MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARM\

PERSONNEL IN WORLD WAR II

Prepared and published under the direction of

Lieutenant General Leonard D. Heaton

The Surgeon General, United States Army

Editor in Chief

Colonel John Boyd Coates, Jr., MC, USA

Editor for Personnel

Charles M. Wiltse, Ph. D., Litt. D.

OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1963
PERSONNEL IN WORLD WAR II

The Historical Unit, United States Army Medical Service

Colonel John Boyd Coates, Jr., MC, USA, Director

Colonel Rex P. Clayton, MSC, USA, Executive Officer

Colonel R. L. Parker, MSC, USA, Special Assistant to Director

Lieutenant Colonel R. J. Bernucci, MC, USA, Special Assistant to Director

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Hesford, MSC, USA, Chief, Special Projects Branch

Charles M. Wxltse, Ph. D., Litt. D., Chief, Historians Branch

Ernest Elliott, Jr., Chief, Editorial Branch

Lieutenant Colonel Leonard L. Collier, MSC, USA, Chief, Information Activities Branch

Major Albert C. Riggs, Jr., MSC, USA, Chief, General Reference and Research Branch

Hazel G. Hine, Chief, Administrative Branch

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 63-60001

For saleby the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office

Washington 25, D.C. Price $6 (Buckram)
PERSONNEL IN WORLD WAR II

by

John H, McMinn, Ph. D.

and

Max Levin, A.M.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARAIY

The volumes comprising the official history of the Medical Department of

the U.S. Army in World War II are prepared by The Historical Unit, U.S.

Army Medical Service, and published under the direction of The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army. These volumes are divided into two series: (1) The

administrative or operational series; and (2) the professional, or clinical and

technical, series. This is one of the volumes published in the former series.

VOLUMES PUBLISHED

ADMINISTRATIVE SERIES

Hospitalization and Evacuation Zone of Interior

Organization and Administration in World War II

CLINICAL SERIES

Internal Medicine inWorld War II:

Vol. I. Activities of Medical Consultants

Voil. II. Infectious Diseases

Preventive Medicine in World War II:

Vol. II. Environmental Hygiene

Vol. III. Personal Health Measures and Immunization

Vol. IV. Communicable Diseases Transmitted Chiefly Through Respiratory and Alimentary Tracts

Vol. V. Communicable Diseases Transmitted Through Contact or

By Unknown Means

Vol. VI. Communicable Diseases: Malaria

Surgery in World WarII:

Activities ofSurgical Consultants, vol.

GeneralSurgery vol. II

Hand Surgery

Neurosurgery vol.

Aeurosurgery vol. II

Ophthalmology and Otolaryngology
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY VII

Surgery in World War II—Continued

Orthopedic Surgery in the European Theater of Operations

Orthopedic Surgery in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation

The Physiologic Effects of Wounds

Thoracic Surgery vol.

Vascular Surgery

Miscellaneous:

Cold Injury Ground Type

DentalService in World War 11

Veterinary Service in World War 11

WoundBallistics

IX

Foreword

During World War II, the U.S. Army Medical Department reached

personnel strength which it had never before attained. Its peak strength of

700,000 was three times that of the entire Regular Army in 1939 and four

times that of the combined Union and Confederate Forces at the Battle of

Gettysburg.

In contrast to personnel procurement in most other arms and services, the

entire officer corps of the Medical Department, exclusive of the Medical Administrative Corps, had to be procured directly from qualified civilian professional groups. It could not be obtained through officer candidate schools.

Furthermore, the personnel required were in critical category, and the need

for them was immediate and urgent.

This volume of the history of the U.S. Army Medical Department in

World War II is the story of how the enormous personnel expansion was

achieved; of how qualified medical personnel were secured; of how the wartime

military medical establishment was utilized and the highest standards of professional medical care were maintained; and, finally, of how the wartime Medical Department was contracted to peacetime level.

The magnitude of the medical achievement in World War II should not

be permitted to obscure the difficulties that attended it. They were numerous

and fundamental.

Although the health of the Army rested with The Surgeon General

throughout the war, he was very early placed in an anomalous situation,

which violated all the principles of sound command, in that he had responsibility without complete authority. He lost overall control of procurement,

classification, promotion, and assignment of personnel, and it was well after

Y-E Day before he was able to implement many plans that he made for the

utilization of the entire medical force. His difficulties were compounded earty

in 1942, at the highest level of the War Department, when reorganization

of the Army interposed the Headquarters Army Service Forces between The

Surgeon General and the General Staff and gave the medical component of

the ArmyAir Forces, along with its other components, more independence than

it had previously possessed.

Emergencies had to be met, and obstacles and obstructions had to be eliminated, as they were encountered. It was almost impossible to prevent them.

Square and round holes both had to be plugged, though those making the assignments and those being assigned frequently did not see eye to eye in the

matching process. Tensions were strong. Many newly commissioned medical officers found it difficult to adapt to military life, while certain medical

personnel in the Regular Army sometimes seemed reluctant to modify, much
FOREWORD

less discard, its time-honored traditions, policies and operations and adjust to

the larger organization and procedures required by global war.

By the middle of 1943, when Maj. Gen. James C. Magee was succeeded as

The Surgeon General by Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, personnel policies for

the remainder of the war had been established for the most part. Many of

the problems, however, which had existed up to this time persisted almost to

the end of the war.

1. The most important of these problems was the procurement of sufficient

medical personnel for all purposes, though how many persons were needed in

given situation depended to considerable extent upon how those available

were used. reported shortage might mean genuine lack of sufficient personnel to carry out an assigned mission. All too often, however, the so-called

shortage had no reference to real need and was no more than the numerical difference between actual and authorized strength. Rank, promotion, pay, and

morale were also part of the general picture.

The absence of an aggressive procurement policy on the part of the Medical Department probably accounts, at least to some extent, for the shortages

experienced early in 1942. Shortages became particularly acute year later,

when Medical Officer Recruiting Boards were abolished by the Army Service

Forces. Thereafter, medical officers had to be recruited chiefly from graduates of medical schools as they completed shortened internships.

Procurement of medical officers from recent graduates was accomplished,

and on the whole satisfactorily, by issuing to undergraduates temporary commissions in the Medical Administrative Corps, and, later, by the Army Specialized Training Program. On the other hand, as will be pointed out shortly,

the need for securing initially sufficient numbers of physicians from the civilian

profession, from which most newly commissioned medical officers had to be

secured, was less acceptably dealt with, not only from the point of view of the

Army Medical Department but also, perhaps, from that of the national interest.

2. second major problem was the correct utilization of available personnel. Medical officers were used with increasing efficiency as the war progressed, but large increments continued to be necessary, both during the war

and immediately afterward, when replacements for those who were being

separated from military service were the principal need.

To utilize personnel correctly, it was essential on many occasions that an

individual be transferred promptly from one assignment to another as the

need for his services changed. Under the happiest circumstances, this was

frequently—particularly in the Zone of Interior—a somewhat cumbersome

process. Under the circumstances that prevailed in World War II, it was

further complicated by division of authority over reassignments, with the result that transfers were often delayed and sometimes were not accomplished

at all.

Part of the difficulty has already been mentioned, the lack of authority by

The Surgeon General to control disposition of medical personnel plus the interposition of the Army Service Forces Headquarters between him and the Gen-
FOREWORD

eral Start' and his unfortunate subordination to the former. Shortly after this

reorganization had occurred, his authority was further reduced when the commander of each corps area became virtually the final authority on transfer of

personnel within his jurisdiction, while at the same time this commander

gained an important voice in transfers between his own area and other corps

areas. It was not until almost the end of the war that this trend was partly

reversed and The Surgeon General secured greater control over the reassignment of Medical Department personnel within the Zone of Interior,

When mobilization began in 1940, the classification of civilian occupations

was still sketchy, and military occupational specialties had not yet been

devised. It is only fair to say that, in spite of its inflexibility in certain respects, the Medical Department early recognized the need for improved classification of medical personnel and developed this method more thoroughly than

any other branch of service. As the classification processes improved, genuine

shortages were reduced or eliminated by employment of available personnel

to the best possible advantage. By the end of the war, the great majority of

medical officers were properly classified and were assigned where it was believed

that they would be most useful, even if, in some instances, the assignment was

not always in conformity with the officer’s precise classification.

There were number of ways in which medical personnel in short supply

were used with great efficiency. An outstanding example was the establishment of centers for specialized treatment and the use of specialist personnel

in them. Another was the replacement, whenever possible, of scarcer categories of personnel with those more easily obtained. The use of Medical

Administrative Corps officers instead of Medical Corps officers in many types

of administrative work was an illustration. The substitution was frankly

repugnant to many officers steeped in the traditions of the prewar Medical

Department, and some urging was necessary before the potentialities of this

plan were fully investigated and implemented. Before the war ended, however, the 7,500 Medical Administrative Corps officers envisaged by The Surgeon

General in April 1942 had grown to 20,000. Another similar, and similarly

fruitful, policy was the substitution of members of the Women’s Army Corps

for able-bodied enlisted men in the performance of many specialized duties.

3. Even after the Medical Department adopted strengthened procurement policy in 1942, procurement difficulties continued, chiefly because other

branches of the military were involved and more comprehensive action was

required than this Department could provide alone. No single agency existed

for this purpose, or, at least, none that could reconcile the conflicting demands

of the Army, the Navy, and other Federal services with those of the civilian

community; that could determine how many physicians each of these groups

should have; and that could then see that each of them received its proper

share of physicians through the exercise, if necessary of compulsion on

individuals.

The closest approach to such an agency was the Procurement and Assignment Service, which could, and did, fix the minimum physician-civilian popu-
XII FOREWORD

lation ratio that must be maintained in any given area. This Service, however, operated under decided limitations. For one thing, it could neither

compel physicians who were in excess of minimum requirements in any area

to serve the Government nor could it determine how physicians recruited for

military and other public service were to be divided among claimant agencies.

About the only power the Service exerted over these agencies was to prevent

them, in the course of their recruiting efforts, from encroaching upon the

minimum physician-population ratios which it had established. Within that

limit, it was of considerable assistance in obtaining volunteers.

The Procurement and Assignment Service was further handicapped by

the fact that it could not compel civilian practitioners to move from areas

of lesser need to those of greater need. All that it could do in this respect

was to use persuasion, and persuasion was, in many instances, much less than

what the situation called for. The Surgeon General contended, and correctly, that the real source of complaints about inadequate civilian medical

care was not the inroads of the Armed Forces upon the professional supply

but the concentration of physicians in some parts of the country far above

the minimum established by the Procurement and Assignment Service and

the inability of that Service to distribute them equitably.

On the other hand, while the Procurement and Assignment Service saw

to it, within the limitations just mentioned, that medical service was in adequate supply for civilian communities, many were of the opinion that its assistance to the military left much to be desired. Attempts of the Armed

Forces to obtain draft of physicians under special rules came to nothing,

chiefly because of the opposition of this Service, whose successful resistance

to this policy demonstrated that such powers of compulsion as it possessed

were chiefly directed against the military. It proved able not only to prevent

the armed services from recruiting physicians on voluntary basis beyond

the limits it had established but also proved able to enjoin them from drafting

physicians even within these limits.

In short, the Selective Service System was the only agency with power

to compel physicians to enter the Armed Forces, and its authority was limited

to persons within the general draft age, which meant that it could not affect

very large number of the physicians in the United States. The effectiveness

of the Selective Service System was further limited by the hesitancy of local

draft boards in drafting physicians, even within the specified age group.

Procurement difficulties continued into the postwar period. When the

war ended, large numbers of casualties were in Army hospitals in the Zone of

Interior, as well as overseas, many of them still to receive definitive treatment

and many of them requiring specialized care. Yet this was the very time

that tremendous pressure was brought upon The Surgeon General for the

early, and sometimes the immediate, release of physicians, not only by civilian

groups and communities, but also by members of the U.S. Congress.

It would be unfair to end this foreword on such note. It is true that

conflicts and misunderstandings were numerous and that they persisted
FOREWORD XIII

throughout the war, but it is equally true that working cooperation and the

desire to get on with the job generally prevailed on local levels. It was an

enormous task to assemble the Medical Corps and allied medical services; to

utilize them to the best purposes during the war; to accomplish this task

with as little disruption of civilian medical service as possible; and then to

return these personnel to civilian life. The task was, nonetheless, carried

out competently and sometimes brilliantly, and the U.S. Army received from

its Medical Department the best medical service an army at war had ever

known.

No history of the personnel, including civilian employees, of the U.S.

Army Medical Department in World War II would be complete without

testimony to their skill, loyalty and devotion, both as group and as individuals. Officers and enlisted personnel, those who were in the Regular Army

and those who entered service from civilian life, gave of themselves unstintingly throughout the entire war. They shared the dangers of combat. Many

of them were wounded. Some of them lost their lives. To each of those

who served, the U.S. Army Medical Department, the U.S. Army, and the

Nation will be forever indebted.

Leonard D. Heaton,

Lieutenant General

The Surgeon General.

Preface

This volume is one of series on the history of the U.S. Army Medical

Department in World War II. It deals most fully with the commissioned

and enlisted members of the Army’s medical service, less fully with the large

number of civilians, the sizable contingent from the Women’s Army Corps,

and the numerous prisoners of war who were employed in the Department’s

work. Other groups that assisted the medical service but which were comparatively small in size—the body of Keel Cross workers, for example—are

given much briefer consideration.

Inevitably, the subject matter of the volume overlaps that of others in this

series. The uses to which personnel were put can hardly be discussed without

touching on their employment in hospitals and, thus, entering on small portion of the field covered by the volume dealing with hospitalization and evacuation in the Zone of Interior. To make clear one way of alleviating personnel

shortages, it has been necessary to give certain facts about training, even at

the cost of encroaching on the history of that subject. Similarly, such apparent

inadequacies as the relatively superficial coverage of Army Ground Forces

medical and paramedical personnel are made up in more appropriate contexts

in other volumes.

For reasons made clear in the narrative, the volume covers not only the

years during which the United States was at war but space of time before and

afterward—roughly the years 1939 through 1946. In few instances, the

account of some train of events begins at considerably earlier or concludes

at rather later date if such departure makes for better understanding

of the subject.

Most of the actions and decisions on personnel matters recorded in this

volume emanated from the higher authorities of the War Department, particularly the Surgeon General’s Office, the General Staff, the Air Surgeon’s

Office, the headquarters of Army Service Forces, and the offices of the commanding generals of service commands and theaters of operations or their

surgeons. The actions that figure most prominently in the account are those

of the Surgeon General’s Office, since it had comprehensive responsibility for—-

though not equally full power over—the Army’s Medical Department. That

power, as regards personnel, was shared by other agencies, not only inside but

outside the War Department. Of great influence in this respect were Congress

and its committees, certain civilian branches of the Executive —the Selective

Service System, the War Manpower Commission, and the latter’s Procurement

and Assignment Service—and nongovernmental agencies such as the American

National Red Cross, professional organizations in the field of medicine and

their journals, other groups intent on promoting special interests, and finally
XVI PREFACE

unorganized public opinion in its various forms of expression. The influence

of all these agencies, so far as it was brought to bear on the personnel administration of the Army’s medical service, is therefore also taken into account.

Statistics have been used extensively in this volume, not only to record in

quantitative terms personnel developments in the Medical Department but

also to compare them with developments in the Army as whole. For these

purposes, the authors have, as rule, used the statistical source which gives

the most detailed and comprehensive data on the particular point under discussion. number of agencies produced these data. However, most of the

time series compiled for the volume are based on data assembled by the Office

of The Adjutant General, the chief agency of theArmy for preparing personnel

actions and maintaining records of them.

The Adjutant General’s summaries of Army strength (including distribution according to race, rank, branch of service, and losses of personnel)

derive added authority from the fact that they are compiled from information entered on each unit’s morning report, which “is permanent, statistical, and historical record” (AR 345-400, May 1943, May 1944, January

1945). Each month, the information in these reports was consolidated for

particular cutoff date, summary being made first on an area level and then

by The Adjutant General, for all areas combined. The most important time

series used which do not entirely follow The Adjutant General’s figures are

the worldwide strength of the Medical Department and its individual components from Pearl Harbor to mid-1946. These series were supplied to the

authors in 1950 by the Resources Analysis Division, Office of The Surgeon

General. They incorporate many of The Adjutant General’s figures but for

the most part differ, often very substantially, from them. The differences

result primarily from using summaries of orders for accessions and separations of personnel instead of The Adjutant General’s summaries of head

counts based on the morning reports. The authors have made use of these

series both in stating Medical Department strengths and in computing ratios

and percentages involving them. One reason for doing so is that the Resources

Analysis Division in the latter part of the war and for some years afterward was The Surgeon General’s chief authority on statistics of Medical

Department personnel; the series may therefore be regarded as virtually the

official statement of the Medical Department on its strength and, as such, appropriate for use in this volume. The series are also somewhat more comprehensive than those of The Adjutant General. The reader may compare the

two sets offigures for himself as they are reproduced in table 1.

The statistical approach proved to be particularly useful in the discussion

of oversea matters. It lent itself to treatment of the oversea personnel situation as whole, rather than by individual theaters, and at the same time facilitated comparisons among different areas, thus enabling the demands of space

to be more readily met than would otherwise have been possible. Nevertheless, much attention is focused on the European theater, not merely because it

gave rise to more comprehensive personnel statistics than any other theater.
PREFACE XVII

but because it was the largest theater in terms of both medical and general

Army strength.

Max Levin is responsible for the sections on oversea developments and for most of the statistical compilations. For all other parts of the volume, John II. McMinn is responsible. The entire manuscript was prepared in the

first instance under the direction of Donald O. Wagner, Ph. D., whose contributions extended to various changes in organization and number of textual

revisions. After both the authors and the original editor had left The Historical Unit, the volume was further reorganized and substantially reduced

in length by Dr. Charles M. Wiltse, assisted by Mrs. Lucy W. Lazarou. The

basic content of the volume and much of its language, however, is still that

of Dr. McMinn and Mr. Levin, whose names appear on the title page as

coauthors.

The bibliographical note mentions the most important documents, types

of recorded material, and file collections used in preparing the volume. Much

information also came from personal interviews and correspondence with

officers and civilians familiar with the Medical Department’s personnel operations during the war and from comments on chapters of the manuscript which

rather large number of them were kind enough to review. The names of

reviewers are listed under “Acknowledgments.” "Without their willing cooperation, many valuable facts would not have come to the writers’ attention,

and many official documents could hardly have been properly interpreted.

Singled out for particular mention here must be Maj. Gen. George F. Lull,

USA (Ret.), and Dr. Durward G. Hall, Colonel, MC, USAR, both wartime

chiefs of the Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General; and Miss Anna

E. Carey, whose long and intimate connection with the personnel service makes

her authority preeminent in all matters concerning it. These three individuals reviewed all of the manuscript in each of its revisions and acted collectively as an ad hoc advisory editorial board in the finalization of the text.

The writers are also indebted to Mr. Joseph A. Logan of the Office of the

Comptroller of the Army, whose advice and assistance as statistical expert

could always be counted upon, and to the former Chief Historian, Dr. Kent R.

Greenfield, his successor, Dr. Stetson Conn, and other members of the Office

of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, who made many

useful suggestions as to form and content. Finally, they wish to acknowledge the contributions made by the Director of The Historical Unit, U.S.

Army Medical Service, Col. John Boyd Coates, Jr., MC; by Mrs. Josephine

P. Kyle, former Chief of the General Reference and Research Branch; by Miss

Rebecca L. Duberstein, who performed the final publications editing and prepared the index; and by their coworkers in all branches of The Historical Unit.

Charles M. Wiltse

Acknowledgments

The following members of the Medical Department and others who were

directly concerned with its personnel administration during World War II

have reviewed and commented on the manuscript either in whole or in part.

Their invaluable contributions are gratefully acknowledged.

Stewart F. Alexander. M.D.. formerly Colonel. MC. AUS

Col. Florence A. Blanchfield, ANC, USA (Ret.)

Miss Anna E. Carey

Mr. Isaac Cogan

Robert Cutler, formerly Brigadier General, GS, AUS

Maj. Gen. GuyB. Denit, MC, USA (Ret.)

Harold Diehl, M.D.

Maj. Gen. Howard W. Doan, MC, USA

Col. Richard H. Fanes, MC, USA (Ret.)

Robert W. W. Evans, M.D., formerly Lieutenant Colonel, MC, AUS

Col. Fred J. Fielding, MC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Francis M. Fitts, MC, USA (Ret), deceased

Maj. Helen B. Gearin, WMSC, USA (Ret.)

Eli Ginzberg, Ph. D.

Maj. Gen. Alvin L. Gorby, MC, USA (Ret.)

Durward G. Hall, M.D., formerly Colonel, MC, AUS

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hartford, MC, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, MC, USA Ret.)

Col. James R. Hudnall, MC, USA (Ret.)

Col. George F. Jeffcott, DC, USA Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, MC, USA (Ret.), deceased

Frank H. Lahey, M.D., deceased

Col. David E. Liston, MC, USA (Ret.)

Brig. Gen. Albert G. Love, MC, USA (Ret.)

Brig. Gen. Harold G. Lueth, MC, AUS Ret.)

Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, MC, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, MC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Agnes A. Maley, AXC, USA (Ret.)

Brig. Gen. Earl Maxwell, USAF (MC)

Maj. Gen. Joseph II. McNinch, MC, USA (Ret.)

Mr. Paul V. McNutt, deceased

Brig. Gen. Harry D. Offutt, MC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Paul A. Paden, MC, USA

Brig. Gen. John A. Rogers, MC, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. William E. Shambora, MC, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Earle Standlee, MC, USA (Ret.)

Thomas T. Stevenson, M.D., formerly Colonel, MC, AUS

Harvey B. Stone, M.D.
XX ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Miss Mary E. Switzer

Col. Gerald H. Teasley, MC, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Emma E. Vogel, WMSC, USA (Ret.)

Bruce P. Webster, M.D., formerly Colonel, MC, AUS

Col. Arthur B. Welsh, MC, USA (Ret.), deceased

Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Wergeland, MC, USA

Brig. Gen. Robert P. Williams, MC, USA (Ret.)
Contents

Page

FOREWORD IX

PREFACE XV

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XIX

Chapter

Composition of the Medical Department

Introduction

Military Components

Civilian Components 19

II Organization and Administration 21

Zone of Interior 21

Theaters of Operations 47

III Requirements: 1939-41 53

Strength of Medical Department Components 53

War Department Responsibilities 54

Factors Affecting Determination of Requirements 58

IV Requirements: 1941-45 67

Medical Corps 67

Dental Corps 75

Veterinary Corps 76

Sanitary Corps 77

Pharmacy Corps 78

Medical Administrative Corps 78

Army Nurse Corps 84

Dietitians and Physical Therapists 88

Enlisted Men 91

Enlisted Women 99

Civilians 100

Additional Unit Requirements Overseas 102

Procurement During the Emergency Period 111

Preemergency Procedures 111

Early Reserve Measures 112

The Beginning of Mobilization 124

Deferment of Service for Reserve Officers 127

Extension of Reservists’ Tour of Duty 129

Effect of Selective Service Legislation 131

Army Nurse Corps 134

Students in Professional Schools 136

Reserve Units 141

Other Sources of Officer Personnel 148

Contributions of Organized Medicine and Nursing 156

Procurement of Enlisted Men 164

VI Procurement, 1941-45: Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Corps 167

Legislation 167

Medical Corps 168

Dental Corps 195
XXII CONTEXTS

Chapter

VI Procurement, 1941-45: Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Corps—Continued

Veterinary Corps 196

Deferment of Professional Students 198

The Affiliated Units After Pearl Harbor 206

VII Procurement, 1941-45: Other Military Components 211

Sanitary Corps 211

Pharmacy Corps 213

Medical Administrative Corps 214

Army Nurse Corps 221

Dietitians and Physical Therapists 231

Enlisted Personnel 233

VIII Procurement of Civilian Personnel 247

Zone of Interior 247

Oversea Theaters 253

IX Classification 267

Officers and Nurses, 1939-41 267

Officers and Nurses, 1941-43 270

Male and Female Officers, 1943-45 274

Enlisted Personnel, 1939-45 284

Utilization of Personnel 289

Assignment of Medical Department Personnel 289

The Replacement System 297

Organizational and Procedural Changes 306

Utilization of Negro Personnel 317

Utilization of Prisoners of War and Native Labor Troops 324

Morale Factors in Efficient Utilization of Personnel 329

XI Strength and Distribution of Military Personnel 339

Overall Strength 339

Distribution, Overseas and in the Zone of Interior 339

Composition of the Medical Department Overseas 405

Permanent Losses of Personnel 420

XII Rank, Promotion, and Pay 451

Zone of Interior 451

Promotion Overseas 470 XIII Redeployment, Retraining, and Demobilization 487

Period of Partial Demobilization 487

Full-Scale Demobilization 491

Offsetting Factors 495

Professional Retraining 500

Postwar Planning 505

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 511

INDEX 515

Illustrations Figure

Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, USA, The Surgeon General, June 1939-31 May

1943 18

Brig. Gen. William L. Sheep, MC, prewar chief of Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General 22

Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) George F. Lull, MC, first wartime chief of Military

Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General 23
CONTEXTS XXIII

Figure Page

Brig. Gen. Charles C. Hillman, MC, wartime chief of the Professional Service Division, Office of The Surgeon General 24 Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, MC, Chief, Administrative Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, when the United States entered the war 25

Col. Francis C. Tyng, MC, Chief, Finance and Supply Division, Office of The

Surgeon General 26

Brig. Gen. James S. Simmons, MC, Chief, Preventive Medicine Division, Office

of The Surgeon General 29

Col. James R. Hudnall, MC, Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon

General, 1943-44 30

Col. Durward G. Hall, MC, Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon

General, 1944-46 31

10 Brig. Gen. Albert W. Kenner, MC, being decorated by Gen. George C. Marshall-_ 32

11 Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, USA, The Surgeon General, June 1943-31 May

1947 33

12 Col. Arthur B. Welsh, MC, wartime Deputy Chief, Operations Service, Office of

The Surgeon General 34

13 Eli Ginzberg, Ph. D., Resources Analysis Division, Office of The Surgeon General. 35

14 Maj. Gen. Raymond W. Bliss, MC, wartime Deputy Surgeon General, Office of

The Surgeon General 36

15 Lt. Col. Paul A. Paden, MC, of the Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General 41

16 Representative theater chief surgeons 50

17 Maj. Gen. Charles R. Reynolds, The Surgeon General, 1935-39 57

18 Representative Army surgeons 70

19 Brig. Gen. Robert Mills, DC, wartime director of the Dental Division, Office of

The Surgeon General 75

20 Brig. Gen. Edward Reynolds, MAC, Chief, Medical Administrative Corps. 78

21 Col. David E. Liston, MC, Deputy Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 82

22 Col. Fred J. Fielding, MC, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army 83

23 Col. Florence A. Blanchfield, ANC, Superintendent of the Army Nurse Corps. 85

24 Maj. Emma E. Vogel, WMSC, Superintendent of Physical Therapists 89

25 Members of the Women’s Army Corps learning from Army nurse how to change

surgical dressing 100

26 Nurses’ aides, Camp Fannin, Tex 101

27 Col. Richard H. Eanes, MC. Chief Medical Officer, Selective Service System __

131

28 Early appointments as commanders of affiliated units 145

29 Lt. Col. Harold C. Lueth, MC, liaison officer from the Office of The Surgeon

General, to American Medical Association, 1942-45 158

30 Col. Sam F. Seeley, MC, Executive Officer, Directing Board, Procurement and

Assignment Service 163

31 Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service 169

32 Col. George L. Caldwell, VC, Assistant Chief, Veterinary Division, Office of

The Surgeon General 198

33 Col. Francis M. Fitts, MC, Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces 202

34 Nurses’ duty uniform, 1943 220

35 Nurses’ dress uniforms, 1943 221

36 Native litter bearers carrying wounded American soldier from the frontlines, vicinity of Buna, New Guinea, November 1942 256

37 Natives building covered bomb shelter, under the direction of medical

technician, Southwest Pacific Area, January 1944 257
XXIV CONTENTS

Figure Page

38 Indian laundry workers, 371st Station Hospital, Ramgarh, India, 28 February

1945 258

39 German prisoners of war assist in unloading hospital train. Liege, Belgium,

18 March 1945, Hospital Train No. 328

40 Medical Department enlisted men awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, in

World War II___ 338

Tables

Strength of Medical Department by components (exclusive of general officers),

30 June 1939-30 June 1946 10

Procurement objectives (10 July 1939), and actual strengths (30 June 1939), of

Medical Department Officers Reserve Corps 56

Numbers of Medical and Medical Administrative Corps officers suggested (1944)

for Zone of Interior general hospitals of various sizes 82

Proposed distribution of nurses, June 1945 88

Medical Department enlisted strength, worldwide and overseas, 31 July 1941-30

September 1945 92

Guide for utilization of personnel in named general hospitals, Zone of Interior 94

Guide for utilization of personnel in convalescent hospitals, Zone of Interior 95

Table-of-organization changes in certain types of hospitals, 1940-44 96

Table-of-organization changes in the medical detachment of the infantry regiment

(T/O 7-11), 1938-45 98

10 Medical Department overstrengths and understrengths in various oversea

theaters or areas, 30 November 1943 105

11 Authorized and actual strengths of medical personnel, Eighth U.S. Army, 31 May

1945 108

12 Active-duty strength of Medical Department groups, by Army components,

30 June 1939-30 November 1941 113

13 Strength of Medical Department Reserves (Regular Army Reserve and Reserve

Corps), 1939-41 116

14 Strength of Medical Department Reserves (National Guard), 1939-41 119

15 Medical Department officers of affiliated Reserve in affiliated medical units,

February 1941 146

16 Medical Department officers in affiliated units, 30 June 1941 147

17 The Army Specialized Training Program: Students of medicine, dentistry, and

veterinary medicine assigned, separated, and discharged and transferred

through curtailment of the program 206

18 Civilians employed by the Medical Department from various funds, March

1940-December 1941 249

19 Economies in enlisted personnel through utilization of local labor, 815th Hospital Center, European theater, 1945 255

20 Ratio of civilian hospital workers to military medical personnel, Persian Gulf

Command, 30 April 1943-31 July 1945 259

21 Utilization of civilian workers and Italian prisoners of war, by Medical Department service-type units, Mediterranean theater, May 1945 261

22 Medical Department civilian labor, Communications Zone, European theater

(exclusive of headquarters), June-December 1945 262

23 Geographic distribution of medical personnel, European Theater of Operations,

Communications Zone, April to October 1945, inclusive 264

24 Movement of Medical Department personnel in and out of Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, D-day to V-E Day

(6 June 1944-8 May 1945) 299
CONTENTS XXV

Number Page

25 Monthly Medical Department strength in Services of Supply or Communications

Zone, European Theater of Operations (exclusive of Iceland), 30 September

1942- October 1944 308

26 Negroes in the Medical Department, 1943-45 319

27 Number of Medical Department officers assigned to the Veterans’ Administration, January 1944-June 1946 339

28 Oversea strength of the Medical Department, 30 June 1939 and 30 June 1940-_ 340

29 Development of Medical Department strength overseas, as compared with

development of service strength, November 1941-September 1945 341

30 Movement of Medical Department troops overseas, compared with movement

of all Army, all combat, and all service troops, July 1942-August 1945 342

31 Oversea strength of the Medical Department and oversea Negro medical strength

by area, 31 July 1941-30 September 1945 345

32 Oversea strength of the Medical Department corps and other officer components,

31 July 1941-30 September 1945 373

33 Authorized allotment of Medical Department officers to oversea areas (less

Reserve officers assigned to duty with the Air Corps) for the fiscal year 1942_ 384

34 Estimated table-of-organization strength of attached medical personnel and

divisional medical battalions in oversea areas, 30 September 1944 385

35 Percentage distribution of Army strength among ground-, air-, and service-type

units and overhead in theaters of operations, 30 September 1944 386

36 Operating strength of Medical Department units in oversea areas, 30 April

1943- August 1945 387

37 Types of Medical Department units in use in the various theaters of operations,

by area, 30 September 1944 396

38 Estimated additions by Air Transport Command to theater medical strength

per 1,000 troops, 1944 397

39 Strength of Medical Department personnel assigned to Air Forces, 30 September

1942-31 May 1945 399

40 Strength of Medical Department by Army components, worldwide and overseas,

31 January and 31 August 1942 404

41 Strength of male personnel by Army components, worldwide and overseas, on

31 July 1941 410

42 Negro Medical Department units overseas, Pearl Harbor to V-J Day 412

43 Proportion of Army female personnel in the Medical Department 413

44 Oversea strength of Medical Department, male and female officer components,

30 September 1942-30 September 1945 414

45 Medical Department officer strength, worldwide and overseas, 30 November

1941-30 September 1945 415

46 Strength and proficiency ratings of Medical Corps specialists, worldwide and

overseas, 20 June 1945 417

47 The American National Red Cross; Oversea hospital workers on duty and en

route, 1942-45 420

48 Battle casualties of the Medical Department, officers and enlisted men: Total

battle casualties, deaths among battle casualties, and killed in action, December 1941-31 December 1946 421

49 Battle casualties of the Medical Department, officers and enlisted men: Wounded

and injured in action, December 1941-31 December 1946 424

50 Battle casualties of the Medical Department, officers and enlisted men: Captured

and interned, December 1941-31 December 1946 427

51 Battle casualties of the Medical Department, officers and enlisted men: Missing

in action, December 1941-31 December 1946 430
XXVI CONTEXTS

Number Page

52 Nonbattle deaths in the Medical Department: Actual, December 1941-31

December 1946; estimated, December 1941-30 September 1945 433

53 Deaths from enemy action: Medical Department and Army as whole, December 1941-30 September 1945 436

54 Returns to civil life: Officers of the Medical Department and of the Army as

whole, December 1941-30 September 1945 437

55 Returns of male Medical Department officers to civilian life, December 1941-

September 1945 439

56 Returns of Medical Department enlisted men to civilian life, October 1943-June

1945 442

57 Returns to civil life: Enlisted men of the Medical Department and of the Army

as whole, October 1943-June 1945 442

58 Rates of discharge for mental and physical disability: Male officers of the Medical Department and of the Army as whole, December 1941-September 1945- 443

59 Disability-discharge rate: Enlisted men of the Medical Department and of the

Army as whole, October 1943-June 1945 444

60 Discharges for disability; Army Nurse Corps, Dietitians, and Physical Therapists, September 1944-30 September 1945 445

61 Rank of Medical Department officers, 1939-45 457

62 Army Nurse Corps first lieutenants and second lieutenants: Numbers in grade

and numbers of promotions, September 1944-August 1945 468

63 Rank of Medical Department officers overseas (excluding general officers),

31 July 1941-31 May 1944 472

64 Temporary promotions of Medical Department officers, worldwide and overseas,

January 1943-September 1945 478

65 Temporary promotions of Medical Department officers by rank, by corps, and

by other components, worldwide and overseas, November 1944 to June 1945,

inclusive 480

66 Rank of Medical Department enlisted men overseas, 31 July 1941-31 May 1944- 484

67 Medical Department officers separated, V-E Day-31 December 1946 (cumulative) 498

68 Civilians and prisoners of war employed in medical activities within Army

Service Forces in the United States, 30 March 1945-30 April 1946 499

Charts

Organization of the Surgeon General’s Office for personnel administration, January

1939 27

Organization of the Surgeon General’s Office for personneladministration, August

1942 28

Organization of the Surgeon General’s Office for personnel administration, February 1944 38

Organization of the Surgeon General’s Office for personnel administration, May

1945 39

Percent of total Army and Medical Department strength, in oversea areas, on

selected dates, 1941-45 371

Percent of total Army strength and Medical Department officers of Medical,

Dental, Veterinary, and Medical Administrative Corps, in oversea areas, on

selected dates, 1941-45 372

Percent of total Army strength and Medical Department officers of Sanitary and

Army Nurse Corps and Hospital Dietitians and Physical Therapists, in oversea areas, on selected dates, 1941-45 372
CHAPTER

Composition of the Medical Department

INTRODUCTION

In the years immediately following World War II, changes in organization

and policy were made that should eliminate or modify some of the personnel

difficulties that make up much of the subject matter of this book. Important

among these postwar developments is the centering of responsibility for health

and medical aspects of mobilization planning and for the maintenance of effective relations with the public health and medical professions at the level of the

Secretary of Defense. Other improvements include the continuously current

professional classification of both civilian and Army doctors; adjustments in

rank and pay of medical and dental officers; the extension of compulsory military service to special groups; desegregation throughout the Army; theappointment of women doctors in the Regular Army Medical Corps, and of male officers

in the Army Nurse Corps; and the establishment of standards for graduates

of foreign medical schools. All of these changes deal with areas in which the

problems of the Medical Department differ in kind or in degree from those of

the Army as whole—problems accentuated by the same wartime conditions

that demanded they be resolved.

At peak strength in 1944, the Department comprised approximately

700.000 military personnel, about 8.5 percent of the entire Army. This figure

does not include substantial number of individuals from other branches of

the military service who served under Medical Department command—among

them chaplains, engineers, and about fifth of the members of the Women’s

Army Corps. In addition, the Department employed perhaps as many as

150.000 civilians in the Zone of Interior and overseas. In both areas, some

80.000 prisoners of war were also detailed to the Medical Department to assist

in its work. The variety of personnel was reflected particularly in the number

of officer components. Before the end of the war, there were nine of these

the Medical, Dental, Veterinary, Sanitary, Medical Administrative, Pharmacy,

and Nurse Corps, the Hospital Dietitians, and the Physical Therapists.

Although the responsibilities of the Department were administrative as

well as medical, the availability of doctors was the major limiting factor in

officer procurement throughout the war. The output of the medical schools was

never great enough to meet the demand, nor was it possible to draw enough

physicians from civilian practice to make up the deficit.

The functions of the Medical Department were preventive as well as curative, and extended not only to men and women but also to the relatively small
PERSONNEL

number of animals—chiefly clogs, horses, and mules—that were used by the

Army. The preventive program included sanitation in connection with messes,

waste disposal, water supplies, and housing; measures for the control of

venereal disease; immunization against many common and some uncommon

diseases; personal hygiene; food inspection; proper nutrition; and insect and

rodent control. The program also extended to epidemiological studies, and the

supervision of public health in occupied territories. Another essentially preventive function of the Medical Department was the physical examination of

all persons entering or leaving the Army and of many on numerous occasions

in between. In addition to research of strictly clinical nature, the Medical

Department was required to engage in “research and experimentation connected

with the development and improvement of Medical Department material,

equipment, and supplies.”

At the higher levels, administrative functions, too, were performed by doctors, since Medical Corps officers alone could command organizations dealing

with the treatment, hospitalization, and evacuation of patients, except in an

emergency when no such officers were available. Medical Corps officers also

performed staff functions such as directing the medical service of nonmedical

units, advising commanders and their staffs on medical matters. The commander of every nonmedical organization the size of battalion or larger

normally had medical officer on his staff. Specific staff responsibilities

extended to medical supply, training, and the maintenance of clinical and

allied medical records.

Although not legally bound to do so, the Medical Department, insofar as

practical, had always cared for Army dependents and for certain civilians

overseas. This was extended during the ar to include prisoners of war and

patients belonging to the U.S. Navy, other Federal agencies, American enterprises engaged in the war effort, and Allied forces when their treatment elsewhere was impracticable. This particular demand on the Medical Department

was offset to some extent by the medical service of our Navy and by those of

Allied countries, especially Great Britain.

In the years before Pearl Harbor, the Medical Department, like the

Army in general, attained size unprecedented in peacetime. The problems

related to this growth were certainly more difficult than any the Department

had encountered since the First World War. Starting with smallcomplement

of officers, nurses, and enlisted men and personnel organization more suited

to the needs of peace than of war, the Medical Department had to carry out

the process of rapid expansion at the same time that it adjusted its recruiting

effort to the quotas permitted by the War Department. The expansion involved building up the Reserves as well as the active forces, and was partly

achieved by re-creating system of unit reserves, or affiliated units. In enlarging its strength, the Medical Department encountered further problems,

Army Regulations No. 40-5, 15 Jan. 1926. Army Regulations No. 40-10, Changes No. 1, 25 July 1935.
COMPOSITION OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

among others the difficulty—at time when civilian medical service was more

than ever in demand—of inducing professional people to enter the Army in

large numbers and of keeping them in it once they had been secured. Partly

as the result of these difficulties, the Medical Department had to improve

its methods of classifying and assigning personnel so as to make the best use

of its manpower. Meanwhile, the Department had to consider how or whether

to utilize certain special groups, such as Negroes (doctors, dentists, and nurses)

and graduates of foreign medical schools.

The first years of war likewise had their special characteristics. Perhaps

the most salient feature was that procurement became more important than

it was before or afterward; the Medical Department, like the rest of the Army,

obtained most of its personnel at this time. The advent of war made the

affiliated units available for use, and the process of bringing them into service

during 1942 and 1943 raised new problems of personnel administration. At

this time, also, the final steps were taken to conserve the supply of students

of medicine for the future use of the Army and of the civilian community.

In late 1943, definite ceilings were placed on certain important categories

of medical personnel. As result, the problem from then on became not so

much one of obtaining more personnel as of using the men and women already

in service as efficiently as possible. Measures for the latter purpose were

developed or initiated during this period, even though they were carried still

further later on. Thus, at the very beginning of the war, certain congressional enactments and War Department directives relaxed the physical standards required for officers, extended the term of military service, and enabled

the Army to deploy its personnel more as it saw fit.

Also, during the first years of the war, the system of rank and promotion Army-wide was basically remodelled. The only pay increase of the war

for enlisted men and officers was provided by Congress in 1942. Late in the

same year, two new female components of the Medical Department were

created—the Physical Therapists and the Hospital Dietitians—and in 1943

new male officer component, the Pharmacy Corps. These were the only Medical

Department components added during the war.

Also, toward the end of 1942, Committee to Study the Medical Department of the Army examined, as one of its fields of inquiry, various phases of

medical personnel administration. The Committee, appointed by the Secretary of War and consisting of six civilian and two retired Army doctors,

hospital administrator, and representative of Headquarters, Army Service

Forces, ranged over wide area in the course of its investigation including,

besides personnel matters, the organization of the Surgeon General’s Office

and its place in the War Department structure, medical supply, and the efficiency of Medical Department installations.

For full account of the Committee and all aspects of its work, see Medical Department,

United States Army. Organizationand Administration in World War II. Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963, pp. 145-185.
PERSONNEL

In certain other fields of personnel administration, developments occurred

which continued into the later war years. Thus, the organization and responsibilities for personnel management began to change radically in number

of ways shortly after the beginning of the war, but did not reach their final

form until later. During this period, also, the Medical Department considerably widened its use of special groups, but without arriving at final solution of the problem.

The later war years were marked by several new trends, beginning in the

summer and fall of 194*3. In the realm of organization and responsibility for

personnel affairs in the Zone of Interior, there was tendency to revise the

organization of the Surgeon GeneraFs Office so as to obtain more detailed

knowledge of personnel resources; at the same time, the movement continued

to centralize in his Office more control over personnel, and also to restore the

personnel authority of the service command surgeons, all of which reversed

the trend of the early war years. In this matter of procurement, while that

process continued to occupy much of the Medical Department's attention, it

was restricted not only by the ceilings imposed on Medical and Dental Corps

strength but by the greater difficulty of obtaining doctors, nurses, and enlisted

men. As result, more emphasis was placed on measures to offset these restrictions on procurement. For one thing, there was greater tendency to supplement the categories of personnel in short supply—or to replace them in certain

kinds of work—with other types of personnel more readily obtainable. There

were also new estimates of personnel requirements and further improvements in

utilization. At the same time that these developments were taking place,

policies concerning promotion and rank were revised, while conditions surrounding the use of Negroes and Japanese-Americans also changed. The

outstanding feature of this period in the field of personnel, however, is that

the Medical Department adjusted itself to the exigencies of war by more intensive cultivation of the resources at hand. Nevertheless, long before the

end of the war, the business of adjustment to restricted area of war and

ultimately to peacetime situation came under consideration; the problems

of redeployment and demobilization seemed to press for an even quicker settlement than those of worldwide war itself.

MILITARY COMPONENTS

At the head of the Medical Department before, during, and after the war

was The Surgeon General. Federal statute provided that he should have

the rank of major general and should be appointed by the President with the

advice and consent of the Senate. further statute provided for four assistants, appointed in the same way, with the rank of brigadier general, one

of whom must be an officer in the Dental Corps.

41 Stat. 76C.

52 Stat. 8. The law, approved on 29 January 1938, was made retroactive to July 1937.
COMPOSITION OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

Prewar Period, 1939—41

Until the passage of the Selective Training and Service Act on 16 September 1940, the Army contained three traditional components: The Regular

Army, the Reserves, and the National Guard. The Regular Army comprised

officers and enlisted men who were on active duty at all times; the Reserves

were intended to meet the need for additional officers and enlisted men during

an early period of mobilization; and the National Guard was designed to

serve in case of emergency or actual hostilities. Both the Reserves and Na- tional Guard were organized into units similar to those of the Regular Army,

but the Reserve units were largely paper ones.

After the passage of the Selective Service Act, the Army contained

body of officers and enlisted men who were referred to simply as “Army of the

United States personnel”; that is, officers commissioned in the Army of the

United States but not necessarily in any of the components just mentioned,

and enlisted men not designated as members of one of these three components.

During the war, this Army of the United States personnel came to constitute

by far the largest part of the Army.

Prior to World War II, the Medical Department contained seven military

components—five officer corps whose members held full commissioned rank

(the Medical, Dental, Veterinary, Sanitary, and Medical Administrative

Corps), one whose members held relative rank (the Army Nurse Corps), and

body of enlisted men.

In 1939, all Medical Department officer corps except the Sanitary Corps

were represented in the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Reserves;

the Sanitary Corps existed only in the Reserves. Reserve officers took correspondence courses, upon the completion of which they were awarded certificates

of capacity entitling them to promotion when they had served the prescribed

time in grade. Many of the older officers were men who had transferred to the

Reserve Corps after World War I. Others had been commissioned upon the

completion of professional training, having taken the prescribed training in the

Reserve Officers’ Training Corps units in medical schools. Medical Department officers and enlisted men of the National Guard had considerable experience with military medicine through their year-round armory-instruction program and the extensive training provided at camps each summer. The Regular

Army had complement of nurses, the National Guard had none, while the

Reserve of the Nurse Corps consisted of nurses registered with the American

National Red Cross. The Regular Army, National Guard, and Reserves each

had complement of Medical Department enlisted men.

Prior to the establishment of the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps), only

small numbers of Medical Department Reserve officers served on active duty

for longer periods than the usual 14-day tour each year. After the initiation of

Many Regular Army officers held temporary commissions with higher rank in the Army of the

United States. In the War Department statistics, the term “AUS enlisted personnel” is reserved for

volunteers in that category others are listed separately as “selectees.”
PERSONNEL

the CCC, however, medical, dental, and veterinary officers were assigned to it

in substantial numbers, and during the fiscal year ending on 30 June 1939,

total of 889 Reserve officers were on duty with the corps. Thereafter, Reserve

officers so engaged, instead of serving on active military duty were to serve as

contract surgeons or as civilian employees.

The Medical Corps

The Medical Corps was the original component of the Medical Department and remained the core of that organization. As it consisted only of

officers who held the degree of doctor of medicine from an acceptable college

or university and who had passed the required examinations, its professional

duties could be defined mainly as those incident to the practice of military medicine. Medical officers also performed certain command and staff functions, as

already mentioned.

Both professional and administrative duties ordinarily assigned to members of the Medical Corps were also shared on occasion by contract surgeons,

although no firm determination was ever made as to their actual legal status

in the Medical Department. They spanned the military and civilian components, being deprived of certain advantages of military service but sharing

in some of the civilian ones. In the early days of the Medical Department,

they were used extensively even on foreign service, and from this group, many

outstanding members of the Regular Army were recruited. In the interim

between the wars, they furnished the only medical service provided to troops

stationed at arsenals and armories throughout the country and gave emergency

treatment to the civilians employed at these stations. Some served on fulltime, others on part-time basis, but the pay either way was relatively small.

They had small complement of enlisted men who usually served long periods

at one station. Both the contract surgeon and his enlisted assistants were held

in high regard by the officers and their families. Children, it is said, would

often run to the infirmary for treatment of minor injuries, or for comfort, instead of going home. Later, many contract surgeons were used to furnish

medical care to the enrollees of the Civilian Conservation Corps. During the

war, they were to make notable contribution at depots and industrial plants

under Army control.

The Dental Corps

The Dental Corps, established in 1911, was responsible for the dental service of the Army. Members of the corps ordinarily were assigned duties directly

connected with the prevention and treatment of dental diseases and deficiencies.

They were also declared to be eligible for employment in other duties deter- mined by the needs of the service and the training and experience of the officers

Annual Report of The Surgeon General, TJ.S. Army, Washington TJ.S. Government Printing Office, 1939, p. 183.

Army Regulations No. 40-10, Jan. 1924.
COMPOSITION OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

concerned. Each officer of the corps was graduate of an acceptable dental

college. The dental officer who served as one of the four assistants to The Surgeon General 10 administered the dental service of the Army and headed the

Dental Division of the Surgeon General's Office.

The Veterinary Corps

The Veterinary Corps, created by the National Defense Act of 1916, required its officers to be graduates of approved veterinary schools. Their duties

fell into two general classes—those pertaining to the inspection of foods of

animal origin procured or used by the Army and those having to do with the

care and management of Army animals. The members also trained and

directed the enlisted personnel of the Medical Department assigned for duty

to the corps. The inspection of foods rather than animal care was the principal activity of Veterinary Corps officers in World War II. This inspection,

in theUnited States and overseas, covered the sanitary and other quality factors

in foods of animal origin during their procurement, storage, shipment, issue,

and other handling by the Army. Only veterinary officers commanded

veterinary units. 11

The Medical Administrative Corps

While the duties of Medical Administrative Corps officers were nowhere

stated in Army regulations, an act of 24 June 1936 provided that appointments to the Regular Army component thereafter should be made from pharmacists who were graduates of recognized schools or colleges of pharmacy. 12

But neither this component nor the one which absorbed it in 1943—the Pharmacy Corps—was ever made up exclusively of pharmacists, nor was training

in pharmacy ever made prerequisite to commissioning in either the Reserve

or Army of the United States sections of the corps. Most members therefore

performed variety of other duties, serving, for example, as adjutant, medical

supply officer, mess officer, and training officer.

The Sanitary Corps

The Sanitary Corps Reserve had no members on active duty at the beginning of 1939. Qualifications for appointment were possession of degree

signifying completion of 4-year technical or scientific college course in the

specialty for which the candidate was selected and years’ experience in

“highly specialized occupation or scientific specialty pertaining to the functions of the Medical Department such as chemistry, food and nutrition, hospital architecture, procurement and manufacture of medical supplies, psyArmy Regulations No. 40-la, 20 Apr. 1939. This eligibility was eliminated from the regulation

in the revision of August 1945. 10 See footnote 5, p. 4. 11 Army Regulations No. 605—20, 1939, and Army Regulations No. 40-2260, 1939. 12 49 Stat. 1902.

663076'—63
PERSONNEL

chology, 13 public health, sanitary engineering, and other appropriate vocations.” In lieu of college education, the candidate might present evidence

of sufficient general and technical knowledge gained by study, training, and

years of experience to demonstrate his fitness for the corps. The requirement

became somewhat more rigid in 1940; nevertheless, the prewar conditions for

appointment have been described as “very loosely drawn.” 14 In 1942, however, it became necessary for sanitary engineer or an entomologist entering

the corps to possess not only the appropriate academic degree but years of

satisfactory experience. About years later, the pressing need for personnel

caused cut in the experience requirement to years. Afterward, the processes

of the Army Specialized Training Program replaced these requirements.

Members of the Sanitary Corps, besides performing duties appropriate to their

special training, came to be used frequently to relieve Medical Corps officers

of certain administrative duties.

The Army Nurse Corps

At the outbreak of the war, the Army Nurse Corps consisted of superintendent, assistant superintendents, chief nurses, and nurses. Until 1944, when

the nurses achieved full commissioned status, all held “relative rank,' 515 with

some of the rights and privileges accorded commissioned officers. To be professionally qualified for appointment to the corps, the applicant had to be

registered nurse with at least years of general hospital training or equivalent

experience. 16 The duties of nurses, defined in detail by Army regulations,

were the customary functions of hospital nurses, with the additional ones of

supervising and administering the nursing service—which included responsibility for overseeing the work of enlisted personnel serving on the wards.

The Nurse Corps was composed entirely of women, although, in late 1942,

suggestion was made that men should be appointed to it for service in psychiatric and genitourinary wards. 17 Toward the end of the war, after the

nurses had attained full commissioned rank, there was some agitation in favor

of appointing men to the corps for general nursing service, but the Army

argued against it successfully on the ground that the performance of certain

13 Army Regulations No. 140-33, 30 July 1936. Psychology was omitted from the list in Army

Regulations No. 140-38, 15 Dec. 1940.

14 Hardenbergh, W. A.: Organization and Administration of Sanitary Engineering Division. [Official record.]

15 “Relative rank” as officially defined meant “comparative rank or position of authority among

officers holding the same grade” (War Department Technical Manual 20—205, Dictionary of U.S.

Army Terms, 18 Jan. 1944). Unofficially, the term generally denoted something less than full military rank. For convenience, it is used in the latter sense in this volume.

