Assessment of PL 111-216

An Assessment of the Effectiveness of 

Public Law 111-216 in Reducing Accident Risk

Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention

Federal Aviation Administration

November 22, 2010
Assessment of PL 111-216

This document presents the results of a safety analysis of proposed rulemaking by the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) on Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air 

Carrier Operations, pursuant to Public Law 111-216, The Fiscal Year 2010 Federal Aviation 

Administration Extension Act. Section 209(b) of the Act mandates that FAA convene a panel of 

experts to establish the best methods and required training time, plus recurrent training 

requirements, to ensure that flight crewmembers of Part 121 air carriers and Part 135 air carriers 

“master aircraft systems, maneuvers, procedures, takeoffs and landings, and crew coordination.“

Section 216 of the Act directs FAA to undertake rulemaking to ensure that Part 121 air carriers 

“develop and implement means and methods for ensuring that flight crewmembers have proper 

qualifications and experience.” Section 216 also requires the rulemaking to ensure at least the 

following.

Comprehensive pre-employment screening of prospective flight crewmembers,

“including an assessment of the skills, aptitudes, airmanship, and suitability of each 

applicant” to function effectively in an air carrier environment.

All flight crewmembers must obtain an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate and have 

“appropriate multi-engine aircraft experience.” 

Section 217 of the Act requires rulemaking to amend minimal requirements under Part 61 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations for obtaining an ATP to ensure that a pilot can “function 

effectively in an air carrier operational environment. Amendments to Part 61 must ensure that 

applicants for an ATP have received flight training, academic training, or operational experience 

that effectively prepares them for a multi-pilot environment, adverse weather conditions, 

including icing conditions, high altitude operations, and adherence “to the highest professional 

standards.” Finally, Section 217 retains the required minimum of 1,500 hours before a pilot can 

qualify for an ATP, including “sufficient flight hours” in difficult operating conditions. 

Based on a detailed review of 417 accidents over 10 years, the analysis found that the 

rulemaking would be most effective against accidents involving turbojets in on-demand Part 135 

operations and against twin-engine aircraft accidents in Part 135 commuter operations. The 

rulemaking would have significant effect against Part 121 accidents, but less so than against Part 

135 accidents, and the rulemaking would have little to effect on the small number of Part 125 

accidents that occurred over the 10-year study period. 

Anticipated Rulemaking

An ATP license is currently required to operate as a pilot-in-command (PIC) during Part 121 

operations. The Act and the rulemaking would retain the minimum of 1,500 hours to qualify for 

an ATP. In addition, as directed by the Act, the rulemaking will require an ATP and an aircraft 

type rating for all pilots in Part 121 operations, and will require that at least 50 of the minimum 

1,500 hours to qualify for an ATP be in multi-engine aircraft. The rulemaking also will include a 

restricted-privileges ATP which allows credit for appropriate academic and classroom training 

and credit for military flight experience. For example, the rule may require 1,000 hours total 

time as a pilot for a graduate of an accredited aviation degree program, or a minimum of 750
Assessment of PL 111-216

hours total time for a military pilot. The restricted-privileges ATP also would have to be a 

minimum age of 21. 

The rule also will require time in a flight simulation training device to obtain an ATP as part of 

the effort to ensure “sufficient flight hours” in difficult operating conditions and to incorporate 

the additional experience requirements defined in Section 217 of the Act. 

In addition, the proposed rule will require either a straightforward minimum of 2,500 hours of 

pilot experience to qualify as a PIC in Part 121 operations, or the rule may alter that by requiring 

that a prospective PIC has at least 1,000 hours of experience in air carrier operations, plus the 

1,500-hour minimum to qualify for an ATP. Though the net effect of these 2 variations on PIC 

eligibility is not exactly synonymous, the effect on accident reduction is essentially the same.

Safety Analysis

Analytical Approach

The analysis assesses the likely capacity of the proposed rules to reduce the number of accidents 

and fatal accidents in the future. It will address all operations in which the PIC must have an 

ATP or in which the rulemaking will require an ATP of the first officer (FO). Therefore the 

analysis will address all Part 121 and Part 125 operations; all operations involving twin-engine 

aircraft as Part 135 commuters; and all on-demand Part 135 or Part 91K operations involving 

turbojets or other airplanes configured with 10 or more seats. The analysis is based on all 

accidents that meet the above criteria from fiscal year (FY) 2001 through and including FY 2010, 

as follows:

Part 121 Operations 354 accidents and 370 aircraft;

Part 125 Operations 5 accidents and 5 aircraft

Part 135 Commuter 14 accidents and 14 aircraft

Part 135 On-Demand 44 accidents and 44 aircraft

The preferred approach would be to assess each element of any rulemaking as a discrete item. 

