If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re N. MORTON, Minor. April 14, 2022

No. 356777

Genesee Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 15-132467-NA

Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and MURRAY and O’BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the

minor child, NM, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (i), and (j).

1 We affirm.

I. FACTS

At the time the initial petition to remove NM from respondent’s case was filed in January 

2018, child protective proceedings involving three of respondent’s other children, ML1, ML2, and 

AW, were already pending. Respondent’s parental rights to these other children were later 

terminated in April 2018, and this Court affirmed that decision in In re Lewis/Ward, unpublished 

per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 19, 2019 (Docket No. 344087). This 

Court’s opinion provides the following relevant facts regarding respondent’s history with 

Children’s Protective Services:

In August 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services (the DHHS) 

filed a petition seeking removal of ML1, ML2, and AW from respondent-mother’s 

care.[2] The DHHS’s petition stemmed from allegations that respondent-mother’s 

youngest child, AW, tested positive for THC at birth, and from an incident where 

ML2 suffered severe injury after consuming a large quantity of liquid Tylenol. In 

 

1 Although respondent also cites MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), the record discloses that the trial court did 

not rely on that ground as a statutory basis for termination. 

2 The two older boys, ML1 and ML2, were placed with their father. AW was adopted by his foster

parents, who later also became NM’s foster parents. 
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September 2015, respondent-mother admitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction over 

the children and conceded that she had improperly supervised the children when 

ML2 consumed liquid Tylenol. The trial court ordered respondent-mother to 

undergo a substance abuse assessment and random drug screens, to complete 

parenting and anger management classes, to participate in parenting time and to 

work with an infant mental health specialist, and to obtain and maintain 

employment and suitable housing.

Respondent-mother participated in a number of services provided through 

[the] DHHS. She completed anger management and parenting classes and 

participated in parenting time and infant mental health classes. However, she 

continued to test positive for marijuana during random drug screens. In July 2016, 

respondent-mother was hospitalized following an outburst at a parenting time visit. 

During this hospitalization, respondent-mother was diagnosed with bipolar 

disorder, but refused medication. Respondent-mother was briefly incarcerated in 

October 2016, which caused her to miss a number of appointments.

Following a period of negative drug screens in January 2017 and her 

continued participation in parenting time, parenting classes, and infant mental 

health classes, respondent-mother was able to have the children during 

unsupervised overnight visits. During this time, the two older children, ML1 and 

ML2, were placed with their father, while AW remained in a foster care placement. 

After respondent-mother completed three consecutive negative drugs screens, the 

DHHS returned ML1 and ML2 to her in October 2017, and she was able to have 

AW for unsupervised overnight visits.

In January 2018, the DHHS moved to again remove the children from 

respondent-mother’s care. The DHHS alleged that there was an incident of 

domestic violence at respondent-mother’s home while the children were present. 

At approximately 3:00 a.m., respondent-mother’s brother and her cousin[3]got into 

a fight and broke a glass table. Her brother was hospitalized and her cousin was 

arrested following the incident. Additionally, ML1 was so afraid during the fight 

that he urinated on himself. During that period, respondent-mother’s electricity 

was shut off and she received an eviction notice. The DHHS filed a petition to 

terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights in February 2018. Following 

evidentiary hearings in April 2018, the trial court entered an order terminating 

respondent-mother’s parental rights to the three children. [Id., unpub op at 1-2.]

The January 22, 2018 removal petition with respect to NM also discussed the domestic-violence 

incident. The petition also alleged that respondent’s power to her house had been turned off on 

January 10, 2018, and that respondent planned to live in a family member’s home with 13 other 

 

3 Although referred to as respondent’s cousin, this person is actually respondent’s current 

boyfriend, Isaiah Johnson, who continued to reside with respondent. Respondent’s brother 

sustained a broken jaw during the incident. 
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individuals, some of whom smoked marijuana in front of the children. Respondent had refused to 

enter a shelter or stay with another relative, and she planned to return to her home, where she had 

already received an eviction notice. Respondent had also told caseworkers that she was breaking 

up furniture to burn in a fireplace in her home for heat. 

After NM was removed from respondent’s care, respondent entered a plea of admission to 

allegations in the petition to enable the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over the child. 

Respondent received approximately three years of additional services, but never moved to 

unsupervised visits in the community. Following a hearing that concluded in February 2021, the 

trial court entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights to NM. This appeal followed. 

II. MOTION TO REOPEN PROOFS

Respondent first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when, after respondent had 

rested, it denied respondent’s motion to reopen proofs during petitioner’s rebuttal testimony to

introduce a series of video recordings that respondent had made, which purported to show 

respondent’s positive interactions with NM during visits. We disagree. 

