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OCCASIONALPAPERS

Prospects of Conventional Arms

Control in South Asia

Nazir Kamal

Security Analyst

Islamabad, Pakistan

Amit Gupta

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stonehill College,

Easton, Massachusetts, USA
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Prospects of Conventional Arms

Control in South Asia

Nazir Kamal

Security Analyst

Islamabad, Pakistan

Amit Gupta

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stonehill College,

Easton, Massachusetts, U.S.A.

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Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

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Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Abstract

The intensely adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan is marked by

military rivalry, mutual distrust, and suspicion. The most dividing disagreement has been

over the Kashmir region. An inability to discuss the Kashmir issue has prevented

discussion on other important issues. Since there is little prospect of detente, at least in

the near-term, the question is whether this rivalry can be contained by other means, such

as arms control approaches.

Conventional arms control has been applied flexibly and successfully in some

regions to reduce threat-perceptions and achieve reassuring military stability. Some

lessons from other international models might be applied to the India/Pakistan context.

This paper discusses the status of conventional arms control in South Asia, the dominant

Indian and Pakistani perceptions about arms control, the benefits that could be derived

from arms control, as well as the problems and prospects of arms control. It also

discusses existing conventional arms control agreements at the regional and global levels

as well as the potential role of cooperative monitoring technology.

5
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

ASLV

C31

CBM

CD

CFE

cm

CTBT

FMCT

GDP

ICBM

IMF

kt

LoC

m

NATO

NTM

PSLV

SAARC

SAR

SIPRI

SLBM

UNMOG

Acronyms

Augmented Space Launch Vehicle

command, control, communications, and intelligence

confidence-building measure

Conference on Disarmament

Conventional Forces in Europe

centimeter

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

gross domestic product

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

International Money Fund

kiloton

Line of Control

meters

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

National Technical Means

Polar Space Launch Vehicle

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

synthetic aperture radar

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

United Nations

United Nations Military Observer Group
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...........................................................................................................................9

1. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................11

2. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN SOUTH ASIA ............................................................12

2.1 CU=NTMEASUmS .......................................................................................................................l2

2.2 PAKISTAN’SPOLICIESANDPERCEPTIONS ONARMS CONTROL........................................................12

2.2.1 InJuence of Kashmir Dispute ................................................................................................l2

2.2.2 Siachen Glacier Dispute ........................................................................................................l3

2.2.3 Pakistani Efiorts in Regional Arms Control ..........................................................................l4

2.2.4 Nongovernmental Analysts ....................................................................................................l5

2.2.5 Reasons for A4inimal Interest in Conventional Arms Control ...............................................l6

2..3 INDIA’SPOLICIESANDPERCEPTIONS ONARMSCONTROL...............................................................l7

2.3.1 International Factors .............................................................................................................l7

2.3.2 Establish ing RegionalSecuri@ ..............................................................................................I7

2.3.3 Lack of Understanding of Conventional Arms Control Concepts .........................................18

2.4 ATTEMPTSTo NEmTMTE...............................................................................................................l8

3. CASE FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL ......................................................................20

3.1 BENEFITSOFCONVENTIONALRMSCONTROL...............................................................................2O

3.2 POSSIBILITIES OFNUCLEmCO~LICT.............................................................................................2O

3.3 POSSIBLEARMSCONTROLAPPROACHES.........................................................................................2l

3.4 DEFENSEEXPENDITURES .................................................................................................................22

3.5 RATIONALEFoRCoNvEPrmowwARMsWDucTIONs.....................................................................23

4 POSSIBILITIES FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN SOUTH ASIA ....................25

4.1 NEAR-TERMPROSPECTS...................................................................................................................26

4.1.1 UN Monitoring Presence .......................................................................................................26

4.1.2 Nondeployment Options .........................................................................................................28

4.1.3 Nonaggression Pacts .............................................................................................................28

4.2 LONGER-TERMPROSPECTS...............................................................................................................28

4.2.1Observation ofMilita~Exercises ...............................................................................................29

4.2.2 Force Limitation Zones ...............................................................................................................29

4.2.3 Training for Cooperative Monitoring ....................................................................................32

5. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................33

APPENDIX A: EXAMPLES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS .............35

A.1 SNAIDISENGAGEMENT AGmEMENTS.............................................................................................35

A.2 GOLANHEIGHTSDISENGAGEMENT AG~EMENT.............................................................................36

A.3 OPENSKIESAGmEMENTS..................................................~............................................................36

A.4 CONVENTIONALFORCESrNEUROPETREATY..................................................................................38

APPENDIX B: INDIAN AND PAKISTANI CONVENTIONAL FORCE AGREEMENTS ..............40

B,,1 AGREEMENTBETWEENINDIAANDPAKISTANONTHEADVANCENOTICEONMILITARYEXERCISES,

MANEUVERSANDTROOPMOVEMENTS...........................................................................................4O

B,2 AGKEEMENTBETWEENPAKISTANANDINDIAONPREVENTIONOFAIRSPACEWOLATIONSANDFOR

PEWITT~GOVERFLIGHTSANDLANDmGSBYMILITmYAIRCWFT............................................42

B,3 AGREEMENTONTHEPROHIB1TIONFATTACKAGAINSTNUCLEARINSTALLATIONSAND

FACILITIES.......................................................................................................................................44

AB(J)UTTHE AUTHORS ...........................................................................................................................45

7
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

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Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Executive Summary

India and Pakistan have been adversaries since the time of their independence

from British colonial rule in August 1947. They have fought three wars since then, the

first within a few months of their independence. Their relationship has also been marred

by limited armed conflicts as well as by crises that have brought them close to war.

Their military rivalry has been costly, as they belong to one of the world’s poorest

regions. Besides draining scarce resources, their military competition threatens to make a

future war more destructive than their past armed conflicts have been. In addition, the

nuclear dimension has deepened concern about the danger of war, as it could escalate

beyond conventional weapons.

Of the various issues that divide India and Pakistan, the most troubling are their

differences over the Kashmir dispute. There is little sign yet that a breakthrough might

occur on this issue. Unless this happens, their bilateral talks are highly unlikely to show

progress on other issues. India and Pakistan are thus faced with the prospect of an

expensive and destabilizing military competition that will aggravate mutual threatperceptions.

Defense spending, a

substantial portion of their Of the various issues that divide India

.

budgets, will continue to rise as and Pakistan, the most troubling are

well. Their protracted rivalry their differences over the Kashmir

has spawned large armed dispute.

forces that have become

costlier to maintain for a

variety of reasons, including the increasing cost of arms procurement.

Since there is little prospect of d+tente, at least in the near-term, the question is

whether this rivalry can be contained by other means. Although arms control prospects

look: rather bleak, India and Pakistan could consider some measures that may help to

prevent a deterioration of their tense relations, without adversely affecting their position

on contentious issues.

Until a breakthrough occurs on the Kashmir issue or their existing positions

soften, what might be possible are modest measures to reduce the threat of war.

One

the Line of

such measure could be a substantially upgraded UN monitoring force along

Control (LoC) in Kashmir so that its presence can discourage cross-border

9
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

firings as well as larger clashes between the forward-deployed Pakistani and Indian

forces. The most likely scenario of a future conflict would be an escalation of military

confrontation along the LoC. A sizable UN presence would also help to address India’s

accusations that Pakistan is providing material support to the armed unrest on the Indian

side of the LoC.

Another proposed measure is an agreement or a tacit understanding for the

nondeployment of ballistic missiles. Nondeployment would cover all missile varieties, as

it would be difficult to distinguish a nuclear armed from a conventionally armed missile.

India and Pakistan should also consider a “no-war” or nonaggression pact. Such a

pact would be declaratory in nature and susceptible to conflicting interpretations about

what would constitute aggression in an actual crisis. Yet, it would still be a step forward,

especially given that there is now heightened concern about the consequences of a future

conflict and the fact that they have not been able to move forward on any major issue.

Should there be a breakthrough in the India-Pakistan relationship or should the

two adversaries become more amenable to the idea of stabilizing their mutual security

through arms control, they could consider a variation of an agreement used successfully

elsewhere in the world. For example, the Sinai disengagement agreements that eased

(India and Pakistan) could consider a

tensions between Egypt and

Israel in the 1970s could serve

variation of an agreement used as a general model for reducing

successfully elsewhere in the world. mutual threat-perceptions, providing early warning and stabilizing the military situation along the India-Pakistan border at a lower level of

armaments. A Sinai-type agreement may require some form of an Open Skies

arrangement for verifying compliance.

A more ambitious model, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

Treaty, would be far less manageable in the India/Pakistan context and might not

succeed. Negotiated in 1990, the CFE sought significant and equal reductions of all

major conventional weapon systems belonging to the member states of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization and the former Warsaw pact countries. To ensure success, any model

would have to be adapted to suit the India-Pakistan context.

An additional long-term prospect for promoting the conventional arms control

process between India and Pakistan is for both sides to gain expertise so that they can

carry out monitoring and verification missions associated with regional arms control

agreements. Pakistan and India could engage separately in training programs that could

include sending personnel to other countries that have experience and advanced

technology for monitoring. This kind of cooperation would be similar to the kind of

cooperation that already exists in terms of military or other professional exchanges

between governments.

10
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

1. Introduction

India and Pakistan have been adversaries since the time of their independence

from British colonial rule in August 1947. They have fought three wars since then, the

first within a few months of their independence. Their relationship has also been marred

by limited armed conflicts as well as by crises that have brought them close to war. In

addition, India and Pakistan continue to make unmitigated allegations of interference in

each other’s internal affairs, including accusations of subversion and sabotage.

This intensely adversarial relationship, marked by military rivalry, has been costly

to these two countries which belong to one of the poorest regions of the world. Besides

draining scarce resources, their military competition threatens to make a future war more

destructive than their past armed conflicts have been. Thus, a future conflict would cause

a major economic setback, aggravating social instability.

In addition, the nuclear dimension has deepened concern about the danger of war,

as it could escalate beyond conventional weapons. Such an eventuality would have

devastating economic, human, and environmental consequences.

The India-Pakistan relationship is beset by serious differences over various issues,

especially the long-standing dispute over Kashmir, and it appears that this bitter

relationship will not improve any time soon. Thus, India and Pakistan are faced with the

proslpect of an expensive and destabilizing military competition that will aggravate

mutual threat-perceptions.

Defense spending, which represents a substantial portion of their budget, will

cent inue to rise as well. Their protracted rivalry has spawned large armed forces that

have become costlier to maintain, with a proportionate increase in maintenance costs and

pension liabilities. Making the military service attractive at a time of social change has

also generated pressure for better salaries and benefits. The cost of arms procurement,

too, has increased.

Since there is little prospect of d&ente, at least in the near-term, the question is

whether this rivalry can be contained by other means, such as arms control approaches.

Conventional arms control has been applied flexibly and successfully in some

regions to reduce threat-perceptions and achieve reassuring military stability. This paper

will discuss the status of conventional arms control in South Asia, the dominant Indian

and Pakistani perceptions about arms control, the benefits that could be derived from

arms control, as well as the problems and prospects of arms control. It will also discuss

existing conventional arms control agreements at the regional and global levels as well as

the role of cooperative monitoring technology.

11
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

2. Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

By definition, arms control implies the reduction and limitation of military forces

or disarmament in one or more categories of weaponry. But in reality, arms control

covers a wider range of activities and it could also include the management of adversarial

relationships between states or groups of states. In the South Asian context, arms control

could take a variety of forms, which may include proscribing activities that impinge on

security, achieving greater transparency, containing military competition, and reducing

forces.

From the outset, however, the India-Pakistan agenda has been virtually bereft of

conventional arms control even as a generic concept that could help to improve mutual

security and stability. Initial interest in such a concept has been of recent origin and

outside of officialdom. Thus, familiarity with the role that cooperative monitoring

technology could play in support of arms control efforts is virtually nonexistent in India

and Pakistan. Not surprisingly, there are some misgivings about reliance on technology.

This is not the case at the international level, where arms control and cooperative

monitoring have become well established as a result of various bilateral, multilateral, and

global agreements. As these agreements show, cooperative monitoring could be employed usefully for a wide range of purposes, including military disengagement, confidence building, and arms control (limitation and reduction). See Appendix A for

examples of conventional arms control agreements.

2.1 Current Measures

India and Pakistan have yet to agree on measures to achieve military stability and

reduce their mutual threat-perceptions. Only a few confidence-building measures

(CBMS) are in place, including restrictions on military exercises and movements near

their common border, prevention of violation of airspace, and a hot line between their

Directorate-General of Military Operations. As subsequent developments have shown,

these CBMS, which were agreed to in 1991, fall far short of the measures required to

reverse the India-Pakistan military rivalry. (For the text of the CBM agreements, see

Appendix B.)

2.2 Pakistan’s Policies and Perceptions on Arms Control

2.2.1 Influence of Kashmir Dispute

At the official level, Pakistan’s attitude toward arms control with India has been

molded by the Kashmir dispute, especially since the early 1990s when tension over that

issue flared up. The ofllcial stance has been that unless India moves forward to negotiate

a settlement of this long-standing dispute, Islamabad would not engage in talks to address

other important issues, whether military or nonmilitary.

In early 1994, Pakistan suspended bilateral

in 1990) after these talks failed to show progress

talks (that began through U.S. urging

on Kashmir. Pakistan also imposed

12
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

conditions for their resumption, including a scaling down of security forces on the Indian

side of the Line of Control in Kashmir.

Pakistan subsequently softened its stance without changing its basic position on

Kashmir. This facilitated a resumption of talks in 1997 that showed some promise that a

way would be found to incorporate Kashmir in an agreed-upon agenda for negotiating

bilateral problems. These talks collapsed after several rounds failed to achieve a

procedural breakthrough on Kashmir. Efforts to iron out procedural problems were

finally successful in September 1998, paving the way for a new round of talks.

Both sides agree that their bilateral agenda should include a subset of securityrelated issues under the rubric of “peace and security.” Conceptually, this subset is broad

enough to incorporate both arms control and CBMS.

However, Pakistan continues to stress that Kashmir is a core issue whose

resolution is central to the normalization of the India-Pakistan relationship and a

precondition for negotiation on other issues.

There is no sign of any change

in their postures on the Kashmir The most likely scenario of a future

dispute. The official view remains that CO17f/iCt WOU/d be all eSCdfltiO/1 Of

Pakistan will not negotiate on other mi/itary confrontation ... in Kashmir.

issues unless Kashmir is treated as the

forelmost issue and progress is made in resolving this dispute through negotiations on the

basis of the UN Security Council resolutions adopted in the late 1940s and 1950s.

According to an opinion survey last year, almost 80% of the Pakistani people

polled rejected the idea of accepting the status quo in Kashmir. 1 The Pakistani stance on

Kashmir also enjoys strong support from most politicians and, perhaps more important,

from influential circles within the Pakistani establishment.

2.2.2 Siachen Glacier Dispute

The firmness of the Pakistani posture on Kashmir is also reflected in its position

on the Siachen Glacier dispute. Although India and Pakistan engaged in negotiations in

the late 1980s on this dispute with a view to achieving disengagement and demilitarization, the prospect of a resumption of talks on that issue has steadily declined. It appears

that Pakistan does not wish to discuss the Siachen issue unless there is progress on the

wider dispute over Kashmir, of which Siachen is a part.

Thus, the shadow cast by the deadlock over Kashmir has stultified the prospects

of India and Pakistan making progress on the arms control front.

‘ “82 pc Pakistanis want to stay home;most hopefulof future,”Dawn (Pakistan),January 31, 1997. The

survey was conducted by Herald, a leading Karachi-based magazine.

13
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

2.2.3 Pakistani Efforts in Regional Arms Control

Even in earlier periods when tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir

was not quite as pronounced as it has been since the early 1990s, there was little evidence

of Pakistani interest in seeking formal arms control with India with a view to establishing

military stability or reducing mutual threat-perceptions.

Pakistan did however, initiate or support numerous UN General Assembly

resolutions in the 1980s and early 1990s urging regional arms control, which India voted

against or abstained from voting. More recently, Pakistan has made implicit references to

the need for conventional arms control at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in

Geneva—a multilateral negotiating body linked to the UN.2 In September 1998,

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif spoke about creating a “regime for nuclear

restraint and conventional balance” in his speech to the United Nations General

Assembly.3 Subsequently, a Pakistani Foreign OffIce spokesman said that the issue of

“conventional arms constraint” would be raised by Pakistan at the next round of bilateral

talks with India4.

In recent years, an issue on which Pakistan has periodically or intermittently

called for an agreement with India relates to a “no-war” or a nonaggression pact. Even in

this area, however, the impact of the Kashmir dispute has been felt. Recently, both Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad reiterated the offer of a

nonaggression pact but linked it to “a just and fair settlement of the Kashmir dispute.”5

The centrality of the Kashmir dispute in Pakistan’s policy toward India can also

be gauged from the attempts by Islamabad to create a link between a settlement on

Kashmir with Pakistan’s willingness to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT). Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reportedly said that Pakistan would have “no

hesitation” to hold talks with the U.S. on signing the CTBT if the Kashmir dispute was

“solved first.”6

Similarly, Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad said that Pakistan would sign the

CTBT if “there is clear demonstration from the major powers of their involvement in the

2 In a statement to the CD, Pakistan’s representative said, “Nuclear restraint and balance in South Asia will

be possible if this is accompanied by effective measures for greater balance and symmetry in the

conventional arms capabilities in South Asia.” Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram at the Plenary of

the Conference on Disarmament on June 2, 1998.

3 See, for example, Amit Baruah, “Indo-Pak Talks on the Basis of Agreed Agenda” The Hindu, October 15,

1998.

4Dawn, October 4, 1998.

5 Akhtar, Hasan, “Islamabad ready to sign no-war pact with India: FO,” Dawn (Pakistan), July 9, 1998.

6 “Nawaz links CTBT signing to Kashmir,” Dawn, July 12, 1998.

14
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

issues of peace and security in South Asia (including the resolution of) the core issue of

Kashmir.”7

Pakistani leaders have said over the past decade that if a settlement of this dispute

were to take place, Pakistan would keenly cooperate toward achieving wide-ranging

agreements with India to reverse their adversary relationship.x

Another issue on which Pakistan had sought an agreement with India was for a

zero-missile regime, but lately Pakistan’s interest in that proposal seems to have receded.

2.2.4 Nongovernmental Analysts

At the nongovernmental level, views on arms control are not much different from

the c)fficial positions, even though a fairly large body of opinion makers has emerged in

Pakistan who write frequently on security issues. They include a steadily growing

number of senior retired civil and military officers as well as journalists and academics.

The opinions and analyses that appear in the Pakistani media on security issues

are, however, almost completely devoid of reference to conventional arms control issues.

Moreover, there is little discussion when this subject is infrequently broached, which is

done mainly by academics writing in journals or monographs published by Pakistani or

foreign research institutes and think-tanks.9

Other than that, arms control Arms CO~~rO/ confinueS tO be a

issues are raised intermittently by a

neglected subject in South Asia... small advocacy group, drawn from

diverse professional backgrounds,

who support de-militarization measures between India and Pakistan but whose main

concern has been the burden of defense spending on the Pakistani economy .10

7 “Pakistan links CTBT signing with Kashmir,” Dawn, July 9, 1998.

8Recently, Islamabad offered flexibility if negotiations were undertaken to settle the Kashmir dispute.

9 Some examples of Pakistani writings on conventional arms issues include: Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Nonoffensive Defense - Promoting Confidence and Security,” Henry Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., April

1995:, Nazir Kamal, “Defensive Security in Regions other than Europe,” Disarmament: A Periodic Review

by the United Nations, New York, No. 4, 1992; Nazir Kamal, “Conventional and Nuclear Issues in IndiaPakistan Relations, National Development and Securi@, a journal of the Foundation for Research on

International Environment, National Development and Security, Rawalpindi, November 1995; and Nazir

Kamal, “Regional Arms Balance and Weapons of Mass Destruction in South Asia,” in D. D. Khanna, cd.,

Sustainable Development, Environmental Security, Disarmament and Development Interjace in South Asia,

MacMillan India Limited, 1997.

10See, for example, Pervez Tahir, “Futility of defence spending debate,” The News (Pakistan), August 28,

1994: Karen Byrne, “Open discussion of de fence budget will benefit forces,” The News, April 22, 1996;

Shahrukh Khan, “Military must realize that a strong economy serves the purpose of defence,” The News,

August 24, 1997; and “Are we paying for security with prosperity?’ The News, March 18, 1996.

15
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

2.2.5 Reasons for Minimal Interest in Conventional Arms Control

A variety of reasons have contributed to the scarcity of public discussion and

debate on conventional arms control issues, as follows:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

The external pressures on Pakistan to forego the nuclear option and the domestic

pressures to resist those attempts have overshadowed regional conventional arms

control issues, even though the primary reason behind public support for safeguarding

the nuclear option has been Pakistan’s concerns about India’s greater conventional

military strength and potential. Thus, the nuclear issue has dominated Pakistan’s

security agenda for more than a decade. The situation created by recent nuclear tests

by India and Pakistan has further reinforced the dominance of the nuclear issue.

The Kashmir dispute, especially since the early 1990s, became a preoccupation

following a marked escalation of violence in the part of Kashmir that falls on the

Indian side of the LoC.

A majority of opinion-makers in Pakistan, including some senior retired military

officers, support the ofllcial position on Kashmir.

There is a general perception that arms control is too complicated and sensitive a

subject, particularly as it may involve intrusive verification measures that would be

unacceptable either because India cannot be trusted to show good faith or because

other national security interests may be compromised unwittingly.

There is a lack of familiarity with conventional arms control. By contrast, nuclear

nonproliferation issues are better known, if not well understood by many, because

they have been the subject of intensive diplomatic activity and media comment for

more than a decade. They have also been a subject that has figured prominently in

political rallies and election campaigns over the last 10 years when parliamentary

democracy was reintroduced in Pakistan after 11 years of military rule.

Of the various factors that account for the lack of attention to conventional arms

control issues, the wide acceptance of the official position on Kashmir and the saliency of

the nuclear issue would seem to be the main ones.

Thus, the only arms control issue that has figured prominently in the columns of

the Pakistani press in recent years has been the official proposal for the nondeployment of

ballistic missiles, made a couple of years ago, after India had completed the development

of its short-range missile, Prithvi- 1.

Not surprisingly, reference to that proposal by security analysts has diminished in

tandem with a perceptible decline of official interest in a zero-missile regime following

Pakistani testing of Ghauri, a medium-range missile, and disclosures by Pakistani defense

scientists about progress in developing other short- and medium-range missiles.

16
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

2.3 India’s Policies and Perceptions on Arms Control

The Indian concerns about arms control, and less so about CBMS, are driven by

three factors: 1) establishing security with respect to Pakistan; 2) establishing security

with respect to China; and 3) the assumption that as a major state in world affairs, Indian

security and foreign policy interests go beyond the immediate South Asian region.

2.3.1 International Factors

The Indian government, since the times of Jawaharlal Nehru, has spoken of the

needl for global disarmament. This desire for disarmament was not primarily influenced

by any Gandhian notion of universal peace. Instead, it came out of the recognition that

the continued escalation of the Cold War would swallow up the newly independent

nations of the south and make them lose their recently gained freedom. There was also

the belief that if the arms race was curtailed, some of the money wasted by the superpowers on armament could be transferred to develop the nations of the south. Only with

global development, Nehru believed, could true peace be achieved in the international

system. 11

In the 1980s and 1990s, this position was broadened to take into account what

Indian policy makers felt was India’s international status. Arms control was no longer

just an issue of global peace but also provided a forum where India’s prestige and

influence could be enhanced. After the first test of the Agni intermediate-range ballistic

missile, K. Subrahmanyam, India’s leading defense analyst commented, “Agni makes

India a significant factor in international power politics. If it is followed by successful

ASLV, PSLV, and ICBM tests, then there can be no future international arms control

negotiations without India’s participation. India’s voice will be heard with much greater

attention than has been the case hitherto. One-sixth of humanity coming into international decision making means greater democratization of the process.”12 Arms control

for India, therefore, has not only meant the process of managing regional arms races but

also of securing status and power in international systems. This preference is reflected in

the Indian position on nuclear issues where the country has consistently wanted to be part

of global regimes, which are considered equitable, rather than regional regimes, which do

not include major powers and place one-sided restrictions on India.

2.3.2 Establishing Regional Security

India’s position on regional arms control, and to a lesser extent CBMS, has been

predicated by the existence of a two-front threat and by the very different natures of the

India-China and India-Pakistan relationships. The existence of a two-front threat has led

to a reluctance to sign agreements with Pakistan because they would leave out China and

prevent building a comprehensive security regime with which India would feel comfort-

‘‘ Fc,r a discussion of Nehru’s foreign and security policies see Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integi-ation

in Asia (Bombay: Asia, 1964), pp. 1-27.

12 K. Subrahmanyam, “The Meaning of Agni,” The Hindu, May 24, 1998. The ASLV is the Augmented

Space Launch Vehicle while the PSLV is the Polar Space Launch Vehicle.

17
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

able. There is also the consideration that arrangements that work between India and

China may run into problems if applied in the India-Pakistan context. The reason lies in

the difference between the two dyadic relationships.

The India-China relationship is a competitive one. The dispute itself is based on

an unresolved border and the jockeying for power between two Asian mega-states.

The India-Pakistan dispute is colored by visceral factors such as history, culture,

and religion that make attempts towards negotiations and concessions difllcult. These

tensions make it difficult for either side to make concessions without being charged by

opposition groups with having sold out to the enemy.

2.3.3 Lack of Understanding of Conventional Arms Control Concepts

Along with these negative feelings, there is a general lack of research and work in

the area of conventional arms control. As in the Pakistani case, there is greater

familiarity with the nuclear issue among scholars and policy makers. Thus scholars at

three of India’s leading think tanks, the Center for Policy Research, the govemment-run

Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, and the Center for the Study of Developing

Societies, have focused primarily on the nuclear issue. Further, on the Indian side, there

has been an intellectual division of labor on conventional force issues. Civilian interest

has focused on conventional weapons acquisition and production.13 Military ofilcers,

through journals such as the United Services Institute Journal and newspaper articles,

have written on conventional forces and doctrine. The focus of these writings has been

on operational and tactical issues rather than on grand strategy or on the possibility of

establishing arms control regimes.

Nor is there a significant body of nongovernmental work on the subject. One

scholar, Ravi Rikhye, wrote extensively in the 1980s on the deployment and use of

conventional forces. 14 Nongovemrnental groups have focused on building cooperative

relations between the two countries and dealing with the nuclear issue. 15 One such group

is the Committee For a Sane Nuclear Policy, which has sought to educate the general

public on safety and security issues in the nuclear realm.

2.4 Attempts to Negotiate

Despite such limitations, a set of CBM agreements between India and Pakistan

have, in part, been reactions to crises in the region. The agreement barring attacks on

‘3 See, for example, K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Securi& Perspectives (New Delhi: ABC, 1983), and Raju

G. C. Thomas, The Defense of India: A Budgetav Perspective of Strategy and Politics (New Delhi:

Macmillan, 1978).

‘4Ravi Rikhye, The Militarisation of Mother India (New Delhi: Chanakya, 1990).

‘s The most recent report detailing Track Two and Track Three diplomacy in South Asia is by Navnita

Chadha Behra, Paul M. Evans, and Gowher Rizvi, Beyond Boundaries: A Report on the State ofNonOfjcial Dialogues on Peace, Security and Cooperation in South Asia, (York, Ontario: University of

Toronto-York University, 1997).

18
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

nuclear facilities, for example, originated from the 1984 crisis where it was believed that

India was planning to attack Pakistan’s nuclear facilities at Kahuta. Similarly, the

agreements on notification of military exercises and violations of air space emerged after

the 1990 crisis over Kashmir. (See Appendix B.)

The two countries, through the early 1990s, were also engaged in negotiations at

the foreign secretary level to discuss contentious issues. These talks were terminated by

Pakistan in 1994 because of charges of Indian misbehavior in Kashmir. At the time the

talks were suspended, Indian diplomats had submitted six “non-papers” to their Pakistani

counterparts on building a regime of new CBMS. These included a commitment by each

country to not wage nuclear war on the other; a mutual withdrawal of forces from the

Siaclnen Glacier without either side giving up its territorial claims; better and more secure

communications between the milita~ commanders of both sides; and a proposal to

resolve the territorial dispute of Sir Creek. 16 These papers, in part, served as the basis for

official talks between the two countries in March and April 1997.17 By June 1997, when

the talks were again broken off, the two sides had come up with eight issue areas to

discuss in the future. Two of these, peace and security and the Kashmir issue, are likely

to be the most prominent when India and Pakistan resume negotiations. In the aftermath

of the nuclear tests, both countries have stated that they want to resume talks, although

there are differing views on how much emphasis should be given to each issue.

Pakistan contends that Kashmir is the core issue that adversely effects IndiaPakistan relations and, therefore, no significant breakthroughs are possible without

addressing this issue. The Indian position is that Kashmir’s future has already been

decided and that it is an integral part of India. Further, India says that talks on Kashmir

make little sense when Pakistan, it claims, is supporting terrorist actions in the state. The

Indian parliament raised the ante when it passed a resolution stating that the entire

territo~ of Kashmir legally belonged to India. Lastly, the Indian preference to discuss

the issue at the bilateral level conflicts with Pakistani attempts to internationalize the

issue.

After the nuclear tests, the Indian government has suggested that both sides sign a

no-first-use pledge. It has also agreed to follow parts of the CTBT without becoming a

member-this would include a moratorium on testing. Other potential areas of

discussion include the spread of light weapons in the region and coordinated attempts to

check terrorism.

“ Shekhar Gupta, “India Redefines its Role,” Adelphi Paper No. 293, (London: Oxford, 1995), p. 46.

‘7 Indian Express, New Delhi, April 11, 1997.

19
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

3. Case for Conventional Arms Control

3.1 Benefits of Conventional Arms Control

Conventional arms control could benefit India and Pakistan in the following ways:

1. Measures to achieve conventional military stability would reduce the danger of

armed conflict. India and Pakistan have fought three full-blown wars over the

past 50 years and have engaged in limited armed conflict on two occasions. 18

Wars in South Asia have tended to result from long-standing disputes and the

actual conflicts have resulted from drawn-out crises.

2. A stable and nonthreatening military equation would provide strategic stability

which is required in the new situation following the recent nuclear device tests

and possible moves by India and Pakistan toward nuclear weaponization. The

nuclearization of South Asia has raised the danger that a conventional conflict

between India and Pakistan could escalate to a nuclear conflict.

3.2 Possibilities of Nuclear Conflict

However, few observers believe that either side would be irrational in the use of

nuclear weapons. Some comfort can be taken from the fact that both countries have

demonstrated restraint, notwithstanding occasional provocative statements by them, and

that a relationship of nuclear deterrence has prevailed in the region since the 1980s.

India’s 1974 nuclear test was not followed by weaponization or any offensive

disposition of its nuclear weapons capability. Similarly, Pakistan, which had developed

the capability to produce nuclear weapons by the mid- 1980s, did not seek to develop an

overt nuclear arsenal. Instead, both sides pursued what is widely believed to have been a

fairly stable relationship of nonweaponized deterrence. Although the situation has

changed as a result of recent developments, most observers do not perceive a serious

danger of one side engaging in a preemptive strike nor do they believe that such a strike

could be carried out meaningfully.

One Indian analyst has observed that “India and Pakistan have very small nuclear

arsenals and for some years to come are not likely to cross the two-digit figure. No one

will use a tactical nuclear weapon as its use is an invitation to a much larger retaliatory

strike. There are no proposals these days to have nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.

These countries are not likely to deploy their weapons lest they should lose them to even

conventional strikes. Since the arsenals are small, extreme care will be taken not to lose

those assets.”19

‘gThey fought full-blown wars in 1948, 1965, and 1971, and limited armed conflicts in 1964 over Rannof

Kutch and an ongoing conflict over Siachen Glacier since 1984.