However, the statutory directions include elements that are difficult to isolate. Where possible 

the elements are addressed separately, but they are not assigned discrete scores. Instead scores

are assigned for the entire rulemaking as a single proposal.

 

Scores represent the likelihood that the proposed rules could have prevented the accident had the 

rules been in place at time of each accident due either to the rule’s capacity to have precluded or 

corrected a contributing condition. The rule was first scored against each accident qualitatively 

with the following categories of effectiveness; low; moderate; moderate-to-high; high; and very 

high. Those categories then were converted to values in the following order: 15%; 35%; 55%; 

75%; and 90%. The end result was a quantified set of benefits in which, for example, a score of 

35% against an accident involving 100 fatalities would have reduced risk by a theoretical 0.35 

fatal accidents and a theoretical 35 fatalities. All scores were reviewed by a 3-person panel.
Assessment of PL 111-216

Note that the mere presence of some condition such as a pilot with less than the proposed flight 

hours did not necessarily mean that the rulemaking would have been effective against a 

particular accident scenario. Many accidents simply do not reflect at all on pilot performance. 

Where a pertinent issue was influential in an accident, its score depended on an assessment both 

of the degree to which the factor influenced the accident and the degree to which a new rule 

realistically could be expected to have changed the outcome of a particular accident, based on the 

details of each accident flight. Finally, as a matter of analytical principle, no accident received a 

score higher than 0.9 based on the assumption that we can never be certain that any intervention 

would eliminate all risk in a particular scenario. With these caveats, the analysis focused on the 

following factors:

Part 121 PIC with less than 2,500 hours;

Part 121 FO with less than 1,500 hours, 1,000 hours, and 750 hours;

Part 121 FO operating without an ATP; 

Part 121 FO operating without a rating in the aircraft being flown;

Crew Resource Management;

Sterile Cockpit Procedures;

Professionalism;

Weather (thunderstorm, icing, turbulence, gusty crosswinds etc.); and

Stall-upset or unusual attitude.

Part 121 operators had 354 accidents involving 370 Part 121 aircraft in the 10-year study period. 

The majority of the 354 Part 121 accidents involved low-level outcomes or isolated risk that did 

not affect most aircraft occupants. For example, turbulence accounted for 102 of the 354 

accidents, all but a few of which involved single injuries, while gate-ramp accidents accounted 

for 88 accidents. Most of those accidents did not reflect on crew performance. Similarly, 

miscellaneous on-board events and deer strikes on runways accounted for another 10 accidents, 

and 12 more events qualified as accidents only because an injury occurred during a precautionary 

evacuation. These types of events account for 60 percent of the total accident set for Part 121 

operators, while still others involved maintenance and other issues not related to crew 

performance. Many of the remainder involved relatively low-level outcomes, though with 

varying levels of risk, while others involved high-time PICs with high-time FOs with ATP 

ratings who likely would not be reached by this rulemaking. The point here is not to dismiss 

these events but to suggest that benefits, as measured by avoided accidents, fatalities, and serious 

injuries, often will be more modest than advocates might anticipate.

Data Sources and Data Quality

Accident reports and structured accident data from the National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB) were the primary data source, supplemented where necessary and possible with data 

from FAA. Accident data will be limited to 10 years due to the poor quality of data available in 

either NTSB or FAA reports on pilot experience for earlier accidents. FY 2001 was selected as 

the starting point because that was the point at which NTSB data on pilot flight hours began to 

capture co-pilots at least somewhat systematically. 
Assessment of PL 111-216

However, several issues limit the applicability of some accidents even within this 10-year 

dataset. First, NTSB records for accidents involving U.S. operators in foreign countries rarely 

report data on pilots. Pilot data also is limited for domestic accidents that have relatively lowlevel outcomes, such as turbulence or ramp-gate accidents. In addition, other records randomly 

involve blank data cells for PIC or FO flight hours, and FO certificates and type ratings. 