A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. Edry v Adelman, 486 Mich 634, 639; 786 NW2d 567 (2010). This Court also reviews 

a decision denying a motion to reopen proofs for an abuse of discretion. People v Herndon, 246 

Mich App 371, 420; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). A trial court abuses its discretion when it “chooses 

an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes.” Edry, 486 Mich at 639.

After respondent had rested, during the rebuttal testimony of the caseworker, Nicole 

Cooper, respondent’s counsel disclosed for the first time that respondent had a series of video 

recordings that respondent had made of in-person visits, which depicted her interactions with NM. 

Counsel thought there were approximately 17 videos, but said there could be more. Counsel asked 

that she be allowed to play the videos for the witnesses, so they could comment on whether the 

information depicted in the videos was accurate. Counsel also sought to have them admitted as 

relevant evidence of respondent’s actions during parenting time with NM. Petitioner objected 

because respondent had rested her case, she had not produced the videos earlier despite that the 

termination hearing began approximately three months earlier, and the late introduction of the 

videos was an unfair surprise. Petitioner also argued that respondent had not provided a valid 

reason to reopen proofs, given the testimony that many of the visits were indeed good, and thus 

the videos would be cumulative of that testimony. Petitioner also noted that if the agency had 

recorded visits, then petitioner should be allowed to reopen its proofs to be able to introduce videos 

of visits that had not gone well. Petitioner also objected on the basis that NM’s foster parents were 

not permitted to record events involving NM. 

The trial court questioned Cooper about whether she had seen both appropriate visits and 

visits where a problem had occurred. Cooper stated that out of the 30 visits she attended, one was 

“extremely bad,” and another nine or so did not go very well. She did not know if the agency had 

recordings of any of respondent’s visits. Counsel for NM concurred with petitioner’s argument. 

The trial court stated that it was the court’s understanding that respondent’s videos depicted good 

visits, but noted that petitioner appeared to concede that many of the visits went fairly well. It also 

suggested that respondent may have other recordings that depicted problems during visits, but were 
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not being offered. The court noted that if respondent’s videos were admitted, there could be 

additional videos that petitioner would want to introduce. The trial court then denied respondent’s 

motion to admit the recordings, in part because the court was satisfied that they would be favorable 

to respondent in light of testimony to this effect. 

In determining whether proofs should be reopened, the trial court must consider “whether 

any undue advantage would be taken by the moving party and whether there is any showing of 

surprise or prejudice to the nonmoving party.” Herndon, 246 Mich App at 420. Other relevant 

factors include “whether newly discovered and material evidence is sought to be admitted, . . . and 

the timing of the motion.” People v Moore, 164 Mich App 378, 383; 417 NW2d 508 (1987), mod 

in part on other grounds 433 Mich 851 (1989). Additionally, the trial court retains “the discretion 

to determine the admissibility of the proposed [evidence] as a threshold issue.” Herndon, 246 

Mich App at 420. Thus, in deciding a motion to reopen proofs, the trial court must consider 

whether the evidence sought to be presented is material and otherwise admissible. Id.; Moore, 164 

Mich App at 383.

The trial court did not address whether the videos were relevant, but assuming that they 

were relevant, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 

by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 

MRE 403. The trial court determined that admission of the videos would cause undue delay. 

Respondent sought to admit the videos and elicit commentary regarding the accuracy of the events 

depicted in the videos. However, all of petitioner’s witnesses, except for Cooper in rebuttal, had 

already testified. If the videos were admitted, fairness would have required that petitioner be 

allowed to recall various witnesses to address their observations in the videos or that petitioner be 

allowed to reopen its proofs to introduce videos it may have kept of visits that did not go well. 

These considerations support the trial court’s determination that introduction of the videos would 

have resulted in undue delay, particularly where the hearing had already been ongoing for three 

months, thereby supporting exclusion under MRE 403.

The trial court also determined that the videos were needlessly cumulative of other 

evidence, specifically testimony already presented during the hearing. The court accepted 

respondent’s offer of proof that the videos would depict favorable interactions between respondent 

and NM. The court stated that based on the testimony, it was “satisfied that many of the visits that 

mother had did in fact go satisfactorily.” Cooper acknowledged that of the 30 visits she attended, 

approximately 20 of them went well. Respondent’s brother testified that he saw video recordings 

that respondent had taken of recent in-person visits, and he claimed that respondent and NM were 

laughing and playing, and NM hugged and kissed respondent. Respondent’s friends also testified 

about their observations of positive interactions between respondent and NM in videos of visits, 

and they reported that respondent did not act inappropriately, become angry, or end the visits early. 