16 Army Regulations No. 40-20, 31 Dec. 1934, with changes thereto. Although the wording of

this regulation was changed subsequently in such way that it could be interpreted to mean that

formal training could be entirely replaced by experience, there is reason to believe that only applicants having formal training were appointed. Also, the requirement that applicants for the “permanent establishment” had to be registered nurses was omitted, perhaps inadvertently, from the issue

of the same regulation for April 1943, but was restored by Changes No. 6, 22 June 1944. 17 Report of the Committee to Study the Medical Department of the Army, 1942.
COMPOSITION OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

nursing tasks would ruin man’s usefulness as an officer in the eyes of enlisted

men.18 Since World War II, male nurses have been accepted, first in the

Reserve and more recently in the Regular Army, where they have amply proved

their worth.

Enlisted personnel

'Fhe enlisted component, unlike other components of the Medical Department, had no special entrance requirements; qualifications were simply those

for admission to the enlisted ranks of the Army as whole. Certain practices were adopted which can hardly be called real exceptions to this rule,

such as the recruitment of technicians by the 'Women's Army Corps for the

use of the Medical Department. The Army also made an effort, by its classification and assignment system, to channel enlisted personnel with appropriate experience into the Medical Department. But the vast majority came into

the Department with no such special background and had to be trained after

they arrived.

World War II, 1941—45

The strength of the Medical Department on December 1941 was approximately 131,600 (table I). 19 Throughout the rapid expansion that followed

American entry into the war, the five original male officer corps retained their

sections in the Regular Army, the Reserves, and the National Guard. The

Nurse Corps, too, retained its Regular Army section, and nurses also began to

come on duty as members of the Reserve. Eventually, officers of all of these

corps were directly commissioned in theArmy of theUnited States.

New military components were added to the Department in the course of

the war, the hospital dietitians and the physical therapists in 1942, and the

Pharmacy Corps in 1943. Dietitians and therapists, like the nurses, at first

held only relative rank, but all three groups achieved commissioned status in

1944.

Dietitians and physical therapists

The administrative histories of the dietitian and physical therapist groups,

including the process by which their members attained officer status, are so

similar that they can be considered together. 20

18 Letter, The Deputy Surgeon General, to Miss Inez D. Mooney, Houston, Tex., 27 Feb. 1945. 19 Strength figures for the war years vary depending on whether they are based on records kept

in the Surgeon General’s Office or on records of The Adjutant General. 20 Unless otherwise noted, the account which follows Is based on (1) the manuscript history of

each group written by its director and (2) letter, Col. Emma E. Vogel, USA (Ret.), to Col. J. B. Coates, Jr., MC, USA, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 28 Mar. 1956. Both

groups are treated in greater detail in forthcoming volume in this series dealing with the Army

Medical Specialist Corps, into which they were eventually absorbed.
10 PERSONNEL

Table 1.—Strength of Medical Department, by components (exclusive

[Office of The Surgeon General’s data in Arabic

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to

to

to

iUl

3|

<“h

CD

Cn

CO

00to

ooCD

CDCO

CD-o

Cn Cn

to to

0505

05

05 05

05

j4

CD (TO

S3

00

pc

CO

Cn

05

00

05

to

CD

to

CD

■405

Cn05

CL

to

CD

C5

05

4^

Cl

f—

1»

S'

Cn

Cn

cn

pi

4*-

4s*.

ca

00

oo

6©cn

to*1

Cn

6©

to

6©

to

to

*^1

Cn

ca

05

00

Cn

00

CO

•4

Co

Cn

6©

CD

05

Cn

CD

to

Or

fc^.

*r*

XT*

-1

30

30

Strength

■§

ST

CaOi

COCO

Oo Oo

-i

Co

4*.

Oo

05

cn to to

CoOo

CD CD

CnGO

00 4-

"*4

OOCC C5

ca00

toCnOO

ca OO

05OnCa

CO

Co

cn co

-4 OS

6©cn

CD

6©cn6©

05to

cn6©

6©CO

05

-ICn ■4

Cn 05

“4

CD

Cn

CD

Oo

00

OoCn

00Cn

OoCn

00

Oo

05

Cn

Oo "4

00

Oo "4

00CD

Oo "5

00 CD

Oo cn

go

-4

Oo

4^

to

Oo

to

Oo6©

Oo<D

22

-4Oo

*40°

05

Ratio

to

Army

CD

fP

Os

in

-4

CO

-4

oo

*-*

05

Cn

Cn

CD

CD

00

to

CD

Cn

ca

Cn

Cn

-*

cn

"4

to

05

to

65,922

6©

6©

6©

to

6©

6©

to

Ki

to

3,119

2,181

6©-400

00 05

Co *46©

00 oo Co 00

to

cn

’9,945

6, 525

05 to

00-4-4

CD

0, 582

05 C5 ca

vo Oo

toCDCD

pi) CD0O

054^

05 CD6©05

Oi

6© sCn

OO cn05

05a-CD

CDcn05

Cn Cn

6©05

-I05*4

caca 05

CO ca

to

Strength

CD

h?i

'O

h2,j P.

Pi

CD

Ratio

to

Army

Co

CO

60

CO

6©

co

ca

OO

oa

4-*-

ca

Cn

05

fc-.

05

ca

05

ca

Cn

4.

6©

ca

r*

cd

to

CO

to

CO

cn

->

to

cn

<D

>-*

05

co

-*

Cn

"4

to

05

"4

ca

to

Oo

Oo

to

CD

05

05

rti

OS

to

6©

to

to

co

CD

Cn

oo

ca

05

OO

Oo

Cn

CD

Cn

cn

VO

to

oa

05

-1

Strength

K*

Oi

Cn

cn

H-*

Oo

ca

CD

Oo

CD

-I

ca

H-*

Oo

cn

pi

oo

05

ca

ca

05

CD

CO

05

Cn

CD

Co

cn

05

05

CO

oa

OO

05

-4

ca

ca

6©

to

"4

CD

ca

CD

"4

CD

Co

CD

-J

Cn

•^1

CD

CD

00

Oo

CD

00

CD

Co

CD

CO

CD

co

CO

VD

CD

co

CO

CD

*4

"4

05

“4

"4

-4

Army

CD*

Oo

HCO

cn

6©

-4

cn

CO

Cn

to

fcCn

co

05

CD

05

ca

CO

Cn

ca

CD

Oo

to

05

*■*

ro

r.i

OS

to

Ci

05

Oi Oo

05 00

Oo

05

Cn |SCo

05

ca pi

CD

OO 4*

OS

pi CD

to

CD

pi

to

“4

Cn

Strength

og

cn

-4

CO

Oo

to

00

4-

CD

05

to

gj

Cn

Cn

cn

Cn

cn

Cn

05

05

05

05

C5

-4

05

pi

pi

pi

o»_

05

05

05

Or

p,

Ratio to

Co05

-u •4

Oi Co

05Cn

Oioo CD

<D

OI

Cn

CD

ca

-46©

09

Cn

24

-1to

CD“-4

to

05Cn

*4

CD

06

CD

to

Army

CO

CO

Oo

CD

Oo

CD

Oo

CD

CD

05

05

OS

OS

to

Strength

CD CO

.726

Cn 6^>Co

OCoc

•4Co

»-*

00co

I—

Co

CDtoCD

ooca6©

-I•4 OO

cacocn CO02

4^OSto

CD

to4“

750

cr

to

totoCn

05

Cn

221

CD

K*

Hto

to

h.

-

h-.

HH*

Ratio

to

00

Co

cnCD

Oi

CnCD

CO

05

CnCa

•4

oo

00CD

to

4-

4*-

OrOr

Cn

cn

Cn

to

Army

CO

pi

cn

05

Cn

Cn

CnOO

ca

4.

OO

4^

CD

-4

-4

05CD

Cn

-I

Strength

o|-

CO

•4

Cn

Co

tO

05

05

to

vo

to

00

Or

05

Z2.

OO

oo

CD

Ratio

to

CO

CnCD

CD

CD

go

■4 CD

to

Cn

-1 05

to

CD

CD

05

00

Army
COMPOSITION OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 11

of general officers), hy months, 30 June 1939-30 June 194.6

numerals; The Adjutant General’s data in italics]

1,132

998

1,154

1.052

1,228

1,093

1,324

1,181

1,448

1,301

1,565

1,453

1,032

983

803

-I00

483

CO Cn

too« to

235

187

227

224

Strength

Sanitary

Corps

Male Medical Department officers—Con.

.229

.200

.213

.190

.210

190

.215

.190

.222

.200

.232

.220

.233

to4^-1

.223

toCO00

.206

-*1

Oicn

COto

to 4^

0. 030

128

138

.132

Ratio

to

Army Strength

Pharmacy Corps

Ratio

to

Army

5,057

4, 931

5, 860

5.694

7,500

7,188

8,565

8,289

9,220

9,278

10, 255

10, 036

4,457

3, 646

3,081

2,642

2,186

00CO

1,812

1,745

--

1,492

1,484

64

66

1,108

1,343

1,470

Strength

Medical Ad- ministrative Corps

PSPSco

to

00

CO

occn

00

CO

05CO

00

00

00

to

CO

to

05

Cn

**•

Ratio

to

Army

--.CnOCOCnOSCnCn

>*050iOO‘^MOoM.J^MOoto-fexlO'^0 fc

OC

**■

CO

JOMtoOOCeCnN^isWtOrf‘N^SMtOi-| ..|

p5MpoH

jf*

ri

c«

to

to

Strength

Total

Female Medical Department officers

-fe«*

Cn

Oi

Oi

Oi

"fe"

Oi

4-*-

-t*-

4-

CO

CO

CO

««

to

Oi

05

Oo

4^

Ratio

to

Army

t&lOifitOtStOiQtO

jh-*)—*K*|—

t—

Hcn

to

v|

is

O)

Oi

O'

03

Oi

CC

Oo

h4s-

•—

OotO-tto

o,

a:

'1

o.

'1

-tv

to

oc

CO

4->

CO

£■

*“1

Co

CO

-—

CO

tO

U.

Strength

Army

Nurses

3.56

3. 52

3. 72

4.14

4. 17

4.18

4.87

3.96

5.02

3.99

5.35

4.07

5.48

3.83

5.64

4.08

5.61

4.06

5.57

3.94

5. 33

4-03

5. 07

3. 75

4.79

3.66

4.43

3.59

4.18

3.56

4.04

3.70

4.01

3.84

3.94

3.90

3. 97

4.06

Ratio

to

Army

C»l

Oi

■t'

--4

-fc>-

4s»

to

Oo

00

Strength

Medical

Department

Dietitians

0.067

.070

.085

.080

Ratio

to

Army

216

209

313

284

Strength

Physical

Therapists

0.033

.030

.046

.040

Ratio

to

Army

C9COt6COC6COtetOtetOt©lOt®lO

cc

•—

$0

CO

i®

to

c«

*•!

50

Oi

Ce

CO

4n

rfk

Co

Oo

00

CJi

rfk

<35

Cn

4s

JSJ

00

CC

(D

Oo

00

CO

CO

CO

oioicecooioiso

05

C5

05

"ri

S^liet0

35050*0

4s^S*^4!s^

''-?OCCCJiOit©tOCocOC«COC5*4K.H.K.H*

tO

CO

**■

«C

Strength

Enlisted men Medical Department

49.

55.9

67.3

65.7

64.0

64.0

66.0

66.1

68.0

68.3

71.1

71.3

69.3

69.

69.8

69.9

68.2

68.3

68.7

68.7

71.1

71.1

71.3

71.4

73.5

73.6

74.1

74.2

74.0

74.0

71.6

72.8

72.9

73.0

72.5

72.5

74.3

74-4

Ratio

to

Army
PERSONNEL 12

Table 1.—Strength of Medical Department, by components (exclusive

[Office of The Surgeon General’s data in Arabic

U1 a> S'

February

January. .. ..

to4k to

December...

November

October.

September

August ...

July

June

May ...

April.. ...

March

February

January

to4k4k

December. ...

November...

October

September

August

July

o>

194S—Con.

May

End of month

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

-k|

kj

kj

_kJ

kl

kl

k|

k|

kJ

kj

05

05

U1

rttoCD

CnbO

CO

00

4kCO

CO

CO

00 00

klcnkj

05CnCC

Cn 05

4k00to

4k

CCCCCC

tok|CC

to 4k

to05

CO CC

00cn00

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CObOCO

COCO

CO 05

bOCO

Cn Cn

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0005 00

4kCO05

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05

Cn k|

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05 05

4k 4k

kl 4k

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to

cnco

toto to

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k-. to

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to kb

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to

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to b©to

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b© kb

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b© ?©to

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to

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4kkb to

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ft

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Oo4k

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9°to

00

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00 CC

Oo to

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Cn

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00

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Oooo 0000

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Ratio

to

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CD

4k

4k

b©

to

b©

bO

Oo

00

to

to

4k

4k

b©

tO

to

05

to

to

CC

b©

to

b©

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to

05

k4

CO

to

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to

CD

to

to

cn

4k

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CCbO

b©to

>cco

b©Oo

bO

b©

to

b©

bO4k

b©

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b©to

to

to

CO

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00

-kb

to

05

to

CC

to

toto

kj

to

Cn

to

toto

CO_CD

to4k

COCC

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CO

Strength

to

COkl

oo9°to

•£4k

bO

ootob©

00 4k

to to

-kJ CO

4k

CnOSbo

b© Oo

tO05CO

to

4k

to

toooto

-kj

4k

4k CO

tototo

to to

05 cn

to

CDCO4k

4ktob©

00'COCO

to

05CC

to

4k •o

to

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tokb to

kl CC

toto

to

CO•to

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4k

to

05

to

05

to

to

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

to

Cn

to

cn

Cn

4k

4k

■S

4k

4k

4k

4k

4k

CC

to

CC

to

CC

Ratio

to

Army

b©

CO

ito

CO

kb

kl

4k

4k

to

to

to

to

k*

b©

to

b©

to

to

Oo

to

CO

to

kJ

to

Cn

b©

to

to

CD

to

4k

CC

Oo4k

004k

Oo

004*

ooto

00

Oob©

00bo

00

00

to

*kiCO

to

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Oo

00

■^bOo

kl.00

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pc

*k|■kj

kbkb

k-I Jkl

ki Jk*

kjk|

to

kjCn

kb to

kjCC

kb

klCC

to

k|

kbto

toto

kj

toto

0500

toto

05 4k

toto

05to

Strength

Oo

05

4k Oo

4k 00

Oo kb

kj00 kj

to 00 11

Oo

CC00

Ooto

00

to

05

to b©

CO bo

to

to toOo

CC to00

05 4k --

b©b©to

to 05

to

0505CC

b©Ooto

05ooCC

to

CC4k

kb

tob©to

Cn kj

to kb

Cn

tooo to

toCnk|

b© b©

4-

toto to

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to

to

to

to

CO

to

CO

to

CO

to

CD

to

CC

to

CO

to

to

to

to

CO

to

CO

to

CO

to

CO

to

CO

to

CO

to

CO

Oo

CO

Ratio

to

Army

p,CD CD

4k

4k

to

4k4k

4k

b©

tO

to

Oo

kl

Oo

00

Oo

00

Oo

00

to

CO

to

CO

to

to

Oo

oo

CO

00

kb

00

to

00

05

to

to

kb

to

4kkb

4~05

to

4-*- 05

4k to

4k05

4k to

05

4k to

4k Cn

4k 4k

4k

4k4k.

4k4k

4kto

4k

4kto

4kOO

4kto

4kCC

4kto

4kCC

4kto

4kCC

4kto

4kCC 4k

4k

to

4k

toto

toto

4k

toto

CCCO

toto

CCCO

toOo

CCCO

toto

CCkl

CCkl

Strength

CD

b©

CO4k

to Co

CO

4k

ki4k -I

4kkb

kl4k kj

00OoOo

00 00

to

Cnkj

b©to

726

tototo

COCOCn

toOokb

CO00

to

CO

toSjto

CCCn05

to

Cn CC

to to

CO05

Oo to 00 CD

Oo kb

CC to oo kbb©to

CC

tokbkb

05

Oo to

cO

to4kOo

kjCCCn

Obtoto

4k

kbocto

ooCO

to

009

to

Cn

to

to

to

to

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

cn

to

Cn

to

pt

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

Cn

to

cn

to

Cn

Ratio

to

Oo

kj

oob©

00bO

00

kb

k|k|

toto

0505

Cn

tob©

Cn bO

to

4k kj

Cn

tob©

toto

Cnbo

05

to4k

05 uto4k

Cn4k

toto

CC00

toto

4kto

4kto

4k05

kb

4kCD

4kto

Cn

ts

4k00

b©to

CC

toto

CCCO

Army

CD

4k

4k

to

4*-

to

Cn

to

cn

to

Cn

4k

4k

to

Cn

4k

4k

4k

4k

4k

4k

4k

4k

4k

4k

4k

4k

to

4k

to

CC

to

CC

b©

CC

b©

to

to

to

Strength

P*

toto

Cn

b© to

00■o to

to

b©tob©

toCObO

4kOo

00

Oo

00

b©

bO

to tob©

COCnbO

Oo toOo

00 00

to ■^b

CO -k|

-4Oob©

782

Oo Oo

00 00

k?4kOo

4k

toto

COCC

tokb4k

CC 14 to

to to

to4k

b© to

CO

to to

kjCO

Oo to

to

b© kbto

kj CO

toto to

4k 00

toto

Cnto4k

s?

CD

hu

h*

Hu.

H*

h*

HHhtthRatio

to

Oo

00bO

OoOo

00to

OoOo

0000

Ooto

00CO

Oo

00

Oo4koo

Ookb

00kl

Ooto

0005

Ooto

00

Oo to

00 CO

Oo Oo

to

CO

to

CD CC

toOo

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CO

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0005

to

ooto

kbb©

kjCO

toto

kjto

0500

Army

bO

bO

b©

bO

b©

bO

b©

to

b©

bO

b©

to

b©

tO

hu

H-*

b©

to

b©

to

to

hHK*

1-

toto to

Cn

to

to

Oo

•-o 00

to 4k

4k

to4k

CO■O4k

to b©

to

tob©4k

bO4k

00

CC

toto

CC CC

to b©

bO

toOo4k

CO

b©

tO

totokb

CO kj

toto4k

to ■©to

CC

Oo4kOo

CO0500

Ooto4k

CO

to

CO

to

oo oo kbto

CO

to

00 to

Strength

0? *d

b©toto

.252

b©

.253

b© toto

.253

b©

.249

b© to

.246

b©

.248

b©toto

.250

b©

.257

b©toto

.255

b©toto

.252

b© to

.256

b© to

.256

b©

.262

b©

.259

b©

.268

.269

b© to

.268

b© to

.262

toto

to

b© to

.260

b© to

.264

b©toto

to054k

Ratio

to

Army

CO
COMPOSITION OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 13

of general officers), by months, 30 June 1939-30 June 1946—Continued

numerals; The Adjutant General’s data in italics]

Male Medical Department officers--Con. Female Medical Department officers Enlisted men Medical Sanitary Pharmacy Medical Ad- Army Medical Physical Department Corps Corps ministrative Total Nurses Department Therapists Corps Dietitians

>> >> ■>, >> >. >. >>

fl .2 .2 ■2g ag .2 C3 t- s_ OS i-4

23 QQ QQ CQ SC QQ SS PS

1,661 0.242 10,950 1.59 28,445 4.1 27, 459 4.00 601 0.087 385 0.056 514, 957 75.0 1,562 .330 10,974 1.60 39, 503 4.3 28,647 4.18 00/ .090 3/5 .040 5/4,947 75.

1,755 .250 11,630 1.66 29, 533 4. 28, 423 4.06 707 101 403 .057 525 026 75.0

1,674 .340 11,362 1.62 31,305 4.5 30,3/0 4.33 000 /OO 333 .050 535 026 75.

1,876 .263 58 0.008 12,622 1.77 30, 743 4.3 29, 576 4.14 734 102 433 .060 529, 360 74.2 1,790 .350 19 2.000 /3,4/3 /.74 33,030 4.0 31,506 4.43 739 ,//0 375 .050 539,300 74.3 1,938 .275 58 .008 13,633 1.88 32,195 4.5 30,922 4.28 825 .112 448 .062 531,817 73.7

1,964 .370 28 2.000 13,073 1.81 33,593 4.7 33,377 4.40 785 .//O 473 .000 538,747 73.3

2,054 .282 58 .008 13,966 1.92 33, 777 4.6 32,355 4.44 909 .124 513 .072 516,981 71.0

2,014 .330 34 .0/0 13,537 1.86 34,930 4-S 33, 003 4-62 883 120 430 .000 516,981 7/./

2,110 .288 58 .008 13, 867 1.89 35,591 4.9 34,089 4. 65 966 .132 536 .073 507,611 69.2

2, 141 .390 40 .0/0 13,840 1.89 35,709 4-9 34,276 4.07 937 130 496 .070 507,0// 09.3

2,162 .292 58 .008 14, 477 1.95 37,079 5.0 35, 465 4.79 1,027 .139 537 .073 508, 867 68.7 2,166 .390 43 .0/0 14,195 1.92 30,479 4.9 35,0/3 4.73 909 130 498 .070 508,859 08.7 2,209 .295 58 .008 14,749 1.97 38, 216 5.1 36,607 4.89 1,048 .140 561 .075 511,751 68.4

2,195 .390 65 .0/0 14,731 1.97 37,300 5.0 35,711 4.77 995 130 500 .070 511,735 08.

2,246 .297 58 .008 14,990 1.98 38, 331 5.1 36,672 4.85 1,100 .146 569 .074 515.124 68.2

3,340 .300 53 .0/0 14.990 1.98 38,300 5./ 30,073 4-80 1,069 ./40 559 .070 5/5, 124 08.3

2,266 .296 47 .006 14,967 1.96 39,431 5.2 37, 722 4.93 1,127 .147 582 .076 519, 450 67.9

2,266 .300 47 .0/0 /4,907 1.95 39,399 5.3 37, 714 4.93 1,101 ./40 581 .080 5/9,450 07.9

2, 317 .299 45 .006 14,977 1.93 40,321 5.1 38,538 4.97 1, 167 150 616 .079 520, 677 67.

3, 317 .300 45 .0/0 14,977 1.93 40,311 5.3 38,538 4.97 1,157 150 0/0 .080 530, 077 07./

2,288 .292 58 .007 14,902 1.90 41,021 5.2 39,184 4.99 1,195 .152 642 .082 532, 771 67.9

2,288 .390 58 .0/0 14,902 1.90 41,011 5.3 39, 184 4.99 1,185 ,/50 043 .080 533, 77/ 07.9

2,288 .289 53 .007 15,010 1.90 41,412 5.2 39, 542 5.00 1,228 .155 642 .081 541,839 68.5

2,288 .390 S3 .0/0 15,010 1.90 41,381 5.3 39,543 5.00 1,197 150 043 .080 541,839 08.5

2,441 .305 55 .007 14,924 1.87 41,909 5.2 40, 018 5.01 1,248 .156 643 .080 553, 095 69.2

2,441 .300 55 .0/0 14,924 1.88 41,871 5.3 40,0/8 5.00 1,210 .150 643 .080 553,095 09.3

2, 515 .312 56 .007 15,060 1.87 42,102 5.2 40, 036 4. 97 1,283 .159 783 .097 558,828 69.4

2,515 .3/0 56 .0/0 15,060 1.87 42,159 5.3 40, /08 4.98 1,268 .160 783 ,/00 558,838 09.4

2,350 .290 57 .007 14, 902 1.84 42, 089 5.2 39,970 4.93 1,312 .162 807 100 567,268 70.0

2,350 .390 67 .0/0 14,902 1.84 42,068 5.3 39,970 4.93 1,291 .160 807 ./00 507,308 70.0

2,364 .292 59 .007 15, 078 1.86 42,494 5.2 40,305 4.97 1,376 .170 813 .100 559,327 69.0

2,364 .390 59 .0/0 15,078 1.86 43,433 5.3 40,305 4.97 1,334 .170 8/3 ,/00 559,337 09.0

2,446 .302 60 .007 15,494 1.91 43,683 5.4 41,354 5.10 1,405 .173 924 .114 562, 796 69.5

2,446 .300 60 .0/0 15,494 1.91 43,075 5-4 41,354 5./0 1,397 .170 924 ,/30 562, 796 09.5

2,394 .295 63 .008 16, 277 2.01 44, 027 5.4 41,604 5.13 1,449 .179 974 .120 555,224 68.5

2,394 .390 OS .0/0 16,277 3. 01 44,0/5 5-4 41,604 5. /S 1,457 .180 974 /30 555,334 08.5

2,386 .296 66 .008 17,071 2.12 44,694 5.6 42,248 5.25 1,456 .181 990 .123 541, 650 67.3

2,386 .300 66 .0/0 17,071 2.12 44,099 5.0 43,348 5.35 1,461 .180 990 ./30 541,650 07.3

2, 505 .310 67 .008 17,958 2.23 45,464 5.6 42,914 5.32 1,470 .182 1,080 .134 537,303 66.6

2,561 .330 67 .0/0 17,620 2.18 45,403 5.0 43,9/4 5.33 1,483 .180 1,071 ISO 537,303 00.0

2,525 .311 65 .008 18,350 2. 26 47,377 5.8 44,802 5.51 1,490 .183 1,085 .133 537, 780 66.1

2,521 .3/0 66 .0/0 17,970 3.3/ 47,339 5.8 44,303 5.5/ 1,466 .180 1,061 130 537, 780 66.2
PERSONNEL 14

Table 1.—Strength of Medical Department, by components (exclusive

[Office of The Surgeon General’s data in Arabic

End of month Total

Army

Strength'

Total

Medical Department

Total

officers

Medical Department Total

ale Medical Department office

Medical Dental

Corps Corps

Veterinary

Corps

Strength Ratio

to

Army Strength Ratio

to

Army Strength Ratio

to

Army Strength Ratio

to

Army Strength Ratio

toArmy Strength Ratio

to

Army

1945—Con.

March 8,157, 386 669,927 82.1 136,483 16.2 84,970 10.4 46,820 5. 74 14, 775 1.81 2,045 0.251

670,151 82.2 136, 707 16.8 85,204 10.6 46,973 5. 76 14,914 1.83 2,034 .250

April .. 8,248, 780 671,967 81.5 139.938 17.0 85,235 10,3 46, 790 5.67 14, 730 1.79 2,040 .247

672,651 81.6 140,622 17.1 85,906 10.4 47,133 5. 71 14,807 1.79 2,046 .250

May 8, 291,336 666, 710 82.2 142,298 17.2 85,430 10.3 46, 750 5.64 14, 705 1.77 2, 050 .247

666,930 80.4 142,598 17.2 85, 736 10.3 46,773 5.64 14,848 1.79 2,056 .250

June 8,266,373 638, 980 80.3 142,616 17.3 85, 585 10.4 46, 600 5.64 14, 770 1.79 2,010 .247

664, 763 80.4 143,481 17.4 86,394 10.5 47,071 6.69 14. 758 1.78 2,059 .250

July 8.186, 444 659,853 80.6 145,342 17.8 86, 700 10.6 47, 990 5.86 14,325 1.75 2, 050 .250

661,019 80.8 146,508 17.9 87.956 10.7 48,837 5.97 14,507 1.77 2,069 .250

August... __

8, 023,304 637, 684 79.5 144,475 18.0 85,645 10.7 46, 980 5. 86 14,170 1.77 2,070 .258

637,641 79.5 144.432 18.0 86, 805 10.8 47. 834 5.96 14.370 1.79 2,116 .260

September 7, 564, 514 593, 644 78.5 138, 655 18.3 82,890 11. 45, 040 5. 94 13, 760 1.82 2, 040 .270

598, 793 79.2 143,794 19.0 86, 684 11.5 48,256 6.38 14,004 1.85 2,107 .280

October 6, 487, 053 503. 516 77.6 115,390 17.8 71, 595 11.0 37.880 5. 84 12,275 1.89 1,850 .235

527,658 81.3 139, 532 21.6 84,871 13.1 48,093 7.41 13,637 2.10 2,008 .310

November-- 5,333, 978 408,190 76.5 96, 820 18.2 61,465 11.5 32, 010 6. 00 10,845 2.03 1,660 .311

443,322 83.1 131,952 24.7 80.294 15.1 46,620 8.56 13,115 2.46 1,987 .370

December 4,228, 936 323, 085 76.4 81.795 19.3 52, 010 12.3 27, 060 6.40 9,620 2. 27 1,450 .343

330,678 78.2 116,388 27.5 73,397 17.4 41.339 9.78 12,662 2.99 1,929 .460 1946

January 3,469, 272 226, 735 65.4 66, 700 19.2 41,290 11.9 21,610 6.23 7,390 2.13 1,260 .363

261,291 75.3 101,256 29.2 64,890 18.7 36,249 10.45 11,466 3.31 1,761 .510

February-. 2, 785, 748 173,218 62.2 55,810 20.0 33, 595 12.1 17, 965 6.45 5, 800 2.08 1,050 377

199,118 71.7 82,410 29.6 53, 488 19.2 29,459 10. 57 9,867 3.54 1,574 .670

March 2,430, 779 146,807 60.4 47, 713 19.6 28, 798 11.8 16.291 6. 70 5,011 2.06 878 .361

165,674 68.2 66,589 27.4 43,352 17.8 24,273 9.99 7,888 3.25 1,299 .530

April. 2,167, 931 137,254 63.3 44,443 20.5 28, 217 13.0 16, 610 7. 66 4,880 2.25 863 .393

150,128 69.3 67,317 26.4 37,845 17.6 22,041 10.17 6,707 3.09 1,146 .530 May 2, 008,494 121, 752 60.6 38, 987 19.4 24, 786 12.3 14, 948 7.44 4,010 2.00 766 .381

132,426 65.9 49,661 24.7 32,824 16.3 19,823 9. 87 5,371 2. 67 973 .480 June 1,889, 090 112,303 59.4 34,324 18.2 22, 053 11.7 13,134 6.95 3,421 1.81 733 .388

121,666 64.3 43,587 23.1 28, 738 15.2 17,347 9.18 4,684 2. 48 874 .460

Strength for 1939 is male strength as shown in the Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1939 plus strength of nurses for 1939 as shown in this table. Strengths for June 1940 to November 1941, inclusive, are from Oct. 1945. All other strengths are from “Strength of the Army,” Mar. 1947, except the strength for March 1942 which has been corrected

as explained in footnote of table 31. Includes women doctors. One was on active duty at least as early as November 1942. By December 1943, they

numbered 42. Their peak strength, reached in November 1944, was 76. On 30 June 1946, their number was 15. Per 1,000of total Armystrength.

The Annual Report of the Personnel Service of the Office of The Surgeon General for fiscal year 1941 showsstrengths

for all Medical Department components as of 30 June 1940 which are equal to those stated here except in the case of the

SanitaryCorps, which is credited with 6, and enlistedmen, whose strength is reported as 13,585.

The Annual Report of the Personnel Service of the Office of The Surgeon Generalfor fiscal year 1942 gives the follow- ing strengths as of 30 June 1941: MC, 8,813; DC, 2,111; VC, 512; SnC, 173; MAC, 803; and enlistedmen, 41,120.
COMPOSITION OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 15

of general officers), by months, 30 June 1939-30 June 1946—Continued

numerals: The Adjutant General’s data in italics]

663076'—63

Male MedicalDepartment officers—Con. Female Medical Department officers Enlisted men

Medical Sanitary Department

Corps Pharmacy Corps Medical Ad- ministrative Corps Total Army

Nurses Medical Department

Dietitians

Physical

Therapists

Strength Ratio to

Army Strength Ratio toArmy Strength ■g-<

Q* OQ Ratio toArmy Strength Ratio

toArmy Strength >*

Strength Ratio

toArmy Strength Ratio toArmy

2,525 0.310 61 0.007 18, 744 2.31 51, 513 6.3 48.923 6. 00 1,500 0.184 1,090 0.134 533,444 65.4

2,534 .310 61 .010 18,688 2.29 51,503 6.3 48,923 6.00 1,495 .180 1,085 .130 533,444 65.4

2,560 .310 70 .008 19.045 2.31 54, 703 6.6 52, 023 6.31 1,520 .184 1,160 141 532, 029 64.5

2.600 .320 70 .010 19, 250 2.33 54. 716 6.6 52,023 6.31 1,537 .190 1,156 140 532,029 64-5

2,560 .309 60 .007 19, 385 2.34 56,868 6.9 54,128 6. 53 1,550 .187 1,190 .144 524, 332 63.2

2,559 .310 60 .010 19,439 2.34 56,863 6.9 54,128 6.53 1,549 .190 1,186 .140 524,332 63.2

2, 540 .307 58 .007 19, 577 2.37 57,031 6.9 54,291 6.57 1,555 .188 1,185 .143 521,282 63.1

2,555 .310 58 .010 19,893 2.41 57,087 6.9 54.291 6.57 1,623 .200 1,173 .140 521,282 63.1

2,520 .308 57 .007 19,848 2.42 58, 552 7.2 55, 702 6.80 1,580 .193 1,270 .155 514, 511 62.8

2,544 .310 57 .010 19.942 2.44 55,552 7.2 55, 702 6. 81 1,585 .190 1,265 .150 514, 511 62.9

2,490 .310 68 .008 19,867 2.48 58,830 7.3 55, 950 6. 97 1,580 .197 1,300 .162 493,209 61.5

2,456 .300 68 .010 19,961 2.49 57,627 7.2 54, 779 6.83 1,580 .200 1,268 .160 493,209 61.5

2, 395 .317 61 .008 19, 594 2. 59 55, 765 7.4 52,950 7.00 1,550 .205 1,265 167 454, 989 60.1

2,334 .310 61 .010 19.822 2.62 57,210 7.6 54,291 7.18 1,596 .210 1,323 .170 464,989 60.2

2,025 .312 57 .009 17, 508 2. 70 43, 795 6.8 41, 250 6. 36 1,360 .210 1,185 183 388,126 59.8

2,187 .340 57 .010 18,889 2.91 54,661 8.4 51,851 7.99 1,538 .240 1,272 .200 388,126 59.8

1,685 .316 62 .012 15, 203 2.85 35,355 6.6 33,150 6.21 1,140 .214 1,065 .200 311,370 58.4

1,898 .360 62 .010 17,612 3.30 51,658 9.7 48,946 9.18 1,426 .270 1,286 .240 311,370 58.4 1,325 .313 48 .011 12, 507 2.96 29, 785 7.0 27, 850 6. 59 995 .235 940 .222 214,290 50.7

1,676 .400 48 .010 15,743 3.72 42,991 10.2 40,654 9.61 1,234 .290 1,103 .260 214,290 50.7

1,095 .316 57 .016 9,878 2. 85 25,410 7.3 23, 650 6.82 910 .262 850 .245 160,035 46.1

1,507 .430 57 .020 13,850 3.99 36,366 10.5 34,291 9.88 1,063 .310 1,012 .290 160,035 46.1

915 .328 48 .017 7,817 2.81 22,215 8.0 20,630 7.41 790 .234 795 .285 117,408 42.1

1,266 .450 48 .020 11,274 4.05 28,922 10.4 26,996 9.69 989 .350 937 .340 117,408 42.2

750 .309 44 .018 5,830 2. 40 18,919 7.8 17, 523 7.21 668 275 728 .299 99, 084 40.8

1,078 440 44 .020 8,770 3. 61 23,237 9.6 21,604 8.89 814 .330 819 .340 99,085 40.8

664 .306 47 .022 5, 153 2.38 16,226 7.5 14, 907 6.88 625 .288 694 .320 92,811 42.8

894 .410 47 .020 7,010 3.23 19,472 9.0 18,024 8.32 704 .330 744 .340 92,811 42.8 545 .271 51 .025 4,466 2.22 14,201 7.1 12,956 6.45 609 .303 636 .317 82, 765 41.2

738 .370 61 .020 5,868 2.92 16,837 8.4 15, 499 7.72 655 .330 683 .340 82,765 41.2 521 .276 47 .025 4.197 2. 22 12,271 6.5 11,193 5.92 526 .278 552 .292 77,979 41.3

668 .350 47 .020 5,118 2.71 14,849 7.9 13,617 7.21 598 .320 634 .340 77,979 41.3

Source Basic Medical Department data, 30 June 1939-30 November 1941, from table 12 does not include reservists on active duty on 30 June 1939. Except for enlisted strength on 31 December 1941 and 31 January 1942, which Is reported in “Strength of the Army” (STM 30) for the cor- responding dates, all basic Medical Department data for the period December 1941-June 1946 come from “Time Series on Medical Department Personnel by Corps, 1942-1946,” which were supplied to J. H. McMinn by the Resources Analysis Division, on 24 January 1950. The series insofar as they

cover the period from December 1941 through December 1944 existed as early as September 1945, when they were made available by the Resources Analysis Division for use in statistical review under preparation by the Army Service Forces. (Memorandum, E. Ginzberg, Resources Analysis

Division for Director, Control Division. Office of The Surgeon General, 28 Sept. 1945. subject: ASF Statistical Reference Book.) They incorporated within the material covering the period mentioned,

strength data prepared by the Office of The Adjutant General embracing the following All of 1944 except the Pharmacy Corps in January, the Army Nurse Corps in February and July, Physical

Therapists in February, and Medical Department Dietitians during the entire year, the Medical

Continuedat bottom of next page.
16 PERSONNEL

Both dietitians and physical therapists had worked in Army hospitals in

World War as civilians. In the years between the two World Wars, they

continued to be employed as civilians in the Medical Department, being assigned

in small numbers to all of the general and large station hospitals. In the

early 1920's, training courses were established at Walter Reed General Hospital,

Washington, D.C., and the graduates of these courses filled most of the vacancies

in Army hospitals from 1922 to 1939. In 1938, both dietitians and physical

therapists were brought into the competitive civil service system.

After Pearl Harbor, it became apparent that civil service registers could

not fill the demand for these two categories and that recruitment, administrative control, and professional supervision should rest in the Office of The

Surgeon General. In January 1942, Miss Helen C. Bums, Chief Dietitian

at Walter Reed General Hospital, and Miss Emma E. Vogel, Chief Physical

Therapist there, were assigned to the Surgeon General’s Office on part-time

basis. Eight months later, both were appointed superintendents of their respective groups and part time became full time.

The need for military status for dietitians and physical therapists became

more imperative as they assumed positions of greater responsibility in which

they supervised military personnel. As civilian employees, they could not be

ordered to stations outside the United States, where their services were badly

needed, although they could volunteer for oversea service. Hospital units

designated for oversea service, as well as those in the United States, seldom

had their full quota in either category.

Source—Continued

Department Dietitians, March—May 1943 and enlisted men except for February—April 1942, January 1943, and August—December 1943. All other figures are diverse from those shown in “Strength of the Army” and were computed by use of the following sources For all male officer corps except the Pharmacy Corps Orders issued by The Adjutant General for accessions and separations.

Pharmacy Corps. Report on Active Duty Personnel, Last Week of the Month, Office of The Surgeon General. Army Nurse Corps. “Procurement and Separations Account,” Nursing Branch, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General. Medical Department Dietitians. Dietetics Branch, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General. Physical Therapists. Physical Therapist Branch, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General. It is probable that all the sources other than those pertaining to the Pharmacy Corps were based, despite the absence of specific statement to that effect, on entrances into and departures from the service and were, specifically, orders issued by The Adjutant General for such actions. It is also probable that the strength figures obtained on this basis were prepared by the Resources Analysis Division short time before they were dispatched for use by the Army Service Forces but it is not impossible, in view of the dissatisfaction of the Office of The Surgeon General with strength data submitted by The Adjutant General, that they were computed much earlier in some other unit than the Resources Analysis Division. The time series as compiled for the Army Service Forces extended through July 1945 but repro- duced The Adjutant General’s figures for all dates shown within that year except in the case of the dietitians. By 1950, however, the figures for 1945, including those pertaining to the dietitians had been revised by the Resources Analysis Division, and data going through the entire year 1946 had been added. For the period January 1945 to June 1946, inclusive, The Adjutant General’s strength figures therefore appear only in the following cases: Pharmacy Corps throughout: enlisted men throughout except for slight variation, probably due to clerical error, in March 1946 Army Nurse Corps, January to July 1945, inclusive, and Dietitians, August 1945; in the case of the last, the agreement between The Adjutant General’s and The Surgeon General’s figures may be merely coin- cidental. The revision was made with view to establishing conformity between the data on separations compiled by the Resources Analysis Division (table 67) and the strength figures utilized by the Office of ihe Surgeon General. The figures on separations covered orders for such actions rather than the separations themselves. Orders for accessions also were used in the computing of strengths. Smce considerable time might elapse between the issuance of an order for an accession or separa- tion and the compliance with the order, the use of these orders in determining strength tends, in the early period of the war, to show greater strengths than those reported by The Adjutant General, who compiled figures on the basis of counts of individuals present at the time of the report.
COMPOSITION OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

On 22 December 1942, an act of Congress 21 provided that female dietetic

and physical therapy personnel should be members of the Medical Department

for the duration of the war and months thereafter. Their rank was to be

relative, but they were given the pay (including longevity pay), allowances

for subsistence and rental of quarters, and mileage and other travel allowances

for commissioned officers, without dependents, of the Regular Army in grades

from second lieutenant through captain. 22 Early in January 1943, on recommendation of The Surgeon General, the Secretary of War appointed the directors of these two groups in the relative rank of major, the first appointments

under the new law. It was not until June 1944 that Congress granted full

commissioned rank in the Army of the United States to the three female components of the Medical Department—nurses, dietitians, and physical therapists.23 This action placed them on par with all other commissioned officers,

male and female. It conferred on them certain important rights and privileges

not granted by their previous status. 24 The same law also gave the members

of theArmy Nurse Corps full officer status.

Pharmacy Corps

Unlike the dietitians and physical therapists, pharmacists in the Army

already had military status, most of them being enlisted men. In the late

1930’s, Congress had decreed that only pharmacists should be eligible for the

Medical Administrative Corps of the Regular Army and that the strength

of this component should be limited to 16 members. 25 Since the law did not

provide that the corps should be reduced immediately, the desired strength was

achieved through attrition. Pharmacists, however, wanted not only larger

officer corps but one bearing their name, and their insistence increased following American entrance into the war. 26 But Maj. Gen. James C. Magee (fig. 1),

The Surgeon General, did not favor legislation of permanent character during the emergency and stated that ‘‘no purpose would be served by legislation

affecting minor component at this time.” lie further stated that regulations assured the proper dispensing of drugs and prescriptions and that “the

organization of Pharmacy Corps to discharge this responsibility is not indicated.” To charges that pharmaceutical service in the Army was “deplorable,”

21 56 Stat. 1072.

22 Army Regulations No. 40—25, Apr. 1943, formulated procedures and requirements for appointment to both groups and for personnel administration in them. 23 (1) 58 Stat. 324. (2) Executive Order 9454, 10 July 1944. 24 In 1947, an act of Congress (61 Stat. 41) combined the dietitians, physical therapists, and

occupational therapists (who had never had officer status) into new Regular Army element of the

Medical Department, the Women’s Medical Specialist Corps.

25 (1) See footnote 12, p. 7. (2) 53 Stat. 559. 28 (1) Letter, Hon. J. P. Wolcott, to Secretary of War, 13 Oct. 1942. (2) Letter, H. M. Burlage,

Professor of Pharmacy, University of North Carolina, 17 Oct. 1942. (3) Postal card, Pat O’Malley

(no address given) to General McAfee (SGO), 30 Nov. 1942.
PERSONNEL 18

Figure 1.—Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, USA, The Surgeon

General, June 1939-31 May 1943.

lie replied that if any specific instances warranting such charges were brought

to his attention, he would request an investigation. 27

Despite the Surgeon General’s opposition, Congress passed law, approved by President Roosevelt on 12 July 1943, which established Pharmacy

Corps in the Regular Army to comprise 72 officers in grades from second lieutenant through colonel. Officers in the Regular Army Medical Administrative Corps, pharmacist and nonpharmacist alike (there were 58) were to be

transferred to the new corps and carried there in addition to the 72 authorized. 28

The effect was to abolish the Regular Army Medical Administrative Corps.

Unlike the law giving military status to the dietitians and physical therapists,

this law made no mention of director for the new corps and The Surgeon

General did not name one. The strength authorized for the corps permitted

only few of the pharmacists then in the Army to have commissioned status.

27 (1) Letter, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, to L. E. Foster, General Manager, Chamber of Commerce, Birmingham, Ala., Nov. 1942. (2) Letter, Assistant to The Surgeon General (Brig. Gen.

Larry B. McAfee), to L. E. Foster, General Manager, Chamber of Commerce, Birmingham, Ala., 11 Nov. 1942. (3) Letter, Assistant to The Surgeon General (Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee), to Dr. H. M. Burlage, Professor of Pharmacy, University of North Carolina, Nov. 1942. 28 (1) 57 Stat. 430. (2) Regular Army Strength Book, Military Personnel Division, Office of

The Surgeon General, U.S. Army.
COMPOSITION OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 19

CIVILIAN COMPONENTS

Civilians served in many types of Medical Department installations. In

the Zone of Interior, the majority were employed in hospitals and medical

supply depots but they were also employed in the Office of The Surgeon General, the offices of other command surgeons, in laboratories, and elsewhere.

Oversea activities of civilian personnel, most of them nationals of the countries

in which they served, were similarly widespread, extending even into the combat zones. Among the thousands who were employed in many parts of the

world were to be found men and women of every degree of skill from laborers

and trained artisans to technicians and even to physicians classified as

specialists.

An important group of civilian workers for the Medical Department who

received no Government pay were members of the American National Red

(Toss. The Red Cross, in addition to giving certain types of assistance to the

able-bodied members of the Armed Forces, assigned many of its personnel to

Army hospitals, both in the Zone of Interior and overseas. In the hospitals,

Red Cross workers rendered the patient various kinds of nonmedical service,

such as providing assistance in the adjustment of social, economic, and family

problems that might otherwise retard recovery; obtaining social histories, including medical information, upon the request of medical officers, to be used

as an aid in determining diagnosis, treatment, and disposition; making loans or

grants of money for certain purposes; providing “comfort” items and services

to patients unable to obtain them for themselves; and planning and directingapproved recreation for patients. 29 For these purposes, the Red Cross recruited

both volunteer workers and paid employees, providing salaries for the latter

out of its own funds.

29 Army Regulations No. 850-75, 30 June 1943. It should be noted that neither the Salvation

Army nor the Young Men’s Christian Association, both of which had rendered valuable services ir World War I, was authorized as welfare agency in World War II.

CHAPTER II

Organization and Administration

Throughout World War II, the authority for all Army personnel matters

rested with the Secretary of War and through him with the Chief of Staff.

On these matters, the Chief of Staff was advised by the Assistant Chief of

Staff, G-l (personnel), and acted through The Adjutant General. This procedure applied to all areas, but both organization for personnel administration and the actual operation of the system differed widely between the Zone

of Interior and the oversea theaters. Briefly, as far as medical personnel were

concerned, the oversea surgeons had far greater jurisdiction than did The Surgeon General in the Zone of Interior, particularly after the War Department reorganization in 1942. Following this latter event, The Surgeon General no longer had the authority derived from being the “immediate” adviser to the Chief of Staff on medical matters, whereas the theater and oversea

command surgeons were virtually independent of further control by The Surgeon General or other authorities in the Zone ofInterior.

ZONE OF INTERIOR

Early Organization for Personnel Administration

The Surgeon General’s Office

As the Chief of Staff’s immediate adviser on medical affairs, The Surgeon

General was responsible for the overall administration of medical personnel

affairs, although the Medical Division in the Office of the Chief of the Air

Corps later achieved similar responsibility for medical personnel assigned to

that corps.

According to Army regulations, The Surgeon General had “advisory

supervision over (1) the appointment, classification, and assignment of Medical Department personnel; (2) the procurement, appointment, classification, assignment, promotion, and discharge of members of the Medical Department

sections of the Reserve Corps.” He had, in addition, full control over personnel matters within units under his own command. This is implied in the

provision which gave him “direct supervision over the administration of all establishments for the care, treatment, and transportation of the sick and wounded personnel and animals of the Military Establishment, under the

This meant the supervision he exercised through his power to advise commanders not under

his direct control on the enumerated matters.
PERSONNEL 22

Figure 2.—Brig. Gen. William L. Sheep, MC, prewar chief of

Military PersonnelDivision, Office of The Surgeon General.

immediate direction of the War Department." lie was also charged with preparing, and keeping up to date, plans for the mobilization of Medical Department personnel and material required in war, or in major emergency.

The Military Personnel Division of the Surgeon General’s Office administered large share of these functions through its Commissioned, Reserve,

and Enlisted Subdivisions, the remainder being performed by other branches

of the Office which will be discussed below. The Reserve Subdivision had

jurisdiction over Reserve officers in the Arm and Service Assignment Group,

which was administered by the chiefs of arms and services. Each chief of

technical service placed officers in this group whom he could assign to his

own installations in case of mobilization. In 1939, the group contained only

about percent of the Reserve Corps of the Medical Department. The

remaining officers in these corps were assigned to the Corps Area Assignment

Group, which will be discussed later. The Commissioned Subdivision kept

individual records of all Medical Department officers on active duty. Until

Army Regulations No. 40—5, 15 Jan. 1926.

Army Regulations No. 140-5, 16 June 1936.

‘‘Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1939, pp. 174-175.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 23

Figure 3.—Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) George F. Lull, MC,

first wartime chief of Military Personnel Division, Office of The

Surgeon General.

some time after the United States entered the war, the Enlisted Subdivision

kept similar records of enlisted men. Col. (later Brig, (fen.) 'William L.

Sheep, MC (fig. 2), headed the Military Personnel Division, until June 1940,

when Col. (later Maj, Gen.) George F. Lull, MC (fig. 3), became its chief.

The Nursing Division was responsible for personnel administration affecting Army nurses, the Dental and Veterinary Divisions each had certain

personnel functions relating to those particular corps, while the Professional

Service Division (fig, 4) furnished advice to the chief of personnel in the

selection of medical officers to fill key professional assignments.

The Office Management Subdivision of the Administrative Division (fig.

5) handled personnel matters of all civilians employed in the Office of The

Surgeon General. Personnel employed in field installations were dealt with

by the Civilian Personnel (Field) Subdivision of the Finance and Supply

Division (fig. 6). The personnel duties of this subdivision were defined as

the “supervision and management of the employment of civilians for Field

Service including their appointment, promotion, demotion, transfer,

Memorandum, Director. Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Colonel

Love, Historical Division, Surgeon General’s Office, 14 Mar. 1944.

Office Order No. 1, Office of The Surgeon General, L'.S. Army, Jan. 1939.
PERSONNEL 24

Figure 4.—Brig. Gen. Charles C. Hillman, MC, wartime chief

of the Professional Service Division, Office of The Surgeon

General.

separation, classification, and retirement"; and the preparation of statistical

reports concerning these functions and of estimates of appropriations required. The subdivision allotted funds to stations to pay civilians employed

there. The organization for personnel administration in the Surgeon General's Office is shown in chart 1.

Corps areas

The medical personnel functions of the corps area commander were

exercised by the corps area surgeon. The latter reported on, or reviewed reports

on, the efficiency of Medical Department officers in the corps area for the action

of the commander. The corps area surgeon also was responsible for maintaining his allotted quota of Medical Department enlisted men by encouraging

recruitment. lie could recommend the transfer of members of the Medical

Department from station to station within the corps area and also the transfer

of enlisted men within the area into or out of the Medical Department. He

See footnote 6, p. 23.

(1) See footnote 2, p. 22. (2) Army Regulations No. 615-200, 24 Nov. 1939.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 25

Figure 5.—Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, MC, Chief, Administrative Division, Office of The Surgeon General, when the

United States entered the war.

could make permanent appointments to the grades of sergeant and corporal in

the Medical Department, appointments of this kind in the higher grades—staff

sergeant, technical and first sergeants, and master sergeant—being reserved for

The Surgeon General. Like The Surgeon General, he could make temporary

appointments to all enlisted grades. lie distributed to the various stations

within his jurisdiction the numbers and classes of enlisted specialist ratings

allocated to the corps area by The Surgeon General. lie could recommend enlisted men to The Surgeon General for ratings in the three higher classes and

could himself give the lower ratings on the recommendation of the senior Medical Department officer concerned. 10

Medical Department Reserve officers in the Corps Area Assignment Group

fell under the jurisdiction of the corps area commander who, acting on the

advice of his surgeon, placed such officers on active duty and made recoinArmy Regulations No. 615—15, 25 May 1937. 10 Army Regulations No. 615-20, 30 Nov. 1923.
PERSONNEL 26

Figure G.—Col. Francis C. Tyng, MC, Chief, Finance and Supply

Division, Office of The Surgeon General.

mendations for their assignment. This assignment group had strength on 30

June 1939 of nearly 23,000, about 98 percent of theReserve Corps of the Medical

Department. Of these, almost 15,000 belonged to the Medical and 5,000 to the

Dental Corps.11

Air Corps

In the Air Corps, the Personnel Subsection of the Medical Division (so

designated on April 1939) administered Medical Department personnel

affairs. 12 Prior to the creation of the Army Air Forces (June 1941), the Air

Corps seems to have exercised much less control over Medical Department

personnel assigned to it than it wielded later. The Surgeon General of the

Army procured personnel, assigned them to the Air Corps, and acted on recommendations for promotions. Once the Air Corps received personnel from The

Surgeon General, it apparently had freedom to assign individuals as it saw fit.

11 See footnote 4, p. 22. 12Memorandum, Chief, Medical Division, Office of the Chief of Air Corps, for The Surgeon

General, 25 July 1939, with enclosure thereto.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 27

Chart 1.—Organization of the Surgeon OeneraVs Office for personnel administration,

January 1939

THE SURGEON GENERAL

PROFESSIONAL

SERVICE DIVISION DENTAL

DIVISION VETERINARYDIVISION

NURSING

DIVISION PLANNING AND

TRAINING DIVISION

FINANCE

AND SUPPLY

DIVISION

LIBRARY

DIVISION STATISTICAL

DIVISION MILITARY PERSONNEL

DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE

DIVISION

offi”e”

MANAGEMENT

SUBDIVISION

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL (FIELD)

SUBDIVISION

COMMISSIONED SUBDIVISION

ENLISTED

SUBDIVISION

RESERVE

SUBDIVISION

ELEMENTS WHOLLY CONCERNEDWITH PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

ELEMENTS PARTLY CONCERNED WITH PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

ELEMENTS NOT CONCERNED WITH PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

In addition to the aforementioned offices, personnel sections and offices

existed in hospitals, tactical organizations, and other units and installations

of the Medical Department.