Where any of these problems existed, the text of each NTSB accident report was reviewed, as 

were files in the FAA’s Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention. That exercise added or 

corrected data for some or all pertinent fields for more than 200 pilots, but some or all pertinent 

data on some pilots simply is not available.

Useful flight-hour data was identified for 332 PICs among the 370 accident aircraft. All but 4 of 

the 332 PICs had more than 2,500 hours. Of the other 38 PICs, damage to 2 aircraft was found 

during maintenance, and the respective air carriers could not associate either accident with 

specific crews. Consistent with comments above about the frequent absence of flight-hour data 

in certain categories of accidents, 24 of the remaining 36 accidents for which PIC flight-hour 

data was not available did not reflect on pilot performance. Those 24 accidents involved 

maintenance issues, ramp events caused by ground staff, and turbulence injuries in clear air 

turbulence or after adequate warnings were ignored. Eight other 12 accidents involved large jets 

operating international flights and 3 involved large jets on domestic flights by major air carriers. 

Most or all of those captains would have had significant flight experience. Consequently, the 

absence of data on those PICs does not affect the findings in this report.

Useful data on flight hours or ratings was available for 326 FOs (88%). The 45 cases for which 

no data was available included the same 38 cases noted above. Consequently, again, the absence 

of data in the 45 records will not affect the findings of this report.

Results of the Analysis, Part 121 Operations

All but 4 PICs exceeded the straightforward 2,500-hour minimum. The alternate approach of 

requiring an ATP plus at least 1,000 hours of experience in air carrier operations likely would 

have affected the eligibility of a fifth PIC, whose total flight time marginally exceeded 2,500 

hours. All 5 of those PICs operated with FOs who had commercial ratings rather than ATPs. 

Crew performance was a primary issue in 4 of those 5 accidents. The fifth accident was caused 

by a tug operator who struck a stationary regional jet at the gate. Though the rule would have 

affected the eligibility of both pilots to operate that flight, the rule would not have influenced the 

accident. 

The proposed PIC minimal hours and the required ATP to operate as an FO in Part 121 

operations would have affected the eligibility of 83 accident crews in the 10-year accident set. 

However, crew performance was an issue in just 34 of those cases, and some of those 34 would 

not be reached by this rulemaking. For example, 2 fatal accidents in which FOs did not have 

ATP ratings illustrate how the rule could have affected the eligibility of the FOs without 

influencing the outcome: Air Midwest at Charlotte (21 fatal) crashed immediately after lift off 

due to an improperly-rigged elevator; and Chalks (20 fatal) crashed into the Atlantic Ocean when 

the wing failed in normal flight. Though both FOs would have been affected by the requirement 
Assessment of PL 111-216

to have an ATP, the rule would have been irrelevant to both accidents and would score zero 

against these accidents. 

Conversely, some of the other elements in the rulemaking, such as screening pilot applicants and 

preparing pilots better for the complex environment of air carrier operations, better training in 

stall recognition, and the importance of professionalism, would have had some minimal chance 

of influencing additional accident outcomes. 

On net, the rulemaking was found to be effective at least to some degree against just 31 

accidents, and in most cases the scores were “low” or “low-to-moderate.” No accidents received 

scores of “very high. Appendix 1 shows the scoring for each of the 31 Part 121 accidents against 

which the rulemaking received positive scores, while Table 1, below, summarizes the scoring of 

the complete rulemaking against all 354 Part 121 accidents from FY 2001 through FY 2010.

Table 1: Scoring Summary in Part 121 Operations

FY 2001 Through FY 2010

Qualitative 

Effectiveness 

Score

Quantified 

Score

Number of 

Accidents

Accidents 

Avoided

None 0 323 0

Low 0.15 17 2.55

Moderate 0.35 6 2.1

Moderate-to-High 0.55 5 2.75

High 0.75 3 2.25

Very High 0.90 0 0

Total 354 9.65

In all 3 accidents that received “high” scores (75% reduction in the likelihood of the accident), 

crew performance essentially explained the accidents and the rule would have affected the 

eligibility of both pilots, as neither the PIC nor the FO met the proposed minimum experience for 

their respective positions. The 3 accidents are outlined below.

