United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 17-1856 

KRISTIN BLOMQUIST; KEVIN WARNER, 

Plaintiffs, Appellants, 

v. 

THE HORNED DORSET PRIMAVERA, INC.; 

UNIVERSAL INSURANCE GROUP, INC., 

Third Party Plaintiffs, Appellees, 

VICTORIA BANUCCI; MICHAEL DIXON; 

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BANUCCI-DIXON, 

Third Party Defendants. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Marcos E. López, U.S. Magistrate Judge] 

Before 

Torruella, Thompson, and Kayatta, 

 Circuit Judges. 

Roberto Boneta, with whom Boneta & Nogueras, LLC was on brief, 

for appellants. 

Julio C. Cayere-Quidgley, with whom Héctor J. Ferrer-Ríos, 

were on brief, for appellee Universal Insurance Group, Inc. 

May 31, 2019 
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. A destination wedding in 

Puerto Rico can be a wonderfully jovial affair. Spirits flow 

freely. The sights are beautiful. Guests chat and dance into the 

early morning hours under the Caribbean sky. Unchecked joviality, 

however, has an unfortunate tendency of leading to carelessness. 

Add an intentionally wet and soapy dancefloor to the equation and 

someone is bound to get hurt. And when someone gets hurt, lawsuits 

frequently follow. That is what happened here. 

Appellants Kristin Blomquist and her husband Kevin 

Warner filed suit in the District of Puerto Rico against The Horned 

Dorset Primavera Hotel, Inc. (the "Hotel"), claiming the Hotel was 

negligent in relation to a slip and fall Blomquist suffered during 

their friends' wedding in the Hotel premises. Blomquist and Warner 

alleged that the Hotel was liable for Blomquist's injuries because 

it did not respond in accordance with its heightened responsibility 

under Puerto Rico law to the presence of a dangerous condition in 

its premises -- a wet and soapy dancefloor. The jury disagreed, 

and the district court entered judgment accordingly. 

Discontent with this result, Appellants moved for 

judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. 

The district court denied both motions, finding that the jury's 

verdict was reasonably supported by the evidence and that the 

Appellants' motion did not provide basis for either a judgment as 
-3- 

a matter of law or a new trial. Blomquist and Warner appealed, 

and we now affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

Appellants Kristin Blomquist and Kevin Warner 

("Appellants"), a married couple from New York, traveled to Puerto 

Rico on April 4, 2013, to attend their friends' destination 

wedding. Upon arriving in Puerto Rico, Blomquist and Warner 

checked into the Horned Dorset Primavera Hotel,1 where the wedding 

ceremony, banquet, and reception were to be held on April 6, 2013. 

The ceremony and banquet were held in one of the Hotel's 

ballrooms. After the banquet, the wedding guests moved outdoors 

for the reception. The outdoor reception area consisted of a 

rectangular space, about thirty-five meters long and eight meters 

wide, described as a "plaza" (the "plaza") and a slightly elevated 

pool section. The plaza is located in a space between two sets of 

stairs, one leading up to the second floor of the Hotel's main 

building, and the other leading up to the elevated pool section. 

Here, a bar was set up and a temporary dancefloor2 was installed. 

 

1 During the course of the proceeding, the Hotel filed for 

bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court allowed the case to continue 

with the Hotel's insurer, Universal Insurance Group, Inc., as the 

defendant. 

2 The temporary dancefloor did not belong to the Hotel. It was 

rented from an outside vendor by the wedding planner. 
-4- 

A DJ set up his equipment in the elevated pool area, which had 

been furnished with tables and chairs. Under the stars, guests 

enjoyed an open bar and danced to the DJ's tunes.

The festivities, however, took a turn for disorder as 

the night wore on. The younger crowd of guests that remained at 

the reception -- a group of approximately forty-five to fifty 

individuals -- began jumping into the pool and transitioning 

between the pool and the nearby dancefloor. At some point between 

12:00am and 1:30am, following the bride's lead, the guests 

purposefully wet the dancefloor and began to "slip and slide."3 

They slipped and slid laying on their front sides, backsides, and 

sideways. A few of the partygoers even began running from the top 

of the pool area staircase to the dancefloor, in an effort to slide 

across it. 

The Hotel's most senior staff member present, Geraldine 

Thouvenin, witnessed these actions and proceeded to confront the 

groom, Michael Dixon, regarding the guests' behavior. Thouvenin 

warned the groom that this behavior was not recommended and was 

dangerous. The groom arrogantly disregarded Thouvenin's warning 

and, in outright defiance, went to the Hotel's kitchen, retrieved 

soap, and poured it on the dancefloor to increase its 

 

3 "Slipping and sliding" refers to the deliberate act of a person 

using the momentum created by a vertical movement to launch their 

body across a flat surface. 
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slipperiness.4 Other wedding guests assisted the groom, pouring 

water and soap on the dancefloor to add to the "fun." 

At some point after the soap and water were poured, 

Blomquist left the reception and pool area to change into her 

bathing suit. When Blomquist returned to the reception area, she 

slipped and fell on the wet and soapy dancefloor,5 fracturing her 

wrist and injuring her back. 

B. Procedural Background 

On November 1, 2013, Blomquist and Warner filed a 

complaint in the District of Puerto Rico on diversity jurisdiction 

grounds against the Hotel and its insurance company, Universal 

Insurance Group, Inc. Blomquist and Warner alleged that the Hotel 

was negligent in failing to provide a safe facility, allowing 

inherently dangerous conditions to continue, and neglecting to 

warn all parties at risk. Blomquist demanded $40,909.18 in medical 

 

4 Appellants did not sue the groom. As the district court noted, 

if anything, Appellants attempted to prevent a third-party 

complaint against the groom and bride to proceed. 

5 Consonant with the governing standard of review, Appellants' 

counsel conceded at oral argument that, for purposes of our review 

of the district court's denial of their motion for judgment as a 

matter of law, we must assume that Blomquist's injuries were the 

result of her deliberate attempt to slip and slide on the 

dancefloor. Appellants' motion for new trial, however, is based 

on the premise that Blomquist's fall was. Thus, for purposes of 

their appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for 

new trial, Appellants maintain that Blomquist did not partake in 

the slipping and sliding on the dancefloor. 
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damages; $400,000 for pain and suffering; $200,000 for disability 

to engage in her normal life and career activities; and $250,000 

for mental suffering and anguish. Warner demanded $200,000 for 

mental pain and anguish. 

A two-day jury trial was held on October 4 and 5, 2016.6 

After closing arguments, the jury was provided a verdict form with 

the following two-prong question (the "verdict question"): 

Do you find by a preponderance of evidence that The 

Horned Dorset Primavera was negligent in the operation 

of the hotel facility at the wedding reception held in 

April 2013, and that its negligence proximately caused 

damages to Kristin Blomquist? 

The jury responded in the negative.7 Accordingly, the 

district court dismissed Blomquist and Warner's claims and entered 

judgment in favor of the Hotel and its insurer. 

Dissatisfied, Blomquist and Warner moved for judgment as 

a matter of law. In the alternative, they requested a new trial. 

The district court denied both motions and this appeal ensued. 

 

6 Pursuant to the parties' consent, trial was conducted before a 

magistrate judge. 

7 If the jury had responded "Yes" to the verdict question, it was 

required to proceed to additional questions. Specifically, the 

verdict form asked the jury: whether it found that the Hotel, 

Blomquist, and/or Warner had acted negligently and if their 

negligence constituted the proximate cause of Blomquist's 

injuries; what proportion of the negligence that caused damage to 

Blomquist was attributable to each of these parties; and, how much, 

if anything, it would award Blomquist and Warner for their physical 

and emotional injuries. 
-7- 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Appellants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 

We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as 

matter of law under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. New Albertson's, Inc., 915 

F.3d 36, 60 (1st Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Notwithstanding, 

"our scrutiny of the jury verdict is tightly circumscribed." 

Sailor Inc. F/V v. City of Rockland, 428 F.3d 348, 351 (1st Cir. 