Changes in Organization, 1942

At the time of the reorganization of the War Department in March 1942,

the Office of The Surgeon General also underwent reorganization. At that

time, the Military Personnel Division was redesignated as the Personnel Service; Colonel Lull, who became its first chief, was promoted to the rank of

brigadier general in March 1943. The former subdivisions (Commissioned,

Enlisted, and Reserve) were renamed divisions. The Commissioned Division

had three branches: Assignment, Classification, and Promotion; the Enlisted

Division, two—Classification and Promotion. For some months, the Civilian

Personnel Division remained separate from the Personnel Service, being placed

under the Administrative Service. In August 1942, however, the administration of military and civilian personnel was united under the Personnel Service

consisting of Military Personnel Division and Civilian Personnel Division.

The Military Personnel Division, as it was established in August 1942, had

three branches: Commissioned, Nursing, and Enlisted. The Reserve Division

had been dropped; Reserve activities had all but ceased, as almost all qualified
28 PERSONNEL

Reserve officers (except those in affiliated units) were already on active duty.

The Nursing Branch, according to the organization manual, “accomplishes the

appointment of all Army nurses and recommends their assignments, transfers,

and other changes in status,” nominally superseding the Nursing Personnel

Division of the Nursing Service which had had similar duties and which were

now discontinued. Actually, however, the Nursing Service (or Division, as it

was now called) retained most of its personnel functions even though its new

Selection and Standards Branch was mentioned only as being responsible in

that held for evaluating nurses’ educational and professional qualifications. 13

The announced functions of the Veterinary Division more obviously overlapped those of the Military Personnel Division, for the Miscellaneous Branch

of the former (in the words of the same organization manual) “processes applications, makes recommendations as to appointments and assignments of veterinary personnel.” The other professional divisions of the Surgeon General’s

Office—Medical Practice, Preventive Medicine (fig. 7), and Dental—likewise

Chakt 2.—Organization of the Surgeon General’s Office for personnel administration,

August 191,2

THE SURGEON GENERAL

CONTROL

DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE

SERVICES

PERSONNEL

SERVICE

OPERATIONS

SERVICE

SUPPLY

SERVICE

MILITARY PERSONNEL

DIVISION

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

DIVISION

PLANS

DIVISION

EMPLOYMENT

BRANCH

MOBILIZATION BRANCH

COMMISSIONED

PERSONNEL BRANCH

CLASSIFICATION

WAGE ADMINISTRATION BRANCH

NURSING

BRANCH

ORGANIZATION BRANCH

ENLISTED

BRANCH

TRAINING

BRANCH

EMPLOYEE

SERVICE BRANCH

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES

MEDICAL PRACTICE

DIVISION

Preventive medicine] division

DENTAL

DIVISION

VETERINARY

DIVISION

NURSING

DIVISION

ELEMENTS WHOLLY CONCERNED WITH PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION;

ELEMENTS PARTLY CONCERNED WITH PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

ELEMENTS NOT CONCERNED WITH PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

SELECTION

STANDARDS

BRANCH

13 (1) Blanchfleld, Florence A., and Standlee, Mary W. The Army Nurse Corps in World War II. [Official record.] (2) Services of Supply Organization Manual, 30 Sept. 1942.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 29

Figure 7.—Brig. Gen. James S. Simmons, MC, Chief, Preventive

Medicine Division, Office of The Surgeon General.

performed more or less extensive personnel work even though this aspect was

not always mentioned in the official manual (chart 2).

The Civilian Personnel Division had four branches: Employment, Classification and Wage Administration, Training, and Employee Service. Since

the reorganization of March 1942, it had been concerned not only with civilian

employees of the Medical Department outside the Surgeon General’s Office

but with those in the Office as well, the latter function being taken over from

the Office Management Subdivision of the former Administrative Division.

The names of the branches reflected other new duties. At the direction of

Services of Supply headquarters, the Civilian Personnel Division assumed

training and employee-relations functions. The work of placement and classification was greatly expanded, and the Division laid more stress on the effective

utilization of personnel with view to reducing the number of employees. 14

Until physical therapists and dietitians were given military status, their personnel administration was handled by the Civilian Personnel Division. Subsections were later established for them in the Procurement Section of the

Commissioned Branch of the Military Personnel Division.

Annual Report, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1943.
30 PERSONNEL

Figure 8.—Col. James R. Hudnall, MC, Chief, Personnel Service

Office of The Surgeon General, 1943-44.

Further Reorganizations, 1943—45

Iii May 1943, General Lull, appointed Deputy Surgeon General, was

succeeded by Col. James R, Hudnall, MC, as cliief of the Personnel Service

(fig. 8). Colonel Hudnall remained in that position until October 1944, after

which Col. Durward G. Hall, MC (fig. 9), became acting chief and then

chief, serving in that capacity until April 1946,

During the administrations of both Colonel Hudnall and Colonel Hall,

steps were taken to revise personnel resources for planning purposes and to

centralize in the Surgeon General’s Office greater control over medical personnel. Consequently, several groups were appointed to study the problems and

make recommendations. One such group was the so-called Kenner Board,

whose chairman was Brig. Gen, (later Maj. Gen.) Albert W. Kenner, MC

(fig. 10). Another, less formally constituted, consisted of the personnel directors of Standard Oil of New Jersey, Atlantic Refining Corporation, and E. I.

Dupont de Nemours, who contributed weeks of their time to review the

personnel policies of the Surgeon General’s Office. 15

15 (1) Report, Kenner Board, 28 Oct. 1943. (2) Statement of Durward G. Hall, M.D., to the

editor, 27 May 1961.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMIN ST RAT )N 31

Figure 9.—Col. Durward G. Hall, MC, Chief, Personnel Service.

Office of The Surgeon General, 1944-46.

Personnel planning

Revision of The Surgeon General's organization for personnel administration, like other organizational changes in his Office at this time, was largely

inspired by criticism from Army Service Forces headquarters directed at the

procedures which Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk (fig. 11), installed as The Surgeon General on June 1943, inherited from his predecessor. 16 One of the

critics was the newly established Control Division of Headquarters, Army Service Forces. In September 1943, thatoffice suggested survey of “the entire field

of ZI hospitalization, to study possible savings in cost of operation, and in

personnel, and as to the latter particularly in the scarce category of doctors and

nurses.” 17 As this proposal indicates, close relationship existed between personnel administration and the hospital system, changes in the latter being

largely influenced by the effort to save personnel without lowering the standards

of medical care—a saving which became particularly necessary during the later

16 Medical Department, United States Army. Organization and Administration in World

War II. Washington TJ.S. Government Printing Office, 1963. pp. 182-185, 202-214. 17 Memorandum, Control Division, Office of The Surgeon General, (Col. Tracy S. Voorhees), for

Col. A. H. Schwichtenberg, Chief, Liaison Branch, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General,

30 Sept. 1943.
32 PERSONNEL

Figure 10/—Brig. Gen. Albert W. Kenner, MC, being decorated by

Gen. George C. Marshall.

war years when personnel resources were more strictly limited than formerly.

Representatives of the Surgeon General’s Office, the War Department Manpower Board, and the Army Service Forces, after making the proposed survey, concluded that “there is reason to believe that the present personnel system

in TSGO needs revamping to insure that essential data requisite for staff planning are available in Washington and that proper guidance based upon

such planning be given the service command surgeons. The Control Division,

Headquarters, ASF, may be in position to lend assistance in this matter.” 18

Some remodeling of The Surgeon General’s organization for the purpose

of obtaining fuller data as an essential of personnel planning had already

begun. On October 1943, Personnel Planning and Placement Branch, to

which was later added the former Records Brandi, was formed in the Military

Personnel Division. The new unit (later called the Records and Statistics

Branch) kept individual records of all Medical Corps officers in the United

18 Memorandum for Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General (through Director,

Control Division, ASF), 30 Nov. 1943, subject Survey of General Hospitals.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 33

Figure 11.—Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, USA, The Surgeon

General, June 1043-31 May 1947.

States according to specialty, together with the requirements in these categories. It also developed statistics on medical officer oversea strength. 19 The

work of the branch proved very useful. For instance, it enabled The Surgeon

General to demonstrate to Army Service Forces headquarters and to the War

Department General Staff in the fall of 1948 that the Army Air Forces had

larger share of doctors, considering its workload, than the Army Service

Forces had; as result, several hundred Army Air Forces Medical Corps

officers were transferred to the Army Service Forces. 20

Another fruitful result of the studies made in this branch was The Surgeon General’s ability to demonstrate that the machine records submitted by

the theaters to The Adjutant General were inaccurate. It w~as these records

that formed the basis of the figures published by The Adjutant General in “Strength of the Army.” Whatever the reasons for such inaccuracy, The

Surgeon General was able to point out that the names of more than 1,100

19 (1) Memorandum, Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for Executive

Officer (attention: Historical Division, SGO), 15 June 1945, subject: Additional Material for Annual

Report, Fiscal Year 1945. (2) Semiannual Report, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General,

U.S. Army, July-31 Dec. 1944. 20Annual Reports, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army,

1944, 1945.
34 PERSONNEL

Figure 12.—-Col. Arthur B. Welsh, MC, wartime Deputy Chief,

Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General.

Medical Corps officers were erroneously included in machine-records rosters

while 2,000 others not so listed were actually on duty. In compiling its own

figures, the Records and Statistics Branch relied heavily on rosters of Medical

Department personnel sent to it by all types of units. The branch also obtained

worldwide head counts of officers. Once it was acknowledged that discrepancies existed between TheAdjutant General’s and The Surgeon General’s

figures, representatives of their offices were able to set about reducing them

and by Y-E Day had brought the difference down to only about 100.21

While personnel administration became steadily more efficient, the manpower requirements of the combat theaters more than kept pace. In January

1944, The Surgeon General, at the direction of the Commanding General,

Army Service Forces, appointed board of officers, two from Headquarters,

21 (1) Annual Report, Personnel Planning and Placement Branch, Military Personnel Division,

Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1944. (2) Semiannual Report, Records and Statistics

Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, July-31 Dec. 1944. (3) Quarterly Report, Records and Statistics Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Jan.-31 Mar. 1945.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 35

Figure 13.—Eli Ginzberg, Ph. D., Resources Analysis Division,

Office of The Surgeon General.

Army Service Forces, and one from his own Personnel Division, to seek further

improvements. The board recommended greater emphasis on overall, longterm planning and the transfer of this function to the Operations Service,

although the Personnel Planning and Placement Branch of the Personnel Service could continue to supply the necessary data on availability of personnel. In

the Operations Service, the stalling of oversea units was the direct responsibility of Col. Arthur B. Welsh, MC (fig. 12), Deputy Chief for Plans and

Operations, while the continuous study of personnel resources for Zone of

interior hospitals was assigned to Eli Ginzberg, Ph. D. (fig. 13), recently

obtained from the Army Service Forces to head the Facilities Utilization

Branch under the Hospital Division. These two functions were merged later

in the year, together with responsibility for personnel planning on mass

rather than an individual basis, in new Pesources Analysis Division, of

which Ginzberg became the director. The unit received added status when

Ginzberg was also named special assistant to Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.)
36 PERSONNEL

Figure 14.—Maj. Gen. Raymond W. Bliss, MC, wartime Deputy

Surgeon General, Office of The Surgeon General.

Raymond W. B1 iss, MC (fig. 1-f), who served in the dual capacity of Chief,

Operations Service, and Assistant Surgeon General. 22

Meanwhile, demobilization and redeployment became an additional problem

to the personnel planners of the Medical Department. The first office to be

charged with planning for the reduction of operations as hostilities ceased was

the Plans Coordination Branch, established within the Plans Division of the

Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, in June 1943. The

branch was renamed the Demobilization Branch and transferred to the Special Planning Division of the same service in February 1944. Its functions

concerned not only planning for reduction in personnel, but in facilities and supplies, and it also worked on medical procedures to be used in demobilizing

nonmedical personnel. Since demobilization affected almost every element of

the Surgeon General’s Office, the Resources Analysis Division was given the

22 (1) Memorandum, Col. Charles D. Daniels, Lt. Col. Gerald H. Teasley, and Lt. Col. Hamilton

Robinson, for The Surgeon General, 18 Feb. 1944, subject: Survey of the Handling of Medical Personnel

in the Office of The Surgeon General. (2) Letter. Eli Ginzberg, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC,

Director, Historical Unit, II.S. Army Medical Service, 25 Jan. 1956. (8) Interview, Eli Ginzberg and

Isaac Cogan with Col. .1. B. Coates, Jr.. Donald O. Wagner, and Maj. I. II. Ahlfeld, 29 Feb. 1956 (hereafter referred to as Ginzberg Interview), pp. 15-17 and 29. (4) Office Order No. 175, Office of

The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 25 Aug. 1944. (5) Office Order No. 208, Office of The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army, 23 Oct. 1944.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 37

further responsibility of coordinating all demobilization and redeployment

planning and all matters pertaining to civil affairs.23

Only days before the defeat of Germany, the Resources Analysis Division received the responsibility for unified personnel planning for redeployment and allied planning problems. The division could call upon any other

elements of the Surgeon General's Office, including the Demobilization

Branch, for aid in these matters.24 Dr. Ginzberg later stated that while The

Surgeon General’s previous planning for reduction of operations had probably been well coordinated with Army Service Forces headquarters and was

satisfactory in evolving general principles, no adequate ‘‘logistical plan” for

redeploying and reducing personnel had been worked out—a plan, namely,

“for coping with the tremendous difficulty of which doctors and in what numbers you would be able to let out at what rate from which places.” 25 The

assembly of detailed facts concerning the distribution and other aspects (age,

efficiency, length of service, and so forth) of medical personnel, the estimating

of future personnel needs as medical operations declined and shifted geographically or in relation to the type of patient care required, and the periodic

setting and resetting of criteria for discharge in the light of these facts and

estimates became the function primarily of the Resources Analysis Division.

Action of this sort was of course closely related to the division’s work in planning the reduction of hospital facilities. 26 The organization of the Surgeon

General's Office for personnel administration as it stood in the middle and

latter part of the war is shown in charts and 4.

The Personnel Control Branch

Besides the major changes in office organization which affected planning

on broad scale, another development, much more limited in scope, was taking

place. This w’as the establishment of means of controlling the allotment

and distribution of personnel within The Surgeon General’s installations

to conform with directives from higher authority. As early as September

1942, General Magee, then The Surgeon General, had set up board of officers

for that purpose. General Kirk continued the board, with various changes of

name and composition, and created the Personnel Control Branch in the Personnel Service (pursuant to an Army Service Forces directive of 30 July 1943)

to supplement or assist its work. 27

23 Annual Report, Plans Coordination Branch, Plans Division, Operations Service, Office of The

Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1944. 24 Office Order No. 88. Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Array, 28 Apr. 1945.

25 Ginzberg Interview, pp. 33-36. 26 For this phase of the division’s work see Smith, Clarence McKittrick The Medical Department:

Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior. United States Army in World War II. The

Technical Services. Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956. 27 (1) Office Orders No. 515. Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Dec. 1942; No. 109,

Mar. 1943 No. 1050, 24 Mar. 1943 No. 24, 28 Jan. 1944 No. 206, 24 Aug. 1945 and No. 344,

Dec. 1945. (2) Report, Personnel Control Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, 28 Jan. 1945. (3) Memorandum, Director, Control Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

for Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, 15 Nov. 1945, subject: Personnel Control Unit.
38 PERSONNEL

Chart 3.—Organization of the Surgeon General's Office for personnel administration

February 1944

THE SURGEON GENERAL

CONTROL DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICESOPERATIONS

SERVICE

SUPPLY

SERVICE

PERSONNEL

SERVICE

MILITARY PERSONNEL

DIVISION

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

DIVISION

DEPUTY CHIEF

FOR HOSPITAL DOMESTIC

OPERATIONS

DEPUTY CHIEF

FOR PLANS OPERATIONS

PROCUREMENT

BRANCH ENLISTEDBRANCH

RECRUITMENT

PLACEMENT

BRANCH MOBILIZATION

AND OVERSEAS

OPERATIONS

DIVISION

HOSPITAL

DIVISION SPECIAL

PLANNING

ARMY NURSE DIVISION

BRANCH CLASSIFICATION BRANCH

CLASS!F1CATION WAGE

ADJUSTMENT BRANCH

FACILITIES

UTILIZATION

BRANCH TROOP UNITS

BRANCH

DEMOBILIZATION!

HOSPITAL BRANCH

DIETITIANS

BRANCH

OPERATIONS

BRANCH TRAINING

BRANCH

PROFESSIONAL

SERVICE PHYSICAL

THERAPY AIDE

BRANCH

RECORDS

BRANCH EMPLOYEE

RELATIONS

BRANCH MEDICAL

DIVISION

SURGERY

DIVISION

RECONDITIONING DIVISION PERSONNEL

PLANNING

BRANCH

STATUS, PAYROLLS AND

RECORDS BRANCH DENTAL

DIVISION

VETERINARY

DIVISION NURSINGDIVISION

NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DIVISIONPHYSICAL

STANDARDS

DIVISION

PREVENTIVE

MEDICINE

SERVICE

ELEMENTS WHOLLY CONCERNED WITH PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

ELEMENTS PARTLY CONCERNED WITH PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

ELEMENTS NOT CONCERNED WITH PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

Organization of the Air Surgeon’s Office

Since all medical personnel functions of the Air Corps had been handled

by the Surgeon General's Office prior to February 1942, the Office of the Air

Surgeon, which came into existence at that time, inherited personnel unit of

only limited authority.28 The business of the Air Surgeon’s Personnel Division, however, increased with the mounting numbers of medical personnel assigned to the Air Forces. Its authority also widened in scope, generally because of the increased prestige of the Air Forces and specifically because of

the transfer of the responsibility for the procurement of Air Forces medical

officers from the Surgeon General’s Office. Late in 1942, by agreement with

The Surgeon General, the Air Surgeon also established Nursing Section

in his office, and it was understood that the Air Forces should have the power

to procure and appoint its own nurses, assign and transfer them, and discharge them “for unsuitability and conduct prejudicial to the service.” The

move was intended to speed nurse recruitment, but lack of personnel in the

Nursing Section caused the recruiting program to be turned over to the Air

28 See footnote 16, p. 31.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 39

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE DEMOBILIZATION BRANCH SERVICE SUPPLY

SERVICES SPECIALPLANNING DIVISION

Chart

4.

—Organization

of

the

Surgeon

General’s Office

for

personnel

administration,

May

19^5

RESOURCES ANALYSIS DIVISION DEPUTY CHIEF

FOR

PLANS OPERATIONS MOBILIZATION, AND

OVERSEAS OPERATIONSDIVISION TROOP UNITS BRANCH RECONDITIONING CONSULTANTSDIVISION OPERATIONS SERVICE VETERINARY DIVISION

DEPUTY CHIEF

FOR

HOSPITALDOMESTIC OPERATIONS PRISONER- OF-WAR LIAISON UNIT

NEUROPSY- CHIATRIC CONSULTANTS DIVISION

THE

SURGEON GENERAL PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE

ELEMENTS WHOLLY

CONCERNED

WITH

PERSONNELADMINISTRATION

ELEMENTS

PARTLY CONCERNED

WITH PERSONNELADMINISTRATION.

ELEMENTS NOT

CONCERNED

WITH PERSONNELADMINISTRATION. WOMEN'S HEALTH WELFARE UNjT

DENTAL DIVISION

STATUS,

PAYROLLS

AND

RECORDS

BRANCH

CONTROL DIVISION CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DIVISION RECRUITMENT PLACEMENT BRANCH CLASSIFICA- TION

WAGE

ADJUSTMENT BRANCH TRAINING BRANCH EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BRANCH

PERSONNEL SERVICE SURGICALCONSULTANTSDIVISION

MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION ARMY

NURSE BRANCH MED.

DEPT. DIETITIANS BRANCH PHYSICAL THERAPIST BRANCH

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES MEDICAL CONSULTANTS DIVISION PROCUREMENT BRANCH CLASSIFICA- TIONS

BRANCH OPERATIONS BRANCH RECORDS,PLANNING PLACEMENT BRANCH
40 PERSONNEL

Surgeon’s Personnel Division. The latter directed publicity, forwarded application blanks, and handled correspondence with applicants. 29

Decentralization of Personnel Administration

Until almost the end of 1943,perhaps the most important change of responsibility for medical personnel administration was the loss of certain elements of

control by the Surgeon General’s Office and the corps area (or service command) 30 surgeons’ officers to certain other authorities, such as the commanding

generals of the service commands, the Ground and Air Forces, and the

commanders of local installations.

The 1942 reorganization of the War Department

The reorganization of the War Department in March 1942 created three

separate Zone of Interior commands: Army Ground Forces; Services of Supply, later known as Army Service Forces; and Army Air Forces, with commanders responsible for administrative details. 31 On paper, the General Staff

was reduced in numbers and its functions limited to policymaking and supervision. Actually, the reorganization weakened the General Staff and caused

unnecessary confusion because of the lack of clear-cut responsibility down

through the major command channels of the Army. G-l, for example, was

responsible for those duties “relating to the personnel of the Army as individuals, function which conflicted with the powers the same directive

had delegated to theArmy Service Forces.” 32

Under the new organization, The Surgeon General, though he remained

chief of technical service, was subordinate to the Commanding General. Services of Supply. He could not send supervisory instructions under his own

name, directly and officially, to medical authorities in the Air and Ground

Forces or the surgeons of the service commands, but unofficial channels were

still open to him and he could issue official instructions concerning medical

matters to the commanding officers of the service commands in the name of the

Commanding General, Services of Supply. 33

29 (1) Memorandum, the Air Surgeon, for Col. Julia O. Flikke, Office of The Surgeon General,

22 Sept. 1942. (2) Memorandum, Col. Julia O. Flikke, for Col. W. F. Hall, Office of the Air Surgeon, 16 Nov. 1942. 30 The corps areas were redesignated service commands on 22 July 1942. 31 War Department CircularNo. 59, Mar. 1942. 32 Lerwill, Leonard L. The Personnel Replacement System, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1954, p. 257. (DA Pamphlet 20-211.) 33 Letter, Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell, Commanding General, Services of Supply, to Commanding

Generals, all Service Commands, 22 July 1942, with Service Command Organization Manual, 22 July 1942, enclosure thereto.

On the other hand, according to high ranking Medical Corps officer, this concession “as envisioned by regulation and the reorganization manual included only such things as broad policy concerning preventive medicine, evacuation, and similar subjects. By no stretch of the imagination, did they include utilization of personnel.” Letter, Col. Paul A. Paden, to Col. C. H. Goddard,

Office of The Surgeon General, June 1952.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 41

Figure 15. Lt. Col. Paul A. Paden, MC, of the Personnel Division,

Office of The Surgeon General.

Certain particular items of personnel control were redistributed in 1942

and early 1943 as further expansion of the Services of Supply policy of

decentralization.

For example, when The Surgeon General, acting through the Commanding

General, Services of Supply, wished to transfer medical officers from one service

command to another he might find himself hampered by the service command

commanders involved; the latter did not complain too vigorously if officers were

assigned to them, but did object if they taken away. At first, the practice

was to order an officer in or out and then, if complaint was forthcoming, to

revoke the order. Lt. Col. (later Col.) Paul A. Paden, MC (fig. 15), an officer

who served in The Surgeon General’s Personnel Division during the war, wrote

afterward that for some months after the reorganization of the War Department “we were often able to materially expedite the movement of personnel to

all areas through good liaison with the Adjutant General’s Sections but

as time went by we were no longer able to do this, as more and more staff sections

had to process the papers. It was only by the most carefully guarded liaison

with Medical Department officers, and other officers outside the ASF, as well
42 PERSONNEL

as within it, that we were able to accomplish the things we did, often despite ‘the

letter’ of published directives.” 34

The doctrine of decentralization apparently proceeded so far that before

undertaking to move medical officer it became standard practice to obtain

definite concurrence from the service command concerned. Moreover, this concurrence was obtained not from the chief of the service command’s Medical

Branch but from the director of personnel of that headquarters. 35 Therestrictions that The Surgeon General suffered in his relationship with service commands, particularly in the early war years, also applied generally to his

relations with oversea commanders throughout the war.

Another phase of the 1942 reorganization was the subordination of the

corps area commanders (later called service command commanders) to the

Commanding General, Services of Supply, and the subsequent realinement of

the service command commander’s headquarters. The realinement of service

command headquarters moved the medical adviser of the service command commander—the service command surgeon—one notch lower in the official organization by subordinating him in personnel matters to the director of personnel of

the service command—a nonmedical officer. The director’s office, however, was

to obtain “recommendations from the technical (including the medical)

branches on matters relating to technical military personnel” and “technical civilian personnel.” 36 At the same time, physical therapists and dietitians

who were still in civilian status, remained under control of the Medical Branch.

Still another phase of the reorganization was the transfer of installations

from the direct command of The Surgeon General to the commanding generals

of the service commands, which began in July 1942, thereby depriving the former of very important share of personnel control. Included among these

installations were medical training centers, certain schools, and all the general

hospitals except Walter Reed. For time, The Surgeon General kept some of

his authority over all general hospitals, including the power to determine personnel allotments for their staffs—subject to Services of Supply headquarters

approval—but this power was transferred to the service commands in April

1945.37 There were other shifts of command authority, and the personnel

control involved in it, back and forth between The Surgeon General and the

34 Letter, Col. Paul A. Paden, MC, to Col. .1. H. McNinch, MC, Office of The Surgeon General,

17 Jan. 1950. 35 Memorandum, Director, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Colonel

Love, HistoricalDivision, Office of The Surgeon General, 14 Mar. 1944.

38 Services of Supply Organization Manual, 24 Dec. 1942. Before the issuance of this manual,

however, some service command personnel officers were apparently shifting Medical Department

personnel (including scarce specialists) around as they saw fit, even though they lacked knowledge

of their special qualifications. Letter, Col. E. C. Jones, Ret., to Col. R. G. Prentiss, Jr., Office of

The Surgeon General, Sept. 1951. Later, apparently as consequence of such actions, provision

was inserted in the Services of Supply Organization Manual requiring the personnel officers to

consult with the medical branch on Medical Department personnel assignments.

Commenting on how the reorganization worked in practice, Colonel Paden, who served in the

Surgeon General’s Office from 1941 to 1944, stated that the inference that service command personnel

directors were to obtain such recommendations “was actually farcical, for they seldom did at first.”

Letter, Col. Paul A. Paden, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, June 1952.

37 See footnote 26, p. 37.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 43

service command commanders during the course of the war. The Surgeon

General retained command of number of installations such as the medical

depots, the Army Medical Center (including Walter Heed General Hospital),

and the Army Medical Museum, 38 Hut herecovered control of most important

group of installations—the general hospitals—only after the end of the war.

Decentralization of personnel control within the Army Service Forces

appears again in the direct transfer of authority over civilian personnel from

The Surgeon General to the service commands during 1942; and in the transfers

resulting from changes in the system of personnel authorizations.

Before September 1942, the Surgeon General’s Office, working partly

through the corps area surgeons, had had virtually complete control of civilians

employed in all Medical Department installations. On that date, however,

Services of Supply headquarters transferred the administration of all civilian

personnel except those employed in the installations directly under command

of The Surgeon General (as well as in those under other chiefs of technical

services) to the service command commanders. At first, there was some uncertainty as to where the 4,400 civilians employed in station hospitals at airbases belonged, and The Surgeon General kept them under his own jurisdiction.

Within months, however, Services of Supply headquarters directed him to

transfer them to the Army Air Forces. These actions removed about 26,000

civilians from The Surgeon General’s direct control, leaving him only about

9,500. 39 About the same time, Services of Supply headquarters directed The

Surgeon General to transfer some of his authority over civilian employees in

installations under his direct command “down to the lowest possible echelon.”

For this purpose, the latter set up civilian personnel offices in each of these in- stallations and gave them almost complete authority in theirfield. 40

System of bulk authorizations

From the beginning of the war, responsibilities for personnel administration were affected by changes in the system of personnel allowances. One of

the most important of these changes was the establishment of bulk authorizations by the Army Service Forces headquarters in June 1943.

The general purpose of such authorizations, according to the Army Service

Forces circular that introduced them, was “to afford commander the utmost

latitude in the administration of his personnel, and at the same time establish

an effective control over numbers of personnel employed. The new procedure alters the control over personnel exercised by the Commanding

38 Morgan, Edward J., and Wagner, Donald O. The Organization of the Medical Department in

the Zone of Interior (1946). [Official record.]

39 (1) Annual Report, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1943. (2)

Services of Supply Organization Manual, 24 Dec. 1942. (3) Letter, Col. J. A. Rogers, to Commanding

General, Services of Supply, 19 Sept. 1942, subject: Medical Department Civilian Personnel at Army

Air Forces Stations. (4) Letter, Director, Civilian Personnel, Office of The Surgeon General, to

Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 22 Oct. 1942, subject: Civilian Personnel of Station Hospitals.

40 Letter, Commanding General, Services of Supply, to The Surgeon General, 31 Aug. 1942, subject:

Responsibility for CivilianPersonnel Programs.
44 PERSONNEL

General, Army Service Forces, from ‘retail’ to ‘wholesale’ basis, and places

correspondingly greater responsibility upon subordinate commanders to exercise close control of sub-authorization.” 41

Under the new system, Army Service Forces continued to set personnel

ceilings, changing these authorizations as conditions required, for all medical

installations directly responsible to it. The ceilings authorized the maximum strength for the numerous categories of officer personnel, such as Medical

Department, Quartermaster, and others. However, there was no limit on the

number of rank within specific category. Father, the limitation on rank was

percentage of overall strength in all categories. In other words, certain

percentage of all officers, regardless of category, were authorized as colonels,

lieutenant colonels, and so forth.

The authorization of enlisted men was not divided into categories indicating where they must be assigned (as so many in Medical Department installations, and so many in Quartermaster installations) but was set at total

figure with maximum percentage in each grade (master sergeant, technical

sergeant, and so forth). This method of allotting officers and enlisted men applied to personnel not in table-of-organization units. Many such units (medical and other) were assigned, as rule temporarily and for training, to the

Army Service Forces, but the size of each and the number of doctors, nurses,

and enlisted men assigned to it were fixed by the provisions of its table of

organization.

Under the new system, the commander’s allowance for civilian employees

was brought into direct relationship with the allowance for military personnel.

Previously, the number of civilians who could be employed was unrestricted

except through the allotment of funds. Now, however, the number varied according to the number of military personnel in service. If, for example, the

total ceiling for civilian and military personnel was set at 30,000 for service

command and the military numbered 20,000, the service command could therefore employ maximum of 10,000 civilians.

Army Service Forces headquarters required its commanders and their

subordinates down to the lowest installation in the commandstructure to follow

similar practices in subauthorizations of personnel. commander might make

subauthorizations totaling less than the authorization he received; in fact, he

was encouraged to do so, since Army Service Forces headquarters emphasized

economy in the use of personnel.

The bulk-authorization system was designed to give subordinate commanders greater freedom in personnel administration, especially in the assignment of numbers, types, and grades of personnel for or within service command installations, as well as to give service command commanders greater

freedom from direction by the technical services. As Brig. Gen. (later Map

11Army Service Forces Circular No. 39, 11 June 1943. The description which follows is based on

this document and on the “Manual of Instructions for Preparation of Personnel Control Forms,” Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 11 June 1943.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 45

Gen.) Joseph N. Dalton, AGD, director of the Army Service Forces Personnel

Division at the time the new system was introduced, explained it:

We have done our utmost to free you from many burdensome rules and regulations

under which you previously had to operate. No longer will some Headquarters Staff

Officer tell you that you must have 120 enlisted men in station hospital when you know

from first hand experience that you could do the job with 100. No longer will you be

prohibited from putting an intelligent captain in charge of function because another

Headquarters Staff Officer, in his great wisdom, decided that you must use Major. No

longer will you be hamstrung in assigning (enlisted) men according to their ability because they are ordnance men, or single men. Hereafter, the only consideration is, “Who is

the best man for the job?” 42

While there was no question that decentralization of control of personnel

relieved The Surgeon General of much routine detail which could be handled

more efficiently locally, it made the correction of inequities more difficult when

these were found to exist, and restricted overall planning.

Partial Restoration of Authority

There was growing awareness in the Army Service Forces headquarters

that if the medical mission was to be accomplished more centralized control

of medical personnel should be reestablished in the Office of The Surgeon General and in the offices of the various service command surgeons. Consequently,

personnel reports coming into the Office of The Surgeon General which had

been considerably curtailed in the decentralization process were again authorized. These reports permitted an analysis of the personnel situation, both as

to number and professional quality and made possible the operations of the

control and planning branches in both Operations and Personnel Divisions.

In late 1943, the service command surgeons regained some of the power

which they had lost as corps area surgeons through the reorganization of the

service commands in August 1942. Now called service command surgeons,

they were restored to their position of direct responsibility to the service command commander, as were the representatives of other technical services. The

personnel division of the service command headquarters, while still charged

with arranging for the selection and placement of all military personnel, was

to make its assignments from then on “upon recommendation of service command Technical Services” (one of which was the surgeon’s office). 43

In letter to the commanding generals of the service commands, Army

Service Forces headquarters stated that the selection of Medical Department

personnel for newly activated units had not been as successful as desired and

gave directions concerning the new method of assignment. In each service

command, Medical Corps and Medical Administrative Corps officer were

to be placed on the start' of the Director of Personnel and put in charge of the

Medical Department personnel records. Their office was to be convenient to

42 Record of Proceedings, Personnel Conference, Army Service Forces, 21 June 1943. 43 Letter, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, to Commanding Generals, all Service Commands,

12 Nov. 1943.
46 PERSONNEL

that of the service command surgeon. They would maintain necessary special records to assure adequate professional and technical evaluation and assignment of Medical Department personnel. The service command surgeon

was empowered to initiate requests for assignment and reassignment of such

personnel, and his recommendations were to be followed unless they were

contrary to service command policies. The letter stated that continual supervision and control of assignments of medical personnel were necessary to prevent misassignments and to provide competent staffs for tactical units. 44 The

changes ordered were important steps in assisting the Medical Department

to place its officers in appropriate assignments.

In May 1944, months after the service command surgeons regained more

complete control of personnel within their commands, The Surgeon General

also acquired limited authority to move personnel from one service command

to another. In early 1944 when there was difficulty in properly staffing both

table-of-organization units and installations in this country, committee appointed by Army Service Forces headquarters to study the administration of

military personnel by the Surgeon General’s Office made recommendations 45

which when put into effect gave The Surgeon General limited power of assignment. Under this arrangement, The Surgeon General had the responsibility for distributing Medical Corps officers and nurses within the Army

Service Forces. He was to direct the transfer of doctors and nurses between

service commands “to effect the indicated readjustment.” In addition, he

could transfer Medical Corps officers returning from overseas who were under

the jurisdiction of Army Service Forces if officers having their particular

qualifications were needed more in one place than in another. He was also

empowered to request the transfer by name of certain key Medical Corps specialists, but he could not effect their transfer without the concurrence of the

receiving commander under Army Service Forces jurisdiction. 46 Hence, The

Surgeon General’s authority to assign personnel, although increased, was not

complete even for Medical Corps officers, and members of other Medical Department corps were not included in the new grant of authority. At the same

time, The Surgeon General could review the rosters of commanding officers

and Medical Corps specialists assigned to table-of-organization units then in

the United States, and to fixed installations, and direct the commanders to

make changes when the staff did not meet required standards or was not being

properly utilized.

The control of The Surgeon General, and also of the service command

surgeons, over the assignment and utilization of personnel was made more

effective by the operation of the consultant system, which will be discussed in

considerable detail inanother chapter of this volume.

44Letter, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, to Commanding Generals, all Service Commands,

26 Nov. 1943, subject: Classification and Assignment of Medical Department Personnel. 45Memorandum, Lt. Col. Gerald H. Teasley, Office of The Surgeon General, and others, for The

Surgeon General, 18 Feb. 1944, subject: Survey of the Handling of Military Personnel in SGO. 48Army Service Forces Circular No. 138, 12 May 1944.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 47

THEATERS OF OPERATIONS

Personnel Functions of the Theater Commander

As early as 1940, the War Department declared that the Chief of Staff of

the Army possessed the duty of specifying the personnel required for the field

forces and establishing policies and priorities for its distribution. Preparation of the replacement plan, including determination of the number of replacements estimated to be necessary, was classified as function of the War

Department in the Zone of Interior,47 function that was extended in April

1942 to include estimating the number of replacements needed in oversea

theaters. War Department policies relating to appointment, assignment, transfer, promotion, demotion, and elimination of personnel by discharge or retirement, likewise were expected, as early as 1940, to govern theater practice, as

were, insofar as feasible, policies relating to promotion of morale authorized by

the Department for the Zone of Interior. Nevertheless, broad powers over personnel matters were delegated to commanders of oversea theaters. Field service regulations issued before Pearl Harbor stated that such commanders were

to control assignment and rank as well as discharge and retirement of personnel within their areas of operations. Their responsibility for proper functioning of both classification and assignment throughout their commands was

emphasized in 1944. One exception to this rule was the granting of ratings

as aviation medical examiner and flight surgeon, which was the function, at

least until the end of September 1943, of the Commanding General, Army Air

Forces.48 During the latter half of 1944, however, this authority appears to

have been delegated to the commanders of the air forces in the individual

theaters. This was true, at least, in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.49 As early as 1942, the War Department granted individual theater

commanders special authority to commission warrant officers and enlisted men

in the Army of the United States. The authority was restricted during the

course of the war, but throughout the period, considerable number of Medical Department soldiers overseas received commissions in the Medical Administrative Corps.

Throughout the period of American participation in the war, it was the

duty of these commanders to prescribe the system of leaves of absence and furloughs to be observed within their areas of jurisdiction and to establish uniform

practices in the award of decorations. Mobilization Regulations 1-10, section

6, of March 1943, permitted them to modify War Department regulations

concerning the maintenance of good morale; field service regulations issued

some months later empowered them to promote various welfare and other

activities having that object. Under field service regulations in effect as early

47 The following section is based largely on material incorporated in War DepartmentField Manual

100—10, “Field Service Regulations,” Dec. 1940 and 15 Nov. 1943 and the changes to them. 48 Army Regulations No. 350—500, 11 Aug. 1942 July 1943, and Changes No. 1, 30 Sept. 1943. 49 History of Twelfth Air Force Medical Section, June—31 Dec. 1944, p. 13. [Official record.]

663076'"—63
48 PERSONNEL

as 1940, the theater commander was to inform the War Department as to his

replacement requirements. He was also to give directions to his subordinate

echelons concerning the submission of periodic replacement requisitions and

was to make allotments of replacement personnel to the various armies in the

theater. War Department order of 19 June 1943 delegated to the commanding generals of theaters of operations, oversea departments, and defense commands outside of the United States the authority “for all phases of civilian

personnel administration with respect to civilian personnel under their respective jurisdiction who are paid from funds appropriated to the War

Department.”

In turn, the theater commander delegated to his G-l section the responsibility for formulating policies and supervising the execution of administrative

matters pertaining to personnel. This extended to civilians under the supervision or control of the command and to prisoners of war,50

Replacement systems overseas were established as early as the spring of

1942, but each theater developed its own replacement policies largely by trial

and error method. It will not until after the G-l conference in April 1944,

which was attended by officers from the North African and European Theaters

of Operations, that there was any uniformity in oversea replacement systems.

As result of the conference, on May 1944, the War Department directed

“all theaters to establish theater replacement and training commands which

were to operate replacement installations and exercise control over casual personnel. These commands were to be responsible for the receipt, classification

and training of all personnel in the replacement system It further

directed each field force commander “to designate an adjutant general from his

command for service at the headquarters of the theater replacement

training command 51

The adjutant general of the theater was also responsible for the classification of all individuals joining the command; their subsequent assignment,

reclassification, and reassignment; their promotion, transfer, retirement, and

discharge; actions for the procurement and replacement of personnel; bestowal

of decorations, citations, honors, and awards; grants of leaves of absence and

furloughs; measures for recreation and welfare and all other morale matters

not specifically charged to other agencies. In addition, he was given custody

of the records of all personnel belonging to the command which were not kept

in subordinate units. 52

Commanders directly or indirectly subordinate to the theater headquarters

also exercised personnel functions within their jurisdictions that were comparable to those of the theatercommander, subject, of course, to his authority, and

they performed these functions through staff representatives similarto those of

the theater commander. Adjustments of classification or assignment, although the responsibility of the theatercommander, were to be decentralized as much as

50 War Department Field Manual 101-5, “Staff Officers’ Field Manual,” 19 Aug. 1940. 51 See footnote 32, p. 40. 52 See footnote 50.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 49

possible. This was especially the case with respect to enlisted personnel, in

regard to which final authority usually was rested in regimental or separate

unit commanders.

Medical Department Personnel Functions

As lias been pointed out previously in this chapter, although the theater

commanders were responsible for all matters pertaining to personnel, they

delegated to the theater chief surgeons most of their authority for Medical

Department personnel. The oversea department surgeons had been given

responsibility for certain problems as early as 1942 when Army regulations had

made it the responsibility of the department surgeon, as staff officer of the

oversea commander, to submit to the latter “such recommendations as to training, instruction, and utilization of Medical Department personnel belonging to

the command, including those not under his personal orders, as he may (might)

deem advisable 53 In December 1940, the preparation of estimates of

personnel requirements that theater technical service might develop was expressly stated to be the function of the chief of that service.

Within their own, more limited, spheres of jurisdiction, the surgeons on

lower levels of command down to the lowest echelon possessed similar functions.

In the European theater, the personnel functions of base section surgeons extended not only to medical personnel permanently assigned to the base section

and to patients in base medical facilities, but also to that of units staging in the

area so far as the balancing of their professional staffs was concerned. 54

Medical Department authorities therefore might intervene in great variety of matters affecting the personnel of their service, including assignment

and rank, but the extent to which they could make their intervention effective

varied, and depended, frequently, on the ability of the officer concerned to establish good working relations with those staffs of the theater or lower commands

including the air forces—that had the decisive authority in such matters.

Medical Department Personnel Offices

As the burden of duties increased for the various theater chief surgeons

(fig. 16), they devolved some of their personnel functions, particularly the

“paper work,” on assistants by setting up personnel sections in their offices.

Since the theater chief surgeon was also at times Services of Supply or Communications Zone surgeon, single personnel section might serve him in both

capacities. The War Department offered some guidance as to how theater

medical personnel section should be constituted by including such unit in

the table of organization for headquarters, medical service, communications

zone. The table provided for personnel section headed by major of the

53 Army Regulations No. 40—10, June 1924, par. 2b(5), and 17 Nov. 1940, par. 2b(5). 54 Annual Report, Surgeon, Channel Base Section, Communications Zone, European Theater of

Operations, U.S. Army, 22 Aug.-31 Dec. 1944, pp. 79-84.
50 PERSONNEL

Figure 16.—Representative theater chief surgeons. Upper left: Maj. Gen. Paul R.

Hawley, MC, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. Upper right: Brig. Gen.

Frederick A. Blesse, MC, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. Lower left:

Maj. Gen. Guy B. Uenit, MC, Southwest Pacific Area. Lower right: Brig. Gen. Edgar

King, MC, Pacific Ocean Areas.
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 51

Figure 16.—Continued. Upper left; Maj. Gen. Morrison C. Stayer, MC, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. Upper right: Brig. Gen. Robert P. Williams,

MC, China-Burma-India theater. Lower left: Col. George E. Armstrong, MC, China theater.

Lower right: Brig. Gen. Crawford F. Sams, MC, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East.
52 PERSONNEL

Medical Corps, with first lieutenant, who might be an officer of the Medical

Administrative Corps, and four enlisted men. 55

The largest and most elaborate organization for the administration of

matters pertaining to medical personnel in any oversea area was the Personnel

Division in the Office of the Chief Surgeon of the European theater, who was

also surgeon of the Services of Supply or Communications Zone. Its preeminence was natural in view of the strength of the Medical Department in that

theater. The division originally consisted of but one second lieutenant of the

Medical Administrative Corps, but grew from officers and enlisted men at

the end of August 1942 to officers, 29 enlisted men, and British civilians

in September 1944 when the office began to function in Paris. 56

Generally speaking, however, Medical Department personnel offices at

theater, army, or base section headquarters were staffed by relatively small

numbers of officer and enlisted personnel. In the Southwest Pacific at the beginning of 1945, when the Services of Supply headquarters was located in

Hollandia, New Guinea, the staff assigned to the Personnel Division of the

Surgeon’s Office comprised three officers and nine enlisted men. Heading the

division was lieutenant colonel of the Medical Corps; the Medical Administrative Corps provided the other two officers. 57 When the Medical Section of

the Mediterranean theater was at its peak strength (April 1945), the personnel

subsection consisted of one officer and two enlisted men. Similarly, during the

combat operations of the Third U.S. Army in the European theater, its Headquarters Medical Section handled personnel matters through two Medical Administrative Corps officers and two enlisted men. 58

In base sections and like jurisdictions, one officer ordinarily was assigned

to personnel duties in the corresponding surgeon’s office, often combining these

with other functions. One or two enlisted men also were assigned to personnel

activities. 59 As might be expected, the medical personnel officers in the base

sections of the European Theater of Operations had somewhat larger staffs than

were common elsewhere. In fact, the Personnel Division of the Surgeon’s

Office, United Kingdom Base, was sizable organization. .Vs of January

1945, the staff comprised officers and 13 enlisted men.60

56 Table of Organization 8-500-1, Nov. 1940.

08 (1) Administrative and Logistical History of the Medical Service, Communications Zone—

European Theater of Operations (1945), ch. Ill, p. 63. [Official record.] (2) Annual Report, Chief

Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, 1944, pp. 3-5. (3) History of Medical Service, Services of

Supply, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, From Inception to 31 Dec. 1943 (1944).

87 Annual Report, Surgeon, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, 1945, pt. I—-U.S. Army Services

of Supply, p. 72. 58 (1) Munden, Kenneth W.: Administration of the Medical Department in the Mediterranean

Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1945, vol. I. chart p. 153. [Official record.] (2) Statement of

Col. JohnBoyd Coates, Jr., MC, to the editor, 27 May 1961.

89 (1) Annual Report, Surgeon, Base R, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, 12 Feb.-30 June 1945,

pp. 3-4. (2) Annual Report, Surgeon, Base K, U.S. Army Services of Supply, 1944-45. (3) Annual

Report, Surgeon, BaseK, U.S. Army Services of Supply, 1945, p. 2. 60Annual Report, Surgeon, Channel Base Section, Communications Zone, European Theater of

Operations, August-December 1944, January-July 1945. (2) Annual Report, Surgeon, Seine Base

Section, CommunicationsZone, European Theater of Operations, January—June 1945.
53

CHAPTER III

Requirements: 1939-41

STRENGTH OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT COMPONENTS

Congressional Responsibilities

Although the Medical Department might estimate its personnel requirements for any fiscal year, the number it was allowed was fixed by Congress or

by the War Department within congressional appropriation. Congress had

set the quotas for officers of the Regular Army until 1939 and for enlisted men

until 1940. Until 1916, the quotas were in terms of numbers of individuals.

The National Defense Act of 1916 and its amendments, which formed the

National Defense Act of 1920, based the number of officers and enlisted men

on the total enlisted strength of the Army, the ratio varying for each corps.

In time of actual or threatened hostilities, however, the Secretary of War was

permitted to procure such additional numbers of enlisted men as might be

required. Thus, in World War I, the maximum strength figure of the Medical

Department—343,394—was 92.52 per 1,000 total Army strength or 98.52 per

1,000 Army enlisted strength. In 1922, Congress abandoned the ratio system

for officers and again authorized an absolute number for each corps.

The authorized officer strength of the Medical Department just prior to

the emergency period was established by act of April 1939 at 1,424 Medical,

316 Dental, 126 Veterinary, and 16 Medical Administrative Corps officers in

the Regular Army, to be reached by 30 dune 1949 through 10 approximately

equal annual increments. Officers appointed in the Medical Administrative

Corps after the passage of this act were to be selected from candidates who

were graduates of 4-year course in pharmacy from an approved school. It

was contemplated that the then current members of the corps would have left

the military service by 30 June 1949. The Medical Administrative Corps was

never reduced to 16 members. Normal attrition had brought the total down

only to 58 by 1943, at which time the members were absorbed in the newly

created Pharmacy Corps. No further changes occurred in authorizations for

Medical Department Regular Army officers during the remainder of the

emergency and the war period.

*39 Stat. 171.

41 Stat. 766.

For detailed discussion of Medical Department strength in World War I, see The Medical

Department of the United States Army in the World War. Washington Government Printing Office,

1923, vol. I.

53 Stat. 559.
54 PERSONNEL

Until 1940, the enlisted strength of the Medical Department remained at

percent of the total Army strength, the ratio set by the National Defense

Act of 1920.

Between April and 22 June 1940, all of Western Europe except England

fell under German control. These events in Europe had tremendous effect

on the U.S. military preparedness program. On 13 June, Congress appropriated sufficient funds to bring the Regular Army to its full statutory strength

of 280,000 set by the National Defense Act of 1920. Before this could be accomplished, when the enlisted strength was still only 249,441, Congress passed

bill allowing the Army to be increased to 375,000.®

No further limitations were placed on the size of the Regular Army. The

third supplemental appropriations act for fiscal year 1941 (approved on

October 1940) made it clear that the only limit on the Regular Army's

strength was that which cash appropriations would impose.

On 31 May 1940, the President asked Congress for authority to bring the

National Guard into Federal service without the existing restriction which

forbade use of the guard outside the United States. The request met with

considerable opposition, and it was not until 27 August that the President was

authorized to call up for period of 12 months the National Guard and other

Reserve components, which however were not to be employed “beyond the

limits of the Western Hemisphere except in the territories and possessions of

the United States, including the Philippine Islands.”

On 16 September 1940, Congress passed the first peacetime selective service

act in the history of the United States. Like the National Guard-Reserve Act of 27 August of that year, the inductees were to serve for 12 months only, and

the same limitation on oversea service was included. In August 1941, the

President was empowered to extend indefinitely the length of service for the

National Guard, selective service trainees, and Reserve officers should Congress

find our national interest to be imperiled.

WAR DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Army Nurse Corps

The strength of the Army Nurse Corps was never set by Congress but

rather by the War Department within the limits of congressional appropriations. In June 1939, the strength was set at 675; year later, 949. This was

the Regular Army nurse component, the only one on active duty until September 1940, when Reserve nurses began to be appointed for that purpose. The

authorization for Regular Army nurses continued to be raised, however, reachWatson, Mark Skinner: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations. United States Army

in World War II. The War Department. Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950. See footnote 5, above.

S.J. Res. 286, 27 Aug. 1940, in 54 Stat. 858. S. 4164, 16 Sept. 1940, in 54 Stat. 885.
REQUIREMENTS: 1939-41 55

ing 1,875 in March 1945. Until 1941, the basis for the calculation of requirements was nurse per 270 military personnel (3.7 per 1,000). In that year,

the War Department General Staff, on recommendation of The Surgeon General, changed the formula to 120 nurses for each 1,000hospital beds, or approximately nurses per 1,000 of Army strength,

Reserve Officers

During the emergency and war years, Congress placed no statutory limitations on the number of non-Regular Army officers of the Medical Department.

Like the nurses, the number to be added became the responsibility of the War

Department, acting within the limits of congressional appropriation. For

example, an act of April 1939 which permitted the calling of 300 Reserve

officers of the Corps of Chaplains and of the Medical Department to extended

active duty did not specify how many of each branch were to be called. The

General Staff in making the decision allotted 255 of these officers to the Medical

Department. 10 In December 1939, the General Staff, in anticipation of supplemental appropriations, authorized the corps area commanders to call up an

additional 508 Medical Department Reserve officers. In the following September, it authorized the calling of 4,019 Reserve nurses to active duty, the

first time such action was taken during the emergency. The number was

increased by 1,000 in January 1941.

Besides setting quotas for personnel on active duty with the peacetime

Army, the War Department provided for the establishment of procurement

objective for each section of the Officers Reserve Corps. No procurement

objective was established for the Red Cross nurses’ reserve; it might therefore

recruit members without limit.

In 1939, the elements to be considered in establishing procurement objective were reviewed and restated; according to memorandum prepared in G-l

(8 June 1939), number of misunderstandings about the objective had arisen,

among others that it “should include all officers needed for maximum effort.

Actually, the peacetime procurement objective should be limited to the needs

to fill early requirements during mobilization until such time as mobilization

procurement can catch up with current needs.” 11 month later, the War

Department published set of figures giving the procurement objectives for

Reserve personnel to be assigned to the corps areas. Comparison of these

figures with the actual membership of the Medical Department Reserve Corps

Annual Reports of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1940, p. 256 1941, pp. 243-244. 10 Letter, Secretary of War, to Daniel W. Bell, Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, 27 May

1939.

11 Memorandum for Record, signed “BSJ,” and concurred in by The Adjutant General, Assistant

Adjutant General, and Officer in Charge, Reserve Division, War Plans Office, June 1939. (Compare

with Army Regulations No. 105-5, 16 June 1936.)
56 PERSONNEL

Table 2.—Procurement objectives {10 July 1939), and actual strengths {30 June 1939), of

Medical Department Officers Reserve Corps

about the same time (30 June 1939) will give some idea of how adequate—in

the opinion of the General Staff—the existing Reserves were to meet anticipated

needs (table 2). The comparison is necessarily rough one, as the figures for

the procurement objective covered only allotments to the corps areas, not to

other using agencies. The latter agencies, however, ordinarily received only

very small proportion of total personnel.

In September 1939, The Surgeon General estimated the requirements of

fully mobilized Army of million, which was the maximum contemplated

by the War Department’s Protective Mobilization Plan with its several augmentations. Reduced to ratios (number of medical personnel per 1,000 of

total Army strength), his estimates were as follows: For the Medical Corps,

7.5; for the Dental Corps, 1.875; for the Veterinary Corps, 0.375; for the

Nurse Corps, 6.25; for the Sanitary and Medical Administrative Corps, 0.75; and, for the enlisted complement, 75.00. 12 This estimate was based on World

War experience.

Although the total Medical Department strength of the Officers Reserve

Corps (including members on duty and those not yet called) was below the

procurement objective, The Surgeon General, as late as November 1939, expressed the opinion that the Reserves were sufficient for the basic force of

12 Memorandum, Col. A. G. Love, for The Surgeon General, 28 Sept. 1939.

Component Procurement

objectives Actualstrengths

Medical Corps __ 20, 870

3, 585

668

1, 918

195

15, 198

5, 063

1, 381

1, 243

454

Dental Corps __ __

Veterinary Corps _______

Medical Administrative Corps.

Sanitary Corps

The large excess of actual strength of the Dental Corps Reserve over the procurement objective

is not easily reconciled with the later statement (see p. 57) that procurement was stopped when

actual strength of that corps slightly exceeded the objective. Either the figures themselves are incorrect or, possibly, larger procurement objective was in operation at the time the actual strength

was computed. It also seems possible that authorities may have continued to appoint men in the

Dental Corps Reserve even after the procurement objective had been exceeded.

Source: (1) Memorandum, The Adjutant General, for Commanding Generals of all Armies;

Commanding Generals, all Corps Areas; Chiefs of all Arms and Services; Commandants, General

Service Schools; Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy; Assistant Chiefs of Staff, War Department

General Staff; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 10 July 1939, subject: Reserve Officers’

Peacetime Procurement Objective for Mobilization, and Assignment and Promotion Procedures for

Reserve Officers, of the Corps-Area Assignment Group—Current Instructions Supplementary to MR

1-3 (new number). (2) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1939, pp. 174—175.
REQUIREMENTS: 1939-41 57

Figure 17. Maj. Gen. Charles R. Reynolds, The Surgeon

General, 1935-39.

1,150,000 contemplated in the War Department Protective Mobilization Plan.

He was doubtful however that they contained enough of the right types of

specialists. 13 Appointments in the Dental Corps Reserve had been suspended

in 1938 with the consent of The Surgeon General, Maj. Gen. Charles R.

Reynolds (fig. IT), when membership slightly exceeded the procurement objective, 14 In December 1939, the General Staff ordered partial suspension of

appointments to all sections of the Officers Reserve Corps, although neither

the Medical Corps nor the Medical Administrative Corps had reached their

authorized procurement objectives. However, the suspension order excepted

the following categories: Graduates of the Reserve Officers Training Corps;

applicants for the Air Corps Reserve; and recent graduates in medicine,

dentistry, and veterinary medicine who were qualified for duty with the Regular Army. 15

13 Magee, James C.; The Medical Department, pp. 10-12 (a lecture delivered at the Army War

College, 17 Nov. 1939).

14 Medical Department, United States Army. Dental Service in World War II. Washington:

U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1955, p. 51.

15 Letter, The Adjutant General, to Corps Area and Department Commanders and Commanders

of Arms and Services, Dec. 1939, subject: Suspension of Appointments in Officers Reserve Corps.
58 PERSONNEL

FACTORS AFFECTING DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS

Medical Department Officer Shortages

After Congress enacted the legislation just discussed, the responsibility for

its implementation fell on the War Department. With no statutory restrictions remaining on strength, outside those imposed by congressional appropriations, the Army increased from total strength of 264,118 on 30 June 1940

to 1,455,565 on 30 June 1941.16

Naturally, this tremendous increase in such short period of time created

many problems. One of the biggest problems in the Medical Department was

the shortage of officers. As early as August 1940, before actual augmentation took place, The Surgeon General reported to The Adjutant General and

to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, that an acute shortage of Medical Department officers has been the subject of “very grave concern” to his office for some

time and that as of 25 July the deficits for the various corps were as follows

(based on an authorized troops strength of 375,000) Medical Corps, 1,527; Dental Corps, 391; Veterinary Corps, 223. He predicted that if the National

Guard called into Federal service the shortages would rise to the following

figures: Medical Corps, 5,295; Dental Corps, 1,259; Veterinary Corps, 657.

Should “some form of Selective Service” increase the Army still further, the

Surgeon General’s Office estimated that in April 1941 the following shortages

would obtain: Medical Corps, 8,455; Dental Corps, 2,044; Veterinary Corps,

1,049.17

Problems Created by National Guard Induction

At the time of induction into Federal service (27 August 1940), the

National Guard brought with it complement of Medical Department officers

and enlisted men. National Guard officers had the same rights of resignation

as members of the Officers Reserve Corps. 18 Many were also relieved from

assignment because they were deemed necessary in an industry or occupation

essential to the public interest. Upon mobilization, the medical service of the

National Guard consisted of personnel assigned to tactical units only. In the

middle of 1941, these units comprised 306 medical detachments, 20 medical

regiments, and medical battalion. The guard had no medical personnel of

its own for fixed hospital service or for administrative overhead; 19 National

18Kreidberg, Marvin A., and Henry, Merton G. History of Military Mobilization in the U.S.

Army, 1775-1945. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955, p. 581. (DA Pamphlet

20-212.)

17 (1) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, Aug. 1940, subject: Shortage of Medical Department Personnel. (2) Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. C. F. Lull), the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, 12 Aug. 1940, subject: Shortage of Medical Department

Officer Personnel. 18Army Regulations No. 140-5, 16 June 1936, pars. 49. 53. 10 (1) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1941, p. 260. (2) Committee to Study the Medical Department, 1942, pp. 14-15.
REQUIREMENTS: 1939-41 59

Guard units, including medical units, were far below full strength when they

were called into Federal service, so that personnel from Regular and Reserve

components had to be assigned to them,20 and National Guard officers could

not be readily shifted to meet changing needs since certain restrictions on their

reassignment were not removed until September 1941. These three factors considerably increased the demand on the Army for medical personnel at the time

of the induction of more than 250,000 guardsmen.

Reserve Shortages

In September 1940, the Army had, aside from the medical units that ere

organic parts of existing divisions, only the following field medical units: Two

surgical hospitals, two evacuation hospitals, two medical regiments, one medical

supply depot, and one medical laboratory. In December, this was increased

to medical battalions, medicalregiments, medical supply depot, medical

laboratory, general dispensary, 15 evacuation hospitals, surgical hospitals, 22 general hospitals, and 22 station hospitals. By the end of June 1941, all

units had been activated. 21

The next problem was the personnel to staff these units. In October 1940, The Surgeon General asked the War Department General Staff to remove the

partial suspension of appointments to the Deserve imposed in December 1939,

and to restore the situation that had existed before that date. This meant that

appointments would be permitted in all corps of the Medical Department up

to their procurement objectives, and the General Staff granted the request in

December 1940 in that sense, with the proviso that applicants must agree to

accept active duty when called upon.22 Apparently, The Surgeon General had

either disregarded the fact that the Dental, Veterinary, and Sanitary Corps had

already passed these objectives or had felt at the time that their uncalled

Reserves were sufficiently large and accessible for all purposes. Two months

later, however, he pointed out that the authority granted did not permit commissioning additional dentists or veterinarians in the Reserves and urgently

recommended that it be “expanded to cover” both of these corps. The recommendation was unfortunately worded; what he wanted was not an expansion

of the authority to cover these corps—the authority already covered them—but

permission to exceed their procurement objectives. He further recommended that in view of prospective needs during 1941 and 1942 the existing

procurement objectives for all Medical Department corps be suspended “until

20 Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding Generals all Corps Areas and Departments,

Sept. 1940, subject: Induction of the National Guard of the United States. 21 Smith, Clarence McKittrick The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone

of Interior. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1956. 22 (1) Letter, Office of The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 26 Oct. 1940, subject:

Appointments in Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Reserve Corps. (2) Memorandum, Assistant Chief

of Staff, G-l, for Chief of Staff, Nov. 1940, subject: Appointments in Medical Department Reserve.

(3) Letter, The Adjutant General, to each Corps Area Commander and The Surgeon General, 19 Dec.

1940, subject: Appointments in Medical Reserve.
60 PERSONNEL

in the opinion of The Surgeon General an adequate Reserve is available for the

defense program with rapid expansion, if such should be required.” 23 This did

not mean that The Surgeon General was willing to accept unlimited numbers in

the Reserves. If the surplus became larger than necessary to meet future needs,

it might mean granting virtual deferment of service to considerable group.24

Because of the difficulties in procuring officers for certain corps, some substitution of one type of officer for another was permitted in meeting requirements. As early as February 1940, the Medical Department received authority

to substitut reservists of the Medical Administrative Corps and Sanitary Corps

for members of the Medical Corps Reserve in meeting the quotas for active-duty

assignments. 25 In 1941, after the Medical Replacement Training Centers for

enlisted men at Camp Lee, Va., and Camp Grant, 111., had been functioning for

several months, the task of obtaining sufficient numbers of medical, dental,

and medical administrative officers to staff them properly led The Surgeon

General to suggest that “branch immaterial” 20 officers be used in battalion and

center headquarters as well as in the companies. The recommendation was

approved. At this time, The Surgeon General stated that each company could

be adequately and properly staffed with six Reserve officers: Two medical, two

dental, one medical administrative, and one branch immaterial.27

Enlisted Personnel

With the increased medical facilities, the Medical Department had an

additional problem of securing an adequate supply of enlisted personnel. As

early as February 1939, General Reynolds, declaring that the percent maximum allowed by the National Defense Act of 1920 would be inadequate in an

emergency, recommended that Congress be asked to amend the law so as to

permit enlisting “in time of actual or threatened hostilities such additional number of men as the service may require.” Higher authority in the

War Department, however, rejected the proposal on the ground that the reasons

for giving priority to the Medical Department in this matter were not apparent.

Several months later (May 1939), The Surgeon General repeated his request,

but it was not until 1940 that he achieved his objective when Congress raised

the Medical Department’s quota to percent and empowered the President

23 Letter (not found), from Senator Pepper, which enclosed protest from the American Dental

Association on selection for training of dentists not commissioned in the Reserve, with 2d endorsement,

The Surgeon General to The Adjutant General, 18 Feb. 1941. 24 Compare the argument advanced by spokesman of the Dental Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, against large increase in the size of the Dental Corps Reserve. (Letter, Office of The

Surgeon General (Lt. Col. R. F. Craven), to The Adjutant General, Oct. 1941.)

25 Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General, 19 Feb. 1940, subject: Added Reserves

for Active Duty With Regular Army.

28 “Branch immaterial” personnel were those whose training was in basic subjects without arm

or service specialization.

27 (1) Memorandum. Procurement Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, for Director, Historical Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 20 Apr. 1944. (2) Memo- randum, Office of The Surgeon General, for The Adjutant General. IS Aug. 1941, subject; Utilization

of Branch Immaterial Officers in Replacement Training Centers, with 1st endorsement thereto, Sept. 1941.
REQUIREMENTS: 1939-41 61

(and hence the War Department) in the event of actual or threatened hostilities to authorize such additional enlistments as he considered necessary. 28 This did

not insure that the General Staff would immediately raise the Medical Department’s authorizations even to percent, for as late as June 1941 these amounted

to less than percent, although by that time actual strength had apparently

risen to little more than percent.

Nor did it settle the question as to what ratio of enlisted men should be

allocated to tactical units on the one hand and to nontactical units and headquarters other than The Surgeon General’s Office on the other. Differences

of opinion arose, particularly on the latterpoint. Until the middle of 1939, The

Surgeon General had been using enlisted men for nontactical assignments to the

extent of little more than of the percent authorized him at that time, leaving less than percent for tactical use. At the existing strength of the Army

(174,000 enlisted men), this permitted the maintenance in this country of no

more than two medical regiments and medical squadron—all at modified peace

strength. Surgeon General Magee reported on 30 June 1939 that the following

units were to be organized: Two additional medical regiments, one veterinary

company, one ambulance battalion, and one medical squadron. Outside the

country, there were two medical regiments, one of which was composed of

Filipinos. General Magee did not propose to transfer any personnel from

nontactical activities, having (as he asserted) already less than enough for those

activities; nevertheless, he called attention to the dearth of medical personnel

for tactical units,29 Subsequent increases in the authorized strength of the

Army to 227,000 during 1939 made possible the creation of more tactical medical

units and detachments. General Magee welcomed this increment; in May and

June 1940 when further enlargement of the Army to 375,000 was underway

and Congress raised the Medical Department’s ratio of enlisted men from to

percent or more, he recommended the establishment of more tactical medical

units, at least of certain types, than the General Staff was ready to approve—for

example, four evacuation hospitals as against two, and four surgical hospitals as

against two. No hospitals of either type had yet been activated, and up to

this point, theArmy was entirely lacking infield units to provide medical service

above the division or corps level.30 From then on, expansion of the Army proceeded even more rapidly—especially after the introduction of selective service

in 1940—and with it the need for tactical medical units, including those at the

divisional level,

year or more before the outbreak of the war, planning for the number

of units (and therefore of enlisted men as well as officers) which would be

28 (1) Memorandum (excerpt), The Surgeon General, for The Adjutant General, 15 Feb. 1939,

with endorsements thereto, 27 Apr. 1939 and 26 May 1939. (2) 54 Stat. 214. 29 Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Washington: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1939, pp. 173, 181. 30 (1) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 20 Jan. 1940, subject: Enlisted

Personnel, Medical Department. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 19

June 1940, subject: Deficiencies in Corps and Army Medical Units. (3) Annual Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940. p. 175. (4) See

footnote 21, p. 59.
62 PERSONNEL

needed in the event of actual hostilities had produced disagreements between

The Surgeon General and the General Stall'. General Magee regarded the

War Department’s Protective Mobilization Plans for 1939 and 1940 as totally

inadequate in the number of hospital centers and general and station hospitals

projected for tactical use in wartime. The General Stalf hesitated to increase

this number, presumably because of the limited initial force contemplated in

the mobilization plans and also because of desire to emphasize in them combat

units rather than service units. Eventually, however, in August 1940, the

Staff modified its plans so as to include the number of general hospitals asked

for by The Surgeon General—102—instead of the 32 originally specified.

It was in connection with the mobilization plans and in order to create reserve

of officers to staff these hospitals that The Surgeon General obtained permission to revive affiliated units in various civilian medical schools and hospitals. 31

The quota of enlisted men for nontactical units and headquarters was less

easily agreed upon than the size of the Medical Department’s tactical force,

just discussed. In February 1940, General Magee declared that Medical Department enlisted strength for these purposes was below the 4.07l5-percent

ratio which had prevailed before July 1939 and which, he said, was itself

inadequate. In June 1940, he proposed 4,85 percent of total Army strength

as the desirable ratio and continued to argue in terms of this figure until at least

the middle of 1941, The argument was bound up with his objection to “displacing” enlisted men by civilian employees in nontactical hospitals to the

extent of more than 20 percent. (His use of the word “displacement” may not

have been quite apt. Little or no actual displacement of enlisted men had

taken place—civilians had been employed mainly if not entirely to supplement

them.) If permanent displacement of 50 percent were accepted, where, he

asked, would the Medical Department, whose hospitals were continually losing

trained personnel to form cadres, get trained cadres for new nontactical hospitals and tactical units? He argued further that displacement of more

than 20 percent would seriously impair the training of tactical units then being

activated, for personnel of the latter must receive their instruction as understudies in nontactical hospitals actually in operation and rendering patient

care. Enlisted men of tactical units could not receive their training as understudies of civilian employees in nontactical hospitals when the civilians themselves had to be trained, and furthermore did not stay very long in their jobs.

The Surgeon General’s Office justified the 4.85-percent ratio on the ground

that this figure was indicated conclusively by “the experience of the Medical

Department extending over many years, both inpeace and war.” 32

31 See footnote 21, p. 59. 32 (1) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 13 Feb. 1940. (2)

Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, Sept. 1940, subject: Employment of Civilians. (3) Memorandum, Acting Surgeon General, for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, Apr. 1941,

subject: I. Increase in Authorization for Medical Department Enlisted Men for Corps Area, Service

Command, and War Department Overhead. (4) Letter, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 12 Dec. 1955. (5) Letter,

Col. Paul A. Paden, MC, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army

Medical Service, 10 Dec. 1955.
REQUIREMENTS 1939-41 63

In September 1940, when General Magee presented the 4.85-percent ratio

as formula for allocating newly inducted personnel of the National Guard

and selective service to the Medical Department, the reaction of the General

Staff was mixed. G-l considered the ratio reasonable. G-3 (operations)

thought it might be acceptable for planning purposes, but proposed that as no

“studied determination” of medical personnel requirements for nontactical

units and headquarters had apparently been made, the actual needs of each such

entity should be determined; The Surgeon General should then meet part of

their requirements by “affiliating” 33 with them the tactical units of similar

type—it seemed to G-3 that such affiliation would also facilitate the training of these units. Commenting that the allotments already tentatively made

seemed generous, G-3 recommended that no change be made in them for the

present. notation in the file containing this correspondence dated January

1941 states that General Magee’s recommendations were “adjusted” in conference, and in memorandum dated 16 April, G-l promised that any further

increases in Army strength would include recommendation that Medical

Department personnel be allocated in the ratio of 4.8 percent. The context of

the latter document indicates that the 4.8 percent applied to nontactical units

and headquarters and was therefore very close to General Magee’s 4.85 percent for these purposes. But in May 1941,34 and probably until the very end of this

period (December 1941), actual authorizations ran far below the desired ratio.

Although the War Department General Staff allotted much smaller

number of enlisted men to nontactical units and headquarters than the Surgeon General’s Office and G-l thought proper, it authorized the employment

of considerable numbers of civilians to make up the difference. In April 1941

when the enlisted allotment was only 2.2 percent, the civilian authorization

amounted to 15,000 or 33 percent of the total allotment, military and civilian, This, according to G-l, still left shortage of 22,000 enlisted men (on the

basis of the 4.85-percent ratio). In terms of actual strength, comparable

figures for which are lacking, the proportion of civilians may of course have

been somewhat different. In December 1941, General Magee reported that it

had been necessary to supplement the enlisted men allotted to hospitals by

civilians to the extent of 50 percent, and by the temporary employment of

tactical hospital units in nontactical hospitals.35 He agreed that civilians

might replace enlisted men in certain technical positions (those in which an

enlisted man could not hope to attain proficiency without long education) and

certain “scullery jobs” (which had no training value for him). 36 But he contended that the hiring of civilians itself presented problems; for example,

33 G-3 did not explain what it meant by this term. 34 Memorandum, Col. H. T. Wickert, for General Magee, May 1941, subject; Enlisted Personnel,

Medical Department.

35 (1) Memorandum, G—1, for The Surgeon General, 16 Apr. 1941, subject: I. Increase in Authorization for Medical Department Enlisted Men for Corps Area, Service Command, and War Department Overhead. (2) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for G-3, 11 Dec. 1941, subject: Personnel

for Arms and Services With Army Air Forces. 36 (1) See footnote 32 (2), p. 62. (2) Report, The Surgeon General’s Conference With Corps

Area Surgeons, 14-16 Oct. 1940.
64 PERSONNEL

their housing, messing, and the impermanence of their employment if they

were later replaced by enlisted men. Such problems proved to be matters of

some moment, although apparently they did not prevent the hospitals from

rendering adequate service. Moreover, the use of new and relatively untrained enlisted men also presented some difficulties.

The War Department General Staff enabled nontactical installations and

activities of the various services, including those of the Medical Department,

to utilize personnel of the field forces. In October 1940, when the latter were

placed under commands separate from those of the corps areas, their commanders were required to furnish the corps area commanders with such commissioned and enlisted personnel as they might request to operate their installations, pending procurement of the required personnel in the corps areas.

In February 1941, announcement was made that field force personnel would be

used to augment station complements whenever field forces were present on

post. This was part of policy which aimed at restricting permanent station

complements to the size necessary to maintain services when tactical forces

were absent. Itrepresented departure from the former policy of providing

station complements large enough for all contingencies so that tactical units

could devote the proper amount of time to training. According to the General

Staff, this expedient was necessary in order to prevent material reduction of

the number of troops assigned to field forces. Whether or not the policy resulted in diminution of the allotments of Medical Department personnel to

nontactical installations, it certainly enabled the latter to increase their complement of enlisted men, at least on temporary basis.37

G-3’s opinion that study of the personnel needs of individual Medical

Department installations would afford firmer basis for allotments was probably not shared by the Surgeon General’s Office; at any rate, no such studied

determination seems to have been made. If it were not made, the reason may

have been that the number of officers then available did not permit them to

spend the time away from their day-to-day operations. Whether such study

would have enabled allotments to be calculated with complete accuracy may

be doubted. To achieve that end in period of rapid expansion, when the

workload and other responsibilities of medical installations were constantly

shifting, the study would have had to be continuous. Nevertheless, thorough

survey of the personnel situation at each hospital, for example, might have

disclosed facts of considerable value to the policymakers. If it did not buttress General Magee’s demand for an enlisted ratio of 4.85 percent, the survey

might have enabled him to see little more clearly how he could get along

without it—as he actually had to do.

One substitute for such detailed study was an estimate of needs according

to the size of installations. For nontactical station hospitals, an estimate of

this kind existed in the form of table of organization showing the normal

37 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanders of Arms and Services, Oct. 1940, subject:

Organization, Training, and Administration of Army. (2) See footnote 21, p. 59.
REQUIREMENTS: 1939-41 65

personnel requirements for station hospitals of various bed capacities in the

Zone of Interior in time of war. 38 Early in 1940, the War Department issued

directions on the use of this table in responding to request from corps area

commander for instructions concerning the employment of civilians in the event

of mobilization. The table was to serve as guide, the local situation determining actual need, pending issuance of new table similar in purpose

which would be included in Mobilization Regulations. The old table stated

requirements only in terms of military personnel; the General Staff therefore

at the same time publicized list of “appropriate positions recommended by

The Surgeon General that may be filled by civilians in Station and General

Hospitals, Zone of Interior, during mobilization.” 39 This list was reissued in

June 1940.

Meanwhile, General Magee was asked for recommendations as to the form

and content of new table for converting bed requirements into personnel

requirements. The General Staff probably expected that the new table would

state requirements in terms of civilian personnel. General Magee, however, in

December 1940 submitted guide for determination of Medical Department

personnel in Zone of Interior station hospitals, which followed the form of the

old table of organization in specifying only military personnel, and merely

stated that corps area commanders and chiefs of arms and services could “replace in part, decrease or augment the authorized enlisted men shown in the

guide by qualified civilian employees.” When (logistics) asked for revision of the guide to show requirements for civilian as well as military personnel, General Magee’s Office gave assurance that the substitution would be made

on man-to-man basis, an explanation which satisfied G-4.40 The new guide

also, however, raised the requirements for enlisted men above those of the old

table of organization. This caused discussion within the General Staff as to

whether if the guide was approved it might not compel larger allotments to the

Medical Department than those already made, which had been based upon the

old table. The final decision as that it would not, and the guide was published

on April 1941 with the understanding that it embodied requirements, not

availabilities. Thus, the General Staff saved itself from sanctioning an

increased allotment. On the other hand, General Magee avoided the necessity

of again committing himself, except in vague terms, to the principle of substituting civilian employees for enlisted men. Nor did the Surgeon General’s

Office apparently use the guide as new factor in estimating the general requirements for enlisted men in nontactical units and headquarters, for that

Office continued to talk in terms of the 4.85-percent ratio. The Acting Surgeon

38Table ofOrganization 786, W, July 1929.

39 (1) Letter, Surgeon, Third Corps Area, to The Surgeon General, 22 Jan. 1940, subject; Civilian

Employees for Station Hospitals, with endorsements thereto, 23 Feb. 1940 and 28 Mar. 1940. (2)

Letter, The Adjutant General, to all Corps Area and Department Commanders, 28 Mar. 1940, subject:

Use of CivilianEmployees in Station Hospitals.

4° Two months after this explanation was forthcoming (March 1941), the Surgeon General’s Office

informed the corps area surgeons that civilians should replace enlisted men on three-for-two basis.

(Minutes, The Surgeon General’s Conference with Corps Area Surgeons, 10-12, Mar. 1941.)
66 PERSONNEL

General urged publication of the guide so that it could be used for planning

purposes and for the assistance of corps area surgeons in procuring properly

balanced statfs.

Civilians

]STo global figure or ratio was set during the emergency period to determine

the number of civilians who could be employed by the Medical Department.

The only formula affecting them which appears to have been discussed at this

time was the proper percentage to be employed in nontactical hospitals—a

proportion which, as we have seen, The Surgeon General held should not exceed

20 percent.
67

CHAPTER IV

Requirements: 1941-45

In May 1941, the War Plans Division of the General Staff was given the

task of preparing study on the ultimate munitions that the United States

would have to produce to defeat the Axis Powers. At the request of President Roosevelt in July and again in August, the study was expanded to

include an estimate of troop strength and total units necessary for the various

theaters. This Victory Program submitted to the President on 25 September 1941 placed total strength at 8,795,658. The production goals for munitions were immediately established on the basis of the Victory Program, but

no action was taken on troop basis until after the Japanese attack on Pearl

Harbor. The Victory Program became the War Munitions Program at that

time, and the preparation of intermediate troop bases became necessary. The

1943 troop basis was set at 8,208,000 (7,533,000 enlisted men, 675,000 officers)

the 1944 troop basis reduced overall strength to 7,700,000. In the spring of

1942, The Surgeon General estimated his requirements for the various corps of

the MedicalDepartment based on the strength estimates of the Victory Program

and the 1943 troop basis, as yet unapproved.

MEDICAL CORPS

In April 1942, in compliance with request from the Assistant Chief of

Staff, G-l, War Department, General Magee estimated that the United States

had total of 176,000 physicians, and remarked that “while many are overage

or have retired from practice it will be assumed that the entire number

is available for the period of national emergency.” He doubted that the

Federal services, including the Military Establishment, could obtain more

than third of these and declared that, if no more than 50,000 were available for the Army, the existing allotments and tables of organization would

have to be reduced by one-third. He estimated that under these existing

allotments and tables 75,000 physicians would be needed for 7,500,000-man

Army, or one for every 100 men. Initially, however, the ratio would be

Watson, Mark Skinner: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations. United States Army

in World War II. The War Department: Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950,

pp.338-349.

Kreidberg, Marvin A., and Henry, Merton G.: History of Military Mobilization in the U.S. Army,

1775-1945. Washington U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1955, pp. 628-629. (DA Pamphlet 20-212.)
68 PERSONNEL

greater, decreasing as the troop basis rose. In suggesting that he might

be allowed 50,000, The Surgeon General at this early date had arrived at

figure very close to the 45,000 ultimately granted him.

In the course of the next few months, the question of the ratios of physicians to troops in foreign armies was injected into the discussion of the

desirable strength of the Medical Corps. This point may have been raised

at this time by the fact that in July plans for the first Allied assault landing

(Operation TORCH) were being formulated. It was the President himself

who raised the question by telling the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of

the War Manpower Commission that he could not reconcile the British ratio

of physicians per 1,000 troops with the United States ratio of per 1,000.

At about the same time, subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor

and Education dealing with war manpower issued preliminary report in

which it stated, after noting that the ratio of doctors to military strength

in the American Army appeared to be more than twice that maintained

by the Allies of the United States, that British experience should be studied

in order to work out balanced plan for use of this scarce national resource.

Shortly after this recommendation was published, The Surgeon General

took note of the President’s comment in communication to the General Staff,

After stating belief that the British ratio was 4.5 per 1,000 instead of 3,

he said that the ratio of physicians to population in Great Britain was considerably lower than in the United States and that because of proximity to active

operations “a large percentage” of British casualties were cared for in civilian

hospitals. Moreover, not only were standards of medical care much higher

in the United States than in Great Britain but the British themselves had recognized the inadequacy of their medical service by requesting “large numbers”

of medical officers from the United States before we entered the war. Then,

The Surgeon General, after reviewing the history of congressional action on

ratios, pointed out that the act of April 1939 in authorizing 1,424 Medical

Corps officers had established ratio of 6.33 per 1,000 of enlisted strength. He

contended, however, that this figure provided Medical Corps officers only for

administrative overhead and hospital care, not for combat units or for the organization and training of tactical medical units. He asserted that it had been

demonstrated “through all the lean years prior to the present emergency” that

this ratio would provide only for the necessary care of the sick “in accordance

with the accepted standards of American medicine.” But during war, he

continued, it was necessary to man tactical units and to provide relatively

higher proportion of Medical Corps officers for the increased hospitalization

incident to the care of battle casualties and troops living under adverse cliMemorandum, The Surgeon General (Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer), for Personnel

Division, Services of Supply, 27 Apr. 1942.

Memorandum, The Surgeon General (General Magee), for Chief of Staff, 23 Oct. 1942.
REQUIREMENTS 11)41-45 69

matic and general health conditions in various parts of the world. Small garrisons and task forces scattered throughout the world increased medical

personnel requirements, although The Surgeon General said it was difficult

to evaluate that factor accurately. He pointed out that he had reduced tables

of organization and service command allotments sufficiently to save more than

8,600 doctors.

General Magee declared that he would be remiss in his duty if he “failed

to emphatically protest any reduction of medical officers which would lower

the standards of medical service below that confidently expected by the

American public. Should these standards be dangerously lowered future criticism would be mainly directed against the Army.” ‘Amy further material

reduction,” he said, “will lower medical efficiency to dangerous level.” He

believed that 50,000 physicians for an army of 7.5 million men would enable

his Department to perform its mission.

In concluding this strong statement of his position, The Surgeon General

expressed his conviction that from the national point of view the problem was

not so much one of reducing the number of physicians in the Army as it was one

of redistributing available physicians to meet civil requirements.

The question of foreign ratios and also the proper ratio of doctors for the

U.S. Army came before the Committee to Study the Medical Department of the

Army. Those who testified on personnel matters included not only officers

from the Surgeon General’s Office and the Services of Supply, but also individuals from the Directing Board of the Procurement and Assignment Service,

the Director of the War Manpower Commission, which in April 1942 had incorporated the Procurement and Assignment Service into its organization,

officials of the American National Red Cross, and other civilians.

Shortly after General Magee’s reply to President Roosevelt concerning

the ratios of foreign and American doctors in army medical services throughout the world, the committee made its report. Among other comments, the

committee stated, on what authority is unknown, that the ratios of Medical

Corps officers to military personnel adopted by the Army was 6.5 per 1,000

troops in the United States and 10.5 per 1,000 in theaters of operations, but this

ratio in foreign armies was not obtainable. Furthermore, the committee stated

that it did not feel competent to express an opinion as to the adequacy of the

American ratios.”

Meanwhile, the Deputy Chief of Staff in October 1942 asked The Surgeon

General to submit plan for the medical service of fully expanded army (fig.

18). The plan, concurred in by the Air and Ground Surgeons and presented in December 1942, proposed 49,100 doctors for an army of 7,500,000—a ratio of

about 6.5 per 1,000—and recommended reduction of allotments to Zone of

Report, Committee to Study the Medical Department, 1942.
YO PERSONNEL

Figure 18.—Representative Army surgeons. Upper left: Brig. Gen. John A. Rogers,

MC, First U.S. Army. Upper right: Brig. Gen. Thomas D. Hurley, MC. Third U.S. Army

Lower left: Brig. Gen. Joseph I. Martin, MC, Fifth U.S. Army. Lower right: Col. (later

Brig. Gen.) William A. Hagins, MC, Sixth U.S. Army.
REQUIREMENTS 11)41-4.", 71

Figure 18.—Continued. Upper left: Col. Myron P. Rudolph, MC, Seventh U.S. Army.

Upper right: Brig. Gen. George W. Rice, MC, Eighth U.S. Army. Lower left: Brig. Gen.

William E. Shambora, MC, was colonel when Surgeon, Ninth U.S. Army. Lower right: ColFrederic B. Westervelt, MC, Tenth U.S. Army.

663076 —63
72 PERSONNEL

Interior installations based on new personnel guides to be promulgated. The

proposed allotment to the threemajor forces were as follows:

Army Ground Forces Allotment

Units in the 1943 troop basis 13, 222

Army Air Forces: Units in the 1943 troop basis 4, 553

Zone of Interior (including station hospital staffs, schools, and so forth) 7, 358

Services of Supply:

Units in the 1943 troop basis for medical service (3 million overseas) 14, 254

Zone of Interior (including station and general hospitals, technician schools,

Medical Replacement Training Centers, laboratories, overhead and procurement and supply activities, except those provided by Army Air Forces) 8, 809

Total 49,100

After reduction of 827.

After reduction of 262.

After reduction of 361.

After reduction of 2,805.

Includes 904 allotted to War Department filler and loss replacement pool.

After discussion about the number of doctors, the Deputy Chief of Staff

in March 1943 set the permissible number at 48,000 for an Army strength of

8,248,000 (the 1943 troop basis plus 40,000 Army nurses). Six months later,

however, G-l stated that in view of reduction of the troop basis to 7,686,000 the War Department could not support the previous figure and ordered

restudy to reduce it, indicating that 45,000 would be about the right number.

Shortly afterward, Army Service Forces headquarters directed The Surgeon

General to modify his plan for the utilization of Medical Corps officers, using

basis of approximately 45,000 officers for an army of 7,686,000 as of

31 December 1943.

At the end of September 1943, Medical Corps strength stood at 39,951 and

total Army strength at 7,273,784, or ratio of 5.49 doctors per 1,000 strength.

Forty-five thousand doctors for an Army of 7,686,000 would have provided

ratio of slightly less than per 1,000. In protesting against this reduction, The

Surgeon General declared that 48,000 was an irreducible minimum. Although

no action seems to have been taken on this rejoinder, The Surgeon General

later noted that the reduction to 45,000 had been made while draft of doctors

was under discussion, and claimed that it was without prejudice to additional

requirements after January 1944. At this time, there was no question of

Memorandum, Acting Surgeon General, for Deputy Chief of Staff (through Military Personnel

Division, Services of Supply), 14 Dec. 1942, subject: Availability of Physicians.

(1) Memorandum, Deputy Chief of Staff, for Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 10 Mar.

1943, subject: Availability of Physicians. (2) Memorandum, G—1, for Commanding General, Army

Service Forces, attention: Military Personnel Division, 18 Sept. 1943, subject; Officer Requirements.

(3) Memorandum, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, for The Surgeon General, 22 Sept.

1943, subject; Officer Requirements, Medical Corps.

(1) Memorandum, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, for The Surgeon General, 22 Sept. 1943, subject: Officer Requirements, Medical Corps, with 1st endorsement thereto, Oct. 1943. (2) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Assistant Chief of Staff. G-l, 11 Sept. 1944, subject: ConferenceWith Chairman, Procurement and Assignment Service.
REQUIREMENTS: 1941-15 73

exceeding an actual strength of 48,000 or even 45,000, since the total number

of Medical Corps officers on duty was only about 40,000 as late as the end of

December 4943 (table 4).

By the end of September 1944, however, the number on duty was approximately 45,000, and on October, the War Department again established that

figure as ceiling; any excess was to be disposed of either by transferring

officers to the Veterans’ Administration or by separating them from the service. Two days later, The Surgeon General stated that 47,000 as of 31 December

1944 was “firm requirement” and that further reduction of tables of organization was “out of the question.” On November 1944, his appeal was rejected,

but the War Department acknowledged that it was “impracticable to maintain an exact ceiling of 45,000” and that “some tolerance or leeway appears

desirable on the long side.” 10 In any event, the strength of the Medical Corps

was permitted to exceed the ceiling; at the end of November 1944, it stood at

46,747 and reached its maximum—about 48,000—in July 1945 (table 1).

Procurement and Assignment Service

The Procurement and Assignment Service, which had been established

shortly before Pearl Harbor as coordinating agency for all Federal services

for medical, dental, and veterinary personnel, in April 1942 created Committee on Allocation of Medical Personnel, which was charged with determining safe minimum standard of medical care for civilians. The minutes of

the first meeting of this committee (26 April 1942) show that it entered on its

task with the idea not only of allocating personnel to civilian and military

service, but of trying to constrain the Army into what it considered an efficient

use of physicians. Dr. Harold S. Diehl, Dean of Medical Sciences, University

of Minnesota, the chairman, said that the committee had to plan to prevent

medical personnel from being put into positions where their special qualifications were not utilized. Dr. lioscoe G. Leland, Director of the Bureau of Medical Economics of the American Medical Association, member, expressed

the opinion that it would be the committee’s job to get the Army to change

its position on requirements by reducing the ratio of physicians to Army

strength and by replacing certain physicians with medical administrative personnel. Dr. Diehl then said that “if we have case and can get the figures to

prove it, we can get theArmy torevise their demands.”

This is one of the first indications that the members of the Procurement

and Assignment Service actually meant to put limit on the number of physicians the Army could have so as to keep civilian communities from being

stripped of doctors. The sequel was that for the duration of World War II

Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, Oct. 1944, subject:

Medical Officer Requirements and Availabilities. 10 Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General, Nov. 1944, subject: Medical Corps

Officers—Procurement, Assignment, and Ceiling.
74 PERSONNEL

the Medical Department was governed in many aspects of its personnel procurement program by the wishes of civilian agency.

On November 1942, at meeting attended among others by Surgeon

General James C. Magee; Vice Adm. Ross Mclntire, his Navy counterpart;

and Paul V. McNutt, Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, the Procurement and Assignment Service recommended ratio of physician to 1,500

of population as minimum for civilian medical service in each State. This

of course would indirectly set limit on the procurement of doctors for the

armed services. Admiral Mclntire agreed that every possible effort should

be made to maintain the proposed ratio and stated that the Navy could operate

with “anywhere from to 6.5 in this war.” General Magee accepted the

1:1,500 ratio for civilian medical service, but objected to committing himself as

to the precise number of doctors the Army would need. The Medical Department, he said, was reducing its figures “as far as our conscience and intelligence

will let us,” but “if it comes to point of making immediate decisions, am

not in position to do so at the present time.” Mr. McNutt was obviously

dissatisfied with The Surgeon General’s position. He said that the Procurement and Assignment Service would give the Armed Forces all it possibly

could, but that he knew “full well” that tables of organization had been too

high. “If you want my candid appraisal of the situation,” he said, “we cannot

be dealing with any 8.2 or 8.3 per 1,000. We had better be talking about 6.4

or 6,5.” The latter ratios would have given the Army about 48,000 doctors

figured on strength of 7.5 million, or in fact very nearly the 50,000 which

The Surgeon General had earlier suggested. That suggestion had probably

been made, however, with view to giving the Army not as many doctors as

would be considered ideal but simply enough to enable the Medical Department to fulfill its function.

The Procurement and Assignment Service adhered to the 1:1,500 ratio

for civilian medical service throughout the war as basis for authorizing the

military services to procure doctors in the several States. Many States did

not possess so high ratio; some had higher. The Procurement and Assignment Service had smallpower to improve their positions by reallocating civilian

doctors, and in fact, it achieved littlein thatrespect.

In discussing the Procurement and Assignment Service’s lack of power

to relocate doctors, the vice chairman of that organization had stated:

Our position would have been much easier, and some of our obvious failures might

have been avoided, if we had possessed the same “power” over the relocation of civilian

doctors to needy communities that we had to limit the commissioning of medical officers

to those men considered “available.” The fact that New York and Chicago, throughout the

war, had an excess of doctors and dentists that we could not relocate, weakened our position and prevented the accomplishment of our obligations to the civilians. If another

great war should break out, personally think that body with power over all professional people should be set up. 11

11 Letter, Harvey B. Stone, M.D., to Col. C. H. Goddard, MC, Office of The Surgeon General,

June 1952.
REQUIREMENTS 1WU1 75

Figure 19.—Brig. Gen. Robert Mills, DC, wartime director of the

Dental Division, Office of The Surgeon General.

DENTAL CORPS

By the start of World War 11, experience had shown that any ratio of less

than dental officer for each 750 men would be grossly inadequate. Although

formal requests for procurement objectives were generally brief, containing no

discussion of the method of calculation, it is clear that the ultimate goal of the

Surgeon General’s Office was an overall ratio of dentist for each 500 men.

This ratio was agreed upon informally between the director of the Dental

Division (fig. 19) and the chief of the Personnel Service, both in the Office of

The Surgeon General. 12 Even though it was not “officially recognized,” the

July request for procurement objective stated that it was based on ratio of

dentists per 1,000, and permission was asked to appoint up to 9,000 Dental

Corps officers for an Army of 4.5 million.13 In November 1942, The Surgeon

General estimated that in view of the planned increase in the size of the Army

12 Medical Department, United States Army. Dental Service in World War II. Washington U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1955.

ls Letter, Office of The Surgeon General, to Commanding General, Services of Supply, July 1942,

subject: Procurement Objective, Dental Corps, Army of the United States.
76 PERSONNEL

lie would need 17,248 dentists. This estimate was accepted by the War

Department General Staff. 14

The overall ratio of dental officers (1 to 500) which the Dental Service

considered necessary was never reached during the entire war period except in

September and October 1942. The problem of meeting the needs of new

recruits for dental rehabilitation, which was particularly serious during the

early part of the war, seems to have been partially met by deferring all but work of an emergency nature.

Early in 1943, the Procurement and Assignment Service determined that

dentist was required for each 2,500 civilians and that total of 22,620 could

be spared for the Army and Navy, thereby leaving 50,250 in civilian practice. 15

This standard and its application could be criticized on several grounds. In

the first place, the standard was arbitrary, being based more on opinion than

knowledge. Moreover, not all communities had as many as dentist per 2,500

civilians—many had not above half that ratio—and there was no machinery to

give them more or even to restrict recruiting to other areas. Finally, if the

number of dentists that could be spared for the Armed Forces had been arrived

at simply by counting as available all dentists in excess of the 1; 2,500 ratio in

communities possessing higher ratio, the number would have been considerably larger than 22,620. The military authorities, however, did not raise these

or other objections to the calculations of the Procurement and Assignment Service; they could hardly have effectively challenged formula which gave them

the right to solicit one-third of the Nation’s dentists for 12 million men while

two-thirds were reserved for 120 million civilians.

In late 1943, Army Service Forces set ceiling of 15,200 for the Dental

Corps. According to Col. George F. Jeffcott,DC:

The manner in which the ceiling for the Dental Corps was established, and the exact

date, are not entirely clear. In memorandum to the Deputy Surgeon General, of Sep 43,

Lt Col D. G. Hall of the Personnel Service, SGO, stated that his office had “that day” been

notified of revised requirement based on changed plans in ASF *. Other incidental

references [however] indicate that representatives of the Dental Division [SGO], the Military Personnel Division, SGO, and of G-l attended conferences on the matter before

decision was reached. It is also probable that PAS [Procurement and Assignment Service]

had hand in the matter, but the extent to which its influence affected ASF is not known.

VETERINARY CORPS

Unlike the Medical, Dental, and Army Nurse Corps, the size of the

Veterinary Corps could not be calculated by simple ratio of veterinarians

to the overall strength of the Army. One factor that complicated the process of calculation was present to some degree before the United States entered

14 Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General, 27 Nov. 1942, subject; Increase in Procurement Objective for The Surgeon General (Dental Corps). 15Minutes, Committee on Dentistry, Procurement and Assignment Service, 20 Feb. 1943. 10 See footnote 12, p. 75.
REQUIREMENTS: 1941-45 77

the war—the inspection of food by the Army Veterinary Service for other branches of the Military Establishment and even for certain nonmilitary

agencies of Government. During the war, one of the most important tasks of Veterinary Corps officers was the procurement-inspection of food for the

iSavy and the Marine Corps; by the end of the war, Army veterinarians were inspecting about 90 percent of the Navy’s food at the time of

procurement. 17

New and increased requests for veterinary officers throughout the war

period therefore perplexed the General Staff, for no fixed basis, such as

troop strength, could be used as guide in making their decisions. 18 Army

Regulations No. 40-2035, 18 December 1942, governing veterinarians, listed

the number of assistants station veterinarian could have (depending on

animal strength) and stated further:

station having human strength of approximately 1,000 will be allowed one or

more veterinary officers, as circumstances warrant, for duty in connection with meat

and dairy hygiene, the maintenance of instruction courses, or other duties pertaining

to the veterinary service. At depots, ports of embarkation and debarkation, purchasing

points, and other places where foods of animal origin are purchased, stored, or handled

by the Army, the assignment of veterinary officers will be based on actual need as determined by The Surgeon General.

In practice, The Surgeon General from time to time requested new procurement objectives which would authorize the Medical Department to obtain additional veterinary officers as the occasion seemed to demand. Although the objectives granted were not as large as those he requested, they

enabled the corps to be moderately enlarged. No ceiling appears to have been

set for the Veterinary Corps until January 1945 and even this was more in the nature of procurement objective, since the War Department General

Staff not only set figure (2,150) somewhat above the actual strength but

authorized procurement of the necessary officers from certain specified, though

restricted, sources. 19

SANITARY CORPS

Throughout the war, no personnel ceiling was established for the Sanitary

Corps, and no ratio w~as adopted as means of computing the numbers required. The Surgeon General merely requested and justified successive procurement objectives which, if approved by the War Department General

Staff", permitted him to add certain numbers to the corps. In February 1945,

further commissioning in the corps was ordered stopped, the membership

being considered large enough for the Army’s needs.

17 Annual Reports, Veterinary Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1942-46. 18 Information from Maj. E. B. Miller, VC, U.S. Army Medical Service historian, 1950. 19 Semiannual Report, Procurement Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army, Jan.-31 May 1945.
78 PERSONNEL

Figure 20.—Brig. Gen. Edward Reynolds, MAC, Chief,

Medical Administrative Corps.

PHARMACY CORPS

The number of personnel required by the Pharmacy Corps was determined by The Surgeon General. Since most of the pharmaceutical work in the Army could be done by pharmacy technicians working under supervision,

the 72 Pharmacy Corps officers permitted by the act of 1943 which created

the corps proved to be more than sufficient throughout the war from The

Surgeon General's point of view.

MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS

On 30 June 1940, the ratio of Medical Administrative Corps (fig. 20)

officers on active duty to Medical Corps officers was little more than 1: 25;

years later, the ratio had risen to 1: 2.4. This was due not to the establishment of formal requirement for Medical Administrative Corps officers

but rather to the transfer of administrative duties from Medical Corps officers to qualified nonprofessional personnel, thereby freeing the physicians for

strictly professional work.
REQUIREMENTS: 1941-45 79

Ill April 1912 when, in reply to questions from G-l, The Surgeon General was discussing the substitution of Medical Administrative Corps for

Medical Corps officers, he said that whereas 75,000 physicians would be needed

according to existing tables of organization and allotments, probably 10 percent of that number, or 7,500, could be supplanted by Medical Administrative

Corps officers. “It is doubtful that all of these or additional substitutions

would prove of economic value,” he explained. 20

Apparently not until the Medical Department found itself limited by the

ceiling on doctors did it envisage the great number and variety of assignments

that members of the Medical Administrative Corps were qualified to fill.

Nevertheless, in report on the procurement and supply of Medical Corps

officers, the Control Division, Services of Supply, stated in June 1942 that as

result of the serious shortage of Medical Corps officers the Medical Department

had an obligation to release them from “all administrative procurement, and

similar duties which can be assigned to nonmedical personnel.” This report

did not limit those to be substituted to members of the Medical Administrative

Corps, but suggested the use of Sanitary Corps, branch immaterial, and Army

Specialist Corps officers as well.21 In July 1942, The Adjutant General issued

letter requiring the relief of Medical Corps officers from duties that did not

demand professional training.

The Committee to Study the Medical Department reviewed the problem

of replacement of Medical Corps officers and made the following recommendations

1. The practice of assigning Medical Corps officers, even temporarily, to

any type of work that could be performed by nonprofessional personnel should

be discontinued.

2. Medical and dental officers should be utilized to the fullest extent in

their professional fields.

3. All professional personnel engaged in administrative tasks except those

who had lost the skills necessary for professional work should be replaced by

Medical Administrative Corps personnel.

4. More nonmedical men who had proved competent in managing establishments providing medical care should be used in positions of greater

responsibility in Army hospitals and even in the higher echelons of the

Medical Department.

5. The Medical Department should take steps, “even at this late date,”

[1942] to increase greatly the number of Medical Administrative Corps trainees

per month.

The committee believed that statements made by The Surgeon General's

representatives that the supply of such officers would equal demand by Jan20 Memorandum, The Surgeon General (Col. John A. Rogers, MC, Executive Officer), for Personnel

Division. Services of Supply, 27 Apr. 1942. 21 The Army Specialist Corps was composed of administrative, professional, scientific, and technical

specialists who were “civilians in uniform” functioning under civil service. The corps existed less

than year, being abolished in late 1942.

663076 —63
80 PERSONNEL

uary 1943 were far too optimistic. 22 As by that date only about 5,900 were on

duty in contrast to the later peak strength of nearly 20,000, the committee’s

belief seems justified (table 1). Actually, the Department did not have enough

Medical Administrative Corps officers until nearly year after the committee

met; even then, the sufficiency lasted but few months.

Not all high ranking Medical Department officers agreed on the extent to

which Medical Administrative Corps officers should replace those of the Medical Corps. The commanding officer of the Medical Replacement Training

Center at Camp Pickett, Va., was reported in 1942 as insisting that he “could

not possibly” run his center “on sound basis” with fewer than two and onehalf or three Medical Corps officers per training company; this would have

required either 10 or 12 for each battalion. At the same time, it was reported

that the training center at Camp Barkeley, Tex., was operating with only three

Medical Corps officers per battalion. 23

In 1943, the training center at Camp Grant, 111., noted that young Medical

Administrative Corps officers were rapidly replacing doctors and dentists, and

that in most cases the replacement had proved very satisfactory. Whereas, on

30 June 1942, 37 percent of the 383 officers at the center had been Medical Corps,

25 percent Dental Corps, and 19 percent Medical Administrative Corps officers,

year later the percentage of medical and dental officers had fallen to 10 and 2,

respectively, while that of Medical Administrative Corps officers had risen to

73 in total officer group of 423.

In the fall of 1943—at time when difficulties were foreseen in furnishing

doctors to all the units and installations which The Surgeon General believed

to be in need of them—General Kirk determined to effect more widespread

replacement. He decided to replace one of the two battalion surgeons with

specially trained Medical Administrative Corps officer to be known as battalion

surgeon’s assistant and to make other substitutions of similar nature. 24 Although fear was expressed that such substitution in the battalion was real

source of danger since it was “unquestionable that many such untrained officers

will assume unwarranted diagnostic powers and seriously endanger the health

of the soldier under treatment,” The Surgeon General disagreed with this belief,

declaring flatly that the battalion surgeon’s assistant was not given that assignment to make diagnoses or to treat the seriously injured. “He is put in there

to do the administration of the detachment, command the litter bearers and

assist the battalion surgeon General Kirk reasoned that since there

had been no trouble in the hospitals with Medical Administrative Corps officers

attempting to assume professional duties there was no reason to anticipate

22 Report, Committee to Study the Medical Department, pp. 11, 38-39.

23 Letter, 1st Lt. T. C. M. Robinson, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Col.

Frank Wakeman, c/o Col. George M. Edwards, William Beaumont General Hospital, El Paso, Tex.,

13 Dec. 1942. 24 Annual Report, Operations Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

U.S. Army, 1943-44.
REQUIREMENTS: 1941-15 81

trouble in the units. 25 Actually, although there may have been complaints

against individual officers, the Office of the Surgeon, Army Ground Forces, was

reported as stating that the work of the assistants had been very satisfactory. 26

Fortunately, there were about 1,500 Medical Administrative Corps officers

in replacement pools in the United States at the time The Surgeon General

decided to use them in this way,27 and beginning in January 1944, they were

ordered to school in successive groups at Camp Barkeley to be trained as battalion surgeon’s assistants. Ultimately (by May 1945), about 2,100 were graduated; 28 in the later stages of the training program, recently commissioned

Medical Administrative Corps officers were sent to the school.

In addition to serving as battalion surgeon’s assistants, Medical Administrative Corps officers came to be assigned to other positions formerly reserved

for doctors. In November 1943, The Surgeon General proposed using them as

registrars in hospitals. Some months later, the General Staff announced that

they were to be preferred for assignment not only as registrars but as executive officers in station and general hospitals both at home and overseas. 29 The

Surgeon General objected to making them executive officers of general hospitals

on the ground that these officers must act for and in the absence of the commanding officer and must have professional appreciation of the proposals

presented in order that the personnel of the hospital might be properly utilized.

As consequence, the General Staff omitted reference to the use of Medical

Administrative Corps (also Pharmacy and Sanitary Corps) officers as executive officers of general hospitals in the restatement of its policy inAugust 1944.30

There were other places in hospitals, however, where Medical Administrative Corps officers could relieve doctors. For example, in the later war years

when the bed census in Army hospitals in the United States was running high,

they were made ward property officers. In some hospitals, too, they came to

serve as administrative assistants to the chiefs of the medical and surgical

services. 31

The extent to which Medical Administrative Corps officers were used in

conjunction with Medical Corps officers in general hospitals of the Zone of

Interior during the later war years is indicated by the table of suggested allotments published by the War Department in May 1944 (table 3). similar

situation came to prevail in other Medical Department installations as well;

for example, in the replacement training centers, which late in the war were

using large percentages of Medical Administrative Corps officers.