1. On June 20, 2007 at 1620, a Beech 1900D operated by Great Lakes Aviation landed 

long and bounced in VMC at Laramie. The crew tried to slow the aircraft but turned onto 

a taxiway at high speed, where the right prop struck electrical an electrical box. A prop 

blade then broke off and struck the right side of the fuselage. The PIC later noted that the 

approach was about 14 knots above the targeted speed and the airplane was one dot high 

on the glide slope. No injuries occurred to the 2 pilots and 9 passengers, but the aircraft 

was substantially damaged. NTSB determined the probable cause to be the PIC’s 

improper decision making, his misjudgment of speed and distance, and his failure to go 

around during an unstable approach. Factors in the accident were improper CRM and the 

FO's failure to intervene.

The PIC had 2,250 hours of pilot experience and the commercially-rated FO had 774 

hours. The rule would have required more experience and seasoning for both pilots. The
Assessment of PL 111-216

extra experience and seasoning in an air carrier environment may well have led the PIC

to go around upon recognizing an unstable approach or could have led the FO to 

intervene. The rule received a score of “high” (75%) against this accident.

2. On August 13, 2004, at 0049, a Convair 580 on a cargo flight operated by Air Tahoma

crashed on approach to Cincinnati. The PIC was killed and the FO was seriously injured. 

The airplane was destroyed. The PIC had exactly 2,500 hours and the commercially 

rated FO had 924 hours as a pilot, the majority of which had been in single-engine 

airplanes. He had just 3 months of experience as a line air carrier pilot.

The FO was flying and about 20 minutes before the accident, he commented multiple 

times that the aircraft was pulling to the right and stated “I don't know why.... I don't 

know what's going on.” With the runway in sight, the FO again noted “What is wrong 

with this plane? It’s really funny. I got something all messed up here." The PIC 

eventually advised the FO that they had a fuel imbalance because the PIC as the pilot not 

flying had erroneously left the cross-feed open, which caused a prohibited fuel transfer. 

The FO then stated that "we're going to flame out" but the PIC responded, "I got the 

cross-feed open. Just keep the power on." Ultimately the aircraft lost power due to fuel 

starvation, despite adequate total fuel, and crashed one mile short of the runway.

The rule would have required more experience and seasoning for both pilots, especially 

for the FO. That extra experience and seasoning may have enabled the FO to identify a 

lateral C/G problem caused by a fuel imbalance. It also may have led the PIC to respond 

with some urgency when he finally recognized a fuel imbalance and the possibility of 

fuel starvation due to his having left the cross-feed open. 

3. On October 16, 2001 at 2114, an ERJ-145 operated by Mesa Airlines landed hard at 

Roanoke. The PIC had briefed the visual approach to runway 33 for which go-around 

was not an option due to hills. The crew noted a quartering crosswind at 15 mph gusting 

21. The FO said the approach was normal until 300 AGL, where he called "one dot high" 

and Ref +5. Airspeed dropped abruptly, the stick shaker activated and the PIC added 

power but the aircraft landed hard before engines could spool up. Damage included 

broken and cracked frames and stringers, popped rivets, and skin worn through in the 

lower aft pressure vessel, plus scraped skin on the lower aft fuselage. NTSB identified 

the probable cause as the PIC's failure to maintain airspeed. Factors included the failure 

of both pilots to follow company CRM and flight manual procedures, and the PIC's 

improper approach briefing.

Both pilots were hired during a period of rapid expansion for the carrier and moved 

through what the NTSB report described as a “rushed’ upgrade program. The PIC had 

2,548 hours with 200 in make-model. The commercially-rated FO had 1,850 hours with 

90 hours in make-model. The PIC had been instructing when the carrier hired her 21 

months before the accident. She had accrued 600 hours as an FO in the BE-1900 and

qualified for upgrade to PIC in the ERJ based on seniority. The FO was hired with 400 

hours, flew as FO on the Beech 1900 then upgraded to the ERJ as an FO based on 

seniority. Neither pilot had any prior experience in swept-wing aircraft nor had the carrier
Assessment of PL 111-216

provided any jet indoctrination or training on swept wing aerodynamics. The rule’s 

emphasis on screening pilot applicants, professionalism, preparing pilots better for Part 

121 operating environments, and more training in stall recognition would have directly 

affected this accident scenario.