More significantly, petitioner’s witnesses did not deny that there were positive visits between 

respondent and NM. Although they testified that there were problems at several visits, they also 

agreed that many of the visits went well. Given that there was ample evidence that many of the 

visits went well, the trial court had a reasonable and principled basis for believing that the video 

evidence depicting favorable interaction between respondent and NM would have been cumulative 

of this evidence and was thus properly excluded under MRE 403.
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Even if the videos were not barred by MRE 403, the trial court still did not abuse its 

discretion by not reopening proofs due to the timing of respondent’s motion to reopen proofs and 

the undue advantage for respondent. The termination hearing was held over six days beginning 

on November 5, 2020, and continuing through the end of respondent’s case-in-chief on February 

6, 2021. Thus, respondent had at least three months to disclose the evidence that she had personally 

produced. Much of the trial court’s discussion concerned the prejudice to petitioner because of 

the timing of the request. Neither respondent nor her attorney ever informed petitioner that the 

video footage existed until after respondent had rested and petitioner was in the middle of 

presenting rebuttal testimony. Respondent’s late revelation clearly acted as an unfair surprise to 

petitioner and the court, regardless of whether the trial court had formally closed discovery. 

Further, the evidence was not newly discovered such that its exclusion could be considered unfair 

to respondent because she could not have produced it earlier. On the contrary, it was respondent 

who recorded the various visitations, so she clearly was aware of the evidence. Petitioner argued 

that if respondent was permitted to present her late-disclosed videos, it should be permitted to 

investigate whether the agency had also recorded visits and then allowed to reopen its own proofs 

to introduce videos of visits that had not gone well. The trial court agreed that if respondent’s 

videos were admitted, despite their late production, petitioner in fairness should be allowed an 

opportunity to introduce other videos, if they still existed, otherwise the introduction of the 

favorable videos would provide an unfair advantage to respondent, particularly when others, such 

as the foster parents, were not permitted to make recordings.

In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent’s motion to reopen 

proofs to admit the video evidence. Assuming the videos were relevant, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by concluding that the videos would cause undue delay and be needlessly 

cumulative such that the videos would be barred by MRE 403. Even if not barred by MRE 403, 

the trial court still did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow respondent to reopen proofs 

because of the timing of respondent’s motion and the undue advantage for respondent. Thus, 

respondent’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing respondent to 

reopen proofs fails.

III. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by finding that petitioner established a 

statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree. 

“In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing 

evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been 

met.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). We review for clear error 

a trial court’s ruling that a statutory ground for termination has been proved by clear and 

convincing evidence. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). “A finding 

is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. 

The trial court found that grounds for terminating respondent’s parental rights were 

established under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (i), and (j). MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) allows for 

termination under the following circumstances: 
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(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 

182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, 

and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following: 

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age. 

The trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent had not rectified the conditions

that led to the adjudication. The conditions that led to adjudication included respondent-mother’s 

lack of adequate housing, lack of proof of a source of income, untreated mental health issues, and 

continued substance abuse. 

Respondent only partially rectified her initial housing problems. At the time of the 

termination hearing, respondent had a home with electricity, heat, and water, and it was large 

enough for NM to have her own room, but Cooper testified that she visited respondent’s current 

home and had some concerns. The concerns included a broken latch on the screen door that could 

easily be opened by a young child to come and go without respondent’s knowledge, a missing 

knob on the door to a closet where respondent kept cleaning supplies, easily accessible sharp 

kitchen knives, “a lot” of debris in the basement that included open containers of cat food, and 

improper ventilation. Respondent also continued to reside with Johnson, who had assaulted 

respondent’s brother, resulting in the latter sustaining a broken jaw. In addition, Johnson had not 

provided information to enable the caseworkers to perform a background check on him. Johnson’s 

involvement in at least one incident of domestic violence, his failure to provide information, and 

the other concerns identified by the caseworker support a finding that respondent’s home was not 

suitable for NM.4 The trial court did not clearly err when it found that this barrier to reunification 

had not been rectified.

With respect to respondent’s income, Cooper testified that respondent reported that she 

was receiving both Social Security and unemployment benefits, but respondent never provided 

any supporting documentation for any of these alleged sources of income. 