25 Letter, Surgeon General Kirk, to Maj. Gen. Morrison C. Stayer, Surgeon, North African Theater

of Operations, U.S. Army, 11 Sept. 1944, in reply to General Stayer’s letter of Sept. 1944, in which

General Stayer had reported the comments of one of his subordinate officers.

26 Semiannual History of Medical Administrative Corps and Sanitary Corps, Jan.—31 May 1945.

27 See footnote 24, p. 80.

28 See footnote 26. 29 War Department CircularNo. 99, Mar. 1944. so \\rar Department CircularNo. 327, Aug. 1944. 31 Annual Reports, William Beaumont General Hospital, 1944 Ashburn General Hospital,

1944 and Fifth Service Command, 1945.
82 PERSONNEL

Figure 21.—Col. David E. Liston, MC, Deputy Chief Surgeon

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army.

As late as 10 years after the war, there were differences of opinion among

Medical Corps officers as to how completely Medical Administrative Corps

officers had been able to perform certain duties previously performed by Medical Corps officers and noncommissioned officers. General Kirk stated that

regardless of the number of Medical Administrative Corps officers employed

“there were never enough doctors to do the job properly” until V-E Day.

Several other medical officers also expressed opinions based on their wartime

Table 3.—Numbers of Medical and Medical Administrative Corps officers suggested {1944)

for Zone of Interior general hospitals of various sizes

Number of beds Medical Corps officers (number)

Medical Ad- ministrative

Corns officers (number)

Number of beds Medical Corps officers (number)

Medical Ad- ministrative

Corps officers (number)

1,000-. 35 24 2,500 60 39

1.500 46 30 3,000 64 44 1,750_- 50 33 3,500 70 47

2,000 55 36 4,000 80 56

Source: War Department Circular No. 209, 26 May 1944.
REQUIREMENTS 1941-45 83

Figure 22.—Col. Fred J. Fielding, MC, Office of The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army.

experiences. Col. David E. Liston, MC (fig. 21), Deputy Chief Surgeon,

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, stated his belief that “the in- creased number of Medical Administrative Corps officers did not materially

affect the requirement for doctors and did affect [that is, reduce] the requirement for senior noncommissioned officers. Often the Medical Corps officer

had to exercise an equal degree of supervision over the Medical Administrative

officer to that exercised over his NCO previously.” On the other hand, Col.

Fred J. Fielding, MC (fig. 22), stated that in the later war years tables of

organization and equipment “were culled to eliminate AIC positions of administrative nature except for CO [commanding officer].” He went on to state

that when in 1944 Medical Administrative Corps officers were trained as

battalion surgeoivs assistants “*this produced direct replacement of

many MC officers formerly required in position not of administrative nature

but related to the professional duty field.” Lt. Col. Paul A. Paden, MC, also

favored using Medical Administrative Corps Officers where possible to relieve

Medical Corps officers. He went so far as to state: “Except for training,

there was no reason why other than few Medical Department officers should

have been assigned to any type of unit until just before its actual employment

in theater of operations.” He felt that even in combat the treatment should
84 PERSONNEL

have been minimal and that therefore Medical Administrative Corps officer

could easily have been battalion surgeon’s assistant. 32

ARMY NURSE CORPS

During the first months of the war, the Surgeon General’s Office made

its estimates for nurse requirements and submitted them to the General Staff,

which customarily accepted them. The ratio was approximately nurses for

1,000 overall strength. In September 1942, when the troop basis was raised to

8,200,000, the Surgeon General’s Office transmitted to the General Staff figure

of 51,177 as its estimate of the nurses required to serve force of that size.33

On this occasion, the General Staff did not approve the estimate. Some time

during the first months of 1943, G-3 notified the Surgeon General’s Office

that 51,177 was too high figure and that the number was being held at 40,000

(including physical therapists and dietitians), which had been previously

authorized for the fiscal year ending on 30 June 1944. The nurse requirement

was verbally agreed to by theAssistant Chief, Operations Service, Office of The

Surgeon General, but neither the Nursing Division nor the Personnel Division,

Office of The Surgeon General, nor the nursing authorities of the War Manpower Commission, were informed that the authorized figure was to be

retained. 34

As result, the Superintendent of the Army Nurse Corps (fig. 23) and

various nursing organizations engaged in recruiting continued to assume for

months that the War Department had authorized quota of 51,000 nurses.

Therefore, when the Superintendent heard that the budget contained provision

for only 40,000 she refused to believe that the budget directive constituted

limitation and insisted that it would be impossible to operate with such

number. The nursing organizations also continued to use the goal of 51,000

to impress the nursing profession with the critical need for recruits.35

In memorandum to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, on

18 December 1943, General Kirk argued that the ceiling figure of 40,000, which

actually included not only nurses but physical therapists and dietitians, was

far too small to meet the requirements of the 1944 troop basis. In reaching

32 (1) Letter, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk (Ret.), to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director,

Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 12 Dec. 1955. (2) Col. David E. Liston, MC, to Col. John

B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, Jan. 1956. (3) Letter,

Col. Fred .1. Fielding, MC, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical

Service, 12 Dec. 1955. (4) Lt. Col. Paul A. Paden, MC, to Col. C. H. Goddard, MC, Office of The

Surgeon General, June 1952. 33 At per 1,000 of troop strength, the estimate would have been 49,200. The higher figure may

have been set in order to provide for losses. 34 Blanchfield, Florence A., and Standlee, Mary W. The Army Nurse Corps in World War II. [Official record.]

35 (1) Haupt, A. C. National War Nursing Program. Hospitals 17 26—30, April 1943. (2) “Have

You Thought It Through, Private Duty Nurse?” Am. J. Nursing 43 522-523, June 1943. (Moreover,

the Subcommittee on Nursing of the National Defense Council’s Health and Medical Committee, unaware of the true situation, used the prospective depletion of civilian resources as lever to secure an authoritative place for the Nursing Supply and Distribution Service in the Procurement

and Assignment Service.)
REQUIREMENTS: RMl^o 85

Figure 23.—Col. Florence A. Blanchfield, ANC, Superintendent

of the Army Nurse Corps.

this conclusion, lie relied largely on the use of ratio of nurse to 10 fixed

beds, the approximate ratio established for Zone of Interior hospitals and

theater of operations fixed hospitals.38

G-l of the War Department General Stall' answered The Surgeon General’s protest, but before doing so, it assembled further data on the subject.

From the Inspector General, G-l obtained report by Maj. Gen. Howard

McC. Snyder, MC, the medical representative on the Inspector General’s staff.

General Snyder cited recent survey of 95 Zone of Interior hospitals which

showed that they averaged 19 beds and 12.4 patients per nurse without consistently overworking the nurses; this was bolstered by consideration of the

facts which the War Department Manpower Board used to justify its estimate

of Army nurse requirements for hospitals in the Zone of Interior; namely,

nurse per 12 beds in general hospitals and nurse per 12 to TD/o beds in station

hospitals. General Snyder pointed out that only 30.6 percent of the patients in

the 95 hospitals surveyed were bed patients, which reduced the amount of

nursing care required. Taking this into consideration, and allowing for the

dispersion of beds necessitated in part by the care of patients having communiseWar Department CircularNo. 306, 22 Nov. 1943.
86 PERSONNEL

cable diseases, he estimated that 750-bed “cantonment hospital” would require

40 nurses, or nurse per 18% beds. His general conclusion was that The

Surgeon General’s estimate of nurse per 10 beds was excessive and that the

allotment of nurses for Zone of Interior hospitals should be reduced to nurse

per IT beds and for fixed-bed theater of operations hospitals to nurse per

15 beds.

G-l added some observations of its own, chiefly on the subject of how

many fixed beds actually were required, and announced on January 1944 that

the ratio for Zone of Interior hospitals would be nurse to 15 beds and for

theater of operations fixed hospitals nurse to 12 beds. The Surgeon General

was to recommend reductions in allowances for Zone of Interior hospitals and

in tables of organization to meet these ratios for the purpose of keeping within

the 40,000 ceiling. G-l concluded that “the present ceiling of 40,000 nurses

will amply meet the overall requirements provided the ratio of nurses to beds

is decreased, convalescent hospitals established, and maximum use made of

semi-skilled aides, civilians, and corpsmen to replace nurses.” The only concession The Surgeon General’s Personnel Service was able to secure was that

physical therapists and dietitians, of which the combined total at that time

was approximately 1,700, would not be lumped with the nurses but would be

inaddition tothe 40,000 limit.37

In response to this directive, The Surgeon General again entered plea

for the to 10 ratio. He proposed, however, to retain the 40,000 ceiling “for

the present” by filling all units in the troop basis with Army nurses at the

existing table-of-organization figures—which would require 38,818 of the

40,000—and supplementing those who remained in the Zone of Interior by

civilian nurses so as to provide ratio of nurse to 10 beds. G-l rejected this

proposal of 25 February 1944, “in view of the critical shortage of military and

civilian nurses,” and few days later, the Deputy Chief of Staff enjoined compliance with the original directive of January. 38

In little more than month, on April 1944, General Somervell was

able to report that this directive was being carried out—in part. The Surgeon General had modified the tables of organization and also the allotments

for Zone of Interior installations to provide the required ratios of nurses to

fixed beds—1 to 12 and to 15,respectively. As to maintaining the 40,000 ceiling, General Somervell referred to study by The Surgeon General which

showed that total strength of 47,677 nurses was necessary to meet requirements for 1944, taking into account the new ratios but not allowing for potential requirements of 3,646 nurses “that can be foreseen at this time.” The figure of 47,677 nurses required was arrived at as follows:

37 (1) Memorandum, G-l, for Chief of Staff, Jan. 1944, subject: Nurse Personnel Requirements.

(2) Letter, G-l, to Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, to The Surgeon General, and

to The Adjutant General, Jan. 1944, subject: Nurse Personnel Requirements.

38 (1) Disposition Form, G-l, to The Surgeon General, 25 Feb. 1944, subject: Nurse Personnel Requirements. (2) Memorandum, Deputy Chief of Staff, for Commanding General, Army Service

Forces, Mar. 1944, subject: Nurse Personnel Requirements.
REQUIREMENTS 11)41-4.", 87

General Somervell added that at his instance The Surgeon General was

continuing his studies to produce the greatest possible economies in the use of

nurses, but it seemed clear to General Somervell that the existing ceiling of

40,000 should be increased by at least 5,000. He therefore asked for further

authorization of 5,000 “to avoid interruption of the Nurse recruitment

program.” 39

On 28 April 1944, G-l more than met General Somervell’s request by raising the authorization for nurses to 50,000 where it remained until almost the

end of January 1945. Meanwhile, The Surgeon General’s estimates of requirements ran considerably above that figure. In October 1944, his Strategic

and Logistics Planning Unit forecast that by 31 December 1944 the need would

rise to 45,869 and would remain at approximately that point until September

1945.40 Early in January 1945, The Surgeon General raised the forecast to

59,401 for June 1945 (table 4).

The Surgeon General’s estimate was considerably higher than forecast

made about weeks later by the Military Personnel Division, Army Service

Forces, which placed the requirement at 55,722 nurses by 30 June 1945. On 28

January 1945, the War Department General Staff virtually met this requirement by raising the ceiling to 55,000. week afterward, it added 5,000 to

make the total 60,000. These increases came in the midst of public agitation

concerning the adequacy of the nursing force and the necessity of draft of

nurses. As many as 60,000 nurses might have been needed if Germany had

continued in the war beyond May 1945. With her defeat in that month, however, the requirement for nurses rapidly diminished, and the problem became

one of reductionrather than increase of the nursing force.

39 Memorandum, Commanding General, Army Service Forces, for Deputy Chief of Staff, Apr.

1944, subject: Nurse Personnel Requirements.

40 Memorandum, Director, Strategic and Logistics Planning Unit, for The Surgeon General, 24 Oct.

1944, subject: Army Nurse Corps Requirements, Medical Department, U.S. Army.

For general and station hospitals in Zone of Interior

For fixed-bed theater of operations hospitals

Number

required

13, 867

20, 031

For other units, provided for in the 1944 troop basis

Hospital ships

Hospital trains

Auxiliary surgical groups

Comnosite units

1,309

228

420

390

Air evacuation squadrons

Evacuation hospitals

Evacuation hospitals, semimobile

498

988 •> 200

Field hosnitals 740

Total

This number was calculated by applying the 15 ratio to and 100,000 beds in general hospitals; total, 208,000 beds. Bed

arrived at by counting it as percent of 2,700,000 troop strength.

This number was calculated by applying the 12 ratio to for in the War Department OperationsDivision troop unit basis.

_____

47,677

108,000 beds in station hospitals

strength of station hospitals was

312,375 beds, which were provided
88 PERSONNEL

Table 4.—Proposed distribution of nurses, June 1,945

DIETITIANS AND PHYSICAL THERAPISTS

Early in 1943, after the dietitians and physical therapists had attained

military status, Maj. Emma E. Yogel, WMSC, Superintendent of Physical

Therapists (fig. 24), recommended ratio of physical therapist to 100 beds in

Zone of Interior hospitals. She later was forced to lower the ratio when procurement failed to meet it.41 The number of physical therapists specified in the

manning guide for 10 April 1943 42 reflected this lowered ratio. Seven months

later, on 22 November, further reduction, for the same reason, was put into

effect.43 The November reduction was drastic; for 500-bed hospital, the

number of physical therapists was cut from to 2; for 700-bed hospital, from

to 3; and for 1,000-bedhospital, from 10 to 5. Dietitians, on the other hand,

did not undergo comparable reductions. The guide issued in April 1943

allotted them to Zone of Interior hospitals at considerably lower rate than

physical therapists; for example, the 500-bed hospital was to have dietitians, the 700-bed hospital 4, and the 1,000-bed hospital 5. The November guide, however reduced the allotment in only the larger sized hospitals—those of

2,000- to 3,000-bed capacity—which were to have to fewer dietitians than

formerly. The result was that from November 1943 onward the guide for

general, station, and eventually regional hospitals provided for the same, or

nearly the same, number of physical therapists and dietitians in proportion to

hospital’s bed capacity. This proportion was not changed, except for minor

reductions in the largest hospitals,44 during the remainder of the war. The

41 Vogel, Emma E. Physical Therapists of the Medical Department, United States Army.

[Official record.]

42 War Department Circular No. 99, 10 Apr. 1943. 43 See footnotes 36, p. 85, and 41. 44 War Department Circular No. 209, 26 May 1944.

Units and installations Authorizedbeds (number) Bases for computation of requirements Nurse requirements (number)

Table-of-organization units in troop basis:

Overseas 437, 500 table of organization 34, 657

Zone of Interior 6, 325 _do __ __570

Non-table-of-organization in Zone of

Interior:

General hospitals __

165, 000 nurse per 15 beds__ 11, 000

Convalescent hospitals 50, 000 nurse per 30 beds__ 1, 667

Regional and station hospitals __ 130, 000 nurse per 15 beds__ 8, 667

Miscellaneous __

575

Miscellaneous:

Theater of operations overhead 265

Pipeline; pools; 2, 000

Total _.

59, 401

Includes fixed and mobile beds actually overseas. Estimated strength V-E Day+90.

Source: Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for G-l, Jan. 1945.
REQUIREMENTS: 1SM1-45 89

Figure 24.—Maj. Emma E. Vogel, WMSC, Superintendent of

Physical Therapists.

new Zone of Interior convalescent hospitals, however, were to have from two to

six times as many physical therapists as dietitians, according to the guide issued

in June 1945,45 but the proportion of both was much smaller in relation to bed

capacity than that allotted to other Zone of Interior hospitals.

The general and station hospitals for service overseas were provided by

their tables of organization with fewer physical therapists and dietitians than

were allotted to similar hospitals of like capacity in the Zone of Interior, and

in 1943, even these few were reduced. Thus, in November 1943, the number

of physical therapists in 1,000-bed general hospital was cut from to 3; in

750- to 900-bed station hospitals, from to 2; and in 500- to 700-bed station

hospitals, from to 1. The numbers and reductions of dietitians were the same

as for physical therapists. In July 1944, dietitians in the 1,000-bed general hospitals were reduced from to 2, and months later, physical therapists in 750-

to 900-bed station hospitals were reduced from to 1. Evacuation hospitals

(750-bed) retained one physical therapist from April 1943 to the end of the

war. 46

45 War Department CircularNo. 170, June 1945. 40 (1) See footnotes 36, p. 85, and 42, p. 88. (2) T/O 8-550, General Hospital, July 1944.

and T/O 8—560, Station Hospital, 28 Oct. 1944.
90 PERSONNEL

Requests for authorizations of both physical therapists and dietitians were

based mainly on the manning guides and tables of organization, but theauthorizations granted by the War Department usually fell below those requested by

the Surgeon General’s Office. In September 1944, the latter asked for an

increase in the ceiling for physical therapists from 1,000 to 1,464 and for

dietitians from 1,500 to 2,000. In October, the War Department went no

farther than 1,250 for physical herapists and 1,750 for dietitfans. Xext month,

the Surgeon General's Office responded by asking for an increase from 1,250

to 1,700 in the authorization for physical therapists. This was disapproved in

December, but at the end of January 1945, the War Department raised the

ceiling for physical therapists to 1,500 and for dietitians to 2,000. 47

further increase was sought in April 1945. Based chiefly on manning

guides and tables of organization, the totalrequirement for physical therapists

was 1,779 and for dietitians, 2,303, made up as follows: 48

The Surgeon General requested ceilings triflelower than this computation

called for; namely, 1,750 for physical therapists and 2,250 for dietitians. Six weeks later (30 May 1945), the War Department raised its total authorization

for physical therapists to 1,700 and for dietitians to 2,150. 49 By that time,

Germany was out of the war. Moreover, during the following months, recruit47 (1) Letter, Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, War Department, 14 Sept. 1944, subject: Request for an Increase in the Procurement Objective for

Dietitians and Physical Therapists, AUS. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General,

Army Service Forces, 30 Oct. 1944, subject: Procurement Objective for Appointment of Nurses, Physical Therapists, and Dietitians in the AUS. (3) Quarterly Report, Physical Therapy Branch, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Jan.-31 Mar. 1945. (4) Diary of Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for week ending Feb. 1945. 48 Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, 16 Apr. 1945, subject: Requirements for Dietitians and Physical Therapists. 49 Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 30 May 1945, subject: Requirements for Dietitians and Physical Therapists.

Dietitians

Physical

therapists

Zone of Interior general hospitals 597 668

Zone of Interior regional hospitals:

Army Service Forces 153 124

Army Air Forces 133 90

Zone of Interior station hospitals

Army Service Forces 233 121

Army Air Forces 185 19

Zone of Interior convalescent hospitals

Army Service Forces 40 101

Army Air Forces 20 20

Instructors 34 24

Surgeon General’s Office

Table-of-organization units 862 557

U.S. Army Military Academy

Nonavailables:

In transit and in personnel centers 25 18

Patients and personnel on terminal leave 15 12

Total 2, 303 1, 779
REQUIREMENTS 1941-45 91

meat did not succeed in increasing actual strength above 1,580 for the dietitians and 1,300 for the physical therapists (table 1).

ENLISTED MEN

In 1940, the quota for the enlisted strength of the Medical Department

was raised from the percent of total Army strength, established by the

National Defense Act of 19*20, to percent or more, at the discretion of the

AVar Department, in case of emergency. This quota remained throughout the

war. The lowest percentage in the period 1942—43 was 6.8; the highest, 7.5.

After August 1944, it never rose above percent; and between October 1944 and

August 1945, it fell steadily from 6.9 to 6.1 (table 1).

At the end of December 1944, the Enlisted Branch of the Surgeon General’s

Office observed that for some time it “had acknowledged that there was sufficient

enlisted personnel, such as it was.” At this time, total Medical Department

enlisted strength was 541,650 (table 1). By the end of March 1945, strength

had decreased to 533,044, but the decline was not considered dangerous since

it was caused “mainly by the deactivation of number of T/O units.” Two

months afterward (31 May 1945), although Medical Department enlisted

strength had fallen still further—to 524,332, of which 377,231 was overseas

(table 5) —the enlisted personnel situation was described as “the best it has been for some time.” 30

Manning guides and tables of organization provided basis for estimating the enlisted requirements, as they did in the case of other personnel. Guides for

station hospitals in the Zone of Interior were issued in April 1941, December

1942, and May 1944. comparison between the first and last of these will show the extent to which enlisted personnel were reduced in all except the

1,500- and 2,000-bed units: 51

50 Quarterly Reports, Enlisted Personnel Branch, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General,

U.S. Army, for periods ending 31 Dec. 1944, and 31 Mar. 1945, and for months ending 31 May 1945. 51 (1) Mobilization Regulations No. 4-2, Change No. 1, Apr. 1941. (2) See footnote 44, p. 88.

(3) Smith, Clarence McKittrick: The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of

Interior. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956.

Enlisted requirement

Table-of-organization bed capacity: April 19Jfl May 19U 250 150 131

300 157

350 200 180

400 225 198

450 250 222

500 275 239

000 325 292

700 370 341

750 390 368

800 410 383

900 455 422

1,000 __ ___ 500 458

1.500 700 706

2,000 900 912
92 PERSONNEL

Table 5.—Medical Department enlisted strength, worldwide and overseas, 31 July 1941-30 September 1945

Army enlisted strength Medical Department enlisted strength

Date and area

Number

Percentage

of total Army

strength

Number

Percentage

of worldwide

MedicalDepartment

enlisted

strength

Rate per

1,000

troops

Percentage

of Army

enlisted

strength

Percentage

of total MedicalDepartment

strength

31 July 1941:

Worldwide 1, 422, 158

128, 476

92. 106, 662 100. 7. 83.

Overseas __94. 4, 301 4. 31. 3. 81.

30 Nov. 1941:

Worldwide 1, 523, 116

154, 938

92. 108, 674 100. 7. 81.

Overseas 93. 6, 580 6. 39. 4. 82.

31 Mar. 1942:

Worldwide 2, 235, 113

306, 638

93. 169, 627

15, 512

100. 7. 84.

Overseas 93. 9. 47. 5. 77.

30 June 1942:

Worldwide 2, 867, 762

565, 384

93. 209, 952

35, 252

100. 7. 82.

Overseas 94. 16. 58. 6. 82.

30 Sept. 1942:

Worldwide 3, 670, 954

768, 165

92. 283, 331

48, 547

100. 7. 81.

Overseas 93. 17. 59. 6. 82.

31 Jan. 1943:

Worldwide 5, 370, 755

1, 036, 329

92. 417, 307 100. 7. 83.

Overseas.. 92. 72, 263 17. 69. 7. 82.

30 Apr. 1943:

Worldwide 6, 147, 248

1, 288, 913

91. 499, 657

92, 446

100. 8. 84.

Overseas 92. 18. 66. 7. 81.

31 July 1943;

Worldwide 6, 467, 436

1, 634, 890

90. 529, 360 100. 8. 84.

Overseas 91. 114, 162 21. 64. 7. 81.

31 Oct. 1943:

Worldwide 6, 625, 157

2, 054, 499

90. 507, 611

146, 959

100. 7. 82.

Overseas. 91. 29. 65. 7. 81.

31 Jan. 1944:

Worldwide 6, 792, 871

2, 580, 104

89. 515, 124

196, 696

100. 7. 81.

Overseas 91. 38. 69. 7. 82.

30 Apr. 1944;

Worldwide 7, 042, 116

3, 251, 857

89. 532, 771

248, 003

100. 6. 81.

Overseas.. 91. 46. 69. 7. 82.

31 July 1944:

Worldwide 7, 191, 703

3, 716, 742

table.

89. 558, 828

284, 791

100. 7. 82.

Overseas

See footnotes at end of

90. 51. 69. 7. 82.
REQUIREMENTS: 1041-45 93

Table 5.—Medical Department enlisted strength, worldwide and overseas, 31 July 1941-30 September 1945—Continued

Army enlisted strength Medical Department enlisted strength

Date and area

Number

Percentage

of total Army

strength Number

Percentage of worldwide

MedicalDepartment

enlisted

strength

Rate per 1,000

troops

Percentage

of Army

enlisted

strength

Percentage

of total MedicalDepartment

strength

31 Oct. 1944:

Worldwide 7, 204, 580

4, 225, 564

88. 562, 796 100. 7. 81.

Overseas 91. 324, 711 57. 70. 7. 83.

31 Jan. 1945:

Worldwide, 7, 139, 700

4, 678, 043

88. 537, 303 100. 7. 80.

Overseas 91. 357, 567 66. 69. 7. 83.

30 Apr. 1945;

Worldwide 7, 274, 779

4, 974, 051

88. 532, 029

385, 296

100. 7. 79.

Overseas 91. 72. 71. 7. 83.

31 May 1945:

Worldwide, 7, 305, 854

4, 925, 323

88. 524, 332

377, 231

100. 7. 78.

Overseas 91. 71. 69. 7. 82.

30 June 1945:

Worldwide 7, 283, 930

4, 783, 503

88. 521, 282

367, 844

100. 7. 78.

Overseas 91. 70. 70. 7. 82.

31 July 1945:

Worldwide, 7, 200, 220

4, 491, 271

87. 514, 511 100. 7. 78. Overseas, __ 91. 350, 056 68. 71. 7. 83.

31 Aug. 1945:

Worldwide 7, 040, 446

4, 214, 725

87. 493, 209

311, 047

100. 7. 77.

Overseas 91. 63. 67. 7. 82.

30 Sept. 1945:

Worldwide 6, 598, 986

3, 788, 062

87. 454, 989 100. 7. 76.

Overseas 91. 273, 049 60. 65. 7. 82.

Male personnel only. All data are from “Monthly Strength of the Army, Continental United States,” and

“Monthly Strength of the Army, Foreign and En Route,’ in “Strength of the Army,” Oct. 1945, pp. 58-59, with the

following exceptions: Oversea data for 31 March 1942 are from sources of corresponding data listed in table 31, footnote

(see the cited footnote forthe reasons forthe substitution); worldwide data for 31 March 1942are oversea strength as shown

here plus male enlisted strength for the same date reported in “Monthly Strength of the Army, Continental United

States,” cited above; data for 31 July 1944 are from “Strength of the Army” for the same date and exclude personnel

unaccounted for by commands (such personnel are included in the male enlisted strength for oversea areas (3,734,062)

reported in “Monthly Strengthof the Army,Foreign and En Route,” cited above, but are excluded from thistable since

the number of medicalpersonnel among them is unknown).

For total Army strength, see table 31.

Worldwide strength for July and November 1941 from “Strength of the Army” for corresponding dates; for other

dates, from table (SGO data). Oversea strength from sources shown in table 31, footnote 3, forperiod prior to September

1942 and for April 1944 in part, from “Strength of the Army” in all other instances.

For troop strength, see table 31; for worldwide rates, see table (SGO data).

For total Medical Department strength, see table 31.
94 PERSONNEL

Table

6.

—Guide

for

utilization

of

personnel

in

named

general

hospitals,

Zone

of

Interior

Source:

War

Department Circular

No.

209,

26

May1944.

Substitution

of

civilians

for

enlisted

men

on

three-for-two basiswas

permitted. This

obtained

until

War

Department

Circular

No.

87,

19

Mar.

1945,

required that

substitution

be

made

only

on

one-for-one basis.

1,000 1.500 1,750 2,000 2.500 3.000 3.500 4.000 Number

of

authorized

beds

00^00)0101^00

C04^00i005Cn Corps Medical

Officers

Corps Dental to

Admin- Medical

.Corpsistrative

Corps Sanitary

tOtOtOtOHHHH Corps Veterinary

67 Nurse Army 100 117 133 167 200 233 267 Corps

dieti- Hospital

tians

Physical therapists

CTiCOCOtOtOtOtOn—

Quartermaster

Corps

Engi- of Corps

neers

11h- 11 I— 1L1— to to to

Corps Signal

to to to co co

Depart- Finance

ment

Corps Chaplain

Oi^t£».COCOCOtOtO

Military of Corps Police

O^vlOOiOiOiM Warranbofficers

Total 160 217 247 277 324 377 427 493

558 838 965 1,096 1,

383 1,

653 1,952 2,men Enlisted 291

718 1,055 1,

212 1,

373 1,

707 2,030 2,379 2,

personnel Total 784

71.

80

70.

33

69.

25

68.

65

68.

28

67.

66

67.

97

69.

60

Total 100 per personnelbeds
REQUIREMENTS: 1941^45 95

As for the Zone of Interior general hospitals, The Surgeon General in 1912

instructed them to use the table of organization for oversea general hospitals

as their guide. This table provided for 500 enlisted men in 1,000-bed hospital. guide specifically for Zone of Interior general hospitals was issued

at the end of 1912 and new one in May 1911. The latter allotted from 558

enlisted men for 1,000-bed hospital to 2,291 for 4,000-bed hospital (table

6). The new guides for both general and station hospitals permitted the replacement of enlisted men “by similarly qualified civilians generally on threecivilian for two-enlisted-men basis” because of the disparity in working hours.

The guide for Zone of Interior convalescent hospitals, issued in June 1945, also

permitted the replacement of enlisted men by civilians, but made no reference

to ratios. It allotted from 200 enlisted men for the 500-bed hospital to 1,400

for the 6,000-bed hospital (table 7). It will be noted that in these guides the

ratio of enlisted men to bed capacity was much lower in convalescent hospitals than in station hospitals, and lower in the latter than in general hospitals.

Successive tables of organization for oversea units, like the manning guides

for Zone of Interior installations, showed reductions in the number of enlisted

men during the war period, as is illustrated in the tables for various types of

hospitals and for the medical detachment of the infantry regiment (tables

and 9).

The total requirement for personnel in table-of-organization units of all

types appeared in the troop basis issued from time to time by the War Department. An analysis of the troop basis for October 1944, prepared by the

Surgeon General's Office, showed the distribution of Medical Department

personnel among table-of-organization units of the ground, air, and service

forces at the actual strength on 30 September 1944 and at the strength planned

on October 1944 for 31 December 1944 and 30 June 1945. The distribution

Table 7. Guidefor utilization of personnel in convalescent hospitals, Zone of Interior

Numberof authorized beds

Officers

Enlisted

men Total

person- nel

Total

personnel per 100beds Medical

Corps DentalCorps

Medical

Administrative

Corps

Sanitary

Corps

Hospital di- etitiansPhysical

therapists

Chaplain

Corps arrant

officers Total

500 13 30 52 200 252 50.

1,000 20 50 83 323 406 40.

1,500 24 60 100 428 528 35.

2,000 28 68 115 529 644 32.

2,500 34 10 80 138 649 787 31.

3,000 40 12 91 158 768 926 30.

4,000 50 16 109 191 958 1, 149 28.

5,000 63 20 130 10 234 1, 203 1, 437 28.

6,000.. 74 24 146 12 267 1, 400 1, 667 27.
96 PERSONNEL

Table

8.-

Table-of-organization

changes

in

certain

types

of

hospitals, 1940-44-

Type

of

hospital

and

authority

Officers

Total enlisted men

Aggre- gate

MedicalCorps

MedicalAdminis- trativeCorps

Dental Corps

SanitaryCorps

Chap-lainCorps

Quarter-masterCorps

arrant officers

ArmyNurseCorps

Hospital dietitians

Physical therapists

Total

General

(1,000-bed): T/O

683,

July

1932_

30

120

162

400

562

T/O

8-507,

25

July

1940

55

120

193

500

693

T/O

8-550*

Apr.

1942_

38

105

162

500

662

T/O

8-550

(Ch

2),

Oct.

1942

37

105

162

500

662

WD

Cir.

306,

22

Nov.1943-

37

100

163

500

663

T/O

8-550

(Ch

3),

Mar.

1944

37

83

146

500

646

T/O

8-550,

July

1944

32

10

83

142

450

594

Station

(250-bed): T/O

684-W,

July

1929___

11

35

50

150

200

T/O

8-508,

25

July

1940-

15

30

50

150

200

T/O

8-560,

22

July

1942-

13

30

51

150

201

WD

Cir.

306,

22

Nov.1943-

13

25

46

150

196

T/O

8-560

(Ch

3),

Mar.

1944

13

21

42

150

192

T/O

8-560,

28

Oct.

1944—

10

21

39

138

179

Station

(500-bed): T/O

8-508,

25

July

1940

23

60

95

275

370

T/O

8-560,

22

July

1942

19

55

89

275

364

WD

Cir.

306,

22

Nov.1943-

19

50

86

275

361

T/O

8-560

(Ch

3),

Mar.

1944

19

42

78

275

353

WD

Cir.

99,

Mar.

1944_.

16

11

42

78

275

353

T/O

8-560,

28

Oct.

1944_

16

11

42

77

253

330
REQUIREMENTS 1941-45 97

Station

(750-bed): T/O

8-508,

25

July

1940

___ T/O

8-560,

22

July

1942.

WD

Cir.

306,

22

Nov.1943..

T/O

8-560

(Ch

3),

Mar.

1944

37 24 24

90

139

390

529

75

116

392

508

75

120

392

512

24

63

108

392

500

WD

Cir.

99,

Mar.

1944_

T/O

8-560,

28

Oct.

1944_

Evacuation

(750-bed): T/O

283-

W,

July

1929.

__ T/O

8-232,

Oct.

1940

T/O

8-580,

July

1942

T/O

8-580,

23

Apr.

1943.

WD

Cir.

306,

22

Nov.

1943.,

T/O

8-580,

31

Jan.

1945...

Evacuation

(400-bed): T/O

8-581,

July

1942

T/O

8-581,

26

July

1943....

T/O

8-581,

25

Mar.1944..

21

12

63

108

392

500

20

12

63

106

351

457

32 37 34 37 37 37 29 29 28

60

100

300

400

52

99

318

417

52

99

318

417

52

101

308

409

53

102

308

410

53

102

303

405

48

88

248

336

40

79

217

296

40

79

217

296

Five

of

these

might

be

members

of

the

Pharmacy Corps.

Since

none

of

the

tables

of

organization

or

circulars

cited

in

the

table

stipulated

that

Pharmacy

Corps

officer

had

necessarily

to

be

placed

in

any

of

these

hospitals,

no

column

has

been

shown

for

them.

See

also

footnote

4.

Includes one

engineer

officer

and

one

officer,

branch

immaterial.

In

order

to

conserve Medical

Corps

officers,

this

circular

stated

that

“executive

officers

and

registrars of

numbered or

fixed

general

or

station

hospitals

should

preferably

be

Medical

Administrative

Corps

officers

commissioned

because

of

prior

training or

experience

as

civilian

hospital

administrators or

Medical

Department noncommissioned officers.”

War

Department Circular

No.

15/,

17

April

1944, allowed

officers

of

other

corps than

the

Medical

Administrative

Corps

to

be

substituted

in

these

jobs,

stating

that

executive

officers

“of

all

numbered or

fixed

station

hospitals

and

registrars of

all

numbered or

fixed

general

or

station

hospitals”

should

preferably

be

either

Medical

Administrative

Corps,

Pharmacy

Corps, or

Sanitary

Corps

officers,

“commissioned

because

of

prior

training or

experience

as

civilian

hospital

administrators or

Medical

Department

noncommissioned officers.”

Permission to

use other

than

Medical

Corps

officers

as

executive

officers

of

general

hospitals was later

withdrawn

(War

Department Circular

No.

327,

Aug.

1944).

These

officers

might

be

in

the

Pharmacy Corps.
98 PERSONNEL

of Medical Department enlisted personnel presented in this analysis was as

Table .-Table-of-organization changes in the medical detachment of the infantry regiment

(T/O 7-11), 1938-45

52 Letter, Military Personnel Planning and Placement Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office

of The Surgeon General (Lt. Col. Fred J. Fielding), to Director, Military Personnel Division, Office of

The Surgeon General, Dec. 1944, subject: War Department Troop Basis as of October 1944.

follows: 52

Actual

Planned

strength,

for 31 Dec.

strength, 191,1, andI

30 Sept. 30 June

Army Ground Forces: 19U 191,5

Combat and communications zones 166,935 164, 664

Zone of Interior 807 943

Total 167, 742 165, 607

Army Air Forces: Combat and communications zones 24,709 25, Oil

Zone of Interior 117 193

Total 24, 826 25, 204

Army Service Forces:

Combat and communications zones 180,250 217, 904

Zone of Interior 1, 656 816

Total 181,906 218, 720

Grand total 374, 474 409,531

Date War strength of regiment

Medical

Corps Dental

Corps

Medical Ad- ministrative CorpsEnlisted men

in medical detachment

Dec. 1938 2, 542 96

Mar. 1940 2, 776 96

Oct. 1940 3, 449 96

Apr. 1942 3. 472 126

Mur. 1943 3, 088 103

26 Feb. 1944 3, 257 126

30 June 1944 3, 207 126

June 1945 3, 697 126

Sept. 1945 3, 697 136
REQUIREMENTS 1941-io 99

ENLISTED WOMEN

The establishment of requirement for enlisted women—members of the

Women’s Army Corps (usually called Wacs) 53—evolved during the course of

1942. The Surgeon General rejected the idea of adding them to the hospital

complements when it was first broached in the spring of 1942. His objection to

taking them was that it would interfere with the employment of civilians and

the training of enlisted men and would cause difficulties in the way of housing

and recreation. His opinion changed as result of pressure from various

sources before the end of 1942—theinsistence of the General Staff and Services

of Supply headquarters that all services should make use of Wacs in order

to release more men for combat duty, the recommendations of the Committee

to Study the Medical Department that Wacs could supplement the supply

of nurses, the difficulty of enlarging or even maintaining the civilian staffs,

and the trend of thought in his own Office and among hospital commanders.

Accordingly, after proposing test at two hospitals, which could not be carried

out because WAC personnel were not available, he appointed board in January 1943 to consider the matter and asked for reports from the service

commands, the Air Forces, the Transportation Corps, the Military District of

Washington, and the Army Medical Center on the possibilities involved.

While not all hospital commanders were favorable to the use of Wacs, Services of Supply hospitals of 600 beds or more estimated that Wacs could replace from 30 to 50 percent of their enlisted men; the Air Forces planned to

make use of Wacs in hospitals having capacity of as few as 200 beds. On

this basis, The Surgeon General’s board calculated that more than 10,000

Wacs would be needed in the hospitals. The Surgeon General sent the service commands tabulations of WAC personnel for hospitals to be used in making

up anticipated requisitions. Before the matter could be carried further,

falling off in WAC recruitment caused WAC headquarters to notify The Surgeon General in June 1943 that he could expect only 150 to 175 women month

for training, beginning in September. The use of large numbers of Wacs

in hospitals therefore had to be postponed.

Late in 1943, when medical installations were requisitioning these women, the Deputy Surgeon General wrote that the Medical Department could employ all of them who could be made available, “in fact,” he declared, “the entire

WAC organization could be utilized in order to release male military operating

personnel.” 54 Several campaigns to recruit members of the Women’s Army

Corps for employment as Medical Department technicians (fig. 25) ensued

during 1944 and 1945, one setting its quota as high as 7,000. This quota was

met.

53 For convenience, the later title of this organization will be used here. Its earlier title (until

July 1943) was “Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps.”

54 Memorandum, General Lull, for Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 27 Dec. 1943, subject: Reduction of Military OperatingPersonnel, Army Service Forces.
100 PERSONNEL

Figure 25.—Members of the Women’s Army Corps learning from Army

nurse how to change surgical dressing.

CIVILIANS

No formula was established for computing the total number of civilians

required for Army medical service in the Zone of Interior until the establishment of bulk authorizations in June 1943.55 Before then, the number of civilians who could be employed was unrestricted except through the allotment of

funds. Under the new system, the permitted number varied inversely with

the number of military personnel authorized.

Large numbers of civilians were used throughout the war as substitutes for

military personnel in many kinds of work. The process of substitution was

intensified during the later war years when the Medical Department had to

move large numbers of officers and enlisted men out of its installations in the

United States for service overseas. As the number of enlisted men remaining

was more than ever inadequate to meet all demands, Medical Department authorities could hardly repeat their earlier protests against the free substitution

of civilians in their installations with any prospect of being heeded. At one

time (May 1944), the General Staff permitted the substitution of civilians

in hospitals for enlisted personnel on three-for-two basis (taking account

of the civilians’ work day of only hours as against that of 12 for enlisted

personnel) in 1945, however, the General Staff ordered that substitutions be

65 This section deals only with developments in the Zone of Interior. Of necessity, there was no requirement for civilians in oversea theaters. They were used if they were available but could not be counted on in advance. Oversea use of civilians is therefore treated under “Procurement” in chapter VIII.
REQUIREMENTS: 1941-45 101

Figure 26.—Nurses’ aides, Camp Fannin, Tex.

made on one-for-one basis. 5(5This one-for-onerule handicapped commanders

of hospitals and other installations which operated for more than hours day.

Civilians employed in Medical Department installations represented all

grades of skill, from the janitor who kept the floors of hospital tidy to the

highly specialized medical or surgical consultant. Technical positions, including those of dental hygienists and laboratory technicians, ere more difficult

to fill than those demanding less skill. As male help became scarcer, large

numbers of women were employed. For example, in 1943, when many enlisted

men were withdrawn from installations for shipment overseas, the commander

of Percy Jones General Hospital, Mich., reported that he had elicited the help

of thefamilies of military personnel. 57

In the nursing field, Army nurses were supplemented by civilian nurses’

aides (fig. 26), both paid and volunteer; by cadet nurses, who were students

receiving part of their training in Government hospitals, in the course of which

they rendered nursing service and on graduation accepted employment as fullfledged nurses in one branch or another of the Federal hospital system; and

finally, graduate nurses who for one reason or another could not meet the

qualifications of the Army Nurse Corps but who could meet the qualifications

of the Civil Service Commission. 58

58 (1) See footnote 55, p. 100. (2) War Department Circular No. 87, 19 Mar. 1945. 57 Annual Report, Percy Jones General Hospital, 1942.

See footnote 34, p. 84.
102 PERSONNEL

Occupational therapists also were employed as civilians throughout the

war by the Medical Department.

The Army Specialist Corps, as already mentioned, during 1942 furnished

limited number, possibly about hundred, of administrative, professional,

scientific, and technical specialists. In late 1942, the Secretary of War decided

that it was not feasible to have two uniformed services and abolished the corps,

permitting its members to the extent practicable to apply for commissions in

theArmy of the United States. 59

Although some difficulties and complaints arose concerning the use and

performance of civilian employees in the Medical Department, certainly thousands of intelligent, hard-working, and responsible civilian employees were

to be found in its establishments. It is even more obvious that whatever drawbacks the use of civilians involved, the Medical Department would have been

quite unable to carry its load without their assistance.

While Eed Cross workers in Army hospitals were not regarded as making

up deficiencies in the supply of military personnel, at least not in the same

sense as were civilians hired for that purpose, they performed variety of

services in connection with the care of patients, for which they received no

pay from the Government. The Medical Department had reason to be grateful

for the contributions these workers made to the well-being of its patients.

ADDITIONAL UNIT REQUIREMENTS OVERSEAS

Additional requirements overseas 60 were based on four factors: (1) Losses,

both physical or administrative; (2) additions to non-table-of-organization personnel; (3) reorganizations of table-of-organization units; and (4) shortages.

Losses

An individual was officially recognized as physical “loss” to his unit

when the unit was notified of his death, capture, internment in neutral country, absence without leave for an appreciable period, or hospitalization. The

unit could then request replacement. The question as to whether hospitalized soldier should remain on the rolls of his unit was resolved in the light of

the amount of time it was believed that the unit could operate efficiently without

the services appropriate to his position. difference necessarily existed between units functioning in forward areas and those operating in the rear.

Under combat conditions, unit could not afford to waitany appreciable period

for the return of an individual, and its right to replace him arose simultane59 Memorandum, Secretary of War, for Director, Army Specialist Corps, 31 Oct. 1942, subject: Disposition of the Army Specialist Corps.

00 Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based on (11 Annual Reports, Surgeon, European

Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1943 and 1944, and (2) Administrative and Logistical History of

Medical Service, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, chs. IV and

X. [Official record.]
REQUIREMENTS: 1941-A5 103

ously with his hospitalization. 61 In July 1944, this situation was given official

recognition when the War Department in effect directed that troops in combat

areas officially designated by the theater commander be dropped from the rolls

of their units immediately upon hospitalization. For most personnel whose

hospitalization originated in locations not designated as combat areas, the assignment to the original unit was to be severed only after completion of GO days’

total hospitalization. 62

Administrative losses occurred when table-of-organization positions were

vacated by the transfer of individuals to other assignments within the unit or in

other units or when they were separated from the military service altogether

for reasons wholly within the control of the Army. From the middle of 1943

on, rotation was still another cause. Even if the vacancy Avere filled by reassignment or promotion, another vacancy was thus created.

Non-Table-of-Organization Allotments

The War Department recognized the need for oversea personnel beyond

that shipped in units from the Zone of Interior and therefore established

“non T/O allotment” for each theater. In the European theater, the amount

of personnel authorized for the medical service out of the non-table-of-organization allotment during 1943 and 1944 was as follows:

In relation to theater medical strength, the authorization for April 1943

amounted to 10.86 percent; that for September 1943, to 6.05 percent; April

1944, to 1.54 percent and September 1944, 0.83 percent. During 1944, the

81 la the European theater, units engaged in combat were authorized in November 1944 to include

in their daily replacement requisitions statement of anticipated losses for period of 48 hours

after the requisition was made as basis for provision of replacements.

62 War Department Circular No. 280, July 1944.

663076 —63——9

April 1943;

Total 1, 143

Officers (including warrant officers) 281

Enlisted 862

September 1943:

Total 1,275

Officers (including warrant officers) 390

Enlisted __

885

April 1944:

Total 1,710

Officers (including warrant officers) 362

Enlisted 1, 348

September 1944

Total 1,403

Officers (including warrant officers) 416

Enlisted 987

This date is only approximate, the authorization being fixed about the time Headquarters,

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, was established in Paris.
PERSONNEL 104

number of Medical Department personnel actually assigned to non-table-oforganization establishments, including, besides the offices of the Theater Chief

Surgeon and base section surgeons, two central dental laboratories, the supply

depots, and other installations, declined from about percent of the total

numberof medical personnel in the theater to less than percent.

Additional and Reorganized Table-of-Organization Units

In some cases, the Zone of Interior failed to provide the oversea theaters

with sufficient number of table-of-organization units to meet the requirements. It was therefore necessary to set up such units locally and to provide

them with personnel. In the early part of 1945, for example, the War Department authorized the European theater to activate 11 medical teams, each with

strength of 10 men; 34 mess teams, each with men; 23 dental prosthetic

teams, each with similar strength; and optical repair teams which required

an aggregate of men. 63 The establishment of newly activated table-of-organization units in the Southwest Pacific Area in late 1944 was one of the factors

which created large number of vacancies for dental officers in that region. 64

An increase in the authorized size of unit after it had arrived in theater

of operations also made it necessary for authorities within the theater to provide it with additional personnel. In 1943, several small station and general

hospitals arriving in the United Kingdom were rerated as larger units. This

required additional personnel. Additional personnel also were required in

certain units in the North African theater through augmentation in size of

all 1,000-bed general hospitals by 50 to 100 percent. 65 For example, the 6th

General Hospital, by an increase of its authorized bed capacity from 1,000

to 1,500 beds in mid-1944, witnessed an expansion of its authorized enlisted

strength from 500 to 562 men.66 When patients in excess of the table-of-organization bed capacity of certain hospitals in the Seine Section were hospitalized

in these installations during January-March 1945, augmentation of the nursing personnel became necessary wherever this took place. Revisions of tables

of organization that established additional authorizations for personnel, such

as dental and medical administrative officers, likewise compelled theater medical authorities to look for the personnel with which to fill these slots. As one

example, the revision of Table of Organization 8-560 on 28 October 1944

created 326 new medical administrative officer posts in oversea station hospitals.

63 For the table-of-organization strength of the units mentioned see “Medical Department Service Organization,” T/O&E 8-500, 23 Apr. 1944.

64 Essential Technical Medical Data, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, for December 1944, dated 15 Feb. 1945.

65 Logistical History of North African-Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, pp. 291- 294. [Official record.]

86 Historical Report, 6th General Hospital, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 22 Oct. 1944. [Official record.]
REQUIREMENTS: 1041-45 105

Shortages

Another factor which created need for personnel to fill vacancies overseas was the practice dating from the spring of 1944 of sending table-of-organization units abroad short of their full complements of medical personnel. In

the latter part of that year, many general hospitals were sent to the European

theater with only 16 Medical Corps officers in each; field units likewise were

dispatched without theirfull complement of such officers. One justificationfor

this procedure was that by this time the theater already boasted an ample

supply of specialist personnel who could be assigned to these understaffed

units, but there continued to be shortages outside the specialties. During June

and July 1944, the European theater received 12 general hospitals, each of

1,000-bed capacity, without their nurse complements (table 10).

Table 10.—Medical Department overstrengths and understrengths in various oversea theaters or

areas, 30 November 1943

Theater or area Authorized

strength

Overstrength Understrength

Number Percent Number Percent

Medical Corps

Europe 3, 812 0. 05

North Africa __ 3, 434 102 2. 97

China-Burma-India 671

Central Pacific 740 70 9. 46

South Pacific 1, 131 157 13. 88

Dental Corps

Europe ___ 729

North Africa __ 650 11 1. 69

China-Burma-India 106

Central Pacific. 195 26 13. 33

South Pacific.. __207 21 10. 14

Veterinary Corps

Europe 51

North Africa 30 23. 33

China-Burma-India 85

Central Pacific __

22 9. 09

South Pacific 19 5. 26

See footnotes at end of table.
106 PERSONNEL

Table 10. Medical Department overstrengths and under strengths in various oversea theaters or

areas, 30 November 1943-—Continued

Theater or area Authorized

strength

Overstrength Understrength

Number Percent Number Percent

Sanitary Corps

Europe. 91

North Africa. 118 1. 69

China-Burma-India 20

Central Pacific 17

South Pacific 61 19 31. 15

Medical Administrative Corps

Europe 835

North Africa. 786 33 4. 20

China-Burma-India 125

Central Pacific 201 29 14. 43

South Pacific. 239 56 23. 43

Army Nurse Corps

Europe... 4, 142

North Africa .. 4, 120 12

China-Burma-India 633

Central Pacific 1, 054 157 14. 90

South Pacific 1, 117 290 25. 96

Enlisted men

Europe. 41, 972 439 1. 05

North Africa. 39, 349 924 2. 35

China-Burma-India 6, 200 05

Central Pacific 14, 056 1, 521 10. 82

South Pacific __ ...

13, 593 1, 105 8. 15

The exact authorized strength used in determining overstrength or understrength is unknown. For the purposes

of this table, it is assumed that the authorized strength is the actual strength on 30 November 1943 as reported in

“Strength of the Army” for that date minus the overstrength or plus the understrength.

Memorandum, Acting Adjutant General, for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, subject: Monthly Reports of Replaceincuts Available in Overseas Theaters, 27 Dec. 1943. (Ovorstrengths appear to bo strength above T/O strength and nonT/O allotments plus permanent overstrength as authorized by the War Department.)
REQUIREMENTS 1941-45 107

In some instances, the overall strength was up to the table-of-organization

requirement, but the personnel were not professionally suitable. For example,

the 5th Auxiliary Surgical Group, after repeated depletions of its well-qualified professional personnel in order to fill other units, was finally shipped to

the European theater in the summer of 1944 with whatever medical officers

were available, regardless of their suitability to the organization’s functions. 67

During 1944, the European theater was almost consistently below authorized strength in Medical Corps officers. Even on D-day, there was shortage

of 35 Medical Corps officers in the theater. persistent shortage of Dental

Corps officers existed during the same year, which was aggravated by increases

in table-of-organization authorizations; in November, the shortage amounted

to 238. With regard to nurses, the situation was similar to that pertaining

to Medical Corps officers. Consistent shortages began to appear in April and

continued into June. From the end of July, the shortages reappeared and

steadily increased so that by the end of the year the theater lacked 345 of its

proper table-of-organization strength in nurses. Until October, there was

critical shortage of physical therapy aides. severe shortage of dietitians

also existed throughout the year. From November, there was steady increase in the deficit in enlisted men, particularly in ground force units. Because of the losses occasioned by the Battle of the Bulge, shortage of

approximately 500 medical enlisted men appeared in each of the four field

armies engaged in the theater.

The shortages persisted to the end of the war. In mid-March 1945, the

medical service of the communications zone of the European theater was reported to be at 94.1 percent of its table-of-organization strength. In this

respect, it was worse off than every other service except the Signal Corps, For

all arms and services, the corresponding figure was 96.2 percent. As regards

Medical Department officers, the shortage in table-of-organization strength

was 9.9 percent and in this category of personnel, too, only the Signal Corps

was at greater disadvantage. The shortage of Army officers as whole was

7.7 percent.

In other theaters, there were similar shortages in 1944. For example, as

of 31 December 1944, the Southwest Pacific Area needed approximately 124

officers to reach the dental strength required under tables of organization. 68

With regard to nurses, the shortage was in excess of 1,300.69

As of 31 May 1945, the Eighth U.S. Army, operating in the Pacific, had

shortages of medical officers and nurses which were, respectively, in excess of

10 and 25 percent of authorized strengths (table 11). In July 1945, the shortage of medical officers in the entire Pacific was at least 300.70

07 Annual Report, 5th Auxiliary Surgical Group, 1944, pp. 98, 144-145. 68 See footnote 64, p. 104. 69Annual Report, Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, 1944, p. 47. 70Memorandum, Eli Ginzberg, Director, Resources Analysis Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Lieutenant Colonel Lueth, 26 July 1945, subject: Notes on 10 July Conference With AFPAC.
108 PERSONNEL

Table 11 .—Authorized and actual strengths of medical personnel, Eighth U.S. Army,

31 May 1945

In the Middle Pacific Area, although there was no shortage of Medical

Corps officers in July 1945, there were inadequate numbers of medical and

surgical specialists. After V-E Day, certain units designed for the European

theater had been diverted to the Pacific and arrived in that area short of such

specialists.71

In the period December 1941-31 August 1945, Medical Corps officers in

the Central Pacific attained their authorized strength only during the month

of January 1945.72 In late 1943,reports to the War Department indicated that

in terms of table-of-organization and table-of-allotment strength plus authorized overhead there was surplus in the North African theater among all, or

virtually all, Medical Department elements. At that time, there were also

some surpluses in the European theater and the Central Pacific. The Central

Pacific, however, had substantial shortages in dental and medical administrative officers as well as in enlisted men, the shortages apparently being greater

than 10 percent of the authorized strength in each case. The situation was

even worse in the South Pacific, every element reported being understrength.