‘gK. Subrahmanyam, “Past Imperfect: Time for New Nuclearspeak,” The Times of India, August 3, 1998.

20
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Thus, a more credible scenario of a nuclear conflict is one that results from the

escalation of a conventional war. More specifically, this could happen if Pakistan comes

under pressure to resort to nuclear weapons in order to halt an Indian breakthrough.

Since Pakistan is militarily inferior to India, both quantitatively and qualitatively, such a

situation could arise if an India-Pakistan war erupted. The likeliest cause of war could be

the Kashmir dispute, which was responsible for the 1948 and 1965 wars.

This scenario, more than any other, poses a genuine challenge to Indian and

Pakistani military planners and civilian policy makers. The balance of forces between

India and Pakistan is not likely to change in favor of a stable military equation in view of

the unequal military potential of the two countries and the intensity of their adversarial

relationship. Nor have any significant steps been taken beyond the 1991 CBMS to

actually lessen the chances of conventional conflict in the region. Therefore, achieving

conventional stability through arms control measures would help to strengthen nuclear

detemence.

Thus, there is a need to address the dangers that would precipitate a conventional

conflict. Both countries recognize the danger that a conventional conflict could escalate

to the point where the decision-makers may be forced to contemplate the use of nuclear

weapons. The decisions to defuse the 1987 and 1990 crises may have stemmed from

such fears. Numerous Indians and Pakistanis believe it to be the case. Hectic U.S. efforts

to help defuse those crises were also, it seems, motivated largely by such fear.

3.3 Possible Arms Control Approaches

The arms control effort could follow several approaches:

. treaties that lead to the management of the adversarial relationship;

. arms reduction; and

. processes that allow for early warning or even those that provide a forum for a

regular discussion of security-related issues between the two sides.

A Pakistan Foreign Office statement stressed the importance of some of these

issues. The spokesman said, “Pakistan has also proposed that under the item pertaining

to peace and security, special and urgent attention may be given to arriving at mutually

agreed measures for avoidance of conflict as well as promotion of nuclear and

conventional restraint and stabilization factors.”2°

A second incentive for arms control comes from the positive impact it would have

on the defense expenditure of both countries, even though the growth of defense spending

has generally been slow in recent years.

20Amit Baruah, “Raising the Stakes,” Frontline, Vol. 15, No. 13, June 20-July 3, 1998.

21
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

3.4 Defense Expenditures

While the early 1980s witnessed high imports of weaponry, by the late 1980s and

through the early and mid- 1990s, both India and Pakistan saw a reduction of their defense

spending as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). Thus, the Indian defense

budget declined from 3.3% of GDP in 1987 to 2.8% in 1995. In the case of Pakistan, its

expenditure dropped from 8°/0 in 1987 to 7.4°/0 in 1993 and then rebounded to an

estimated 8°Ain 1995.21

During this period, militaW expenditure as a percentage of central government

expenditure also declined in both countries. In India such expenditure dropped from

15.7?40 in 1985 to 12.7% in 1995. In Pakistan, the percentage declined from 28. 1?40in

1985 to 25.3% in 1995.22

Yet, the slowdown in

the growth of military spending

has been attributed largely to

acute budgetary problems. In

the absence of a financial

squeeze, their military expendiDespite budgetary constraints,...

allocations for defense greatly overshadow

... allocations for social and economic

development.

tures would most likely have grown at a faster rate, as both countries maintain large

armed forces and have had to make do with shoestring budgets in recent years. There is

also pressure on both sides to increase defense expenditures .23

India’s defense budget for fiscal year 1998-99 stands approximately at $10

billion.24 This marks an increase of roughly 7% over the previous year, after adjusting for

inflation, which is the biggest raise in recent years, and it represents a little over 15°/0 of

total central government expenditure.25 Plagued by more acute financial problems,

Pakistan’s allocation for defense for the same period stands at $3.15 billion, registering

no real-term increase because of inflation and currency devaluation. This represents a

little over 23?40of total central government expenditure.

Despite budgetary constraints, allocations for defense greatly overshadow

allocations for social and economic development. Both India and Pakistan have

2’SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1997), p. 203.

their

been

22U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1996

(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 74 and p. 85.

23See, for example, the views of the Indian parliamentary committee on defense, “Panel indicts Govt over

inadequate defence budget,” The Times of India, July 10, 1998.

24All monetary figures are expressed in U.S. dollars.

25India increased more significantly its allocation for the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department

of Space.

22
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

running huge budget deficits and are low-income economies faced with staggering social

and economic problems.

More than 40% of India’s population of 960 million and about 30% of Pakistan’s

population of 130 million live below the poverty line. Thus, together, there are half a

billion people in India and Pakistan who live in grueling conditions. Pressures exerted by

population growth have also been a major cause of environmental degradation in the

region. Similarly, India and Pakistan have high rates of illiteracy (India about 50% and

Pakistan about 65’?40).Likewise, both countries rank very low in the Human Development

Index developed by the United Nations Development Program. Pakistan ranks 138 and

India ranks as 139 out of 178 countries in the index.

Military expenditures will increase once nuclear weapons are included in their

force structures. (India has already announced an increase in its defense spending.)

Depending on the scale of weaponization, it could add a significant additional burden to

the economies of both countries.

Initial analysis of one

proposed Indian nuclear force Military expenditures will increase once

suggests a requirement of about nut/ear weapons are included in their force

150 nuclear weapons with the structures.

necessary delivery systems,

along with the required command, control, communications, and intelligence (C31)

features needed to manage these systems. An Indian parliamentarian, Subramaniam

Swamy, has even called for a nuclear force of 400 intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

Some Indian estimates have put the cost at approximately $714 million annually

for ten years. This estimate is based on each nuclear warhead costing $375,000 and each

missile costing about $3.75 million. When the cost of a C31 infrastructure is added, the

total cost of the force was estimated at about $2.5 billion.2G Since Indian pricing on

defense production tends to be deflated, as it places expenditures under civil and other

heaclings, it must be assumed that the cost of each warhead and missile may be

significantly higher. A leading Pakistani nuclear scientist, Dr. Samar Mobarik Mand, has

called for the development of a nuclear force of 60 to 70 bombs, though he also said that

deterrence did not depend on the size of the arsenal.27

3.5 Rationale for Conventional Arms Reductions

A costly arms competition would ensue if either side initiates a build-up of

nuclear capabilities. Conventional weaponry may be the area to begin expenditure

cutbacks because, unlike nuclear weapons and related systems, conventional forces do not

enjoy the status that nuclear forces do in terms of the international prestige it bestows on

26 su”brammi~ %Timy> “India’s Defense Needsj” The Hindustan Times, July 12, 1998.

27Dawn, Karachi, June 3, 1998.

23
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

the possessor and the importance which politicians and other influential figures give to

nuclear weapons.

Another positive aspect of conventional arms control would be the economic

gains that could be derived. Both India and Pakistan are trying to make market reforms

and modernize their economies. In order to accelerate this process, they need to create a

conducive environment for attracting foreign direct investment on a sustained and

substantial scale. Among other things, such investments would help to raise the

technological base of their economies, as seen in countries that have attracted large-scale

investments.

The pace of economic modernization will be adversely affected by continued

tensions between India and Pakistan. Any escalation in arms competition between them

would make potential investors wary of making long-term commitments. Private

investors are unlikely to invest in a region that is prone to conflict. Following the May

1998 nuclear device tests, the flow of investments almost dried up and the Indian stock

market plummeted by nearly one-fifth of its value.28 The impact of sanctions imposed by

the United States and some other countries has already been estimated to cost the Indian

economy about $4 billion29 as well as a loss of about one billion dollars in foreign investments.30 These sums are significant for a country with a per capita income of $400.

Pakistan’s situation is more dit%cult because of the nation’s high debt, estimated

at between $60 to $80 billion,31 with foreign debt in excess of $30 billion. The sanctions

imposed on Pakistan after its nuclear device tests of May 1998 have brought the country

to the brink of financial collapse. Assistance from the International Money Fund (IMF)

was suspended, which has raised the danger of default on its debt payment unless a new

package of assistance is secured.

In order to obtain this loan, however, Pakistan is being asked to undertake

economic reform measures that might create political difficulties for the government,

partly because of the short-term hardships it would impose on the general public. The

preconditions by the U.S. for facilitating new IMF loans also include nonproliferation

measures by Pakistan, such as joining the CTBT and supporting the commencement of

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations in Geneva.32 Even before the

sanctions were imposed, there was growing concern in Pakistan about the negative

28Molly Moore, “Bomb Tests Wound India’s Economy,” The Washington Post, June 20, 1998, p. A 01.

29India Today, July 6, 1998.

30India Today, July 13, 1998.

3’Manzur Ejaz, “Redefining State Priorities;’ The News International Pakistan, August 3, 1998.

According to Oxford Analytica, a UK-based body, Pakistan’s total external debt amounts to $42 billion.

See “UK firm fears debt default by Pakistan” Dawn (Pakistan), August 10, 1998. It should be noted that in

recent years Pakistan’s short-term debts have risen sharply.

32Maleeha Lodhi, “Testing Times for Pakistan’s Nuclear Diplomacy,” The News International Pakistan,

July 30, 1998.

24
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

impact of economic deterioration on its security. Notably,

voiced by the Pakistan army chief, General Jahangir Karamat.33

such concerns were also

For both India and Pakistan, therefore, the path to economic growth, or at the very

least continued economic stability, lies in convincing foreign governments and

international investors of the soundness of their economic and fiscal policies, their

willingness to pursue greater economic reforms, and their commitment to the peaceful

and negotiated settlement of disputes and outstanding issues.

Peace and stability between them would also benefit other countries in the

neighborhood. The region as a whole would be perceived as more stable by foreign

govmnments as well as by overseas investors who may also seek to exploit the region’s

full :market potential.

Finally, conventional arms control would also enable India and Pakistan to lower

mutual threat perceptions. It has been argued that they have pursued an “action/reaction”

model in their weapon procurement policies. Purchases by one side have led the other

side to seek comparable weapons systems .34 Such a competitive build-up of capabilities

heightens threat perceptions and leads to the belief that the military balance in the region

has been fundamentally altered or is in the process of being changed drastically.

Thus, Pakistan’s procurement of F-16 fighters from the U.S. in the early and mid1980s caused concern in India that the air balance in the region would be altered.

Similarly, India’s ongoing procurement of more capable SU-30 combat aircraft from

Russia is viewed by Pakistan as a threatening move. The entry into service of the Prithvi

missile, which India originally stated would be fitted with conventional warheads, was

seen. as a destabilizing move in Pakistan, motivating it to speed up its missile development efforts. Thus, adopting measures to control or manage the arms balance would lead

to a lessening of mutual threat perceptions.