2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although we examine the 

record as a whole, the facts are construed in the light most 

favorable to the jury verdict, Jennings v. Jones (Jennings I), 499 

F.3d 2, 3 (1st Cir. 2007), and any inferences are drawn in favor 

of the non-movant, Jennings v. Jones (Jennings II), 587 F.3d 430, 

438 (1st Cir. 2009). Moreover, "we do not evaluate the credibility 

of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence." Lama v. Borrás, 

16 F.3d 473, 475 (1st Cir. 1994). In sum, "[w]e must sustain the 

district court's denial of a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a 

matter of law unless the evidence . . . could lead a reasonable 

person to only one conclusion, namely, that the moving party was 

entitled to judgment." Id. at 476 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law was 

grounded on their contention that the Hotel was liable because it 
-8- 

did not comply with its "duty to remediate the dangerous condition" 

on the dancefloor despite its knowledge of the "dangerous activity" 

taking place thereon. In denying Appellants' motion for judgment 

as a matter of law, the district court recounted that the jury was 

presented evidence reflecting that the dangerous condition was 

created by "wedding guests and/or the groom"; that Warner was aware 

of the condition and even partook in the slipping and sliding; and 

that at least one member of the Hotel's staff -- Thouvenin -- 

warned the groom about the dangers the condition presented. Based 

on this, the district court determined that the evidence "[did] 

not point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of liability 

that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict for [the 

Hotel and its insurer]."8

Appellants filed their suit under Puerto Rico's general 

 

8 In fact, the district court went beyond this, concluding that 

"the Jury determined the Hotel was not negligent," which implied 

that they "found the Hotel staff acted reasonably and prudently 

under the circumstances in deciding not to halt the wedding 

reception" and instead only warning Warner about the dangerous 

condition. Because a negative response by the jury to either of 

the verdict question's two prongs -- one related to negligence and 

the other to causation -- would have freed the Hotel from 

liability, see P.R. Civ. Code Art. 1802, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, 

§ 5141 (requiring both negligence and causation for the imposition 

of liability), the district court's conclusion regarding the 

jury's finding of negligence is not necessarily accurate. It is 

possible that the jury found that the Hotel was negligent in not 

taking further action (e.g., warning every single guest about the 

dangerous condition) but that its negligence was not the proximate 

cause of Blomquist's injury. 
-9- 

tort statute, Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. 

Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 5141 ("Article 1802"). Article 1802 provides 

that "[a] person who by an act or omission causes damage to another 

through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage 

so done." Id. Negligence under Article 1802 is generally defined 

as "the failure to exercise due diligence to avoid foreseeable 

risks." Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 47, 

50 (1st Cir. 1997). To succeed on a negligence-based tort claim, 

a plaintiff must establish four essential elements: "(1) a duty 

requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of 

conduct, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proof of damage, and (4) a 

causal connection between the damage and the tortious conduct." 

Id. at 50. "[L]iability will only arise if the damages complained 

of were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant." Irvine v. Murad 

Skin Research Labs., Inc., 194 F.3d 313, 322 (1st Cir. 1999). 

Although they are not absolute insurers of their guests' 

well-being, hotels have a heightened duty of care towards their 

guests. Woods-Leber, 124 F.3d at 51. A hotel is required to 

maintain its premises in such conditions that its guests will not 

suffer foreseeable injuries; in other words, the hotel must ensure 

that the areas to which its guests have access are safe. Cotto v. 

C.M. Ins. Co., 16 P.R. Offic. Trans. 786, 793 (1985). In carrying 

out its duty of care, a hotel must act as would a "prudent and 
-10- 

reasonable person under the circumstances." Vázquez-Filippetti v. 

Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2007). 

Accordingly, a hotel breaches its duty of care, and thus is liable 

for an injury caused by a dangerous preexisting condition within 

the hotel's premises (e.g., as a result of an accidental fall), if 

(1) the hotel knew or should have known of the condition, and 

(2) the hotel did not take the precautions of a prudent and 

reasonable person to avoid or remedy the foreseeable risks the 

condition created. See id. at 49 (holding that a breach of duty 

only occurs if a defendant "acted (or failed to act) in a way that 

a reasonably prudent person would foresee as creating undue risk"); 

Woods-Leber, 124 F.3d at 51 (citing Goose v. Hilton Hotels, 79 

P.R.R. 494, 499 (1956)). 

Appellants' tort claim is not at all unusual. As we 

have noted before, "[c]ases premised on the existence of a 

dangerous condition often arise from a 'slip-and-fall,' caused by 

a wet or slippery floor, and involve a claim that the business 

owner was negligent in permitting the condition to remain because 

it is foreseeable that a wet floor is likely to cause injury." 

Vázquez-Filippetti, 504 F.3d at 50. 

For Appellants to succeed on their challenge to the 

district court's denial of their motion for judgment as a matter 

of law, they must establish that, based on the evidence presented 
-11- 

at trial, a reasonable jury could only conclude: (1) that the Hotel 

breached its duty of care towards Blomquist (i.e., that the Hotel 

was negligent), and (2) that this breach of duty constituted the 

proximate cause of Blomquist's injuries.9 See Lama, 16 F.3d at 

476; Woods-Leber, 124 F.3d at 50. A finding to the negative on 

either is fatal to Appellants' request for a judgment as a matter 

of law. 

Appellants' chances for success slip from their grasp on 

the second prong -- the jury was presented sufficient evidence to 

conclude that the Hotel's breach of duty did not constitute the 

proximate cause of Blomquist's injuries. Moreover, sufficient 

evidence was presented for the jury to conclude instead that the 

proximate cause was Blomquist's deliberate conduct. 

1. Breach of Duty 

Appellants aver that no reasonable jury could have 

failed to find that the Hotel was negligent and breached its duty 

of care under Puerto Rico law in the present case's circumstances; 

in particular, where the Hotel "allow[ed] its guests to wet and 

soap up a dancefloor during a wedding (with an open bar) . . . 

[and] engage in dangerous behavior on it," and only advised one of 

 

9 The two other elements of a negligence-based tort claim are not 

at issue here. The Hotel does not dispute its heightened duty of 

care under Puerto Rico law or the physical injuries suffered by 

Blomquist. 
-12- 

the persons present, the groom, to discontinue the dangerous 

behavior. 

They contend that the Hotel had knowledge of the wet and 

soapy dancefloor and that, since Blomquist's fall and the resulting 

injuries were foreseeable, the Hotel had a duty to warn the guests 

of the condition of the dancefloor and, furthermore, remedy the 

situation by taking measures to put an end to the guests' dangerous 

behavior. Appellants rely on the testimony of Hotel employee 

Thouvenin in support of this contention. Thouvenin testified that 

she witnessed the wet dancefloor and the guests sliding on it. Up 

to this point, we can agree with Appellants. Because Thouvenin 

was present as an employee of the Hotel, her testimony regarding 

the dancefloor's condition and the wedding guests' behavior could 

only led a reasonable jury to conclude that the Hotel was aware of 

the dangerous condition on the dancefloor and of the dangerous 

activity taking place thereon. Similarly, the jury could only 

have concluded that the risks presented by the precarious 

combination of a wet and soapy surface and the ever-present forces 

of gravity, such as that of Blomquist's fall, were foreseeable to 

the Hotel. Reaching the opposite conclusion would belie basic 

human experience, as reflected in a long line of case law. See 

generally Donald M. Zupanec, Store or Business Premises Slip-andFall: Modern Status of Rules Requiring Showing of Notice of 
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Proprietor of Transitory Interior Condition Allegedly Causing 

Plaintiff's Fall, 85 A.L.R.3d 1000 (2019) (collecting cases). 

With these two elements met -- knowledge of the dangerous 

condition and a foreseeable risk -- the Hotel had, as a matter of 

law, a duty to address the dancefloor's dangerous condition. 

Vázquez-Filippetti, 504 F.3d at 50. In doing so, the Hotel had to 

act as would a prudent and reasonable person in those 

circumstances, id. at 49, and here is where things start to slide 

downhill for Appellants. The inquiry as to whether the Hotel acted 

as a prudent and reasonable person is case-specific and factdependent. See Ocasio-Ocasio v. Guadalupe-Hernández, Civil No. 

09-1982 (SEC), 2010 WL 5184785, at *3 (D.P.R. Dec. 21, 2010) 

(citing Irvine v. Murad Skin Research Labs., Inc., 194 F.3d 313, 

322 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying Puerto Rico law)). As such, the 

question of how the Hotel should have responded to the situation 

on the dancefloor is one better left for the fact-finder, in this 

case, the jury. Id. This, in tandem with our standard of review 

-- which requires that we construe the facts in a light most 

favorable to the jury verdict and draw any inferences in favor of 

the Hotel, Jennings I, 499 F.3d at 3; Jennings II, 587 F.3d at 438 

-- sets up a slippery slope for Appellants' fall to failure. 

Thouvenin testified that the only action the Hotel took 

to prevent the wedding guests from continuing to slip and slide on 
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the wet dancefloor was warning the groom that such conduct was not 

safe.10 We recognize that the extent of this response was, as a 

matter of law, lacking and, thus, inappropriate given that 

Thouvenin's warning was directed at a single individual,11 despite 

the Hotel having a heightened duty of care towards every guest, 

including Blomquist. See Woods-Leber, 124 F.3d at 51. 

Notwithstanding, a finding that the Hotel breached its heightened 

duty of care by not warning all guests, and Blomquist in 

particular, is not enough to save Appellants. The jury could have 

found that the Hotel did not have a duty of take the further step 

of remedying the dangerous condition by preventing the guests from 

using the dancefloor. This finding, as will become evident below, 

plays a critical role in our proximate cause analysis. 

The jury was certainly presented evidence of additional 

measures the Hotel could have taken to prevent the guests from 

using the dancefloor. On cross-examination, Appellants' counsel 

 

10 The content and forcefulness of Thouvenin's warning to the groom 

is not completely clear on the record. Thouvenin, however, did 

testify that in the hospitality business employees cannot use 

language as forceful as "You stop it right now" when talking to 

guests. 

11 Our review of the record reveals that this warning was not the 

first or only warning given to the groom about wetting the 

dancefloor. Before formalities commenced on the day of the 

wedding, the Hotel's General Manager told the groom that "the 

[dance]floor cannot be wet." In fact, the Hotel acquired a tent 

to place over the dancefloor in order to prevent it from getting 

wet if it rained.
-15- 

asked Thouvenin if she requested the Hotel's security guard to 

intervene with the dancing guests or if she turned off the power 

so there was no light, to which she responded that she did not. 

These could seem to be effective measures to us, but the jury might 

as well have found that they would have been counterproductive. 

For example, the crowd of guests could have reacted violently to 

a security guard's intervention, even more so if they were under 

the influence of alcohol. As the Hotel's general manager testified 

based on his forty-six years of hospitality experience, when guests 

are provided an open bar they tend to drink more and "lots of 

things . . . happen." Likewise, the jury could have concluded 

that turning off the lights would have been ineffective in 

deterring the guests' behavior and, furthermore, made the 

dancefloor more dangerous than it already was by limiting their 

vision. 

Based on the foregoing, it was reasonable for the jury 

to conclude that the Hotel's breach of duty towards Blomquist was 

limited to its failure to warn her of the dangerous conditions on 

the dancefloor and, by the same token, that the Hotel's heightened 

duty of care did not require it to take additional measures to 

prevent her from using the dancefloor. 

	
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2. Proximate Cause 

Under Puerto Rico law, a negligent omission, such as a 

hotel's failure to carry out its duty of care, may constitute the 

proximate cause12 of an injury if "in all likelihood, verging on 

certainty, the injury could have been avoided if the action omitted 

would have been carried out." Soc. de Gananciales v. G. Padín 

Co., 17 P.R. Offic. Trans. 111, 124 (1986) (citation omitted). 

General experience guides the analysis to make such 

determinations. See Díaz v. E.L.A., 18 P.R. Offic. Trans. 473, 

500 (1987). After a careful review of the record, we find that 

the jury was presented sufficient evidence to conclude that 

Blomquist would have sustained her injuries even if the Hotel had 

met its duty of care by warning her of the dangerous condition on 

the dancefloor. 