In some elements, the understrength was over 25 percent.

Both line officers and Medical Department authorities were sometimes extremely reluctant to use nurses in forward areas, particularly during the

earlier phases of combat operations. Units sometimes were given additional

enlisted personnel instead of nurses. 73 In at least one case, after unit had

been transferred from Alaska to Europe, it was considered necessary or advisable to replace the extra enlisted technicians by nurses. 74

71 Col. Fred J. Fielding, formerly of the Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, minimizes the extent to which units arrived in the Pacific short of specialists. Commenting

on the statement in the text, he remarks (Letter to Col. J. B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical

Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 12 Dec. 1955) “This was not the policy, however, and only one

or two units were diverted while on high seas or before landing in ETO. Units from ETO were

reorganized with balanced staff and shipped to Pacific after V-B Day.” 72 Whltehlll, Buell: Administrative History of Medical Activities in the Middle Pacific, 1946,

p. 12. [Official record.]

73 This was authorized for certain evacuation hospitals by T/O&E 8-581 (25 Mar. 1944). 74 Annual Keport, 28th Field Hospital, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944, p. 11.

Group

Strength

Percent short

Authorized Actual

Medical Corps 786 703 10.

Medical Administrative Corps 354 330 6.

Veterinary Corps.

Dental Corps 172 160 7.

Sanitary Corps 41 42

Army Nurse Corps

Enlisted men

372

11, 973

278

11, 148

25.

6.

Source: Quarterly Report, Surgeon, Eighth U.S. Army, 1945 (2d quarter), p. 2.
REQUIREMENTS 1941-io 109

Shortages of enlisted specialists also existed although it is difficult to assess

their prevalence. For example, the 3d General Hospital, through the operation

of the 38-year draft limitation, lost 140 enlisted men in the months before its

departure for the North African theater on 12 May 1943. This created

shortage which was manifested overseas primarily in the clerical field since the

unit had not obtained adequately trained replacements before leaving the

United States. 75

75 Annual Report, 3d General Hospital, 1944.

Ill 663076 —63——10

CHAPTER

Procurement During the Emergency Period

During the period 1939-41, the problems of procurement were apparently

of greater moment to The Surgeon General than those of requirements. Especially difficult was the procurement of Medical Corps officers although in

no category of Medical Department personnel was the supply always equal to

the demand. Shortages varied, of course, and according to Lt. Col. Paul A.

Paden, MC, former chief of The Surgeon General’s Personnel Division:

“Army-wide shortages were never so acute as local shortages.”

PREEMERGENCY PROCEDURES

The National Defense Act of 1920 stated that the Army of the United

States should consist of the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves, Thus, there were three means of entering the medical service of the Army:

1. Regular Army.—Individuals interested in securing an appointment in

the Regular Army could apply to The Adjutant General. Applicants having

the necessary educational qualifications had to pass competitive examination

prepared by The Surgeon General and conducted by an examining board which

also considered the candidate’s physical condition, moral character, and general

fitness. The board’s report went to the Central Medical Department Examining Board for review and the necessary grading of papers. If the candidate was found qualified by this board and was recommended by The Surgeon

General, and if the recommendation was approved by the Secretary of War,

he was appointed to the appropriate Medical Department corps as Regular

Army officer.

2. Officers’ Aeserve Corps.—Persons interested in obtaining Reserve commissions applied to the corps area commander. The latter, acting on the

recommendation of board which examined the candidates’ qualifications

(educational and otherwise), transmitted the names of successful applicants

Letter, Lt. Col. Paul A. Paden, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S.

Army Medical Service, 10 Dec. 1955.

Beginning at least as early as 1921, the competitive examination was dispensed with in the case

of medical and dental interns who had completed year’s internship in an Army hospital, and who were

found qualified by board of officers, and were recommended by the commanding officer of the hospital

wherein their internship was served. Examinations for such interns were apparently in effect, however, from August 1939 to November 1941. (AR 605-10, 24 Feb. 1921 AR 605-20, 16 Aug. 1939

and 1, 14 Nov. 1941.)

Army Regulations No. 605-20, 16 Aug. 1939.
112 PERSONNEL

to The Adjutant General for issuance of letters of appointment to the appropriate Medical Department Reserve Corps.

3. National Guard.—Any officer of State National Guard Unit might be

commissioned in the National Guard of the United States upon passing “such

tests as to his physical, moral, and professional fitness as the President may

prescribe.” Most State National Guard officers obtained such commissions.

In peacetime, this made them eligible for active duty with the Guard at the

order of the State Governor, and in time of national emergency declared by

Congress, it enabled the President to call them into the active service of the

United States. Enlisted men of the National Guard also might hold commissions in the National Guard of the United States, which would give them

officer status whenever the latter was called into active service.

EARLY RESERVE MEASURES

The Situation at the Beginning of the Emergency

The most important function of the procurement system during the early

emergency period—at least from the standpoint of the Medical Department

was to provide additional officers and nurses, by way of the Reserves, for the

medical service of the active forces. These forces were constantly expanding,

and their needs were immediate. On 30 June 1939, the Nurse Corps and all

officer corps except the Veterinary Corps were below their authorized activeduty strength, and authorizations of medical, dental, and veterinary officers,

as well as nurses, increased considerably during the following year. The National Guard and the Regular Army could not furnish the additional strength

that would be needed under conditions of rapid expansion. The National

Guard was called in August 1940, but Congress did not authorize officer appointment to the Regular Army in sufficient numbers to correspond with the

1939-40 increases in enlisted strength. Even the small Regular Army additions which Congress permitted were not realized in full. Thus, at the end

of June 1940, there were 46 vacancies in the Regular Army Medical Corps, 11

in the Dental Corps, and 10 in the Medical Administrative Corps; only the

Veterinary Corps had filled its quota. The backlog of reservists, however,

looked more than adequate on paper. On 30 June 1939, the Reserves of three

of the five officer corps were above their procurement objectives (table 12),

while Reserve nurses registered with the Red Cross were many times the number of the nurses on active duty with the Army. Changes in the Officers’

Reserve Corps as of June 1940 and June 1941 are shown in table 13. Comparable figures for the National Guard are in table 14.

Army Regulations No. 140-S3, 30 July 1936.

48 Stat. 53.

Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, 1940, p. 9. Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Washington: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1940, p. 162. The active duty strength was 672 the Red Cross Reserve amounted to 15,761.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 113

Table 12. Active-duty strength of Medical Department groups, by Army'components, 30 June

1939—30 November

Component 30 June 1939 30 June 1940 30 June 1941 30 November

1941

Regular Army;

Medical Corps 1, 094

220

126

64

672

1, 160

252

126

62

942

1, 206

266

126

61

1, 280

1, 271

270

126

68

1, 402

Dental Corps.

Veterinary Corps

Medical Administrative Corps

Army Nurse Corps

Total officers and nurses. 2, 176 2, 542 2, 939 3, 137

Enlisted men __ __ 9, 359 14, 974 31, 343 31, 872

Grand total 11, 535 17, 516 34, 282 35, 009

Reserves Medical Corps.. ._

...

706

157

96

414

101

45

8, 025

10 2, 090

10 404

186

772

4, 153

8, 984

2, 531

541

226

933

5, 409

Dental Corps.

Veterinary Corps ...

Sanitary Corps

Medical Administrative Corps xj

Army Nurse Corps

Total officers and nurses. 976 572 15, 630 18, 624

Enlisted men 13 10

Grand total. 976 572 15, 631 18, 634

National Guard:

Medical Corps. ...

1, 080

280

33

275

1, 072

280

28

266

Dental Corps.

Veterinary Corps __ ...

Sanitary Corps

Medical Administrative Corps

Total officers 1, 669 15 1, 647

Enlisted men 16 14, 715 12, 075

Grand total ... 16, 384 13, 722

Army of the United States: Medical Corps

Dental Corps ...

Veterinary Corps _______

Medical Administrative Corps.. 76

Total officers 17 76

Enlisted men 18 755 794

Grand total 755 870

Selectees, enlisted men 19 29 51. 255 63, 351

See footnotes on pages 114 and 115.
114 PERSONNEL

Unless otherwise specified, data on officers and nurses from 30 June 1939 to 30 June 1941,

inclusive, are from corresponding “Annual Reports of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army” and data on

enlisted men are from equivalent “Annual Reports of The Secretary of War.”

Data for male officers, with the exceptions mentioned in other footnotes, are from Memorandum,

F. M. Fitts, to Colonel Lull, 29 Oct. 1942, subject: Status of Medical Department Officers as of Dec.

1941, addendum to “History of Military Personnel Division, Personnel Service, 1939-April 1944.”

The figures represent strength on December 1941.

Authorized Regular Army strengths were: (1) For 30 June 1939: MC, 1,133; DC, 233;

VC, 126; MAC, 72; ANC, 675; and enlisted men, 8,643. (2) For 30 June 1940; MC, 1,210; DC,

264; VC, 126; MAC, 72; ANC, 949; and enlisted men, 13,628. (3) For 30 June 1941 MC, 1,230;

DC, 267 VC, 126; MAC, 72; ANC, 1,875; (no figures for enlisted men). (Data are from “Annual

Reports of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army” for dates corresponding to those shown except authorization for enlisted men in 1939 which is from the report for 1940, p. 170.)

Probably includes retired officers on active duty as follows: MC, 18; VC, 2; and MAC, 3.

(Figures pertaining to the Medical and Medical Administrative Corps are for the week ending

on July 1941 and were provided by the Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

on 30 August 1949.)

Includes the following retired officers on active duty: MC, 38; DC, 2; VC, 2; and MAC, 7.

(Data from source of Regular Army strength figures on the same date, see footnote 2, above.)

IncludesPhilippine Scouts.

Includes an estimated 608 members of the Regular Army Reserve. The number of Regular

Army Enlisted Reserves who, regardless of branch, were called into active service was 12,190 all of

these went on duty in February 1941. Of the total, 672 or somewhat more than percent were

Medical Department personnel. By 30 June 1941, the Regular Army Enlisted Reserves on active

duty had declined to 10,919. Assuming that percent of the decline had occurred in the Medical

Department, the loss to the medical service amounted to 64, leaving balance of 608. Figure supplied by Statistics and Accounting Branch, Statistics Section, Office of The Adjutant

General, 24 October 1957. Includes an estimated 548 members of the Regular Army Reserves. This

estimate is based on the rate of decline of the Regular Army Reserves without distinction of branch

between February and 30 June. As shown in footnote 7, above, this rate when applied to the Medical

Department left balance of 608 on 30 June. If the rate of decline, approximately 12 per month, is

assumed to have continued, the loss between this date and 30 November 1941 amounts to 60, and the

strength on the latter date is reduced to the figure stated at the beginning of this note.

Authorized active-duty strengths for the Reserves are known only for 30 June 1940. At that

time they were: MC, 1,271 DC, 219 VC, 76 and MAC, 4. The number authorized for the Medical

Corps was 1,283 minus the number of Medical Administrative and Sanitary Corps Reserve officers on

active duty.

“Divisionalreports in the source for these figures (Annual Report of The Surgeon General, 1941)

show 1,745 dental Reserve officers and 435 veterinary Reserve officers on extended active duty (pp. 183,

190). The explanation for the discrepancy in the case of the dental officers may be similar to that

mentioned in footnote 12 (that is, the figure stated in the table may include individuals for whom

active-duty orders had been requested), but it does not explain the difference in the Veterinary Corps

figures.

11 Includes Sanitary Corps.

12 Data are described in the source as “on duty or duty orders requested as of June 30, 1940.”

Except in the case of the Sanitary Corps, where the strength is reduced to 6, the same figures are

reproduced in the report for 1941 (p. 142) under the simple heading of “on duty June 30, 1940.”

The report for 1940 also states (p. 209) that 25 Veterinary Corps reservists were on active duty on

30 June failure to include those who had not yet come on active duty may account for the discrepancy.

13 Does not include Regular Army Reserve (see footnotes and 8, above). The figure for 30

November 1941 Avas provided by the Statistics and Accounting Branch (see footnote 8, above) on

24 October 1957. 14 Commissioned personnel of the Medical Department in the National Guard of the United States,

as reported by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in his annual report for fiscal year 1941. The Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, for the same date (p. 260), gives the

following figures instead of those shown For MC, 1,120 DC, 243 VC, 60 MAC, 153 total, 1,576. No strength is shown for the Sanitary Corps, but 16 warrant officers are credited to the Medical

Department; presumably, these were men serving in medicalunits.

Elsewhere in the 1941 Annual Report of The Surgeon General, the number of Veterinary Corps

officers of the National Guard is stated to be 34 (p. 190), and the number of Dental Corps officers,

282 (p. 183). These figures, which approximate those shown in the body of this table, undoubtedly

are more accurate than the corresponding personnel figures stated. It also is unlikely that the strength of the Medical Corps personnel, like that of the Veterinary Corps personnel, could have

exceeded the strength shown for the National Guard of the United States, which consisted of all individuals who had been inducted since the federalization of the National Guard minus those who

had been completely separated from the Federal service and also had been dropped from their
EMERGENCY PERIOD 115

National Guard status. On the other hand, the figure for the Medical Administrative Corps probably

is very low in view of the much higher strength shown for the group at later periods and the fact

that few if any members of the corps could have been inducted after 30 June 1941. (See footnote 15.)

As late as 30 June 1943, the active-duty strength of the Medical Administrative Corps in the National

Guard was shown to be 277. (Annual Report, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army, 1943.) Similar considerations govern the strength of the Dental Corps personnel,

which at the same date was reported to be 273.

The Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the fiscal year 1941 shows no breakdown for

the Medical Department corps in the National Guard but reports the aggregate strength of these

groups on 30 June 1941 as 1,491.

15 Adjustment of strengths shown for November 1941, in memorandum cited in footnote 2,

p. 114, for MC is 1,072 for DC, 300 for VC, 28 and for MAC, 266.

In view of the considerations mentioned in footnote 14, it is unlikely that the Dental Corps

personnel of the National Guard numbered 300, since at the end of June it had been only 280. At

that time, the total number of Medical Department officers of the National Guard remaining to be

inducted had been six. {In Annual Report of Chief of National Guard Bureau for the fiscal year

1941, pp. 117-118.) For that reason, the number of Dental Corps officers of the National Guard

on active duty on November 1941 has been reduced to 280. In view of the fact that the Active

National Guard as late as 30 June 1942 is credited with one Sanitary Corps officer, one such officer

is credited to the active duty strength on November 1941. breakdown of the National Guard

strength of Medical Department officers on 30 November 1941 is not available, but it is assumed

that it did not differ greatly from the same strength at the beginning of the month. However, according to information supplied by the Statistics and Accounting Branch, Statistics Section, Office

of The Adjutant General, on 24 October 1957, the aggregate of the strength on 30 November 1941

was 1,590, but for purposes of consistency, the total of 1,647 as of November 1941 is stated in the

body of this table.

10 Strength for 30 June 1941 is based on Annual Report of Secretary of War for 1941, which

shows medical enlisted strength of National Guard on that date to be 15,470. Since 755 of these

are estimated to be Army of the United States personnel (see footnote 18), the strength of the

National Guard personnel proper is deemed to be 14,715. Strength of 30 November 1941 is based

on data supplied by Statistics and Accounting Branch, 24 October 1957, showing medical enlisted

strength of the National Guard on the former date to be 12,869. Since no separate strength figures

for AUS enlisted personnel are shown in these data, it is assumed that the estimated 794 medical

enlisted men in that category (see footnote 18) must be subtracted from 12,869 in order to arrive

at approximately the true National Guard strength, that is, 12,075.

17 Personnel who entered the Army of the United States directly, without previous service as

members of the Regular Army, the Reserves, or the National Guard. Strength information from

Statistics and AccountingBranch (see footnote 8), 24 October 1957. This information is not broken

down by corps, but the number 76 corresponds closely to the strength (77) of the first class for

MAG’s at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., which graduated in September 1941. The entire 76 therefore have

been attributed to the Medical Administrative Corps. According to “Officers Appointed in the MC,

DC, VC, MAC, and PhC. From January 1939 through 1946. Month of Occurrence. OTN 337,”

(prepared by the Adjutant General’s Office, Strength Accounting Branch, July 1946), 161 Medical

Department officers classified as AUS had come on duty by 30 November 1941. They included the

following: MC, 28; DC, 38; VC, 10; MAC, 85. However, some of these are shown as having come

on active duty as early as January 1941, and it is possible that many of those comprehended in the

data entered upon active duty at the time stated but as members of the Reserves or the National

Guard, acquiring AUS status later. 18 Comprises volunteers on 1-year enlistments. According to the Annual Report of the Secretary

of War, 1941, total of 767 enlisted volunteers had come on duty with the Medical Department from

September 1940 to the end of June 1941. The corresponding number for the Army as whole was

22,390. Of these, 22,060 remained on duty on 30 June 1941, for loss of 1.5 percent. Applying the

same percentage to the enlisted volunteers of the Medical Department, the balance remaining on

30 June 1941 was 755. The number of such personnel on duty on 30 November 1941 is unknown,

but on 31 December 1941, it was 802. (Information from Statistics and Accounting Branch, 24

October 1957.) By prorating the difference between the numbers present on 30 June and 31 December on monthly basis, the estimated strength of Medical Department enlisted personnel classified

as “AUS” is found to be 794.

19 The figure for 30 November was prorated by the Statistics and Accounting Branch (see footnote 8), 24 October 1957. 20 Of these, 38,756 were serving in Regular Army units and 12,799 in National Guard units.

(Annual Report of Secretary ofWar, 1941.)

At this time, the total authorized strength of Medical Department enlisted personnel, both se- lectees and others, was approximately 82,150. Of these, about 20,437 were allotted to National Guard

units, 1,387 to the veterinary service, and 60,326 to the remainder of the Medical Department

establishment. (Annual Report of The Surgeon General, 1941, p. 148.)
PERSONNEL 116

Table

13.

—Strength

of

Medical

Department

Reserves

(Regular

Army

Reserve and

Reserve

Corps), 1939-4-1

Personnel

Strength,30

June 1939

Changes,

July

1939-30 June

1940

Strength, 30

June 1940

Net change since 30

June 1939(percent)

Changes,

July

1940-30 June

1941

Strength,30

June 1941

Netchange since 30

June 1940(percent)

Changes,

July30

Nov.

1941

Strength,30

Nov. 1941

Net change since 30

June 1941(percent)

Pro- cured

Lost

Pro- cured

Lost

Pro-cured

Lost

Enlistedmen

Regular

Army

Reserve

19,

301 1,028

28,

020 1,475

45 43

10,

919

-61

Total

officers:

Reserve Corps

131,

726 115,965 39,100 23,339 15,

198 5,

063 1,381 454 1,

243 15,

761 3,054 16

132,

652

116,

853 39,

918 23,

139 15,

299 4,665 1,

537 475 1,163 15,779 3,233 49

0. 0. -0. -0. 0. -8 11 -6 0.

01 206

Male

only

Ml,

008

10,

120

17,

541

11,

647

122,

747

Male

only Medical

Corps

Dental

Corps

Veterinary

Corps

Sanitary

Corps

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps

Army

Nurse

Corps

(Red

501 308 163

701 207 398 80

4,

903 3,919 722 74 47 141

6,

740 5,

244 959 218 63 256

21,

302 13,974 4,428 1,

393 459 1,048

-8 -9 -5 -9 -3 -10

20,

609 13,745 4,

060 1,

346 415 1,043

-3 -1 -8 -3 -10 -0.

Enlisted

men:

2,

149

-34

157,

000 13,020

720

Medical

Department
EMERGENCY PERIOD 117

Figures

for

1939

and

1940

are,

respectively, from

“Annual

Report

of

the

Secretary

of

War”

(.1939)

p.

85,

and

(1940)

p.

61.

Figure

for

1941

is

number

members of

of

the

Regular

Army Reserve on

active

duty

on

30

June

1941.

(See

table

12.)

Since

the

entire

membership of

the

Regular

Army

Reserve was required to

be

called

to

active

duty

by

15

February

1941, it

is

assumed that

those

on

active

duty

on

30

June

1941

constituted

the

entire

strength

of

this

Reserve. The

corresponding

figure

for

the

Medical

Department is

estimated

to

be

608

(table 12,

footnote

7)

which

is

59

percent

less

than

the

strength

for

Medical

Department members

of

the

Regular

Army Reserve on

30

June

1940.

Aggregate

of

strengths,

as

shown

in

this

table,

of

male

officers

in

all

branches

and

nurses.

Adjustments

of

strengths

shown

in

“Annual

Reports

of

the

Secretary

of

War”

for

corresponding dates;

that

is,

for

1939—116,719; for

1940

—116,636;

for

1941

—122,020,

by

subtracting

from

these

strengths

the

amounts

attributed

in

the

same

sources to

the

Medical

Department; namely,

Affiliated

units,

officers:

All

brandies Male

only

Medical

Department,

1,

639 1,

414 176 49

Medical

Corps

Dental

Corps

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps

Affiliated Reserve Officers;

10

All

branches Male

only

11

1,

561 1,410 1,257 122 31

Medical

Department, male

only

12

1,

405 1,264 120 21

-0. 0.

-2 -32

Medical

Corps

Dental

Corps

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps

1939

mo

mi

Medical

Corps

15,956

15,187

14,497

Dental

Corps.,

4,979

4,627

4,630

Veterinary

Corps..

1,509

1,525

1,319

Sanitary

Corps

432

451

498

Medical

Administrative

Corps

1,217

1,132

1,631

Totaland

adding

the

aggregate

strength

of

the

corps listed

as

shown

in

the

body

of

this

table.

Footnotes continued on

page

118.

24,093

22,922

22,575
118 PERSONNEL

Computed

by

substracting

from

total

accessions

for

Officer

Reserve

Corps as

shown

in

“Annual

Reports

of

the

Secretary of

War”

for

1910

and

1941;

that

is,

for

1939-40—12,300,

for

1940-41—16,189, accessions of

Medical

Department officers

reported in

the

same

sources

as

follows;

and

adding

aggregate

accessions of

the

same

groups as

stated

in

this

table.

Computed

by

adding

number

procured

to

strength

at

beginning

of

the

period

and

subtracting

the

strength

at

the

close

of

the

period

from

the

total.

Basic

data

through

June

1941

from

“Annual

Reports

of

The

Surgeon

General, 1939-41.” Basic

data

for

November 1941

from

Memorandum,

F.

H.

Fitts

to

Colonel

Lull,

29

Oct.

1942,

subject:

Status

of

Medical

Department

Officers as

of

Dec.

1941, addendum to

History

of

Military

Personnel

Division,

Personnel Service

—1939-

April

1944.

Basic

data

from

Memorandum, Superintendent,

Army

Nurse

Corps,

for

The

Surgeon

General,

Dec.

1941,

in

Miss

Byers’

Book

Data

on

Army

Nurses, 1941.

Basic

data

through

June

1941

from

“Annual

Reports of

the

Secretary

of

War”

for

dates

corresponding

to

those

shown.

Strength

on

30

November 1941

is

unknown, but

is

estimated

to

have

been

157,000 for

the

Army

in

general.

The

vast

increase

in

the

strength

of

the

Enlisted

Reserve

Corps

which

this

figure

signifies

is

the

result

of

amendments to

the

basic

Selective

Service

law

in

August 1941

authorizing

release from

active

duty

of

men

inducted

under

the

act

who

were

over 28

years

of

age

upon

their

own request

and

release of

men

below

this

age

upon

showing

that

their

retention in

the

Army

would

subject

them

or

their

wives

and

dependents to

undue

hardship.

Under

these

provisions over

155,000 men

were

released between

September 1941

and

Pearl

Harbor,

but

all

of

them

were retained in

the

Enlisted

Reserve

Corps

(“Selective Service

in

Peacetime,”

First

Report

of

Director of

Selective

Service, 1940-41, pp.

267-268).

Since

more

than

2,000

were in

the

corps

on

30

June

1941,

this

figure

has

been

added

to

155,000 to

determine the

estimated

strength of

the

corps

on

30

November.

Medical

Department enlisted

strength

during

the

period

July-November 1941

was

in

the

vicinity

of

8.4

percent

of

the

total

draftee

strength

of

the

Army.

(According

to

“Annual

Report

of

the

Secretary

of

War”

for

1941),

the

total

number

of

drafted

enlisted

men

on

active

duty

was

606,

915

on

30

June

1941.

Of

these,

8.5

percent

(see

table

12)

were

Medical

Department

personnel.

On

30

November 1941,

in

accordance with

data

supplied

by

the

Statistics

and

Accounting

Branch,

Statistics

Section,

Office

of

The

Adjutant

General,

on

May

1958,

the

total

number

of

selectees

on

active

duty

was 756,747.

The

proportion

of

those

assigned

to

the

Medical

Department was 8.4

percent

(table

12).

Assuming

that

the

same

percentage of

the

155,000 released men

comprised

Medical

Department

personnel,

the

number

of

such

personnel

placed

in

the

Enlisted

Reserve

Corps

was

13,020. The

number

of

Medical

Department enlisted

men

who

were in

the

Enlisted

Reserve

Corps

after

30

June

1940

and

before

September 1941

is

unknown,

but

in

view

of

the

earlier

figures

on

the

same

topic,

it

must

have

beer

negligible.

Consequently, 13,020

is

taken

as

an

approximation of

the

Medical

Department

membership

in

the

Enlisted

Reserve

Corps

on

30

November

1941.From

“Annual

Report

of

The

Surgeon

General” for

1941.

Includes

members

of

the

Affiliated Reserve

(footnote 10)

and

members

of

the

Officers

Reserve

Corps

who

were not

members

of

the

Affiliated Reserve

although

members

of

the

affiliated

units.

id

Members

of

the

Officers

Reserve

Corps

who

possessed

Reserve Status

only

through

assignment

to

an

affiliated

unit.

11

Adjustment

of

strength

of

all

branches as

shown

in

“Annual

Report

of

the

Secretary

of

War”

for

1941;

that

is,

1,659,

by

subtracting

strengths

reported

therein

for

the

Medical

Department

(Medical

Corps,

1,326; Dental

Corps,

137;

and

Medical

Administrative

Corps,

45)

and

adding

the

strength

of

the

Affiliated Reserves in

these

corps

as

stated

in

the

body

of

this

table. 12

Basic

data

for

June

1941

from

“Annual

Report

of

the

Surgeon

General,”

1941,

pp.

145-146.

Slightly

different

figures are also

given

in

the

same

source (pp.

146-147);

namely,

Medical

Corps,

1,264; Dental

Corps,

120;

and

Medical

Administrative

Corps,

31.

(The

source states

that

these

figures

represent the

strength

of

the

affiliated

units,

but

their

size

indicates

that

they

really

apply

to

the

Affiliated Reserve.)

Basic

data

for

November

are

from

Memorandum,

F.

H.

Fitts,

to

Colonel

Lull,

cited

in

footnote

6.

This

source reports

the

total

number

of

Medical

Administrative

Corps

officers

in

the

Affiliated Reserve to

be

31,

but

the

distribution of

the

same group by

rank

results

in

total

of

21.

However,

since

31

is

the

strength

which

the

group possessed on

30

June

1941,

it

is

possible

that

the

figure

31

is

correct

for

30

November. 1939-40

1940-41

Medical

Corps

1,518

2,686

Dental

Corps

35

649

Veterinary

Corps. ..

143

57

Sanitary

Corps

47

35

Medical

Administrative

Corps

50

124

Total

1,793

3,

551
EMERGENCY PERIOD 119

Table

14.

—Strength

of

Medical

Department

Reserves

{National

Guard), 1939-41

Component

Strength, 30

June 1939

Changes,

July

1939-

30

June

1940

Strength,30

June 1940

Net change since 30

June 1939(percent)

Changes,

July

1940-

30

June

1941

Strength,30

June 1941

Net change since 30

June 1940(percent)

Changes, 30

June30

Nov. 1941

Strength, 30

Nov. 1941

Net change since 30

June 1941(percent)

Procured

Lost

Procured

Lost

Procured

Lost

National

Guard

of

United

States: Officers: All

branches

16,

341

16,

415

0.

19,

069

16

15,

926

-16

Medical

Department

1,

592

1,

509

-5

1,

669

11

1,

557

Medical

Corps

1,078

1,

022

1,

080

1,

081

0.

Dental

Corps

245

228

-7

280

23

260

-7

Veterinary

Corps

73

65

--11

33

-49

29

-12

Sanitary

Corps

50

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps

195

193

275

42

186

-32

Warrant

officers

212

31

28

215

73

87

201

196

-2

Enlistedmen All

branches.

183,

233

224,

882

23

243,

057

213,

449

-12

Medical

Department

12,

144

14,

745

21

14,

735

-.

07

12,

075

-18

Sources

of

National

Guard

of

United

States; Active

National

Guard

officers: All

branches

14,

465

1,

523

1,

426

14,

562

0.

5,

125

3,

471

16,

216

11

15,

926

-2

Medical

Department

1,

537

309

274

1,

572

808

767

1,

613

1,

557

Medical

Corps

1,

089

242

216

1,

115

593

587

1,

121

0.

1,

081

-3

Dental

Corps.

235

48

40

243

138

111

270

11

260

-4

Veterinary

Corps

67

60

-10

14

40

34

-43

29

-17

Sanitary

Corps

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps

145

18

10

153

63

29

187

-22

186

0.

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table,

p.

121.
120 PERSONNEL

Table

14.

—Strength

of

Medical

Department

Reserves

(National Guard), 1939-^1 —Continued

Component

Strength,30

June 1939

Changes,

July

1939-

30

June

1940

Strength, 30

June 1940

Net change since 30

June 1939(percent)

Changes,

July

1943-

30

June

1941

Strength,30

June 1941

Net change since 30

June 1940(percent)

Changes, 33

June30

Nov.

1941

Strength, 30

Nov. 1941

Net change since 30

June 1941(percent)

Procured

Lost

Procured

Lost

Procured

Lost

212

31

28

215

73

87

201

-7

196

-2

184,

825 12,

197 674 42 30

226,

837 14,

799 739 47 33

23 +22 10 12 10 14 100

243,

057 14,735 533 24 14

-0. -28 -49 -58 50 -63 -50

213,

449 12,

075 343 15

-12 -18 -36 -38 -36 -50 -33

Medical

Department

Inactive

National

Guard

officers: Medical

Department. .. Veterinary

Corps

Medical

Administra- Holding

commissions in

National

Guard

of

United

States:

10

1,

602 53 48

1,

955 54 51

22

3,

081 115 20 88

57 113 600

3,

001 120 20 93

-3

Medical

Department. Medical

Corps

-100

Veterinary

Corps..

Sanitary

Corps

Medical

Adminis- trative

Corps

-100 73
EMERGENCY PERIOD 121

Members

of

the

National

Guard

who

had

taken

an

oath

and

had

been

appointed

for

Federal service

whenever

it

became

necessary (Dictionary of

United

States

Army

Terms'

TM

20-205,

18

Jan.

1944).

Basic

data

through

June

1941

from

“Annual

Reports

of

Chief

of

National

Guard Bureau” for

corresponding dates.

Strength

on

30

November 1941

computed

by

prorating on

monthly

basis

the

difference between

the

strength

on

30

June

1941

and

the

strength

of

the

Active

National

Guard

on

30

June

1942

(see

footnote

5).

Membership

in

the

Active

National

Guard

of

the

United

States

and

the

difference prior

to

completion

of

the

induction

of

the

Guard

into

the

Federal

service

between

the

commissioned

strength

of

the

Active

National

Guard

and

that

of

the

National

Guard

of

the

United

States

(exclusive

of

enlisted

men

holding

commissions) was

the

result

almost

entirely

of

the

timelag

between

appointment in

the

Active

National

Guard

and

recognition of

the

appointee

by

the

Chief

of

the

National

Guard Bureau.

(See

“Annual

Reports of

Chief

of

National

Guard Bureau”

for

1939

and

1941.)

With

the

induction

of

the

Guard

and

termination

of

appointments therein,

the

difference

disappeared. (In

the

Annual

Report

of

the

Chief

of

the

Bureau

for

1942,

only

the

strength

of

the

Active

National

Guard

was

reported.)

Comprises

individuals

with

the

status

of

warrant

officers

in

the

Active

National

Guard.

Enlisted men

in

the

Active

National

Guard

did

not

have

separate

status

in

the

National

Guard

of

the

United

States.

Figures

shown

are

therefore the

same

as

those

stated

under

Active

National

Guard

except

those

for

1939 and1940 which

are

the

difference between

the

number

of

enlisted

men

in

the

Active

National

Guard

at

those

times

and

the

number

of

enlisted

men

of

the

National

Guard

holding

commissions in

the

National

Guard

of

the

United

States.

The

numbers

of

enlisted

men actually

inducted

with

the

National

Guard

were

substantially

in

excess of

the

strengths

shown

here;

by

30

June

1941,

according

to

the

National

Guard

Bureau,

the

number

in

all

branches

had

reached 278,526 and

those

in

the

Medical

Department had

grown to

17,238.

(Annual

Report

of

Chief

of

National

Guard

Bureau, 1941.)

The

number

further

Increased

slightly

so

that

on

30

November 1941 the

total

inducted

for

all

branches

reached 279,358.

The

number

inducted

in

the

Medical

Department is

unknown

but

could

scarcely

have

been

more

than

100

greater

than

it

had

been

on

30

June.

(Annual

Report

of

Chief

of

National

Guard

Bureau, 1942.)

Figures

provided

by

the

Secretary

of

War

relative to

30

June

1941

are

considerably

less

than

those

reported

by

the

National

Guard Bureau: 272,559

in

all

branches

and

15,011 in

the

Medical

Department.

(Annual

Report

of

the

Secretary

of

War,

1941.)

All

basic

data

pertaining

to

officers

and

warrant

officers

through

30

June

1941

come

from

the

“Annual Reports

of

the

Chief

of

the

National

Guard Bureau”

corresponding

to

the

dates

shown.

Figures

for

30

November 1941

were

computed

by

prorating on

monthly

basis

the

differences between

the

strengths

on

30

June

1941

and

the

corresponding

strengths

on

30

June

1942.

According

to

the

“Annual

Report

of

the

Chief

of

the

National

Guard

Bureau”

for

1942,

the

strengths

on

the

latter

date

were

as

follows;

Basic

data

on

losses

are

from

the

sources of

the

accompanying strength

data.

(See

footnote

5.)

Figures on

procurement were

computed

by

adding

losses

to

the

strength

at

the

end

of

the

period

and

subtracting

the

strength

at

the

beginning of

the

period

from

the

resulting sums.

Strengths

for

1939

and

1940

include

comet.

Basic

data

for

1939

and

1940

from

the

corresponding

“Annual Reports of

the

Chief

of

the

National

Guard Bureau.”

Basic

data

for

June

and

November 1941

are

active-duty

strength

of

National

Guard

enlisted

men

at

these

times

(see

table

12).

Information

not

available.

Basic

data

through

June

1941

from

corresponding

“Annual Reports

of

the

Chief

of

the

National

Guard Bureau.”

Figures

for

30

November 1941

were

computed

by

prorating

on

monthly

basis

the

difference between

the

strengths

on

30

June

1941 and

30

June

1942.

In

addition

to

enlisted

men, the

following

held

commissions

in

the

National

Guard

of

the

United

States: 1939

and

1940,

warrant

officers,

2;

comets,

1;

June

1941,

warrant

officers,

1.

None

of

these

held

commissions

in

Medical

Department

component.

All

data

from

“Annual

Reports

of

the

Chief

of

the

National

Guard

Bureau,” 1939

to

1941, inclusive.

Active

Inactive

Enlisted

National

National

men

holding

Guard

Guard

commissions

All

branches

15,524

75

3,001

Medical

Department: Medical

Corps

1,043

Dental

Corps

251

20

Veterinary

Corps

27

Sanitary

Corps

Medical

Administrative

Corps

184

99

Total

1,506

126

Warrant

officers

189
122 PERSONNEL

Since no means existed at this time by which persons could be compelled

to accept appointments in the Regular Army or the Reserves, or even (if

reservists) to accept call to active duty, Army authorities had to depend on

appeals to the patriotism or self-interest of those they wished to reach; in the

case of nurses, the Red Cross joined in the appeal. During the spring and

summer of 1940, publicity campaigns were undertaken to speed the entry of

medical reservists into active service. The Surgeon General requested medical

journals to print informational letters, and prominent civilian members of the

Reserve Corps as well as Reserve Officers’ Training Corps instructors in medical

schools were utilized to encourage recruitment.

The procedure for bringing Reserve officers and nurses on active duty began

with summons from the chief of the reservists assignment group (the corps

area commander orThe Surgeon General). Thereservist had the right to either

accept or refuse the call as he wished. If he accepted, thenext step was physical examination. If that was satisfactory, the necessary papers were forwarded

to The Adjutant General, who issued duty orders.

Act of April 1939

But the problem of applying the officer Reserves to actual needs proved to

be acute. The first move of any importance to draw on the Medical Department

Officers Reserve Corps for the benefit of the active forces was made in the act

of April 1939—the same act that fixed the authorized strength of the Regular

Army officer corps. Under this act, the President was empowered to call up

255 male Reserve lieutenants and captains of the Medical Department for not

more than year of voluntary active duty with an extension, at the discretion

of the Secretary of War, to as long as years. Only during an emergency

declared by Congress could Reserve officers be ordered to duty without their

consent; virtually no means existed by which, in time of peace, they could

be compelled to serve even their 2-week tour of active duty when called upon.

They could resign, or if they persisted in ignoring the call, one of two courses

was open to the Army: It might place them on the ineligible list for the

remainder of their 5-year term of appointment, or if they had had 15 years of

satisfactory service to their credit, it could transfer them to the Inactive

Reserve. In either case, they lost certain privileges, such as right of promotion.

Like all previous legislation pertaining to reservists, the new act imposed no

penalties whatever on those who declined to serve for the or years specified;

in fact, it was only on their application that the duty orders could be issued.

This concession was necessary as matter of good faith, since reservists had

accepted their commissions under no obligations of lengthy peacetime service.

The act of April 1939 was the last occasion, until the later emergency

period, that Congress itself laid down the conditions under which new increArmy Regulations No. 140-5, 16 June 1963.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 123

ments of Reserve officers were to be called to active duty. 10 Thereafter, the

War Department assumed that function.

Modification of the act

In making allotments to the Medical Department for the purpose of

bringing Reserve officers on duty, the General Staff' did not always prescribe the same conditions of service as were laid down in the act of April 1939.

With only 139 of the 255 medical officers allotted under this act procured and

placed under orders by the end of November, the General Staff modified the

rules. proposed further enlargement of the Army would give the Medical

Department an additional 508 officers, whenever the necessary legislation

should be passed. In anticipation of such legislation, corps area commanders were instructed to recruit only captains and lieutenants who were less than 35

years old. These men could be placed on active duty for year only. 11 The

Surgeon General, foreseeing administrative difficulties arising from these differences, recommended to The Adjutant General (1) that procurement of officers

over 35 years of age for active duty be permitted, and (2) that the allowable

tour of duty be extended beyond year. The latter step would reduce the

annual turnover to number “considered more within reason.” 12 few

months later, the War Department granted authority to extend the tour of

all Medical Department officers to years, but there is no indication that, for

the time being, the age limit was raised above 35. 13 The restriction was

lifted only after the enactment of compulsory service for the Reserves in

August 1940.

Since the bulk of the new officer and nurse strength added during this

period was to come from the Reserves, anything that limited the number of

reservists subject to call, that interfered with summoning them to active duty,

or that prevented the Medical Department from using them as long as necessary

might mean that requirements could not be fully met. Late in December

1939, therefore, the War Department authorized new appointments in the

Reserve if the existing members would not accept active duty voluntarily and

if the new appointees would agree to serve immediately. This authority seems

to have had rather limited application and to have resulted in the appoint10 Letter, Secretary of War, to Hon. Daniel W. Bell, Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget,

27 May 1939. 11 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to each Corps Area Commander, 23 Oct. 1939, subject:

Additional Reserve Officers To Be Placed on Duty With the Regular Army. (2) Letter, The Adjutant

General, to each Corps Area Commander, Dec. 1939, subject: Age Limit, Reserve Officers, Medical

Department. (The policy was laid down in October 1939, in anticipation of the appropriation act of

February 1940 which made the procurement possible.)

12 Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 18 Jan. 1940, subject: Removal of

Certain Restrictions Governing Selection of Additional Medical Department Reserve Officers.

13 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. William E. Shedd, Assistant Chief of Staff, G—1, for Chief of Staff,

War Department General Staff, 27 May 1940, subject: Medical Department Reserve Officer Personnel,

with 1st endorsement thereto, June 1940.
PERSONNEL 124

ment of no more than 125 Medical Department officers between June and

August 1940.14

Emergency Measures

An indication of the scarcity of officers is the fact that, in January 1940,

The Surgeon General was forced to recommend the summoning of Reserve

officers to active duty for periods of 28 days as provision for the year's

maneuvers. The General Staff approved the use of 138 Medical Department

Reserve officers on this basis for service in tactical units. 15

At almost the same time, the General Staff announced two measures of

more permanent relief. One was program recalling retired Regular Army

officers to active duty for utilization with Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

units and the recruiting service. This was of small importance numerically,

and it was not until months later that The Surgeon General substituted

retired officers for some of the 23 Regular Army Medical Corps officers on

Reserve Officers’ Training Corps duty. 16 Much more significant from the

standpoint of policy was the grant of authority to substitute reservists of the

Medical Administrative and Sanitary Corps for members of the Medical

Corps Reserve in meeting the quotas for active-duty assignments.

THE BEGINNING OF MOBILIZATION

The Change From Voluntary to Involuntary Service

Full mobilization began with the calling of the National Guard into

Federal service (27 August 1940) and the enactment of the Selective Training

and Service Act less than month later (16 September). More or less concurrently with these measures, number of steps were taken to increase the

supply of Medical Department officers and nurses. The law ordering the

induction of the National Guard was itself perhaps the most important in this

respect. This law also made active duty compulsory for all reservists, including those of the Medical Department. It authorized the President during the

14 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to each Corps Area Commander, 22 Dec. 1939, subject:

Procurement of Medical Department Reserve Officers. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 15 Aug. 1940, subject: Reserve Officer Personnel. (3) Letter, The Surgeon General,

to 'Phe Adjutant General, 24 Aug. 1940, subject: Appointments in Medical Department Reserve. (4) Memorandum, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, for Chief of Staff, 30 Dec. 1940, subject: Cancellation of Authority to Appoint in the Medical Department Reserve. 15 (1) Letter, The Surgeon General (Executive Officer), to The Adjutant General, 18 Jan. 1940,

subject: Additional Medical Department Reserve Officers Required for Temporary Duty With Regular Army. (2) Memorandum, War Department General Staff (Personnel Division, G-l), for Chief of Staff, Feb. 1940, subject: Additional Medical Department Reserve Officers Required for Temporary Duty With Regular Army, with 2d endorsement thereto, Mar. 1940. 18 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to Corps Area and Department Commanders, 22 Jan. 1940, subject: Assignment of Retired Officers to Active Duty. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, July 1940, subject: Utilization of Retired Officers (cited in Memorandum, Lt. Col. D. G. Hall, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director, Historical Division, Office of The Surgeon Geneial, 20 Apr. 1944, subject: History of Procurement Branch, Military Personnel Division, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General.)
EMERGENCY PERIOD 125

period ending on 30 June 1942 to call to active duty for period of 12 months, with or without their consent, members and units of the Reserve components of the Army of the United States (Officers’ Reserve Corps, National Guard, and Enlisted Reserve Corps) and retired members of the Regular Army. There were important restrictions, however. Reserve components could not be

employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere, except in territories and possessions of theUnited States. The law also stipulated that any reservist called to duty, if below’ the rank of captain and having no income beyond what he himself earned to support dependents, could resign and be discharged upon

his own request if made within 20 days of his entry upon duty.17

Signalizing as it did the passing from voluntary to involuntary military

service, this law constituted an important step toward placing the United States on preparedness basis as far as personnel was concerned. Physically qualified Reserve and National Guard officers holding the rank of captain or above ere

for the first time compelled to serve. Previously, too, Congress had in one way

or another limited the numbers of Reserve officers to be placed on active duty;

this law, carrying no such limitations, opened the way for mobilization on

much wider scale. The effect of granting individual officers below the grade of captain theright toresign, however,reduced the benefit of the law, for hundreds

of Medical Department Reserve officers exercised this right before it was canceled on 13 December 1941, shortly after entry of the United States into the

war. Desirable as it was from the standpoint of the Army to prohibit resignations entirely, Congress may have felt that public opinion demanded some concessions to officers in the lower ranks; it is wmrth noting that these concessions

were similar to the exemptions granted draftees when selective service legislation as enacted shortly aftemvard.

Further Emergency Reserve Measures

Immediately following the enactment of the Selective Service Act, two

measures were introduced to increase the supply of officers for the Army as

whole and therefore for the Medical Department. On 27 September 1940, the

War Department called Reserve officers employed with the Civilian Conservation Corps to active duty for assignment within Army installations. 18 The

second measure came in October when the system of corps area debits and credits

was initiated. If the number of Reserve officers available to corps area commander was insufficient for his needs, he was ordered to report the shortage

to the War Department, which would then start action to supply additional

officers from other corps areas. Such system was necessary because the distribution of men in training by corps areas did not correspond to the distribution

17 54 Stat. 858. 18 Letter, The Adjutant General, to each Corps Area Commander and Commanders of Arms or

Services, 13 Sept. 1940, subject: Placing on Active Duty of Reserve Officers Who are Employees of

the Civilian Conservation Corps.
126 PERSONNEL

of Reserve officers. 19

similar system had already been applied to nurse

procurement. 20

Medical Administrative Corps

Members of the Medical Administrative Corps Reserve responded to the

call to active duty in larger proportion than did Medical Corps reservists

(tables 12 and 13). possible reason is that some of those holding Reserve

commissions in the Medical Administrative Corps were enlisted men of the

Regular Army who for reasons of pay and prestige would accept active duty

as officers more readily than would civilian doctors in the Medical Corps

Reserve. Yet the number responding fell far short of the demand for qualified

personnel who could act as instructors in medical training centers or serve in

hospital administration. Men therefore had to be trained for commissioning

in the corps. It was not until July 1941, however, that the first officer candidate school, at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., opened for Medical Administrative

Corps training. In April, The Surgeon General had asked for the establishment of such school, to accommodate 100 candidates with eventual expansion

to capacity of 200. As part of general enlargement of the officer candidate

school program (planned but not yet put into effect), the Chief of Staff

authorized school for 100 Medical Administrative Corps candidates, to be

opened on July instead of on August 1941, although The Surgeon General

had recommended the latter date. One class of 77 second lieutenants graduated before Pearl Harbor.21

Sanitary Corps

The procurement of Sanitary Corps officers presented no great problem,

from the standpoint of actual numbers, during this period. Members on

active duty increased from on 30 June 1940 to 186 year later; the shortage

on 30 June 1941 was only 22. The Sanitary Corps in the prewar period

consisted of professional men, such as entomologists, bacteriologists, and sanitary engineers. As such, its members required long periods of civilian training. Yo officer candidate school, therefore, was established for the corps at

this time—or even later when the practice of commissioning nonprofessional

men in the corps began.

19 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General, each Corps Area, Oct. 1940.

subject: Additional Reserve Officers for Extended Active Duty with Corps Areas. (2) Memorandum,

Lt. Col. D. G. Hall, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director, Historical Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 20 Apr. 1944, subject: History of Procurement Branch Military Personnel Division, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General. 20 Letter, The Adjutant General, to each Corps Area Commander and The Surgeon General.

24 Sept. 1940, subject: Procurement of Reserve Nurses. 21 (1) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, Apr. 1941, subject: Officer Candidate School. (2) Memorandum, Operations and Training Division, War Department General Staff, for Chief of Staff, Apr. 1941, subject: Officer Candidate School. (3) Memorandum, Reserve Division, Office of The Adjutant General (Col. H. N. Sumner), for Major West, G-3, 15 Oct. 1941,

with enclosure thereto.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 127

DEFERMENT OF SERVICE FOR RESERVE OFFICERS

While The Surgeon General was anxious to place many reservists on

active duty as possible, he recognized that in some cases they might, at least

temporarily, be employed to greater advantage in civilian capacity. Reserve

officers on inactive status were exempt from the draft, and the process of granting them deferment of service differed from that employed with respect to

potential draftees. On his own authority, The Surgeon General could defer

the service of Medical Department Reserve officers in the Arm and Service

Assignment Group only. Appeals for deferment by officers in the Corps Area

Assignment Group (which contained much the larger portion of the Reserve)

could be acted upon only by the corps area commanders. At times, in order

to protect civilian interests, The Surgeon General recommended the transfer

of officers from the latter to the former group.22 In September 1940, he

recommended to the Office of the Secretary of War that Reserve officers who

held key positions as public health officers or as teachers at medical institutions

be transferred to the War Department Reserve Pool for assignment and

retention in their civilian jobs. That office disapproved the proposal, stating

that they must be available for active duty if their services were needed, but

agreed that the military service of State public health officers and teachers at

medical institutions would be deferred as long as possible. 23 Throughout the

emergency and war periods, deferment continued to be granted to certain

members of faculties (either reservists or civilians) who were declared by the

respective deans to be essential.

U.S. Public Health Service and Veterans' Administration Reserves

The P.S. Public Health Service and the Veterans’ Administration cooperated with The Surgeon General in keeping to minimum the deferments of

members of their staffs who were also Reserve officers in the Medical Department. The Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service stated in

circular addressed to members of his organization that except in cases of

emergency or in unusual situations, where the services of the men who happened to be Reserve officers were most essential to the conduct of Public Health

Service work, no effort would be made to delay or prevent such officers from

being ordered to active duty. When called, they were to be released immediately from employment by the Public Health Service. 24

22 Letter, The Surgeon General, to Dean, School of Medicine, Creighton University, Omaha,

Feb. 1941. 23 Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Maj. F. H. Kohloss, Office of Assistant Secretary of

War, Dec. 1940, subject; Deferment of Extended Active Duty of Certain Categories of Officers of

the Medical Department Reserve. 24 Circular (unnumbered), Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service, to Commissioned Officers

in Charge, U.S. Public Health Service, and Others Concerned, Oct. 1940, subject: Commissions in Reserve Corps of Army, Navy, or Marine Corps.
128 PERSONNEL

The Veterans’ Administration and the War Department, beginning in

August 1940, worked out plan by which the Medical Department when necessary could obtain the services of the Medical and Dental Corps Reserve officers

employed as civilians by the Veterans’ Administration without disrupting

the medical service of the latter. The Veterans’ Administration employed

about 400 such Reserve officers, and to call to duty any appreciable number at

one time would obviously have disorganized the work of that agency. The

plan agreed upon provided that the War Department would defer the military

service of key employees as long as possible; it would submit names of officers

desired but would not order anyone to active duty until the Veterans’ Administration had an opportunity to secure replacement. 25 The War Department

would ascertain from the Veterans’ Administration the earliest date on which

an officer could be made available. If that date was more than 60 days ahead,

the officer would be transferred to the War Department Reserve Pool and not

called to active duty. similar plan was adopted for Reserve nurses who were

in the employ of the Veterans’ Administration.26 Later, this plan was modified,

at the request of The Surgeon General, by provision that the headquarters

having assignment jurisdiction was to make every reasonable effort to determine

the officer’s physical fitness before requesting his release from the Veterans’

Administration. 27 Obviously, an officer found physically unfit for duty was

not requested, and the Veterans’ Administration therefore was spared the

trouble and expense of obtaining replacement for man who later was

returned to it after being rejected for Army service.

Establishment of Rosters for Reserve Officers

In November 1940, the Secretary of War directed each assignment

authority (corps area, departmental, and arm or service headquarters) to prepare and maintain rosters for the purpose of establishing priority in which

Reserve officers would be ordered to active duty. These headquarters were to

maintain separate rosters for Medical Department Reserve officers, general

provisions and restrictions on selection of Reserve officers being clearly defined.

The position of an officer on roster was to depend on the following factors:

Extent of deferment proposed by the officer and reasons therefor, personal

obligation as to dependents, professional attainments and value to the service

(in this connection age and physical aptitude were to be considered), and the

need for the officer’s services to the community in his civilian status. In the

25 (1) Letter, The Secretary of War, to the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 18 Oct. 1940. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, to Senator Chan Gurney (South Dakota), 22 Oct. 1940. 28 (1) See footnote 25(1), above. (2) Letter, Col. Florence A. Blanchfleld, USA (Ret.), to Col.

John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 21 Feb. 1956, with

enclosure thereto. 27 (1) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 25 Aug. 1941, subject: Release of

Medical Department Reserve Officers by Veterans’ Administration for Extended Active Duty. (2)

Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General, First Corps Area [and other corps areas],

11 Sept. 1941, subject: Release of Medical Department Reserve Officers by Veterans’ Administration

for Extended Active Duty.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 129

preparation of these rosters, assignment authorities were directed to use the

supplementary classification questionnaires for Medical Department Deserve

officers (W.D., A.G.O. Form No. 178-2).28 Such system of rosters became

necessary after the Chief of Staff stated that as individuals had accepted commissions in the Officers’ Reserve Corps with the understanding that national

emergency meant war, they would be consulted as to their availability before

being arbitrarily called to duty for training during peacetime. 29

EXTENSION OF RESERVISTS’ TOUR OF DUTY

As early as January 1939, even before the augmentation of the Army began,

The Surgeon General stated that the tours of duty of Medical Department

Reserve officers might have to be extended beyond year. As voluntary procurement measures failed to secure the desired number of officers, it became more

evident that an extension of the 1-year tour was necessary. 30 In 1939 and 1940,

Medical Department Reserve officers were brought on duty for year, with

possible extension of service to years.