The most significant barrier to reunification was respondent’s continued mental health 

issues. The evidence clearly established that respondent had not rectified this barrier to 

 

4

In our previous opinion, we affirmed the prior termination of respondent’s other children in part 

because of respondent’s refusal—not inability—to remove Johnson from her home despite the 

trauma that Johnson’s violence caused to her children. Respondent admitted that violence in her 

home was normal and that she would have knocked her brother out if Johnson had not done so. In 

re Lewis/Ward, unpub op at p 5. Respondent’s parental rights were therefore properly not 

terminated on the basis of being a victim of domestic violence, but on the basis of a complete 

unwillingness to protect her children from violence and possibly her own commission of violence. 

See In re Plump, 294 Mich App 270, 273; 817 NW2d 119 (2011). The fact that respondent 

continues to permit Johnson in her home despite our previous opinion underscores the 

reasonableness of the caseworker’s concern.
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reunification. Before NM’s removal, respondent had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, but 

she refused to take her psychotropic medication. At the January 31, 2018 preliminary hearing, the 

trial court agreed to allow NM to remain in respondent’s care after she assured the court that she 

would begin taking her medication. The trial court also ordered respondent to undergo a 

psychological evaluation. At the continued February 14, 2018 preliminary hearing, the caseworker 

reported that respondent had another appointment with her psychiatrist and that petitioner was 

providing transportation, but that respondent continued to refuse to take her medication and 

intended to continue self-medicating with marijuana. Many witnesses testified regarding 

respondent’s continued struggle with her mental health issues. Cooper testified that respondent 

had frequent mood swings, and respondent reported during one parenting-time visit that her 

counselor had recommended that she go to the hospital because the counselor was worried that 

respondent would harm herself or someone else. Respondent also told Cooper that she owned 

firearms even though she was prohibited from possessing them because of her criminal history, 

and respondent had threatened to use them to keep her other two boys away from their father. 

Cooper further testified that respondent’s participation in mental health services had been sporadic, 

and respondent continued to refuse to take her medication. Cooper also stated that respondent had 

previously completed parenting and anger-management classes, but had not benefited from them. 

Respondent had told Cooper several times that she intended to get her other children back, and she 

stated that if her rights to NM were terminated, she intended to go to the foster home and demand 

to see NM. This caused Cooper to be concerned that NM would not be safe and that respondent 

would take matters into her own hands. Cooper did confirm with respondent’s therapist that she 

met with respondent regularly, but the therapist also reported that she once wanted to refer 

respondent to a hospital because she was suicidal. Cooper also stated that, during visits, respondent 

would not wait until after a visit to ask questions, but would ask inappropriate questions during 

the visits in front of NM. Most of these conversations involved respondent “ranting about the 

system,” and telling Cooper that the caseworkers should leave respondent alone. Further, Cooper 

testified that it was her understanding that respondent continued to smoke marijuana, but 

respondent had not completed a drug screen since August 9, 2019, when she tested positive for 

marijuana and cocaine.

Alta Parsons, a court-appointed special advocate for NM, stated that she observed NM

participate in activities with respondent, but respondent did not initiate them, and Parsons had not 

seen NM look to respondent as her support person during visits. Parsons opined that over the four 

years that she had been assigned to respondent’s case, respondent had not benefited from services. 

Respondent repeatedly expressed that she, not “the system,” knew how to raise her children. 

Parsons also testified that respondent sometimes became frustrated that NM did not want to 

participate in visits, and she would tell NM that she was lucky that respondent had come to the 

visit or she would threaten to withhold treats if NM did not cooperate or provide affection to 

respondent. NM’s infant mental health therapist testified that respondent’s mood during visits was 

inconsistent. When respondent was not in a good mood during visits, NM would exhibit distress 

and not want to be around or interact with respondent. 

Respondent acknowledged that she “stormed out” of a hearing on June 25, 2019, when the 

trial court ordered a return to supervised parenting time. Respondent also acknowledged that she 

became so upset during a visit that NM had called her foster mother “mommy” that she grabbed 

her backpack, left the lobby, and ended the visit. When asked why she did not want to take her 
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psychotropic medications, respondent stated that she had tried it, but it caused her to “freak out”

at one of the foster parents, so she stopped because she was “crazy enough without it.”

In sum, clear and convincing evidence supports that respondent’s mental and emotional 

instability remained a barrier to reunification. Further, considering respondent’s continued refusal 

to take her medications, her lack of success in her attempt at self-medication with marijuana and/or 

cocaine, and her failure to benefit from services to address her mental and emotional instability, 

the trial court did not clearly err by finding that this condition was not reasonably likely to be 

rectified within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the evidence supported termination of 

respondent’s parental rights under § 19b(3)(c)(i).5 

IV. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent also argues that the trial court erred when it found that termination of her 

parental rights was in NM’s best interests. We disagree. 