At trial, the Hotel presented two key pieces of evidence 

upon which the jury could reach this conclusion: a video showing 

the wedding guests' behavior on the dancefloor, and the testimony 

of Hotel employee Antonio Rosa Miranda ("Rosa"), who was working 

as a waiter during the wedding reception. The video depicts the 

atmosphere at the dancefloor area during the early morning hours. 

It shows guests joyfully slipping and sliding in their bathing 

 

12 The legal cause of a tortious injury is also referred to as 

"adequate cause" in Puerto Rico case law. 
-17- 

suits across the visibly wet13 yet crowded dancefloor, while others 

dance beside them. Some guests even have friends grab their limbs 

and spin them on the dancefloor. Despite Blomquist's testimony to 

the contrary, based on the video, the jury could have concluded 

that Blomquist knew the dancefloor was wet, as she saw the other 

guests slipping and sliding, but nonetheless attempted to join the 

fun, which ultimately led to her injuries. That Blomquist changed 

into her bathing suit after the dancefloor had been soaked with 

water and soap, and thus after the guests had already began to 

slip and slide therein, as stipulated by the parties, further 

supports the belief that she was determined to partake in the 

dangerous behavior. 

Rosa's testimony reinforces this notion. He testified 

that he saw many of the guests "running and sliding chest first on 

the dancefloor." Among these guests was Blomquist, whom he saw 

fall while "running or . . . slipp[ing] or . . . try[ing] to slide 

and [going] . . . sideways." Rosa was able to single Blomquist 

out among the crowd of guests on the dancefloor with certainty 

because she was, according to him, "bigger than all the other 

girls." 

Together, the video and Rosa's testimony provided 

 

13 The video also shows a guest further wetting the dancefloor by 

spraying what appears to be champagne into the air. 
-18- 

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the 

proximate cause of Blomquist's injuries was not the Hotel's breach 

of its duty of care towards her, but rather Blomquist's deliberate 

attempt to slip and slide on the wet dancefloor like the other 

guests. See Soc. de Gananciales v. Jerónimo Corp., 3 P.R. Offic. 

Trans. 179, 186 (1974) (holding that, under Puerto Rico law, 

proximate cause is not "every condition [without] which the result 

would not have been produced," but rather only that condition 

"which ordinarily produces [the result] according to general 

experience."). In other words, sufficient evidence was presented 

for the jury to conclude that Blomquist's fall was not the result 

of an accident attributable to the Hotel's failure to warn her of 

the dangerous condition in the dancefloor because, based on common 

experience, she would have decided to partake in the slipping and 

sliding that caused her injuries regardless. See Aquellos 

Aseguradores de Lloyd's London v. Compañía de Desarrollo Comercial 

de P.R., 126 D.P.R. 251, 264 (1990), 1990 WL 710138 (noting that 

there are situations in which "one cause substitutes [and] takes 

[the] place" of a prior natural cause14 of an injury, thereby 

 

14 Puerto Rico law distinguishes natural cause from legal or 

proximate cause. Natural cause is an expansive concept, covering 

"any of the conditions necessary to produce an injury," while legal 

or proximate cause is only "the condition that ordinarily causes 

the damage, according to common experience." Jiménez v. Pelegrina 

Espinet, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. 881, 887 (1982). 
-19- 

"break[ing] the causal nexus . . . [and] becoming . . . the only 

legal cause of the resulting damage, thus releasing the first actor 

from liability" (citation omitted)); see also Crespo v. H.R. 

Psychiatric Hosp., Inc., 14 P.R. Offic. Trans. 1027, 1034 (1983) 

(in the context of wrongful death claim, recognizing the difficulty 

in preventing a determined individual from performing a selfinjurious act). After all, the jury had already been presented 

evidence of the ineffectiveness of the Hotel's warnings; even after 

being warned by Thouvenin about the risks of slipping and sliding 

on the dancefloor, the groom continued engaging in this dangerous 

behavior. 