Extension by Interpretation

After Congress made active duty compulsory (or partially so) for both

Reserve and National Guard officers (August 1940), the Judge Advocate

General ruled that officers who had entered on active duty before passage of

this legislation could be compelled to serve an extra year without their consent.

He ruled further that officers called to duty under the new law without their

consent were exempt from the extra duty unless they agreed to it.31 In other

words, those who had volunteered prior to August 1940 for year's service

were now forced to stay in for 2; those who had been brought on duty involuntarily after August 1940 did not have to stay in for the second year unless they

so requested.

At first, The Surgeon General favored retaining Medical Reserve Corps

officers on duty for the second year. 32 Two months later, however, he conceded

that since few officers were concerned, the number thus made available for military service would be negligible, and the psychological reaction of the individual and the profession at large would be unfavorable. The Secretary of

War adopted The Surgeon General’s point of view and announced that, with

28 Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding Generals, all Corps Areas, and Commanders of

War Department Arms and Services, 20 Nov. 1940, subject: Reserve Officers for Extended Active Duty

Under Public Resolution 96, 76th Congress. 29 Letter, Lt. Col. F. M. Pitts, to Col. Calvin H. Goddard, Director, Historical Unit, Office of The

Surgeon General, 21 Jan. 1952. 30 Letter, General Magee, to Colonel McCornack, 24 Jan. 1939. 31 (1) Letter. The Adjutant General, to each Corps Area and Department Commander, 19 Sept.

1940, subject: Reserve Officers Ordered to Active Duty Without Their Consent. (2) Letter, The

Adjutant General, to Chiefs of all War Department Arms and Services, 10 Oct. 1940, subject: Continuation of Active Duty, Without Their Consent, of Reserve Officers Now on Extended Active Duty. 32 Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 15 Jan. 1941, subject; Extensions of

Tours of Active Duty for Medical Corps Reserve Officers.
130 PERSONNEL

the exception of officers whose current tours of active duty were based on agreement for extension of tour, the policy of the War Department was that Reserve

officers of the Medical Department be not continued on active duty for period

longer than year without their consent. With minor exceptions, Reserve

officers of the Medical Department whose tours had been extended without

their consent under the law of August 1910 would upon application be relieved

from active duty.33

Service Extension Act, 1941

The Service Extension Act of August 1941 permitted the President to

extend for 18 months the service of members of the Reserves and National

Guard. The act also provided for the release of officers whose retention would

cause them undue hardship. The War Department announced that so far as

practicable it would release all Reserve officers (other than officers of the Air

Forces) having 12 months’ service if they did not wish to extend their tours

beyond that period. The Surgeon General, under pressure to obtain more

officers, recommended and the War Department in response directed that the

tours of all Medical Reserve Corps officers be extended where it had been determined that replacements were not available. 34

Establishment of the Army of the United States

On 22 September 1941, joint resolution of Congress permitted the President to commission newly appointed officers in the Army of the United States

as an alternative to one of its several components (including the Reserves).

Persons so appointed might be ordered to active duty for any period the President prescribed, and the appointment might continue “during the period of the

emergency and six months thereafter.” 35 On this basis, the Secretary of War

declared that, with exceptions that would not include many officers, all persons

commissioned thereafter during the emergency were to be appointed in the

Army of the United States. Applications for appointment in the Officers’

Reserve Corps then being processed would, with the exceptions mentioned

above, be considered as applications for appointment in theArmy of the United

States. 36 Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the problem of extending the term of

active duty for National Guard and Reserve officers was solved by an act of 13

December 1941 which obliged all members of the Army to serve for the duration of the war and months thereafter.

83 Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding Generals of all Armies, Army Corps, and others, May 1941, subject: Extension of Tours of Active Duty, Reserve Officers. 34 Letter, Office of The Surgeon General, to Office of The Adjutant General, Sept. 1941, subject:

Extension of Tours of Active Duty, Reserve Officers, with 1st endorsement thereto, 20 Sept. 1941. (It must be assumed that National Guard officers, although they were not specifically mentioned in this correspondence, were covered by the same policy.) 35 55 Stat. 728. 38 Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding Generals of all Armies, Corps Areas, Departments,

and others, Nov. 1941, subject: Policies Relating to Appointments in the Army of the United States

Under the Provisions of Public Law 252, 77th Congress.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 131

Figure 27. Col. Richard H. Eanes, MC, Chief Medical Officer,

Selective Service System.

EFFECT OF SELECTIVE SERVICE LEGISLATION

When the Selective Training and Service Act was passed on 16 September 1940, no occupational group, as such, was excluded except ordained ministers of religion and students preparing for the ministry. Therefore doctors,

dentists, veterinarians, and other professional people of value to the Medical

Department would be drafted as needed and duly commissioned in any of the

corps except the Nurse Corps (women were exempt from the draft). In addition, age limits were originally broad enough (21 to 35, inclusive) to cover

large number of the physicians and much larger proportion of the dentists in the country.

The prospect of drafting professional men in both the numbers and types

needed was dimmed by the action of the Selective Service boards. These

boards, in whom sole authority for the selection lay, may not have been technically qualified to pass upon the essentiality of professional personnel either

to the Army or to the local community; their decision as to whether doctor

or dentist was or was not to be deferred might depend somewhat on his local

popularity. On the other hand, Col. Richard II. Eanes, MC (fig. 27), who

was on duty with Selective Service headquarters during the war, stated later
132 PERSONNEL

that while it was “technically correct” that local boards were not technically

qualified to make decisions concerning the absolute essentiality of the individual for the medical needs of the community, “sound judgment on the part

of many local boards generally resulted in decisions that were proper.” 37 It

was quite reasonable to expect, however, that since the boards had to consider

the health needs of their local communities they would consider these needs

first before taking intoaccount those of theArmy.

On the other hand, however lenient the draft boards might be toward

doctors and dentists, individual members of those professions could not be

certain of escaping the draft. That fact undoubtedly caused some to apply

for commissions before the blow fell. In that way, they avoided the indignities—as some considered them—of being compelled to enter the Army and

serve as enlisted men until accepted for commission, as all draftees must do.

Such prospect was rather remote, especially for physicians, but it remained

possibility.

The Medical Department, partly at the request of the professional organizations, desired to remove that possibility completely. The Army felt that

it would be the target for widespread criticism if the services of professional

men were wasted in relatively minor, nonprofessional activities. On the day

the Selective Training and Service Act was passed (16 September 1940),

therefore, The Surgeon General recommended to the War Department that

appointments in the Reserves be opened to persons who might be drafted.

Since no action was taken, substantially the same request was repeated on

26 October, again with no immediate result. 38 About the same time, The

Surgeon General reminded the corps area surgeons that they could make

appointments in the Reserve Corps if vacancies existed and when an applicant

was desired for active duty.39 Meanwhile, the heads of selective service and

the local draft boards, foreseeing no shortage of civilian dentists, did not

hesitate to induct as an enlisted man any dentist who was not needed at the

moment in his own community. The American dental profession, supported

by The Surgeon General, voiced its concern, claiming that serious difficulties

might ensue if dentists were not used in their professional capacity. 40 In

January 1941, the chief of the Dental Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

suggested to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, that qualified physicians,

dentists, and veterinarians who stood high on the list for induction should be

granted commissions in the Reserve Corps “without reference to procurement

objectives.” He also advised that such persons be “assigned to active duty

as soon as commissioned.” This suggestion was no doubt vitiated from the

War Department General Staff’s point of view by further and apparently

37 Letter, Col. Richard H. Banes (Ret.), Chief Medical Officer, Selective Service System, to Col.

C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, Sept. 1953. 38 Letters, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 16 Sept. 1940, and 26 Oct. 1940, subject: Appointment in Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Corps Reserve. 39 Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Executive Officer), to each Corps Area Surgeon, 29 Oct.

1940, subject: Extended Active Duty Vacancy Required for Approval of Applicant for Commission. 40 Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Brig. Gen. Albert G. Love), for G-l, 25 Mar. 1941.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 133

conflicting proposal that person so commissioned should be called to active

duty “as soon as his services can be properly utilized.” 41 No action was

taken on these proposals.

Congressional Action

In the meantime, several bills were introduced in Congress to commission

licensed physicians and dentists in lieu of induction, and also to defer students

and teachers in medical and dental schools. The Army disapproved all these

bills on the grounds that no one group should get preferential treatment. In

addition, The Surgeon General did not want to be placed in the position of

commissioning all doctors and dentists.42

War Department Action

At this same time, The Surgeon General desired to add to the numbers in the Dental, Veterinary, and Sanitary Corps Reserve, but he wished to retain

the power to determine just which officers were to be commissioned. The publicity surrounding the induction of dentists for service as enlisted men continued

to embarrass him; communities and professional societies persisted in demanding that dentists be commissioned rather than be allowed to serve as enlisted

men. On May 1941, the War Department finally stated that inducted individuals who qualified for appointment in the Dental or Veterinary Corps

Reserve should be encouraged to apply for appointment in the Reserve so that

they could serve in professional capacity. Those qualified would be discharged

as enlisted men and ordered to active duty as commissioned officers for period

of 12 months, 43 after wdiich they would, presumably, return to inactive status

in the Reserve. Although this order undoubtedly accommodated many inducted

men, it did not prevent the induction of dentists or veterinarians, xlgitation

continued both to commission inducted men and to open the Reserve Corps to

permit further commissioning, 44 thereby preventing the induction of additional dentists. The Office of The Surgeon General, however, held that the

Army could not justify commissioning unlimited numbers in the Reserve without reference to its needs, as this wmuld be tantamount to granting deferment

denied to persons outside the medical profession. 45

41 Letter, Brig. Gen. Leigh C. Fairbank, to Brig. Gen. William E. Shedd, G—1, 22 Jan. 1941,

subject: Reserve Commissions for Physicians, Dentists, and Veterinarians Subject to Induction. 43 (1) S. 783 and 197, 77tb Cong. (2) Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 77th Cong., 1st sess.,

hearings on S. 783, “Doctors and Medical Students Under the Selective Service,” pp. 155, 159, 163-164. 43 Letter, The Adjutant General, to each Commander of Army or Service, May 1941, subject:

Appointment in the Dental and Veterinary Corps Reserve of Inducted Individuals.

44 Letter, C. Willard Camalier, Chairman, Dental Preparedness Committee, American Dental

Association, to James Rowe, Jr., Administrative Assistant to the President, 17 Sept. 1941. 45 Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. Robert C. Craven), for The Adjutant

General, Oct. 1941.
134 PERSONNEL

By the spring of 1941, the selective service authorities were beginning to

show some alarm over the professional personnel situation, and on 22 April

they cautioned local boards that shortage of dentists might impend. This

warning was strengthened on 12 May. 46 At that time, local boards were

reminded that (1) they still had full responsibilty for determining whether

dentist was indispensable to his community; (2) the Army didnot need dentists

for the time being; and (3) if board felt that dentist should nevertheless be

inducted, he should be advised that he might apply for commission as soon

as he went on active duty. This directive must have discouraged the draft of

dentists, but it did not positively prohibit it. Although the Selective Service

System maintained that group deferments should not be granted, it can be

seen from these memorandums that the authorities of that agency moved closer

to sanctioning the deferment of at least one group. There were no major

changes of policy on the subject during the remainder of 1941, and with the

creation of the Procurement and Assignment Service in the fall of that year,

new agency was to determine whether doctors, dentists, and veterinarians were

available for military service or should be kept in their communities.

ARMY NURSE CORPS

Applicants for appointment to the Army Nurse Corps underwent somewhat different routine from the other Medical Department corps. To enter

the Regular Army component of the corps, they applied directly to The Surgeon General, and did not ordinarily have to take professional examination,

although The Surgeon General might prescribe one if he chose. An applicant

must, however, present certificate from the superintendent of the nursing

school attended, and if she was qualified professionally, morally, and physically,

according to Army standards, and was registered in the State in which she had

graduated or in which she was practicing nursing, she became eligible for

appointment. Entrance to the Reserve could be gained primarily but not

exclusively by enrollment with the Red Cross Nursing Service which furnished

The Surgeon General list of available nurses who could be called upon in

time of emergency. While Reserve nurses must be obtained from the Red Cross

“so far as practicable,” they could also be recruited “from any other acceptable

source.” 47

The law calling up the Reserves did not affect Reserve nurses, since the

latter were not part of the Army Reserves, Two weeks after the law was

enacted, however, the General Staff authorized the assignment of 4,019 Reserve

nurses to active duty on voluntary basis. Previously, all nurses procured for

active duty had to be appointed to the Regular Army. They could now also

48 Memorandums 1-62 and 1-99, Selective Service Headquarters, 22 Apr. 1941 and 12 May 1941,

respectively, for State Directors. 47Army Regulations No. 40-20, 31 Dec. 1934.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 135

be brought in with the status of reservists serving for year, but under suitable

conditions, the period could be extended.48

The recruitment of nurses proved to be much less simple than The Surgeon

General had expected. With over 15,000 enrolled in the First Reserve of the

Red Cross, he anticipated little difficulty in meeting the first requirements for

Reserve nurses, amounting to 5,019, by January 1941. At first, however,

relatively few accepted active duty, and only 607 had been assigned by February 1941. The Red Cross sometimes found it necessary to canvass as many as

10 Reserve nurses before discovering one willing to accept active duty.49

The meagerness of the response impelled The Surgeon General to recommend invoking the more liberal terms of Army regulations, and corps area

commanders were accordingly authorized to procure Reserve nurses not only

from the Red Cross but from “any acceptable source.” 50 The Red Cross was

thus prodded to more vigorous action. publicity campaign was undertaken,

using the radio, newspapers, and magazines, to promote recruitment. These

measures apparently had their effect—between the first of February and the

middle of March 1941, 1,000 nurses were placed on active duty. By 30 June

1941, 1,280 Regular Army and 4,153 Reserve nurses were in service, 500 of the

Regulars having been brought in within the past 12 months, and all the

Reserves since September 1940. This represented 595 and 866 fewer than the

respective authorizations as they existed on 30 June 1941.51

Procurement for the Army Nurse Corps, unlike that for other Medical

Department Corps, was hampered by the fact that its Reserve, built up by the

Red Cross, was never under legal compulsion to accept active duty. On the

other hand, no limit was ever placed on the number who could be recruited for

the Red Cross Reserve. The War Department could restrict only the number

of nurses who were placed on active duty as Reserve appointees; it could not

as in the case of other components—impose procurement objectives which

limited the inactive as well as the active membership to certain figure.

Adherence to these procurement objectives for other corps sometimes reduced

the number of transfers from inactive to active status by preventing the

recruitment of new reservists who might be more amenable to accepting active

duty or more available for performing it than the existing members. The

Red Cross, however, could go on enlarging its backlog of Reserve nurses

indefinitely, with the prospect that among the larger number more would be

found to volunteer for active service.

48 (1) Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Executive Officer), to The Adjutant General, 10 Sept.

1940, subject: Procurement of Reserve Nurses. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, to each Corps

Area Commander and The Surgeon General, 24 Sept. 1940, subject: Procurement of Reserve Nurses. 49 (1) Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Washington U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1941. (2) Statement of Medical Department Activities by Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, The

Surgeon General, for the Sub-Committee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives,

77th Cong., 1941, p. 10. (3) Blanchfield, Florence A., and Standlee, Mary W. The Army Nurse Corps

in World War II. [Official record.]

50 (1) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 16 Dec. 1941, subject: Reserve

Nurses. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, to each Corps Area Commander and The Surgeon General,

Jan. 1941, subject:Procurement of Reserve Nurses. 51 See footnote 49 (1).

663076 —63 11
136 PERSONNEL

STUDENTS IN PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS

Only one phase of the problem of obtaining professional personnel has so

far been discussed—that which concerned fully trained doctors, dentists, veterinarians, and sanitarians. This aspect overlaps the second phase of the

problem, which concerned students in professional schools. Recent graduates

were highly regarded source of officer personnel. For them and for the

community at large, the transition to military service was easier than for men

already established in civilian practice. As group, these young men were

also physically best able to perform arduous military duties. The Medical

Department was therefore anxious to obtain their services as soon as they had

finished their education. But to do this, it was desirable to place claim on

them some time in advance—while they were still students. They also had to

be permitted to complete their studies, which meant protecting them against

the draft and against premature call to duty as officers. Thus, the phase of

procurement having to do with fully trained doctors (and other professional

personnel) merged with that of maintaining the source of future supply—-

students in professional schools. The civilian community was also interested

in maintaining such supply for its own needs, and the Medical Department

could therefore cooperate with leaders of the civilian profession in protecting

the student group.

Although at the beginning of mobilization the Officers’ Reserve Corps

seemed to contain ample numbers of dentists and veterinarians for immediate

needs, it was early recognized that continuing supply of men in those fields

as well as in medicine could come only from the group of graduating students,

interns, and residents if civilians as well as military needs were to he met.

Medical Students

In 1939, medical educators raised the question of how the Army would

utilize its young Reserve officers who, upon the declaration of national emergency, might be engaged in the study of medicine. Among those in process of

receiving their medical education, the Army had some claim on those holding

commissions in either medical or nonmedical sections of the Officers’ Reserve

Corps, or enrolled in either of the corresponding sections of the Reserve

Officers’ Training Corps.

In February 1940, the War Department announced that Medical Corps

Reserve officers would not be called up until they had completed one year of

hospital internship. 52 considerable number of medical students, however,

held commissions in nonmedical sections of the Officers’ Reserve Corps, commissions which they had received on completing course in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps undertaken during their premedical years. Retention of

these commissions would have eliminated them as future officers in the Medical

52 Letter, The Adjutant General, to all Corps Area and Department Commanders and The Surgeon

General, 19 Feb. 1940, subject: Extended Active Duty for Medical Reserve Officers.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 137

Corps. The growing possibility of war caused their status to receive careful

study within the War Department. As result, the Department in April 19-40

authorized the transfer of these nonmedical Reserve officers to the Medical

Administrative Corps section of the Officers’ Reserve Corps if they were fulltime students in approved medical, dental, or veterinary schools. The transfer

was to be effective only at the direction of the War Department during mobilization, and the call to active duty was made function of The Surgeon General. The War Department ordered the transfer in August 1940. By June

1941, 529 medical, 48 dental, and 32 veterinary students had been transferred

to the Medical Administrative Corps Reserve. 53

Students in the medical units of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps were

few; only 23 medical schools and colleges had such units and only small percentage of their students were enrolled. No similar units existed in dental or

veterinary schools. There were many more nonmedical Reserve Officers’

Training Corps units in the educational institutions of the country, but how

many premedical students belonged to them is unknown. In September 1940,

the Selective Service Act granted deferment of service to third- and fourthyear students in all sections of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. 54

But the vast majority of medical students, interns, and residents had

assumed no military obligations whatever. At first, The Surgeon General

attempted to obtain for immediate service in the Medical Department some

of those who had justcompleted their studies as interns or residents. Later on,

as selective service became imminent, he tried to protect others of the unobligated group—veterinary and dental as well as medical students—from calls

to service until they had finished their schooling. In the early months of 1940, The Surgeon General appealed to residents and interns (the latter after they

had finished year’s internship) to take commissions in the Officers’ Reserve

Corps with the obligation of accepting active duty for year beginning about

July 1940. lie appealed to them because he thought they might be more

willing than others to accept such duty since they had not committed themselves to practice. As their acceptance had to be voluntary, The Surgeon

General was limited to publicity and persuasion in his efforts to commission

these young physicians.

When it seemed probable in the summer of 1940 that selective service would

be introduced, the situation of students, interns, and residents changed considerably. The vast majority of them, not being members of the Officers’ Reserve Corps or Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, could lay no claim to exemption or deferment. The War Department made no plans to exempt them, and

it was assumed that they would be faced with the choice of accepting commissions in the Medical Department Reserve or being inducted into the Army, in

which case they would serve as privates. At the same time, the leaders of medi53 (1) Letters, The Adjutant General, to Corps Area and Department Commanders and each Chief

of Arm or Service, 17 Apr. 1940, and 25 Aug. 1940, subject: Special Mobilization Procedures for

Procurement of Medical Department Reserve Officers Who are Students in Approved Schools. (2) See

footnote 49 (1), p. 135. 54 54 Stat. 858.
138 PERSONNEL

cine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine expressed their concern over the harm

these professions might suffer if the supply were cut off by an interruption of

training. In this matter, Army authorities, including The Surgeon General

and his assistants, had dual responsibility. They must first of all provide

the necessary medical service for an expanding Army. At the same time, they

had to take into account the problems of civilian medicine during periods of

mobilization and war.

Commissioning of Interns

The Surgeon General had followed the policy of approving interns’ applications for commissions with the understanding that they would not be called

to active duty before the completion of training. 55 In May 1941, the War Department authorized the commissioning of interns in the Medical Corps Reserve “with the understanding that they will be ordered to one year’s active

duty immediately upon completion of their internship.” 56 On 19 December

1940, the War Department had issued an order authorizing appointment of

sufficient number of applicants to fill any vacancies in the procurement objectives of the Medical Department Officers’ Reserve Corps. Men accepting commissions under the terms laid down in this order had to agree that they did not

come within the category of those entitled to resign (granted by the law of

August 1940 making active duty for reservists compulsory) and that they would

not exercise theright if ordered to active duty. 57

Deferment Under Selective Service

The Selective Training and Service Act deferred the service of all college

and university students until July 1941. Otherwise, local draft boards were to

grant deferments for persons whose employment or activity was necessary to

the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest. Spokesmen for

the medical profession objected to leaving the decision on interns and residents

to the “wisdom or lack of wisdom” of the local draft boards, demanding that

medical men should have voice in deciding “what is important to protect

in medical training and in the maintenance of American medical institutions.” 58 full-scale controversy was soon in progress, as the War Department attempted to persuade large number of students who would graduate

in June 1941 to apply for commissions in the Medical Corps Reserve. The

procedure for granting such commissions was simplified in February 1941,

and, as the end of the school year approached, considerable publicity was

given to the plan among military authorities and deans of medical schools. The

55 Statement of Brig. Gen. A. G. Love, Office of The Surgeon General, at Conference, Committee

on Medical Preparedness, Chicago, 23 Nov. 1940, reported in the Journal of the American Medical

Association, Dec. 1940, p. 2008.

68 Letter, The Adjutant General, to all Corps Area and Department Commanders and The Surgeon

General, 26 May 1941, subject: Deferment of Medical Students. 67 Letter, The Adjutant General, to each Corps Area and Department Commander and The Surgeon

General, 19 Dec. 1940, subject: Appointmentin the MedicalDepartment Reserve. BS Wilbur, R. L.: Some War Aspects of Medicine. J.A.M.A. 116 661-663, 22 Feb. 1941.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 139

response was not satisfactory. Of the 5,000 male students who graduated in

medicine in 1941, only 1,500 made application for commissions in the Medical

Corps Reserve. 59 Many interns and residents preferred to take their chance

with the draft, knowing the reluctance of local boards to induct physicians as

enlisted men. If actually drafted, that would be time enough to apply for

commission.

The policy of the Selective Service authorities toward students was an

important factor in the situation. Although at first this agency stood firmly

against group deferments, it stated in February 1941 that it was of great importance that the supply of physicians “be not only maintained but encouraged

to grow” and that no medical student or intern who gave promise of becoming

an acceptable physician should be called for military duty prior to his becoming one. short time later (May 1941), the Selective Service office made the

same statement apropos of dental students. 60 There is no doubt that local

boards placed vast numbers of students—medical, dental, and veterinary, as

well as other—in class II and deferred them for occupational reasons. compilation prepared by the Selective Service Administration covering the period

from the passage of the Selective Service Act to Pearl Harbor shows the percentage of deferred students in several fields of study: 61

Medical Administrative Corps Reserve Commissions

In February 1941, The Surgeon General, linking desire to build up the

strength of the Reserve Corps with his wish to permit the continuance of training in civilian schools, submitted to the War Department detailed analysis

of the problem with recommendation that provision be made for the granting

of commissions in the Medical Administrative Corps Reserve to junior and

senior students not only in approved medical schools but in approved dental

69 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to all Corps Area Commanders, 18 Feb. 1941, subject: Appointment in Medical Corps Reserve of Graduates of Approved Medical Schools. (2) See footnote

49(1), p. 195. 80 (1) Memorandum 1—91, National Headquarters, Selective Service System, for all State Directors, 22 Apr. 1941, subject: Supplement to Memorandum 1-62 Occupational Deferment of Doctors,

Internees, and Medical Students (III). (2) Memorandum 1-99, National Headquarters, Selective

Service System, for all State Directors, 12 May 1941, subject: Supplement to Memorandum 1-62

Occupational Deferment of Dentists and Dental Students (III).

01 Selective Service in Peacetime, First Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1940-41, p. 172.

Dentistry

Field of study

Percentage in

class II

81

Medicine 80

Veterinary medicine 72

Engineering 71

Chemistry 69

Pharmacy 66

Physics 59

Geology 56

Biology 46
PERSONNEL 140

and veterinary schools. This would have extended the practice already adopted

to the case of interns but not yet formally approved by the War Department.

In rejecting this new proposal, the General Staff expressed the view that “such

action would constitute special treatment for particular class of students

which would result in exempting them from Selective Service”; exemptions

from selective service could not be granted for any particular group unless it

could be clearly demonstrated that personnel in that group would be required

inkej positions in industries essential to the national defense. 62

Under pressure from various medical and dental societies and backed by

the knowledge that the Under Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, was

keenly interested in the problem, on 10 May 1941 The Surgeon General again

recommended to the War Department that either of the following actions be

taken: To commission medical student in the Medical Administrative

Corps Reserve as soon as he was enrolled in grade medical school or to

enroll him at that time in the Enlisted Reserve Corps for period of years

and then commission him in the Medical Administrative Corps Reserve until

graduation, when he would be commissioned in the Medical Corps Reserve

and called to duty on completing his internship. 63

On 26 May 1941, the War Department went part of the way by granting

authority to commission as second lieutenants in the Medical Administrative

Corps Reserve, after duly 1941, male junior and senior students in approved

medical schools in the United States who were fit for military service. Under

regulations published several weeks later, students so commissioned were transferred to and retained in the War Department Reserve Pool 64 until eligible

for appointment in the Medical Corps Reserve (at the end of their 4-year

course). Xo examination except the physical was necessary. Appointments

were to be made without reference to the procurement objective for the Medical

Administrative Corps Reserve. Officers were to be discharged from the Reserve if they discontinued their medical education, dropped out of school entirely, matriculated in an unapproved school of medicine, or failed to secure

appointment in the Medical Corps Reserve within year of the completion of

the 4-year course in medical school.65 Discharge from the Medical Administrative Corps Reserve placed the individual again within the purview of selective service. It will be noted that this grant of authority took no account of

dental and veterinary students or of first- and second-year medical students.

Xo further concessions, however, were made until after the outbreak of war.

82 Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for The Adjutant General, 18 Feb. 1941, subject: Commissioning of Junior and Senior Students in the Medical Department Reserve Corps, with 1st endorsement thereto, IS Mar. 1941.

63 (1) Memorandum, Under Secretary of War, for General Marshall, May 1941. (2) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Assistant Chief of Staff. G—1, 10 May 1941. 84 Officers in this pool could be ordered to active duty only with the approval of the War Department.85 Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General (and others), 26 May 1941, subject:

Deferment of Medical Students.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 141

RESERVE UNITS

Revival of Affiliated Units

The affiliated Reserve units constituted special type of Reserve, and, from

the personnel viewpoint, they possessed character in many respects different

from that of other medical units. They had their own quotas and their own

system of procurement, and their development affected the general personnel

situation in number of special ways.

The Protective Mobilization Plan

As the threat of war increased, the value of an affiliated Reserve such as

that so successfully used in World War again became evident. The Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939 called for number of tactical hospitals to be

brought into service during the first months of an emergency. reserve of

personnel for these hospitals composed of men and women highly skilled and

already trained to work together as unit would make them quickly available

if the need arose. It was for this purpose that The Surgeon General, Maj.

Gen. Charles R. Reynolds, in March 1939 proposed the revival of affiliated

units.

He had made the suggestion several times before without effect. This

time, he submitted formal and detailed request, beginning with statement

of the case for affiliated units. Hospitals called for by the Protective Mobilization Plan, he argued, must be completely integrated units with harmonious

staffs of competent and qualified physicians and surgeons, which would be

sufficiently coordinated and organized to be able to function in theater of

operations with minimum of delay. General Reynolds stated it to be his

firm conviction that such units would be forthcoming only if they were affiliated in peacetime with large and well-staffed civilian hospitals. An obstacle

to the provision of superior medical service for mobilization, in any case,

was the fact that the necessary specialists could not be recruited under existing

Reserve regulations. These regulations provided that appointees to the Officers Reserve Corps must be less than 35 years of age and must enter the corps

as first lieutenants. Few of the outstanding specialists who would be needed

in case of mobilization or war were under 35, for very few physicians acquired

the desired proficiency before reaching that age. Those who were qualified

could not be expected to accept commissions as first lieutenants and thus find

themselves in the same grade with recent graduates of medical schools.

On the basis of the facts just outlined, General Reynolds made series of

recommendations, the most important of which was that selected hospitals and

medical schools rated as satisfactory by the American College of Surgeons and

the American Medical Association be invited to organize hospital units. He

also recommended that selected individuals in participating institutions, above

the age of 35 years, be commissioned in the Reserve with grades (and oppor-
142 PERSONNEL

tunities for promotion) which were commensurate with their professional

qualifications.

During succeeding months, the War Department General Staff studied

this proposal; it opposed the recommendation that officers be commissioned

above the rank of first lieutenant as contravening current policy, but, on

August 1939, the proposal was approved, subject to the determination of certain details. 66 These details concerned the proposed waiving of restrictions on

the appointment, promotion, and training of Medical Department Reserve

officers for these units. The Surgeon General was requested to submit recommendations on these points, and also on the allocation of units and other administrative details.

In reply, General Magee, who had succeeded General Reynolds in June

1939, advised that, as beginning, all theater of operations hospitals provided

for in the Protective Mobilization Plan—32 general, 17 evacuation, 13 surgical,

and station hospitals—be affiliated units. He proposed to allocate these, as

far as possible, to institutions that had sponsored similar units in World War

I. The commanding officer of each unit was to be member of the Regular

Army, as was the executive officer in general and evacuation hospitals; these

two officers would join the unit when it was activated. It was recommended

that all other officers be members of the Reserve. The unit director was to be

the senior staff member, and he would be the responsible peacetime head of the

organization. General Magee outlined detailed procedure for the appointment and promotion of Reserve officers which included authority to appoint

officers between the ages of 23 and 55 to any grade for which there existed an

appropriate vacancy. Promotion in the unit was to be by virtue of appointment to position which carried higher grade. Withdrawal from the staff

of the sponsoring institution would automatically operate to terminate the

Reserve appointment. Active- and inactive-duty training requirements were

also listed.67

On 19 October 1939, General Magee submitted revised list of sponsoring

institutions, including all of the proposed units except the four station hospitals. 68 War Department approval followed month later. At the same time, The Surgeon General was given assignment jurisdiction over officer personnel

prior to mobilization and was authorized to proceed with the organization of

these affiliated units upon issuance of the necessary War Department directive. Details of the plan were approved early in 1940.69

00 Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General. Aug. 1939, subject: System of Affiliating Medical Department Units With Civilian Institutions, and Appointment and Promotion in the

Medical Reserve Corps.

87 Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 22 Sept. 1939, subject: Affiliation of

Medical Department Units With Civilian Institutions. 88 Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 19 Oct. 1939, subject: Affiliation of

Medical Department Units With Civilian Institutions. 80 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General, 22 Nov. 1939, subject: Affiliated

Medical Units—Allocation, Organization, and Mobilization. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General, 26 Jan. 1940, subject: Officers of Affiliated Medical Units—Appointment, Reappointment, Promotion, and Separation. (3) Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General,

11 May 1940, subject: Officers of Affiliated Medical Units—Appointment, Promotion, and Separation.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 143

Organization of the units

Meanwhile, the Office of The Surgeon General had been actively engaged

in implementing this project. Once the sponsoring institutions had been

chosen and approved, The Surgeon General notified these institutions, outlined the plan, asked their acceptance of it, and requested them to begin the

necessary work of establishing and training the proposed units. Upon receipt of concurrence, the Office of The Surgeon General advised The Adjutant

General, and thus affiliation was formally established.70

The response during the spring and summer of 1940 was enthusiastic.

Since the project had been first proposed, Germany had overrun Norway,

France, and the Low Countries, and involvement of the United States seemed

imminent to many. The resulting patriotic appeal was reinforced by the fact

that most of the proposed sponsors had organized similar units in the First

World War, and the old numerical designations were revived for the new units.

Not only did the listed institutions respond to the appeal, but many others

applied to General Magee during 1940 and 1941 for inclusion in the project,

lie rejected these offers, stating that the program might later be broadened to

include additional smaller hospitals.

The actual organization of the units through the commissioning and assignment of officers was long and tedious process, requiring many months to

complete. Detailed instructions were distributed. 71 With rare exceptions,

officer appointments made by the institution were not questioned by The Surgeon General. The Office of The Surgeon General maintained contact with the

sponsoring institutions through its Reserve Subdivision and during the organization period established rosters of unit personnel. At the time, there was no

definite provision for furnishing these hospitals with enlisted men. It turned

out, however, that when the hospitals were activated—in 1942-43—a large

part of this personnel was drawn from existing theater of operations hospital

units. Another part came from the reception or training centers. Special

arrangements were also made whereby men from the sponsoring institution

could be voluntarily inducted into the service and earmarked for assignment

to the affiliated unit when it was activated. 72

The original list of hospitals proposed by The Surgeon General and

approved by the General Staff provided for the necessary theater of operations

hospitalization envisaged by the Protective Mobilization Plan for the first 120

days of mobilization. There still remained the problem of insuring the additional hospitalization required for the four successive augmentations of the

basic plan. It had been The Surgeon General’s intention to create additional

affiliated units for this purpose, once the organization of the first group of

70 Memorandum, Lt. Col. Paul A. Paden, Director, Medical Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Colonel Love, Historical Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 15 Apr. 1944;.

71 Letter (mimeographed), The Surgeon General, to each affiliating institution, 16 May 1940,

subject: Affiliated Units, Medical Department, U.S. Army.

72 (1) Smith, Clarence McKittrick The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation,

Zone of Interior. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1956. (2) See footnote 70.

663076'’—63—12
144 PERSONNEL

hospitals had been accomplished. By June 1940, the preparation of the approved hospitals had proceeded sufficiently to make the organization of additional affiliated units feasible. The widespread publicity given to the program

had resulted, as already mentioned, in large number of requests for affiliation

from institutions not on the first list, including some that had sponsored units

in 1917. It seemed the proper time therefore to expand the program. On 26

June 1940, General Magee requested permission to organize additional hospitals. He proposed that neither the exact number of units nor their distribution be determined at that time. On 22 July 1940, the War Department

approved the organization, as affiliated units, of an additional 36 general hospitals, 13 evacuation hospitals, and 10 surgical hospitals as part of the first

augmentation of theProtective Mobilization Plan. 73 This authorization almost

doubled the number of affiliated hospitals to be made available.

The original plan had been to provide, at the time of activation, Regular

Army officers as commanding officers of these affiliated units who "would replace

the directors when the units were called into service. As the organization

proceeded, however, it became apparent that in certain instances it would be

desirable to continue unit directors as commanding officers during mobilization.

Four unit directors, each of whom had had experience and training during

World War and who had maintained an unusually active interest in the

Organized Reserve since that time, were considered qualified to command their

units. General Magee recommended that these men receive mobilization assignments as commanding officers, and that officers of the Regular Army Medical

Corps be assigned as executive officers. He further proposed that if similarly

qualified directors were appointed in other units lie should be authorized to

make similar assignments. The request for the assignment of the four officers

(fig. 28) was approved: Col. Thomas R. Goethals, MC, to the 6th General

Hospital, Lt. Col. (later Col.) Henry R. Carstens, MC, to the 17th General

Hospital, Col. E. T. Wentworth, MC, to the 19th General Hospital, and Col.

J. G. Strohm, MC, to the 46th General Hospital; but The Surgeon General was

required to make separate requests for future assignments, as these would

involve changes in the approved allotments of officers. 74

By October 1941, the organization of affiliated units had reached an advanced stage, and 41 general hospitals, 11 evacuation hospitals, and surgical

hospitals actually had been organized. certain number of institutions had

not shown interest in the project, and no personnel were assigned to those units;

number of additional units also were contemplated, but the Secretary of War

had not yet authorized them.75

73 Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 26 June 1940, subject: Affiliated Units.

Medical Department, with 1st endorsements thereto, 22 July 1940. 74 Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 18 June 1940, subject: Affiliated Units,

Medical Department, with 1st endorsement thereto, July 1940. 75 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. Francis M. Fitts, Office of The Surgeon General, Oct. 1941, subject: Status Report, Affiliated Units. (2) The publication cited in footnote 72(1), p. 143, contains

lists (tables and 7) of the affiliated general and evacuation hospitals, showing Army number,

institution with which affiliated, dates of activation and embarkation, and initial destination.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 145

Figure 28.—Early appointments as commanders of affiliated units. Upper left: Col.

Thomas R. Goethals, MC, to the 6th General Hospital. Upper right: Col. Henry R.

Carstens, MC, to the 17th General Hospital. Lower left; Col. E. T. Wentworth, MC, to the

19th General Hospital. Lower right: Col. J. G. Strohm, MC, to the 46th General Hospital.
146 PERSONNEL

Deferment of Active Duty for Members of Affiliated Units

While affiliated units awaited activation, the Reserve officers in them enjoyed what amounted to deferment of service. The possibility of calling the

officers of these units to active duty received consideration in September and

October 1940. During the spring and summer of that year when large numbers

of Reserve officers in other categories were being called to duty, the directors

of affiliated units were recruiting for their organizations on the understanding

that appointees would remain on inactive status until the units themselves were

called up. Following mobilization of the National Guard and the advent of

selective service in the autumn of 1940, however, number of persons suggested

calling the officers of affiliated units individually to active duty. The Surgeon

General not only rejected these proposals but attempted to get assurances from

the War Department that neither individual reservists nor the affiliated units

in which they served would be called to active duty before war came. While

the General Staff would make no clear-cut declaration of policy to that effect, it followed (for the time being) The Surgeon General’s recommendation in

practice. 76 No affiliated unit was activated until after Pearl Harbor, and no

steps were taken to call up individual members until still later (table 15).

The urgent demand for additional Medical Corps officers throughout 1941

drew attention once more to the affiliated units as source of supply, and

particularly to the more than two hundred Medical Corps Reserve officers in

these units who were of draft age. In May 1941, The Surgeon General submitted recommendation to The Adjutant General that these officers be discharged from their special commissions and that upon application they then

be appointed in the Reserve in the grade of first lieutenant and ordered to

active duty as soon as their services were required; they were also to be instructed that if their units were called they would be assigned for duty with

them. Apparently, the heavy demand for additional officers prompted The

Surgeon General to recommend measure which would in effect have abrogated

Table 15.—Medical Department officers of affiliated Reserve in affiliated medical units,

February 1941

76 (1) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, 28 Sept. 1940. (2)

Memorandum, The Adjutant General, for The Surgeon General, 29 Oct. 1940, subject: Mobilization of Affiliated Units.

Status Medical

Corps Dental

Corps

Medical

AdministrativeCorps

Total

officers

Original appointments in the affiliated Reserve

Transfers from nonaffiliated to affiliated Reserve.-

547

239

53

19

13 613

264

Total 786 72 19 877

Source: Report, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon

February 26th, 1941.

General, subject: Officers in Affiliated Units, as of
EMERGENCY PERIOD 147

the original understanding with some of the officers in the sponsoring institutions. To this recommendation, the War Department replied that program

to discharge affiliated Medical Corps Reserve officers from their commissions

and permit them then to volunteer for appointment in the nonaffiliated Reserve

as first lieutenants would probably result in the loss of many officers. It was

pointed out that many of these officers would not accept reappointment in that

grade. However, the War Department authorized the discharge of affiliated

officers above the rank of first lieutenant who, prior to discharge, volunteered

to accept an immediate appointment in the nonaffiliated Reserve in the lower

rank. The number of affiliated Reserve officers who accepted active duty on

these terms is unknown, but past experience indicates that it was probably

approximately percent. 77

While The Surgeon General was suggesting means of placing on active

duty some of the officers in affiliated units already formed, he was also sanctioning the formation of additional units for use in case of war. In June

1941, the general regulations for affiliated units were modified, providing for

some amelioration of the condition mentioned above, 78 The Surgeon General

announced that no additional appointments would be made to affiliated units

in the age group eligible for induction under selective service. Officers of

the nonaffiliated Reserve who had been assigned without change of grade to

affiliated units were to be considered as available for active duty. But officers

of the affiliated Medical Corps Reserve could be brought on active duty only

when they requested appointment in the nonaffiliated Reserve in the grade of

first lieutenant.

The number of personnel assigned to affiliated units on 30 June 1941 is

given in table 16. Of those shown, 1,257 Medical Corps, 122 Dental Corps,

and 31 Medical Administrative Corps officers were said to belong to the affiliated Reserve and the remainder to the nonaffiliated Reserve. In October

Table 16.—Medical Department officers in affiliated units, 30 June 19J+1

77 (1) Letter. Office of The Surgeon General (Executive Officer), to The Adjutant General, May

1941. subject: Physicians of Draft Age Holding Commissions in Affiliated Units, with 1st endorsement thereto, 20 May 1941. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, Aug. 1941, subject:

Active Duty Orders for Medical Officers (Affiliated).

78 Letter, Office of The Surgeon General, to each affiliating institution, Juno 1941.

Type ofhospital MedicalCorps DentalCorps Medical Ad- ministrative Corps

General __ _. 1, 144

233

37

157

15

44

Evacuation

Surgical __ __ _____ ___

Total 1, 414 176 49

Source: Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, 1941, pp. 145-146.
148 PERSONNEL

1941, 158 Medical Corps, Dental Corps, and Medical Administrative Corps

officers from affiliated units were on active duty.79 Thus, the basic problem

of obtaining the services of medical personnel in affiliated units for the rapidly

expanding Army remained unsolved right up to the outbreak of war—and

even afterward.

OTHER SOURCES OF OFFICER PERSONNEL

Additional sources of professional personnel for the Medical Department

in the prewar years existed, but for variety of reasons were still looked upon

as “off limits/’ These included graduates of foreign and of substandard

American medical schools, Japanese-Americans, female doctors and dentists,

and certain other professional minorities.

Graduates of Foreign and Substandard American Medical Schools

Foreign graduates

As early as 1933, the National Board of Medical Examiners, while not

raising general bar against graduates of foreign schools, stipulated that

student matriculating in European medical school after the school year

1933 would have to submit evidence of the following in order to be admitted

to the board’s examination: (1) premedical education equivalent to the

requirements of the Association of American Medical Colleges and the Council on Medical Education of the American Medical Association; (2) graduation from European medical school after course of at least academic

years; and (3) license to practice medicine in the country in which that

school was located. In 1939, the same board barred from its examinations

the graduates of “extramural” (that is, not university connected) British

medical schools. 80

Army Regulations No. 140-33, issued on 30 July 1936, required candidate for the Medical Corps Reserve to possess license to practice in

State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or diploma from the National

Board of Medical Examiners; he must also hold the degree of Doctor of

Medicine from class medical school—that is, one approved by the American Medical Association. Although in the fall of 1940 The Surgeon General

received many protests, both from individuals and from organizations such

as the American Jewish Congress,81 protesting the exclusion of foreign graduates from the Medical Corps, revision of AR 140-33 on 15 December 1940

did not change essentially the previous conditions for admission to the Medical

Corps.

79 See footnotes 49(1), p. 135, and 75(1), p. 144. 80 Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Colonel Lull), to George L. Cassidy, Associate Editor,

New York Post, 14 Nov. 1940, with enclosure thereto. 81 Letter, Carl Sherman, Chairman, Administrative Committee, American Jewish Congress, to Assistant Secretary of War, 28 Nov. 1940.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 149

At that time, The Surgeon General stated that he himself had no means

of classifying foreign medical schools definitively. While some were undoubtedly satisfactory, there was considerable evidence that many did not have

acceptable standards, and he did not desire to have the American soldier

treated by physicians not fully qualified in accordance with the standards of

approved American schools. 82 Several officers who were in the Surgeon General’s Office at the time have restated and enlarged upon these points. Brig.

Gen. Albert G. Love (Ret.) has pointed out that “in the years prior to World

ar II, the American Medical Association had done tremendous job

in classifying medical schools, raising the standard of medical education, and

forcing substandard schools to raise their standards or close their doors.”

former staff member of The Surgeon General’s Personnel Division, who

dealt with hundreds of graduates of foreign medical schools, wrote that “some

were unquestionably well qualified professionally, mentally, physically and

socially. Others, were, however, very undesirable as Medical Corps officers

many had failed in American medical schools before entering foreign

schools. Others had Arts school academic averages so low that their admission to an approved [medical] school was not justified. It was also known

that many European medical schools, particularly German, had deteriorated

rapidly in the late twenties and in the thirties. 83

Also in December, 1940, Dr, J. John Kristal, Chairman of the Executive

Committee of the American Alumni of British Medical Schools, wrote to Dr.

Irvin Abell, Chairman of the Committee on Medical Preparedness of the

American Medical Association, listing six “quite stringent” requirements that

might be established for graduates of the British medical schools in order to

obtain commissions in theU.S. Army Medical Corps Reserve. Ilis proposal was

approved by The Surgeon General who on 30 December 1940 forwarded it to

the War Department General Staff, substituting, however, the word “foreign”

where Dr. Kristal had used “British,” and including stipulation of citizenship. The six requirements were as follows:

1. They shall be citizens of the United States. They shall present satisfactory

evidence of premedical education equivalent to the requirements of the Association of

American Medical Colleges and the Council on Medical Education of the American Medical

Association.

2. They shall have completed medical course of at least four academic years.

3. They shall have obtained license to practice in the country in which the medical

school from which they graduated is located.

4. They shall have evidence of year’s internship or more in hospital acceptable to

the Council on Medical Education and the Committee on Hospitals of the American Medical

Association.

5. They shall he eligible to take the examination given by the National Board of

Examiners.

6. They shall have license to practice medicine in some state or territory of the

UnitedStates.

82 Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Colonel Lull), to The Adjutant General, 23 Nov. 1940. 83 (1) Letter, Brig. Gen. Albert G. Love (Ret.) to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., Director, Historical Unit,

U.S. Army Medical Service, 29 Nov. 1955. (2) Letter, Col. Paul A. Paden, to Col. C. H. Goddard,

Office of The Surgeon General, 21 Jan. 1952.
150 PERSONNEL

Two months later (5 February 1941), the War Department General Staff

approved these recommendations. 84

Graduates of unapproved American schools

As to graduates of unapproved schools in the United States, The Surgeon

General continued to hold that they should be rejected, urging that as soldiers

had to take what the Army offered in the way of doctors they should be afforded

at least the protection which most States accorded them as civilians. Therefore, only doctors who could be licensed to practice in majority of the States

should be granted commissions in the Medical Corps. 85 (The graduates of

these unapproved schools could receive licenses in only one or two States.)

Again, as in the case of graduates of foreign schools, objections were raised

to the existing policy. This time, however, it as felt that considering the

shortage both in the Armed Forces and in civilian life the policy not only subjected doctors to the chance of being drafted, after which they would serve not

as doctors but as enlisted men, 86 but also that it worked to the economic disadvantage of doctors already in the service. “When these men get out of the

Army,” the president of State medical society wrote to The Surgeon General,

“they will find that [graduates of unapproved schools] have adopted [that is, taken over] their practices.” He considered this an unfair advantage to take

of any doctor and asked if it was possible to commission graduates of unapproved schools as second lieutenants “or some lower commission” and allow

them to serve as mess or sanitary officers. The Surgeon General replied that

the advantage given to graduates of unapproved schools was more apparent

than real. However, he held out promise: “If the general thought of the

medical profession should be that these men should be accepted on the same

footing as graduates of Grade schools, thought can be given to modification

of our present practice.” 87

Soon, thereafter, the Directing Board of the Procurement and Assignment

Service suggested terms on which graduates of unapproved medical schools

might be accepted for commissions. In April 1942, accordingly, The Surgeon

General announced that such graduates would be commissioned in the Medical

84 (1) Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. G. F. Lull), to The Adjutant General, 30 Dec.

1940, subject: Appointment of Graduates of Foreign Medical Schools. (2) Letter, The Adjutant

General, to The Surgeon General, Feb. 1941, subject: Appointments of Graduates of Foreign Medical

Schools in Medical Department Reserve. (3) Letter, The Adjutant General, to Corps Area and Department Commanders and The Surgeon General, Feb. 1941, subject; Appointments of Graduates of

Foreign Medical Schools in Medical Department Reserve. 85 Letter, The Adjutant General, to President, Association of Medical Students, Middlesex Hospital.

Cambridge, Mass., 22 Dec. 1941. (The Surgeon General had sent this reply to The Adjutant General

for forwarding to the president of the Association of Medical Students, 16 Dec. 1941.)

88 (1) Letter, Dr. John F. McGuinness, Woburn, Mass., to President Roosevelt, Jan. 1942. (2)

Letter, Senator C. Wayland Brooks (III), to The Surgeon General, 13 Feb. 1942. (3) Letter, Joseph

H. Dorfman, Detachment Commander, Headquarters Detachment, Detachment of Illinois, Sons of

American Legion, to The Surgeon General, 10 Feb. 1942. 87 (1) Letter, President, Massachusetts Medical Society, to Surgeon General Magee, 31 Jan. 1942. (2) Letter, Surgeon General Magee, to Dr. Prank R. Ober, President, Massachusetts Medical Society,

Feb. 1942.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 151

Corps of the Army of the United States if they met the following conditions:

The applicant must, in addition to possessing the doctor of medicine degree,

have had year's rotating internship, and have license to practice medicine

in one of the States or in the District of Columbia; he must also have been

engaged in the ethical practice of medicine and must present five letters to this

effect from doctors who knew him and who were graduates of recognized

schools of medicine. The Surgeon General would determine whether the

graduate was eligible. The final stipulation—that the applicant must be

member of his local county medical society and be indorsed by his State medical society—had to be changed later because some medical societies refused to

admit graduates of unapproved schools until they had been practicing for

years. The Surgeon General agreed, therefore, that he would accept those

who met the other conditions if they presented statement from the secretary

of the county or district medical society that they were engaged in the ethical

practice of medicine and would be eligible for society membership except for

the fact that they had been in practice less than years.88 Schools whose

graduates the Medical Department agreed to accept on these terms were

Middlesex University College of Medicine, the Chicago College of Medicine,

and the Cincinnati College of Eclectic Medicine. The Surgeon General

judged the graduates of two other schools more on their individual merits.

Doctors graduated from any of these unapproved schools were commissioned

only in the grade of first lieutenant.

When in the fall of 1943 the State authorities of Massachusetts declared

that graduates of the Middlesex University College of Medicine would not be

eligible for the licensing examinations held after June 1944, the Medical Department refused to recommend for appointment additional graduates of

that school (not waiting until Massachusetts examined the last ones it had

stipulated it would admit to examinations) in July 1944, the Medical Department announced, however, that it would accept recent graduates of that school

under terms previously in effect. No figures are available on the total number

of graduates of unapproved schools who joined the Army Medical Corps under

the terms laid down by The Surgeon General, although in early 1944 it was

stated that between 200 and 300 graduates of Middlesex University College

of Medicine alone had been appointed. 89

The problem of unapproved schools did not arise in the case of dentists,

there being no such dental schools. As for veterinary schools, The Surgeon

General refused to commission graduates of the sole unapproved institution of

88 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General, 28 Apr. 1942, subject: Admission of

Graduates of CertainNonrecognized Schools of Medicine to the Army of the United States. (2) Letter,

The Surgeon General, to Dr. Frank H. Lahey, Boston, Mass 15 July 1942.

89 (1) Letter, The Surgeon General, to Dr. Frank H. Lahey, War Manpower Commission, 24 Aug.

1942. (2) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Officer Procurement Service, Army Service Forces,

Attn: Col. E. G. Welsh, Acting Director, Dec. 1943, subject: Discontinuance of Appointments

of Graduates of Middlesex University College of Medicine. (3) Memorandum, The Surgeon General,

for Director, Officer Procurement Service, Army Service Forces, 20 July 1944, subject: Middlesex University School of Medicine. (4) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General (for forwarding

to the Hon. David I. Walsh, U.S. Senator (Mass.)), Jan. 1944.
152 PERSONNEL

that kind, the veterinary school of Middlesex University. 90 Graduates of that

school who were drafted served in enlisted status—unless they received commissions in an officer component, such as the Medical Administrative Corps,

which required completion of the regular course at an officer candidate school.