4 Possibilities for

in South Asia

Conventional Arms Control

This section will deal with both the near-term and longer-term possibilities for

conventional arms control between India and Pakistan, starting with the near-term

prospects. The possibilities will be discussed in terms of what seem to be the most

feasible approaches.

33 “1’oor economy greater threat than that from outside: COAS,” Dawn, May 5, 1998.

34 For a discussion of this problem and its consequences see Amit Gupta, “Determining India’s Force

Structure and Military Doctrine: I Want my MiG:’ Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 5, May 1995, pp. 441-

458.

25
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

4.1 Near-term Prospects

In the existing circumstances, the prospects for conventional arms control in

South Asia are fairly dismal. India and Pakistan have not been able to move forward

toward resolving the fundamental issues that continue to stall their bilateral talks.

At the Colombo summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

(SAARC)35 countries in July 1998, the prime ministers of India and Pakistan agreed to

make an effort to reopen talks. Intense pressure to do so had come from the United

States, which had imposed sanctions on them following their nuclear device tests. But

the exploratory talks between the Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries failed to make

headway, ending in mutual recrimination.

They had agreed in 1997 that all issues would be discussed and a mechanism for

discussing each issue simultaneously would be worked out. Those talks were suspended

because they could not agree on a mechanism for discussing the Kashmir dispute.

In the most recent attempt, in September 1998, India and Pakistan decided to

revert back to their previously agreed-upon framework for talks. That framework

provides the conceptual basis for addressing conventional arms control issues under the

rubric of “peace and security,” which they had accepted as one of the major subsets of

their bilateral agenda.’c

But it is highly unlikely that substantive progress would be made because

fundamental differences persist over the Kashmir issue. As long as one side or the other

shows inflexibility, their overall relations will remain locked in tension and this would

mar the prospects for arms control.

Although arms control prospects look rather bleak, India and Pakistan could

consider some measures in the near term that may help to prevent a deterioration of their

tense relations, without adversely affecting their position on contentious issues.

4.1.1 UN Monitoring Presence

One such measure could be an expanded UN monitoring presence along the Line

of Control in Kashmir. A UN observer group in Kashmir maintains only a token

presence. In 1949, when India and Pakistan established a cease-fire line in Kashmir

under the Karachi Agreement, they accepted a supervisory role by the United Nations

Military Observer Group (UNMOG). However, this group’s role has been seriously

affected by disagreement between India and Pakistan over its mandate and fmctions.

Although the UN Security Council has not terminated UNMOG, its effectiveness has

35 SAARC consists of the following countries: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and

Maldives. SAARC was established in 1985 at the initiative of Bangladesh.

36The Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman said recently that at the forthcoming bilateral Foreign Secretary

talks the Pakistani side would introduce the issue of conventional arms restraint under the agenda subset of

Peace and Security. Dawn, October 4, 1998.

26
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

been fin-ther affected by its reduced size, equipment, and funding.37 A new mandate

adapted to deal with present-day problems is needed.

At the LoC, frequent cross-border firing has caused considerable loss of life and

damage to property, affecting mainly poor farmers. Such incidents increase tension

between the governments and fuel public anger. The most deadly exchange of artillery

fire in many years occurred in August 1998, raising the tension sharply and also causing

some fear of escalation.

A UN presence would also help to address India’s allegations that Pakistan is

engaged in infiltrating armed insurgents into the Indian side of the LoC. In addition, a

UN presence would discourage hot-pursuit operations, which will remain a danger as

long as tensions over the Kashmir dispute remain high. Any such action by India would

prompt a countervailing Pakistani response, thereby bringing the two adversaries to the

brinlkof a bigger conflict.

Despite the difficulties posed by Kashmir’s mountainous terrain and by population centers being close to the LoC, a UN monitoring role would still be useful but it

would require a much bigger presence than the 43 observers who comprise UNMOG.

For example, the demilitarized zone in the Golan Heights, which is much shorter and less

rugged than the LoC, is monitored by a force of some 80 UN military observers who are

assisted by more than 1,000 troops. 38

Although technology has not played a major role in the United Nations

peacekeeping operations, there is growing interest in strengthening those operations by

relying more on available technology.

In many cases, technology may provide a more cost effective and less intrusive

monitoring option than sole reliance on human observers. For example, overflights by

UN observer teams could be enhanced by use of certain sensors to evaluate violations of

the agreement pertaining to the Line of Control. Similarly, if both India and Pakistan are

receptive to the idea, there could be an additional role for technology. For example, the

UN observer groups could make supplementary use of ground sensors in areas of special

monitoring concern.

37As of May 1998, UNMOG had a total strength of 43 military observers, drawn mainly from Europe. In

1994, UNMOG’S budget was approximately $7.2 million. Since 1972, when a new line of control was

established following the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, India has argued that UNMOG’S mandate had lapsed,

maintaining that its mandate was linked specifically to the 1949 agreement.

38The cost of the UN observer force in the Golan Heights was $32 million in fiscal year 1996-97.

27
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

4.1.2 Nondeployment Options

Another measure that India and Pakistan could consider is an agreement for the

nondeployment of ballistic missiles. Alternatively, they could declare a moratorium on

deployment, as they have done on nuclear device testing. Their missile capabilities are

not planned exclusively for

nuclear deterrence, especially The deployment of missiles would...

the shorter range missiles, increase the risk of escalation to the

which may be deployed for

battlefield purposes and for

nuclear level.

other conventional roles.

Missile deployment would make an armed conflict more destructive. It would also

greatly raise the risk of being employed as terror weapons, as seen during the Iran-Iraq

war when cities were targeted. Nondeployment would be good not only for conventional

stability but also for nuclear stability, as it would minimize a hair-trigger situation.

In view of the degree of intrusiveness that would be required to monitor such an

agreement and given the national sensitivities of India and Pakistan at least in the near

term, reliance would have to be placed on a tacit understanding. Such an understanding

should be possible as it would serve equally the security interests of both sides. It maybe

possible to fiu-ther strengthen such an understanding if a third party, using its advanced

National Technical Means, were to perform a monitoring role on an informal and discreet

basis with the agreement of both sides.

4.1.3 Nonaggression Pacts

A nonaggression or a “no-war” pact would be desirable. Although Pakistan

recently made such a pact conditional on progress in resolving the Kashmir dispute,39 its

previous proposals have not carried such a link.m A nonaggression pact would be

declaratory in nature and its integrity would depend on how aggression is defined or

would be interpreted in a crisis. Nevertheless, it would have some positive psychological

effect. Given the importance of avoiding conflict, especially in light of the increased

nuclear danger, any step that promises to reduce the threat of war would be a welcome

development.

4.2 Longer-term Prospects

Once relations between India and Pakistan improve, or the existing stumbling

block to negotiating arms control ceases to exist, they could examine a number of

approaches to achieving military stability and controlling their arms competition.

3’ Hasan Akhtar, “Pakistan ready to sign no-war pact with India: FO,” Dawn, July 9, 1998.

40 See, for example, “Nawaz for no-war pact with India,” The News, August 8, 1996.

28
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

4.2.1 Observation of Military Exercises

As a first step, India and Pakistan could strengthen the 1991 agreement

concerning large-scale military exercises by an agreement for inviting observers from the

other side to their military exercises. Though not an arms control measure, it would be a

useful start in trying to overcome suspicion and build mutual confidence. Once there is

military contact between the two sides, it would facilitate delicate negotiations for more

substantive measures.

4.2.2 Force Limitation Zones

In order to achieve conventional stability, discourage arms competition, and

greatly reduce mutual threat-perceptions, India and Pakistan would need to consider

concepts of defensive security. This could take, for example, the form of force-limitation

zones along their border. In this regard, the Sinai-II agreement between Egypt and Israel

would seem to be the most appropriate model even though that agreement was an interim

arrangement preceding the peace treaty of 1979. Sinai II covered an area of 620 square

kilometers and the verification arrangements worked very successfully.41

The main provisions of the Sinai agreement that seem relevant to South Asia are

1) the establishment of a bufler zone, where neither side has forces, and 2) the limited

deployment of forces in the zones adjacent to the buffer zone. The deployment of

Egyptian and Israeli forces was monitored through a comprehensive verification process.

The verification regime was monitored by four parties-from Egypt, Israel, the United

States, and the United Nations. Israel and Egypt were free to use their available NTM,

which included flight missions up to the buffer zone, and to operate reconnaissance

aircraft up to the middle line of the buffer zone according to a predetermined schedule of

two aircraft up to seven times a week.42

Clearly, the Sinai model would have to be modified so that it conforms to South

Asia’s geographical and political context. The details concerning force levels and the

conilguration of the zone would have to be worked out by military experts.

In the India-Pakistan case, the creation of a buffer zone could be done on a sectorby-sector basis starting with Punjab, where both sides are least likely to achieve a military

breakthrough in a future conflict. Conflict in that strategic sector would also be very

costly, thereby posing the greatest danger of escalation to the nuclear level.

The buffer zone could then be expanded to cover the entire border as confidence

builds. The maintenance of limited troops in the area adjacent to the buffer zone would

have to be arrived at by negotiations and could be monitored by use of reconnaissance

aircraft in the buffer zone.

41 See Appendix A for a discussion of the Sinai agreements.

42 Itshak Lederman, “Verification in the Middle East and Europe: Lessons from Past Experience,” in Shai

Feldlman (cd.), Confidence Building and Verij$cation: Prospects in The Middle East (Boulder: Westview,

1994), p. 139.

29
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Certain steps can be taken to make the Sinai-type arrangement more applicable to

South Asia. Given the proximity of major population centers like Lahore and Arnritsar to

the border, the buffer zone could change course and size to fit the security requirements

of both countries.

There is also the issue of outside observers. The Sinai disengagement was

monitored both by the United States and the United Nations. Further, the United States

invested money and national prestige in making the agreement work. The question to be

raised is whether India and Pakistan would permit international observers to monitor and

help implement such an agreement. India, given its long-standing opposition to foreign

military presence in the region, will not be likely to accept a U.S. presence along its

border with Pakistan. The latter, too, may have serious difficulty with a U.S. role. The

United Nations, on the other hand, has had a peacekeeping force in Kashmir since 1949

and both countries could agree to extend this force and its mission to cover the entire

border.

4.2.2.7. Monitoring Aspects of Force Limitation Zones

In the Sinai agreement, two early warning monitoring stations, equipped with

sensors but no offensive weaponry, were established to provide an early warning

capability. These could also be manned by the UN group, which would obviate the need

for an American monitoring presence in the area. Alternatively, India and Pakistan could

maintain their own stations, subject to inspection by the UN.

The Sinai force-limitation agreements provided for flights through the middle of

the buffer zone so that both parties could monitor the implementation of the agreement.

The problem of airspace intrusion has become a problem in the India-Pakistan

relationship and, following the nuclear tests, Pakistan accused India of carrying out

violations of its airspace. The Indian government responded that no such intrusions had

taken place.43 Yet such airspace violations take place despite an agreement on

nonviolation.

Given the need for aerial reconnaissance for monitoring a force limitation

agreement, and the tensions created by airspace intrusions, both countries, as part of such

an agreement, could consider an Open Skies protocol. The protocol would permit a

certain number of flights through the middle of the buffer zone and thereby allow each

country to independently verify compliance with the force limitation agreement.~ It

43 Kuldip Nayar, “Delink Kashmir from Bomb:’ Deccan Herald, August 12, 1998, and Michael Krepon,

“Time Ripe for Serious Bilateral Talks/’ The Hindu, August 12, 1998, p. 13.

U A major question concerning transparency of aerial inspections has been the risk of excessive

intrusiveness. But this is not an insurmountable problem. The degree of transparency could be controlled

by limiting the capabilities of the sensor suite and by placing restrictions on the flight path and aircraft

altitude. Aerial inspection may reduce reliance on on-site inspection and thus cut the cost of monitoring.

Aircraft-mounted sensors offer sharper resolutions than satellite imagery. In cases where NTM capabilities

are considered inadequate, or reliance on ground-based monitoring is inadequate, aerial inspection could be

the most effective means of cooperative monitoring

30
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

would also enhance the existing agreement for the prevention of airspace violation and

thus serve as a useful confidence-building measure. These flights could be enhanced by

regular patrols by UN aircraft through the buffer zone.

Another option for India and Pakistan could be to negotiate some form of a

bilateral Open Skies agreement as a supplemental means for monitoring the force

limitation zones. For example, Hungary and Romania have been implementing an Open

Skies agreement that provides for cooperative monitoring overflights since 1992.45

Cooperative monitoring is also stipulated in the multilateral Open Skies treaty under

which some of the signatories to the treaty have engaged in experimental exercises in

each other’s territo~.’s Whichever recourse is taken, technical and procedural measures

would need to be built into the agreement so that the national security of the parties is not

compromised.

Developments taking place in commercial satellite imagery offer an additional

monitoring capability for arms control or other security-related purposes. Advances in

commercial technology and the increasing competition among satellite service providers

will soon enable clients to obtain satellite pictures with a ground resolution of 2 m at an

inexpensive price. As a result of this brisk competition, clients will also be to obtain

updated pictures of the visited site at shorter intervals.47

4.2.;?.2 Other Aspects of Force Limitation Zones

To some extent, force-limitation zones would also address the arms asymmetry

between India and Pakistan by reducing the military significance of an overall

imbalance.48 The military balance between them has always been in India’s favor by an

overall ratio that has varied from 3:1 to 2:1. Since the two countries are significantly

unequal in size and military potential, it will not be possible realistically for Pakistan to

match India’s military strength. Nor will India agree to draw down its capabilities in

order to allow Pakistan to achieve an approximate parity, at least partly because of its

requirements vis-a-vis China.

The more ambitious approach to arms control provided by the Conventional

Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty may not be feasible in South Asia as India and Pakistan are

likely to find it exceedingly difficult to agree on an acceptable correlation of forces, both

in armaments and manpower. Furthermore, the extensive demands on verification,

particularly the scale of on-site inspection, are likely to be considered too intrusive.

45See Appendix A for Hungary/Romania Open Skies agreement discussion.

4CSee Appendix A for multilateral Open Skies agreement discussion.

47See Nazir Kamal and Pravin Sawhney, “Missile Control in South Asia and the Role of Cooperative

Monitoring Technology”, SAND 98-0505/4, Sandia National Laboratories, October 1998. Appendix E.

48Refer to The Milita~ Balance 1997-98, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, for specific

details.

31
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Unlike a CFE-type regime, the concept of force limitation zones would give them

more room for defense planning and addressing other security interests unrelated to their

common border. It would also significantly lower mutual threat-perceptions as well as

greatly strengthen conventional stability, thereby creating conditions for reducing the

burden of defense on the economy and reversing their intensely adversarial relationship.

4.2.3 Training for Cooperative Monitoring

An additional long-term prospect for promoting the conventional arms control

process between India and Pakistan is for both sides to build up expertise so that they can

carry out monitoring and verification missions associated with regional arms control

agreements. Pakistan and India could engage separately in training programs that could

include sending personnel to other countries that have experience and advanced

technology for monitoring. This kind of cooperation would be similar to the kind of

cooperation that already exists in terms of military or other professional exchanges

between governments.

The countries which could be useful in this regard include not only the major

powers such as the United States and Russia, but also some other countries that have

unique regional cooperative experience. Examples include Hungary and Romania in the

context of cooperative overflights, Egypt and Israel for their experience with force

limitation zones, and European countries that are part of the Conventional Forces in

Europe treaty regime.

Such programs to acquire advanced expertise in monitoring would be necessary

for the successful implementation of the proposed force limitation zones concept. They

may also prove necessary for the verification of other substantive conventional arms

control approaches that may seem more desirable or feasible in the South Asian context.

For most arms control agreements, some means of cooperative monitoring may

prove necessary for various reasons. One of these could be the inadequacy of the parties’

National Technical Means (NTM) to monitor compliance. Cooperative monitoring may

also prove necessary to the extent that the NTM capabilities of the two sides are uneven.

Cooperative monitoring can also play an important role in boosting mutual confidence.

A wide range of sensor technologies has been used successfully for the

cooperative monitoring of different types of arms control agreements, whether

conventional armaments, nuclear weapons, or missiles. Ground-based sensors could be

used exclusively or in conjunction with aerial inspection or space-based surveillance

technologies. Different agreements would require different levels of resolution.49 Many

49For information on sensors and typical requirements for resolution, see Nazir Kamal and Pravin

Sawhney, “Missile Control in South Asia and the Role of Cooperative Monitoring Technology”, SAND

98-0505/4, Sandia National Laboratories, October 1998. Appendices C and D.

32
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

of these sensors are commercially available. Creative configurations can suit the

requirements of a specific agreement. Meanwhile, advances in computer technology have

greatly enhanced the efficiency of cooperative monitoring techniques.

5. Conclusions

Arms control continues to remain a neglected subject in South Asia. While both

sides have some arms control advocates, on the whole there has been little public support

or discussion of arms control.

It is difficult to see how the India-Pakistan military rivalry can be contained

without some form of agreement to stabilize their arms equation. Arms control could

also help to lessen the burden of defense as well as indirectly assist the process of

economic revival.

Of late, however, there have been some positive developments. The recently

agreed agenda for bilateral talks between India and Pakistan consists of several subsets of

issues. One of them falls under the rubric of “peace and security.” Conceptually, it

would include arms control, though much of the focus of attention in past talks, have

been on CBMS.

Another development has been incipient Pakistani interest in concepts that imply

some form

1)

2)

of arms control, including:

the reference made by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the need for a regime

for nuclear restraint and conventional balance at the United Nations in

September 1998,

the Pakistani delegate at the India/Pakistan talks in October 1998 formally

proposed a “stabilization regime” covering nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and conventional forces.

Unfortunately, of the

various issues that divide India

and Pakistan, the most troubling are their fundamental differences over the Kashmir dispute. The two sides hold

Arms control could ...Iessen the burden of

defense (and) indirectly assist the process

of economic revival...

irreconcilable positions on this emotive issue and there is little sign that a breakthrough

miglht occur.

In such circumstances, arms control prospects would be severely limited as the

depth of mutual distrust would deter them from contemplating agreements, especially

those requiring cooperative monitoring.

Until a breakthrough occurs, what might be possible are modest measures to

reduce the threat of war. Concern about the danger of war has been heightened by the

33
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

nuclear dimension, especially in the aftermath of nuclear device tests. Any measure that

can even modestly lessen that danger would be a welcome development.

One such measure could be a substantially upgraded UN monitoring force along

the LoC in Kashmir so that its presence can discourage cross-border firings as well as

more serious clashes between the forward-deployed Pakistani and Indian forces. The

most likely scenario of a future conflict would be an escalation of military confrontation

along the LoC. A sizable UN presence would also help to address India’s accusations

that Pakistan is sending trained infiltrators to support the armed unrest on the Indian side

of the LoC.

Another proposed measure is an agreement or a tacit understanding for the

nondeployment of ballistic missiles. Nondeployment would cover all kinds of such

missiles since it would be difficult to distinguish a nuclear-armed from a conventionally

armed missile. The deployment of missiles would not only make a future conflict more

destructive, it would also increase the risk of escalation to the nuclear level.

India and Pakistan should also consider a “no-war” or nonaggression pact. Such a

pact would be declaratory in nature and susceptible to conflicting interpretations about

what constitutes aggression or would constitute aggression in an actual crisis. However,

it would still be a step forward, especially given that there is heightened concern about

the danger of conflict and the fact that they have not been able to move forward on any

major issue.

Should there be a breakthrough in the India-Pakistan relationship or should the

two adversaries become more amenable to the idea of stabilizing their mutual security

through arms control, they could consider the Sinai agreements as a general model for

reducing mutual threat-perceptions and for stabilizing the military situation along their

common border at a lower level of armaments.

Establishing force-limitation zones along the border would be a less ambitious

and a more manageable approach than the type of arms control attempted under the

Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. A Sinai-type agreement may require some form of

an aerial inspection protocol for verifying compliance. It may also require early warning

monitoring stations on both sides of a force limitation, or buffer, zone. Where necessary,

reliance may also be placed on the use of ground sensors. This model would have to be

adapted to suit the India-Pakistan context.

An additional long-term prospect for promoting the conventional arms control

process between India and Pakistan is for both sides to build up expertise so that they can

carry out monitoring and verification missions associated with regional arms control

agreements. This will not only help serve the purpose of verifying a force limitation

agreement but may also prove necessary for the verification of other substantive arms

control approaches. As greater levels of intrusiveness are accepted, more types of on-site

systems could be employed to build confidence and verify compliance with agreements.

34
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

APPENDIX A: Examples of Conventional Arms Control

Agreements

A. 1 Sinai Disengagement Agreements

The Sinai I and II agreements came in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.

Undler Sinai-I, signed in January 1974, Israel withdrew 20 km from the Suez Canal and a

10-km buffer zone was created with limited force zones on both sides. A UN peacekeeping force conducted on-site inspections while the U.S. provided aerial surveillance to

monitor the situation.

More significant was the Sinai-II agreement, reached in September 1975. Under

it, Israel withdrew from the Giddi and Mitla passes to a line east of these passes in return

for the monitoring of those strategic passes by the U.S. A wider 25-km buffer zone was

created between limited force zones where Egypt and Israel were restricted to a maximum

of 8,,000 military personnel along with ceilings on tanks and artillery pieces. Egypt and

Israel were permitted to operate a single signal collection station in the buffer zone near

the Giddi pass. They were also permitted to conduct aerial reconnaissance missions up to

the edge of their respective force limitation zones.

A UN peacekeeping force of 4,000 personnel inspected the Israeli and Egyptian

garrisons in the limited force zones, while the U.S. operated sensor fields at the two

passes, using off-the-shelf seismic, acoustic, and magnetic sensors that had earlier been

used in the Vietnam War. The U.S. performed overflights to observe the buffer zone and

conducted inspections of the Israeli and Egyptian signal collection stations in the buffer

zone. Under Sinai-II, an area of 620 square kilometers was monitored.

Its implementation proved extremely successful. There were few significant

violations and the monitoring systems worked well. The confidence that resulted from

this contributed significantly to the Egypt-Israel Peace Accord of March 1979. Under

that accord, Israel withdrew from the Sinai in phases, completing the process in 1982.

The monitoring of the Giddi and Mitla passes was terminated earlier in 1980.50

The peace accord of 1979 imposed restrictions on Egyptian military presence in

the Sinai by creating several force limitation zones. In the post-Sinai phase, the following steps were taken: in Zone C, closest to the Israeli border, Egy-pt could only deploy

civilian police units while in Zone B it could maintain up to 4,000 lightly armed troops.

A ceiling of 22,000 troops, 230 tanks, 540 armored personnel carriers, and 126 mediumrange artillery pieces was imposed on Egypt in Zone A on the Sinai side of the Suez

Canal. The UN peacekeeping forces monitor these arrangements in coordination with the

parties that rely on their National Technical Means (NTM).

50See Michael Vannoni, Sensors in the Sinai: A Precedent for Regional Cooperative Monitoring, Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 1996, p.xiii.

35
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

As the Sinai-II agreement showed, sensor-based monitoring can be an effective

instrument for cooperative monitoring even if the parties are deeply suspicious of each

other and have a history of deep mutual distrust. The sensors used were fairly simple by

contemporary standards. Though their capabilities and hardiness had been established in

the Vietnam War, conditions in the Sinai were vastly different.

However, cooperative monitoring would not have been possible in the Sinai case

without a third-party role by the U. S., which had friendly relations with both Israel and

Egypt. Another lesson is that Sinai-II’s success was facilitated by progress toward a

peace treaty. Doubtless, the effectiveness of Sinai-II contributed to the success of the

peace process, but the crucial breakthrough from Sinai-I to Sinai-II may not have

occurred except in the context of shuttle diplomacy by the U.S. and movement toward a

peace accord.

A.2 Golan Heights Disengagement Agreement

In May 1974, after the termination of armed conflict between Israel and Syria, an

80-km demilitarized zone was established in the Golan Heights. Surface-to-air missiles

are banned from 5-km-wide adjacent zones on both sides. A UN observer force monitors

the agreement, using 11 observation posts. Sensors are not employed. Reliance by the

two parties on their NTM and coordination between them and the UN force has proved

adequate. The agreement’s duration is indefinite.

The Golan Agreement has worked very well for more than two decades even

though a peace process has not been in place and the two parties have been at loggerheads

over Lebanon. The radical Hizbollah, backed by Syria and Iran, has been at war with

Israel, which occupies a strip of territo~ in southern Lebanon. Perhaps the main reason

for the stability of the Golan accord is that both parties want to avoid conflict and, as has

been observed, the “overall system of monitoring provides sufficient early warning to

both parties.”51 The Golan case demonstrates that sensor technology is not indispensable

for all types of agreements.

A.3 Open Skies Agreements

As the Open Skies agreements show, the degree of intrusiveness from aerial

inspection can be controlled by placing restrictions on the type of sensors to be employed

and on their technical parameters. Similarly, the territorial scope of such inspection can

be controlled by placing constraints on the aircraft’s altitude and flight path. For

example, with a ground resolution of 4.5 meters, cameras mounted on an aircraft can only

detect the presence of a bridge. The object’s precise identification would require a much

51See Michael Vannoni et al., Confidence Building on the Korean Peninsula: A Conceptual Development

for the Cooperative Monitoring of Limited-Force Deplo-vment Zones, SANDOC97-0583, Cooperative

Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratones, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 1997, p. 59.

36
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

sharper resolution of 1.5 m, while a detailed description of h would require a 1-m or

better resolution.

The experience gained from the multilateral Open Skies treaty and a similar

agreement between Hungary and Romania could apply to other regions to address

specific requirements.

A.3,,1 Open Skies treaty between NATO and former Warsaw Pact

In 1992, the member-states of NATO arid the former Warsaw Pact, together with

some former Soviet republics, signed an Open Skies treaty, for which negotiations had

begun in 1989. The treaty’s purpose was to create transparency and generate mutual

confidence by allowing the parties to observe by aerial inspection any significant military

movements, including training exercises. Although the treaty has not yet come into force

(because of delays in its ratification by Russia and Ukraine), there are encouraging signs

that this may happen in the near future.

Under this treaty, each party can conduct a limited number of short-notice flights

by unarmed aircraft anywhere over the territory of other parties, using approved

technologies and in the presence of the personnel of the host country. The treaty provides

for rigorous checking of the aircraft’s instruments shortly before an overflight is

undertaken. All the parties to the treaty share the data equally.

The question of intrusiveness was a highly sensitive issue during the negotiations,

and much of the delay in concluding the treaty was caused by this issue, which was

initially a major concern of the former Soviet Union and also of the U.S.

The treaty stipulates sensors whh specific capabilities and configurations,

allowing the inspected party to monitor their application during the overflight in order to

guard against any loss of vital national secrets, while enabling enough information to

assure the parties of adequate transparency. The technologies are commercially available,

inexpensive, and can be operated easily.

The treaty provides for four categories of sensors, including aircraft-mounted

optical and video cameras (both with a 30-cm resolution), an infrared scanner whh a 50-

cm resolution, and a sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar (SAR) with a 3-m

resolution.

Although the Open Skies agreement is not linked to the Conventional Forces in

Europe (CFE) treaty, the transparency derived from it would supplement the monitoring

provisions of the CFE treaty, agreed to during the Cold War, which do not include aerial

inspection.

The Open Skies treaty, which provides an unprecedented degree of transparency,

was facilitated by the end of the Cold War and the Soviet collapse in early 1991. Until

then.,the talks had made little progress because of the issue of intrusiveness. Another

factor that made the treaty possible was the idea of a common European home, which

37
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

post-Communist Russia was eager to be a part of, and for which such a treaty was

considered essential by Western Europe. Although the treaty has not entered into force, a

number of trial flights have taken place over the territories of some member-states.

A.3.2 Open Skies Agreement between Hungary and Romania

The only instance, thus far, of a bilateral Open Skies agreement is the one

between Hungary and Romania that came into effect in 1992. It was negotiated after the

multilateral Open Skies talks between NATO and former Warsaw Pact members ran into

snags, and it was feared that the imminent collapse of the Warsaw Pact (of which both

were members) would create a vacuum, thereby bringing their pre-Cold War tensions to

the surface.

Thus, the purpose of this treaty was to create mutual confidence and goodwill so

that an amicable solution could be found to the sensitive issue of ethnic minority rights

that had been the cause of bitter bilateral relations in the pre-war period. It succeeded in

enabling them to achieve a historic reconciliation in 1996.

The treaty provides for four overflights a year after an advance notice of one

week. Each flight is limited to a distance of 1200 km or a maximum duration of three

hours. Loitering or repeated passes over the flight path are prohibited. Although the

agreement provides for optical and video cameras, in practice they have only made use of

optical cameras with a ground resolution of 10 cm. Panchromatic film was used as it

could be developed rapidly and the data could be shared quickly.

The objective of overflights was to provide enough transparency so as to enable

detection of any significant military activity. The initial flights covered military

facilities, including a military college, an exercise ground, a former Soviet air base, a

military airfield, and an ammunition storage site.

Though technologically simple, the sensor adequately served their distinct needs.

Indeed, with the passage of time, they did not feel the need to utilize the full quota of

overflights.

Perhaps the most powerful factor that pushed Hungary and Romania into an Open

Skies agreement was pressure from NATO, which had made the normalization of

relations between them a precondition for their admission into the Western alliance,

which they were very eager to join.

A.4 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is perhaps the most comprehensive conventional arms control regime in international history. Starting with 22

signatories, it now includes 30 countries. Its various restrictions on armaments

encompass the territories of all the European NATO member-states and all the former

Warsaw Pact countries as well as some former Soviet republics.

38
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Signed in 1990, the treaty was conceived to address Cold War problems. Its

general purpose was to achieve military stability in Europe at a lower level of armaments

through agreed-upon ceilings on major weapon categories and other restrictions on the

deployment of forces. The treaty’s specific objectives were to eliminate the danger of

surprise attack across Central Europe by NATO or Warsaw Pact forces and to make

large-scale offensive operations exceedingly difficult to undertake for both sides.

The most salient features of the CFE treaty are the following:

. the equal limits imposed on tanks, artille~ pieces, armored combat vehicles,

fighter aircraft, and attack helicopters belonging to the alliances as groups

. restrictions on major armaments that active units can hold

. limits on major weapons that any one country in Europe can possess

● division of geographical areas into several zones with specific restrictions

being placed on each zone

● obligations for the parties to negotiate reductions of military manpower for

each country

The treaty came into effect in 1992 and, by 1995, more than 50,000 pieces of

majcm military equipment had been destroyed, including 18,000 battletanks. Implementing the treaty’s restrictions required more than 2,500 on-site inspections of declared

sites, specified sites, and destruction sites.

In 1996, the CFE treaty parties agreed to adapt the treaty in light of the political

and military changes that followed the end of the Cold War. In particular, Russia and

Ukraine found certain restrictions that affect them directly to be adverse to their new

security interests in their immediate periphe~. Thus, to ensure the long-term viability of

the treaty, it was agreed that restrictions on force deployment would be lifted for certain

parts of the northern and southern zones of the treaty area. A broader adaptation of the

treaty, as agreed to in principle, has yet to be concluded.

39
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

APPENDIX B: Indian and Pakistani Conventional Force

Agreements

B. 1 Agreement between India and Pakistan on the Advance Notice on

Military Exercises, Maneuvers and Troop Movements

Whereas Pakistan and India recognize the need to jointly formulate an agreement at the Government level on giving

advance notice on exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements in order to prevent any crisis situation arising due to

misreading of the other side’s intentions.