“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of 

parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be 

made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). We review for clear error a trial court’s finding that termination of 

parental rights is in a child’s best interests. In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 63; 

874 NW2d 205 (2015). When applying this standard, “regard is to be given to the special 

opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” In 

re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); see also MCR 2.613(C).

Whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests is determined by a 

preponderance of the evidence. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). 

Factors to be considered include “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the 

child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the 

parent’s home.” Id. at 41-42 (citations omitted). A court may also consider whether it is likely 

“that the child could be returned to her parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all.” In 

re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). 

The trial court did not clearly err when it found that termination of respondent’s parental 

rights was in NM’s best interests. By the end of the termination hearing, NM had been in 

petitioner’s care for approximately three years, which was most of her life. During that time, 

respondent obtained housing that likely would be suitable if respondent addressed the safety issues 

with the home and if Johnson cooperated with the caseworkers by providing necessary information 

for a background check. It also appears that respondent had a source of income, but the amount 

was uncertain because she did not furnish requested information to the caseworkers. However, 

 

5 Only one statutory ground is required to terminate a respondent’s parental rights; therefore, we 

need not address respondent’s argument that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), and (j). See In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 244.
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respondent’s admission that she had previously supplemented her income by selling cocaine is 

particularly troubling, especially where respondent had not participated in drug screening for eight 

months before termination. 

In addition, respondent’s mental and emotional health remained unstable, which was 

apparent during many parental visits, and NM was not particularly bonded with respondent. 

Testimony supports the trial court’s finding that many of the visits went well and that there was 

no question that respondent loved NM, but the evidence also indicated that there were many visits 

that went poorly, sometimes causing NM to have stress-induced asthma attacks, and that NM had 

developed a stronger bond with her foster parents, whom she looked to for support and guidance. 

Cooper had seen NM interact with both her foster parents and respondent. Cooper maintained that 

during visits with respondent that went poorly, NM became upset, did not want to participate 

without her foster mother present, and often attempted to end visits early. It was very obvious to 

Cooper that NM preferred her foster parents, whom she referred to as mom and dad, whereas she 

referred to respondent by her first name. According to Cooper, NM told her that she did not like 

respondent and did not want to be with her, and that even respondent had admitted to Cooper that 

she did not have a bond with NM. By contrast, NM’s brother AW was in the same foster home 

and the two had a very good relationship. 

NM’s infant mental health therapist similarly testified that NM was happy to be in her 

foster home with her brother and had a good attachment with the foster parents. The therapist had 

also watched NM interact with respondent. Some of the interactions were positive, but depending 

on respondent’s mood during the visit, NM would sometimes show distress and did not want to be 

around or interact with respondent. NM also sometimes showed distress at the beginning of visits 

because she did not want her foster mother to leave the room. The therapist did not believe that 

respondent could currently meet NM’s emotional needs. The therapist also stated that it would 

not be good or healthy for NM to live with respondent currently, and could not provide a time 

frame for when this could change. The therapist agreed that keeping siblings together was an 

important factor in establishing permanence, which NM needed. 

Parsons similarly testified that NM was very much at ease with her foster family, initiated 

interaction, and was very playful. NM also sought interaction with Parsons, but not with 

respondent. Parsons was concerned that NM’s interactions with respondent could lead to trauma, 

and NM had already begun to develop negative behaviors in connection with visits. Parsons 

believed that respondent’s parental rights should be terminated because she had witnessed multiple 

occasions when she feared for NM’s safety, and Parsons had witnessed NM being treated like a 

person who was there to help the adult, rather than the other way around. Parsons did not see 

evidence that NM was bonding with respondent. Parsons also testified that she had met Johnson, 

who resided in respondent’s home. Johnson did not share Parsons’s opinion about how to raise 

children, and he believed that it was appropriate to be “much more physical” when raising a child.6

Parsons testified that NM seeks out her foster parents, and she looked to them to be picked up or 

comforted, and to provide rules and organization in the home.

 

6 See footnote 4.
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NM’s foster mother testified that she and her husband had adopted NM’s brother, AW, and 

they were willing to also adopt NM, thereby enabling the siblings to remain together. Caseworker 

Caroline Ostrander believed that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in NM’s best 

interests because she had been in the system for almost all of the three years of her life and she 

was in need of permanency, and because respondent had not made sufficient progress despite the 

services offered to her. The foregoing testimony supports the trial court’s determination that 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in NM’s best interests. 

Affirmed.

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause

/s/ Christopher M. Murray

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien