Dist. Court, 125 Nev. 9, 15, 200 P.3d 77, 81 (2009) (a writ of mandamus is 

the appropriate remedy to challenge a district court's refusal to consider 

an application for treatment filed pursuant to NRS 484C.340). 

Petitioner contends that the district court erred by denying 

her application for alcohol treatment under NRS 484C.340 based on a 

general policy against granting the applications of defendants who are 

arrested for another DUI after entry of their guilty plea instead of an 

individual assessment of whether a defendant is qualified for the 

treatment program. It is well-settled that the district court abuses its 

discretion by refusing to consider an application for treatment filed 

pursuant to NRS 484C.340, Stromberg v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 125 

Nev. 1, 3, 200 P.3d 509, 510 (2009), is required to consider the merits of an 

"application for treatment as well as any opposition proffered by the 

prosecuting attorney," Savage, 125 Nev. at 17, 200 P.3d at 82, and must 

consider each case on its own merits, see Willmes v. Reno Mun. Court, 118 

Nev. 831, 835, 59 P.3d 1197, 1200 (2002). Accordingly, it is an abuse of 

discretion for a district court to deny an application for treatment based on 

a judicial policy without first considering the merits of the case. 

The record reveals that petitioner was arrested for another 

DUI after entering her guilty plea and applying for treatment under NRS 

484C.340. On status check, the district court informed petitioner that it 

discussed the new DUI case with defense counsel,' had a policy against 

accepting people into the alcohol treatment program if they were arrested 

for another DUI while their application was pending, and would not accept 

her into the program. On reconsideration, the district court stated that it 

'The record does not contain a transcript of this discussion. 

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"always looked at every situation before [making] a decision," would 

"consider not following a policy if there was a particular reason not to," 

and the reasons advanced by defense counsel during status check did not 

justify treating the petitioner "differently than [it had] treated other 

people in the past who have been in this exact same position." Defense 

counsel argued that the district court's policy violated legislative mandate 

and the Willmes case, but did not argue that the district court overlooked 

or failed to consider merits unique to petitioner's case. Based on this 

record, we are not convinced that the district court's ruling constituted a 

manifest abuse of discretion or an arbitrary or capricious act. See State v. 

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. „ 267 P.3d 777, 

780 (2011) (defining manifest abuse and arbitrary or capricious exercise of 

discretion for purposes of mandamus relief). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 2 

' J. 

erry 

cc: Hon. Linda Marie Bell, District Judge 

Law Offices of John G. Watkins 

Clark County District Attorney 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2Cause appearing, we grant petitioner's motion to file a reply and 

have considered the reply attached to that motion. We deny petitioner's 

motion to strike the State's notice of supplemental authorities, 

supplemental appendix, or motion for judicial notice. 

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