pickett (fig. 21) continued to enroll trainees until

mid-1943, when the declining rate of activations reduced the Medical Department’s

demand for fillers and replacements, and the Medical Replacement Training

13Annual Report, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Pickett, Va., fiscal year 1943.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 179

Center was ordered to close. In October, after the last class graduated and property

accounts were cleared, the center was officially deactivated. 14

Camp Grant and Fort Lewis

Preparations for the establishment of Medical Replacement Training Center

at Camp Grant began early in the fall of 1940, under the supervision of the commanding general of the Sixth Corps Area. The reservation, then under the control

of the Illinois National Guard, was located on the east bank of the Rock River,

miles south of Rockford, 111. The eastern half of its approximately 3,500 acres of

rolling terrain was unusually well suited for field operations. At times, however, the

climate made training difficult; the temperature varied from 20° below zero in

winter to as much as 104° above in summer, and between December and March,

snow and cold weather made meaningful outdoor training near impossibility.

Many difficulties had to be overcome before the center could begin enrolling

trainees. Although the Medical Replacement Training Center was to be the major

activity at Camp Grant, with plans calling for center headquarters and seven

training battalions of 1,000 men each, reception center with facilities for 2,500

men was also planned. Since the reception center was slated to open on 15 January

1941, weeks before the Medical Replacement Training Center, it was given

priority. Despite the center’s low priority and delays in construction, work was

completed on 24 March 1941, 10 days behind schedule, but in time to house the

first shipment of trainees.

The site assigned to the Medical Department at Camp Grant also proved difficult to manage. Even before the reservation was surveyed, the commander of the

Sixth Corps had decided not to allow construction in areas occupied by buildings

belonging to the Illinois National Guard. This restriction left little space for building in areas with easy access to facilities for sewage and waste disposal and added

to the cost of the center. The construction of hard-surfaced roads, and the ditching

and leveling of the grounds had to be postponed when expenditures exceeded appropriations. Hard-surfaced roads and walks could not be provided until the autumn of 1941, and the ditching required for surface drainage was delayed even

longer.

Buildings at the center were arranged to increase control by the company commander. Each training company was assigned four barracks, one administration

building, and one messhall, grouped so that the company commander could keep

close watch over all activities in the company area. When selectees arrived at the

center, they were assigned to standard, semipermanent barracks, designed to

house 63 men. Later, at the direction of the War Department, 77 men were housed

in each barrack. This was accomplished by using metal adapter to hold one bunk

on top of another, an arrangement which proved quite satisfactory since it actually

increased the floor space available to the men. During the summer months, the

camp could accommodate an additional 6,000 trainees in tents.

14 See footnote 8, p. 175.
180 MEDICAL TRAINING

Spring brought with it the unwelcome discovery that every roof in the center

leaked profusely. The problem was traced to composition roofing, installed during

subzero weather to meet construction deadlines, that failed with the first spring

rains. Damage to ceilings was extensive, not to mention the discomfort, and repairs could not be completed until fall.

Housing was less of problem than classroom facilities, however. Initially,

each battalion was provided with one recreation building, type RB-1, which could

be adapted for use as classroom. An administration building, type A-12, was

later authorized for each battalion, but this provided only two additional classrooms. As result, classes had to be held in barracks and messhalls throughout the

winter and during inclement weather. The shortage of classrooms was not eased

until late 1942 when an additional recreation building was authorized for each battalion.

The pressure for classroom space was even more acute in programs for common and administrative specialists and in the special training unit for illiterate,

non-English speaking, and mentally deficient trainees. When the center was designed, plans did not include classrooms for either group, and there was no provision for housing the special training unit. Extra housing was provided by converting

barracks and messhalls originally designed for men assigned to regimental headquarters. Efforts to provide additional classrooms for common specialists were only

partially successful, and National Guard buildings requiring extensive structural

changes had to be pressed into use.

Requisitions for the equipment and supplies required for basic military and

technical training were submitted in December 1940. Between January and April

1941, the center received few trucks, most of the training equipment required for

two medicalregiments, and seven sets of hospital training equipment. Since training

programs focused on the operation of medical battalion, training equipment for

the center had to be improvised from hospital and regimental sets.

Supplies and instructors for the common specialist schools and the special

training unit were provided by the U.S. Office of Education, through the Illinois

Board of Vocational Education. Instructors for the Cooks and Bakers School, the

Clerical School, the Motor Mechanics School, and the special training unit were

hired on the recommendation of civilian liaison agent assigned to the center by

the Board of Vocational Education. The board also furnished tools and garage

supplies for the Mechanics School, and most of the typewriters and machinery used

by the Clerical School. This cooperative effort continued until December 1941, when the commandant of the center was notified that supplies and instructors

would have to be withdrawn because the U.S. Office of Education could not provide

funds for their support. Through special arrangements, the equipment provided

by the board was retained until February 1942 when the War Department was

able to fill requisitions for replacements. Of the 23 civilian instructors, 15 were retained as civil service employees for the duration of the war. The remaining vacancies were filled by military personnel with civilian teaching experience. 15

16 Annual Report, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Grant, 111., fiscal year 1942.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 181

By mid-1942, the problems that developed during the activation of Camp

Grant were under control, and the center was able to settle into the routine of training. Cadre problems, however, continuously plagued the program. On 19 April

1943, control of the Medical Replacement Training Center was transferred from

the War Department to the Sixth Service Command, and shortly thereafter, the

center was ordered to replace at least 80 percent of its cadre with limited service personnel. Many of the replacements were found to have received only weeks of

training at Camp McCoy and to be limited mentally as well as physically. The new

system proved far less satisfactory than did its predecessor, which allowed the

center to select cadre from among its own trainees.

At the same time, officials at the center were favorably impressed by the performance of company of enlisted women—members of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (usually called Wacs)—assigned to replace men in administrative positions. Under the terms of their assignment, each woman replaced one enlisted man, and the vast majority were reported to be both capable and industrious workers.

After June 1942, Camp Grant also reported marked reduction in the number

of doctors and dentists assigned to serve as training officers. In most instances,

these positions were filled by young officers in the Medical Administrative Corps.

Although many of these new officers lacked experience, they became accomplished

instructors under the proper supervision, and their performance was considered

highly satisfactory.

In December 1942, special program was established to train sanitary technicians and meat and dairy technicians for the Army Air Forces. Under this program, the center was capable of training 55 sanitary technicians every weeks, and

175 meat and dairy inspectors every weeks. New housing and classrooms were not

authorized, but the center was allowed to add 11 officers and 42 enlisted men to the

cadre. In July 1943, quotas for the Sanitary Technicians Course were reduced to

20 technicians per cycle, and the quota for meat and dairy inspectors was reduced

to 12. 16

In May 1944, after the establishment of the preactivation system, the Medical

Replacement Training Centers were redesignated as ASF (Army Service Forces)

Training Centers to symbolize the transition to the new system. 17 At this juncture,

Camp Grant was one of three centers training troops for the Medical Department,

and all were being taxed to provide combined capacity of 50,000 trainees. When

troop requirements were increased to 70,000 in mid-1944, Camp Grant was unable

to provide facilities for further expansion. In June 1944, the medical training

center began the process of transferring to Fort Lewis where additional training

facilities were available. As classes graduated, buildings were closed, and the cadre

and equipment were shipped to Fort Lewis. The last of the staff departed for Fort

Lewis on 30 September 1944, and on 15 October, the center at Camp Grant was

officially disbanded. 18

16 Annual Report, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Grant, 111., fiscal year 1943.

17 Army Service Forces Circular No. 135, 11 May 1945.

18 (1) Annual Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Grant, 111., fiscal year 1944. (2) Report, Regular Training Branch. In Annual Report, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1945.
182 MEDICAL TRAINING

Fort Lewis, bordering on Puget Sound, was originally the home of the 3d Infantry Division. At the time the medical section of the ASF Training Center at

Camp Grant moved to its new site, Fort Lewis housed number of activities, including Corps of Engineers training section. The surrounding terrain was flat,

but wooded, and provided natural features well suited to diversified training program. The weather was cold and fogs were frequent, but the climate did not seriously limit activities.

Troop housing and fixed training aids, however, posed special problems. At

conference at Fort Lewis on July 1944, the capacity of the engineer training section was set at 18,000, and the medical training section was authorized capacity

of 30,000 trainees. Housing in northFort Lewis assigned to the Engineer Corps,

and the medical training section was to occupy quarters, as required, in the southern

and northeastern sections of the post. Quarters in south Fort Lewis, which housed

approximately 60 percent of the medical training section, consisted of few threestory, brick barracks of varying capacity; some one-story, hollow-tile barracks, with

capacity for 58 men each; and large number of two-story, 63-man cantonment

barracks. In northeast Fort Lewis, trainees were housed in one-story, theater-of-operations barracks with concrete floors.

Since these areas were separated by distance of almost miles, separate

training facilities had to be constructed at both sites. Few fixed training aids existed

in the areas assigned to the medical training section, and those available required

extensive repairs. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the post

engineer could not provide manpower for construction. Almost without exception,

training aids were built by personnel from the medical training section, with the

post engineer supplying only the material. Facilities constructed by the medical

training section included classrooms for the common specialist schools and fixed

training aids ranging from rifle and carbine ranges to bayonet courts, gas chambers,

obstacle courses, and demonstration areas. In short, the medical training section

had to build almost every facility required by the center except housing.

During the period that the center was being transferred from Camp Grant,

the medical training section at Fort Lewis temporarily experienced shortage of

cadre. The initial cadre, consisting of 100 officers and 250 enlisted men, arrived at

Fort Lewis between the fifth and 10th of June. Trainees began to arrive almost immediately, and within month, more than 1,000 were enrolled. The first training

cycle began shortly before the end of June. On 26 June, contingent of 97 officers

arrived from Camp Barkeley, followed still later by 70 officers from the Tank Destroyer School, Camp Hood, Tex., who were assigned to the center for months to

help set up the military training program. Cadre strength gradually increased

throughout the summer of 1944 as instructors and overhead personnel were transferred from Camp Grant. By the beginning of October, the transfer was complete.

The medical training section at Fort Lewis reached its peak strength at the

end of September 1944 when more than 24,000 enlisted men were being trained.

Four general hospitals, the first table-of-organization units established at the center

under the new system of training, were activated during the same month. After

October 1944, the level of training activity at Fort Lewis gradually declined. Train-
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 183

ing continued on reduced basis until February 1946, when the medical training

section was notified that it would be transferred to Fort Sam Houston, Tex., to become part of Brooke Army Medical Center. The last unit was transferred late in

March, and on April 1946, the medical training section at Fort Lewis was officially closed. 19

Camp Barkeley and Camp Crowder

Early in March 1941, while the Medical Replacement Training Centers at

Camps Lee and Grant were still under construction, War Department General

Staff, G-3, Operations and Training, began to prepare plans for expanding the

Army to 2,800,000 men. Initially, The Surgeon General considered creating two

new centers, one in central California, with capacity of 6,000, and another in

Texas, with capacity of 8,000. 20 second study of training center requirements,

prepared at the end of March, suggested expanding the capacity of Camp Lee, and

the establishment of three new centers: One in Texas or Oklahoma with capacity

of 10,000; second at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., with capacity of 5,000; and

third on the west coast, with capacity of approximately 4,200. Anticipating the

possibility of further expansion, the War Department authorized the establishment

of third Medical Replacement Training Center with capacity of 4,000 trainees

at Camp Barkeley on 12 July 1941.

The new Medical Replacement Training Center was located 11 miles southwest of Abilene, Tex., approximately 120 miles north of the geographic center of

the state. The main camp covered approximately 2,500 acres of land and was located at an altitude of 1,870 feet. Hills to the south and west, which were approximately 400 feet higher, contained over 58,000 acres of bivouac and maneuver areas.

Combat ranges were located in 9,400-acre tract to the west. The climate permitted

training to continue throughout the year, although the absence of shade and continuous duststorms made the camp disagreeable during the spring and summer.

At the time the center was being established, Camp Barkeley was also being used

to train elements of the 45th Infantry Division.

During the early months of operation, the center at Camp Barkeley encountered problems similar to those experienced by other Medical Replacement Training Centers during their initial stages of mobilization. On 15 August, the War Department directed the commanding generals of the Medical Replacement Training

Centers at Camps Lee and Grant to select specified number of enlisted men and

train them for cadre assignments at Camp Barkeley. These centers provided total

of 519 of the 640 enlisted men authorized for the new center, and the remainder

were selected from trainees completing the basic training course. Officers selected

for the center were sent to the Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

for special training in August 1941, and then assigned to Camp Grant for on-the-job

19 (1) Remarks, Brig. Gen. James E. Baylis, “Training Center Commander’s Problems.” In Notes. Army Service

Forces, 5th Training Conference, ASFTC, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 25 Oct. 1944. (2) History, Medical Training Section,

Army Services Force Training Center, Fort Lewis, Wash., June 1944 to March 1946.

20 See footnote (2), p. 174.
184 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 22.—Camp Barkeley, Tex., December 1941

training. Initially, this cadre proved adequate, but as the center began to grow, it

reported chronic shortage of staff.

The commanding general of the Medical Replacement Training Center, Brig.

Gen. Roy C. Heflebower, reported at Camp Barkeley on 10 September, and on

November 1941, the center was officially activated. Heavy rains delayed construction, and when the first trainees arrived in mid-November, the building program

was several weeks behind schedule. Despite cold, rainy weather, inoperative heating systems, and incomplete classrooms, the first training cycle began on December. Since outdoor training was impractical, classes were held in the barracks,

where men wrapped in overcoats sat on the floor. Trainees accepted these conditions with good spirits, however, since the first cycle coincided with the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor.

Construction was completed few weeks after thebeginning of the first cycle,

but the initial shortage of individual, organizational, and training equipment proved

more difficult to overcome. Although equipment provided by the Medical Department usually arrived on time, and in adequate quantities, other classes of equipment were usually in short supply. As late as June 1942, General Hcflebower reported that the center was still awaiting supplies ordered in October 1941 and

stated that; “In this connection there is one practice which is not only cause for

annoyance, but results in waste of time and effort, as well as delay in the ultimate

receipt of supplies. This is the return of requisitions by intermediate headquarters

asking for explanation as to the need for certain items, or questioning the quantities
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 185

Figure 23.-—Hutments used to house trainees at Camp Barkeley, Tex.

of these items requested, when the items appear on table of allowance issued by

the War Department.” 21

The facilities constructed at Camp Barkeley in the fall of 1941 were designed

for the housing and training of 4,000 enlisted men. The original center, located in

the northeastern section of the camp, contained standard two-story cantonment

barracks and one-story general purpose buildings (fig. 22). In addition to standard

barracks and administration buildings, each battalion quadrangle contained two

large RB-1 classroom buildings and large recreation hall. Other classroom buildings in the center were assigned to specialist schools.

Early in 1942, wartime growth began to produce shortage of quarters and

classrooms. When the capacity of the center was increased from 4,000 to 7,600 in

February 1942, the additional trainees were housed in an adjacent hutment area

previously occupied by the 158th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Infantry Division.

The one-story 15-man hutments (fig. 23) provided adequate housing, and trainees

seemed to prefer these quarters to the more modern, two-story barracks. As classrooms, however, these long, narrow buildings with their low ceilings were totally

unsatisfactory. The lack of essential classrooms and training aids in this area, and

the assignment of similar facilities at Camp Robinson, Ark., brought forth an official protest from The Surgeon General. Expressing belief that these expedients

might jeopardize the Medical Department’s chances of obtaining permanent facilities, The Surgeon General warned the Director of Training, ASF, that this

places “the Medical Department in the position of qualifying trainees toward

21 Annual Report, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., fiscal year 1942.
186 MEDICAL TRAINING

mediocrity rather than balanced training, due to the fact that administrative and

occupational specialists cannot be properly trained.” 22

The shortage of housing and facilities was aggravated at the end of June 1942

when the center was again ordered to double its capacity. The initial plans for

housing the additional 7,000 trainees provided that two battalions would be located to the north of the center in hutments vacated by the 45th Infantry Division,

and the remaining five battalions would be placed in tent camp that was to be

erected to the southeast of the original center. Before the tent camp could be completed, however, plans were altered to convert it into hutment area capable of

housing all 7,000 trainees. As result of changes and delays, this area was not completed in time to house the center’s increasing capacity. The additional trainees had to be quartered wherever space was available, often in tents at the construction site, and battalions had to be moved repeatedly to permit the construction of

hutments. The problem was further complicated by the expansion of the special

training unit which was supposed to contain approximately 350 men but grew to

strength of about 2,000. The center was unable to provide any of the special facilities required for their training. Construction in the hutment area was not completed until January 1943.

Classroom facilities in the new hutment area were barely adequate. When the

area was being planned, the center recommended that classrooms be provided at

ratio of one large classroom and two small rooms per battalion and that an additional classroom be provided for the Cooks and Bakers School. It gained approval, however, to construct only 15 small buildings (20 by 136 feet) and four

large ones (one RB-1 and three RB-2 buildings). The larger buildings were capable

of seating two companies for lecture or film and one for demonstration or practical exercise. company could be squeezed into the smaller classrooms, but the

buildings were so long and narrow, and the ceilings so low, that they were little

better than hutments.

Camp Barkeley, the first Medical Replacement Training Center to be relieved

of its exempted status, was placed under service command control in December

1942.23 In August 1943, as Camp Pickett was being closed, the training center at

Camp Barkeley was assigned responsibility for training Negro troops. During the

following year, the number of Negro trainees assigned to the center varied between

1,000 and 1,400. In March 1944, Camp Barkeley was again expanded, this time to

capacity of more than 17,000 trainees. The camp again reported shortage of

housing and serious overcrowding, but no further construction was authorized. In

April 1944, the Medical Replacement Training Center was incorporated into the

preactivation system and designated an ASF Training Center. The capacity of

the center, including units, replacements, and preactivation fillers, was increased

to 37,150. The additional trainees were housed in quarters vacated by units of the

Army Ground Forces. 24

22 Memorandum, The Surgeon General for Brig. Gen. C. R. Huebner, Training Division, Services of Supply, 25 Mar. 1942, subject: Temporary Increase in Training Facilities at Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Grant,

111. 23 Annual Report, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., fiscal year 1943. 24 (1) Annual Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., fiscal year 1944. (2) Annual

Report, Army ServiceForces Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., July 1944 to April 1946.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 187

When Medical Department training requirements began to decline late in

1944, Camp Barkeley was gradually phased out of the program. In September,

the training load was reduced to 24,894, followed in November by cut of 10,000.

As training requirements declined still further, the Army Service Forces decided

to consolidate the center at Camp Barkeley with the Signal Corps training center

at Camp Crowder. The transfer took place between the 11th and 17th of March,

and on April, the center was officially closed. Training at Camp Crowder continued on reduced scale until early 1946 when the Medical Replacement Training

Center was finally deactivated.25

Camp Joseph T. Robinson

By the time the fourth Medical Replacement Training Center was authorized

on 20 December 1941, experience gained at Camps Lee and Grant provided the

answers to many problems of center activation. The rolling, wooded plateau occupied by Camp Joseph T. Robinson, site of the new center, was ideally suited for

basic enlisted training. Trees were scattered throughout the center, and the thick

woods surrounding the camp provided areas for outdoor classrooms (fig. 24), field

problems, and bivouacs. The sandy soil dried quickly after rains, and the climate

permitted year-round training without hardship to trainees.

Figure 24.—Open-air classrooms used extensively at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark.

25 Annual Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Crowder, Mo., for period July 1945 through 26

Feb. 1946.
188 MEDICAL TRAINING

The area assigned to the medical training center had formerly been occupied

by artillery, engineer, and quartermaster units of the 35th Infantry Division. Hardsurfaced roads, gravel walks, and gravel- or clay-surfaced drill fields had been constructed, and there were enough gas-heated, one-story buildings to provide each

company with its own messhall, dayroom, and classroom, and each battalion with

recreation building, branch camp exchange, officers’ club, and infirmary. Each

company was also provided with one outdoor classroom. Since the units for which

the area was originally constructed varied in size, the organization and strength

of training units had to be adapted to existing utilities. This, however, proved only

minor inconvenience.

On January 1942, an advance party of officers reported at Camp Robinson

and began setting up the center. By 15 January, when the center was activated,

departments were organized, buildings were allotted, and supplies were being requisitioned. About 50 percent of the initial officer cadre arrived on the day the center

was activated, along with complement of enlisted cadre sent by Camp Lee. Enlisted cadre from Camps Grant and Barkeley reported few days later. The first

contingent of trainees arrived on February 1942, and by 23 February, 5,508 men

were enrolled for training.

The first trainees were housed in tents and shifted to hutments as rapidly as

they could be constructed. By 15 August 1942, the transition had been completed.

steady stream of supplies and equipment flowed into the center, allowing training to proceed without interruption. Aside from needing more vehicles to perform

routine administrative duties, such as drawing rations and distributing supplies,

the center did not report any major problems.

Between February 1942 and October 1943, seven training cycles were completed at Camp Robinson. The center reached its peak capacity on 23 July 1942

when it was authorized to enroll approximately 7,000 trainees per cycle. During

the following year, enrollment ranged between 5,000 and 7,000. On 24 June 1943, the center was notified that it was to be phased out of the program. On 14 October

1943, after the last battalion graduated, the Medical Replacement Training Center

at Camp Robinson was officially deactivated. 26

Camp Ellis

On February 1943, Camp Ellis was activated and designated as an ASF unit

training center. Initially, the post served as center for training units of the Quar- termaster Corps, the Corps of Engineers, the Signal Corps, and the Medical Department. After the preactivation system was established, Camp Ellis also served

briefly as replacement training center. Under the new program, medical trainees assigned to Ellis were assigned to the 30th, 31st, and 32d Medical Training Regiments for weeks of basic military training under ASF programs at facilities controlled by the post commander. After completing this phase, they were transferred

to the 28th and 29th Medical Training Regiments, activated on 23 June 1944 under

26 (1) Annual Report, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., fiscal year 1942.

(2) Annual Report, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp JosephT. Robinson, Ark., fiscal year 1943.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 189

the control of the medical group, for technical and tactical training under Medical Department programs. On 10 November 1944, the 28th Medical Training Regiment was disbanded, followed on 16 December by the 29th. During this period, the

two units were each able to complete two 8-week training cycles, and total of

15,531 men were trained. 27

MOBILIZATION TRAINING PROGRAMS

From the beginning of limited mobilization to the end of World War II, nine major mobilization training programs governed the training of Medical Department enlisted men.28 As the war changed complexion and generated fresh requirements, the length, scope, and mission of basic training programs had to be adjusted

to strike new balance between objectives and resources, and incorporate the lessons of combat.

Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1 (9 September 1940)

When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, Medical Department basic

training was governed by program issued in 1935 for use by medical regiments

supporting infantry divisions. As the war in Europe intensified, the Medical Department began to prepare program for enlisted training, and on September

1940, MTP (Mobilization Training Program) No. 8-1 was published. 29 In contrast

to its predecessor, the program provided guidelines not only for training units but

also for training individuals who were destined to become fillers in newly activated units. This combination of unit and individual training was designed to meet

the requirements of an expanding army in which field medical units needed to support newly activated combat divisions, as well as training centers, would be receiving raw recruits and draftees.

Under MTP No. 8-1, enlisted men were to receive 13 weeks of basic training.

As in the plan of 1935, the training cycle was divided into two phases: The first,

period of basic military training; and the second, period of basic technical and

tactical training. After weeks of basic military training at the beginning of the

cycle, the trainee was expected to be able to display and care for his uniform and

equipment, to understand military courtesy, and to have acquired fundamental

knowledge of such basic military subjects as individual defense and march discipline.

The third to 13th weeks of the program were devoted to basic technical and

tactical training. Training in basic military subjects continued, but after the

second week of the cycle, the program stressed basic technical subjects that would

27 Annual History of Headquarters Medical Group for 1944, 1644thService Unit, Camp Ellis, 111. 28 (1) MobilizationTraining Program No. 8-1, Sept. 1940. (2) Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5, Aug.

1941. (3) Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5, 17 Nov. 1941. (4) MobilizationTraining Program No. 8-5, Jan.

1942.

29 This program superseded all similar programs distributed with cover letter, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief of

Staff of the Army, Aug. 1935, subject: Sixteen-Week Training Schedule Effective Upon Mobilization (Medical Regiment)
190 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 25.—Trainees set up and operate an aid station as part of their tactical training

at Camp Grant, 111.

prepare men either for specific duties or for further training at medical unit or

installation (fig. 25). During this period, men were also trained to march and execute

tactical movements, to establish and operate battalion or regimental dispensaries,

and to maneuver with the combat arms in the field.

At the same time, men selected to become common or administrative specialists were trained at schools established at center. The range of common specialists

to be trained was limited to clerks, mess sergeants, and cooks. The program was

vague as to the means by which common specialists would be trained and the

amount of training required. Commanders were simply notified that training requirement existed and were allowed high degree of autonomy in establishing procedures.

Individuals qualified to be trained as technicians ere selected at the end of

the fourth, eighth, and 12th week of the cycle and sent to Medical Department

special service schools or to enlisted technician schools for to 12 weeks of technical

training.

Since the first increments of trainees sent to Medical Replacement Training

Centers were earmarked for assignment to specific units, the centers organized

them in groups that could be provided with special training. Trainees being ordered

to numbered general hospitals, for example, were assigned to one battalion, and
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 191

Figure 26.—Class for clerk-typists at common specialists school, Camp Pickett, Va.

those being assigned to numbered station hospitals or evacuation hospitals were

assigned to still other battalions. Through this kind of grouping, battalion commanders were able to tailor the program to the trainee’s assignment.

Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5 (5 August 1941)

By mid-1941, the Medical Department was able to turn its attention from the

training of selectees earmarked for units activated under the limited mobilization

of September 1940 to the training of individual fillers and replacements. On

August 1941, the program issued in September 1940 was superseded by MTP No.

8-5, which focused exclusively on the training of individuals. The new program retained the 13-week cycle, and provided weeks of basic military training, weeks

of basic technical training, and weeks of basic tactical training. These periods remained essentially unchanged. There were slight variations in the number of hours

allotted to each subject but none of major significance.

In contrast to its predecessor, MTP No. 8-5 emphasized the training of common and administrative specialists. In addition to training clerks (fig. 26), cooks,

and mess sergeants, centers were authorized to provide courses for shipping and

497-333 75 14
192 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 27.—A class for motor mechanics at Camp Barkeley, Tex., in 1943.

receiving clerks, supply sergeants, bandsmen, truckmasters, mechanics (fig. 27),

truckdrivers, and motorcyclists. Common specialties were more clearly defined,

and training procedures for specialists were more precisely formulated. The program

also authorized the centers to provide special training for juniormedical and surgical

technicians (fig. 28). Such technicians were to be trained to fill an intermediate

level of specialization between basic medical soldiers and the graduates of enlisted

technicians schools. Soldiers trained through these programs were not considered

eligible for rating higher than fifth class.

Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5 (17 November 1941)

The accelerated pace of unit activation in the fall of 1941, after Congress voted

to extend the tours of men on active duty and continue selective service for an additional year, produced demand for basic soldiers and common specialists beyond

the capacity of existing training centers. This demand could be filled in one of two

ways: by expanding existing centers and activating new ones; or by shortening the
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 193

Figure 28.—Unrated surgical technicians view demonstration of operating room procedures with simulated patient during training conducted by the Medical Training Section,

Fort Lewis, Wash., in 1944.

training cycle. In November 1941, the Army adopted both techniques. On November, the third Medical Replacement Training Center was activated at Camp

Barkeley, and on 17 November, new mobilization training program was put into

effect which shortened the training cycle to 11 weeks. As in previous programs,

weeks were allotted for basic military training, and weeks for basic tactical training. The time devoted to technical training, however, was reduced from to

weeks. The reduction was achieved by decreasing the time devoted to each subject

in theprogram.

Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5 (2 January 1942)

The pace of unit activation was even further accelerated after the United States

entered World War II. To meet the demand for trained medical soldiers and common specialists, the fourth Medical Replacement Training Center was activated

at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, and the capacity of existing centers was expanded.

At the same time, the period of basic training for fillers and replacements was reduced to weeks. Under the 8-week training program, Medical Replacement Training Centers continued to provide recruits with weeks of basic military training,

but the technical training phase was shortened from to weeks, and the tactical
194 MEDICAL TRAINING

phase was reduced by week. Specifically, the program was shortened by decreasing the time devoted to subjects such as interior guard, drill, marches and bivouacs, physical conditioning, anatomy and physiology, field sanitation, medical aid, night

combat, and the technical and tactical employment of arms.

Mobilization Training Program No. 8-5 (1 August 1943)

Between January 1942 and August 1943, two additional programs governed

basic training at Medical Replacement Training Centers. 30 The first, issued on 15

November 1942, when the pace of unit activations was beginning to decline, returned the centers to an 11-week training cycle. The second, published on 12 May

1943, restored an additional week to the program.

While these changes were taking place, the Allied war effort moved from the

defensive to limited offensives in North Africa and the South Pacific, and combat

tests of the training provided Medical Department enlisted men produced changes

in organization and doctrine. On August 1943, when training requirements were

Figure 29.—Trainees negotiating the obstacle course at Camp Pickett, Va., under live machinegun fire.

so (1) MobilizationTraining Program No. 8-5, 15 Nov. 1942. (2) MobilizationTraining Program No.8-5, 12 May

1943.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 195

at an ebb, new training program was published that reflected both the reduced

demand for fillers and lessons learned in combat.

Under the new program, trainees ere provided with 17 eeks of basic training:

weeks of basic military training, followed by weeks of technical and tactical

training, and eeks of intensive field training. Experience in the theater was

reflected by the addition of subjects such as hand-to-hand combat, demolition,

boobytraps and mines, infiltration, village fighting, and knots and lashings. Commanders were urged to move trainees into the field whenever possible and to train

them under simulated combat conditions (fig. 29).

Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1 (1 June 1944)

On 15 April 1944, training centers under the jurisdiction of Army Service

Forces ere revamped to shift emphasis from training fillers for newly activated

units to providing replacements for units in the theater.31 Before this revision, ASF

medical units were activated wherever adequate housing and training facilities

were available. While units were supposed to be assigned fillers who were graduates

of replacement training centers, they were frequently required to provide basic

training for few who were shipped directly from reception centers. This burden

grew heavier after October 1943, when the capacity of the Medical Replacement

Training Centers was reduced to thepoint that only replacements could be trained.

By this time, Camps Pickett and Robinson had been deactivated, and the flow of

trainees through Camps Barkeley and Grant as reduced to prescribed number

of replacements. Medical Replacement Training Centers could no longer serve as

“feeder belts” providing trained enlisted men to newly activated units, and units

were required to assume almost the entire burden of conducting basic military and

technical training.

In April 1944, the Army Service Forces attempted to eliminate this problem

by transforming Medical Replacement Training Centers intoASF Training Centers.

Under their new designation, training centers were to act as “collecting points” for

the training of all medical personnel and units and as “pools” providing units with

trained enlisted men.

The men assigned to the center for basic training were to include the following;

Selectees from reception centers, surplus personnel from service command or Zone

of Interior installations, surplus personnel from table-of-organization units and deactivated units, designated personnel from the Army Specialized Training Program,

men from War Department reassignment centers who required retraining, and unassigned personnel from ASF schools and general hospitals. ASF Training Centers,

in turn, were to train these men for assignment as loss replacements, rotational

replacements, cadre, and fillers for ASF table-of-organization units and Zone of Interior installations. Centers ere required to keep 95 percent of their trainees

available for assignment as replacements. Whenever the number available fell be

low 95 percent of the input allotment, enlisted men being trained for other purposes

had to be reassigned.

31 Army Service Forces Circular No. 104, 15 Apr. 1944.
196 MEDICAL TRAINING

On May 1944, the Army Service Forces issued MTP No. 21-3 which governed

the training of all male enlisted personnel under its jurisdiction. The ASF program

continued the 17-week cycle established by MTP No. 8-1 on August 1943:

weeks of basic military training, followed by weeks of basic tactical and technical

instruction, and concluded by weeks of basic team training. For the first time,

however, the programs controlling basic military training, and the technical training

of nonmedical common specialists, were standardized throughout the Army Service

Forces. In sum, the Army Service Forces took over the responsibility for writing

training programs for common specialists such as mechanics, drivers, and cooks,

and the Medical Department was limited to writing programs for such medical

specialists as sanitary and veterinary technicians. The framework of documents

governing the system was completed when Medical Department program for the

training of units and medical common specialists was published on June 1944.32

Under the standardized basic program prescribed by Army Service Forces,

Medical Department enlisted men were required to participate in 96 hours of

training in the use of weapons, including the rifle, the carbine, the bayonet, and

grenades. 33 Field training was increasingly emphasized, and commanders were urged

to conduct as many night exercises as possible. During the last year of the war,

emphasis was placed on conditions likely to be encountered in the Pacific, and information from that theater was made available to all training centers, regardless

of whether it conformed to doctrine.34

After completing their basic military training, most enlisted men were required to participate in some form of technical training. The new system, however,

had greater flexibility than the one it replaced. Men who were disqualified for overseas assignment were given as much basic military and technical training as they

were capable of absorbing, and those who possessed usable occupational skills could

be assigned appropriate duties after their basic military training. Men selected for

training as enlisted technicians, who formerly would have been assigned to unit

or installation after graduating from Medical Department Enlisted Technicians

Schools, were returned to the training center and credited with completing the

technical phase of instruction. 35 At the end of this phase, all men were required to

complete weeks of unit or team training.

While the program at ASF Training Centers was established primarily to

train enlisted replacements, it was also used to guide the training of fillers and

cadre for Medical Department units being activated under ASF control. Men earmarked as fillers and cadre were separated from the basic training program at the

end of the 14th week of the cycle, along with men who had completed their training

for enlisted technicians schools, and assigned to units scheduled for activation at

the centers. When such units were activated, they were required to complete weeks

of field training comparable to the team training phase of the replacement program,

32 Mobilization TrainingProgram No. 8-1, June 1944. 33 Mobilization TrainingProgram No. 21-3, May 1944.

34 Memorandum, Lt. Col. Charles H. Moseley, MC, Deputy Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Grant, 111., 15 July 1944, subject; Information From the Field.

35 See footnote 33.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 197

and weeks of special unit training. Because of its special provisions for training

units, the program was commonly referred to as “preactivation training” or the

“preactivation system.”

As the war entered its final phases, the program at ASF Training Centers was

revised to provide even greater flexibility. Medical sections of ASF Training Centers

were receiving enlisted men from variety of sources, and constant adjustments

were necessary to provide each man with training suited to his needs. Enlisted men

sent to medical training centers from other arms or services, for example, usually

did not need to repeat the basic military phase of the program. By the same token,

many Medical Department technicians who were being sent overseas as loss replacements after long periods of service in the Zone of Interior needed only military

and team training. These were only minor problems, however, compared to those

encountered in the retraining of enlisted men who were returning from duty overseas. Frequently, such men had more experience than their instructors and were inclined to take dim view of anything that smacked of basic training.

On February 1945, the War Department took an important step toward increasing the flexibility of the system by urging commanders at all echelons to give

personal attention to the training and assignment of men who had returned from

the theaters. Commanders were reminded of their responsibility for evaluating the

background, experience, and physical and mental capacity of enlisted men before

committing them to program of training. In addition, the War Department made

it clear that soldiers with combat experience did not automatically have to satisfy

requirements written into programs for newly inducted trainees. Men who had been

returned to the Zone of Interior for redeployment were to be trained separately

from inexperienced replacements, so they would not feel that they were repeating

basic training.

Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1 (15 April 1945)

Special retraining programs for enlisted men were formally established by

revised basic military training program published by the Army Service Forces on

10 March 1945 and by Medical Department technical and team training program

issued on 15 April. 36 Under these procedures, ASF Training Centers were required

to screen the records of men sent for retraining and evaluate each individual’s

qualifications. Men who had completed mobilization training at an Army Service

Forces or AGF (Army Ground Forces) training center, or who had participated in

redeployment training within months before being transferred to the Army

Service Forces, were exempted from further basic military training. Men who could

not satisfy these qualifications, and those who had been trained at AAF (Army Air

Forces) training centers, were required to complete basic military refresher courses.

The qualifications of men from both groups were then evaluated to determine

whether they should be retained at the center for technical and team training, or

36 (1) MobilizationTraining ProgramNo. 8-1,15 Apr. 1945. (2) MobilizationTrainingProgram No. 21-4,10 Mar.

1945.
198 MEDICAL TRAINING

assigned directly to unit or Zone of Interior installation. The program for newly

inducted trainees remained unchanged.

The revised mobilization training programs also allowed the Medical Department to regain control over the training of all its common specialists. Courses for

these specialists, and all other enlisted men trained by the Medical Department,

were refocused to prepare trainees for service in the Pacific theater. Special training

was provided, for example, in the prevention and control of tropical diseases such

as malaria, dengue, filariasis, typhus, and plague. Periods were also set aside for

instruction in subjects such as the protection of equipment from moisture and fungus, stream crossing, and the identification of Japanese uniforms and equipment.

Emphasis on realism, field experience, and night training reached its wartime peak.

By the end of World War II, highly flexible and refined system had been

developed for training Medical Department enlisted men. Training cycles could be

lengthened or shortened to meet the demand of the moment, and course content

could be adjusted to meet the needs of the theater. Individual and unit training

had been linked together under the preactivation system, and many of theproblems

of unit activation had been minimized. Finally, working system was developed

for retraining men who were being rotated to and from the Zone of Interior.

TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR ARMY AIR FORCES

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Until the reorganization of the War Department in 1942, enlisted medical

personnel serving in the Army Air Corps received their basic training at Medical

Replacement Training Centers along with men scheduled for assignment to all

other components of the Army. Requisitions for personnel required by Army Air

Corps units and installations were submitted to the War Department, which allocated the output of centers on the basis of need. In November 1941, for example,

the Chief of Staff approved plan that required the Medical Department to provide the Army Air Corps with 11,282 white and 844 Negro medical soldiers by the

end of February 1942. Approximately two-thirds of these men were to be provided

by Medical Replacement Training Centers, and the balance were to be reassigned

from medical units. 37

During the reorganization of 1942, responsibility for training men assigned to

ASWAAF (Arms and Services With the Army Air Forces) was transferred to the

Air Forces. For several months after the reorganization, the War Department assigned arms and services personnel trained by the Army Service Forces to theArmy

Air Forces by redesignating replacements who were not needed in the theater as

fillers. Army Service Forces could not hope to fill AAF requirements through this

system, however, since the War Department refused to allow further expansion of

its already strained facilities, and the Air Forces would not allow trainees earmarked for Army Air Forces to be diverted through ASF centers. By August 1942,

Army Air Forces was reporting shortage of more than 97,000 ASWAAF fillers.

When the Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces, Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) George

37 Memorandum, Lt. Col. C. H. Karlstad, GSC, Chief, Mobilization Branch, for Chief, Operations Branch, 26

Nov. 1941, subject; Personnel for Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 199

Table 10.—Output of Medical Replacement Training Centers, 1942-45

Basically trained Medical Department enlisted men.

Of this number, approximately 58,718 were sent to Enlisted Technicians Schools, 4,534 to Army Specialized

Training Units, and others to Officer Candidate Schools just before, or soon after, completion of basic training.

Included in total figure immediately above.

Includes personnel trainedunder Army Service Forces Circular No. 104, 15 Apr. 1944.

Sources: (1) Annual Report, TrainingDivision, Office of The Surgeon General,fiscal year 1944. (2) Annual Report,

Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1945.

E. Stratemeyer, complained to War Department General Staff, G-3, on October

1942, that Army Service Forces had failed to provide Army Air Forces with an

adequate number of enlisted men, and demanded authority to establish AAF training programs for arms and services personnel, theDirector of Training, ASF, pointed

out that such training had been an Air Forces responsibility for more than months,

and agreed that Army Air Forces should, indeed, establish training programs. 38

For the remainder of the war, medical soldiers serving with the Army Air Forces

were provided with basic training centers under adaptations of technical training

programs designed by the Medical Department. The Surgeon General continued to

coordinate all training policies, plans, and activities within Army Service Forces,

Army Ground Forces, and Army Air Forces, and to train replacements and fillers

for Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces. 39

38 (1) Memorandum, Maj. Gen. George E.Stratemeyer, Chief of the Army Air Forces, for Chief ofStaff, Oct. 1942,

subject: Assumption of Responsibility for Training ASWAAF Personnel by AAF. (2) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. C. R.

Huebner, Director of Training, Services of Supply, forCommanding General, Army Air Forces, Oct. 1942, subject:

Assumption for Training ASWAAF by the AAF. 39 (1) Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1943. (2)

Memorandum, Maj. William A. Moore, MC, to Col. Wood S. Woolford, MC, Acting Air Surgeon, Dec. 1942, subject:

Training of Medical Department Enlisted Men. (3) Memorandum, Maj. William A. Moore, MC, to Col. Wood S.

Woolford, MC, Acting Air Surgeon, Dec. 1942, subject: Report of Conference on Training at Hq. T.T.C., Knollwood

Airport, Southern Pines, N.C. (4) Letter, Col. Wood S. Woolford, MC, Acting Air Surgeon, to Director of Individual

Training, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 11 Dec. 1942, subject: Basic Medical Training for Medical Department

Enlisted Men at Basic Training Centers of theAir Force Technical Training Command.

Trained personnel Fiscal year

1942 Fiscal year1943 Fiscal year

1944 Fiscal year1945 Total

Medical Replacement Training Centers:

Camps Lee and Pickett

Camp Grant

39,492

26,566

11,322

2,384

44,922

31,672

45,256

36,325

8,903

21,323

21,320

4,081

93,317

79,561

77,898

42,790

Camp Barkeley

Camp Robinson.

TotaL 79,764 158,175 55,627 293,566

Men shipped to Enlisted Technicians

Schools, discharged, and so forth

Total

(3) (21,259) 37,459 37,459

79,764 158,175 93,086 331,025

Common or occupational specialists

Preactivation, loss, rotational, and

others

14,615 41,957 14,588 9,368

40,482

80,528

40,482

Grand total 94,379 200,132 107,674 49,850 452,035
200 MEDICAL TRAINING

Chart 3.—Periods of training, Medical Replacement Training Centers, 1941-46

CAMP LEE

CAMP GRANT

CAMP BARKELEY

CAMP ROBINSON

CAMP PICKETT

CAMP ELLIS

FORT LEWIS

CAMP CROWDER

Source: Goodman, Samuel M.: Charts on Emergency Training Agencies and Courses. Volume X. [Official record.]

OUTPUT OF MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS

The rate at which the Medical Department was able to train fillers and replacements was governed by three major factors: (1) The supply of trainees provided by induction centers; (2) the combined capacity of the centers per cycle,

usually expressed in terms of housing; and (3) the length of the training cycle. In

the course of World War II, each of these factors had to be adjusted to enable the

Medical Department to meet War Department training quotas. For more than

year after the first training centers were established, for example, Medical Replacement Training Centers were unable to come to capacity training levels because

reception centers could not fill their quotas. The trainees who were shipped were

usually behind schedule, producing lag between cycles and idle capacity.40 It was

not until mid-1942 that training centers reported relatively constant flow of inductees from the reception centers.

The output of Medical Replacement Training Centers was most frequently

altered by adjustments in the length of the training cycle. Output per cycle could

be increased only by providing additional facilities, and construction could not

keep pace with demand. By shortening the training cycle, however, the War Department could increase the number of cycles in any given period.

The interaction of physical capacity and cycle length can be illustrated by

comparison of the Medical Department’s annual training capacity in mid-1942

40Annual Report, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Grant, 111., fiscal year 1941.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 201

Chart 4.—Length of training cycles, Medical Replacement Training Centers, 1940-46

WEEKS

TRAINING UNDER MTP 8-1 TRAINING UNDER MTP 8-5

SEPT AUG

17

NOV JAN

15

NOV

12

MAY AUG JUNE

15

APR

Source: Goodman, Samuel M.: The Training of Replacements, Fillers, and Cadres, 1939-1945. VolumeV. [Official

record.]

and mid-1943. On 30 June 1942, Medical Replacement Training Centers had

combined capacity for training 36,000 enlisted men every 10 weeks, or an annual

capacity for training 187,200.41 By June 1943, these centers were capable of training

more than 44,349 enlisted men per cycle. At this point, however, the length of the

cycle had been increased by weeks, and the annual capacity was reduced to

164,091.42 The reverse effect was produced whenever the cycle was shortened. The

annual output of training centers, the length of the training cycle, and the centers

in operation during World War II are illustrated in table 10 and charts and 4.

TRAINING PROCEDURES

Three parallel trends are evident in the development of procedures for training

Medical Department soldiers; ever greater “realism,” increased emphasis on the

principle of “learning by doing,” and continuous growth in the amount of time

devoted to field problems. These trends developed, in part, through changes in the

mobilization training programs, but they were shaped as well by developments at

the Medical Replacement Training Centers and the Office of The Surgeon General.

Field Training

Changes in the mobilization training programs guiding the training of enlisted

men provide an index to trends in Medical Department training procedures. The

first mobilization training programs did not set aside an unbroken period for field

exercises. Subjects included in the tactical phase of training were simply enumerated, and the individual training centers were allowed to determine how and where

the subjects would be taught.43

41 Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The SurgeonGeneral, fiscal year 1942. 42 See footnote 39 (1), p. 199. 43 See footnotes 28 (1) and (2), p. 189.
202 MEDICAL TRAINING

The concept of tactical training period “largely devoted to field and applicatory exercises” began to develop when Medical Department mobilization

training program issued in November 1941 set aside weeks for field training. 44

second stage in the development of the concept was produced by training program

published in August 1943, which merged tactical training with technical and logistical training, and lengthened the training cycle to 17 weeks by the addition of

3-week “field training period” at the end of basic training. During this period;

men were required to apply their newly acquired skills under “field and simulated

war conditions,” and the program directed that “where practicable and facilities

permit, the soldier should be moved into the field and should live under field conditions .”45

These concepts provided only limited guidance, however, and Medical Replacement Training Centers frequently pioneered the development of methods

that were later incorporated into the mobilization training programs. One of the first steps was taken at Camp Lee, where specially designed orientation program

dramatically presented the mission of the Medical Department to trainees few

days after their arrival. Unaware of their destination, trainees were marched under

cover of darkness to natural amphitheater in the woods, where they watched the

staging of mock battle in which aidmen moved forward to treat simulated casualties. Sound effects were provided by dynamite blasts and amplified recordings of

bombs, artillery, and small arms fire, and while the cast played its part, narrator

indoctrinated trainees in the combat mission of medical soldiers. 46 When Camp

Robinson adopted this technique, attacks by low flying aircrafts and chemical attacks with smoke and tear gas were added to the simulated battle conditions.

Camp Robinson also constructed an infiltration course before one was required

in medical programs, so that trainees could practice emergency treatment and

evacuation of casualties under enemy observation and fire.47

The emphasis on field training was carried still further at Camp Barkeley in

1942 and 1943, when each battalion was required to complete 5-day field exercise

at the end of the training cycle. During this period, the battalion marched to

maneuver area, set up field kitchens, slept in shelter tents, and functioned as regimental medical detachments, or as medical battalions responsible for operating aid

stations, collecting stations, and clearing stations. Simulated casualties of all types

were used to provide experience in diagnosis, treatment, and the transportation of

patients in the field. Emphasis was placed on the selection of sites; camouflage;

cover and concealment; individual security; defense against air, mechanized, chemical, and airborne attacks; the care and handling of equipment; and personal hygiene

and sanitation. During the course of the problem, trainees were rotated so that

each man assisted in the operation of each type of station. All trainees, whether

they were basic medical soldiers or common specialists such as motor mechanics,

chauffeurs, and cooks, were required to participate in the exercise. 48

44 See footnote 28 (3), p. 189.

46 MobilizationTraining Program No. 8-5, Aug. 1943 (Tentative).

46 (1) See footnote 8, p. 175. (2) Letter, Brig. Gen.W. R. Dear, Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Pickett, Va., to Col. Frank B. Wakeman, MC, Office of TheSurgeon General, 11 Nov. 1942. 47 See footnote 26 (2), p. 188.

48 Annual Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., fiscal year 1944.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 203

Wartime trends in technique reached their culmination on 15 April 1945, when

the final program of the war was published. The new program denied training centers any latitude in deciding whether the “field training period” would actually be

spent in the field, and eliminated escape clauses such as “where practicable and

facilities permit.” The last weeks of the 17-week cycle were set aside for “team

training,” and the program directed that “the trainees [would] be bivouacked in

the field during the weeks’ team training and [would not] be quartered in permanent camp except in emergency.”49 The program also required minimum of four

moves to new bivouac sites, with two being made at night. Instructors were urged

to make every aspect of the problem realistic, and surprise air, gas, and mechanized attacks were required. At least one of these attacks had to result in an emergency movement to an alternate bivouac area that had been mined and boobytrapped by an advance party.

Improvisation in the use of field expedients was particularly stressed. Trainees

were required to mess on emergency field rations for at least 48 hours, and dehydrated foods were prepared for other meals. During these periods, the unit was not

allowed to operate field mess. Maneuvers were not to be halted merely because

they interfered with scheduled meal. Trainees were expected to perform for long

periods under continuous pressure and to exert maximum effortfor short periods.

To produce these effects, master field problem encompassing the medical

support of an infantry division was incorporated into the training program. The

problem was designed for one training battalion and required maneuver area with

sufficient depth and frontage to permit the installation of medical units performing

first and second echelon evacuation. During the first of four phases of the problem,

one company of the training battalion acted as infantry, while second played the

part of medical detachments supporting infantry regiments. third company was

cast in the role of collecting company, and the fourth acted as clearing company.

Each training company was called upon to select sites, set up its equipment, and

function as it would in combat. At the end of each period, the companies were rotated, and the trainees changed jobs, so that every man would have an opportunity

to practice job in each unit. Specialists such as mechanics, truckdrivers, clerks,

and medical technicians performed the job for which they were being trained.

At the beginning of the problem, the unit received complete written field

order covering the first period of operation. Trainees were then marched from the

camp to bivouac areas under simulated combat conditions. Front and rear guards

were posted, and march discipline was enforced. The problem opened with an attack in which trainees became simulated casualties and were given emergency

medical treatment by other trainees acting as company aidmen. Treatment at this

echelon consisted of controlling hemorrhage, treating shock, applying improvised

or issued splints, bandaging, giving plasma, and preparing slings. Litter bearers

then evacuated casualties to the battalion aid station where they were checked and

given additional treatment. After treatment, records were initiated, and casualties

were sorted for further evacuation. Collecting company litter bearers evacuated

casualties to collecting station, where more elaborate treatment was provided,

49Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, 15 Apr. 1945.
204 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 30.—See legend on opposite page.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 205

Figure 30.—Trainees at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., learn to evacuate wounded men from

tanks by practicing on wooden models.

and the system of property exchange was put into operation. After being treated

at the collecting station, casualties were evacuated by ambulance to clearing station, where additional treatment was provided, and mock surgical operations were

performed. After additional records had been initiated and an emergency medical

tag had been filled out, the problem was terminated.

While the maneuver was in progress, instructors were required to provide

close supervision and make on-the-spot corrections of errors. Trainees were expected to handle casualties by approved techniques and to use field expedients

whenever patients had to be transported over difficult terrain. Commanders were

encouraged to add any difficulty they thought might be encountered in combat to

theprogram.

Training Aids

The use of training aids to provide vicarious experience grew apace with emphasis on “realism” and “learning by doing,” In the early years of the war, training

centers had to rely almost exclusively on their own resources. Higher authorities

usually confined themselves to preparing manuals and rationing supplies needed

for the program. Medicines and equipment were in such short supply that the pace

of training could often be maintained only by rotating them between battalions.

Training sets were few in number, and those that were issued to the centers frequently had to be adapted to uses for which they were not originally intended.
206 MEDICAL TRAINING

Under these conditions, centers had to devise their own training aids. Every

center contained carpentry shop and an art shop that could be turned to the task,

and these shops produced wide range of devices, some of which were later perfected and issued as standard training equipment. At Camp Lee, for example,

skilled enlisted men made plaster casts of the body, and painted them to show all

types of fractures and injuries. Cross-sectional models were similarly constructed

to show the location of muscles and organs. Store mannequins were used to depict

war scenes, and puppet shows were occasionally used to illustrate lessons in military

courtesy. At some centers, miniature battlefields were constructed to demonstrate

the deployment of medical installations in combat. Murals designed to impress the

medical soldier with the importance of his mission were painted in dayrooms, recreation buildings, and other areas where trainees gathered, and posters were used to

reinforce this indirect indoctrination. Terrain features such as streams and lakes

were employed not only to train men in methods of transporting the wounded over

water barriers but also to train them in the use of landing nets and in methods for

boarding and disembarking from transport vessels. 50 Mock hospital trains, tanks

(fig. 30), and C-47’s were also constructed at the centers to provide equipment for

training in the evacuation and transportation of the wounded.

In mid-1942, the Surgeon General’s Office began to take more active role in

the development of training aids. set of three-dimensional training aids and

rubber moulages designed by the Training Division were used extensively to orient

trainees to the wounds they would encounter in combat. The Training Division

also made large number of graphic materials available, including training films,

filmstrips, and still prints, and series of sketches on first aid. 51 When medical

supplies became available for training purposes, the Training Division recommended that first aid packets be distributed to enlisted men so that exercises in the

use of the packet could be incorporated into all basic training programs. By the end

of the war, the Surgeon General’s Office had also developed training set for use

in teaching the administration of blood plasma and simulated morphine Syrette.

By mid-1944, when the Medical Replacement Training Centers were integrated

into ASF Training Centers, the supply of training equipment had increased to the

point that units undergoing preactivation training could be provided with substantial portion of the equipment they would use in the theater of operations. Individuals and units were no longer trained to use equipment they saw only in diagrams. At each center, field hospital was permanently set up for use in demonstrations, and on two occasions, hospital trains were routed through the centers so they

could be examined by trainees.52 During the last year of the war, training aids were

available to supplement almost every phase of instruction.

CADRE AND STAFF TRAINING

Medical Replacement Training Centers were plagued by cadre problems

throughout World War II. Inadequate numbers, lack of training, the loss of quali60 See footnotes 8, p. 175; 16, p. 181; and 26 (2), p. 188.

61 See footnote 39 (1), p. 199.

62 See footnote 18 (2), p. 181.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 207

fied instructors to other units, and frequent expansion and contraction of the training program combined to create seemingly unending personnel problem. Prewar

plans provided little guidance. The Surgeon General’s Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939, for example, placed higher priority on assigning cadres to newly

activated units than to training centers, and then made the centers responsible for

cadre training. 53 With the onset of mobilization, the shortcomings of prewar planning came sharply into focus.

The pioneer centers established at Camps Lee and Grant early in 1941 ran

headlong into the problem of creating training staff. majority of the officers

sent to Camp Lee had attended monthlong refresher course at Carlisle Barracks,

Pa., before their arrival at the center, but their preparation proved inadequate to

qualify them either as instructors or as commanders of training'units. Few Regular

Army officers had either commanded units or trained green troops, and the preparation of most of the Reserve officers assigned to the center was limited to ROTC

(Reserve Officers’ Training Corps), correspondence courses, and an occasional

weeks at summer camp. 54

The first group of officers assigned to Camp Lee so unsettled Colonel Hawley,

the Director of Training, that days before the first shipment of trainees was due

to arrive, he fired off tart letter to the Training Division, Surgeon General’s Office, stating that “if the new officers have no more experience and training than the

ones just sent us, they will be utterly worthless for at least one month. The Surgeon

General’s Office could help little by getting this green material in as early as possible so that we can do something with it before the selectees arrive.” 55 The commanding general of Camp Grant, after encountering similar problems, stated flatly

that “without exception, company commanders were unqualified for their work.”

Both centers established special cadre schools to indoctrinate officers in the fundamentals of instruction and responsibilities of leadership. At Camp Grant, however,

weather closed in before the center opened, confining the school to indoor instruction.

If the Medical Department was hard pressed to furnish qualified training officers, it found it even more difficult to provide enlisted training cadre. War Department mobilization plans gave the formation of tactical units priority over the

training of selectees, and the few Medical Department enlisted men who had received military training before the war had been assigned to newly activated units.

Frequently, Medical Replacement Training Centers appeared to be taking the

leftovers. The enlisted men sent to Camps Lee and Grant as cadre were supposed

to have been trained, but they were described by the commanding general of Camp

Grant as “a conglomerate mass” and “pitiful group.”56 Both centers attempted

to train these men for their duties before opening, but at Camp Grant, weather

kept both officers and enlisted men indoors.

43 (1) The Surgeon General’sProtective MobilizationPlan, 15 Dec. 1939, with annexes. (2) Goodman, Samuel M.:

History of Medical Department Training, U.S. Army World War II. Volume I. Draft of Introductory Chapter. [Officialrecord.]

54 See footnote 15, p. 180.

44 See footnote (1), p. 173.

44 See footnote 15, p. 180.

497-333 75 15
208 MEDICAL TRAINING

During the first few months that the centers were in operation, War Department replacement policies made it difficult to eliminate useless and unfit enlisted

men from the cadre. Under the existing system, centers were required to submit

requisitions for personnel to The Adjutant General months in advance of their

assignment. While the system was adequate for long-range planning, it created

serious problems for agencies charged with training peacetime draftees during their

single year of service.

In mid-1941, the War Department began to reconsider its unit activation

policies. In July 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, informed the chiefs of the

arms and services that the establishment of cadre training camps and special service

schools was being considered and invited them to comment. 57

In reply, The Surgeon General strongly endorsed the establishment of cadre

training schools. The Medical Department’s experience indicated that only basic

medical soldiers and lower administrative specialists could be trained during 13-

week cycle. few men with technical skills acquired in civilian life might be qualified for the third and fourth grades of enlisted rank, but too few to meet cadre requirements. The capacity of the Medical Field Service School noncommissioned officers’ course was only 200 per year and obviously inadequate for mobilization. To

break this bottleneck, The Surgeon General recommended the establishment of

noncommissioned officers’ schools at replacement training centers. By careful selection and an additional to 10 weeks of training, he thought the Medical Department would be able to qualify at least part of the corporals and duty sergeants required in nontechnical positions.

Officers, The Surgeon General believed, should undergo similar training. During the first year of mobilization, the Medical Department had been able to qualify

commissioned cadres through refresher courses at the Medical Field Service School.

Once the pool of Reserve Corps and National Guard officers was exhausted, however, the Medical Department wouldhave to commission recent graduates of medical schools who had no previous military training. The basic course at the Medical

Field Service School would have to be extended to months, and the facilities of

the school expanded. These men could then be qualified for service in tactical units

and installations by month or two of service at replacement training centers. 58

While these schools were originally intended to prepare enlisted men to staff

newly activated units, they also became major source of training center cadre.

On 25 September 1941, after Selective Service and the terms of men already drafted

were extended for an additional year, the War Department exempted replacement

training centers from the restrictions of the standard replacement system and

authorized them to select men necessary to replace cadre losses from qualified

graduates of the center.

Long before this policy was announced, Medical Replacement Training Centers began using their graduates to replace cadre losses. Training centers adopted

67 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, G-3, for

The Surgeon General, 17 July 1941, subject: Training of Cadres for New Units at Replacement Training Centers. 68 Memorandum, The Surgeon General for the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, G-3, 26 July 1941, subject: Training of Cadres for New Units at Replacement Training Centers.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 209

this policy shortly after the beginning of the first training cycle, when it was dis- covered that trainees with ROTC and CMTC (Civilian Military Training Camp)

experience were often better prepared to conduct classes and act as squad and

section leaders than the Regular Army enlisted men assigned to serve as cadre.

Following the exchange of communications between The Surgeon General and the

Assistant Chief of Staff in July 1941, noncommissioned officers’ schools were established at both Medical Replacement Training Centers. Because special training

program had not been authorized, classes were held at night or between training

periods. measure of their effectiveness can be found in the experience of Camp

Grant, where, in the period immediately following the establishment of the schools,

approximately 20 percent of the cadre were graduates of the center. 59 By continuing

the process of replacing inefficient cadre members with graduates of the schools,

centers were able to develop highly competent staff. These schools continued to

be major source of cadre replacements until 15 March 1944 when they were replaced by leadership training courses.

Once Camps Lee and Grant had lifted themselves by their bootstraps, they were

able to supply cadre for the new centers that were being activated. In November

1941, for example, the two centers sent total of more than 560 officers and enlisted men to staff Camp Barkeley, and similar number were sent to Camp

Robinson when it was activated early in 1942.

For time, cadre schools provided an answer to the problem of securing

training staff. While quality improved, quantity remained problem, and during

periods of expansion, almost every replacement center reported shortage of cadre

and overhead personnel. Beginning in April 1943, however, struggle to provide

qualified cadre was renewed. This time, the problem resulted from War Department policy requiring Medical Replacement Training Centers to replace 80 percent of their enlisted cadre strength with limited service personnel. 60 Highly qualified enlisted men suitable for overseas duty had to be replaced at rate of not less

than percent month, and their replacements were not necessarily qualified as

instructors. Indeed, large proportion of the replacements sent to the centers were

limited not only physically but also mentally. At Camp Grant, for example, over

50 percent of the 451 limited service personnel sent as replacements were found to

have scored in the lower two classes on the Army General Classification Test. 61

Even limited service men who were mentally alert required extensive training

before they could be used as instructors. Camp Barkeley had to arrange with the

Eighth Service Command to transfer permanent general service personnel from

center and regimental headquarters to cadre positions and to replace them with

branch immaterial limited service personnel. Since most of these men were familiar

with Medical Department doctrines, it proved less difficult to train them as instructors. Unfortunately, only small number of such men were available. Early

in 1944, Camp Barkeley also obtained permission to conduct weeks of training

59 See footnote 15, p. 180.

60 (1) See footnotes 16, p. 181; and 23 (1), p. 186. (2) Letter, The Adjutant Generalto TheSurgeon General,? Apr.

1943, subject: Utilization of Limited Service Personnel.

61 See footnote 16, p. 181.
210 MEDICAL TRAINING

for limited service personnel sent as replacements. Those who proved acceptable

could be retained, and the remainder were to be returned to the Eighth Service

Command for reassignment. The course began on 13 March, but was discontinued

on 28 May, when it was concluded that the low quality of the men being sent to

the school made its continuation uneconomical. 62

War Department rotation policies also made it difficult to retain competent

training officers. By careful selection and supplementary training, centers had been

able to overcome initial difficulties and develop skilled officer cadre. Beginning

in mid-1943, however, an increasing number of experienced training officers were

sent overseas as replacements for officers scheduled for rotation, and training centers were required to train growing volume of returnees as instructors. 63

In July 1944, Army Service Forces directed schools and training centers to review the qualifications of all instructors and to revise their instructor training and

guidance programs to meet minimum ASF standards. 64 Standards outlined in the

directives were considered minimal, and commanders were urged to expand their

programs to meet local needs. As result, course length and content varied from

center to center. The shortest course established lasted weeks, and the longest

was month. Content was divided between military techniques of instruction, and

specific military subjects. Classes in military techniques of instruction included

topics such as training literature, lesson preparation, lecture preparation, demonstration methods, training films, filmstrips, and the preparation and use of sand

tables. Specific military subjects included map reading, first aid, military sanitation, malaria control, and other topics of military importance. 65 The purpose of

these programs was to qualify officers as instructors before they were assigned to

any particular unit. Almost all pool officers participated in the program, and those

who demonstrated their proficiency were retained as instructors. 66

In March 1944, Army Service Forces directed the establishment of troop

leadership schools for enlisted personnel at all ASF training centers and authorized

commanders to enroll percent of the strength of the center. Men attending these

schools were chosen from trainees who had completed basic training and demonstrated capacity for leadership and from enlisted men permanently assigned to

the cadre. The 9-week program at troop leadership schools was divided into two

phases. During the first phase, which lasted weeks, students received formal

instruction in teaching methods and in the duties of noncommissioned officers.

The second weeks of the program was devoted to the application of these principles. In this phase, students were assigned the rank of acting corporal and were

attached to companies undergoing their first weeks of basic training. By serving

as section leaders, students were given an opportunity to develop leadership qualities. After completing the course, men were either retained at the center as cadre

62 See footnote 24 (1), p. 186. 63 Annual Report, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Grant, 111., as of 15 October 1944. 64 (1) Army ServiceForces Circular No. 201,1 July 1944. (2) Army Service Forces Circular No. 220,14 July 1944.