Because the evidence presented at trial could lead a 

reasonable jury to conclude that the Hotel's failure to meet its 

duty of care was not the proximate cause of Blomquist's injuries, 

we affirm the district court's denial of Appellants' motion for 

judgment as a matter of law. 

B. Appellants' Motion for a New Trial 

We review the district court's denial of Appellants' 

motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Jennings II, 587 

F.3d at 435-36 (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 

U.S. 415, 435 (1996)). A district court may grant a new trial "if 

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence" or if "the 

action is required in order to prevent injustice." Id. at 436 
-20- 

(quoting Kearns v. Keystone Shipping Co., 863 F.2d 177, 181 (1st 

Cir. 1988)). "On appeal, we owe much deference to the trial 

court's determination. . . . We reverse only if we find that the 

trial court has abused its discretion in making its assessment of 

the weight of the evidence." Correia v. Feeney, 620 F.3d 9, 11 

(1st Cir. 2010). 

Unlike our review of a district court's decision 

regarding a motion for judgment as a matter of law, however, our 

"new trial motion standard of review . . . [does] not requir[e] 

that we take the evidence in favor of the verdict." Jennings II, 

587 F.3d at 438 (citations omitted).15 Notwithstanding, when it 

comes to witness credibility our standard tilts in favor of 

deferring to the jury's verdict. See Correia, 620 F.3d at 12 ("It 

is axiomatic that, absent exceptional circumstances, issues of 

witness credibility are to be decided by the jury." (quoting United 

States v. García, 978 F.2d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1992))). "In 

general, conflicting testimony or a question as to the credibility 

of a witness are not sufficient grounds for granting a new trial." 

 

15 This court recently expressed that the standard of review for 

the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, which is 

deferential to the jury's verdict, may be applied "in reviewing 

the denial of a motion for a new trial . . . predicated on a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, [given that] the 

inquiries merge." Dimanche v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 893 F.3d 

1, 8 n.9 (1st Cir. 2018). In the present case, the result would 

be the same under either the deferential or traditional standard. 
-21- 

García, 978 F.2d at 748 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Appellants aver that the district court abused its 

discretion by not considering their arguments challenging Rosa's 

testimony that he saw Blomquist dancing and then falling while 

attempting to slip and slide on the dancefloor. They stress two 

points: first, that Rosa testified that Blomquist was wearing a 

black bathing suit when she fell, while stipulated photo evidence 

reflects that she was actually wearing a black dress over a pink 

bathing suit; and, second, that the testimony was directly 

contradicted by Blomquist's testimony that she did not slip and 

slide on the dancefloor, and was unaware it was slippery. 

The nature of this challenge sets it up to fail. We 

have held that "conflicting testimony or a question as to the 

credibility of a witness are [generally] not sufficient grounds 

for granting a new trial." García, 978 F.2d at 748 (citation 

omitted). This is precisely the type of challenge Appellants 

raise. They argue that we should strip Rosa's testimony of 

credibility, accept Blomquist's version of the events, and 

conclude that the district court abused its discretion in 

concluding that the jury's verdict was not "against the weight of 

the evidence." Jennings II, 587 F.3d at 436. We are not persuaded. 

The jury was presented with Blomquist's testimony, 

claiming that her fall was accidental, and Rosa's testimony, which 
-22- 

strongly suggested that Blomquist's fall was the result of an 

unsuccessful attempt to slip and slide on the dancefloor. No other 

witnesses testified about the specific circumstances of 

Blomquist's fall. Thus, the jury had to decide whether to accept 

Blomquist's account of how she fell or Rosa's. That they chose to 

accept Rosa's, despite the inconsistencies in his testimony 

regarding Blomquist's attire, is not grounds for a new trial. 

García, 978 F.2d at 748. 

We hold that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that the weight of the evidence supports the 

jury's verdict, and therefore affirm the denial of Appellants' 

motion for a new trial.16

III. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court's 

denial of Appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and 

motion for a new trial. 

Affirmed. 

 

16 Inasmuch as Appellants attempt to raise an argument based on the 

doctrine of comparative negligence under Puerto Rico law, they did 

not properly flesh it out on appeal and therefore we deem it 

waived. See U.S. v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).