Dist. Court, 125 Nev. 9, 15, 200 P.3d 77, 81 (2009) (a writ of mandamus is

the appropriate remedy to challenge a district court's refusal to consider an application for treatment filed pursuant to NRS 484C.340).

Petitioner contends that the district court erred by denying her application for alcohol treatment under NRS 484C.340 based on a general policy against granting the applications of defendants who are arrested for another DUI after entry of their guilty plea instead of an individual assessment of whether a defendant is qualified for the treatment program. It is well-settled that the district court abuses its discretion by refusing to consider an application for treatment filed pursuant to NRS 484C.340, Stromberg v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 125 Nev. 1, 3, 200 P.3d 509, 510 (2009), is required to consider the merits of an "application for treatment as well as any opposition proffered by the prosecuting attorney," Savage, 125 Nev. at 17, 200 P.3d at 82, and must consider each case on its own merits, see Willmes v. Reno Mun. Court, 118 Nev. 831, 835, 59 P.3d 1197, 1200 (2002). Accordingly, it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny an application for treatment based on a judicial policy without first considering the merits of the case.

The record reveals that petitioner was arrested for another DUI after entering her guilty plea and applying for treatment under NRS 484C.340. On status check, the district court informed petitioner that it discussed the new DUI case with defense counsel,' had a policy against accepting people into the alcohol treatment program if they were arrested for another DUI while their application was pending, and would not accept her into the program. On reconsideration, the district court stated that it
'The record does not contain a transcript of this discussion.

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A 2"always looked at every situation before [making] a decision," would

"consider not following a policy if there was a particular reason not to," and the reasons advanced by defense counsel during status check did not justify treating the petitioner "differently than [it had] treated other people in the past who have been in this exact same position." Defense counsel argued that the district court's policy violated legislative mandate and the Willmes case, but did not argue that the district court overlooked or failed to consider merits unique to petitioner's case. Based on this record, we are not convinced that the district court's ruling constituted a manifest abuse of discretion or an arbitrary or capricious act. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. „ 267 P.3d 777, 780 (2011) (defining manifest abuse and arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion for purposes of mandamus relief). Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED. 2

' J.

erry cc: Hon. Linda Marie Bell, District Judge Law Offices of John G. Watkins Clark County District Attorney Attorney General/Carson City Eighth District Court Clerk

2 Cause appearing, we grant petitioner's motion to file a reply and have considered the reply attached to that motion. We deny petitioner's motion to strike the State's notice of supplemental authorities, supplemental appendix, or motion for judicial notice.

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A 3
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