66 Officer Instructor GuidanceProgram, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 26 July 1944. 66 See footnote 18 (1), p. 181.
MEDICAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS 211

replacements, assigned as cadre for newly activated units, or sent overseas as replacements. 67

By the end of World War II, the Medical Department had developed highly

flexible and refined system for training cadre, fillers, and replacements. Training

centers were no longer plagued by shortages of housing and equipment, and training aids were abundantly available. Cycles could be lengthened and shortened to

meet the demands of the moment, and content could be adapted to meet the needs

of the theater. By integrating lesson plans, training aids, and maneuvers, centers

were able to develop highly realistic training program for Medical Department

enlisted men. And by the same token, the training of draftees, returnees, and

rotational replacements had been combined, under the preactivation system, into

highly efficient mechanism for filling Medical Department units and installations

in the theater and in the Zone of Interior.

67 (1) Letter, Commanding General, Army Service Forces, to Commanding General, Sixth Service Command, 15

Mar. 1944, subject: Establishment of Leadership Training Course. (2) Letter, Commanding General, Army Service

Forces, to Commanding General, Sixth Service Command, 11 Apr. 1944, subject: Establishment of Leadership Training Course. (3) Memorandum, Col. R. G. Melin, GSC, to Colonel Sanford, Director, Military Training, 13 May 1944.

(4) Army Service Forces Circular No. 150, 20 May 1944.

CHAPTER VII

Enlisted Technicians

Medical activities at all echelons required the services of skilled technicians.

To keep pace with expansion, the flow of trainees was accelerated from bare

trickle in 1939 to nearly 6,000 graduates month at its peak in 1943. By the end

of the war, more than 120,000 men and women had been trained for specialized

positions in Army medical units.

PREWAR EXPANSION

The blueprint for accelerating the training of enlisted technicians was provided by The Surgeon General’s Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939. During the

first 30 days of mobilization, schools for enlisted technicians were to be established

at the Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., and at four general hospitals;

William Beaumont, El Paso, Tex., Fitzsimons, Denver, Colo., Letterman, San

Francisco, Calif., and Army and Navy, Hot Springs, Ark. Each was to be prepared

to initiate large-scale training in six enlisted specialties on 10 days’ notice. In addition to the laboratory, X-ray, dental, and pharmacy technicians courses that were

part of the peacetime program, training was to be expanded to include courses

for medical and surgical technicians who had previously been trained on-the-job.

All courses were to be of months’ duration, and new classes were to enroll monthly.

The combined enrollment ofall schools was to exceed 1,000 during the first month,

and in subsequent months, enrollment was to expand to meet the requirements of

troop units.

When The Surgeon General's Protective Mobilization Plan was published in

December 1939, installations charged with responsibility for training technicians

were directed to prepare their own mobilization plans. Training programs were not

included in the plan, and each school was required to prepare tentative course of

instruction. Program guidance was provided by Mobilization Training Program

Goodman, Samuel M.: History of Medical Department Training U.S. Army World War II. Volume IV: Report

on the Schooling of Enlisted Personnel, July 1939-30 June 1944. [Official record.] (2) Goodman, Samuel M.: History

of Medical Department Training U.S. Army World War II. Volume VI: Report of the Training of ASF-Type Medical

Department Units, July 1941-30 June 1945. [Official record.] (3) Goodman, Samuel M.: History of Medical Department Training U.S. Army World War II. Volume VII: The History of the Training of Medical Department Female

Personnel, July 1939-31 December 1944. [Official record.] (4) Stapleton, James B., and Chapele, Francis O.: Enlisted

Technicians. [Official record.]

(1) Johnson, JohnB.; The Medical DepartmentEnlisted Technicians Training Program, July 1944-1 July 1945.

Supplement to Goodman, Samuel M.: History of Medical Department Training U.S. Army World War II. Volume

IV. Report on the Schooling of Enlisted Personnel, July 1939-30 June 1944. [Official record.] (2) Goodman,

Samuel M.: History of Medical Department Training U.S. Army World War II. Volume IX. Medical Department

Training Activities, July 1945-2 September 1945. Supplement to Historical Monographs and Supplements Covering the Period July 1939-30 June 1945, table 3. [Official record.]

The Surgeon General’s Protective MobilizationPlan, 1939.
214 MEDICAL TRAINING

Table 11.—Capacity of Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools, July 1941

Total capacity during single, 3-month period. Not necessarily the sum of three individual classes because of

limits created by housing and facilities.

Source; Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941.

No. 8-1, dated September 1940, when the War Department published outlines

specifying the scope of instruction and text references for each course.

Plans for the establishment of enlisted technicians schools were put into effect late in 1940, when it became apparent that existing schools could not fill the

requirements of partially mobilized Army. During the fall and winter of 1940,

contracts were let for construction of the five schools specified in The Surgeon

General’s Protective Mobilization Plan, and an additional school at the Station

Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Tex. As provided by the plan, course for sanitary

technicians was scheduled at the Medical Field Service School. Construction of

the six new Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools began in the fall of

1941, and by April, all were in operation. The capacity of these schools in mid1941 is summarized in table 11.

WARTIME EXPANSION

The schools established in 1941 were built during the first of three phases of

school expansion. The second began immediately after American entry into the war,

when it became evident that ‘The June 1941 level of training facilities

would be grossly inadequate.” Construction began on schools at the following

general hospitals; Billings, Indianapolis, Ind.; O’Reilly, Springfield, Mo.; Lawson,

Atlanta, Ga.; and Fitzsimons, and by July 1942, they had enrolled their first

class of trainees. The four new Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools

were identical in size and capacity, each capable of training peakload of 1,000 students. At Fitzsimons General Hospital, the new school was combined with one

already in operation, bringing capacity to 1,847. By October 1942, the monthly

Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941.

Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1942.

Installation

Monthly quotas of enlisted students Peakload Laboratory

Dental Medical Pharmacy

Surgical VeterinaryX-ray Sanitary Total

100 100 100

25 25 55 25 55 30 35 250 625

10 50 10 15 10 100 250

William Beaumont General 15 25 100 20 100 25 15 300 750

Hospital.

15 25 125 20 100 15 300 750

Houston.

15 25 125 20 100 15 300 750

Letterman General Hospital 10 50 40 120 300

Total.. 86 115 505 103 410 55 96 100 1,470
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 215

Table 12.—Capacity of Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools, July 1942

Total capacity during single, 3-month period. Because of limits created by housing and facilities, it is not

necessarily the sum of three individual classes.

Source: Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1942.

output of technical schools had more than doubled. Training capacities resulting

from the second expansion are summarized in table 12.

Despite their increased capacity, Medical Department Enlisted Technicians

Schools were unable to meet the demand that developed late in 1942. In October

1942, Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces,

demanded control of the technical training of all personnel assigned to the Air

Forces except medical specialists, and requested that the Medical Department

train at least 2,000 specialists month for the AAF (Army Air Forces). Shortly

thereafter, the Medical Department was notified that it would be required to train

more than 34,000 technicians during 1943.

Training facilities for the third phase of expansion were provided by scheduling

instruction in two 8-hour shifts at five general hospitals: Billings, Fitzsimons,

Lawson, O’Reilly, and William Beaumont. Students were housed in training areas

vacated by theater-of-operations hospitals that had been shipped overseas. These

expedients swelled the capacity of Medical Department Enlisted Technicians

Schools by nearly 2,500 trainees month (tables 13 and 14).

In the months between December 1942 and September 1943, technical training reached its wartime peak; Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools

were filled to capacity, and courses at other installations expanded proportionally.

In December 1942, the Roentgenology Section of the Army Medical Center became

Memorandum, Brig. Gen. C. R. Huebner, Director of Training, Services of Supply, for The Surgeon General,

Nov. 1942, subject: Technical Training of Enlisted Personnel, Arms and Services With the Army Air Forces.

Memorandum, Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces, for the Chief of Staff,

Oct. 1942, subject: Assumption of Responsibility for Training ASWAAF Personnel by the AAF.

(1) See footnote 6. (2) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, for the Commanding General, Services of Supply, Nov. 1942, subject: Training of Medical Department Technicians for Duty With the Army Air

Forces.

Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1944.

Installation

Entering quotas first of each month

Peakload

of students Labora- tory

Dental MedicalPharmacy

Surgical Veterinary

X-ray Total

Army Medical Center 30 25 55 30 55 25 40 260 670 Army and Navy General Hospital.. 15 12 40 20 20 12 119 297 Fitzsimons General Hospital 67 75 295 22 257 67 783 1,847

Letterman General Hospital 65 50 140 300 William Beaumont General 20 20 125 20 125 25 15 350 800 Hospital.

Brooke General Hospital 20 20 145 20 125 25 355 770 Billings General Hospital. .. 50 50 125 125 50 400 1,000

50 50 125 125 50 400 1,000

Lawson General Hospital 50 50 125 125 50 400 1,000

Total 308 309 1,100 119 1,007 50 314 3,207
216 MEDICAL TRAINING

Table

13.

—Capacity

of

Medical

Department

Enlisted

Technicians

Schools,

July

1943

Monthly

average.

Source:

Annual

Report,

Training

Division,

Operations

Service,

Office

of

The

Surgeon

General, 1943.

Installation

Monthly

entering

quotas

Total

Veteri- nary (SSN 250)

X-ray (SSN 264)

Medical (SSN 409)

Dental (SSN 855)

Labor- atory (SSN 858)

Phar- macy (SSN 859)

Surgical(SSN 861)

Sanitary(SSN 196)

Meatand dairy

inspector (SSN 120)

Equipment maintenance technician (No

SSNassigned)

Ortho- pedic(SSN

366)

Enlisted technicians

schools:

10

62 60 245 160 162 351 232 68 122

10 25 40 100 20 185 106 12 100

10 25 20 100 20 81 100 100

27 60 375 310 143 436 382 63 377

119 195 720 735 360 1,210 880 157 799 85 100 420 14

25 25

15 65 15 137 60 100 85

20

100

Medical

Replacement Training

Centers

(Camps

Barkeley, Grant,

Pickett,

and

Robinson).

320

100

14

50

494

1,462

598

463

20

2,173

320

100

100

14

5,794
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 217

Table 14.—Annual capacity, Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools, 1942 and 1943

Does not include the capacity of schools opened on July 1942.

Source: Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiiscal year 1943.

the Army School of Roentgenology and was transferred to the University of Tennessee, Memphis, Tenn., where it harnessed the classrooms and laboratories of the

university for training officers and enlisted students. In addition, the training of

X-ray technicians at enlisted technicians schools continued unabated. Early in

1943, the number of general hospitals conducting the 3-month course for orthopedic

mechanics was increased from three to 12, and the capacity of the program was

expanded from 13 to 41 trainees per cycle. 10 Finally, in June 1943, training activities at the St. Louis Medical Supply Depot, St. Louis, Mo., were organized into

the Medical Supply Services School, and the capacity of the school for training enlisted technicians was expanded from 50 to 300. 11

Enrollment at Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools passed its

wartime peak in the summer of 1943, when schools were capable of enrolling almost

6,000 new students each month. By mid-1943, the rate of unit activations was

declining, and demand for enlisted technicians temporarily abated. On 19 July

1943, the Director of Training, ASF (Army Service Forces), instructed the Medical

Department to sharply curtail enrollments until the end of the year. Quotas were

reduced by 50 percent for the Army Air Forces, 25 percent for the AGF (Army

Ground Forces), and approximately 33 percent for all other components and commands. The total number of trainees enrolled from components other than the

Army Air and the Army Ground Forces between August and 31 December 1943

was not to exceed 9,343. 12

By the time this directive was issued, the Air Forces had withdrawn its trainees

10 Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1943.

11 History of the St. Louis Medical Depot, Dec. 1942 through Dec. 1943.

12 Memorandum, Commanding General, Army Service Forces, for The Surgeon General, 19 July 1943, subject

Specialists Schools. Inclosures thereto.

Course Annual capacity, 30 June 1942 Annual capacity, 30 June 1943

Veterinary technician (SSN 250) 600 600

X-ray technician (SSN 264)_. .. 1,368 5,928

Medical technician (SSN 409) 7,200 17,544

Dental technician (SSN 855) 1,308 7,176

Medical laboratory technician (SSN 858). 1,296 5,556

Pharmacy technician (SSN 859) ... 1,428 240

Surgical technician (SSN 861) .......... 6,084 26,076

Sanitary technician (SSN 196) 1,200 3,840

Meat and dairy inspector (SSN 120) 1,200

Equipment maintenance technician (No SSN assigned) 156 1,200

Orthopedic mechanic (SSN 366) 48 168

Total.. ...... ...

20,688 69,528
218 MEDICAL TRAINING

from the program. In November 1942, quotas demanded by the Army Air Forces

threatened to consume all but small fraction of the capacity of enlisted technicians schools. The Medical Department harnessed every available resource to

meet these demands, and by May 1943, it began to appear that AAF medical activities had reached their capacity to absorb technicians. On 24 May 1943, the

Medical Department notified the Air Surgeon that the Surgeon General’s Office

was being flooded by letters from disgruntled technicians in the Army Air Forces,

and informed him that 13

This office is interested in the assignment of graduates of our Enlisted Technicians Schools because of the highly adverse effect on the morale of Air Force trainees in the schools of letters

from recent graduates telling them not to take their work too seriously, that once they are assigned to an Air Force station they will be broken to private and never engage in the specialty

for which they were trained anyway.

On 22 June 1943, the Air Forces notified Army Service Forces that it no longer

required quotas at Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools; any further

training wouldbe assumed by the Army Air Forces. 14 Commanders of AAF medical

activities were informed that quotas at ASF schools were no longer available, and

they furnished specifications for on-the-job training programs. The capacity

of these programs was limited, however, and the results often disappointing.

Fortunately for AAF medical units, the Air Surgeon’s decision to withdraw

from the MDETS (Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School) program

did not produce serious shortage of technicians in the Air Forces. Indeed, the

Air Forces remained so heavily overstocked with technicians that, in September

1944, the Air Surgeon agreed to release approximately 1,100 enlisted technicians to

Army Service Forces in exchange for an equal number of limited-service personnel

with AGCT (Army General Classification Test) scores of 100 or better. 15 In October

1944, AAF medicalactivities were notified that it was again possible to send trainees

to schools under the control of Army Service Forces. 16

In the autumn of 1943, schools were able to abandon the double-shift plan and

return to normal scheduling. Training continued at reduced pace until April

1944, when an increasing need for loss replacements and spate of new unit activations under the preactivation program renewed the demand for trained technicians. 17

For short period, enrollment at the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians

13 Memorandum, Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, for the Commanding General, Army Air

Forces (attention: The Air Surgeon), 24 May 1943, subject: Misassignment of Graduates of Medical Department

Enlisted Technicians Schools. 14 2d Memorandum Indorsement, Brig. Gen. Robert W. Harper, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training Division,

to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Military Training Division, 22 June 1943, to Memorandum, Col.

F. B. Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director of Military Training,

Army Service Forces, June 1943, subject: Technical Training forEnlisted Personnel, Arms and ServicesWith the Army

Air Forces.

15 (1) Memorandum, Col. Floyd L. Wergeland, MC, Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

for Director, Military Personnel, Army Service Forces, Sept. 1944, subject: Medical Department Specialists for

Numbered ASF Medical Units. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

10 Sept. 1944, subject: Transfer of Medical Department Specialists to the Army Service Forces. 16 Letter, Col. O. K. Niess, MC, Director of Administration, Office of the Air Surgeon, to Commanding General,

Personnel Distribution Command, Atlantic City, N.J., 14 Oct. 1944, subject: Training of Enlisted Personnel in Army

Service Forces Medical Department Schools. 17 Army Service Forces Circular No. 104, 15 Apr. 1944.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 219

Schools was restored almost to its former levels. After June 1944, however, enrollment continually declined.

After the invasion of Europe, the demand for general servicemen in the combat

arms became so intense that few were available for technical training. In their

place, the Medical Department accepted an increasing number of women, and by

April 1945, more women than men were graduating from enlisted technicians

schools. 18

As the war neared an end, enrollments dwindled, and it became necessary to

close many schools altogether. In October 1944, the course for X-ray technicians

at the Army School of Roentgenology was discontinued. The Medical Department

Enlisted Technicians School at Letterman General Hospital closed on December

1944, followed by those at Billings and O’Reilly General Hospitals in March 1945.

The schools at Army and Navy General Hospital and the Army Medical Center

were discontinued few weeks later. The Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School at Lawson General Hospital officially closed on 15 July 1945. By

the end of the war, only the schools at Fitzsimons, William Beaumont, Brooke, and

Wakeman (located at Columbus, Ind.) General Hospitals remained in operation.

The numbers of enlisted technicians who graduated from Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools for the period June 1939-September 1945are as follows:19

Medical specialty Number

Medical 35,736

Surgical 43,587

Advanced medical and surgical 2,775

Dental 10,463

Laboratory 8,859

X-ray 8,537

Pharmacy 2,518

Veterinary 1,624

Total 114,099

Totals include both men and women.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ENLISTED TECHNICIANS

SCHOOLS

The organization and administration of Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools followed patterns established for Special Service Schools during

the interwar years. 20 Variations in size resulted in varying number of officers being

assigned to administrative duties, and position titles were adjusted to reflect the

degree of specialization. Variations in size and title, however, serve only to mask

the basic similarity of administrative organization.

18 See footnote 2(1), p. 213.

19 (1) See footnotes 1(1) and 2(2), p. 213. (2) Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The

Surgeon General, for fiscal year 1945.

20 (1) Army Regulations No. 350-105, Oct. 1938. (2) Army Regulations No. 350-110, Oct. 1936. (3) Army

Regulations No. 350-1000, 28 July 1933. (4) Army Regulations No. 350-1030, 28 June 1933.
220 MEDICAL TRAINING

Chart 5.—Typical organization of Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, 19J+4

COMMANDANT

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

SECRETARY

ADJUTANT

SPECIAL

SERVICES PERSONNEL SUPPLY MESS

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

DIRECTOR OF TECHNICAL TRAINING DIRECTOR OF MILITARY TRAINING

DENTAL

SECTION

LABORATORY

SECTION

MEDICAL

SECTION

SURGERY

SECTION

X-RAY

SECTION

COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY

Source: Annual Report, Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, Billings General Hospital, Fort

Benjamin Harrison, Ind., for fiscal year 1944.

Each school was under the direction of commandant, who in every instance

was the commanding officer of the installation to which the school was attached.

The title is misleading for, with the exception of establishing post policies affecting

the school, the post or hospital commander rarely took an active part in school

administration. Responsibility for the operation of the school was vested in the assistant commandant and, under his jurisdiction, in the executive officer, the director

of training, the battalion commander, and other administrative officers. The most

important division of responsibility within the staff was between the director of

training and the battalion commander or director of military training. The director

of training was responsible for academic phases of instruction. He supervised the

preparation of subject material, texts, training aids, and schedules. Under his

guidance, the directors of academic divisions prepared programs and supervised

training in theirrespective subjects. Typically, an academic division was created for

each technical program, so thatthe training division was divided into X-ray, dental,

laboratory, medical, surgical, and pharmacy sections. second major administrative division, under the battalion commander or the director of military training,

controlled students outside the classroom. Through student companies, this division was responsible for inspections, guidance, physical training, and discipline.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 221

Officers responsible for other administrative functions, such as the mess officer, the housing officer, and the supply officer, were controlled by either the executive officer or the adjutant (chart 5).

The physical facilities housing Medical Department Enlisted Technicians

Schools wore similar to their administrative organization. Schools in buildings

of prewar vintage, such as the Professional Service Schools at the Army Medical

Center and the Army School of Roentgenology, varied widely, but those housed in

new construction were much alike. Schools constructed in 1942at Billings, O’Reilly,

Fitzsimons, and Lawson General Hospitals were practically identical. Each was

constructed according to single master plan, consisting of from 11 to 16, 63-man

barracks (63-M), five 63-man barracks modified as classroom buildings, one 1,000-

man mess, one large recreation building (RB-1), six small recreation buildings

(RB-4), one officers’ quarters and mess (QM-40), storehouse (SH-7), and an infirmary (1-2). Buildings were usually heated by individual hot-air, forced-circulation furnaces, although few had steam heat or stoves. Academic buildings were

divided into classrooms according to plans approved by The Surgeon General, and

schools were permitted to make modifications to meet local requirements.

In most respects, school facilities proved adequate. The only complaint occurring repeatedly in annual reports centered on problems of heating and ventilation.

Schools in the South were almost unbearably hot during the summer, and those in

the North faced dual problems of winter cold and summer heat. The Medical DeTable 15.—Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools operated during World War II

Designated as school on June 1943.

Installation Date opened Date closed

Army Medical Center Apr. 1941 31 Mar. 1945

Army and Navy General Hospital Apr. 1941 11 Aug. 1944

William Beaumont General Hospital Apr. 1941 31 Dec. 1945

Fort Sam Houston (Brooke) Apr. 1941 Still in operation on 31 Dec. 1945

Fitzsimons General Hospital. Apr. 1941 Still in operation on 31 Dec. 1945

Letterman General Hospital Apr. 1941 Dec. 1944

Army School of Roentgenology, Memphis, Jan. 1943 15 Oct. 1944

Tenn.

Medical Supply Service School, St. Louis

Medical Depot. 16 Feb. 1942 Jan. 1946

Billings General Hospital July 1942 17 Mar. 1945

Lawson General Hospital July 1942 15 July 1945

O’Reilly General Hospital July 1942 17 Mar. 1945

Fitzsimons General Hospital July 1942 Still in operation on 31 Dec. 1945

Station Hospital, Fort Huachuca 18 Nov. 1943 23 Sept. 1944

School of Reconditioning Instructors,

Camp Grant and Fort Lewis. June 1944 29 Sept. 1945

Wakeman General Hospital 11 Aug. 1944 Still in operation on 31 Dec. 1945

Optical Course School, St. Louis Medical Depot. 13 Sept. 1943 23 Sept. 1944
222 MEDICAL TRAINING

partment Enlisted Technicians School at Lawson General Hospital, for example,

reported that:21

An unsuccessful attempt was made prior to construction of the school to have some type of

central heating or individual gas heating. Each building was equipped with individual hot air

coal furnaces, and the buildings have not been satisfactorily or efficiently heated during the winter

months. It is felt that this has interfered with the proper training of the students in classrooms

and laboratories. All classroom buildings are poorly ventilated and should be equipped with

ventilating fans such as have been recently obtained for the dental and laboratory buildings.

Schools frequently complained of poorly lighted classrooms and of the inconvenience of conducting classes in converted, temporary barracks.

Between 1940 and the end of the war, formal training of Medical Department

enlisted technicians was conducted at 16 schools or installations (table 15).

PROGRAM GUIDES

All but one of the enlisted technicians schools activated in 1941 were under

the direct control of The Surgeon General. Although not designated as Special

Service Schools, they bore the same administrative relationship to The Surgeon

General by virtue of being established at named general hospitals exempt from

corps area control.22 The schools opened on July 1942, at Billings, O’Reilly, and

Lawson General Hospitals, were similarly under the control of The Surgeon General. The sole exception was the school activated at the Station Hospital, Fort Sam

Houston. Not being located at an exempted station, the school fell under the jurisdiction of the VIII Corps Area, and all communications between The Surgeon

General and the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School at Fort Sam

Houston were channeled through the VIII Corps.

The reorganization of Army Service Forces in August 1942 altered the administrative relationship between The Surgeon General and the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools. Service Commands replaced the older Corps

Areas, and were placed under the control of Army Service Forces. When named

general hospitals lost their exempted status and were placed under Service Command control, the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools also fell

under their jurisdiction. The only exceptions were schools at the Army Medical

Center and the St. Louis Medical Depot—installations which retained their exempted status. 23

The reorganization of August 1942 did not materially affect the influence of

The Surgeon General over training programs and doctrine. These functions, as

well as assignment and relief of instructors, were assumed by the Commanding

General, ASF, and in turn delegated to the chiefs of the technical services. Although

removed from direct command, The Surgeon General remained in control of doctrine and programs at Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools throughout World War II.

21 Annual Report, Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga.,

fiscal year 1943. 22 Army Regulations No. 170-10, 10 Oct. 1939. 23 Army Regulations No. 170-10, 10 Aug. 1942.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 223

497-333 75 16

The channels through which control was exercised were altered several times

during the war. Before mobilization, draft outlines for technical courses were developed by the Professional Service Schools at the Army Medical Center and submitted to the Office of The Surgeon General for review. After being approved, they

were forwarded to The Adjutant General for War Department review. Responsibility for drafting course outlines shifted, however, when the Medical Department

began to gear its training program for mobilization. In August 1940, the Office of

The Surgeon General completed the draft of general program guide which was approved and published by the War Department on September 1940 as Mobiliza- tion Training Program No. 8-1. section of this publication established the training qualifications for Medical Department technicians, and outlined the major

subjects to be included in technical courses. In November 1940, the Office of The

Surgeon General issued circular letter which outlined courses in greater detail.

Together, these programs governed training at Medical Department Enlisted

Technicians Schools until August 1943.24

Since neither publication provided guidance beyond listing subjects required

in each course and allotting time to major blocks of material, schools were responsible for developing their own schedules of instruction. As result, courses devoted

to specific subject varied significantly from school to school. In 1942, for example,

the number of hours scheduled for hematology in the Laboratory Technicians

Course varied from as few as 16 to as many as 80. The time devoted to anatomy

in theX-ray Technicians Course varied from 15 hours to 60, while in the Pharmacy

Technicians Course, 68 hours were scheduled in prescriptions at one school, and

180 hours at another.

In April 1943, the Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, began

study of course content at the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools

that revealed wide variations in emphasis within courses. That summer, the Training Division developed program guide designed to insure standardization.25 The

guide was approved by the next highest echelon, and published on 29 August 1943,

as an ASF (Army Service Forces) memorandum.26 This program guide controlled

training for male enlisted technicians through the remainder of the war. The program guide for female technicians was developed at the Army and Navy General

Hospital. 27 While these guides reduced the amount of variation between courses,

neither eliminated it entirely.

In developing courses, schools reduced lectures and emphasized “learning by

doing.” Following an introductory lecture, almost every school devoted the bulk

of classroom time to on-the-job training. The school at the Army and Navy General

Hospital reported in mid-1943 that “some months ago we requested all instructors

to limit their straight lectures to twenty-five minutes, devoting the remainder of

24 (1) Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, Sept. 1940. (2) Circular Letter No. 79, Office of The Surgeon

General, Nov. 1940, subject: Training of Medical Department Personnel.

26 Memorandum, Col. R. W. Bliss, MC, for Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, Aug. 1943,

subject: Training Program for Medical Department Technicians.

26 Army Service Forces Memorandum No. S350-44-43, 29 Aug. 1943.

27 Memorandum, Maj. JohnW. Graves, MC, Assistant to Chief, School Branch, Training Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, for the Commandant, Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, Army and Navy General

Hospital, Hot Springs, Ark., Nov. 1943, subject: Training Programs for Medical Department Technicians (WAC).
224 MEDICAL TRAINING

the hour to oral quiz and review.”28 Similarly, the school at William Beaumont

General Hospital reported that demonstrations were included in almost all lectures. The Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School at Lawson General

Hospital reported that “students are taught laboratory procedures by lectures,

demonstration, and by actually performing over and over again the various procedures. Performance of the procedures, under close supervision, is the most important part of their training.”29 After month of formal course work, student

laboratory technicians spent major portion of their time in training laboratories,

where, under close supervision, they practiced procedures they would later perform

independently. In courses for medical and surgical technicians, the latter part of

training was devoted to practice in modelhospital wards. In every course, emphasis

was practical, rather than theoretical. The guiding principle was to teach technician to perform duty, without necessarily understanding why it was done in

given way. The short period of time allowed for training permitted no other approach.

Until August 1943, courses for medical, surgical, dental, X-ray, and laboratory technicians were divided into two major phases. The first phase was conducted

in the school and included both formal and applied training. The second phase consisted of on-the-job training at the hospitals to which the schools were attached.

At Fort Sam Houston, for example, student laboratory, dental, and X-ray technicians spent months in the school, and third month at the VIII Corps Area

Laboratory, the Central Dental Laboratory, or the Station Hospital X-ray Clinic.

Medical and surgical technicians spent the last part of their training working in

hospital wards. 30

Under the training program published by Army Service Forces in August 1943, the length of the laboratory and X-ray courses was increased from to months,

and of the medical and surgical courses from to months. Most schools used the

added month to increase the proportion of time devoted to practical training; time

spent in on-the-job training at hospitals remained unchanged. The Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School at Fitzsimons General Hospital, for example, increased the period of formal training for surgical and medical technicians

by days, and the period spent in model wards by 10 days.31 At Billings General

Hospital, extra hours in the same courses were used, in part, to add week of field

training, so that students could practice operating aid stations and evacuating

patients under adverse conditions.32

The amount of field training varied both between schools and between courses.

The Equipment Maintenance and Repair Course was marked by total absence

of field training, while more than one-third of the instruction scheduled for the

28 Annual Report, Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, Army and Navy General Hospital, Hot

Springs, Ark., fiscal year 1943. 29 See footnote 21, p. 222. 30 Annual Report, Enlisted TechniciansService School, Medical Department StationHospital, Fort Sam Houston,

Tex., fiscal year 1942.

31 Annual Report, Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, Fitzsimons GeneralHospital, Denver, Colo.,

fiscal year 1944. 32 Annual Report, Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, Billings General Hospital, Indianapolis,

Ind., fiscal year 1944.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 225

Sanitary Technicians Course was conducted out-of-doors under field conditions.

Most technical courses, however, fell between these extremes. survey conducted

early in 1945 indicated that two Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools

conducted very little field training, primarily because facilities were not available.

Five schools reported that student medical and surgical technicians participated

in field exercises stressing the operation of battalion aid stations, emergency medical

treatment, and the loading and unloading of ambulances. 33 More field training was

included in the medical, surgical, and X-ray courses than in any of the others.

Some courses, such as pharmacy, did not lend themselves to out-of-doors training,

while others, such as the course for laboratory technicians, developed skills that

were easily transposed to the field.

In addition to course-oriented field training, students at Medical Department

Enlisted Technicians Schools were required by War Department and Medical Department directives to participate in “Concurrent Basic Military Training.” The

bulk of this training was designed to keep trainees in state of physical fitness and

torefresh their knowledge of subjects such as dismounted drill. few subjects, such

as sanitation, were also applicable in the field. In August 1943, the amount of time

devoted to concurrent basic military training was standardized at 72 hours for 3-

month courses, and 108 hours for 4-month courses. Each student was required to

attend from to hours of field sanitation, emergency medical treatment, and individual security.

TECHNICAL TRAINING

Medical and Surgical Technicians

At most schools, the training of medical and surgical technicians was organized

as single program. Typically, trainees attended classes together during the first

month or two of the course and were separated only during the final, on-the-job

phase of instruction. At that point, medical technicians were assigned to medical

wards, and surgical technicians to surgical wards or the surgical service. Initially,

course length was set at months, but this length proved inadequate to provide

trainees with time to practice applying the knowledge they acquired in formal

classes. In August 1943, when the Medical Department reorganized technical

training, course length was extended to months. The additional time was used to

expand the scope of the course and to increase the amount of practical training

provided in the classroom. Throughout the war, trainees were provided with

month of on-the-job training in hospital wards. At first, this phase of the program

was conducted at the general hospital adjacent to the school, but in mid-1944, the

program was expanded to include “satellite” hospitals in the same geographic

area. 34

33 Goodman, Samuel M.: History of Medical Department Training U.S. Army World War II.Volume XI; Medical

Department Enlisted Technicians Schools Special Reports. Questionnaire Returns on History of Schools July 1939-

30 June 1944. [Official record.]

34 (1) Letter, Lt. Col. Charles H. Moseley, MC, Deputy Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

to Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, 24 June 1944, subject: Applicatory Training for Medical and

Surgical Technicians. (2) Memorandum, Col. Floyd L. Wergeland, MC, Director, Training Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, for Commandant, All Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools, 18 July 1944, subject:

Assignment of Medical and Surgical Technicians, and inclosures thereto.
226 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 31.—Utilizing mannikin which separates the organs of the body, Medical Corps

officer instructs medical technicians in anatomy at the Enlisted Technicians School, Brooke

General Hospital, San Antonio, Tex., in 1942.

After August 1943, the program for medical and surgical technicians consisted of 12 weeks of intensive training designed to prepare soldiers for service at all

types of medical units and installations. Lectures and demonstrations were most

common during the first month of classes, when trainees were introduced to the

fundamentals of their specialties. During this period, instruction focused on subjects such as anatomy and physiology, hygiene and disease prevention, ward procedure, ward management, and emergency medical treatment (fig. 31). Classes

were designed to prepare the student for practical training during the last months

of the program. Subjects were introduced through lectures and demonstrations,

but emphasis was placed on student participation and practical exercises in which

classes were broken down into small groups so that each student would be able to

practice procedures under an instructor’s supervision.