Therefore, the Governments of Pakistan and India jointly decide that:

1. Their Land, Naval and Air Forces will avoid holding major military mrmoeuvres and exercises in close proximity

to each other. However, if such exercises are held within distances as prescribed in this Agreement, the strategic direction of

the main force being exercised will not be towards the other side, nor will any logistics buildup be carried out close to it. The

following will constitute a major military manoeuvre/exercise for the purposes of this Agreement:

a. Land Forces

1. India-Pakistan International Border

Concentrations of Corps level (comprising two or more divisions) and above

2. Line of Control and the area between the Manawar Tawi and Ravi Rivers.

Division level and above.

b. Naval Forces: Any exercise involving six or more ships of destroy er/fngate size and above, exercising in

company and crossing into the other’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

c. Air Force: Regional Command level and above.

2. Both sides may not conduct exercises of Land Forces at Divisional level and above within five kilometers (Kms)

of the areas specified at Paragraph (1 ).a. (1) and (2).

3. Both sides will provide notice regarding exercises of Land Forces as follow:

a. All exercises/concentrations at Divisional level in areas specified at Paragraph ( 1).a(2).

b. All exercises/concentrations at Corps level within a distance of seventy five Kms in areas specified at

Paragraph (1).a. (1 ) and (2).

c. All exercises above Corps level irrespective of the distance.

4. Both sides will give fifteen days prior notice when formations with defensive roles are moved to their operational

locations for periodic maintenance of defences.

5. The schedule of major exercises with troops will be transmitted in writing to the other side through diplomatic

channels in advance as follows:

a. Air exercises at Regional Command level and above. -- Fifteen days

b. Divisional level exercise, and major Naval exercises involving six or more ships of destroyer/fngate size and

above, exercising in company and crossing into the other’s EEZ.

c. Corps level exercises -- Sixty days

d. Army level exercises -- Ninety days

Provided that the above provisions relate to the commencement of moves of formations and units from their

permanent locations for the proposed exercises.

40
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

6. Information on the following aspects of major exercises will be intimated

a. Type and level of exercises.

b. General area of the exercise on land, air and sea. In respect of air and sea exercises, these will be defined in

latituc[e and longitude.

c. Planned duration of the activity.

d. Number and type of formations participating.

e. Any shifting of forces from other Commands/Co@ Strategic formations envisaged.

f. The move of strategic formations, particularly armored division, mechanized divisions, air assault

divisionsheserve infantry formations and artillery divisionslair defence artillery divisions.

Provided that in respect of major Air and Naval exercises, only the information at Paragraphs (a) to (c) need be

intimated.

7. In case some change in exercise area/grouping of participating formations from the previously notified

composition is necessitated, the country carrying out the exercise will intimate the details of changes so as to reach the other

counbry at least thirty days in advance in respect of Corps level exercises and above, and fifteen days in advance in respect of

divisional level exercises and Naval exercises. In respect of Air exercises, if minor changes to the previously notified details

are necessitated, an advance notice of seven days will be provided.

8. Any inductionlconcentration of additional troops of a division size force and above, within one hundred and fifty

kms of areas specified at Paragraph 1a.(l) and (2), for internal security duties and/or in aid of civil power will be notified to

the other side at least two days before the start of their movements, whenever possible. In case of immediate movements,

information may be passed on Hot Line to the Army Headquarters of the other country. The force so employed will not move

forward their logistic baseshstallations and armor/artillery.

9. Each country will be entitled to obtain timely clarification from the country undertaking military

manoeuvres/exercises concerning the assembly of formations, the extent, direction of the exercise and the duration

10. The Naval ships and submarines belonging to the other country are not to close less than three Nautical Miles

(NMs) from each other so as to avoid any accident while operating in international waters.

11. Combat aircraft including fighter, bomber reconnaissance, jet military trainer and armed helicopter aircraft will

not fly within ten kms of each other’s airspace, including the Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ), except when such

aircraft are operating form Jammw Pathankot, Amritsar and Suratgarh air bases on the Indian side, as well as Pasmr, Lahore,

Vehari and Rahimyar Khan air bases on the Pakistan side, in which case they will maintain a distance of five kms from each

other’s airspace. Unarmed transport and logistics aircraft including unarmed helicopters and Air Observation Post (AOP)

aircraft will be permitted to operate up to 1000 meters from each other’s airspace including the ADIZ.

12. Aircraft of either country will refrain from buzzing surface units and platforms of the other country in

international waters.

13. This Agreement supersedes all previous understandings in so fm as the above points are concerned.

14. This Agreement is subject to ratification. It shall come into force with effect from the date on which the

Instruments of Ratification are exchanged.

15. Done at New Delhi on this sixth day of April, 1991.

Shaharyar M. Khan

Foreign Secretary

For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Muchkund Dubey

Foreign Secretary

For the Government of the Republic of India

41
Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

B.2 Agreement Between Pakistan and India on Prevention of Air

Space Violations and for Permitting Over Flights and Landings by

Military Aircrail

Preamble

States parties to the present Air Agreement, recognizing the fact that both the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and the

Indian Air Force (IAF) aircraft operate near each other’s airspace.

Aware that despite best efforts by both sides, violations of each other’s airspace have occurred from time to time.

Desirous of promoting good neighborly relations between the two countries. Conscious of the fact that renewed

efforts should be made to avoid unnecessary alarm.

Have agreed to enter into the following Air Agreement:

Air Violations

Article 1

Henceforth, both sides will take adequate measures to ensure, that air violations of each other’s airspace do not

take place. However, if any inadvertent violation does take place, the incident will be promptly investigated and the

Headquarters (HQ) of the other Air Force informed of the results without delay, through diplomatic channels.

Article 2

Subject to Articles 3,4 and 6, the following restrictions are to be observed by militaxy aircraft of both the forces:

a. Combat aircraft (to include fighter, bomber, recomaissance, jet military trainer and armed helicopter aircraft)

will not fly within 10 kms of each other’s airspace including ADIZ. No aircraft of any side will enter the airspace over the

territorial waters of the other country, except by prior permission.

b. Unarmed transport and logistics aircraft including unarmed helicopters, and Air Observation Post (AOP)

aircraft, will be permitted up to 1000 meters from each other’s airspace including ADIZ.

Aerial Survey, Supply Dropping, Mercy and Rescue Missions

Article 3

In the event of a country having to undertake flights less than 1000 meters from the other’s airspace including

ADIZ, for purposes such as aerial survey, supply dropping for mercy missions and aerial rescue missions, the country

concerned will give the following information in advance to their own Air Advisors for notification to the Air HQ of the other

country:

a. Type of aircraftlhelicopter.

b. Height of flight within Plus/Minus 1000 ft.

c. Block number of days (normally not to exceed seven days) when flights are proposed to be undertaken.

d. Proposed timing of flight, where possible.

e. Area involved (in latitude and longitude).

No formal clearance would be required as the flights are being undertaken within own terntoxy.

Air Exercises Near Border

Article 4

In order to avoid any tension being created, prior notice be given with regard to air exercises, or any special air

activity proposed to be undertaken close to each other’s airspace including ADIZ, even though the limits as laid down in

Article 2 are not likely to be infringed.

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Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Communication Between PAF and TAP

Article 5

In matters of safety and any air operations in emergency situations, the authorities designated by the respective

Governments should contact each other by the quickest means of communications available. The Air Advisor shall be kept

informed of such contacts. Matters of flight safety and urgent air operations should promptly be brought to the notice of the

other side through the authorities designated by using the telephone line established between the Army Headquarters of the

two countries.

Operations from Alr Fields Close to the Borders

Article 6

Combat aircraft (as defied in Article 2A. above) operating from the air bases specified below will maintain a

distance of 5 kms from each other’s airspace:

a. Indian Side

1. Jannu

2. Pathankot

3. Amritsar

4. Snratgarh

b: Pakistan Side

1. Pasmr

2. Lahore

3. Vehari

4. Rahim Yar Khan.

Flights of Military Aircraft Through Each Other’s Air Space

Article 7

Military aircraft may fly through each other’s airspace with the prior permission of the other country and subject

to conditions specified in Appendix A to this Agreement.

Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each country has the sovereign right to specifi fiuther conditions, at

short notice, for flights of militmy aircraft through its airspace.

Validity of Agreement

Article 8

This Agreement supersedes all previous understandings in so far as air space violations and over flights and

landings by military aircraft are concerned.

Article 9

This Agreement is subject to ratification. It shall come into force with effect from the date on which the

Instruments of Ratification are exchanged.

Article 10

Done at New Delhi on this sixth day of April, 1991.

Shaharyar M. Khan

Foreign Secretary

For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Muchkund Dubey

Foreign Secretary

For the Government of the Republic of India

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Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

B.3 Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear

Installations and Facilities

Signed: December 31, 1988 (Ishunabad)

Instruments of Ratification Exchanged: December 1990 (Enhy Into Force)

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of the Republic of India, hereinafter

referred to as the Contracting Parties, reaffixing their commitment to durable peace and the development of friendly and

harmonious bilateral relations; conscious of the role of confidence building measures in promoting such bilateral relations

based on mutual trust and goodwill; have agreed as follows:

1. (1) Each party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging or

participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at

causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or

facility in the other country.

(2) The term “nuclear installation or facility” includes nuclear power

and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium

enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as

any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel

and materials in any form and establishments storing significant

quantities of radio-active materials.

2. Each Contracting Party shall inform the other on 1st January of each

calendar year of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear

installations and facilities and whenever there is any change.

3. This Agreement is subject to ratification. It shall come into force

with effect from the date on which the Instruments of

Ratification are exchanged.

Done at Islamabad on this Thirty-fust day of December 1988, in, two copies each in Urdw Hindi and English the

English text being authentic in case of any difference or dispute of interpretation.

[Signed:]

Humayun Khan

Foreign Secretary

Islamic Republic of Pakistan

K.P.S. Menon

Foreign Secretary

Republic of India

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Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

About the Authors

Naziir Kamal is a freelance security analyst who previously worked as a Senior Fellow at

the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad. He has also worked in other capacities in

the past, including Director in the Office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign

Affairs, and Consultant to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. He

obtained his Ph.D. degree from the Australian National University in Canberra and his

Master’s degree from the University of Sussex in England, both in the field of

International Relations.

Amit Gupta is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stonehill College in Easton,

Massachusetts. With a Master’s degree from the Australian National University,

Canberra, and a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, he specializes

in thle field of international security. Gupta has worked for the United Nations Program

in Peace and Global Transformation. His articles have been published in Orbis, Asian

Survey, and Economic and Political Weekly. He is the author of the book Building an

Arsenal: The Evolution of Regional Power Force Structures (Praeger: Westport, CT, and

London, 1997).

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Prospects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Distribution

300 MS 1373 CMC Library, 5341

1 MS 9018 Central Tech Files, 8940-2

2 MS 0899 Technical Library, 4916

1 MS 0619 Review & Approval Desk, 15102 for DOE/OSTI

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