The most significant accident to receive a “moderate’ score (55% reduction in likelihood) 

involved a DC-9, operated by USA Jet on a cargo flight, which crashed in heavy fog while on 

approach in mountainous terrain to Saltillo, Mexico (1 fatal and 1 serious). In that accident, the 

flight data recorder shows the aircraft alternating above and below the glide slope and left and 

right of the localizer throughout the approach, with the PIC flying. The aircraft ultimately stalled 

and crashed 1,000 feet short and 500 feet right of the runway. 

The FO on that flight was an experienced flight engineer but had just 830 hours as a pilot and 75 

hours as a Part 121 pilot. A more experienced FO likely would have called for a go-around or 

may have been willing to intervene and push the power up, either of which would have averted 

this accident. The other 4 accidents with “moderate” scores resulted in 1 serious injury in a 

turbulence accident (no damage) and substantial damage to a turboprop and two regional jets. 

The remaining 23 accidents in the 10-year accident set against which the rulemaking scored 

positively were limited to “low” and “low-to-moderate” scores. They included 2 fatal accidents 

(Colgan at Buffalo and Corporate Airlines at Kirksville), plus 3 serious injuries and hull losses to

3 turboprops and 1 cargo jet.

In sum, the rulemaking would require a minimum of 2,500 hours for Part 121 captains, an ATP 

for Part 121 FOs, and an emphasis on screening pilot applicants, preparing pilots better for Part 

121 operating environments, professionalism, and more training in stall recognition. These 

provisions would have had some degree of influence on 31 of the 354 accidents in the Part 121 

data set (8.8%), but likely would have reduced the risk of accidents by a theoretical score of just 

9.65 accidents among 354 accidents over 10 years (2.7%). The rulemaking also would have 

averted a theoretical 23.4 fatalities (5.4%), 3.9 serious injuries (2.1%), and 11 minor injuries 

(2.9%) over the 10-year accident set.

Part 125 Operations.

A PIC on a Part 125 flight must have an ATP. The rulemaking would not require FOs to have an 

ATP. Therefore, the net effect of the rulemaking would be limited to the various emphasis areas 

that the rule specifies.

Part 125 operators had 5 accidents in the 10-year study period. They resulted in 4 hull losses, 1 

fatality and 1 serious injury. All 5 captains had total flight time in excess of the proposed 1,500-

hour minimum to obtain an ATP. Four of the 5 captains had more than 9,000 hours.

Two of the four hull losses were caused by uncontrollable engine fires in flight, and a third was 

caused by an engine failure that prevented the prop from feathering. One of these accidents led 

to an emergency landing and post-crash fire on snow-covered tundra in Alaska, while the other 

two led to intentional ditching. In the fourth hull-loss accident, the crew undershot the runway 
Assessment of PL 111-216

while landing to deliver fuel at a remote mining site in Alaska. The DC-4 had been modified 

with a raised cockpit above fuselage to accommodate an upward swinging, modified nose door, 

which “presented a different sight picture” than a normal DC-4. The FO had only a commercial 

certificate but the captain, who was the pilot flying, had nearly 22,000 hours and 13,600 in makemodel. The rulemaking would not have influenced these scenarios.

The fifth accident involved wing-to-wing contact with a parked aircraft on a general aviation 

ramp at Newark. The NTSB cited the Part 125 crew’s visual misjudgment of clearing distance 

between aircraft. The accident report does not identify which pilot was flying the Part 25 Boeing 

737-700, but the PIC had nearly 13,000 hours and 1,245 in type, while the FO held an ATP. The 

rulemaking is unlikely to affect visual perception of wing clearance. In sum, the proposed

rulemaking would have had no effect on the 5 Part 125 accidents over the past 10 years.

Part 135 Commuters.

For Part 135 commuters, the rulemaking would affect only the requirements to obtain an ATP for 

pilots-in-command of multi-engine airplanes. Part 135 commuters had 14 accidents involving 

multi-engine airplanes over the 10-year study period. They resulted in 1 fatal accident with 2 

fatalities, plus 4 hull losses. Just 2 of the 14 crews included FO’s, 1 of whom was an ATP. 

Total flight hours for these PICs ranged from 2,942 to nearly 25,000 hours.

Of the 14 accidents in the past 10-year dataset involving multi-engine commuter aircraft, 3 were 

caused by faulty maintenance and a fourth accident was caused by unforecast and unexpected 

turbulence, which was the only accident in which an FO was flying. Among the remaining 10

accidents, the broader elements in the rulemaking may have influenced 8 accidents, which 

included 1 hull loss and 7 aircraft with substantial damage. However, the rule scored highly 

against just one accident. The emphasis on professionalism, particularly the need to complete 

checklists and to follow procedures, plus the emphasis on weather were the primary sources of 

effectiveness in these accidents.

Overall, the rulemaking would have averted a theoretical 2.2 of the 14 accidents in 10 years. It 

also would have avoided a theoretical 0.35 fatalities and 0.45 serious injuries. Appendix 2 shows 

the scoring for the 8 commuter accidents against which the rulemaking received a positive score. 

Part 135 On-Demand

In principle, the rulemaking would affect all pilots in command operating on-demand Part 135 

services involving either turbojet airplanes or airplanes configured with 10 or more passenger 

seats. However, the latter category was not involved in any on-demand Part 135 accidents in the 

10-year study period. Consequently, the on-demand accident set was limited to 44 accidents 

involving turbojet airplanes. Useful data was available on 41 of the 44 PICs 40 of 44 FOs.

As with other segments of commercial aviation outlined above, many accidents did not reflect on 

crews. The rulemaking received positive scores against half of the 44 accidents. The highest 

score was a single “moderate” (55%) in a non-fatal accident in which the PIC entered an 

intentional aileron roll maneuver during cruise and temporarily lost control, causing substantial 
Assessment of PL 111-216

structural damage to the left wing and elevator assembly. The proposed emphasis on 

professionalism as part of ATP requirements, plus improved screening or monitoring all had 

some chance of influencing this accident.

For the other 21 accidents against which the rulemaking received positive scores, 11 received a 

“low-to-moderate” score (35%) and 10 received “low” (15%). Scores were mostly a result of the 

targeted emphasis on professionalism, weather, and the value of recognizing go-around gates 

during unstable approaches (airmanship). 

In sum, the rulemaking would have avoided a theoretical 5.9 accidents (13.4%), plus 12.4 of a 

total of 48 fatalities (35.8%), and 3.05 of 19 serious injuries (10.8%). Appendix 3 shows the 

scoring for the 22 on-demand accidents against which the rulemaking received a positive score.

Summary

Based on a detailed review of 417 accidents over 10 years, the analysis found that the 

rulemaking would be most effective against accidents involving turbojets in on-demand Part 135 

operations and against twin-engine aircraft accidents in Part 135 commuter operations. However

the rulemaking would have significant effect against only a small number of Part 121 accidents, 

and the rulemaking would have had no effect against the small number of Part 125 accidents that 

occurred over the 10-year study period. 

The analysis also noted that a large percentage of accidents had no reflection on crew 

performance, due to the prevalence of ramp accidents caused by others, turbulence accidents that 

involve either passenger behavior or conditions that could not be anticipated, and several types 

of miscellaneous events. Nevertheless, the rulemaking could save a total of about 1.8 accidents 

per year, plus 3.6 fatalities and 0.7 serious injuries per year in Part 121 and Part 135 operations.
Assessment of PL 111-216

Appendix 1: Scoring Against 31 Part 121 Accidents in Which the Rulemaking Received Positive 

Scores, FY 2001 – FY 2010

NTSB #

Damage High Injury DATE CARRIER LOCATION Aircraft Service Fatal Prime Scenario Score

DEN07LA101 S Mnr/None 6/20/2007 Great Lakes Laramie, Wyo BE-1900D Pax 0 LOC Taxi 0.75

DCA04MA068 D Fatal 8/13/2004 Air Tahoma Florence, KY CV-580 Cargo 1 USOS 0.75

NYC02LA013 S Mnr/None 10/16/2001 Mesa Roanoke, Va ERJ-145 Pax 0 Landed Hard 0.75

CHI01FA084 S Mnr/None 2/10/2001 Great Lakes ORD BE-1900 Pax 0

ARC-Gear 

Landing 0.55

NYC03FA035 S Mnr/None 1/6/2003 ExpressJet Cleveland, OH ERJ-145LR Pax 0 Runway Exc. 0.55

MIA01LA030 N Serious 11/20/2000 Atl So East Ashville, NC ATR-72 Pax 0 Turb 0.55

DCA08RA077 D Fatal 7/6/2008 USA Jet Saltillo, Mex DC-9-15F Cargo 1 USOS 0.55

DFW08CA215 S Mnr/None 8/14/2008 Trans States STL ERJ-145LR Pax 0 Tailstrike 0.55

FTW04LA225 S Mnr/None 8/30/2004

Custom Air 

Transport El Paso B727 Cargo 0 ARC-Wing Tip 0.35

DCA04MA045 S Mnr/None 5/9/2004 Amer. Eagle SJU ATR-72 Pax 0 Runway Exc. 0.35

ANC01FA011 S Mnr/None 10/22/2000

Frontier 

Flying Serv Bethel, Ak BE-1900 Pax 0 Runway Exc. 0.35

DCA08WA071 S Mnr/None 5/16/2008

Asia Pacific 

Airlines Phonpei, Micronesia B727-200F Cargo 0 Runway Exc. 0.35

DCA09MA027 D Fatal 2/12/2009 Colgan Air BUF DHC-Q400 Pax 50 App & Landing 0.35

DCA05MA004 D Fatal 10/19/2004

Corporate 

Airlines Kirksville, MO BAE-32 Pax 13 CFIT LOW 0.35

DCA07FA037 S Mnr/None 4/12/2007 Pinnacle Traverse City, MI CL-600-2B19 Pax 0 Runway Exc. 0.15

NYC06LA191 S Mnr/None 7/24/2006 Amer. Eagle Newark ERJ-135LR Pax 0 Ramp-Gate 0.15

DCA05MA099 S Mnr/None 9/18/2005 Spirit Fort Lauderdale A321-231 Pax 0 Tailstrike 0.15

NYC05FA094 S Mnr/None 6/7/2005 UPS Louisville MD-11F Cargo 0 Landed Hard 0.15

DCA08FA018 S Mnr/None 12/16/2007 Air Wisc. Providence CL600-2B19 Pax 0 Landed Hard 0.15

DCA04MA082 S Mnr/None 9/19/2004 FedEx MEM MD-11 Cargo 0 Tailstrike 0.15

DCA09FA048 S Serious 5/6/2009 World Awys BWI DC-10-30 Pax 0 Landed Hard 0.15

FTW03MA160 S Mnr/None 5/24/2003 Southwest Amarillo, TX B737-300 Pax 0 Runway Exc. 0.15

CHI02LA170 S Mnr/None 6/16/2002 Vanguard KCI MD-82 Pax 0 Tailstrike 0.15

LAX04LA050 S Mnr/None 11/14/2003 United SFO B747-400 Pax 0 Tailstrike 0.15

CEN10LA363 N Serious 6/28/2010 Amer. Eagle Longview, TX ERJ-145LR Pax 0 Turb 0.15

DCA05MA071 N Serious 5/31/2005 Air Wisc. ORD CL-600-2B19 Pax 0 Ramp-Gate 0.15

DFW05LA112 N Serious 4/29/2005 Southwest LITTLE ROCK B737-700 Pax 0 Turb 0.15

ERA09LA488 N Serious 8/27/2009 Airtran Inverness, FL B717-200 Pax 0 Turb 0.15

CHI02LA111 N Serious 4/18/2002 ATA Springfield, Mo B757 Pax 0 Turb 0.15

CEN09MA142 D Serious 1/27/2009 Empire Lubbock, TX ATR-42-300 Cargo 0 App & Landing 0.15

DCA04WA043 D Mnr/None 4/28/2004

Centurion Air 

Cargo Bogota, Colombia DC-10-30F Cargo 0 Runway Exc. 0.15
Assessment of PL 111-216

Appendix 2: Effectiveness of the Rulemaking Against 8 Part 135 Commuter Accidents in Which 

the Rulemaking Received Positive Scores, FY 2001 – FY 2010

Date Operator Damage Fatal Serious LOC Aircraft Service Event Score

3/13/2002

Warbelows Air 

Ventures SUBS 0 0 Fairbanks, AK PA-31 Comm

Landed Gear 

Up 0.15

8/24/2002

Cape Smythe Air 

Service SUBS 0 0 Nuiqsut, AK PA-31 Comm

Landed Gear 

Up 0.15

7/13/2003 Air Sunshine SUBS 2 0

Treasure Cay, 

Bahamas CE-402C Comm

Ditched; Engine 

& Pilot 

Response 0.35

4/4/2004 Peninsula Airways SUBS 0 0 Unalaska, ak G-21 Comm

Lost Control on 

Landing 0.75

9/17/2004 Everts Air Alaska SUBS 0 0 Telida, ak PA-31-350 Comm

Landed Gear 

Up 0.15

2/19/2009

Frontier Flying 

Service SUBS 0 1 Nome, ak PA-31-350 Comm

CFIT, Flat 

Terrain 0.15

2/1/2010 Cape Air SUBS 0 0 Watertown, ny CE-402C Comm

Overran on 

Landing 0.35

3/15/2010 Servant Air DEST 0 2 Kodiak, ak BN-21-21 Comm

LOC on 

Climbout 0.15

Appendix 3: Effectiveness of the Rulemaking Against 22 Part 135 On-Demand Accidents in 

Which the Rulemaking Received Positive Scores, FY 2001 – FY 2010

NTSB #

DamAge Date Hi Inj City Operator Aircraft Serv. Fatal Prime Scenario Score

DEN01FA030 S 12/20/2000 Mnr/None Jackson, WY Million Air Dallas HS-125-700 Pax 0 App & Landing 0.35

DCA01MA034 D 3/29/2001 Fatal Aspen, CO Avjet G-III Pax 18 CFIT 0.35

CHI01LA296 S 8/28/2001 Mnr/None Detroit Grand Aire Express Falcon Cargo 0 ARC 0.15

WAS02WA004 S 10/26/2001 Mnr/None Ciudad Victoria, Mex American Jets International Lear 25B MED 0 Gear Collapse 0.35

CHI02FA097 S 3/25/2002 Mnr/None Anderson, IN

Corporate Flight 

Management MU-300 Pax 0 RE-Landing 0.35

LAX02LA252 D 8/13/2002 Mnr/None Big Bear City, CA

Corporate Flight 

International CE-S550 Pax 0 RE-Landing 0.15

NYC02FA177 D 8/30/2002 Fatal Lexington, KY Care Flight International Lear 25C Med 1 RE-Landing 0.35

CHI03FA099 D 4/8/2003 Serious St Louis, MO Grand Aire Express Falcon Cargo 0 Ditched (Fuel) 0.15

CHI04FA031 S 11/11/2003 Mnr/None Wheeling, IL West Coast Charters CE-560XL Pax 0 RTO & Rwy Exc 0.35

ANC04FA026 S 2/20/2004 Serious Ft. Lauderdale Aztec Captital Corporation Lear 25B Pax 0 RE-Landing 0.15

NYC04LA088 S 3/19/2004 Mnr/None Utica, NY Airnet Systems Lear 35A Pax 0 App & Landing 0.35

NYC04RA153 D 7/2/2004 Fatal Tocumen, Panama Air Trek AIA-1124 Med 6 LOC T/O-Climbout 0.35

DEN05MA029 D 11/28/2004 Fatal Montrose, CO Air Castle Corporation CL-600 Pax 3 LOC T/O-Climbout 0.35

DEN05LA111 S 7/15/2005 Serious Eagle, CO Aspen Base Operations Lear 35A Pax 0 Landed hard 0.15

CHI06LA058 S 1/5/2006 Mnr/None Woodruff, WI Netjets as Executive CE-560 Pax 0 RE-Landing 0.15

NYC06FA137 D 6/2/2006 Fatal Groton, CT International Jet Charter Lear 35A Pax 2 App & Landing 0.35

MIA07RA034 D 1/9/2007 Fatal Guadalajara, Mex Ameristar Jet Charter Lear 24F Cargo 2 CFIT 0.35

CHI07CA058 S 1/10/2007 Mnr/None Columbus, OH Airnet Systems Lear 35 Cargo 0 LOC In Flight 0.55

NYC07LA081 S 3/17/2007 Mnr/None Beverly, MA Air Trek CE-500 Med 0 App & Landing 0.15

NYC07LA202 S 8/23/2007 Mnr/None Westhampton, NY Jet Share US Lear 60 Pax 0 App & Landing 0.15

DCA08MA085 D 7/31/2008 Fatal Owatonna, MN East Coast Jets HS-125-800 Pax 8 App & Landing 0.15

CEN09CA175 S 2/24/2009 Mnr/None KC, MO Bankair Lear 35A Cargo 0 App & Landing 0.15