During the second month, training centered on first aid and emergency care

of all injuries and diseases common to wartime medicine. The topics studied included inflammation and infections, wounds and burns, gas casualties, and injuries

to various regions of the body. The last half of the month was devoted exclusively
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 227

Figure 32.—Surgical technicians in training at the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, Letterman General Hospital, San Francisco, Calif., view demonstration of

operating room techniques.

to surgical and ward techniques (fig. 32). The final month of the program was spent

working in hospital wards, learning the duties of ward attendant under the supervision of nurse. 35

Advanced Medical and Surgical Technicians

In August 1942, the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School began

to provide months of advanced training for selected individuals who had completed the surgical and medical technicians courses. 36 The purpose of the course

was twofold: to prepare male technicians to replace nurses in forward areas, and

to train graduates of the basic courses who had been selected to remain at the

35 See footnote 26, p. 223. 36 See footnote 9, p. 215.
228 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 33.—Dental technicians study full dentures under close supervision of two Dental

Corps officers. Such applicatory classes were part of the training of dental technicians in the

Enlisted Technicians Schools of the Medical Department.

schools as instructors. few lectures were included in the program, but the bulk

of the training was conducted in hospitals, where trainees could understudy nurses

on duty in the wards. 37 While the program was in operation, courses were established

at all Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools except those at Wakeman

and the Army and Navy General Hospitals. Training was temporarily halted in

May 1944, but resumed in July to provide additional instructors for Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools. Despite the program’s apparent success,

37 Final Report, Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, O’Reilly General Hospital, Springfield, Mo.,

July 1944 to 15 March 1945.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 229

Figure 34.—Class in dental hygiene and prophylaxis.

these highly trained technicians were never awarded an occupational specialty and

could not be recognized in tables of organization. In March 1945, the Medical Department was directed to discontinue the course because it was not designed to fill

table-of-organization vacancies and could not be justified by the troop basis. 38

Dental Technicians

The 12-week course for dental technicians was designed to prepare students

to serve either in dental laboratory as prosthetic technician or in dental clinic

as chair assistant. At most schools, the first weeks of the course were devoted to

the fundamentals and mechanics of dental laboratory procedures. Trainees in both

subspecialties attended classes in dental and oral anatomy, prosthetic materials

and metallurgy, tooth carving, full and partial dentures, and various aspects of

tooth repair. During the final month of the program, trainees were split into two

groups for on-the-job training. Those slated to become laboratory technicians

worked in laboratories and attended extra classes in dental prosthetics (fig. 33).

Those scheduled to become chair assistants received special training in roentgenology, dental records, dental hygiene, and chair assistance (fig. 34).39

38 Annual Report, School Branch, Part B. In Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of

The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1945.

39 Medical Department, United States Army. Dental Service in World War II. Washington: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1955.
230 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 35.—Practical training in the laboratory.

Laboratory Technicians

In April 1941, 3-month version of the prewar course for laboratory technicians was established at each of the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians

Schools. The purpose of the course was to train enlisted men to perform routine

laboratory tests at any type of medical unit. Their studies included bacteriology,

parasitology, serology, hematology, and some entomology. 40 Emphasis was always

on the practical exercise, and in August 1943, the course was lengthened to 16

weeks, to provide more time for practical training (fig. 35).

X-ray Technicians

In common with other technical courses, the program for X-ray technicians

was divided into two phases. For the first months, trainees attended lectures and

participated in practical exercises designed to translate theory into technical ability.

During this phase, their studies included anatomy, physics, fluoroscopy, radio40 Final Report, Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga., 22

June 1945.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 231

Figure 36.—Instruction in darkroom technique.

graphic materials, and darkroom techniques (fig. 36). By far, the largest single

block of their time was spent in practicing the use of X-ray equipment. Students

were trained to operate both the equipment common to fixed hospitals and the

special equipment, darkrooms, and generators used in field units. 41 During the

final month of training, students were assigned to the local general hospital for onthe-job training. At the Army School of Roentgenology, which was not attached to

general hospital, students worked in the X-ray clinics of two nearby civilian

hospitals. Toward the end of the war, they were also sent to Kennedy General

Hospital, on the outskirts of Memphis, Tenn., and to the X-ray department of the

U.S. Army General Dispensary in Memphis. When course length was extended

from to months in 1943, the additional time was used to bolster the school phase

of training.

Pharmacy Technicians

The Pharmacy Technicians Course was established in 1939 to improve the

quality of enlisted men assigned to pharmacies in Army hospitals. The program of

the new course included lectures and practical exercises in organic chemistry,

pharmaceutics, arithmetic, applied bacteriology, materia medica, toxicology, dispensing, drug identification, pharmacy administration, and Medical Department

See footnote 37, p. 228.
232 MEDICAL TRAINING

supply procedures. The course began on 15 September and the first class of 19 men

was graduated on 31 May 1940.42

In April 1941, when training began at the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools, 3-month course for pharmacy technicians was established at each

school. Class capacities were never large, and by 1943, the relatively large number

of pharmacists received by the Army through Selective Service had relieved the

shortage of technicians. In March 1943, courses were discontinued at the Army

Medical Center, and at Army and Navy, Letterman, and Brooke General Hospitals. Training continued on reduced scale at the Medical Department Enlisted

Technicians Schools at William Beaumont and Fitzsimons General Hospitals until

May 1945, when the wartime program was discontinued. In contrast with most

technical courses, the course for pharmacy technicians was conducted exclusively

at the schools. Only one school reported sending technicians to work at hospital,

and in that instance, on-the-job training was limited to single week. 43

Sanitary Technicians

The monthlong training program for sanitary technicians required by The

Surgeon General’s Protective Mobilization Plan was established at the Medical

Field Service School on September 1940, 44 and two classes graduated that fall.

third class was enrolled in April 1941, and classes continued to be held each month

until November 1941, when the course was discontinued. 45 Responsibility for

training sanitary technicians was then transferred to Medical Replacement Training Centers. 46

Medical Equipment Maintenance Technicians

The Medical Maintenance Technicians Course was established at the St.

Louis Medical Depot in January 1942, and the first class began the following month.

The directive establishing the program clearly outlined its scope and purpose. The

course was to be of months’ duration, and cover packing, unpacking, assembly,

installation, and care of X-ray equipment, sterilizers, and other expensive and

highly technical items of Medical Department supply and equipment. In the selection of students, careful consideration was to be given to their adaptability, intelligence, and mechanical ability. The minimum educational qualification was

high school diploma. It was suggested that an officer be appointed who could con42 (1) CircularLetter No. 39, Office of The Surgeon General, 14 Aug. 1939. (2) Letter, Col. George R. Callender,

MC, Director, Army Medical School, Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., to The Adjutant General (through

channels), June 1940, subject: Report of Enlisted Technicians Course in Pharmacy.

43 Annual Report, Medical DepartmentEnlisted Technicians School, Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston,

Tex., fiscal year 1943. 44 Letter, Brig. Gen. Robert Brooke, Commandant, Medical Field Service School, to The Adjutant General,

through The Surgeon General, Aug. 1940, subject: Programs.

48 4th Indorsement, Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to the Commanding General, Fort Bragg,

N.C., 22 Sept. 1942. 46 Letter, The Surgeon General to Commanding Generals, All Medical Replacement Training Centers, 19 May

1942, subject: Sanitary Technicians.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 233

tact the major suppliers of X-ray equipment and sterilizers and arrange for instruction from representatives of those concerns.

Almost without exception, the first instructors were provided by medical

equipment manufacturers. In most instances, instructors even furnished the tool

kits and instructional aids. By the end of the first year of operation, the course had

stabilized into 12-week program covering X-ray equipment, sterilizers, anesthesia apparatus, resuscitators, electronic equipment, and basic military training. The

course consisted of practical exercises and on-the-job training, interspersed with

minimum of informal conferences and lectures. Classes were kept as small as possible, and many practical exercises were conducted in the maintenance and repair

sections of the depot. Other exercises were conducted with nonserviceable equipment turned over to the school by the depot.

Veterinary Technicians

In common with other prewar courses, the length of the Veterinary Technicians Course was reduced to 12 weeks in August 1940. In April 1941, courses for

veterinary technicians were established at the Enlisted Technicians Schools at the

Army Medical Center (fig. 37) and at William Beaumont General Hospital. Training was confined to these two institutions throughout the war.

Figure 37.—A Veterinary Corps officer instructs class of veterinary technicians at the Army

Veterinary School, Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C.
234 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 38.—Technician practicing use of portable optical equipment.

The program in veterinary technology was designed to train enlisted men to

perform variety of duties. After courses were standardized in 1943, one-third

of the program was devoted to meat and dairy hygiene. The second third was devoted to animal management. The remaining time was spent on subjects such as

forage and grain inspection and administration. 47

Optical Technicians

The program for optical technicians was established on 13 September 1943.

The course was designed to train students who had civilian background in optical

work to prepare and dispense optical equipment in the field. During their weeks

at the St. Louis Medical Depot, trainees learned to operate mobile and portable

optical units, to fit lenses into both normal frames and gas masks, and to make

emergency repairs and alterations (fig. 38).48

47 Program of Instruction forVeterinary Techniciansat the Schoolfor Medical Department Technicians, 18 Mar.

1943. In Annual Report of Technical Activities, Medical Department Professional Service Schools, Army Medical

Center, Washington, D.C., fiscal year 1943, Section V: School of Medical Department Technicians. 48 Annual Report, Army Service Forces Medical Supply Service School, St. Louis Medical Depot, St. Louis, Mo.,

fiscal year 1944.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 235

Orthopedic Mechanics

In contrast with other enlisted technicians, orthopedic mechanics were trained

as apprentices. By understudying and assisting experienced craftsmen in orthopedic workshops, trainees learned to measure, fabricate, and fit belts, supports,

braces, splints, and shoes for orthopedic patients. 49 The first course began in September 1940, when two enlisted men were enrolledat Walter Reed General Hospital

for 12 months of on-the-job training. Their training was cut short after months,

however, and they were graduated in June 1940. During the next years, course

length was shortened to months; the program was expanded to include two more

general hospitals, but enrollment remained small. Between June 1941 and June

1943, only five mechanics graduated. Early in 1943, the demand for orthopedic

mechanics grew steadily, and the number of hospitals conducting courses was increased from three to 13 by 1944. The capacity of the program was increased from

13 trainees per cycle in 1943 to 45 by 1944, where it remained until the end of the

war.

Other Courses

The overwhelming majority of technicians trained during the war were graduates of the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, the Medical Supply

Service School, and the apprenticeship for orthopedic mechanics. In addition to

these programs, the Medical Department established courses to train small numbers of enlisted personnel in other specialties.

Typical of these courses was the 2-week Dental Equipment Course established at the Ritter Dental Manufacturing Co., Inc., Rochester, N.Y., in February

1942. The course was designed to train enlisted men to pack, unpack, install, and

service dental equipment used by Medical Department units and installations. The

first series of courses was conducted between February and 25 April 1942, and

the second series as held between July and 12 September the same year. total

of 264 enlisted men were graduated.

Throughout the war, course in blood plasma technique was conducted at the

Army Medical Center for selected graduates of the Laboratory Technicians Course

at the Center’s enlisted technicians school. Since the purpose of the program was to

train men to serve in plasma banks, instruction focused on the operation of blood

donor centers and plasma laboratories. Course length was set at weeks, and enrollment was irregular. Fewer than 50 technicians graduated during the war. 50

Beginning in June 1944, courses were established at the Army Medical Center,

and at DeWitt, Brooke, and Mason General Hospitals to train small groups of

enlisted technicians to operate and maintain electroencephalographs. The course

was offered until November 1945 when it was discontinued. Course length varied

between and 14 weeks.

49 See footnote 10, p. 217. 60 Medical Department, United States Army. Blood Program in World War II. Washington: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1964.
236 MEDICAL TRAINING

In mid-1944, the Medical Department began to train men to serve as instructors in physical reconditioning programs. The School for Physical Reconditioning

Instructors was established at the ASF Training Center, Camp Grant, 111., on

May 1944, with capacity for training 300 enlisted students every weeks, and

the first class enrolled at the beginning of June. The course was designed to familiarize students with the emotional and mental problems of convalescent soldiers,

to provide knowledge of games and recreational activities useful in rebuilding

physical vigor, and to develop the trainee’s leadership abilities. The program included subjects such as passive and active exercises, posture relaxation, gymnasium

activities, games, relays, tournaments, swimming, and similar activities, as well as

basic military subjects. When Camp Grant closed, the school was transferred to

the training center at Fort Lewis, Wash., where it was discontinued on 29 September 1945. 51 Between June 1944 and September 1945, 1,314 instructors had graduated from the program.

ENLISTED WOMEN

Despite being the last of the technical services to accept members of the Women’s Army Corps, the Medical Department became their single largest employer.

By the end of the war, some 20,000 Wacs (enlisted members of the Women’s Army

Corps), or more than one-fifth of the entire Corps, were employed by medical installations. As long as well-trained civilians and enlisted men were available, The

Surgeon General was reluctant to accept enlisted women. In the autumn of 1943, the Medical Department began accepting about 200 women month for training

as enlisted technicians. Early in 1944, when the Medical Department suffered the

loss of some 5,000 technicians to the Infantry, The Surgeon General asked for an

extensive program to recruit Wacs for the Medical Department. Within months,

more than 4,000 women had been recruited. From mid-1944 until the end of the war,

Wacs played an increasingly important role in Army medical service. 52

Since one of the purposes of the program was to recruit skilled women from

the civilian sector, many Wacs recruited for the Medical Department required no

further technical training. In addition to recruiting technically skilled women, recruiters were authorized to accept high school graduates with an AGCT score of

100 or better for training as technicians. The program proved so popular that

training facilities had to be continuously expanded.

The first Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School for members of

the Women’s Army Corps was established at the Army and Navy General Hospital

on September 1943, in facilities that had been used for years by the school for

male technicians. 53 Housing was remodeled to meet the standards of the Women’s

Army Corps, and, as far as possible, male instructors were replaced by qualified

61 Loughlin, Richard L.: The Medical History of the United States Army in World War II. Reconditioning. [Official

record.]

62 Treadwell, Mattie E.: The Women’s Army Corps. United States Army in World War II. Special Studies. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954. 63 Annual Report, Medical Department Enlisted TechniciansSchool (WAC), Army and Navy General Hospital,

Hot Springs, Ark., fiscal year 1944.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 237

Figure 39.—Laboratory procedures. (Top) Enlisted WAC technician receives supervised on-the-job training in laboratory procedures. (Bottom)

Dental Corps officer teaches WAC dental technician to make dental plates.
238 MEDICAL TRAINING

Table 16. Women’s Army Corps technicians trained in Medical Department Enlisted Technicians

Schools, July 1943-30 June 1944

Source: Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, fiscal year 1944.

members of the Women’s Army Corps. In January 1944, Negro enlisted women

began attending classes at school established for them at Fort Huachuca. Both

schools provided courses for medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, and medical laboratory technicians (fig. 39) as shown in table 16. With one exception, courses for

WAC (Women’s Army Corps) technicians were month shorter than those for

men because they omitted the final weeks of on-the-job training. 54 The programs

for male and female dental technicians were identical.

As recruiting intensified in the summer of 1944, the facilities of the Medical

Department Enlisted Technicians School at the Army and Navy General Hospital

became increasingly inadequate. Since the school could not be expanded at the

hospital, it was shifted to Wakeman General Hospital, where it was eventually expanded to capacity of 790. The first classes enrolled on 11 August 1944.

During the final year of the war, separate training programs for Wacs were

eliminated at Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools. In October 1944,

the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School at Fort Huachuca was discontinued, and the Army began training Negro women at the school at Wakeman

General Hospital. The following month, coeducational training began at the

schools at Fitzsimons and William Beaumont General Hospitals. In December,

month of on-the-job training was established for WAC medical and surgical technicians, making these programs identical with those for male technicians. Coeducational training was established at Brooke General Hospital in January 1945, and

at Lawson General Hospital in March.

By January 1945, the influx of WAC trainees had created shortage of WAC

housing at all enlisted technicians schools. Eventually, the Medical Department

was able to gain ASF authorization for special 16-week combined medical and

surgical technicians course at Northington and Foster General Hospitals, located

at Tuscaloosa, Ala., and Jackson, Miss., respectively. The new program provided

half day of formal instruction, and half day of on-the-job training. By July

1945, 105 technicians had been trained under the new program.

64 See footnote 9, p. 215.

Installation X-ray (SSN 264) Medical

(SSN 409) Dental(SSN 855) Laboratory(SSN 858) Surgical(SSN 861) Total

Army and Navy General

Hospital. 68 352 70 67 395 952

Station Hospital, Fort

Huachuca, Ariz. (Negro

only).

38 39 94

Total. 74 390 76 72 434 1,046
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 239

Women’s Army Corps Hospital Orderlies

The only Medical Department training program that met with failure was

the course for hospital orderlies. Women who enlisted for general service in the

Women’s Army Corps were not required to meet the same standards as those recruited for training as Medical Department Technicians, and by 1944, large

backlog of low-grade workers had accumulated in WAC training centers. At the

request of the Women’s Army Corps, an experimental program designed to train

such women to replace male hospital orderlies was established in August 1944 at

Nichols and Mayo General Hospitals, located at Louisville, Ky., and Galesburg,

111., respectively. During the next few months, 140 women were enrolled in the

8-week program. In October, however, an inspection revealed that such women

were incapable of performing heavy physical work and required so much supervision that they added to the nurses’ workloads. In November, the course was discontinued.

Women’s Army Corps Table-of-Organization Units for

General Hospitals

Beginning in September 1944, operations in Europe placed increasing strain

on Medical Department resources. Repeated transfers of enlisted men to the combat arms and mounting patient loads led the Surgeon General’s Office to ask for

8,500 enlisted personnel—men or women—who could be trained as technicians. In

addition, The Surgeon General asked for 5,000 civilian nurses’ aides and recommended that all the enlisted technicians be women. 55

At this juncture, the Director of the Women’s Army Corps, Col. Oveta C.

Hobby, sensed an opportunity to revive schemes for the establishment of WAC

table-of-organization units. Already disturbed by complaints that WAC technicians were being required to perform duties beneath their station, and reluctant

to recruit more women unless their status could be guaranteed, Colonel Hobby

took her case directly to Gen. George C. Marshall during the closing days of 1944.

As result of this conference, and second, concerning competition with civilian

nursing aides on January 1945, General Marshall directed the Medical Department to cease recruiting civilian nurses’ aides and to prepare tables of organization for Women’s Army Corps hospital companies.

The tables of organization drafted by representatives of the Surgeon General’s

Office and the Women’s Army Corps called for 100 enlisted women and one WAC

officer per hospital company. Nineteen women were to be trained as medical clerks,

and thebalance as medical and surgical technicians. Since all were to be technicians

or skilled clerks, the lowest rating was technician, fifth grade. Companies were to

be allotted to named general hospitals in proportion to the number of beds, and

hospitals desiring such companies could requisition them.

55 (1) Medical Department, United States Army. Personnel in World War II. Washington: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1963. (2) See footnote 52, p. 236.
240 MEDICAL TRAINING

The training of WAC hospital companies was conducted without major difficulties. The Third WAC Training Center at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., was turned

over to recruits, and the basic training program was condensed so that medical

training could be conducted at the same post. Since the directive establishing the

program required trainees to report to their hospital assignment not more than

12 weeks after reporting for basic training, the training period for medical technicians was shortened to weeks. The usual weeks of on-the-job training was

postponed until trainees reported to their duty station.

Instructors for the course were provided by the Fourth Service Command

upon recommendation by The Surgeon General. The nucleus of the training staff

came from the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School, Lawson General

Hospital, and the program was conducted under the command of Lt. Col. James

M. Dunn, MC, former assistant commandant of the school at Lawson General

Hospital. The staff of the medical and surgical section ultimately included 28

medical officers, three Medical Administrative Corps officers, 23 Army nurses, 32

enlisted men from Lawson General Hospital, and about 160 enlisted women. Most

of the enlisted women were graduates of the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School who had achieved grades of excellent or superior. Since many of the

staff had never been involved in teaching, Colonel Dunn required the entire staff

to attend an intensive instructor guidance course. The staff for the medical clerks’

course was created by sending WAC officer and several enlisted women to Camp

Barkeley, Tex., for conferences with instructors in the medical clerks’ course at

the basic training center. Women graduating from this course at Fort Oglethorpe

were placed on weeks’ probation at their duty station, instead ofreceiving weeks’

on-the-job training. By the end of the war, total of 120 WAC hospital companies

had been trained and attached to hospitals in the Zone of Interior (table 17).56

EDUCATIONAL TECHNIQUES AND PROBLEMS

Instructors for Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools were secured from variety of sources, and each school was responsible for developing its

own teaching staff. When the first Medical Department Enlisted Technicians

Schools were established in 1941, the commanding officers of the hospitals to which

the schools were attached became the commandants of the new schools. The assistant commandant, and, in some instances, other key officials, were selected by

The Surgeon General from among Regular Army and Reserve Corps officers. In

most instances, large proportion of the school’s initial staff was formed by transferring personnel from the hospital to which the school was attached. Instructors

for schools established after 1941 were usually selected from among newly commissioned officers. Occasionally, new schools were able to secure instructors from

schools already in operation, but such sources were the exception. 57 Instructors

56 See footnotes 19(2), p. 219; and 55(1), p. 239. 67 Annual Report, Medical DepartmentEnlisted Technicians School, O’Reilly General Hospital, Springfield, Mo.,

fiscal year 1943.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 241

Table

17.

Enlistedwomen trained

in

Medical

Department

Enlisted

Technicians

Schools,

July

1944

to

SO

June

1945

Source:

Annual

Report

of

the

Training

Division,

Operations

Service,

Office

of

The

Surgeon

General,

fiscal

year

1945.

Installation or

source

X-ray technician (SSN

264)

Medicaltechnician (SSN

409)

Dental technician (SSN

855)

Labora- torytechnician (SSN

858)

Surgicaltechnician (SSN

861)

Hospitalorderlies

Occupa-tionaltherapyassistants

Special combined

medical and

surgicaltechnicians course

Physical therapytechnicians Total

FitzsimonsGeneral

Hospital..

83 42

108 503 209 866 84 18

20 50

92 46

77 387 80 636 76 14

380 1,028 289 2,278 216 39 74 66 181 55 50 245

William

Beaumont

General

Hospital

__ Brooke

Hospital

Center__Wakeman

Hospital

Center

189

257 17

330 39

Army

and

Navy

General

Hospital

Fort

Huachuca Mayo

General

Hospital

74 66

Nichols

General

Hospital- ..__ Halloran

General

Hospital--

181

Northington

General

Hospital

.-.

55 50

Foster General

Hospital_. Physical

therapy

technicians-__

245

Total316

1,788

347

509

1,270

140

181

105

245

4,901
242 MEDICAL TRAINING

were sometimes ordered to another school for brief period of indoctrination and

training before assuming duties at new installation.

Although enlisted instructors were secured from variety of sources, the

initial cadre was usually selected from the adjacent hospital or another school. At

all schools, replacements for instructors were selected from among groups of unassigned graduates. This method of replacing instructors proved highly satisfactory,

for it allowed careful evaluation of the student before assignment and assured his

complete familiarity with the school and the course. Inexperienced staff members

were usually oriented by the school section to which they were assigned, and the

amount of orientation and training they received varied from school to school. New

instructors were usually required to become familiar with Army field manuals on

instruction as well as to observe experienced teachers in the classroom. As general

rule, inexperienced teachers were also required to study instructors guides and

lesson plans on file at the schools, to prepare practice lessson plans of their own,

and to deliver brief lectures before faculty committees.

During the last years of the war, the demand for experienced personnel in

the theaters made heavy inroads into school staffs, and instructor replacement became an acute problem. On occasion, schools reported having to replace more than

50 percent of their instructors in single month. To combat the loss of experienced

teachers, several schools established formal training programs for new instructors.

The Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School at Billings General Hospital,

for example, conducted wecklong course of lectures and demonstrations on training techniques, and the school at Lawson General Hospital conducted course that

varied in length from 13 to 39 hours. 58

SELECTION, QUALITY, AND DISPOSITION

OF TRAINEES

Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools received trainees from three

major sources: Medical Replacement Training Centers, fixed hospitals and numbered units under the control of Army Service Forces, and hospitals and units under

the control of the Air and Ground Forces. With two exceptions, trainees were required to have completed high school or an equivalent technical program. Those

who had completed weeks of basic military training and achieved an AGCT

score of more than 100 were qualified, even though they did not meet the educational requirements for training as sanitary technicians or veterinary technicians. 59

In theory, students were selected according to their adaptability, intelligence, and

previous educational attainments. In practice, many students were poorly or carelessly selected.

During the year preceding the establishment of enlisted technicians schools,

students enrolled in technical courses at the Army Medical Center experienced few

68 See footnote 33, p. 225. 69 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to The Surgeon General, Jan. 1942, subject: Selection of

Soldiers for Specialists Schools. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General to The Adjutant General [War Department], 16 Jan.

1942, subject: Selection of Soldiers for Specialists Schools.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 243

difficulties. Of the 188 students enrolled in the technical program, only 11 failed to

graduate. Schools established in 1941, however, frequently complained about the

presence of large numbers of unqualified trainees in their classes. In July 1941, only months after an enlisted technicians school was established at the Army

and Navy General Hospital, the commandant complained to the Director of Training, Office of The Surgeon General, that: 60

One of the worst troubles of the selectee school is the poor mental equipment of many of the

men sent in for instruction *. The schools would undoubtedly be much more efficient if

the officers making the selection of candidates could be induced to send only well educated men

of proper type and character. Some few men we receive are obviously drunks, derelicts, or undependable, and many others of insufficient mental education to be capable of absorbing advanced training.

The assistant commandant of the school was equally disturbed and expressed

concern over the time lost in attempting to bring poorly qualified men up to

minimum grade. Of the students enrolled in the school at the Army and Navy

General Hospital through July 1941, 27 percent had less than an eighth grade education, and officials reported that the situation did not improve during the next 10

months. 61 Reports from the Army Medical Center were equally critical; approximately one-third of the trainees assigned there were not educationally qualified,

and many complained that they had never been asked if they desired to become

technicians. In his annual report, the commandant observed that: “A certain proportion of these men assigned to the laboratory are incapable of getting beyond

scrubbing the floors.” 62

Beginning in May 1942, both schools reported an improvement in the quality

of students being sent for training. During the next 12 months, schools were generally satisfied with the quality of trainees. The only students identified as being

consistently below standard were those sent by the Army Air Forces between December 1942 and June 1943. The Army Medical Center complained that:63

As whole these men have been the poorest sent here, relatively ill-prepared, and in many

instances did not desire to take this type of instruction. The trainees in some instances were

mechanics with little or no interest in the medical specialties. They were therefore unsatisfactory

students and required considerable additional special instruction which interfered to some extent

with the instruction of the better qualified personnel.

During conference in January 1943 on the problems of training AAF personnel, the Director of Training, ASF, informed representatives of the Medical

Department that enlisted technicians schools were required to continue training

men sent by the Army Air Forces, even if they were regarded as untrainable. In

60 Letter, Col. Ralph H. Goldthwaite, MC, Commanding Officer, Army and Navy General Hospital, Hot Springs,

Ark., to Maj. Frank B. Wakeman, MC, Plans and Training Section, Office of The Surgeon General, July 1941.

61 (1) Letter, Lt. Col. Charles K. Holmes, MC, Assistant Commandant and Director of Training, Army and Navy

General Hospital, Hot Springs, Ark., to Commanding Officer, Army and Navy General Hospital, July 1941, subject:

Qualifications of July Class. (2) Annual Report, Army and Navy General Hospital, Medical Technicians School, fiscal

year 1942.

62 Annual Report of Technical Activities, Medical Department ProfessionalService Schools, Army Medical Center,

Washington, D.C., fiscal year 1942. SectionV: Annual Report of Technical Activities of the SchoolforMedical Department Technicians.

63 See footnotes 47, p. 234; and 61(2).
244 MEDICAL TRAINING

setting quotas, the Medical Department was allowed to include 10-percent attrition factor so that the least qualified 10th of the trainees received from the Air

Forces could be eliminated. The remaining 90 percent had to be either graduated

or permitted to finish the course without graduating. Schools were directed to retain AAF trainees despite scholastic failure and to require periods of supervised

study. Those who could not qualify as technicians were required to gain maximum

benefit from attending. Academic standards were protected by allowing schools

to refuse to certify those who could not qualify for graduation.64

The Medical Department had little choice but to accept the mass assignment

of low-caliber AAF trainees. As The Surgeon General’s Deputy Director of Training lamented to one center official: 65

This office is not unappreciative of the tremendousproblem and burden placed upon

training facilities in attempting to qualify personnel who were not basically fitted for the absorption of technical instruction. However, the rate of procurement of Air Force personnel and the

high ratio of technicians required necessitates rather small ratio of selection. For my own amusement determined the number of AirForce personnel being assigned monthly to medical service

with the Air Force. The problem involved is astounding when it is considered that approximately

one out of every four men assigned to medical service with the Air Force must be technician of

some kind. (You are probably familiar with Air Force T/O’s). The Air Corps does not

have adequate numbers from which to select technical personnel. This is why the Director of

Training, S.O.S., makes the unqualified statement that [the] job will be done despite handicaps

and imposition on schools, the presumption being that man who had completed eight weeks of

training in special service school is better man than when he entered the school even though

he was not successful in graduating.

When the Army Air Forces withdrew from the program in June 1943, its decision

was accepted without comment.

Variations in quality continued after June 1943, but without any apparent

pattern. After its conversion into training center for enlisted women, the school at

the Army and Navy General Hospital reported that women being sent for training

were generally highly qualified. 66 The school at Lawson General Hospital found

itself neither pleased nor vexed by the trainees itreceived, and reported that quality

tended to vary between classes. The Army Medical Center experienced increasing

difficulty with students sent from Medical Replacement Training Centers, enrolling one class in which five members had jail or guardhouse records. 67 Despite

minor variations, however, students enrolled during the last years of the war appear to have been better qualified than those who attended between 1941 and 1943.

By mid-1944, trainee quality had improved to the point that the rate of attrition

for all candidates between July 1941 and 30 June 1944 had been reduced to 8.5 percent.

64 Memorandum, Maj. Gen. John C. Magee, The Surgeon General, for the Commandant, Medical Department

Enlisted Technicians School, Army and Navy General Hospital, Hot Springs, Ark., 14 Jan. 1943, subject: Training

of Enlisted Technicians, Army Air Forces.

65 Letter, Lt. Col. D. J. Sheehan, MC, Deputy Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Col. Robert E. Peyton, MC, Director of Training, Services of Supply, Headquarters, Medical Replacement Training

Center, Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., 17 Feb. 1943. 65 See footnote 53, p. 236. 67 See footnote 33, p. 225.
ENLISTED TECHNICIANS 245

Other studies conducted by the Medical Department indicate that scholastic

deficiencies were the immediate cause for relieving approximately 70 percent of

the trainees who failed to graduate from enlisted technicians schools. Predictably,

there was strong correlation between the length of formal civilian education and

success in technical training. Trainees with education beyond high school were almost certain to graduate, while those with less than grammar school education seemed destined to fail. Each year of formal education beyond grammar school

significantly increased the trainee’s chances of success. Not all scholastic failures,

however, were attributable to civilian educational achievement; disinterest also

contributed to academic failure. Lack of interest was most frequently noticed in

trainees who had been transferred from other arms or services. The Army Air Forces,

in particular, seemed to have penchant for assigning men who had no interest in

becoming medical technicians. On occasion, authorities also noticed resistance to

training. Such resistance was noted during 1941 among draftees who were under

the impression that they wouldbe retained in the service if they excelled. The same

tendency was reported late in 1944 for substantially the same reasons. Disciplinary

dismissals, transfers, and recall for overseas movements accounted for those students who failed to complete the courses for nonacademic reasons.

Trainees were sent to Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools

from variety of units and installations under the control of the Army Air, Army

Ground, and Army Service Forces, but few remained permanently under the

control of the Medical Department. Trainees sent to enlisted technicians schools

by units and installations were returned to their parent organization whether they

failed or completed the course. 68

Unassigned trainees sent to schools from replacement training centers were

assigned to medical units and installations upon completion of their training. Until

April 1944, The Surgeon General had the authority to make recommendations on

the allocation of unassigned graduate technicians from all commands except the

Army Air Forces. Schools were required to submit reports on the availability of

unassigned technicians through the Office of The Surgeon General, which forwarded

them to The Adjutant General with recommendations for allocation. The Surgeon

General could recommend assignment to any medical activity in the Army, including those controlled by the Army Air Forces. Only unassigned personnel sent

to school by the Army Air Forces were exempt. Technicians were assigned according to The Surgeon General’s recommendations, unless they were required as

loss replacements. 69 Unassigned trainees from AAF training centers who successfully completed their technical training were returned to the Air Surgeon for allocation to AAF medical organization.

68 (1) Circular Letter No. 49, Office of The Surgeon General, July 1940, subject: Selection of Enlisted Men,

Medical Department, for Attendance at Special Service Schools. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department;

to Commanding Generals, All Armies, Corps Areas, and Medical Replacement Training Centers, Chiefs of Armored

Force and Army Air Force, 15 Jan. 1942, subject: Trainees Selected to Attend Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools.

69 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, to Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces and Services

of Supply, 27 May 1942, subject: Enlisted Men From Replacement Training Centers to Attend Special Service Schools,

and Their Assignment Upon Completion of Such Courses. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, to Arms and

Services (except Air Corps), 31 Dec. 1941, subject: Trainees Selected to Attend Special Service Schools.
246 MEDICAL TRAINING

When the system of preactivation training was established on 15 April 1944,

The Surgeon General was relieved of his responsibility for making direct recommendations on the allocation of unassigned trainees. 70 Under the preactivation

program, technicians who had been sent to school from replacement training centers

were returned to those centers for weeks of basic team training. After completing

team training, they were designated as fillers or replacements and assigned to appropriate units.

70 (1) War Department Memorandum No. W615-70-42, 17 Dec. 1942. (2) Army Service Forces Circular No. 104

15 Apr. 1944.
497-333 75 17

CHAPTER VIII

Medical Department Field Units

In the summer of 1939, the Medical Department had only five active field

organizations. Of these, four were at peace strength, and one was “skeletonized.” During the first year of the limited emergency, the field strength of the Medical

Department was modestly expanded, and by 30 June 1940, four medical battalions, medical regiment, and the medical detachments of four Regular Army

combat divisions were in training. All, including those activated early in 1940,

were designed to provide organic support for combat divisions.

The first nonorganic medical units were activated following the onset of limited

mobilization. By July 1941, The Surgeon General reported that 76 nondivisional

medical field units had been activated, including numbered general and station

hospitals, evacuation and surgical hospitals, medical supply depots and laboratories, numbered general dispensary, veterinary evacuation hospital, and veterinary general hospital. Many of these units, described as “professional” units

by The Surgeon General, were types that would later be trained by the Army Service Forces.

COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING MEDICAL DEPARTMENT UNITS

From the beginning of limited mobilization until the reorganization of March

1942, responsibility for training nondivisional medical units was vested in the offices of the field army surgeons through the field armies and General Headquarters.

In November 1940, for example, the 2d Medical Laboratory, Fort Sam Houston,

Tex., which was the only active nondivisional unit then in operation, was placed

under the control of the Third U.S. Army. month later, before any other nondivisional units were activated, the War Department directed that 60 nondivisional units whose activation was being planned be attached to the First, Second,

and Third U.S. Armies. This group included 20 station hospitals, 17 general hospitals, 12 evacuation hospitals, six surgical hospitals, medical laboratory, general dispensary, veterinary evacuation hospital, and two medical supply depots.

From the standpoint of training responsibility, such attachments were considered

equivalent to assignments. Corps Areas usually controlled the technical training

Unless otherwiseindicated, this chapter isbased on Goodman, Samuel M.:History of Medical DepartmentTrain

ing U.S. Army World War II. Volume VI: Report on the Training of ASF-Type MedicalDepartment Units, July

1941-30 June 1945. [Official record.]

Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington; U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1940.

Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1941.

See footnote 3.
248 MEDICAL TRAINING

of units when they were in garrison, but when the unit moved to the field, training

became an army responsibility. Responsibility for training divisional medical units

was vested in the division commander.

The Surgeon General participated in the training of medical units in his capacity as staff adviser to War Department General Staff, G-3, Operations and

Training, on matters related to medical service. The Office of The Surgeon General, for example, developed the tables of organization, the training programs, the

instructors’ guides, and the field and technical manuals used not only by nondivisional medical units but also by divisional units. Commanding officers of nondivisional units, such as general hospitals and evacuation hospitals, called upon

The Surgeon General for guidance, and he assumed responsibility for explaining to

them their relationship to the armies and for listing the training programs and

instructional materials available for training. Representatives of The Surgeon

General also conducted technical inspections of both divisional and nondivisional

units.

The Reorganization of 1942

The War Department reorganization of March 1942 altered both the system

of command responsibility for medical units and The Surgeon General’s relationship to their training. War Department Circular No. 59, dated March 1942,

which authorized the division of the Army into three separate commands, also provided general guidelines for the unit training responsibilities of each command.

Under the new system, AGF (Army Ground Forces) and AAF (Army Air Forces)

(1) Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to Commanding Generals of All Armies, Army Corps, Divisions, Corps Areas, and Departments; Commanding General, General Headquarters, Air Force; Chief of Staff, General Headquarters; Chiefs of Arms and Services; Chief of the Armored Force; Commanding Officers of Exempted Stations, 14 Jan. 1941, subject: Organization, Training, and Administration of Medical Units. (2) Letter, The Adjutant

General, War Department, to Chiefs of Arms and Services; Commanding Generals of All Armies, Army Corps, Divi- sions, Corps Areas, and Departments; Commanding Officers of Exempted Stations; and the Chief of Staff, General

Headquarters, Oct. 1940, subject: Organization, Training, and Administration of theArmy. (3) Medical Department,

United States Army. Organization and Administration in World War II. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1963.

Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to All Army Commanders; All Corps Area and Department

Commanders; All Chiefs of Arms and Services; Chief of the National Guard Bureau; Assistant Chiefs of Staff, War

Department General Staff; Commanding General, General Headquarters, Air Force; Commandants, General and

SpecialService Schools; and CommandingOfficers ofExempted Stations, 14 Mar. 1938, subject: The Protective Mobilization Plan. (The Initial Military Program.)

(1) Letter, The Adjutant General,War Department, to The Surgeon General, 10 Feb. 1939, subject: Tables of

Organization, and inclosure thereto. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to TheAdjutant General, U.S. Army,

14 Aug. 1940, subject: Medical Department MobilizationTrainingProgram 8-1. (3) Letter, Capt. T. J. Hartford, MC,

Assistant to Chief, Training Subdivision,Plans and Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Capt. J. F.

Morehead, MC, Headquarters, 28th Surgical Hospital, Fort George G. Meade, Md., Mar. 1941. (4) See footnote 4,

p. 247.

(1) Letter, Capt. T. J. Hartford, MC, Assistant to Chief, Training Subdivision, Plans and Training Division,

Office of The Surgeon General, to Capt. Jordan A. Kelling, MC, Surgeon, 148th GeneralHospital, Camp Shelby, Miss.,

21 Feb. 1941. (2) Letter, Capt. T. J. Hartford, MC, Assistant to Chief, Training Subdivision, Plans and Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Capt. Paul O. Wells, MC, Commanding Officer, 56th General Hospital, Fort

Jackson, S.C., Mar. 1941.

Letter, Lt. Col. G. C. Dunham, MC, Observer, to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 27 Aug. 1940, subject: Report of ObservationsMade During the ThirdU.S. Army Maneuvers, August 1940.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 249

were responsible for training their own combat units, and ASF (Army Service

Forces) was responsible for training the units necessary for its functioning. Responsibility for training nondivisional service units, however, was not clearly

delineated. 10 Each of the three major commands was charged with training units

assigned to it, but the ultimate use of service unit could not always be clearly

forecast, and many service units were common to all commands. In April 1942, and

again in May, Army Ground Forces requested clarification. 11

On 30 May 1942, theWar Department issued more specific statement on training responsibility, announcing that: “In general, the using command will train

unit.” 12 Through this policy, the Commanding General, AAF, became responsible

for training all Air Force units, including arms and services with the Army Air

Forces. The Commanding General, ASF, was responsible for training units organized to operate installations and activities controlled by him and those units

organized in the United States solely for Services of Supply installations and activities in overseas garrisons, bases, and theaters. The Commanding General, AGF,

was responsible for training all units not falling into one of the other categories.

By mutual agreement, the commanding generals of AGF, AAF, and ASF could

transfer responsibility for training certain units to each other. Such transfers were

encouraged when one command controlled the bulk of the training facilities available

for particular type of unit, or when training program -would create duplication of existing facilities. The War Department also directed that: “Facilities such

as exist at general and station hospitals and certain specialized replacement training centers and schools are required for the proper training of certain units and are

under control of the Commanding General, Services of Supply [ASF]. The Commanding General, Services of Supply [ASF], by arrangement with [the] Commanding General, Army Ground Forces or Army Air Forces, should take over the responsibility for unit training which requires the use of these facilities.” 13 While this

statement provided limited guidance, it still left doubt about the responsibility for

units, such as veterinary evacuation hospitals, field hospitals, and small surgical

teams, that might be used in either combat or communications zones, and, hence,

might be considered either AGF or ASF units. The responsibility for training AAF

units, however, was clearly defined.

In an effort to further define the responsibilities of the Army Service Forces and

the Army Ground Forces, the War Department asked each command, in June 1942,

10 (1) Millett, JohnD.: United States Army in World War II. TheArmy Service Forces. The Organization and Role

of the Army Service Forces. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1954. (2) Palmer, Robert R., Wiley, Bell I.,

and Keast, William R.: United States Army in World War II. The Army Ground Forces. The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948.

11 (1) Memorandum,Brig. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces, for Assistant Chief of Staff,

War Department General Staff, G-3, Apr. 1942, subject: Agency or Agencies to Activate Units. (2) Memorandum,

Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, G-3,

May 1942, subject: Responsibility for Training.

12 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. I. H. Edwards, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, G-3, Operations and Training for theCommanding General, Army Ground Forces; Commanding General, Army Air Forces; and

Commanding General, Services of Supply, 30 May 1942, subject: Responsibility forTraining.

13 See footnote 12.
250 MEDICAL TRAINING

to provide list of the units that it thought it should train. The lists submitted by

the two commands suggest that each desired to control the training of all units

except those which were clearly organic to the mission of the other. 14 The first list

delineating responsibilities for training specific units was issued by the War Department on 20 June 1942, but the compromise was not satisfactory to either headquarters.15 During the next several months, theselists were repeatedly altered in an

attempt to arrive at more satisfactory solution. In October 1942, the War Department expanded the responsibilities of the Army Ground Forces by authorizing

that command to prepare the tables of organization, equipment, and basic allowances for units that served ground elements.

By January 1943, the division of responsibility had reached state of relative

stability, and theArmy Ground Forces was responsible for training and writing the

tables of organization, equipment, and basic allowances for the following units:

Medical battalions, including those for such specialized divisions as the motorized,

armored, and mountain divisions; medical squadrons for cavalry divisions; medical

regiments; medical companies to serve the airborne divisions; ambulance battalions; animal-drawn companies; veterinary companies; evacuation hospitals, including the motorized type; and medical supply depots. The Army Service Forces

was responsible for training units including general, station, and convalescent

hospitals (human and veterinary); veterinary evacuation hospitals; field hospitals;

hospital centers; headquarters of Medical Department concentration centers;

general dispensaries; general laboratories and laboratories of the army or communications zone; surgical hospitals; sanitary companies; medical gas treatment

battalions; hospital trains; three types of units concerned with evacuation by sea

hospital ship platoons, hospital ship companies, and ambulance ship companies;

auxiliary surgical groups; detachments for museum and medical arts services; and

the medical sections for the headquarters of communications zone.

This division of responsibilities was by no means final. Many units were altered

in name, size, or organization, and some types were abolished or superseded by

units developed to meet special needs. Except for minor readjustments, however,

the allocation of responsibilities between the two commands for developing, activating, and training Medical Department units continued to rest upon the basis

of the zone of the overseas theater within which they were to be employed. The

Army Air Forces trained only few medical units designated to meet the special

needs of air troops—chiefly medical supply, an evacuation, and dispensary

unit.16

14 (1) Memorandum, Col. Walter L. Weible, GSC, Deputy Director of Training, Services of Supply, for The Surgeon General, June 1942, subject: Responsibility for Training.(2) Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, to Director of Training, Servicesof Supply, 10 June 1942, subject: Responsibility for Training. (3) Memorandum, Col. F. L. Parks, GSC, Deputy Chief of Staff, AG, forAssistant Chief of Staff,

War Department General Staff, G-3, 11 June 1942, subject; Responsibility for the Activation of Units, and inclosures

thereto. 15 (1) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. I. H. Edwards, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, G-3,

Operations and Training, for the Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, Services of Supply,

20 June 1942, subject: Responsibility for theActivation of ServiceUnits. (2) See footnote 10 (2), p. 249. 16 See footnote (3), p. 248.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 251

The Surgeon General’s Responsibility for Training Under the Army Service Forces

The reorganization of 1942 did little to alter The Surgeon General’s relationship to medical units trained by Army Service Forces. As The Surgeon General,

and the special adviser to the Commanding General, ASF, on matters related to

medical service, he continued to prepare the tables of organization, mobilization

training programs, medical field and technical manuals, and training aids used by

all ASF medical units. 17 Representatives of the Surgeon General’s Office were also

entitled to conduct technical inspections of all medical units under the jurisdiction

of the Army Service Forces. 18 In sum, The Surgeon General’s powers within the

Army Service Forces were identical to those he had exercised throughout the Army

before the War Department was reorganized.

The Surgeon General’s relationship to medical units assigned to the Army

Ground Forces or the Army Air Forces for activation and training, however, was

more remote. Since the commanding generals of ASF, AGF, and AAF stood on

par in their relationship to the War Department, The Surgeon General, the Air

Surgeon, and the Ground Surgeon were equals when they functioned as the chief

surgeons for their respective commands. In their capacity as command surgeons,

the Air Surgeon and the Ground Surgeon were responsible for inspecting AAF and

AGF medical units, just as The Surgeon General was responsible for inspecting ASF

units. In October 1942, authority to prepare tables of organization, equipment, and

basic allowances was also dispersed among the command surgeons. With these exceptions, however, The Surgeon General remained the ultimate authority on medical training doctrine, just as he continued to be responsible for doctrine on matters

relating to the health of the entire Army. In his capacity as the chief of technical

service, The Surgeon Generalcontinued to prepare technical manuals, field manuals,

and mobilization training programs, or in the phrase commonly used, to promulgate

doctrine, for all medical units of the Army. 19

THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES UNIT ACTIVATION

AND TRAINING SYSTEMS

The Cadre System

Between September 1939 and April 1944, Medical Department theater-of-operations units were activated and trained by method generally referred to as the

cadre system. Under this system, new medical unit was built upon nucleus of

17 (1) Letter, Brig. Gen. C. R. Huebner, Director of Training, Services of Supply, to Chief of Chemical Warfare

Service; Chief ofEngineers; Chief of Ordnance; Chief Signal Officer;Quartermaster General; Surgeon General; Chief of

Administrative Services; Commandant, Command and General Staff School; Superintendent, United States Military

Academy, 23 May 1942, subject: Training Publications and Visual Aids, Services of Supply. (2) Army ServiceForces

Manual 301, 15 Aug. 1944. 18 Army Service Forces Manual 4, April 1945. 19 See footnote (3), p. 248.
252 MEDICAL TRAINING

presumably trained personnel supplied by another unit. Depending on the unit

being trained, the source of the nucleus, or cadre, might be Zone of Interior medical installation, such as fixed general or station hospital, or another theater-ofoperations unit or divisional medical unit undergoing training in the Zone of Interior.20

The War Department letter activating new unit routinely specified the size

of the cadre, the installation or unit that would supply the cadre, and the date at

which the cadre would report for duty. The same letter also included schedule

for the arrival of the commanding officer and other officer and enlisted personnel,

and specified the sources of personnel other than cadre. The Surgeon General routinely supplied, other than cadre, officers and nurses, for all units except those of

the Army Air Forces. The Adjutant General supplied given number of technicians without requisition. Other fillers were requisitioned from The Adjutant

General by the activating command as needed. Unit personnel were usually sched- uled to arrive in three increments. The commanding officer was to arrive alone on

the day of activation, followed in few days by the other officers and cadre, and

finally, by the unit’s enlisted complement.

In theory, the cadre system was designed to provide the commanding officer

of new unit with nucleus of trained officers and enlisted men capable of administering the unit and training other personnel. It was also assumed that all

personnel would report to the unit within approximately week after its activation. The commanding officer and his cadre were scheduled to arrive at their new

post just far enough in advance of other personnel to put administrative and housekeeping affairs in order.

In practice, the cadre system frequently deviated from the theoretical model.

In some instances, the designated commanding officer of unit arrived days, or

even several weeks, after other personnel had reported for duty. At times, the

highest ranking soldiers who arrived were privates. More often, however, lieutenant arriving with the cadre became the temporary commanding officer and was

responsible for securing quarters, establishing the unit administratively, and initiating training program. Activation under temporary commanding officer did

not necessarily work to the disadvantage of unit, since such officers frequently

managed to have training well underway by the time the designated commanding

officer arrived. In some instances, however, the training program had to be postponed.

By the same token, unit fillers were supposed to arrive in group shortly after

the commander and his staff. In practice, however, few units received an appreciable portion of their fillers immediately after activation. Usually, fillers arrived

at irregular intervals over period varying from few weeks to many months, and

those who were sent varied in their background and training. One group might contain fillers trained by replacement training center, and the next to arrive could

consist entirely of recruits sent directly from reception centers. Still other groups

might be of veterans of combat theater or men trainedby one of the combat arms

20 (1) Annual Report, Headquarters, 37th General Hospital, 1943. (2) Annual Report, Headquarters, Fifth Auxiliary Surgical Group, 1943.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 253

or technical services. Each group had to be trained according to its background and

experience, and as result, large unit, such as general hospital, might have to

provide several groups of men with different levels of basic military and technical

training at any given time. Because of these problems, it was not unusual for unit

commanders to require months or year to complete the basic training of all the

men in their organization.21

Training under the cadre system -was further complicated by the uncertain

quality of fillers and cadre assigned to the unit. For the cadre system to function

efficiently, parent organizations had to release at least some of their best men to

newly activated units. In practice, however, many units used the cadre system to

slough their less efficient personnel. 22 Since such men were frequently given ratings

before they were released from the parent organization, the unit commander who

received them was faced not only with the problem of administering and training

unit with substandard cadre but also with arranging for the transfer of overrated, noncommissioned officers so that he could replace them with qualified men

in the same grades. 23

Many units also complained of being assigned high proportion of limitedservice personnel. 24 Theater-of-operations units were supposed to receive only men

qualified for service overseas, but some units reported that as many as four-fifths of

their fillers were limited-service personnel whose presence made it difficult or impossible to conduct marches, calisthenics, or field exercises requiring strenuous

physical activity.25 The mental inadequacy of many limited-service personnel also

made it difficult for commanders to achieve training objectives. 26

Unit commanders who were dissatisfied with their cadre or fillers usually attempted to improve their organizations by arranging transfers. This process of

transferring and replacing undesirable personnel perpetuated many of the evils of

the cadre system, and added to the inconvenience caused by the irregular arrival

of fillers. Some organizations required many months to attain or approximate their

table-of-organization strength and to become sufficiently stabilized to make meaningful unit training possibility. 27

The procedure for training medical technicians and common specialists under

the cadre system only added to the problems of unit commanders. When new unit

was activated, The Adjutant General automatically provided it with limited

number of technicians wiio were graduates of the Medical Field Service School,

Carlisle Barracks, Pa., the Medical Supply Services School, the Army School of

Roentgenology, Memphis, Tenn., and the Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools. limited number of common specialists, such as cooks, bakers,

21 Memorandum, Lt. Col. Tyron E. Huber, MC, for The Historian, Training Division, Surgeon General’s Office,

June 1945, subject: Unit Training, Army Service Forces, World War II, and inclosure thereto.

22 (1) Annual Report, Headquarters, 216th General Hospital, Camp Forrest, Tenn., 1943. (2) Annual Report,

Fourth Auxiliary Surgical Group, Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga., 1943.

23 (1) Annual Report, Fifth Auxiliary Surgical Group, Fort Sam Houston, Tex., 1943. (2) Annual Report, Fifth

Station Hospital, Camp Stewart, Ga., 1941.

24 (1) Annual Report, Headquarters, 11th GeneralHospital, Camp Livingston, La., 1942. (2) Annual Report, Headquarters, 216th General Hospital, Camp Forrest, Tenn., 1942.

25 See footnotes 22 (1) and 24 (1).

26 Annual Report, 41st Station Hospital, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1942. 27 See footnote 22 (2).
254 MEDICAL TRAINING

truckdrivers, and clerks, could be obtained from Medical Replacement Training

Centers by requisition through The Adjutant General. Specialists and technicians

needed in excess of those supplied by The Adjutant General, however, had to be

trained by the unit commander. In training common specialists, the unit commander had choice of options. If there were common specialists schools at the

post at which the unit was located, he could enroll selected members of his organization. 28 If there were no such schools, he had to train his own cooks, truckdrivers,

and clerks. Often, it was possible to simplify the task by searching for related civilian skills among personnel sent as fillers. When such men were not available, the commander had to provide special training programs within the unit.

The training of technicians posed more serious problem. Commanders had

their choice of two alternatives; One, they could send selected members of their

unit to thepost or stationhospital for parallel training; or two, they could send them

to Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools. Without close supervision

from higher authorities, the training which hospital units received depended primarily upon the attitudes of local surgeons and unit commanders. In some instances, well-planned, on-the-job training programs were established in named

hospitals and were coordinated with unit field training. In others, the commanders

of named hospitals assigned men from numbered units to vacant jobs regardless of

their training value. In such assignments, technical training suffered because many

men did only menial work, and controversies developed between hospital commanders responsible for postmedical care and unit commanders responsible for

technical and field training of their men. 29 The preferred alternative, therefore, was

to send men to Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools.

Field units, however, were not always successful in obtaining authorization

to send their men to Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School. The Surgeon General had to allot quotas for these schools indirectly through the Service

Commands, Defense Commands, and the headquarters of Army Ground and Army

Air Forces, which, in turn, subdivided quotas among subordinate units. Within

Army Service Forces, quotas were subdivided second time among posts under

ASF jurisdiction. These suballotments were then utilized by the post for training

both technicians from the station hospital and students from units being activated

at the post. Because of this conflict of interest, it was reported that: “It was unusual for any unit to be able to send away from the unit over one-third of

the technicians that should have received training in Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools.” 30

Unit commanders frequently added to the problem by using the schools to

train specialists for unrated positions in their tables of organization. Numbered

general hospitals, for example, were authorized 84 medical technicians: 35 who were

rated graduates of enlisted technicians schools, and 49 who were unrated graduates

of schools at medical replacement training centers. Often, unit commander would

28 Annual Report, Headquarters, 10thHospital Center, Camp Rucker, Ala., 1942.

29 (1) See footnote21, p. 253. (2) Smith, Clarence McKittrick: The Medical Department: Hospitalization andEvacuation, Zone of Interior. United States Army in World War II. TheTechnical Services. Washington;U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1956. 30 See footnote21, p. 253.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 255

attempt to fill all of these vacancies with rated graduates of Medical Department

Enlisted Technicians Schools, thereby creating spurious shortage of technicians which made it difficult for other commanders to fill rated vacancies in their units. 31

Whether technicians were qualified for ratings through Medical Department

Enlisted Technicians Schools or on-the-job training at post hospitals, their training increased the administrative problems of the unit commander. Many of his future technicians had to be excused from unit training for all or part of the training day while acquiring skills at the post hospital, while others were enrolled at distant schools for periods of or months. Moreover, since schools and post hospitals

ere capable of enrolling only relatively small number of trainees from any given

unit at one time, instability frequently continued over protracted period. 32 Such

instability was further increased when the unit, in its turn, was called on to provide

cadre for another newly activated unit.

Despite its inherent drawbacks, most units trained during World War II were

activated under the cadre system. In mid-1942, Army Service Forces began to move

toward centralizing the activation and training of nondivisional service units. On

31 July 1942, representatives of the Surgeon General’s Office and other technical

services met at conference called by the Unit Training Branch of the Training

Division, ASF, to discuss the advisability of establishing unit training center for

ASF units. The Surgeon General’s Office was reluctant to accept this recommendation, however, since there were already 12 large Medical Department unit training

centers in Army Ground Forces housing adjacent to large fixed hospitals, and

similar facilities were under construction at 22 fixed general hospitals and 34 station hospitals. The Surgeon General believed it would be preferable to continue

training medical units at large number of sites adjacent to an active fixed hospital

if Army Ground Forces would provide assurance that these facilities would remain

available. If not, he requested that the Medical Department be allotted proportionate share of the facilities at the proposed unit training center. 33

In November 1942, Medical Training Section was established at the newly

activated Services of Supply Unit Training Center (later designated Camp Plauche),

New Orleans Staging Area, New Orleans, La., “with the primary mission of controlling all training for medical units” at the center. 34 During the next 12 months,

the Medical Training Section at Camp Plauche was responsible for training approximately 120 units, including seven general hospitals, 15 sanitary companies,

38 station hospitals, 56 hospital platoons, three portable surgical hospitals, and one

hospital ship complement. In November 1943, the Medical Training Section’s

primary mission was changed to providing unit technicaltraining for malaria survey

31 Memorandum, Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, for the Director of

Training, Services of Supply, 28 Aug. 1942, subject: Dissipation of TrainedEnlisted Personnel. 32 See footnote 21, p. 253. 33 Memorandum, Col. JohnA. Rogers, MC,Executive Officer, Office of The SurgeonGeneral, to Training Division,

Services of Supply (attention: Unit Training Branch), Aug. 1942, subject: Unit Training Center. 34 (1) Letter, Lt. Col. B. L. Steger, MC, Director of Medical Training, Headquarters, Services of Supply Unit

Training Center, New Orleans, La., to Maj. John W. Middleton, MC, Training Division, Surgeon General’s Office,

Dec. 1942. (2) Memorandum,Lt. Col. Donald J. Wolfram, MC, Chief, Readiness and Requirements Branch, Training

Division, SurgeonGeneral’s Office, to The Historian, Training Division, Surgeon General’sOffice, July 1945, subject:

History of Unit Training Center, Camp Plauche, La., and attachment thereto.
256 MEDICAL TRAINING

and malaria control units which had been activated and received their basic training at other centers. Between August 1943 and November 1945, 141 malaria control units and 76 malaria survey units, comprising almost all the malaria units

activated in the Zone of Interior, were sent to Camp Plauche for technical training.35

After overcoming series of initial problems, the medical section at Camp

Plauche was able to provide number of services that facilitated the activation

and training of medical field units. When the officer designated as director of medical training for the medical section at Camp Plauche, Lt. Col. (later Col.) Byron

L. Steger, MC, arrived at the center in November 1942, he encountered conditions

prevalent, on lesser scale, at posts and camps throughout the United States. At

first, authorities at the camp refused to believe that there was such position as

Director of Medical Training, and assigned him duties as medical instructor.

After several conferences, Colonel Steger persuaded the local commander to assign

him the position he had been sent to fill. Two officers sent to assist him arrived

shortly afterward, but the administrative personnel for his section did not arrive

for another weeks.

Shortly after the medical section was activated, it was discovered that number of medical units had already been activated, including 28 general and station

hospitals, and 15 sanitary companies. No control was exercised over any of these

units, and they had no place to turn for advice when problems arose. Each hospital

sought to train as many men from their organization at the local station hospital

as possible; as result, the general hospital with the senior colonel was getting

reasonably good training for his unit, and the remaining units had to fend for themselves. 36 The newly established medical section, however, was gradually able to

bring these problems under control by arranging for an equitable allocation of the

training facilities available at the post hospital and by securing additional quotas

at Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools from the the Surgeon General’s Office. Center-level courses were set up for common specialists and 4-week

refresher course for officers was inaugurated. The medical section also organized

its own training aid section and provided central facilities for producing and distributing lecture and conference material.

second ASF Unit Training Center with facilities for training Medical Department theater-of-operations units was activated at Camp Ellis, 111., on February 1943. At first, the center attempted to operate under common headquarters,

but within short time, it was realized that the special training requirements of

each of the technical services made this structure too cumbersome. After several

reorganizations, the medical section was established as separate entity early in

May 1943. Between May 1943 and January 1945, when the center was deactivated, 266 medical units of all types were activated at Camp Ellis. 37

85 Letter, Maj. Joseph E. Schenthal, MC, Director, Medical Training Section, Third Regiment, Army Service

Forces Training Center, Camp Plauche, New Orleans, La., to the Surgeon, New Orleans Port of Embarkation, New

Orleans, La., Nov. 1945, subject: Summary of Activities, Medical Training Section, Army Service Forces Training

Center, Camp Plauche, New Orleans, La. 86 See footnote 34 (2), p. 255. 87 (1) Annual Report, Unit Training Center, 1644thService Unit, Camp Ellis, 111., 1943. (2) “The Story of Camp

Ellis.” [Official record.]
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 257

The medical section at Camp Ellis played similar role in the training of

medical units. It operated school for cooks, bakers, truckdrivers, and other common specialists, and, in addition, conducted courses for unrated medical, surgical,

X-ray, dental, and pharmacy technicians. weeklong orientation course was provided for the unit commander, his adjutant, executive officer, and supply officer,

to acquaint them with the problems of unit activation. The medical section also

assisted the various units at Camp Ellis to secure training aids and provided them

with general, station, and field hospital equipment sets for use on field problems. 38

The Preactivation System

Despite the inherent advantages of unit training centers, the Army Service

Forces did not achieve complete centralization of its training facilities until the

preactivation system was adopted in April 1944, well after the pace of unit activations within Army Service Forces was past its peak. During the final year of the

war, facilities for training medical units were available at three Army Service

Forces Training Centers: Camp Ellis, Camp Barkeley, Tex., and Fort Lewis, Wash.

Camp Grant, 111., also served briefly as center for unit training under the preactivation system, until its facilities were transferred to Fort Lewis in the summer

of 1944. Camp Plauche, which by this time was being used exclusively to provide

field training for malaria control and survey teams activated at other centers, was

never reorganized to include preactivation training.

Under the preactivation system, ASF Training Centers served as pools from

which unit could draw full complement of trained enlisted personnel at the

moment of activation. Responsibility for training personnel before it was assembled

as unit was vested entirely in the training center. When new unit was scheduled

for activation, the center received orders for its “preactivation” or, in effect, was

informed that it was required to earmark given number of enlisted men at the

center for assignment to the unit as fillers. Such men then received basic military

and technical training at the center, and those selected to become technicians were

sent to an appropriate enlisted technicians school. Late in the war, the system also

served as device for channeling “spare parts” or men from overstrength or deactivated Zone of Interior units into field units scheduled for shipment overseas.

The ASF preactivation system had several intrinsic advantages over the

system that it replaced. It relieved the commander of responsibility for providing

his men with basic military and technical training and simultaneously eliminated

the problems that developed when men were received in increments over several

months and had to be provided with separate training programs. It also relieved

the unit commander of responsibility for finding ways to train the technicians

needed to fill his table of organization. Unit training at ASF Training Centers could

thus begin at the end of the 14th week of the basic training cycle, instead of being

delayed for weeks, or even months, while fillers in the unit were being brought to

common level of training. In sum, the new system provided the commander with

38 (1) See footnote21, p. 253. (2) Annual Report, Headquarters, MedicalGroup, 1644thServiceUnit, ArmyService

Forces Training Center, Camp Ellis, 111., 1944.
258 MEDICAL TRAINING

all the components necessary for his unit and allowed him to focus his attention on

molding these components into smoothly functioning team. 39

In addition to the intrinsic advantages of the preactivation system, units

activated after 15 April 1944 had several other factors working in their favor. War

Department policies requiring Zone of Interior installations to release general

service personnel for service overseas, for example, provided ASF Training Centers

with an adequate supply of noncommissioned officers and experienced enlisted men

who could be assigned to newly activated units. 40 Thus, units activated under the

new system were more frequently provided with the training nucleus of enlisted

personnel that should have been provided under the cadre system, and less frequently subjected to debilitating cadre levies. Units activated after April 1944 also

had the advantage of receiving at least the first weeks of their team training at

ASF Training Centers, which provided guidance and assistance to the unit commander that formerly had been available only to organizations activated as ASF

Unit Training Centers. As result, units found it easier to obtain training aids and

equipment, and the facilities of the post were at their disposal.

In June 1942, Unit Training Branch was organized in theTraining Division,

Surgeon General’s Office, to discharge the newly assigned responsibility for preparing Medical Department nondivisional units trained by the Army Service

Forces for functional deployment in the theaters of operations. In addition to maintaining liaison with other elements of the Surgeon General’s Office and divisions of

the Army Service Forces and the War Department in matters relating to the activation and training of numbered units at class and class IV installations of the

Army Service Forces, the Unit Training Branch was also responsible for inspecting

their technical training and submitting appropriate recommendations to the Director of Military Training, ASF. The Unit Training Branch reached its peak

strength in December 1942, when the staff consisted of two officers and an enlisted

clerk. Because of its limited staff, and the constantly growing number of medical

units scattered throughout the Zone of Interior, the Unit Training Branch found

it impossible to conduct frequent and periodic inspections. Control was maintained

by requiring units to file bimonthly Unit Training Status Reports, developed in

the summer of 1942, that provided the Surgeon General’s Office with information

on the strength, training programs, equipment, and status of each medical unit

being trained by Army Service Forces. 41 The Unit Training Branch then confined

itself to inspecting units that were being prepared for shipment overseas. Whenever inspection of numbered ASF medical unit was required, members of the Unit

Training Branch also inspected all other medical units at the same post. No record

was kept of the number of units inspected before mid-1943, but between June

1943 and June 1944, the Unit Training Branch conducted 751 inspections and be39 (1) See footnote 21, p. 253. (2) Memorandum,Lt. Col. Donald J. Wolfram, MC, Chief, Readiness and Requirements Branch, Training Division, Surgeon General’s Office, to the Historian, Training Division, Surgeon General’s

Office, July 1945, subject: History of Unit Training Center, Camp Plauche, La., and attachment thereto. 40 (1) Army ServiceForces Circular No. 26, 24 Jan. 1944. (2) Army ServiceForces CircularNo. 100, 21 Mar. 1945. 41 Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, fiscal year

1943.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 259

tween June 1944 and June 1945, it inspected all of the 319 units activated by Army

Service Forces.

Until April 1945, inspections conducted by representatives of the Surgeon

General’s Office encompassed all aspects of training and preparation for overseas

movement, including any discrepancy that might result in unit’s being declared

unsatisfactory by the Inspector General. 42 As result, 104 of the 115 ASF medical

units inspected by the Inspector General in the months preceding June 1944 were

declared qualified to perform their primary mission. Of the remaining 11, four reported only minor deficiencies and four had not been allowed enough time for refitting and refresher training after returning from overseas service. Only two were

rejected for serious deficiencies. The following year was equally successful. 43

In May 1944, the Unit Training Branch was redesignated as the Readiness and

Requirements Branch, to symbolize the transition to the preactivation system.

After this system was established, representatives of the Surgeon General’s Office

inspected all nondivisional medical units during their first weeks of unit training

at ASF Training Centers. In September 1944, the Surgeon General’s Office also

prepared series of training tests consisting of questions and field problem that

was designed to prepare such units for inspection. 44 In April 1945, the responsibilities of the subordinate agencies of the Army Service Forces were redefined, and

the chiefs of the technical services were directed to confine themselves to purely

technical inspections. Thereafter, representatives of The Surgeon General coordinated their inspections with those of the service commands, and representatives

of the service commands inspected units in matters involving administration, supply, and military training. 45

ARMY AIR FORCES SYSTEMS

The Army Air Forces trained less than half dozen types of medical units designed to fit the special needs of air troops—primarily medical supply, an evacuation, and dispensary unit. Because such units were small and required only

limited housing facilities, the Army Air Forces was able to bring these units together

at selected locations and provide special schools for their training.

The Army Air Forces facilities for training tactical medical units were decentralized until the spring of 1942 when new medical detachment at Warner Robins

Air Depot in Georgia was called on to furnish Medical Department officers for

42 Memorandum, Capt. Harold D. Brennand, MAC, Regular Training Branch, Training Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, to the Historian, Training Division, Surgeon General’s Office, July 1945, subject: Policy and Procedure Governing Inspection of ASF-Type Medical Department Units by Surgeon General’s Office.

43 (1) Report, Readiness and Requirements Branch, fiscal year 1944. In Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, fiscal year 1944. (2) Report, Readiness and Requirements

Branch, fiscal year 1945. In Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S.

Army, fiscal year 1945.

44 Memorandum, Col. Floyd L. Wergeland, MC, Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for

theDirector of Military Training, Army ServiceForces, Sept. 1944, subject: Test for Training Inspection, Numbered

ASF Medical Units, and inclosures thereto.

45 See footnotes 18, p. 251; and 43 (2).
260 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 40.—School of Aviation Medicine building, Randolph Field, Tex.

tactical units under the Air Service Command. The station surgeon, Maj. (later

Lt. Col.) Richard R. Cameron, MC, asked permission to establish school for this

type of training. In the fall, the Medical Training Section at Warner Robins Air

Depot began training men for newly created type of unit, the medical supply

platoon (aviation). This unit, consisting of two Medical Administrative Corps officers and 19 enlisted men, was designed to supply medical equipment to rapidly

moving combat air squadrons in forward areas where Services of Supply did not

maintain depots. In such areas, AAF general depots were furnished with the medical

supply platoons (aviation) necessary to supply combat units. The Medical Training

Section at Warner Robins Air Depot eventually developed into the Medical Service

Training School which was established late in 1943 with Colonel Cameron as commandant.46 By this time, the school had been assigned the additional mission of

training medical dispensary detachments (aviation), unit consisting of four officers and 24 enlisted men with enough equipment to set up 36-bed field dispensary

in areas where hospital facilities were not available. It also provided facilities for

training command and administrative specialists. 47

Air evacuation of sick and wounded troops was major responsibility of the

Air Transport Command, which was established in June 1942 as successor to the

former Air Corps Ferrying Command. Responsibility for organizing and training

46 See footnote (3), p. 248. 47 History, Army Air Forces, Medical Service Training School, Robins Field, Ga., 1942, vol. I. [Officialrecord.]
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 261

troop carrier units, together with personnel for replacements, was delegated to the

Troop Carrier Command, activated in June 1942with headquarters at Stout Field,

Indianapolis, Ind. In addition to carrying out the typical responsibilities of the

surgeon of any large command, the Staff Surgeon, Col. Wood S. Woolford, MC,

was responsible for the development and training of units for evacuating casualties

by air. In 1942, the Air Surgeon and Colonel Woolford developed plans for stan- dard unit. In the latter half of 1942, the 349th Air Evacuation Group was established at Bowman Field, Louisville, Ky., as training command for personnel assigned to units accompanying patients during air evacuation flights. In June 1943,

the 349th Air Evacuation Group was established as the Army Air Forces School of

Air Evacuation, and in October 1944, it was absorbed into the School of Aviation

Medicine, Randolph Field, Tex. (fig. 40) 48

ARMY GROUND FORCES SYSTEMS

Medical units attached or organic to AGF organizations were universally activated and trained under the cadre system. Nondivisional medical units under the

jurisdiction of Army Ground Forces were activated and trained at wide variety

of posts and camps throughout the Zone of Interior, in approximately the same

manner as those activated by Army Service Forces. Organic units were activated

and trained in conjunction with their division.

When Army Ground Forces inherited responsibility for the creation and training of combat divisions from General Headquarters on March 1942, it adopted

unit activation procedures that were already well developed. In common with

ASF units, AGF divisions were established by letter of activation under the

cadre system. The commander, assistant commander, and artillery commander

were selected by the War Department from list that Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair,

Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, submitted for their consideration. General McNair was also responsible for selecting and designating the heads

of the general staff of the new division and other key officers for which Army Ground

Forces was responsible. The selection of special staff heads and other key service

officers was coordinated with the appropriate chiefs of the technical services in

Army Service Forces.

Each division was assigned parent unit responsible for furnishing it with

trained cadre. The G-3 section of Army Ground Forces then formulated plans for

the division’s assignment and issued letter officially ordering activation of the

unit and instructing all agencies in their respective duties. This letter provided for

delivery by the service commands, without requisition, of enlisted fillers from reception centers and replacement training centers on schedule orked out by the

division and the service command. In addition, War Department General Staff,

G-l, Personnel, prepared memorandum providing instructions for the selection,

schooling, and assignment of commissioned personnel for the division.

Early in 1942, these procedures ere expanded to provide special training for

48 (1) See footnote (3), p. 248. (2) Link, Mae Mills, and Coleman, Hubert A.: Medical Support of the ArmyAir

Forces in World War II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.
262 MEDICAL TRAINING

Figure 41,—Medical Department officers attend courses at the Command and GeneralStaff

College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., where extensive use was made of training aids, including

demonstrations. Here instructors demonstrate staff work at an infantry division headquarters

for the benefit of class at the college.

division cadre officers. Thereafter, when new division was activated, the commander, assistant commander, and division artillery commander were designated

by the War Department not later than 78 days before activation and assigned to

General Headquarters, or after March 1942, to Army Ground Forces, for week of

orientation. The division commander then spent month in special training at the

Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. (fig. 41), the assistant division commander took special course at the Infantry School, Fort

Benning, Ga., and the division artillery commander was sent to the Field Artillery

School, Fort Sill, Okla. Officers assigned to the division’s general and special staffs,

including the division surgeon, joined the division commander for the monthlong

course at the Command and General Staff School. The remaining members of the

officer cadre were sent to special cadre courses conducted at branch schools under

the jurisdiction of the chief of their arm or service. All Medical Department cadre

officers, except the division surgeon, attended the Special Cadre Course for Divisional Officers at the Medical Field Service School.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 263

After completing their special training, the commander and his staff arrived

at the division camp 37 days before activation. week later, they were joined by

the rest of the cadre, and few days after that, by complement of 452 officers provided by the War Department from graduates of officer candidate schools, service

schools, and officer replacement pools. The unit was formally activated on D-day;

during the next 15 days, the unit received its quota of fillers (approximately 13,000

in the case of the infantry division). After the last installment of fillers arrived, the

division was ready to begin training.

Between March 1942 and August 1943, when the last of the divisions of World

War II was activated, Army Ground Forces made several refinements in the procedures for division activation. None of these changes, however, had significant

effect on the activation of medical components of the division, and from the standpoint of the Medical Department, procedures remained unchanged after the establishment of the division cadre course.

When the War Department was reorganized in March 1942, Army Ground

Forces inherited schedule for training newly activated divisions that had only

recently been put into effect by General Headquarters. Before 1942, training programs were designed to fill and train Regular Army and National Guard Divisions

under peacetime conditions. The previous program had provided neither specific

date for the attainment of combat readiness nor clear differentiation between individual and unit training. Once unit had completed its initial 13 to 16 weeks of

training under the mobilization training programs, its training was governed by

series of annual and special training directives that prescribed additional unit training and exercises designed to prepare the unit for thenext series of maneuvers. Such

directives were couched in the broadest terms and governed not only the training of

divisions and their organic medical support but also the training of all other field

units, including those later controlled by Army Service Forces.

On 16 February 1942, General Headquarters issued training directive designed to bring divisions to state of combat readiness 44 weeks after the date of

activation. 49 This period was divided into three definite phases—individual training, unit training, and combined-arms training—and training guide was set up

for each period. During the individual training period, commanders were required

to use War Department mobilization training programs as their guides. Although

the mobilization training programs were drawn up on 13-week period, General

Headquarters allowed an extra weeks to compensate for delays in the arrival of

fillers and equipment and to permit testing by higher commands. During the 13-

week unit training period, specific guides were available only for infantry, field

artillery, engineer, and quartermaster organizations; commanders of other service

organizations were expected to rely on guidance provided by the division and to

tailor their programs to combine elements of their technical specialty with divisional training requirements. The directive of 16 February provided the only

guidance for the period of combined training. 50 Nondivisional units of the

Army Ground Forces trained on the same schedule but were provided with only

49 See footnote 10 (2), p. 249.

60 Wiley, Bell I.; The Army Ground Forces. Training in the Ground Army 1942-1945. Study No. XI. Historical

Section—Army Ground Forces, 1948, p. 4. [Official record.]

497-333 75 -18
264 MEDICAL TRAINING

limited guidance beyond their branch mobilization training programs. During 1942,

control over the training of nondivisional units, including medical units, was vested

principally in the armies; it was not unusual for such units to go for months without

being subjected to the tests and inspections that were provided for the guidance of

divisional units at each stage of their training.

The General Headquarters training directive of February 1942 was superseded

on 19 October 1942 by an AGF directive designed to guide all existing and future

units through the training cycle. The new schedule shortened the training period

for divisions from 44 to 35 weeks, and time was allotted among training phases in

thefollowing pattern: Individual or basic training, 13weeks; unit training, 11 weeks;

and combined training, 11 weeks. Reduction of the basic phase from 17 to 13

weeks seemed possible because of the accelerated pace of inductions, making it

possible to fill the division and begin training immediately upon activation. Shortening of the entire training cycle was considered necessary because of the likelihood in 1943 of heavy requirements for overseas operations. In addition, the directive added two new training tests to the program: physical training test required for all units, and an infantry battalion combat-firing test.

By late 1942, when the new directive was issued, the training of divisions assumed pattern which was basically stable throughout the remainder of the war.

The 13-week individual training period, based on War Department mobilization

training programs, was devoted to individual and small unit training up to the battalion level. As at replacement training centers, the first few weeks focused on

basic military subjects such as military courtesy, drill, and map reading designed to

transform the individual into soldierbefore he began training as specialist. After

the first month, emphasis shifted to technical subjects, and soldiers were oriented

to the basic elements of their unit’s specialty. During the last weeks of the individual training period, training focused on tactical subjects and was increasingly

conducted in the field. The last few days of the basic period were devoted to preparing for the mobilization training program tests given by corps or army commanders to units on the platoon level.

At the end of the individual training period, the division began 11 weeks of

progressive unit training that began with the squad and culminated in regimental

exercises, with the goal of developing each unit into team capable of taking its

place in the division and carrying out its special mission in combat. While combat

arms concentrated on tactical training, support elements were given practical training in their specialist roles and taught to work together in platoons and companies.

Medical technicians, for example, practiced skills required in first and second

echelon medical service; and medical companies moved to the field to engage in

exercises requiring them to evacuate casualties across rivers, set up battalion aid

stations, and move casualties from collecting stations to clearing stations. Units

were also required to complete series of tests, such as the AGF platoon combatfiring proficiency tests for infantry components and the AGF battery tests for the

field artillery. Because of their highly specialized mission, however, medical units

were required only to complete the AGF special battle courses and physical fitness

tests.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 265

Unit training was followed by 11 weeks of combined-arms training designed

to weld the elements of the division into division team. After October 1942, this

phase consisted of three series of problems: One, regimental combat team exercises, culminating in field maneuvers; two, division exercises and maneuvers; and three, command post exercises. The combined training period began with regimental

combat team exercises, and ended with maneuvers by one division against another.

Exercises were conducted both by day and at night, in all types of terrain. All

exercises were followed by critique. During such exercises, medical units and

other service elements were expected to function in supporting role. 51

The training received by medical elements of the 89th Infantry Division was

typical of the experience of most divisions during World War II. Orders for the

creation of the new division were issued on April 1942, and approximately

month later, members of the division cadre reported to Army schools for special

training. The division surgeon, Maj. (later Col.) Clifford G. Blitch, MC, arrived

at Camp Carson, Colo., the home of the new division, on June 1942, after completing the monthlong cadre course at the Command and General Staff School

along with the commanding general and his general and special staff officers. Medical officers who had completed the special cadre course at the Medical Field Service

School reported to the division on 13 June, followed between and 12 July by the

unit’s remaining Medical Department officer fillers. The latter consisted of 37

Medical Corps, 12 Dental Corps, and five Medical Administrative Corps officers.

The 72-man medical enlisted cadre arrived at Camp Carson on June 1942, after

completing cadre course at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. On 15 July 1942, the 89th

Infantry Division was officially activated.

For several months following its activation, the division was engaged in providing basic training for fillers who had been assigned directly from reception centers. Such training, conducted under programs written by the chiefs of the arms

and services, was nearly identical with that provided at replacement training

centers. By January 1943, medical units of the division were in their final stage of

basic training, and during the first week of February, an VIII Corps testing team

administered individual training tests to all units of the division. As result of these

tests, the division received rating of “very satisfactory” despite the fact that,

during January, it suffered heavy losses from cadre levies. In mid-January, medical

elements of the division sent 12 officers to the Medical Field Service School to be

trained as cadre for the 66th Infantry Division, and shortly thereafter, seven more

officers were transferred to the 76th Infantry Division. On 31 January, Colonel

Blitch was transferred to the 99th Evacuation Hospital, and Maj. (later Lt. Col.)

Sydney L. Stevens, MC, regimental surgeon of the 354th Infantry Regiment, was

assigned to replace him. From February through 24 April 1943, the division and its medical elements

were enrolled in the unit phase of training. Emphasis at all levels was placed upon

realism and battlefield leadership, with the objective of developing each team into

unit capable of taking its place in the division. All such training was conducted

51 See footnote 10 (2), p. 249.
266 MEDICAL TRAINING

under simulated tactical conditions. Training began with the smallest unit and

progressed to the largest, culminating on 24 April with demonstration given by

the division for President Roosevelt in which the medical battalion played part

in evacuating casualties on litter raft constructed from the tarp of weapons

carrier. During the individual and unit training phases, number of enlisted men

were also detached to attached special schools, including 50 men who were sent to

Medical Department Enlisted Technicians Schools for training as medical and surgical technicians, and 36 men who received month of special training at the Camp

Carson station hospital. Between 12 and 17 April, medical personnel participated

in physical training tests given by the VIII Corps testing team.

The division’s combined arms training began on 10 May, and lasted until 19

June. Three collecting companies, each assigned to regimental combat team, took

part in exercises which were conducted in the Camp Carson and Lake George areas

of Colorado. Company D, the division clearing company, moved to Lake George

to establish clearing station and to set up base camp for the division. During

these exercises, all units were able to gain experience in handling both actual and

simulated casualties, including 376 men who became sick or were injured in the

course of training. When not engaged in exercises, the medical battalion practiced

evacuation of casualties over water obstacles, using facilities provided at Camp

Carson lake. Units were also required to conduct two training sessions on an infiltration course, one by day and one at night, and to train their men to climb cargo

nets in full field equipment. Combined arms training was completed on 19 June

1943 following critique by the division commander.

On 28 June, the division moved south of the Camp Carson area to an area

near Pueblo, Colo., to hold series of maneuvers under the direction of the VIII

Corps. Again, the three collecting companies were employed under combat team

control, while the clearing company remained under the division. In the course of

the maneuvers, medical units evacuated total of 347 sick and injured, as well as

number of simulated casualties. These maneuvers had originally been planned to

extend to the beginning of August, but on 14 July, they were cut short to make

time for the division’s reorganization.

On August 1943, the 89th Infantry Division was reorganized and redesignated as the 89th Light Division. After the reorganization, the officer strength of

medical elements was reduced from 51 Medical Corps, 12 Dental Corps, and 12

Medical Administrative Corps to 38 Medical Corps, eight Dental Corps, and nine

Medical Administrative Corps, respectively, while enlisted strength was reduced

from 896 to 582. The medical battalion was placed under new table of organization, and its allotment of vehicles was reduced to eight jeeps and four trailers.

During theperiod from August to 15 November, the unit spent its time in maneuvers designed to test the capabilities of the 89th Light Division. On 15 November, the 89th Light Division completed its training at Camp Carson and moved to the

Louisiana Maneuver Area for corps and army maneuvers, and eventual shipment

overseas. 52

The growth of training systems for nondivisional units of the Army Ground

52 Medical History and Progress of the 89th InfantryDivision for the Calendar Year 1943.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 267

Forces during 1943 and 1944 paralleled the development of unit training systems

in Army Service Forces. In mid-1942, the Army Ground Forces began to experiment with the use of group headquarters to control the 700-odd units that were

then being trained under corps and army jurisdiction. In the summer and fall of

1943, after group headquarters proved effective in controlling the training of tac- tical units, group organization was extended to service units. By 31 December 1943,

12 group headquarters had been organized to control the training of nondivisional

medical units. 53 Late in 1942, the Army Ground Forces also adopted systemized

activation procedure for nondivisional units. The system was followed closely for

approximately months, but after mid-1943, the dwindling manpower supply made

rigid application nearly impossible. 54

Throughout 1942, the basic training of AGF nondivisional units was guided

by mobilization training programs prepared during the General Headquarters

period by chiefs of the appropriate arms or services. Since most mobilization training programs did not extend beyond the basic training phase, units in advanced

stages of training did not have detailed programs to follow, and training was conducted under weekly schedules drawn up by the unit commander in accordance

with the very general guidelines provided in directives issued by higher headquarters. No effort was made to revise these programs until late 1942; then, deficiencies observed in combined training exercises and in the theater focused attention sharply on the fact that many mobilization training programs were obsolete, and that unit training programs had never been prepared for the guidance of

service units. Early in 1943, the special staff sections of Army Ground Forces were

instructed to revise mobilization training programs covering the individual training

period and to prepare unit training programs covering the unit training period.

By the autumn of 1943, all of the staff except the Ground Surgeon had submitted

revised mobilization training programs. In January 1944, the medical section submitted unit training schedule, and shortly afterward, the mobilization training

program for AGF medical units was published.

Before the end of 1944, Army Ground Forces also adopted series of MOS

(Military Occupational Specialty) tests designed to test individuals in their proficiency as specialists. Most of these tests were already in use by subordinate commands, or modified versions of tests prepared by the chiefs of the services were used.

Usually, MOS tests were divided into two parts: One, theoretical questions involving the duties and skills required in particular specialty, and, two, practical

exercise requiring the application of specialized techniques. Tests for personnel in

quartermaster and medical units were supplemented by exercises designed to

check the ability of the units to perform their primary mission. The test for members of medical collecting company, for example, required the unit to collect and

transport casualties under tactical conditions. Because such tests were already in

use by many subordinate commands, the tests published by Army Ground Forces

were not mandatory. 55

63 See footnote 10 (2), p. 249. 64 Wiley, Bell I.: The Army Ground Forces. Problems of Nondivisional Training in the Army Ground Forces

Study No. 14. Historical Section—Army Ground Forces, 1946. [Official record.]

55 See footnote 10 (2), p. 249.
268 MEDICAL TRAINING

On 14 April 1944, approximately months after Army Service Forces adopted

the preactivation system, the Army Ground Forces also published an accelerated

training schedule for nondivisional units. Under the new system, training schedules

varied according to the source of the unit’s fillers and, because of the diverse duties

assigned AGF nondivisional units, according to the unit’s mission, branch, or

service. In medical units, only the period of individual or basic training varied:

Units that received the bulk of their fillers directly from reception centers were required to complete 14-week program of individual training; those whose fillers

were sent from units of replacement training centers of another branch were required to provide weeks of individual training; and units whose fillers were provided by medical unit or Medical Replacement Training Center were required

only to complete 1-week refresher course. Following this phase, all medical units

were required to complete weeks of unit training and weeks of combined training.

Thus, depending on the unit’s source of fillers, the training period for medical units

ranged from 13 to 26 weeks. By comparison, the training time required for other

technical service units ranged from 13 to 42 weeks. 56

The final year of the war produced marked decline in AGF training activity.

Efforts focused on converting unneeded organizations and excess Zone of Interior

personnel into units required for support in the theater of operations. The accelerated system made it possible to tailor the training of each unit according to

its needs. The most serious problem created by the program involved the training

of technical personnel. Most nondivisional technical service units, including medical

units, contained large number of men whose duties required qualification as technicians or specialists. Getting these men to school without disrupting the training

program and impairing the integrity of the unit had been serious problem even

under the former system. Under the accelerated program, the problem became increasingly acute. Schooling was accomplished in many instances at the cost of having

majority of the unit’s personnel absent after the completion of basic training.

Despite this problem, however, the system remained in effect through the end of

the war. 57

PROGRAM GUIDES AND TRAINING LITERATURE

The Medical Department’s prototype for World War II mobilization training

programs was created in 1935 when The Surgeon General directed the staff at the

Medical Field Service School to prepare 16-week training program for the mobilization of medical regiments. This program, issued by the War Department on

August 1935, served as model for mobilization training programs throughout the

war. Under this program, instruction was roughly divided into three phases: The

first phase included both military and technical subjects, with emphasis on military

subjects such as drill and military courtesy; the second, emphasized technical subjects, such as first aid, nursing, ward management, litter drill, and the organization

and functions of the Medical Department; and the third, was devoted primarily to

86 See footnote 54, p. 267. 67 See footnote 10 (2), p. 249.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 269

field activities and review of basic military training. The program also contained

special annexes outlining the training of common specialists, such as cooks, clerks,

cobblers, horseshoers, wheelwrights, and motor mechanics, and, in addition, prescribed the training for medical, surgical, and veterinary technicians. 58 Programs

utilized during World War II differed widely from the 1935 prototype in details but did not radically alter its form.

The program of 1935 was superseded, on September 1940, by 13-week program bearing the designation Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, entitled

“Medical Department Mobilization Training Program for Medical Department

Units at Unit Training Centers and Medical Department Replacements at Enlisted Replacement Centers.” In contrast to its predecessor, which was designed to train

specialized units within the medical regiment, the new mobilization training program was general program written to guide the training of specialists within the

unit, regardless of the unit’s ultimate mission. As in the previous program, the new

schedule was divided into three phases, which, for the first time, were broken up

into three distinct chronological periods. At the end of the first weeks of training,

or the basic period, the soldier was expected to be able to care for his uniform and

equipment, to march and pitch shelter tents, and to understand the fundamentals

of technical subjects prescribed by the program.

The technical period, which lasted from the third through the 10th week of the

cycle, focused on providing the individual with technical skills that would enable

him to fill specialized position in his unit. During this period, members of the

unit received the same amount of training and attended number of common classes

in basic military subjects. Those who were selected to become common specialists

and technicians, however, spent the bulk of their time in specialized training, while

the remaining members of the unit continued their basic military and basic technical training. At the end of this period, trainees were also expected to be familiar

with basic tactics and logistics.

In the final monthof the cycle, units turned their attention to tactical training.

At the end of the 13th week of the cycle, medical units were expected to be able to

march and execute tactical movements, to establish and operate stations, to collect

and treat casualties in the field, to operate battalion or regimental stations, and to

participate in field exercises with the combat arms under tactical conditions. Having trained his men as individuals, the unit commander was responsible at this

stage for training them as team through the employment of appropriate field exercises. Commanders were expected to adjust the program to the needs of their

unit during all phases of training, and during the tactical phase, tailoring was

particularly important. Indeed, commanders were notified that:59

The character of operations which will be required, the character and armament of

the enemy, the probable theater of operations, including the geographical, topographical, sanitary,

and climatic conditions therein and the results that may be expected should always be considered.

The programs may, therefore, require modification to adapt them to the type of medical unit to

68 Letter, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, Aug. 1935, subject: Sixteen-week Training Schedule—Effective Upon Mobilization (Medical Regiment).

59 Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, Sept. 1940.
270 MEDICAL TRAINING

be trained, to meet the status of the individual or unit, to shorten or lengthen the time of training

in order to conform to the time available, to make the best use of existing facilities and of training

expedients, and to conform to the climatic or other conditions of the training situation. Progressive

and balanced training in subjects essential to accomplish the training mission, however, must be

preserved at all times.

In addition to these general guidelines, special programs were provided for

units organic to divisional medical service, including the collecting, clearing, and

ambulance components of the medical regiment and medical battalion.

In January 1941, the Medical Department published mimeographed “Instructors’ Guide” that had been prepared by the staff at the Medical Field Service

School to supplement Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1. By themselves,

mobilization training programs were little more than outlines that presented course

titles, time allocations, and text references in tabular form. The schedule for 13

weeks of unit training under the program of September 1940, for example, consisted of six pages and charts and explanatory notes. In contrast, the four-volume

“Instructors’ Guide” specified the location, references, and instructional aids for

each hour of training, and provided the instructor with detailed outline of the subject. Commanders were not required to use the guide, but they were assured that

“if the outlines for the subjects scheduled for the various hours are followed,

satisfactory standard of proficiency will be attained.” 60 Commanders were also

urged to consult field manuals that would provide them with detailed knowledge

of the mission of their unit and the special training it required. As each new mobilization training program was issued during the course of World War II, it was

followed by comparable “Instructors’ Guide,” and as the war progressed, the

guides became increasingly more detailed and complete.

With minor changes, the mobilization training program for medical units

issued in September 1940 remained in effect until September 1943. On 18 February

1942, the original document was superseded by revised version that eliminated

schedules for programs at replacement training centers. 61 Except for small refinements in the allocation of training time, and modernization ofreferences, however,

the new unit training schedule remained identical with its predecessor.

Neither program provided guidance for units that had completed the 13-week

basic training cycle, and there were no published guidelines for the advanced training of units that had completed Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1 until

mid-1942. Before the War Department reorganization of 1942, the Office of The

Surgeon General instructed unit commanders to look to the headquarters of the

combat organizations to which they were attached for guidance after completing

the basic training cycle. On 29 July 1942, however, after the reorganization placed

many types of nondivisional medical units under the jurisdiction of Army Service

Forces, the Medical Department prepared mobilization training program for the

advanced training of numbered hospital units containing personnel that had completed their basic training either under Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1 or

at Medical Replacement Training Center. Reflecting the technical orientation of

60 Instructors’ Guide for Medical Department MobilizationTraining Program No. 8-1. Volume I. Basic Military

Training, January 1941. 61 Mobilization Training Program No. 8-1, 18 Feb. 1942.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 271

ASF units, the program provided week of review and orientation for all personnel

and 12 weeks of advanced training for officers, common specialists, and technicians. During this period, specialists and technicians were expected to participate in

on-the-job programs in hospital on the post to which the unit was attached, while

officers attended classes in administration and sanitation. In October 1942, the

program was amended to provide training for nurses, and the following March,

program for sanitary technicians was added. 62

The basic and advanced training programs remained the only unit training

guides available until mid-1943, when the Medical Department prepared three

special advanced programs for specific types of units. The first, Mobilization Training Program No. 8-21, guide for training malaria survey and malaria control units,

published on May 1943. Based on the assumption that all personnel would

have at least weeks of basic training in another unit, Medical Replacement

Training Center, or Medical Department Enlisted Technicians School before

assignment to malaria unit, the new program outlined two 4-week programs, one

for survey units, and one for malaria control units. Both programs contained similar introductions to malariology and entomology, but major emphasis in the program for survey units was placed on parasitology and the use of malaria survey

equipment, while the program for control units stressed mosquito control methods

and appliances.

The program for malaria units was followed on 21 May 1943 by specialized

guide, Mobilization Training Program No. 8-15, providing 13 weeks of advanced

training for army and communications zone medical supply depots. Under this

program, men selected to work in the headquarters, transportation, optical repair,

or depot sections of medical supply depots were assigned to comparable sections of

Zone of Interior depots for on-the-job training. During the final stage of training,

all members of these units participated in an 85-hour field problem.

The third guide written for specific unit was mobilization training program

for portable surgical hospitals, Mobilization Training Program No. 8-22, issued on

20 August 1943, approximately months after the first of these units was activated.

Assuming that personnel assigned to the unit had already received basic training,

the program for portable surgical hospitals prescribed weeks of intensive training

designed to prepare the unit for jungle warfare. Included in the unit’s program were

military subjects such as scouting and patrolling; hasty entrenchment and camouflage defense against chemical, mechanized, and airborne attack; and heavy tent

pitching, map reading, and litter carrying over difficult terrain. The medical portion

of the program also focused on jungle warfare and included such topics as tropical

disease, malaria, and field sanitation.

On September 1943, the basic-unit training program, Mobilization Training

Program No. 8-1 of February 1942, was superseded by new guide designated

Mobilization Training Program No. 8-101, “Mobilization Training Program for

Medical Department Units of the Army Service Forces.” In line with the increasing

length of basic training cycles throughout the Army, the revised program extended

62 MobilizationTraining Program No. 8-10, 29 July 1942, with changes and 2, dated 21 Oct. 1942 and 13 Mar.

1943,respectively.
272 MEDICAL TRAINING

the period of basic training to 16 weeks. Renewed emphasis on military subjects

was reflected by the use of the additional time to expand the basic military phase

of the program from to weeks. By comparison, the technical training phase remained unchanged at weeks, and the tactical training phase was reduced from

weeks to 2.

On 10 January 1944, this program was supplemented by guide for units that

had been assigned such numbers of limited service personnel that they were unable

to sustain the normal pace of training. 63 This supplementary mobilization training

program for substandard units could be utilized only after unit had been in training for weeks and had demonstrated that it was staffed by substandard personnel.

With the approval of Army Service Forces, such units were placed on decelerated

schedule during their seventh week of training, and allowed an additional 19 weeks

to complete the cycle. By this technique, substandard units were able to spend

total of 25 weeks in basic training.

The mobilization training program for substandard units was the last issued

for unit training under the cadre system. After the cadre system was replaced by

the preactivation system on 15 April 1944, all unit training programs had to be

rewritten. Under the new system, which shifted the entire responsibility for basic

training to the replacement training centers, all male recruits, regardless of their

branch, assigned to Army Service Forces were provided with weeks of basic military training under common program written by Army Service Forces. 64 In their

seventh week of training, those soldiers who were assigned to medical components

of the Army Service Forces began an 8-week technical training phase, or its equivalent at an enlisted technicians school, under Medical Department Mobilization

Training Program No. 8-1, ‘‘Mobilization Training Program for Medical Department Enlisted Personnel of the Army Service Forces,” published on June 1944.

At the end of the 14th week of the cycle, men who had been selected for assignment

as replacements were scheduled for weeks of basic team training. Those who were

earmarked for assignment as fillers were separated from the basic training program

and transferred to newly activated units.

During the final year of the war, threemobilization training programs governed

the training of all Medical Department units. The first, new program published

by the War Department on July 1944, provided medical units established under

the preactivation system at ASF Training Centers with weeks of basic training

before they entered the advanced training cycle. On 10 May 1945, the War Department issued revised version of the same program that left training schedules

virtually unchanged, but for the first time during the war provided lengthy discussion of the scope, content, and purpose of the program.65

Under this program, members of hospital units, general dispensaries, hospital

trains, laboratories, and medical groups devoted their first week of training to

classes in military and medical subjects and squad and platPon exercises. The second

and third weeks were spent in field exercises designed to train the unit to perform

63 MobilizationTraining Program No. 8-101A, 10 Jan. 1944. 64 MobilizationTraining Program No. 21-3, May 1944. 66 (1) Mobilization TrainingProgram No. 8-2, July 1944. (2) Mobilization TrainingProgram No. 8-2, 10 May

1945.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 273

its mission under tactical conditions with minimum of confusion and delay. In

addition, units were also required to participate in hours of night training each

week. The last weeks of the program were used to provide unit personnel with

additional parallel or on-the-job training at fixed installations and hospitals and to

prepare the unitfor overseas movement. Malaria control units, malaria survey units,

and sanitary companies, the latter consisting entirely of Negroes, were provided

with separate schedules that substituted practical exercises in their technical

specialty for parallel training at fixed installations. After completing the 6-week

basic training program, units were expected to be prepared to move to the field or

the theater of operations on short notice or, if time permitted, to complete an

advanced unit training cycle.

The second program, mobilization training program issued in 1943 to guide

the advanced training of medical supply units, was the only program of that period

to remain in effect under the preactivation system. The third and final program was

published on July 1944 as revised version of Mobilization Training Program

No. 8-10, the guide originally issued in 1942 to govern the advanced training of

numbered hospitals and nondivisional units of the Army Service Forces. During

the first 10 weeks of the program, specialists and technicians spent half of each

day in on-the-job training at local hospitals and installations; the remaining time

was divided between classes in military and technical subjects. After the technical

phase was completed, the cycle concluded with weeks of field exercises. Officers,

including for the first time dietitians and physical therapists, were provided with

weeks of classes in military, technical, and administrative subjects. The final section of the program contained the schedules prepared by the Ground Surgeon in

January 1944 for AGF divisional and nondivisional units during their advanced or

unit phase of training.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

During the early years of World War II, medical units were plagued by

chronic shortage of personnel and equipment. In part, these problems were the

result of nationwide shortage of the specialized men and materiel required by the

Armed Forces and, in part, from confusion and controversy over the role to be

played by numbered medical units in the Zone of Interior. Details of this controversy have been discussed at length in another volume in this series, but certain

aspects need to be considered here.66 To great extent, this controversy developed

because The Surgeon General contended that numbered medical units should be

used primarily as schools for tactical training that would furnish cadres and fillers

to affiliated hospitals and other medical units, while the War Department, and

later the Hospitalization and Evacuation Branch, ASF, believed that such units

should be used to operate hospitals in the Zone of Interior. At times, shortages and

changes in military requirements forced each party to modify its position, but the

basic controversy dominated training policies until early 1943.

When mobilization began in the fall of 1940, The Surgeon General planned to

66 See footnote 29 (2), p. 254.
274 MEDICAL TRAINING

issue only field training equipment to numberedhospital units and to assign only the

two to five officers required for tactical and administrative training. In principle,

these policies were opposed by the General Staff, which published statement on

January 1941 stating that hospitals should be immediately available to operate

in either the United States or theater of operations in an emergency. 67 Despite

this policy, however, shortages of officers, men, and equipment forced the General

Staff to adopt The Surgeon General’s position. Units activated during 1941 were

initially provided with cadre of Regular Army enlisted men, between two

and five officers each, and only enough selectees—from either reception centers or

Medical Replacement Training Centers—to provide them with approximately half

of their table-of-organization enlisted strength. The General Staff’s position on

issue of equipment also differed from The Surgeon General’s. In December 1940, 68

the staff announced that all Army units could obtain complete issues of equipment,

except for controlled items (those in short supply and issued only with War Department permission), by submitting requisitions to corps area headquarters. Two

weeks later, it issued special directive making this policy specifically applicable

to Medical Department units. 69 When units were first activated in 1941, however,

shortages of supplies and equipment again made it impossible for the Medical

Department to comply with War Department policies.

Events during the first half of 1941 tended to reduce the areas of disagreement

between The Surgeon General and the War Department on personnel policies. In

May 1941, difficulties encountered by the Medical Department in drawing complements from named hospitals in the United States for newly established hospitals

in overseas areas and units required by task forces being formed to protect the

French West Indies, and the inherent threat of such levies to medical service in the

Zone of Interior, persuaded The Surgeon General to ask the War Department to

authorize full complements of officers, nurses, and enlisted men for the 17 hospitals

activated earlier in the year. By this step, he hoped to simplify the problems of

converting training units into functional organizations. At the same time, however,

he requested authority to withhold all supplies and equipment from such units

except training equipment, individual equipment, vehicles, and controlled items,

until they were assigned missions involving medical care. In July, the War Department approved increases to bring 11 of these units to full table-of-organization

enlisted strength, and their officer and nurse allotments to 50 and 75 percent,

respectively. It also authorized withholding full issues of hospital equipment to

these units, and, at least for these units, approved practice already adopted by

the Medical Department. month later, however, the War Department refused to

approve request for authority to apply this policy to all units, and when the

67 Letter, The Adjutant General to Chief ofStaff and CommandingGenerals, Armies and Corps Areas, Jan. 1941,

subject: Purpose and Training of Certain Medical Corps Units To Be Activated With Selective Service Men. 68 Letter, The Adjutant General to Chief of Staff, General Headquarters; Commanding Generals, Armies, Corps

Areas, and Departments; Chief of the Armored Force; Commanding General, GeneralHeadquarters, Air Force; Chiefs

of Arms and Services; Chief of the National Guard Bureau; and Commanding Officers of Exempted Stations, 30 Dec.

1940, subject: Current Supply Policies and Procedure. 69 Letter, The Adjutant Generalto Commanding Generals of all Armies, Army Corps, Divisions, Corps Areas, and

Departments; Commanding General, General Headquarters, Air Force; Chief of Staff, General Headquarters; Chiefs

of Arms and Services; Chief of the Armored Force; Commanding Officers of Exempted Stations, 14 Jan. 1941, subject:

Organization, Training, and Administration of Medical Units.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 275

number of medical units activated and earmarked for task forces was increased

from 11 to 31 in August 1941, different supply procedures had to be applied to the

two groups of units.

The controversy reached critical point in the fall of 1941 when the War

Department pressed The Surgeon General to provide hospitals with full assemblages

and asked for his recommendations. In response, he pointed out that five hospital

assemblages had been issued, and 20 others were ready. Pointing to slow deliveries

by manufacturers, however, he again asked for authority to hold assemblages in

depots until units were assigned missions requiring the actual care of patients. To

support this recommendation, he argued that units in training did not require

full issue of equipment, that storage in the field was inadequate, that careless

handling by unit members would result in breakage and deterioration, and that

units were not trained to repack assemblages for overseas shipment. In response,

the War Department refused to abandon its position, but recognized the possibility

of storing scarce supplies, and, on December 1941, directed The Surgeon General

to earmark and hold all available equipment until it could complete survey of

warehousing facilities. Thus, by the time the United States entered the war, The

Surgeon General and the War Department had arrived at common policy of providing units withless than full quota of officers and nurses, and at times, reduced

complement of enlisted personnel. They disagreed, however, on the question of

providing units with full issues of supplies and equipment, and the dispute continued

unabated during the first half of the war.

By December 1941, the Medical Department had activated 22 general, 24

station, 17 evacuation, and eight surgical hospitals as training units. Of this group,

three station hospitals had been sent overseas, and 12 general, nine station, four

evacuation, and three surgical hospitals were included in task force pools and

authorized almost 100 percent of their table-of-organization enlisted strength, and

from 50 to 75 percent of their commissioned strength. The balance had half or less

of their enlisted strength and from three to five officers each. In addition, the Medical Department had organized an unactivated reserve of affiliated units that included 41 general, 11 evacuation, and four surgical hospitals. Such units consisted

primarily of professional complement of doctors and nurses and, under prewar

plans, were to be called to active duty immediately after the outbreak of war, supplied with equipment and enlisted personnel, and pressed into service without

further training. Supplies for these units consisted of five assemblages that had

already been issued, 20 being held in reserve, and 41 that were in various stages of

packing.

Early in January 1942, The Surgeon General outlined his plans for full-scale

mobilization. 70 Affiliated units were to be called to active duty and provided with

half their enlisted strength from training units, and the balance from reception

centers, Zone of Interior installations, and other medical units. Training units that

transferred such personnel, in turn, were toretain cadre to train additional fillers.

Some training units, especially station hospitals, were to be brought to authorized

70 Memorandum,Lt. Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, to the Assistant

Chief of Staff, G-3, 13 Jan. 1942, subject: Activation of Numbered ProfessionalMedical Units, and inclosures thereto.
276 MEDICAL TRAINING

enlisted and commissioned strength, and sent overseas as needed. Every unit was

to draw individual clothing, equipment, and vehicles at its home station. Hospital

assemblages would be provided only to those being sent overseas, preferably at the port of embarkation.

Shortly after this system was proposed, The Surgeon General realized that it

would have to be modified. The practice of activating training units at half strength,

adopted in 1941, resulted in units being hurriedly assembled at ports of embarkation. Members of units going overseas frequently had little time to become acquainted with each other’s capabilities before embarkation, and installations from

which fillers were drawn were often drained of personnel. In February 1942, therefore, The Surgeon General recommended that all units be activated at full table-oforganization enlisted strength.71 In May 1942, after receiving both ASF and AGF

support, the policy received War Department approval. 72

The Surgeon General, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, received only partial support, however, for his stand on the issuance of assemblages. After lengthy discussion, he accepted compromise whereby unit assemblages were declared controlled

items and placed under War Department control, and the Medical Department

was authorized to make fractional issues of training equipment. 73 Although The

Surgeon General agreed to this compromise, he did not give up hope of being able

to hold assemblages in medical depots until numbered hospitals were assigned

operational missions. Once unit assemblages had been declared controlled items,

he sought this control indirectly. On February 1942,74 he succeeded in persuading

the War Department to include paragraph in movement orders for units ordered

overseas, directing The Surgeon General to ship appropriate assemblages to ports

of embarkation or staging areas. Neither of these measures, however, settled the

controversy over equipment.

Under the compromise reached in January and February 1942, units were to

receive only field training equipment, individual equipment, and vehicles for use

in field training. Technical training and experience with professional supplies and

equipment were to be gained at Zone of Interior hospitals. As long as one or two

units were activated at particular post for training, this method seemed satisfactory, but delay in the construction of housing often caused units to be grouped

wherever housing was available. Too often, this system produced overcrowding

and inefficient training.

In March 1942, the entire system was challenged by the Hospitalization and

Evacuation Branch of Army Service Forces, which took the stand that hospital

units could best be prepared for overseas service by receiving complete assemblages

71 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, Acting The Surgeon General, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,

28 Feb. 1942, subject; Organization and Dispatch of Medical Department Theater of Operations Units. 72 Letter, The Adjutant General to the Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces; ArmyAir Forces; Services of

Supply; Armored Force; Armies; Army Corps; Corps Areas; Air Forces; Departments; Divisions; Base Commands;

and Defense Commands; Exempted Station and Force Commanders, May 1942, subject; Allotments of Grades and

Ratings and Authorized Strengths to Tactical Units (less Air Corps and Services with Air Corps).

73 Letter, The Adjutant General to The Surgeon General, 21 Jan. 1942, subject: Equipment for Medical Department Units.

74 Disposition Form, Maj. Gen. Brehon Somervell, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, to The Adjutant General, Feb. 1942, subject: Proposed Modificationof Movement Orders, and inclosure thereto.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FIELD UNITS 277

and being required to function as hospitals in the Zone of Interior. This stand

strengthened when Army Ground Forces submitted similar recommendation in

May, believing that units should be trained in the storage, maintenance, and repair

of hospital equipment, and that they should be capable of managing their own

messes and administration. In the paper duel that followed, The Surgeon General

reached the point by September 1942 of agreeing to issue housekeeping equipment,

but he continued to insist that all other equipment be withheld until units were

assigned operational missions.

At this point, controversy over the issuance of assemblages was absorbed by

larger and inconclusive dispute over the use of numbered hospitals to provide

medical service in the United States that lasted until mid-1943. By late 1942, many

units were becoming restless from long periods in training without an opportunity

to function, and reports of doctors sitting idle in army camps were beginning to

reach the public. Moreover, reports from the theater indicated the desirability of

training units to pack their own equipment and to reduce its size and weight by

eliminating unnecessary items. On 16 September, and again on 12 October, Army

Service Forces directed the Medical Department to prepare plan for employing

numbered medical units in the Zone of Interior, 75 and on 17 September 1942, it

requested The Surgeon General’s comments on draft of policy requiring the

issuance of complete assemblages to all hospital units. 76 In response, The Surgeon

General repeated his earlier recommendations, and supported by almost every

argument that had been used since 1940, to oppose the issuance of assemblages.

As result, Army Service Forces published compromise policy in January 1943

by which assemblages would contain only Medical Department supplies and equipment, while items needed by hospitals but supplied by other services, such as the

Quartermaster Corps, could be furnished to units upon requisition. 77 Although

The Surgeon General was not satisfied with this compromise, the policy remained

in effect until the end of the war. Debate continued until mid-1943, when rapid

reductions in the troop strength in the Zone of Interior brought it to an inconclusive

end.

In contrast to the hospital units trained by Army Service Forces, evacuation

units trained by Army Ground Forces were charged with providing medical service

during their training in the United States. To fill this dual role, they required both

personnel and equipment and usually suffered from shortage of both. In the absence of an adequate number of Medical Corps officers, Army Ground Forces was

unable to assign full complements to units in training. The ratio of Medical Corps

officers to table-of-organization authorizations varied from time to time and unit

to unit, but often it was less than 50 percent. Shortages of medical officers continued

through 1943 and 1944, and at times, units were brought to full table-of-organization strength only after being scheduled for shipment overseas. Whenever possible,

75 (1) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Services of Supply, forThe

Surgeon General, 16 Sept. 1942, subject: Assignment, Training, and Utilization of Theater of Operations Medical

Units. (2) 1st Indorsement, Brig. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Services of Supply, to The

Surgeon General, 12 Oct. 1942. 76 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Services of Supply, for The

Surgeon General, 17 Sept. 1942, subject: Medical Unit Assemblages, and inclosure thereto. 77 War Department Memorandum No. W700-4-43, 18 Jan. 1943.
278 MEDICAL TRAINING

however, The Surgeon General agreed to provide AGF units with full complement of professional personnel during the maneuver phase of training. 78

Shortages of equipment were most severe during 1942 and the first half of

1943. During that period, the Ground Surgeon repeatedly petitioned the Surgeon

General’s Office for more complete allowances of supplies and equipment, and it

was repeatedly notified that production of medical supplies was sufficient only to

meet the needs of units scheduled for shipment to the theaters of operations. In

mid-1943, however, the situation began to improve, and by the end of the year,

some units reported all of their equipment on hand. By early 1944, the Ground

Surgeon was able to report that all medical units engaged in maneuvers in Louisiana

had between 95 and 100 percent of their authorized equipment.

78 Shambora, WilliamE.: Army Ground Forces Medical Training During World War II. [Official record.]
497-333 75 19

INDEX

AAF. See Army Air Forces.

AAF Evacuation Service, 145

AAF School of Air Evacuation, 146, 261

AAF School of Applied Tactics, 70

Academic standards, 86-88

Adjutant General, The, 57, 97, 118, 136, 208, 222, 245, 252, 253, 254

Adjutant General’s School, 58, 119, 122

Administration of training, in Zone of Interior,

27-28

“Advanced Course,” for field grade officers,

“Advanced Graduate Courses,”

AGCT. See Army General Classification Test.

AGF. See Army Ground Forces.

Air Corps, 7, 16, 20, 38, 41, 145

Air Corps Ferrying Command, 260

Air Depot, Warner Robins, 259, 260

Air Evacuation Group, 349th—145, 146, 261

Air Force units, 249

Air Forces, 44, 45, 53, 54, 198, 217, 218, 242,

243, 244

Air Service Command, 259

Air Surgeon of the Army Air Forces, 30, 33, 69,

145, 218, 245, 251, 261

Air Transport Command, 261

Alaska, 145

Allbritton, Capt. M. G., 154

Allied Nations, 63

American Association of Medical Colleges, 63

American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology,

65

American Council on Education, 74, 75

American Dietetic Association, 154, 155, 156,

157, 167

American Expeditionary Forces, 151

American Medical Association, 83, 163, 168

Council on Medical Education and Hospitals

of, 157, 158, 167

Negro counterpart of, 55

American Red Cross, 17, 145

Anatomy, 168

Anesthesia, 140

Anesthesiology, 71

Anesthetists, student, selection of, 140

Aptitude Test for Medical Professions, 87

A.rea, Louisiana maneuver, 266

Armed Forces, 273

Armored Force, 109

Arms and Services With Army Air Forces, 198

Army:

First U.S., 247

Second U.S., 247

Third U.S., 37, 247

Army Air Corps, 68, 69, 198

Army Air Forces, 29, 32, 33, 42, 44, 51, 54, 70, 115, 116, 117, 119, 137, 145, 181, 198, 199,

215, 217, 218, 243, 244, 245, 248, 249, 250,

251, 252, 254, 259-261

facilities for training medical units in, 259

hospitals in, 131

training programs for enlisted personnel in,

198-199

Army and Navy General Hospital, 19, 41, 138,

158, 213, 219, 223, 228, 232, 236, 238, 243,

244

Army Dental School, 5, 10, 40, 67

Army extension course, 2, 50

Army General Classification Test, 86, 115, 159,

209, 218

Army Ground Forces, 29, 31, 33, 44, 45, 53, 54,

186, 197, 198, 199, 217, 242, 245, 248, 249,

250, 251, 254, 255, 261-268, 276, 277

battery tests for field artillery in, 264

commanding general of, 71, 261

directive of 19 Oct. 1942—264

G-3 section of, 261

medical units of, 267

nondivisional units of, 263, 267, 268

physical fitness tests in, 264

platoon-firing proficiency tests in, 264

refresher course in, 71

special battle courses in, 264

training activity in, 268

Army hospitals, program for cadets in, 149

Army Industrial College, 7, 15, 25, 38, 41, 48

Army Medical Center, 5, 6, 10, 17, 19, 29, 30,

33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67,

89, 91, 137, 213, 219, 222, 232, 233, 235,

242, 243

basic graduate courses at, 5, 40

establishment of,

instructors at, 91

Professional Service Schools at, 4, 7, 40, 66-

67, 221, 223

Roentgenology Section at, 215

training program at, for

enlisted men,

RA officers,
280 INDEX

Army Medical School, 5, 10, 62, 67

basic graduate course at, 40

training in plastic surgery at, 67

Army-Navy college training program, 75 Army Nurse Corps, 2, 152

chief, nurses in, 136-137

officer graduates of, 143

peacetime appointments to, 127

prewar programs of, 127-128

Army nurses;

basic military training for, 128-136

establishment of basic training centers for,

131

in neuropsychiatry, special programs for,

41-48

program guides for training of, 129

program of instruction prescribed for, 132

Army of occupation, in Germany, 151

Army Reconditioning Program, 124

Army Reserve components, activation of, 38

Army School of Malariology, 61, 65

Army School of Military Neuropsychiatry, 60

Army School of Nursing, 128, 147 Army School of Roentgenology, 33, 65, 217,

219, 221, 231, 254

Army Service Forces, 29, 31, 32, 33, 44, 54, 60,

75, 78, 98, 99, 122, 124, 130, 138, 140, 142,

164, 165, 171, 187, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199,

210, 217, 218, 222, 242, 245, 247, 249, 250,

251, 254, 255, 257, 258, 259, 261, 263, 268,

270, 272, 273, 277

commanding general of, 29, 32, 80, 130

Hospitalization and Evacuation Branch of,

276

jurisdiction of, 255

medical sections of, 197

medical unit of, 258

Military Training Division of, 99

Personnel Division of, 75

preactivation system in, 257

unit training systems in, 267

Army Service Forces schools, 135

Army Service Forces Training Division, 34

Army Special Service Schools, 45

Army Specialized Training Division, 77, 82, 87

Army Specialized Training Program, 42, 72-88

Army Specialized Training Unit, 78

Army Veterinary School, 5, 9, 10, 37, 40, 67

Army War College, 7, 15, 25, 38

Arnold, Gen. H. H., 68

ASF. See Army Service Forces.

“ASF Depot Course,” 48, 49

ASF Training Centers, 45, 116, 117, 182, 186,

195, 196, 197, 206, 207, 210, 236, 257, 258,

259, 272

ASF Unit Training Centers, 256, 257, 258

Ashford General Hospital, White Sulphur

Springs, W.Va., 158

Asia, 13

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3—208, 209

Assistant Commandant:

Medical Field Service School, 102

Officer Candidate School, Camp Barkeley,

99

Association of American Colleges, 82

Association of American Medical Colleges, 84,

87

ASTP. See Army Specialized Training

Program.

ASTU. See Army Specialized Training Unit.

ASWAAF. See Arms and Services With the

Army Air Forces.

Aviation Cadet Classification Centers, 69

Aviation Medical Examiners’ Course, 69

Axis, the, 43

Bacteriology, 168

Baruch Center of Physical Medicine, 170

“Basic Course,” 44

Basic Graduate Course for Veterinary Corps

Officers, 67

“Basic Graduate Courses,”

Basic military training, 43-51

Basic Summer Training Camp for Reserve

Officers,

Battalion, Medical, 32d—92

Battalion Surgeons’ Assistants, school for, 123-

124

Billings General Hospital, Indianapolis, Ind.,

71, 214, 215, 219, 221, 222, 224, 242

Biology, 168

Blackstone, Va., 177

Blitch, Maj. C. G., 265

Blood plasma, course in preparation of, 67

Board:

Central Physical Therapy, 157

Kenner, 99

of Vocational Education, 180

Bolton Act, 147, 150

Bousfield, Dr. M. O., 56, 57, 58

Bowman Field, Louisville, Ky., 137, 146

Britain, 21

British Expeditionary Force, 22

Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam

Houston, Tex., 183

Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston,

Tex., 71, 154, 157, 170, 219, 232, 235, 238

Burke-Wadsworth bill, 22

Burma, 145
INDEX 281

Bushnell General Hospital, Brigham City,

Utah, 71, 158

Cadet Nurse Corps, 147, 149

Cadre system, 251-257

Cameron, Maj. R. R., 260

Camouflage Course, 58

Camp Barkeley, Tex., 31, 45, 47, 99, 102, 111,

112, 115, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123, 124, 182,

183-187, 188, 193, 195, 202, 209, 240, 257

Department of Administration at, 109

Department of Training at, 108

officer candidate school at, 98

training program at, 101

Camp Breckinridge, Ky., 71

Camp Bullis, Tex., 37

Camp Carson, Colo., 265, 266

Camp Crowder, Mo., 183-187

Camp Edwards, Mass., 142

Camp Ellis, 111., 188-189, 256, 257

Camp Grant, 111., 31, 179-183, 187, 188, 195, 207, 209, 236, 257

Camp Hood, Tex., 182

Camp Lee, Va., 31, 32, 48, 174-179, 183, 187,

188, 202, 206, 207, 209

Camp McCoy, Wis., 132, 181

Camp Pickett, Va., 32, 174-179, 186, 195

Camp Plauche, La., 255, 256, 257

Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., 31, 33, 185,

187-188, 193, 195, 202, 209

Canada, 63

Canal Zone, 64

Canal Zone Health Department, 65

Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 4, 5, 11, 12, 17, 35, 36,

37, 39, 45, 89, 90, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 107,

108, 109, 111, 115, 117, 118, 119, 183, 207,

254

Central Dental Laboratory, 224

Central Physical Therapy Board, 157

“Certificate of Proficiency, Various Courses,

Special Schools, U.S. Army” (MD Form

60e), 143

Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal,

Md., 7, 38, 53-54, 58

Chemistry, 168

Chicago Quartermaster Depot, 42, 58

Chief of

Infantry, 31

Staff, 97

Army Air Forces, 198

Citizens’ Military Training Camps,

Civil Service, student dietitians brought into,

166

Civil Service Commission, 147, 149, 154, 166,

167, 168

Civilian institutions:

extension courses and subsidized study at,

specialized training in, 59-60

Class installations, 32, 33

Class II installations, 29

Class III installations, 29

Class IV installations, 29, 42

Clerical School, 180

College (s):

Meharry, 84

of Medical Evangelists, 84

Columbia University, N.Y., 60, 61, 66

Columbia University Neurological Institute, 61

Command(s):

Air Corps Ferrying, 261

Air Transport, 261

Troop Carrier, 261

Service:

First, 142, 143

Second, 142

Sixth, 181

Eighth, 117, 118, 209

Command and General Staff School, 7, 15, 25,

26, 38, 41, 58, 262, 265

Commandant, Medical Replacement Training

Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 98, 122

Commanding General: Army Air Forces, 146, 249

Army Ground Forces, 249

Army Service Forces, 29, 30, 32, 33, 75, 76,

80, 98, 222, 251

Commissions, in the Reserve,

Committee:

Joint Army-Navy Manpower Commission,

84

on Education of the American Occupational

Therapy Association, 163

Wakeman-Davis, 52

Communications Zone, 163

“Concurrent Basic Military Training,” 225

Congress, the 22, 23, 50, 73, 150, 192

Continental UnitedStates. See Zone of Interior.

“Cooking of Dehydrated Foods,” 152

Cooks and Bakers School, 122, 175, 180, 186

Corps, Quartermaster, 277

Corps Area Surgeons, 174

Corps Areas, 247

Corps maneuvers, 24

Corps of Engineers, 182, 188

Correspondence courses, for

National Guard officers,

Reserve officers,

Costa Rica, 63, 64

Council on Medical Education and Hospitals,

American Medical Association, 158, 167
282 INDEX

Course(s):

Advanced,

Advanced Graduate,

Army extension, 2, 50

Aviation Medical Examiners, 69

Basic graduate,

Basic graduate, Army Medical Center, 5, 40

Basic Graduate for VC officers, 67

Camouflage, 58

Correspondence,

Dental Equipment, 235

Dental Technicians, 10

Educational Reconditioning, 125

Equipment Maintenance and Repair, 224

Extension, 2, 6-8, 10, 50-51

Flight Surgeon’s Assistants, 11

Food and Nutrition, 67

Forage inspection refresher, 67

Laboratory Technicians, 10, 223, 235

Maintenance and Repair, 93

Mayo Clinic,

MC officers, 53

Medical and Field Inspector’s, 52

Medical Department Officers’ Basic,

Medical Field Service School Officers’ Basic,

45, 53

Medical Maintenance Technicians, 232

Mess Management, 97

Motor Transport Officers, 122

National Guard and Reserve Officers,

Noncommissioned Officers, 10

Occupational therapy assistants, 170-171

Officers’ Basic, 36

Officers, 44

Optical, 93

Ordnance Automotive Maintenance, 58, 122

Pharmacy technicians, 223, 231

Physical Reconditioning Officers, 124

Physical therapists, 153, 169

Professional Specialists,

Refresher, 67, 72

Reserve officers, 92

Seventh Refresher, 44

Special Cadre, 54-55, 58, 92, 262

Special Extension, for Medical Department

officers,

Special Graduate, in Clinical Pathology, 68

Tactical Unit Surgeon’s, 70

Tropical Medicine, 50, 95

Veterinary Technicians, 10, 233

X-ray Technicians, 10, 223

Craig, Gen. M., 14

Cushing General Hospital, Framingham, Mass.,

143

Darnall General Hospital, Danville, Ky., 46

Davis, Brig. Gen. A. D., 50, 52

D-day, 263

Dear, Brig. Gen. W. R., 176

Defense Commands, 255

Dengue, 95, 198

Dental Corps, 1, 44, 74, 79, 123, 266

dentists assigned to,

officers, 35-95

Dental Equipment Course, 235

Dental technicians, 229

Dental Technicians Course, 10

Dental training, 77-88

Department(s), of

Administration, 107, 109

Agriculture, 63

Chemical Warfare, 111

Dental Field Service, 108

Extension Courses, Medical Field Service

School,

Fever Therapy, 144

Field Medicine and Surgery, 108

Logistics, 107

Military Art, 107, 108

Military Medicine, 70

Reconditioning, 124

Sanitation, 107, 108

Tactics, 111, 112

Training, 107, 108, 111, 114

Veterinary Field Service, 108

Depot (s):

Air, Warner Robins, 259, 260

Medical, St. Louis, 91, 232, 234

Medical Supply, St. Louis, 217

New York General, 48

Quartermaster, Chicago, 58

DeWitt General Hospital, Auburn, Calif., 71,

235

Dietetics, wartime training programs in, 151

Dietitians, 151-171

Director(s):

of Military Personnel, ASF, 99, 117

of Military Training, ASF, 83, 258

of Training, ASF, 185, 199, 217, 243

Training Division, SCO, 118, 174, 243

Division(s):

Infantry:

3d—24

66th—265

76th —265

Light, 89 th—266

of Medical Sciences, National Research

Council, 59
INDEX 283

D. T. Watson School of Physiotherapy, 159

Dunn, Lt. Col. J., 240

Edgewood Arsenal, Md., 7, 53-54

Chemical Warfare School, 38, 58

Educational Reconditioning Course, 125

VIII Corps, 222, 266

testing team, 265, 266

VIII Corps Area, 222

Laboratory, 224

Eighth Service Command, 117, 118, 210

89th Light Division, 266

Electroencephalography, 71

11th Medical Regiment, 11

Emergency training programs: at civilian and military hospitals, 169 at educational institutions, 169

in physical therapy, 166

results of, 169-170

Enlisted personnel, 18-19 on-the-job training for, 10

responsibility for training of, 10

training of, 19

training programs for, 9-11

Enlisted Replacement Training Centers, 19

Enlisted Reserve, 15, 73

Enlisted Reserve Corps, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 83, 86

Enlisted technicians, 213-246

Enlisted Technicians Schools, 33, 233

Enlisted Training Centers, 19

Equipment, shortage of, in—-

medical units, 273

World War 11—273 Equipment Maintenance and Repair Course,

224

Europe, 13, 21, 35, 44, 154, 189, 210, 219, 239

Evacuation Hospital, 99th—265

Extension course (s), 8, 50-51

for enlisted personnel, 10

for officers in Reserve components.

for Regular Army officers,

to supplement camp training,

Far East, 63

Federal Security Agency, 157

Field Artillery School, 262

Field training, 11-12

Filariasis, 198

1st Medical Regiment, 11, 12, 32

1st Medical Squadron (Cavalry), 11

First Service Command, 142, 143

First U.S. Army, 247

Fitts, Col. F. M., 83

Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo.,

19, 41, 138, 143, 154, 158, 213, 214, 215, 219, 221, 232, 238

Fleetwood, S. Sgt. P. E. G., 175

Fleming, Lt. Col. W. D., 53

Flight nurses, 145-146

“Flight Surgeons Assistants Course,” 11

Flikke, Col. J. O., 136

Florida State Board of Health, 64

Food and Nutrition Course, 67

Fort Belvoir, Va., 58

Fort Benning, a., 7, 24, 36, 38, 262

Fort Bliss, Tex., 11

Fort Bragg, N.C., 56

Station Hospital, 71

Fort Clayton, C.Z., 61

Fort Dix, N.J., 171

Fort Huachuca, Ariz., 50, 56, 132, 159, 238

Station Hospital, 57, 58, 159

Fort Knox, Ky., 109

Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 7, 38

Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., 183, 265

Fort Lewis, Wash., 24, 179-182, 236, 257

Fort Livingstone, La., 56

Fort George G. Meade, Md., 19, 174, 175

Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., 19, 174, 240

Fort Ord, Calif., 37

Fort Sam Houston, Tex., 11, 33, 138, 155, 183,

214, 222, 224, 247

Station Hospital, 33, 158

Fort Sill, Okla., 262

Fort Warren, Wyo., 19, 183

Fort Washington, Md., 58, 122

Foster General Hospital, Jackson, Miss., 238

Foundation:

John and Mary R. Markle, 63

Mayo, 60, 61

Fourth Service Command, 240

France, 21, 27, 151

American Expeditionary Forces in, 151

surrender of, 22

French Fleet, 220

French West Indies, 274

G-l, Personnel, 76

G-3, Operations and Training Division, 3, 51

See also War Department General Staff.

General Headquarters, 33, 214, 247, 261, 262,

263, 267

administration of training by, 27-28

training directive dated February 1942—264

General hospitals, activated as training units,

275

General Staff, 22, 274

Germany, 21, 151
284 INDEX

Gonorrhea, sulfonamide-resistant, treatment

for, 144 Gorgas Institute, 65

Griffin, Lt. Col. W. C., 42

Ground Forces. See Army Ground Forces.

Ground Surgeon, 33, 251, 278

“Guide for the Professional Refresher Training

of Medical Corps Officers,” 72

Gulf Coast Air Corps Training Center,

Randolph Field, Tex., 44, 46

Halloran General Hospital, Staten Island,

N.Y., 71, 171

Hastie, Judge W. H., 56, 57, 58, 70

Hawaii, 12

Hawley, Lt. Col. P. R., 175, 207

Headquarters, First Service Command, 142,

143

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron,

349th Air Evacuation Group, 145

Heflebower, Brig. Gen. R. C., 184

Hellebrandt, Dr. F. A., 170

Hobby, Col. O. C., 239

Hospital(s), general, named:

Army and Navy, 19, 41, 138, 158, 213, 219, 223, 228, 232, 236, 238, 243, 244

Ashford, 158

Billings, 71, 214, 215, 219, 221, 222, 224, 242

Brooke, 71, 154, 157, 170, 219, 232, 235, 238

Bushnell, 71, 158

Cushing, 142, 143

Darnall, 46

DeWitt, 71, 235

Fitzsimons, 19, 41, 138, 143, 154, 158, 213, 214, 215, 219, 221, 232, 238

Foster, 238

Halloran, 71, 171

Kennedy, 231

Lawson, 50, 66, 138, 142, 153, 159, 214, 215, 219, 221, 222, 238, 240, 242

Letterman, 41, 153, 213, 219, 232

Lovell, 153

McCloskey, 71, 157

Mason, 60, 61, 66, 71, 142, 235

Mayo, 239

Nichols, 71, 239

Northington, 238

O’Reilly, 158, 214, 215, 219, 221, 222

Percy Jones, 71, 159

Tilton, 171

Wakeman, 219, 228, 238

Walter Reed, 71, 138, 144, 151, 153, 154, 158, 235

William Beaumont, 41, 213, 215, 219, 224,

232, 233, 238

Hospital(s), miscellaneous:

Evacuation, 99th—265

portable surgical, 71

St. Elizabeths, 141

Hospital(s), station:

Camp Edwards, 143

Fort Huachuca, 55, 58, 159

Fort Sam Houston, 41, 158

Hospitalization and Evacuation Branch, ASF,

273, 276

Howard University, Washington, D.C., 84

Law School, 56

Hunt, Dr. T., 87

Hygiene, 168

Illinois Board of Vocational Education, 180

Illinois National Guard, 179

Indiantown Gap, Pa., 36

Infantry, the, 236

Infantry Division(s):

3d—182

35th—188

45th—183, 185, 186

66th—265

76th—265

79th—176

89th—265

93d—55, 58

158th—185

Infantry Regiment, 354th—265

Infantry School, the, 7, 15, 38, 262

Initial Protective Force, 14, 15

Inspector General, The, 136, 259

Installation(s):

Class 1—31, 32, 33

Class 11—29

Class III—29

Class IV—29

“Instructors’ Guide,” 269

International Health Service of the Rockefeller

Foundation, Pensacola, Fla., 63, 64

Japan, 80, 124, 141

Japanese attacks, 22

Jefferson Barracks, Mo., 37

John and Mary R. Markle Foundation, 63

Johns Hopkins University, specialized training

for officers at, 60

Joint Army-Navy Manpower Commission

Committee, 84

Kelser, Lt. Col. R. A., 42

Kennedy General Hospital, Memphis, Tenn.,

231
INDEX 285

Kenner Board, investigations of, 99

Kinesiology, 168

Kirk, Maj. Gen. N. T., 143

Laboratory, Medical, 2d—214, 247

Laboratory, Medical Nutrition, 67

Laboratory technicians, 230

Laboratory Technicians Course, 10, 223, 235

Lake George, 266

Latin America, 22

Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga., 50, 66,

138, 142, 153, 155, 159, 214, 215, 219, 221,

222, 224, 238, 240, 242, 244

Letterman General Hospital, San Francisco,

Calif., 41, 153, 213, 219, 232

Limited Emergency, the 21-23

Limited-service personnel, 43

Logistics, instruction in, 104

Loma Linda, Calif., 84

Louisiana maneuver area, 266

Lovell General Hospital, Ayer, Mass., 153

Lovett, Capt. H. M., 155

Lull, Maj. Gen. G. F., 167

MAC. See Medical Administrative Corps.

MacArthur, Gen. D., 14

McCloskey General Hospital, Temple, Tex.,

71, 157

McNair, Brig. Gen. L. J., 27, 28, 261

Magee, Maj. Gen. J. C., 55, 127, 276

Maintenance and Repair Course, Medical

Supply Services School, 93

Maintenance and Repair Division, Medical

Supply Services School, 91, 93

Malaria, 95, 198

control, instruction in, 132

control units, 273

Maneuvers, in Louisiana, 266

Marshall, Gen. G. C., 21, 25, 239

Mason General Hospital, Long Island, N.Y.,

60, 61, 66, 71, 142, 235

Matlack, Lt. Col. F. S., 175

Mayo Clinic, courses at,

Mayo Foundation, Rochester, Minn., 60, 61

Mayo General Hospital, Rochester, Minn., 239

M-day, 12, 15

Mechanics School, 108

Medical Administrative Corps, 1, 2, 74, 76, 84,

97-125

officer candidates of, 102, 107

officer candidate schools of, 45, 92, 97, 98,

102, 109, 115, 117, 119, 123

construction and administration of tests

at, 113

qualification of applicants for, 115

Medical Administrative Corps—continued officers in, 35, 97, 128, 259, 260, 265, 266

standards for commissioning in, 115-119

Medical Administrative Corps Officers Reserve, 73

Medical Administrative Corps Reserve, 2, 83, 86

Medical and Field Inspector’s Course, 52

Medical Aptitude Test, 87

Medical Battalion, 32d—92

Medical College of Virginia, Richmond, Va.,

170

Medical Corps, 1, 2, 7, 42, 44, 50, 52, 74, 88, 99,

123, 266

officers, 35-39, 128

Medical Corps Officers’ Course, 53

Medical Corps Reserve, 88

Medical Department, 1, 3-5, 8, 43, 56, 57, 58, 61, 115, 122, 130, 136, 174, 229, 235, 236,

243, 245, 255, 270, 274, 276, 277

active field organizations of, 247

cadre officers in, 262

civilian institutions utilized by, 59

components of, 1-3

directives of, 225

enlisted women in, 236-240

field strength of, 247

field units, 247-278

officers, 18

courses for, 6, 72, 92

supply procedures of, 231, 239

technicians in, 239

theater-of-operations units in, 256

Medical Department Enlisted Technicians

Schools, 170, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219-222,

223, 224, 228, 230, 232, 235, 238, 240, 242,

245, 253, 255, 256, 266, 271

Medical Department Mobilization Training

Program. See Mobilization Training

Program.

Medical Department Officers’ Basic Course,

Medical Department Professional Service

Schools, 5, 7, 33, 40

Medical Department Replacement Center, 175

Medical Department Replacement Pools, 47,

50, 123

Medical Department Reserve,

Medical Department Reserve Officers’ Training Corps,

Medical Department Special Service Schools,

39

Medical Department Unit Training Centers, 18

Medical Department Units, 247-251, 272

Medical Depot, St. Louis, Mo., 122, 222

Medical Enlisted Reserve Corps, 72
286 INDEX

Medical Equipment Maintenance Technicians,

232-233

Medical Field and Sanitary Inspectors, 52-53

Medical Field and Sanitary Inspectors Course,

122

Medical Field Service School, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10,

12, 15, 17, 19, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39,

43, 44-45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 63, 69,

70, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 99, 108, 111, 112,

124, 175, 183, 208, 214, 232, 253, 265, 268, 269, 270

Commandant, 102

Department of Extension Course,

establishment of,

instructors at, 102

special courses for officers at, 262

Medical Field Service School Officers’ Basic

Course, 45, 53

Medical Laboratory, 2d—214, 247

Medical Maintenance Technicians’ Course,

232

Medical Nutrition Laboratory, 67

Medical Regiment (s):

1st—11, 12, 92

2d—11

11th—11

12th—11 Medical Replacement Training Centers, 31, 32,

33, 34, 43, 102, 111, 112, 122, 173-211, 232,

242, 254, 268, 270, 271

Medical Research Division, Edgewood Arsenal,

Md., 53, 54

Medical Section, Camp Ellis, 111., 257

Medical Service Training School, Warner

Robins Air Depot, 260

Medical Supply Depot, St. Louis, Mo., 217

Medical Supply Services School, St. Louis

Medical Supply Depot, 48, 91, 92, 94, 95,

217, 235, 253

Maintenance and Repair Course at, 93

Maintenance and Repair Division of, 91, 92,

93

Officers Supply Division of, 92

Optical Course at, 93

Optical Division of, 92

Medical Supply Training School, New York General Depot, N.Y., 48

Medical technicians, 1943 program for, 226

Medical TrainingBattalion, 8th—178

Medical Training Regiment (s):

28th—188-189

29th—189

30th—188, 189

31st—188, 189

32d—189

Medical Training Section, Warner Robins Air

Depot, 255, 260

Medical units, in—

Louisiana, 278

Zone of Interior, 273

Medicine, Army specialized training in, 77-88

Meharry College, Nashville, Tenn., 84

Mess Management Course, 97

MFSS Officers’ Basic Course. See Medical

Field Service School Officers’ Basic Course.

Military District of Washington, 122

Military installation(s):

Camp(s):

Barkeley, 31, 45, 46, 47, 98, 99, 108, 111,

112, 115, 117, 118, 119, 123, 174, 182,

183-187, 194, 195, 202, 209, 240, 257

Carson, 265, 266

Crowder, 183-187

Edwards, 143

Ellis, 188, 256, 257

Grant, 31, 174, 179-183, 195, 207, 209,

236, 257

Hood, 182

Lee, 31, 32, 48, 174-179, 183, 188, 202, 207

McCoy, 132, 181

Pickett, 32, 174-179, 186, 195

Plauche, 257

Robinson, 31, 33, 185, 187-188, 193, 195,

202, 209

Fort(s):

Belvoir, 58

Benning, 24, 36, 38, 262

Bliss, 11

Bragg, 56

Clayton, 61

Dix, 171

Huachuca, 50, 56, 132, 238

Knox, 109

Leavenworth, 38

Leonard Wood, 183, 265

Lewis, 24, 179-183, 236, 257

Livingstone, 56

Meade, 19, 174, 175

Oglethorpe, 19, 174

Ord, 37

Sam Houston, 33, 138, 214, 222, 224, 247

Sill, 262

Warren, 19, 183

Washington, 58

Military Occupational Specialty tests, 267

Military Personnel Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 91

Military subject, instructors in, 90

Military Training Division, ASF, 99

Mobilization cadres, 19-20
INDEX 287

Mobilization Regulations No. 1-1, 14 Aug.

1938—18

Mobilization Training Program(s):

8-1, Sept. 1940—174, 189-191, 214, 223, 269, 270

8-1, February 1942—270, 271

8-1, June 1944-195-197

8-1, 15 Apr. 1945—197-198

8-5, Aug. 1941-191-192, 193

8-5, 17 Nov. 1941—193

8-5, Jan. 1942—193

8-5, Aug. 1943—194

8-10, July 1944—273

8-10—130

8-15, 21 May 1943—271

8-21, May 1943—271

8-22, 20 Aug. 1943—271

8-101, Sept. 1943—271

21-3, May 1944—180

Monterey, Calif., 24

Moss, Dr. F. A., 87

Motor Mechanics School, 180

Motor Transport Officers’ Course, 122

Motor Transport School, 122

MTP. See Mobilization Training Program.

National Defense Act, 1, 7, 128

National Emergency Program, 73-74

National Guard, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 21, 22, 24, 43,

44

activation of

components of, 38

units of, 22, 32

commissions in, 7, courses for officers in, 37, 67, 92, 208

correspondence,

refresher, 39

divisions of, 263

medical units of, 18

training programs for, before 1942—18

National Guard and Reserve Officers Course,

National Medical Association, 55, 56, 57, 58,

127

National Research Council, 60, 62, 157

Division of Medical Sciences of, 59

Subcommittee on Tropical Diseases of, 62

National Selective Service, 74

Navy. See U.S. Navy.

Navy College Training Program, 74, 75

Negro manpower, plans for utilization of, 21

Negro students, physical therapy training

course for, 159

Negro troops, 20-21

Negro wards, 21

Neuropsychiatric nursing, 141-143

Army nurses in—-

formal courses for, 141-142

program for, 141

Neuropsychiatry, 140

Neuropsychiatry Branch, 65, 66

See also Neuropsychiatry Consultants Division.

Neuropsychiatry Consultants Division, 141

New Guinea, 145

New Orleans Staging Area, New Orleans, La.,

255 New York General Depot, 48

New York Port of Embarkation, 48

New York University, N.Y., 60, 61, 66

Nichols General Hospital, Louisville, Ky., 71, 239

Noncommissioned Officers Course, 10

North Africa, 194

Northington General Hospital, Tuscaloosa,

Ala., 238

Nurse anesthetists, 137-141

duties and training of, 138

in Army, in 1945—140

strength and utilization of, 140-141

training of, in WWII—140

Nursing and Psychiatric Consultants Division,

142

Nursing Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, 129, 130, 136, 141

Occupational therapists, 151-171

Occupational therapy, 151, 169

Occupational therapy assistants, course for,

170-171 Occupational Therapy Branch, Surgeon Gen- eral’s Office, 163

Office of the Director of Military Training,

Army Service Forces, 34

Office of The Surgeon General, 31, 33, 34, 52,

53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 71, 124,

129, 130, 144, 223, 245, 248, 270

Military Personnel Division of, 91

Training and Nursing Divisions of, 129

Officer Candidate School(s), 15, 47, 97-119,122,

124

at Camp Barkeley, 108, 117

battalion commander at, 102

commandant of, 102

curriculum of, 102

instructors at, 102

Officer Pool Program, 41

Officer pool training, 45-50

Officer training, in peacetime, 5-9

Officers’ Basic Course, 36, 45, 92
288 INDEX

“Officers’ Course,” 44

Officers’ Orientation School, 48

Officers’ Reserve Corps, 83

Officers’ Supply Division, Medical Supply

Services School, 48, 91, 92

Troop Carrier Command, 261

Operating room nurses, 143-144

Optical Course, Medical Supply Services

School, 93

Optical Division, Medical Supply Services

School, 91, 92, 93

Optical technicians, 234

Ordnance Automotive Maintenance Course, 58,

122

Ordnance School, Atlanta, Ga., 58

O’Reilly General Hospital, Springfield, Mo.,

158, 214, 215, 219, 221, 222

Organized Reserve units, 12

Orthopedic mechanics, 235

Pacific, 196

Pacific theater, 124, 146, 198

Pan American Highway, 63, 64

Parasitology, 168

Pearl Harbor, 13, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 43, 46, 129

Penicillin, 144

Pensacola, Fla., 64

Percy Jones General Hospital, Battle Creek,

Mich., 71, 159, 160

Personnel, shortage of, 273

Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, 75

Pharmacy technicians, 231-232

Pharmacy Technicians Course, 223, 231

Philippines, the, 12

Physical Reconditioning Officers’ Course, 124

Physical Standards Division, Surgeon General’s

Office, 158

Physical therapists, 151-171

emergency training courses for, 169

Negro, 159

orientation courses for, 153

special instruction courses for, 153

Physical therapy, 169

apprentices, training performance reports

for, 166

courses, 168

emergency training program in, 166

technicians, training of, 170

wartime training programs in, 151

Physical Therapy Branch, Surgeon General’s

Office, 162

Physics, 168

Physiology, 168

Plague, 198

Planning and Training Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 34

Poland, 22

Portable surgical hospitals, 71

President, the, 22, 23, 24, 75

See also Roosevelt, Pres. F. D.

Procurement and AssignmentService, 56

Professional Service Schools, 10, 44, 223

Army Medical Center, 4, 66-67

“Professional Specialists Courses,”

Program (s):

Army Reconditioning, 124

Army Specialized Training, 42, 72-88

Emergency training, 166, 169-170

Navy College Training, 74, 75

Officer Pool, 41

Physical therapy training, 151, 166

ROTC,

Surgical technicians, in 1943—226

Training, in dietetics, 151

See also Mobilization Training Programs.

Program guides, 222-225

Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939—14-16,

22, 25, 26, 68

Quartermaster Corps, 42, 188, 277

Quartermaster Replacement Training Center,

175, 176

Quartermaster School, 48

Randolph Field, Tex., 13, 38, 44, 137, 146, 261

Readiness and Requirements Branch, Training

Division, Surgeon General’s Office, 259

Reconditioning Consultants Division, Surgeon

General’s Office, 170

Refresher courses

for Medical Department officers, 72

in forage inspection, 67

Regiment (s):

Infantry, 354th—265

Medical:

1st—11, 12, 92

2d—11

11th—11

12th—11

Regular Army, 1, 2, 15, 38

Medical Administrative Corps officers in,

training programs, for

divisions of, before 1942—263

enlisted personnel in, 9-11

Regular Army Medical Corps, 65

officers, 38

basic training program,
INDEX 289

Reserve Corps, 127

officers, 208

Reserve officers, 4, 37, 97

correspondence courses for,

refresher course for, 39

Reserve Officers’ Course, 92

Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, 7, 8, 76, 88

program,

students, summer camp for, 40

units, 12

Reserves, the, 1, 2, 15, 22, 43, 44, 74, 75 Ritter Dental Manufacturing Co., Inc., 235

Rock River, 179

Rockefeller Foundation, International Health

Service of, 63, 64

Roosevelt, President F. D., 21, 22, 23, 24, 75

Ross, N., 155

ROTC. See Reserve Officers’ Training Corps.

Russia, 22

Sabine River area, corps maneuvers in, 24, 36

St. Elizabeths Hospital, psychiatric cases sent

to, 141

St. Joseph’s Hospital School of Nursing, 143

St. Louis Medical Depot, 48, 122

St. Louis Medical Supply Depot, 91, 217, 222, 232, 234

San Antonio, Tex., 69

Sanitary Corps, 1, 2, 44, 54, 67

officers, 35-39

Reserve,

Sanitary technicians, 232

Sanitary Technicians Course, 181, 225

Santa Ana, Calif., 69

SATC. See Students’ Army Training Corps.

Savannah Ordnance Depot, Savannah, Ga., 56

Scholastic Aptitude Test for Medical Colleges

(Medical Aptitude), 87

School(s):

Chemical Warfare, 53, 58

Clerical, 180

Command and General Staff, 58

Cooks and Bakers, 122, 175, 180, 186

Field artillery, 262

Infantry, 262

Mechanics, 108

Motor mechanics, 180

Motor transport, 122

selection of, 83

School for

Battalion Surgeons’ Assistants, 123, 124

Personnel Services, 124

Physical Reconditioning Instructors, 236

School of—

Aviation Medicine, 7, 10, 11, 38, 41, 68-70, 137, 146, 261

funded by Air Corps,

under command of Chief of Air Corps,

Military Neuropsychiatry, 50, 61, 65-66, 142

Tropical Medicine, San Juan, P.R., 62

2d Medical Laboratory, Fort Sam Houston,

Tex., 214, 247

2d Medical Regiment, 11, 12

Second Service Command, 142

Second U.S. Army, 247

Secretary of Navy, 75

Secretary of War, 43, 56, 57, 70, 75, 76, 159

Selective Service, 15, 22, 24, 31, 32, 74, 207

legislation, 24

Selective Service Act, 75, 141, 154

of 1917—72

Selective Service System, 78

Selective Training and Service Act, 24, 38

of September 1940—38, 73

Senior Cadet Nurse Corps, 146-147

Service Command(s):

First, 142, 143

Second, 142

Sixth, 181

Eighth, 117, 118, 209

Service Unit, 1308th—175

Services of Supply, 260

Unit Training Center, 255

Seventh-Day Adventist School, 84

Seventh Refresher Course, 44

Signal Corps, 20, 188

training center, 187

Sixth Corps, 179

Sixth Corps Area, 179

Sixth Service Command, 181

“Skinner Plan,” 9, 38

Somervell, Maj. Gen. B. B., 80, 130

South Pacific, 194

Special Cadre Course, 54, 58, 92

for divisional officers, 54-55, 262

“Special Extension Course for Medical Department Officers, Regular Army,”

Special Graduate Course in Clinical Pathology,

68

SpecialService Schools, 25, 50, 51, 70, 219, 222

See also School of Aviation Medicine.

Specialized and advanced military training, 51

Specialized training, for selected officers, 59

Specialized Training and Reassignment unit, 78

Springer, Capt. J. E., 171

Spruit, Lt. Col. C. B., 36

Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif., 159
290 INDEX

Station Hospital(s):

Camp Edwards, 143

Fort Huachuca, 55

Fort Sam Houston, 41, 214, 222

Station Hospital X-ray Clinic, 224

Steger, Lt. Col. B. L., 256

Stevens, Lt. Col. S. L., 265

Stimson, H. L., 57

Stout Field, Indianapolis, Ind., 261

Stratemeyer, Maj. Gen. G. E., 199, 215

Students’ Army Training Corps, 73

Subcommittee on

Physical Therapy, NRC, 157

Tropical Diseases, NRC, 62

Venereal Diseases, Division of Medical

Sciences, NRC, 144

Superintendent of

Army Nurse Corps, 140

Nurses, 136, 140

Surgeon General, The, 2, 3, 4, 12, 17, 18, 21, 30,

31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 39, 41, 44, 53, 60, 62, 68,

69, 72, 80, 82, 88, 97, 98, 99, 115, 123, 127,

128, 136, 137, 138, 139, 143, 144, 145, 147,

149, 152, 156, 157, 158, 162, 163, 164, 167,

168, 170, 171, 183, 185, 186, 199, 208, 209,

221, 222, 236, 240, 245, 246, 247, 248, 251,

252, 255, 268, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278

Deputy Director of Training, 244

Surgeon General’s Office, 30, 48, 62, 65, 118,

124, 139, 141, 142, 147, 152, 153, 154, 157,

159, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 171, 175, 207,

218, 239, 251, 255, 256, 258, 259, 278

Physical Standards Division, 158

Physical Therapy Branch, 162

Reconditioning Consultants Division, 171

Veterinary Division, 67

Surgeon General’s Protective Mobilization

Plan of 1939-16-21, 39, 174, 200, 213, 214,

232

Surgeons General of the Army and Navy, 144

Surgical hospitals, 275

Surgical technicians, program for, in 1943—226

Syrette, 206

Tactical Unit Surgeon’s Course, 70

Tank DestroyerSchool, Camp Hood, Tex., 182

Taylor, Col. R. I., 143

Technical courses, visual aids for, 93

Tennessee Valley Authority, 63, 64

Tests:

AGF:

battery, 264

platoon combat-firing proficiency, 261

special battle, 264

Aptitude, 87

Tests—Continued

Medical aptitude, 87

Military Occupational Specialty, 267

Scholastic Aptitude, 87

3d Division, 24

Third U.S. Army, 37, 247

Third WAC Training Center, 240

349th Air Evacuation Group, 145

354th Infantry Regiment, 265

Tilton General Hospital, Fort Dix, N.J., 171

Trainees:

appointments of, 166

classifications of, 166

salaries of, 166

Training—-

between the wars, 1-14

in continental United States, administration

of, 27-28

Training centers, 174-188

Training Department, 90

Training Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, 34, 61, 118, 129, 130, 138, 142,

159, 206, 207, 223, 258

activities of, 34

director of, 119

Training program(s):

emergency, results of, 169-170

for Army Air Forces enlisted personnel, 198-

199

for Army Nurses, before WWII—127 Training Subdivision, Office of The Surgeon

General, 34

Tropical and Military Medicine, 62

Tropical diseases, instruction in, 132

Tropical Medicine Course, 50, 95

Tulane University, New Orleans, La., 62, 63, 64

School of Medicine, 62

12th Medical Regiment, 11

Typhoid fever, 95

Typhus, 95, 198

Unit Training Branch: Training Division, ASF, 255, 258, 259

Training Division, SGO, 258

“Unit Training Camp for Reserve Officers,”

Unit Training Centers, 19

Unit Training Status Reports, 258

United States. See Zone of Interior.

U.S. Army, 20

U.S. Army General Dispensary, Memphis,

Tenn., 231

U.S. Army Medical Department, training

facilities of, in 1939—1

U.S. Cadet Nurse Corps, formation of, 147
INDEX 291

U.S. Civil Service Commission. See Civil

Service Commission.

U.S. Navy, 63, 74

U.S. Office of Education, 75, 180

U.S. Public Health Service, 63, 147

University(ies):

Columbia, 60, 61, 66

Howard, 84

Johns Hopkins, 60

New York, 60, 61, 66

of Illinois, 61

of Pennsylvania, 60, 61

of Tennessee, 33, 65, 217

of Wisconsin, 159, 170

Stanford, 159

Tulane, 62, 63, 64

V-J Day, 153, 157, 162, 169

V-12. See Navy College Training Program.

Vaughn, Dr. A. N., 57

Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944—167

Veterinary Corps, 1, 2, 44, 74, 80

officers, 35-95

Veterinary Corps Reserve,

Veterinary Division, Surgeon General’s Office,

42, 67, 80

Veterinary technicians, 233-234

Veterinary Technicians Course, 10, 233

Veterinary training, 77-88

Visual aids, in technical courses, 93

Visual Aids Library, 112

WAC. See Women’s Army Corps.

Wakeman, Col. F. B., 52

Wakeman General Hospital, Columbus, Ind.,

219, 228, 238

Wakeman-Davis Committee, 52

Walker, Lt. M. C., 147

Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington,

D.C., 5, 6, 30, 62, 71, 138, 144, 151, 153, 154,

158, 164, 235

War Department, 16, 18, 20, 21, 28, 30, 33, 36,

42, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 60, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 87, 141, 157, 174, 176, 181, 183, 197,

198, 200, 208, 223, 247, 249, 250, 251, 258,

261, 262, 263, 268, 272, 273, 274, 276

directives, 30, 107, 225

mobilization plan. See War Department

Protective Mobilization Plan,

mobilization training programs, 263

policies, 2, 8, 110, 274

reassignment centers, 195

War Department—Continued

reorganization of March 1942—28-34, 270

training aids, 112

training circulars, 27

training guides, 29

War Department Circular No. 59—248

War Department General Staff:

G-l, Personnel, 51, 76, 261

G-3, Operations and Training, 30, 98, 183,

199, 248

G-4—28

War Department Protective Mobilization

Plan, 16, 17, 18, 21, 207

War Department Special Staff, 3, 32

War Department Technical Manual 21-250, “Army Instruction,” 19 Apr. 1943—106

War Emergency Course, 164, 168, 170, 171

design and purpose of, 163

qualifications of applicants for, 163

War Manpower Commission, 84, 163

War Plans Division, 28

Warner Robins Air Depot, Ga., 259, 260

Wickliffe, Capt. N., 155

William Beaumont General Hospital, El Paso,

Tex., 41, 213, 215, 219, 224, 232, 233, 238

Wilmington Anti-Aircraft Firing Center, Wil- mington, Del., 56

Wilson Dam, Ala., 63

Woman’s Medical College of Pennsylvania,

Philadelphia, Pa., 83

Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps, 181

Women’s Army Corps, 71, 157, 158, 159, 170,

171, 236, 238, 239

technicians in, 238

training of hospital companies in, 240

Woolford, Col. W. S., 261

World War I—1, 2, 9, 14, 17, 20, 23, 25, 26, 65,

154

occupational therapists in, 151

physical therapists in, 151

Senior Cadet Nurse Corps during, 146

utilizing nurses as anesthetists during, 137

World War II—21, 95

Army Specialized Training Program in, 72

dietitians in early years of, 152

mobilization training programs in, 268

preparations for, 1-34

programs utilized during, 268

senior cadet program in, 149

shortage of personnel and equipment of

medical units in, 273

training nurse anesthetists in, 137

training problems encountered in, 59

United States entry into, 98
292 INDEX

X-ray technicians, 230-231

X-ray Technicians Course, 10, 223

Zone of Interior, 27, 46, 48, 78, 88, 109, 113,

123, 130, 163, 173, 197, 198, 211, 240, 252,

255, 256, 257, 261, 268, 273, 274, 277

Zone of Interior—Continued

administration of training in, 27-28

hospitals in, 276

chief nurses in, 137

training in, 138

installations in, 195, 258, 275

Zoology, 168

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 0-497-333
History of the Medical Department, U.S. Army in World War II

DISTRIBUTION LIST

MEDICAL TRAINING IN WORLD WAR II

Active Army:

OSD (1)

OSA(l)

USofA(l)

ASA (FM) (1)

ASA (I&L) (1)

ASA (R&D) (1)

USASA (1)

DASA(l)

DCSPER (2)

ACSI (1)

DCSOPS (2)

DCSLOG (2)

CORC (1)

CAR (1)

CINFO (1)

CNGB (1)

CLL(l)

CRD (1)

CMH (1)

TAG (1)

TIG (1)

TJAG (1)

TPMG (1)

CofCh (1)

TSG (30)

Cof SptS(l)

CofEngrs (1)

ACSC-E (1)

Dir of Trans (1)

Med Bds (1)

FORSCOM (5) TRADOC (5)

OS Maj Comd (2)

except

USAREUR (4)

LOGCOMD (2)

SHAPE (2)

MDW (1)

Armies (3)

Corps (1)

Div (2)

Bde (1)

Sp Op Gp (1)

Med Gp (2)

Med Bn (1)

USATC(l)

USMA (3)

Svc College (2)

Br Svc Sch (1)

AHS (5)

USAMEDSVS (1)

Med Sec, GENDEP (OS) (1)

Med Dep (OS) (1)

GH (5)

Army Hosp (4)

USAH (25-100 Beds) (1)

USAH (100-500 Beds) (2)

USAH (500-750 Beds) (4)

Med Cen (2) except

WRAMC (5)

BAMC (5)

WRAIR (5)

AFIP (5)

USAPERSCEN (1)

HSC (5)

PG (1)

Med Lab (1)

AFES(l)

Arsenals (1)

Med FLDMS (1)

DB (1)

Disp (1)

USAC(l)

MAAG(l)

Mil Msn (1)

JBUSMC (1)

Units org under fol TOE:

8-500 (AH) (1)

8-510 (1)

8-551 (5)

8-581 (1)

Historical Unit,

USAMEDD (850)

NG: State AG (1); Div(l)

USAR: LOGCOMD (1); Div (1); Bde (1); Med Gp (2); USAH (1); TOE’s 8-500 Team AH (1);

8-510 (1); 8-551 (1); 8-581 (1).

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 310-50.

Request copies remaining on hand after initial distribution be returned to The Historical Unit, USAMEDD, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Md. 21701.