Alien and Naturalized Physicians

Alien and naturalized physicians in the Army in an enlisted status could

be commissioned in the Army of the United States provided they met the

following requirements: (1) Citizens of cobelligerent Allied countries had to

meet requirements for professional training and the necessary War Department

investigations, such as those of the Military Intelligence Service and the

Provost Marshal. Such applicants had to have release from the military

attache of their country's legation in the United States, and as The Surgeon

General pointed out, that process involved many difficulties. Since the applicant’s government had to be acceptable to the U.S. Department of State, it

was often necessary for The Adjutant General to determine from day to day

that Department’s evalution of the foreign government concerned. (2) Enemy

aliens had to meet the investigation of all agencies, including that of the

Assistant Chief of Stall', G-2 (intelligence), and in addition had to be naturalized. (Naturalization had been rendered easier in March 1912 by an enactment of Congress that persons who had served months in enlisted status

could obtain citizenship immediately.) 91 They must, moreover, have arrived

in this country before January 1938, and also “as general, but less rigid

rule,” they had to prove that they did not have relatives remaining in enemy

countries. (This meant that, even though naturalized, they had some of the

legal disabilities of aliens.) As further barrier, most foreign physicians

applying for commissions had been educated inforeign schools and hence had to

meet the special requirements The Surgeon General had laid down for such

graduates. 92

The question of what to do about alien physicians not serving in the Army

was matter of concern to the Procurement and Assignment Service. Since

many States required applicants to establish American citizenship as one prerequisite to admission to State licensing examinations, and other States issued

temporary licenses which were subject to cancellation unless the holder obtained

American citizenship within specified time, the Department of Justice took

steps in January 1943 to have the Immigration and Naturalization Service

assist in relieving the shortage of civilian physicians by expediting the legal

process of naturalizing alien physicians.

90 Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. J. F. Crosby, VC), to Dr. Louis Karasoff, Middletown,

N.Y., 17 Apr. 1942, with 2d wrapper endorsement thereto, 10 Jan. 1945. 91 56 Stat. 182. 92 Memorandum, The Surgeon General (Chief, Personnel Service), to Col. Itichard H. Eanes.

Medical Division, National Headquarters, Selective Service, Feb. 1943.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 153

Japanese-American Medical Personnel

Physicians and dentists

Japanese-American citizens were treated differently from other groups.

The Surgeon General recommended in May 1942 against commissioning them,

whether they were serving in enlisted status or were civilians. He stated that

although they might meet all the requirements for commissions “they would

be placed at personal disadvantage and in many embarrassing positions.

They would inspire lack of confidence and distrust throughout the

Army rendering no military value and being under suspicion at all

times.” 93

Regulations prohibited the assignment of Japanese-American officers to

units made up of others than their own group. At Camp Shelby, Miss., however, when the 442d Regimental Combat Team (a Japanese-American unit)

had an oversupply of doctors and dentists, the commander loaned one of the

doctors to another unit and the excess dentists to the camp dental clinic, where

their services proved very satisfactory. They could not, however, be permanently assigned to these organizations for the reason stated above. On

visit to Camp Shelby in October 1943, the Assistant Secretary of War learned

of this incident and called it to the attention of The Surgeon General as an

indication of what might be done if War Department policy were changed,

remarking that Japanese-American medical talent was “not being usefully

employed.” The Surgeon General followed this suggestion by attempting to

detach some of the Japanese-American doctors from the Army Ground Forces,

but without success.94

Nurses

The question of whether to commission nurses who were Nisei (that is,

American citizens of Japanese ancestry) caused considerable discussion, particularly after it had been announced (January 1945) that draft of nurses

was necessary to meet the Army’s needs. The Surgeon General had previously

stated that there were no position vacancies for Nisei nurses. This assumed

that because of their racial background they could be placed only in special

jobs. Possibly the belief existed in some quarters that use of such nurses

would antagonize soldier patients. In August 1944, however, the Secretary of

ar ruled out the factor of race by announcing that qualified Nisei nurses

could be appointed in the Army if their loyalty was vouched for by the

93 Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. J. A. Rogers, Executive Officer), to The Adjutant

General, 11 May 1942, subject: Physicians, Dentists, and Veterinarians of Japanese Ancestry. 94 (1) Letter, Assistant Secretary of War, to The Surgeon General, 23 Oct. 1943. (2) Letter,

Surgeon General Kirk, to Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy), 10 Nov. 1943.
154 PERSONNEL

Provost Marshal General’s Department, and that The Surgeon General would

direct their assignment to duty.95

Early in 1945, the Surgeon General’s Office estimated that about 300 of the

800 Nisei nurses in the United States would be available for military duty.

Under pressure from the New York newspaper, Pd/, which had also previously

criticised him for rejecting these nurses because there were no vacancies for

them, The Surgeon General announced that he would take them on the terms

laid down by the Secretary of War. This meant that while they were subject to

the same conditions of availability, professional training, and physical condition as other nurses they would not be rejected because of ancestry alone. The}

would, however, be used only in the United States. These transactions did not

lead to the admission of any large number of Nisei nurses into the Army. By

February 1945, only four had been appointed, all that were accepted during

the war.96

Female Doctors and Dentists

With few possible exceptions, before World War II, the Army had not

accepted women of any group in full commissioned status,97 although nurses

had held relative rank. In late 1942, dietitians and physical therapists received the same status. During World War I, 55 female doctors had served

on contract basis.98 Even before World War II, certain civilian groups had

agitated to have women commissioned in the Medical Corps in the event of

war. In England, after war broke out, female doctors were commissioned in

the “women’s forces,” but not in the Royal Army Medical Corps.99

In June 1942, the Services of Supply took steps to procure female doctors,

not for service with the Medical Corps, but with the Women’s Auxiliary Army

Corps. They served as contract surgeons when first placed on duty and if

found acceptable were made members of the corps, in the status of “second

officer,” which was not commissioned status. In January 1943, 25 female

doctors were assigned to the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps or were being

considered for assignment. 100

In 1942, The Surgeon General testified before the Committee to Study the

Medical Department that he had requested that few women doctors be com95 Letter, G-l, to The Adjutant General, 11 Aug. 1944, subject: Enlistment of Japanese-American

Nurses.

98 (1) Memorandum, Acting Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for The

Surgeon General (and others), 17 Mar. 1945. (2) Weekly Diary, Acting Chief, Personnel Service,

Office of The Surgeon General, week ending 17 Mar. 1945. (3) Manuscript, Col. [Florence A.] Blanchfield. and Mary [W.j Standlee, The Appointment of Racial Minorities in the Army Nurse Corps, p. 32. 97 During the Civil War, at least one woman, Dr. Mary Walker, was commissioned as an Assistant Surgeon. (Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. Albert G. Love), to Dr. Morris

Fishbein, American Medical Association, Apr. 1943.)

98 Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Lt. Col. Francis M. Fitts), to Unit Director, 2d General

Hospital, Presbyterian Hospital, N.Y., 16 Aug. 1941.

89 Crew, F. A. E. Army Medical Services, Administration. London Her Majesty’s Stationery

Office, 1953, vol. 1, p. 206. 100 Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Brig. Gen. Larry B. McAfee, Acting Surgeon

General), for Commanding General, Services of Supply, Jan.. 1943, subject; Utilization of Women

Doctors, with 1st endorsement thereto, 19 Jan. 1943.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 155

missioned to serve the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps, but the Comptroller of the United States had informed him that women could not hold commissioned rank in the Army of the United States. feiv months later, he

reiterated the Comptroller General’s ruling to General Somervell and added

that if enabling legislation were introduced, women belonging to other professional and technical groups might feel that they had been discriminated

against. He stated that there was no other objection to commissioning qualified female doctors in the Army of the United States, but suggested that their

use be limited to service with the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps either in

the United States or abroad. The Secretary of War, undeterred by the thought

that introduction of bill to grant commissions to female doctors might antagonize women of other professional and technical groups, pressed for such

legislation; he suggested that, once commissioned, female doctors should be

confined for the time being to duties with the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps

and to hospitals where there was large number of women patients.

The necessary legislation was passed in April 1943. Applying to both

Army and Navy, it provided that licensed female physicians could be granted

commissions in theArmy of the United States or the Naval Reserve, “during the

present war and six months thereafter.” Such officers were to enjoy the same

rights, privileges, and benefits as other members of those organizations having

the same grade and length of service. 101 This law did not limit their service

to the United States, and number served abroad. It made female doctors the

first women to hold full commissioned rank in the Army of the United States,

antedating not only the nurses, 102 dietitians, and physical therapists (by more

than year), but the officers in the Women’s Army Corps, who attained that

status few months later (1 July 1943).

Desirable though it was in itself, the new law did little to meet the Medical

Department’s demand for personnel. Although the Army placed no limit on

the number of professionally and physically qualified female doctors it would

accept, only 76, or percent of the approximately 7,600 women doctors in the

United States, were ultimately commissioned. 103 On 28 February 1945, when 74

women were serving in the Army Medical Corps, were majors, 36 captains, and

34 first lieutenants; on the same date, 17 were overseas. At least one received

promotion to the grade of lieutenant colonel upon being separated from the

Army. 104

Between June 1943 and March 1945, several attempts were made in Congress to authorize the commissioning of women dentists, but all attempts failed,

101 57 Stat. 65. 102 Two exceptions were the Army Nurse Corps Superintendent, and her Assistant Superintendent,

promoted to the grade of colonel and lieutenant colonel, respectively, in March 1942. (Letter, Col.

Florence A. Blanchfield, USA (Ret.), to Col. J. B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S.

Army Medical Service, 21 Feb. 1956.)

103 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. D. G. Hall, Office of The Surgeon General, for Brig. Gen. G. F.

Lull and Col. J. R. Hudnall, Office of The Surgeon General, 21 Apr. 1943. (2) Sixteenth Census of

the United States: 1940, Population: The Labor Force, vol. Ill, p. 75 (table 58).

104 Army Medical Bulletin No. 88, 1945. p. 50.
156 PERSONNEL

probably because the War Department felt that there was no shortage of

dentists in theArmy. 105

Other Minority Groups

Efforts to secure commissioned status for certain other groups serving in

the enlisted ranks occurred spasmodically throughout the emergency and war

periods. Groups who sought such status included chiropractors, optometrists,

osteopaths, and podiatrists. Of these groups, the optometrists alone were

commissioned and these only after the cessation of hostilities.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF ORGANIZED MEDICINE AND NURSING

Before the end of 1940, civilian professional organizations in the medical

field were becoming involved in the process of recruiting medical officers and

nurses for the Army. The most influential of these organizations was the

American Medical Association, whose interest in procurement extended beyond

the Reserves—at first the main source of officers—and included the entire

civilian profession. It was for this reason that The Surgeon General requested

the cooperation of the association. To obtain much larger numbers of officers

than it already had, the Medical Department would have to go outside the

ranks of those previously enrolled in the Reserves and recruit officers directly

from civilian life. Moreover, if major war occurred, even though the United

States had more physicians per capita of population than any other country,106

the supply would have to be rationed between the military and civilian medical

services. The civilian professional organizations would be vitally interested

in both processes and might render valuable aid in solving the problems they

involved. precedent for collaboration had been set during World War I,

when the American Medical Association and its constituent groups, the State

medical societies, had participated in the recruitment of medical officers.

Committee on Medical Preparedness

The American Medical Association, having offered its services to the Federal Government in May 1940,responded to The Surgeon General’s request at its

annual session in June 1940 by creating Committee on Medical Preparedness.

This committee, consisting of 10 members, was to establish and maintain contact

with appropriate governmental agencies “so as to make available at the earliest

possible moment every facility that the American Medical Association can

105 Medical Department, United States Army. Dental Service in World War II. Washington:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955. 106 According to figures compiled probably In 1942, by the Procurement and Assignment Service for Physicians, Dentists, and Veterinarians, the United States had physician for each 750 people. The latest figures available for other countries, published in 1932, showed that England and Wales,

on the other hand, had only for each 1,490 Germany, for each 1,560 France, for each 1.690 and Sweden, for each 2,890. “Final Report of the Commission on Medical Education” (New York, 1932), p. 99.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 157

offer for the health and safety of the American people and the maintenance of

American democracy.” 107 The committee was to cooperate with the Advisory

Commission to the Council of National Defense, theU.S. Public Health Service, and other Federal agencies, as well as with the Medical Department of the

Army and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy. The committee

was also to consider problems in other fields besides those concerned with

providing medical personnel for military needs.

At the same session, the American Medical Association considered plan

presented by The Surgeon General of the Army; at his request, it agreed to conduct survey of the medical profession, and accepted in principle his suggested procedure for designating physicians who could be spared from civilian

practice and brought into the Army. The plan had to receive the sanction

of the General Staff before it could become in all respects operative, and was

evidently intended to take full effect only “in the event of national emergency

of great magnitude” 108—or, more specifically, war.

The survey of the medical profession, however, was undertaken immediately by the Committee on Medical Preparedness. To get information for the

preparation of roster, the committee sent questionnaires to all physicians in

the United States. The committee realized that the returns would be based on

the individual doctor's own estimate of his availability and utility as medical

officer, but it planned to control this by using data from the various specialty

boards and other information in the possession of the American Medical Association. The questionnaire was single-sheet schedule, coded for transfer to

machine record cards. In addition to the usual personal data, the committee

asked for information concerning details of medical education, licensure, membership in medical societies, full-time appointments, type of practice, certification of examining boards, details of specialty practice, previous military experience, present commission, willingness to volunteer in the event of war,

“service you consider yourself best qualified to perform,” and physical

disabilities, 109

The questionnaires were mailed in July 1940. Eventually, more than

185,000 physicians received them, and by January 1942, 85.8 percent had been

returned. About 26,000 had to be completed for those who failed to do so for

themselves. These were prepared from available information on file in the

offices of the State and county medical societies. Eventually, 96 percent of the

questionnaires were completed. 110 Meanwhile, the process of transferring the

information on the returned questionnaires to punchcards began, and the cards

were sorted into specialist groups and others. Various directories and lists

were constantly used in editing the returns.

The object of the survey was to determine (1) the number of physicians

licensed to practice medicine, (2) the number suitable for active service and the

107 Medical Preparedness. J.A.M.A. 114 2466, 22 June 1940. 108 Memorandum, Colonel Dunham, for The Surgeon General, 14 June 1940. 108 Medical Preparedness. J.A.M.A. 115 137, 13 July 1940. 110 Information from Lt. Col. Harold C. Lueth, MC, former liaison officer, Office of The Surgeon

General, with Chicago office of the American Medical Association, 26 May 1945.
158 PERSONNEL

Figure 29.—Lt. Col. Harold C. Lueth, MC, liaison officer from

the Office of The Surgeon General, to American Medical Association, 1942-45.

number incapacitated, (3) the number and location of physicians who were

qualified and available for the Armed Forces and for other essential services

in case of national emergency, (4) the number available for service to the civilian population under emergency conditions, (5) the availability and qualifications of those who could serve in special fields of medicine, (6) the number and

identity of physicians qualified for teaching and research who were essential to

the maintenance of educational institutions, and (7) the number, age, qualification, availability, and other characteristics of all members of the medical

profession.

In planning and carrying out this project, there was close liaison between

the Committee on Medical Preparedness and the Office of The Surgeon General.

The latter assigned representative, Lt. Col. (later Col.) Charles G. Hotter,

MC, to the headquarters of the American Medical Association in Chicago; he

reported for duty in October 1940. His successor, from 15 March 1942 to 26

March 1945, was Lt. Col. Harold C. Lueth, MC (fig. 29). An important part

of the liaison work consisted of an exchange of information. From data supplied by corps area commanders, the Journal of the American Medical Assoda-
EMERGENCY PERIOD 159

tion published weekly lists of Medical Corps Reserve officers ordered to active

duty, and the same information was recorded in the files of the committee. In

turn, the corps area surgeons were assisted in the classification and procurement

of Reserve officers by members of the committee. 111

When the federalization of the National Guard and the inauguration of

selective service created heavy demand for more medical officers in the fall

of 1940, the Committee on Medical Preparedness offered to aid in procuring

and classifying physicians qualified to act as chiefs of services, if sufficient

number could not be obtained from the Reserve. The Surgeon General

accepted this offer.

Acceptance of The Surgeon General's Plan

Meanwhile, inAugust 1940, The Surgeon General presented to the General

Staff for approval revised version of the plan placed before the American

Medical Association in June. The original plan had involved rather elaborate system of cooperation between Army authorities and the national, State,

and county organizations of the American Medical Association for the purpose

of designating physicians available for the Army. This one developed the first

more fully in some respects and curtailed it in others. The General Staff criticized two points of the proposal—the decentralization of responsibility for the

Army’s part in the program to the corps area commanders and the commissioning of newly appointed civilians in rank appropriate to the position they were

to fill. Nonmedical officers of the War Department had difficulty in appreciating the fact that the average Medical Department Reserve officer who held

advanced rank by virtue of length of service and the fulfillment of certain nonprofessional training requirements was not necessarily qualified to act as chief

of the medical or the surgical service in large hospital. To bring in qualified

civilians for such positions and commission them in grades appropriate to their

responsibilities meant changing the rules pertaining to rank and promotion in

the Reserves, which the General Staff wished to uphold. After some discussion, however, G-l was inclined to gopart of the way, conceding that the grade

should “in all cases be appropriate to the age of the applicant.” 112

The approved version of the plan appeared on February 1941.113 It

made no mention of advanced rank (although this was already being granted

in some cases) and allowed for only small part of the decentralization which

111 (1) Letter, Office of The Surgeon General, to each Corps Area Surgeon, 30 Oct. 1940, subject:

Weekly Report for Liaison Officer, U.S. Army, in Care of the American Medical Association. (2) Letter,

Office of The Surgeon General, to Corps Area Surgeons, 27 Nov. 1940, subject: Assistance of the

American Medical Association in Classification and Procurement of Physicians.

112 Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. L. B. McAfee), for Assistant Chief of

Staff, G-l, for Chief of Staff, Oct. 1940, subject: Assistance of American Medical Association in

Classification and Procurement of Physicians.

113 Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General and Corps Area and Department Commanders, Feb. 1941, subject: Assistance of American Medical Association in the Classification and

Procurement of Physicians.
160 PERSONNEL

The Surgeon General had recommended as means of speeding the appointment

of new medical officers. The plan stated that the American Medical Association would prepare and maintain roster of civilian physicians, with their

specialties and qualifications, who had agreed to accept commissions in the

Army of the United States when needed for active duty in “national emergency.” The Surgeon General was to designate one or more officers to represent

him at the headquarters of the American Medical Association in Chicago for

all matters concerning the association and the Medical Corps Reserve. Vacancies existing in any corps area were to be reported to the War Department,

which would attempt to fill them by transfers of Reserve officers from the Arm

and Service Assignment Group or from the surplus of other corps areas before

the services of the American Medical Association were called upon. If no

qualified Reserve officers could be found, The Surgeon General was to notify

the American Medical Association concerning the professional vacancies

required to be filled and their respective locations. His representative would

then forward the recommendations of the association to the corps area commander who would have the designated person or persons examined physically

and send their applications for commissions to The Adjutant General for final

action. The corps area commander could not grant waivers for physical

defects, but could reject an applicant on these grounds. Applicants appointed

in this way must not be more than 55 years of age and their appearance before

the examining board would be dispensed with.

The War Department General Staff announced that the plan would be

put in operation “at such time as the War Department may direct.” It

took no further action before Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, The Surgeon General, the American Medical Association, and the corps areas had already carried out some features of the plan before it was approved. The American

Medical Association had compiled its roster (which was intended to include

all physicians in the country, not merely those willing to accept commissions),

The Surgeon General had appointed his liaison officer with the association

in Chicago, and information had been exchanged concerning the availability

of civilian physicians for certain appointments in the Army.

The plan, while it might have met the requirements of war situation

from military standpoint, would not have insured adequate civilian medical service under war conditions. In his original proposal to the American

Medical Association, The Surgeon General had made the point that in time

of war such plan would “distribute the professional load, and if properly

administered, should prevent the stripping of rural and isolated communities

of their necessary medical personnel.” 114 This was point that greatly concerned the profession before and during the war. But, in the first place,

neither The Surgeon General’s original plan nor the one finally approved

by the War Department specifically exempted members of the Reserves from

call to active duty even if their departure should “strip” the local comlu See footnote 108, p. 157.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 161

munities. As early as November 1940, the secretary of the American Medi- cal Association warned the Surgeon General’s Office that certain localities

in Kentucky and Tennessee were being deprived of doctors by that means. 115

Moreover, nothing prevented civilian doctor from volunteering his services

to the Army, and only the self-restraints of the latter and the limits of the

procurement objectives would keep it from accepting him. There were few

volunteers, however, in relation to the total need.

The plan had certain advantages in that it initiated joint action between

various agencies of the Federal Government and the American Medical Association, and after it was approved by the association, several conferences

took place between representatives of the Army, Navy, and Public Health

Service. It failed, however, to provide for the creation of an “independent”

government agency to control the apportionment of doctors between the civilian community on the one hand and Federal agencies on the other.

Origin of the Procurement and Assignment Service

While The Surgeon General was seeking the approval of the War Department for his procurement plan, the American Medical Association was

projecting broader plan of collaboration which led ultimately to the establishment of the Procurement and Assignment Service in October 1941. The

association’s Committee on Medical Preparedness, seeing “evidence of duplication of effort and of much confusion,” felt that “the early appointment

of coordinator for medical and health services is greatly desired to speed

mobilization of medical resources for any emergency.” It voted that

message to that effect be sent to President Roosevelt and the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. Whether or not as result of

this action, the Council of National Defense established Health and Medical Committee in September 1940 to coordinate these aspects of defense and

to advise the Council concerning them. 116 Its membership consisted of the

chairman of the American Medical Association’s Committee on Medical Preparedness, who served as chairman, the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy,

and Public Health Service, and the chairman of the National Research Council’s Division of Medical Sciences. Six months later (31 March 1941), its

Subcommittee on Medical Education 117 recommended the establishment of an

official procurement and assignment agency. The Health and Medical Committee transmitted this proposal to the American Medical Association, which

resolved on June 1941 that the Government be urged “to plan immediately for the establishment of central authority with representatives of

the medical profession to be known as the Procurement and Assignment

115 Letter, O. G. West, American Medical Association, to Gen. A. G. Love, 18 Nov. 1940. 118 (1) Medical Preparedness. J.A.M.A. 115: 465, 10 Aug. 1940. (2) Minutes of the Advisory

Commission to the Council of National Defense, pp. 90, 92. 117 Membership; The Chairman of the Health and Medical Committee (chairman), the Commissioner of Hospitals of New York City, and members of the Harvard, Minnesota, and Tulane

Medical Schools and the Stanford University Hospital.
162 PERSONNEL

agency for physicians for the Army, Navy, and Public Health Service and

for the Civilian and Industrial needs of the nation.” The Surgeon General’s Office expressed its full support of this resolution. 118

The Health and Medical Committee in turn voted to adopt the association's

resolution in principle and held meeting on 22 October 1941 to “initiate the

development of Procurement and Assignment Service.” At this meeting,

which included the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Public Health

Service, number of consultants from the American Medical and Dental Associations and one from the Veterans’ Administration, committee was appointed

to draft program for the proposed agency.

The committee submitted detailedreport analyzing the medical and allied

personnel needs of the various public and private agencies and outlining the

organization and duties of the proposed Procurement and Assignment Agency.

Two days later (30 October 1941), Paul V. McNutt, the Director of Defense

Health and Welfare Services (under whom the Health and Medical Committee

now functioned), sent letter containing the substance of these proposals to

President Roosevelt for his approval which was given the same day. After

outlining the purpose and organization of the new agency, Mr. McNutt stated:

The functions of the Agency would be: (1) to receive from various Governmental and

other agencies requests for medical, dental and veterinary personnel; (2) to secure and

maintain lists of professional personnel available, showing detailed qualifications of such

personnel; and (3) to utilize all suitable means to stimulate voluntary enrollment, having

due regard for the overall public needs of the Nation, including those of governmental

agencies and civilian institutions.

The letter concluded with statement proposing to instruct the Agency to

draft legislation providing for the “involuntary recruitment” of medical,

dental, and veterinary personnel if the national emergency appeared to

require it. 119

On IT November 1941, The Surgeon General appointed Capt. (later Lt.

Col.) Paul A. Paden, MG, as his liaison officer with the Procurement and

Assignment Agency. 120 (The “Agency” had been designated “Service” shortly after its creation.) Another medical officer of the Army, Maj. (later Col.) Sam F. Seeley, MC (fig. 30), became Executive Officer of the Service’s

Directing Board. 121

War came few weeks after the new Service was established and before it

had begun to function. It should be emphasized here, however, that the Procurement and Assignment Service neither procured nor assigned personnel. Its purpose was simply to assist in these operations. In that respect, it differed

118 (1) Proceedings of the Cleveland Session [American Medical Association], 2-6 June 1941.

.T.A.M.A. 116: 2783, 21 June 1941. (2) Letter, American Medical Association, to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, 12 June 1941, with 2d endorsement thereto, 23 July 1941. 119 Letter, Paul V. McNutt, Administrator, Federal Security Agency, to the President, 30 Oct. 1941.120 (1) Letter, Paul V. McNutt, Administrator, Federal Security Agency, to The Surgeon

General, 14 Nov. 1941. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, to Paul V. McNutt, 17 Nov. 1941. 121 For composition of the directing board, see Mordecai, Alfred History of the Procurement and Assignment Service for Physicians, Dentists, Veterinarians, Sanitary Engineers, and Nurses— War Manpower Commission.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 1G3

Figure 30.—Col. Sam F. Seeley, MC, Executive Officer, Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service.

little from the machinery contemplated in The Surgeon General’s plan

approved by the War Department months before—which, in fact, it superseded. The Procurement and Assignment Service had no powers of compulsion—other than moral force—over the men it declared available for Federal

service; and if they entered the service, it could only exhibit their qualifications,

not insure their assignment to jobs for which they were specially equipped;

in fact, “assignment” in the title of the new agency referred to the declaration

of availability for one or other of the services rather than for particular job.

Some of the objections that might have been made to the earlier War Department plan therefore applied to the new agency. It met the request of the

American Medical Association, however, in being coordinating body for all

Federal services; it also had the prestige of Federal agency.

Subcommittee on Nursing

Meanwhile, the nursing profession was being organized for defense purposes not only by the Eed Cross but by other organizations as well, both governmental and private. Federal agency, the Subcommittee on Nursing,
164 PERSONNEL

established late in 1940 under the Medical and Health Committee of the Office

of Defense Health and Welfare Services, had the following broad functions: 122

To coordinate on national level all nursing for defense in the Government

agencies and the American Red Cross.

To act as two-way channel between the Government agencies and the

Nursing Council on National Defense,

To assist the Health and Medical Committee and its various subcommittees

in all questions dealing with nursing.

To act as the Nursing Advisory Committee to the Office of Civilian Defense.

To suggest Federal legislation regarding nursing and to assist in the

development of policy under which nursing programs are carried out.

The National Nursing Council

Private nursing groups had also created organizations designed to assist

in supplying the Armed Forces and to distribute nurses equitably in civilian

life. The National Nursing Council for War Service, originally formed on

29 July 1940 as the Nursing Council for National Defense, represented five

national nursing organizations—the American Nurses Association, the National League of Nursing Education, the National Organization for Public

Health Nursing, the Association of Collegiate Schools of Nursing, and the

National Association of Colored Graduate Nurses—together with the Red

Cross. The National Council encouraged the creation of State councils. In

1940, it had also initiated National Survey of Registered Nurses, “to determine the number of professional nurses, their availability for military and

particularly, for civil duty, and their special attainments.” Lacking the

money to complete such an ambitious project, however, it turned it over to the

Subcommittee on Nursing, where it was placed under the guidance of Special

Inventory Committee, which completed it in 1941.123 The Public Health

Service assisted in coding and compiling the information gathered. This

survey was comparable in purpose to the survey of doctors conducted by the

American Medical Association.

PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED MEN

The enlisted strength of the Medical Department on 30 June 1939 was

9,359 and by 30 November 1941 had risen to 108,674, representing percent of

that of the Army as whole (table 1). Most of the increment came by way

of voluntary enlistment, or after November 1940 by selective service, although

the induction of the National Guard into Federal service also added sizable

122 Haupt, Alma C., Executive Secretary of Subcommittee: Report of the Subcommittee on Nursing, Health and Medical Committee, Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services. Read before

Joint Boards of the National Nursing Associations, New York City, N.Y., 24 Jan. 1942. 123 (1) See footnote 49 (3). p. 135. (2) “News About Nursing.’’ Am. J. Nursing 41 223, 1941. (3) Speech presented by Pearl Mclver, 12 July 1941, to joint meeting of the Subcommittee on Nursing, Nursing Council on National Defense, and the American Red Cross Advisory Committee.
EMERGENCY PERIOD 165

numbers. The Medical Department Enlisted Reserve was only negligible

source of personnel; in contrast with the Medical Corps Reserve, which had

many times the strength of the Regular Army Medical Corps, the medical

sections of the Enlisted Reserve Corps and the Regular Army Reserve in

June 1940 together numbered 1,524, only little over one-tenth of the Regular

Army enlisted strength of the Medical Department. None of its members was

on active duty. 124

The supply of enlisted personnel could be increased—in effect and over

short periods—by speeding the production of trained men, for the Medical

Department could not make full use of man’s services until he had received

modicum of instruction in medical techniques. The establishment of training

centers was one means of attaining this goal. In the prewar period, medical

replacement training centers were established at Camp Lee, Ya., and Camp

Grant, 111., in January 1941, and at Camp Barkeley, Tex., in November 1941.

In the latter month. The Surgeon General asked for additional training-center

facilities and requested that those in being should be kept at full capacity by

the prompt shipment of selectees to them. Reduction of the training period

from 13 to 11 weeks at those centers and elsewhere, which The Surgeon General

recommended at the same time, would also increase the rapidity of supply. It

was the maximum reduction he then considered possible. 125

It was important that after enlistment or induction enlisted men with

medical skills should find their way into the Medical Department and remain

there; it was also important that if possible they should be put in jobs where

their civilian experience or natural intelligence could best be utilized. One

interesting experiment to this end was undertaken by the Medical Department

in collaboration with the Red Cross. Under an agreement signed in January

1940, the Red Cross established Registry of Medical Technologists, listing

individuals who met age and technical qualifications set by the Medical Department. Male registrants who qualified physically were to serve as either staff

or technical sergeants in the Medical Department when called to duty in case

of mobilization. Female registrants and men who did not qualify physically

would be employed as civilian workers by the Medical Department in case of

war, and civil service grades were established for them. The Army set age

limits of 21 to 45 years. Members of the Regular Army, National Guard, or

Reserve were not eligible for enrollment. Types of technologists enrolled included the following: Dietitians; physiotherapy and occupational therapy

aides; dental hygienists; dental and orthopedic mechanics; laboratory, chemical laboratory, pharmacy, and X-ray technicians; meat and daily hygiene

inspectors; and statistical clerks. By September 1940, after almost 80,000

announcements had been mailed to these groups, 639 men and 403 women

technologists were enrolled.

124 Annual Report of the Secretary of War. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1940, pp. 45, 61. 125 Letter, The Surgeon General, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G—1, Nov. 1941, subject; Replacements From Medical Replacement Training Centers.
166 PERSONNEL

Vastly more important than any other means of channeling newly inducted men with appropriate backgrounds into the Medical Department was

the system of classification used from September 1940 onward at the Army's

reception centers, system which performed similar service for all branches

of the Army. The classification at reception centers, although it did not, or

could not, always produce the desired results, was not only extremely useful

in channeling new recruits into the proper branch of the Army but aided in

directing them to theproper type of job within that branch.

The Medical Department experienced difficulty in the emergency and

war periods in retaining trained noncommissioned officers. During the emergency, many Regular Army enlisted men and some National Guardsmen in

the first three grades (master or first sergeants, technical sergeants, and staff

sergeants) quickly became commissioned officers. Some were commissioned

directly, others after course in officer candidate school; still others accepted

active duty under commissions which they already held in the Officers' Reserve

Corps. Most of these were only “paper” losses, for the great majority of the

men concerned accepted commissions within the Medical Department as Sanitary and Medical Administrative Corps officers; thus, loss in the enlisted

group became gain in officer personnel.
663076'—63 13 167

CHAPTER VI

Procurement, 1941-45: Medical, Dental, and

Veterinary Corps

LEGISLATION

Immediately following Pearl Harbor, two important measures were passed

regarding manpower in the Army. An act, approved on 13 December 1911,

extended the tour of active duty of all officers and enlisted men, including retired officers in service, to date months after the end of the war. Under

it, reservists no longer served stipulated period of time on active duty and

then reverted to inactive status. Reserve officers who had been relieved from

active duty following period of satisfactory service were recalled. Restrictions on age-in-grade for service other than with troop units were removed as

were geographic restrictions on the use of reservists and guardsmen.

week later, 20 December 1941, an amendment to the Selective Service

Act provided for registration of all men between the ages of 18 and 65, and

sanctioned military service for those between 20 and 45. The same law permitted the President to defer the military service of draftees by age groups if

this seemed in the national interest. The subsequent lowering of the maximum

induction age from 45 to 37 years, which had certain adverse effects on the

procurement of Medical Department officers, did not, however, take place until

year later.

Relieving that it was unnecessary for officers to meet the rigid physical

requirements then in force in order to perform many types of duty, the War

Department about the same time took steps to relax the physical requirements

for Reserve officers not yet called to active duty and for civilians who might

be commissioned as officers. For minor deficiencies such as slight overweight

or defective vision, the prospective officers were permitted to sign waivers, subject to final acceptance or rejection by The Surgeon General in accordance with

the recommendations of his Division of Physical Standards. The “limited

service” category was later used as means of designating and classifying such

officers.

55 Stat. 799.

(1) Memorandum, Under Secretary of War, for The Surgeon General, 12 Dec. 1941. (2)

Statement of Dr. Durward G. Hall, to the editor, 27May 1961.
168 PERSONNEL

MEDICAL CORPS

Lag in Procurement During the First Months of War

There were three means of getting physicians into the Army: By calling

up those who belonged to the Reserve or the National Guard; by organizing

affiliated units to be called into service when needed; and by direct commissions from civilian life. The hard core of the wartime Medical Department

was the Reserve, made up for the most part of men who believed in their obligation to perform military service. The ranks these men held in the Reserve

were often lower than those given to men of no greater competence who volunteered at later dates.

In the first months after Pearl Harbor, the number of doctors that came

into the Army was relatively quite small. It is true that the Army in general

was growing rather slowly. Nevertheless, the Medical Department wished

to have more than enough doctors for immediate needs so as to be well prepared for the vast increases in the size of the Army that were bound to come.

Physicians entering the Army directly from civilian practice needed some training in military methods before they could work with full effectiveness; moreover, it was better to have an adequate system of medical care ready beforehand

thanto build one in the midst of pressing need.

Five months after the declaration of World War II, approximately 3,000

fewer physicians were on active duty with the Army than at the end of the

same length of time after the declaration of World War I. In the first place,

the Army depended on the doctors to volunteer. In the second place, many

doctors misunderstood the functions of the Procurement and Assignment Service and, believing that that agency actually did procure, waited for some notification from the agency. And, finally, the prevalent rumors about the idleness

and misassignment of Reserve doctors after they had gone into service undoubtedly discouraged some from accepting active duty in an Army which,

they believed, either did not need them or could not or would not use them

properly. As time went on, the knowledge of affiliated units which had been

called early in the war and had remained in this country without useful work

confirmed many doctors in their belief that the Army did not—at least not

yet—need additional doctors.

Role of the Procurement and Assignment Service

Organization

Although the Procurement and Assignment Service was established in

November 1941, it became an active factor in procurement only after the United

States entered the war. For several months, it was engaged in setting up its

organization, and functions changed somewhat during the course of the war.

Memorandum, Procurement Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

for Director, Historical Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 20 Apr. 1944.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 169

Figure 31.—Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service. Left to right

Abel Wolman, Dr. J. E. Paullin, Dr. II. S. Diehl, Miss Mary Switzer, Dr. F. H. Lahey, Dr,

H. B, Stone, and Dr. C. W. Camalier.

From the standpoint of governmental organization in general, the Procurement and Assignment Service was one of the agencies in the Executive

Office of the President. There, it occupied subordinate position, being at first

directly responsible to the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services,

branch of the Office for Emergency Management, hich in turn as main

division of the President’s Executive Office. Later, in April 1942, it was shifted

to the Bureau of Placement of the War Manpower Commission, another main

division of the Office for Emergency Management. In both positions, the Procurement and Assignment Service was under the jurisdiction of Paul V,

McNutt, at first directly when he was Director of the Office of Defense Health

and Welfare Services, and then indirectly when he became Chairman of the

War Manpower Commission. Its head throughout the war continued to be

Dr. Frank H. Lahey, Chairman of the Volunteer Directing Board. Whatever

its position on an organization chart happened to be, the Procurement and

Assignment Service in practice seems to have worked somewhat independently

of control from above other than from Mr. McNutt.

The Procurement and Assignment Service at first concerned itself only

with doctors, dentists, and veterinarians. Eventually, nurses and sanitary

engineers also came within its scope. The Directing Board (fig. 31) was the

policymaking body of the Service and was instrumental in establishing the

Letter, Mary E. Switzer (Administrative Assistant to Mr. Paul V. McNutt, during World War II), to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 19 Aug. 1952.
170 PERSONNEL

central and field organizations. It also created number of advisory committees. Their names indicate the aspects of the Board’s work with which it

believed it would need special assistance; there was committee on each of the

following: Allocation of Medical Personnel, Dentistry, Hospitals, Industrial

Health and Medicine, Information, Medical Education, Negro Health, Public

Health, Sanitary Engineering, Veterinary Medicine, and Women Physicians.

In 194-3, two members of the nursing profession were appointed to the Directing Board, and Nursing Advisory Committee and Nursing Division were

created.

To carry out its functions locally, the Procurement and Assignment Service

early established system of committees for the corps areas, States, and districts

or counties. The committees were composed of members of the medical professions—physicians, dentists, veterinarians, medical and dental educators, hospital administrators, and public health representatives. Later, in 1943, system

of State and local committees on nursing was also organized. Most of this

apparatus was modeled on or taken over from agencies set up by the national

nursing organizations.

Since it was agreed that representatives of the Procurement and Assignment Service should act in an advisory capacity to the Selective Service System,

the relationship between these two agencies was close. In fact for time (5

December 1942 to 23 December 1943), both were part of the War Manpower

Commission. Other agencies with which the Procurement and Assignment

Service worked closely were the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized

Personnel, the National Research Council, and the national medical, dental,

and veterinary associations.

Functions

The unique function of the Procurement and Assignment Service was to

assure the continuance of adequate medical care for the civilian population by

determining minimum local needs and calling halt to recruitment when the

supply of physicians and dentists dropped to the indicated level. For short

time, the Procurement and Assignment Service also assisted in ascertaining the

professional eligibility of applicants for the Army and Navy, but for the greater

part of the war, this function was carried out in the Chicago offices of the

American Medical Association by personnel of the Office of The Surgeon

General.

On 21 January 1942, the War Department issued directive to corps area

and department commanders stating that applications received by the Army

were to be sent to the Procurement and Assignment Service, who would then

determine the eligibility of the applicant according to the requirements of

Army regulations on the basis of information from the authorities of the

National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel and send eligible applicants forms for appointment. Adieu returned, the completed forms were forwarded to The Surgeon General together with statement of the applicant’s
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 171

eligibility and description of his classification and evaluation as determined

by the recent nationwide survey made by the Medical Preparedness Committee

of the American Medical Association.

In May 1942, however, The Surgeon General requested the Service to send all applications to him after retaining them only long enough to obtain state- ment of the applicant’s availability from the Service’s State chairman. Three

months later, he recommended revocation of the directive of 21 January, stating

that the Procurement and Assignment Service no longer took any part in processing applications, The reason for The Surgeon General’s action undoubtedly

included the need to speed commissioning as the flow of applications

increased, but it also reflected some dissatisfaction with the existing state of

things. The Procurement and Assignment Service, with its nonmilitary orientation, protected the civilian community better than The Surgeon General could

have done, but it was only as effective as its local administration. At this time and throughout the war, the actual recruitment of medical and paramedical

personnel for the Army was the primary business of the Personnel Service in the Office of The Surgeon General.

While the Procurement and Assignment Service ceased to have much to do

with determining the eligibility of professional men applying for appointment

in the Army, it continued to need information concerning the qualifications of

civilian professional personnel. number of agencies had been collecting

information of this nature since before the war, information which in many

instances proved useful to the Medical Department as well as to the Procurement and Assignment Service. One of these agencies was the National Roster

of Scientific and Specialized Personnel. The National Roster had as its function the registration of all persons trained in the sciences and in other specialized fields, the coding of their registrations, the machine processing of data,

and the machine selection of papers of qualified registrants. As the American

Medical Association was engaged in similar task for physicians, the National

Roster at first registered only small specialized group of the medical profession. However, the American Medical Association, the American Dental

Association, and the American Veterinary Medical Association made available

to the National Roster all punchcard files they had collected. Later on, the

Roster, cooperating with the Procurement and Assignment Service, developed

questionnaires and enrollment forms which were sent to all physicians, dentists,

and veterinarians. The National Survey of Registered Nurses, initiated in 1941

by the Nursing Council for National Defense, was also carried on and completed

in 1941.

(1) Letter, Office of The Surgeon General, to War Department General Staff, subject: Appointment of Physicians, Dentists, and Veterinarians in Army of the United States. (2) Letter, Office of

The Adjutant General, to all Corps Area and Department Commanders, 21 Jan. 1942, subject:

Procurement of Officers for Medical Department, Army of the United States.

(1) Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General, for Procurement and Assignment Service,

12 May 1942. (2) Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Maj. D. G. Hall), to The Adjutant General,

31 Aug. 1942, subject: Procurement of Officers for Medical Department, Army of the United States.
172 PERSONNEL

In determining minimum local civilian needs and deciding which and how

many professional men could be spared for the Armed Forces, the Procurement

and Assignment Service began with an individual approach. If the doctor

was so necessary to his community that he could not be permitted to volunteer

for military service, he was classified as essential and prohibited from accepting commission. If not, the Service classified him as available and encouraged him to enter the Army or the Navy. This procedure was soon partially

superseded, in the case of doctors, by what amounted to classifying them as

essential en masse; that is, the Procurement and Assignment Service prohibited

recruitment in any State which had less than the ratio of doctors to population

it considered necessary minimum. In States having higher ratio, recruitment was permitted on the former basis. As the ratios were computed on the

basis of each State as whole, urban areas might conceivably have much

higher ratio than rural districts, but the Procurement and Assignment Service

had no power to redistribute doctors.

The Procurement and Assignment Service attempted to classify as available or essential all doctors within the age group which was eligible for military

service, but it did not do this fast enough to prevent some doctors from accepting commissions before being classified. The difficulty would have been

obviated if the Service had promptly classified all applications for commissions.

In some cases, however, this was not done.

The task of classification was performed mainly by the State committees

of the Service. If an individual objected to the way he was classified, or if

his community or institution protested that he had been wrongly designated

“available,” an appeal could be carried to the corps area committee, which

would reappraise the judgment. If the decision there went against the appellant, he could carry the matter to the Directing Board in Washington, D.G.

Probably the most important of the Directing Board’s advisory committees, so far as the Medical Department was concerned, was the Committee

on Allocation of Medical Personnel. This committee obtained information

for the Directing Board and appraised the sources of medical manpower. The

committee based its determination of civilian needs on studies carried on in

cooperation not only with the official agencies concerned (the U.S. Public

Health Service, the Children’s Bureau of the Department of Labor, and the

Department of Agriculture) but also with the American Medical Association, the American Dental Association, the American Public Health Association,

and other similar groups. It established criteria for determining the minimum personnel requirements of medical schools, hospitals, industry, and the

civilian population. In this respect, it was, to some extent, “rationing”

board. The committee also determined and set up State quotas of physicians

for military service, taking into consideration the overall needs of the civilian

population.

Committee to Study the Medical Department, 1942,

See footnote 4, p. 169.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 173

Since the Procurement and Assignment Service established the criteria

which controlled the recruitment of professional personnel for the Medical

Department of the Army and Navy, the Service could state rather definitely

the maximum number of doctors, dentists, veterinarians, and other groups

which the Armed Forces could contain. It thus restricted, and at the same

time promoted, the procurement of medical personnel for the military forces.

It forbade any procurement whatever in certain States; in others, it classified

certain individuals as essential to their communities and so kept them from

entering either the Army or the Navy. On the other hand, by classifying

person as available, it directed recruiting effort toward him and in effect told

him that he should be in uniform. True, it had no legal power to compel him

to join up—the legal power was all on the side of preventing essential practitioners from doing so—but the moral pressure which committee of professional men could exert on their colleagues by labeling them “available” must in

many cases have been decisive. Another effective influence was the pressure

from local medical societies. And back of these intangibles stood the everpresent threat that local draft boards could if they chose call up any able-bodied

man within the prescribed age group,regardless of his professional training.

Medical Officer Recruiting Boards

The Procurement and Assignment Service came too late, and had too

little actual authority, to effect Medical Department procurement in the early

months of the war. In March 1942, the Surgeon General’s Office had no

alternative but to inform Headquarters, Services of Supply, that there was

serious shortage of physicians for the Army. The 1940-41 procurement

program had fallen 1,500 short at the end of that fiscal year, and was still

falling behind. There were in fact only 12,465 medical officers then on active

duty, with orders for another 500 requested, compared with an objective of

28,656 by the end of 1942. Although the Procurement and Assignment Service wtis sending applications and related papers to the Office of The Surgeon

General at rate of about 75 day, an average of only 50 day could be

completed and sent to The Adjutant General, owing to inadequate data. These

figures, if projected through the remainder of 1942, forecast shortage of

some 4,000 medical officers by January 1943. The analysis impressed both

the Services of Supply and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, resulting in the

establishment of the Medical Officer Recruiting Board.

Procedures

On 12 April 1942, the Director of Military Personnel, Services of Supply,

instructed The Surgeon General to prepare plan embodying the following

points: (1) The authority to accept, examine, and commission applicants

Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. G. F. Lull), for Gen. J. E. Wharton, Military

Personnel Division, Services of Supply, 20 Mar. 1942, subject: Shortage of Medical Corps Officers.
174 PERSONNEL

was to be decentralized to 48 State representatives; (2) commissions in sufficient numbers were to be tendered in grades above the lowest to attract qualified applicants, and upper age limits were to be relaxed to provide experienced

Medical Corps officers in appropriate grades; (3) corps area and station surgeons were to be charged with active participation in the campaign to recruit Medical Corps officers; and (4) an intensive publicity campaign would

be launched to call the attention of physicians and the public to the Army’s

need for doctors. 10

These provisions were carried out, and as his contribution to the plan,

The Surgeon General issued instructions to the new recruiting boards, each

board consisting of one Medical Corps officer and one officer whose branch

was not specified (branch immaterial). They were authorized to secure applications for commissions in the Army of the United States (Reserve officers were to apply to The Surgeon General himself for active duty) of qualified physicians under the age of 55 and of dentists under 37. The boards

were to function in cooperation with the Procurement and Assignment Service

and where possible would obtain office space at or near the headquarters of

the State chairman of the Service. Medical societies also cooperated with

the board, rendering them considerable assistance. The boards were to obtain applications, authorize physical examinations at the most convenient

Army medical installation empowered to perform such examination, and

evaluate the professional qualifications and physical findings. They could

appoint, without further delay, applicants under the age of 45 years to the

grade of first lieutenant or captain, the grade to depend upon experience

and professional qualifications. The boards were to administer the oath and

forward the completed papers to The Surgeon General. Regulations which

determined rank on the basis of age and professional qualifications were to

remain unchanged—applicants under the age of 37 years were appointed in

the grade of first lieutenant, except that those who had passed the age of 30

were appointed as captains when they had been certified by an American

specialty board or had completed years’ residency in specialty in addition to the required year’s internship; or, if they were older than 36 years

and 10 months and would reach 37 years about the time active duty began,

they could be appointed in the grade of captain. The boards were not empowered to appoint certain types of applicants, but were to complete the

applications and send them to The Surgeon General. Such were applicants

in the age group from 45 to 54, those applying for grade higher than that

of captain, Negro physicians, graduates of American substandard or foreign

schools, Federal employees, or persons drawing Federal pensions, and others

whose qualifications the board questioned. 11

10Memorandum, Director, Military Personnel Division, Services of Supply (Brig. Gen. James B. Wharton), for The Surgeon General, 12 Apr. 1942. 11 Instructions to Medical Officer Recruiting Boards, by Col, John A. Rogers, Executive Officer,

Office of The Surgeon General, May 1942.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 175

The Surgeon General’s control

Until September 1942, The Surgeon General controlled the boards on

behalf of the War Department, and he issued instructions to them either directly or through The Adjutant General. His authority included the power

not only to establish but to close board. He might also be directed by higher

authority to open additional boards. 12

Accomplishment of the boards

The boards had remarkable success in recruiting doctors. Bringing to

doctors, individually or in groups, for the first time during the war the story

of the Army’s urgent need for their services, clearing up misunderstandings,

and having the power to examine and commission directly, they swore in very

large numbers in their few months of operation. One board reported in June

that its record for minimum time elapsed between receipt of an application and

the commissioning of the applicant was days and that it was prepared to maintain an average of days. 13 For the most part, the board cooperated closely

with the State representatives of the Procurement and Assignment Service,

requesting availability clearance for doctors who expressed willingness for

Army service. In some instances, however, the boards, in their enthusiasm,

did not await these availability rulings. 14 The Surgeon General informed the

Procurement and Assignment Service that the need for medical officers was

so pressing that it would not be possible to delay appointment of qualified applicants to ascertain their availability “as determined by anyone other than the

applicant himself.” But Mr. McNutt complained to the Secretary of War,

and The Surgeon General was directed to agree not to commission any more

medical officers unless they had been cleared by the Procurement and Assignment Service. 15 Thus, however great his need, The Surgeon General’s attempt

to shake off the reins of civilian agency as unsuccessful.

Air Forces activities

The Army Air Forces, meanwhile, had sought authority as early as March

1942 to procure its own medical officers, on the ground that The Surgeon Gen- eral was not able to allot enough physicians to meet Air Forces needs, nor proc12 (1) Instructions to Medical Officer Recruiting Boards, by Order of The Surgeon General, 23

May 1942. (2) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for The Adjutant General, 28 Apr. 1942. (3)

Letter, The Surgeon General, to Hon. E. D. Smith, Senator from South Carolina, 20 June 1942. (This refers to request to The Adjutant General for removal of board from South Carolina to another State.) (4) Letter, Director, Military Personnel Division, Services of Supply (Brig. Gen.

James E. Wharton), to The Surgeon General, 23 June 1942, subject: Officer Procurement Program

Medical Department.

13 Letter, Lt. Col. R. F. Olmsted, to Col. J. R. Hudnall, Office of The Surgeon General, 22 June

1942.14 Memorandum, Lt. Col. Durward G. Hall, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director, Historical

Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 20 Apr. 1944, subject: History of Procurement Branch, Military Personnel Division, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General. 15 (1) Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. F. M. Fitts, MC), for Executive Officer,

Procurement and Assignment Service, 15 May 1942. (2) See footnote 7, p. 172.

663076 —63 14
176 PERSONNEL

ess them fast enough. The Surgeon General agreed to place Air Forces medical

officers on duty with the recruiting boards to handle the applications of those

interested in serving with the Air Forces, although each applicant’s preference

as to branch of service already appeared on the papers sent to The Surgeon

General.16

Simultaneously, the General Staff granted the Air Surgeon the right to

determine the grade of appointment for doctors in company grade and to send

the papers directly to The Adjutant General; papers recommending appointment in grade of major or above he still had to send to The Surgeon General. 17

The following tabulation shows the results of the Air Surgeon’s procurement

efforts from 21 March 1942 to July 1942:

Applicants physically disqualified 280

Applicants rejected by the Air Surgeon 486

Applicants not desiring Air Forces service (presumably persons

who had changed their minds) 155

Orders requested for duty with Air Forces 2, 053

The ligure of 2,053 approximated the objective of 2,200 which the Air Surgeon

had set for this period. 18

Officers in the Surgeon General’s Office were forced to admit that the Air

Surgeon’s efforts had relieved them of the responsibility ofrecruiting for him.

Probably the “glamor” which many people attached to service in the Air Forces,

in addition to the aggressiveness with which the recruiting campaign was

aged, accounted in considerable degree for its success. Itaccounted also for

much of the dissatisfaction that later developed, especially among qualified

specialists who had come on active duty from the Medical Corps Reserve, often

at some personal sacrifice. As the Chief Surgeon of the European theater

recalled it: “These specially trained men understandably expected that their

special skills would be used; but the Air Forces did not have sufficient beds

under their control to utilize all of this talent *. In the E.T.O., from 1914

on, we traded with the Air Forces, giving it good young medical officers

without special training for qualified specialists.” 19

Procurement and Assignment Service reaction

In June 1942, Dr. Frank H. Lahey, Chairman of the Directing Board of

the Procurement and Assignment Service and President of the American Medi16 (1) Letter, Air Surgeon (Col. David N. W. Grant, MC), to The Surgeon General, 22 June

1942, subject: Medical Corps Officers for Duty. (2) See footnote 12 (1), p. 175. 17 Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General, Army Air Forces. July 1942, subject:

Coordination, The Surgeon General and The Air Surgeon. (The Army Air Forces Medical Service

historian states, however, that it appears that the Air Surgeon never used the authority to “sign

and issue letters of appointment” of Medical Corps officers in company grades. See Link, Mae Mills, and Coleman, Hubert A. Medical Support of the Army Air Force in World War II. Washington:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955.)

18 (1) Memorandum, Chief Clerk, Personnel Division, Air Surgeon’s Office, for Chief, Personnel

Division, Air Surgeon’s Office (undated). (2) See publication cited in footnote 17. Letter, Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, USA (Ret.), to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director,

Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 12 Mar. 1956.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS ITT

cal Association, and Mr. Paul Y. McNutt, Chairman of the War Manpower

Commission, took occasion in addressing the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association in Atlantic City, N.J., to inform doctors of the Army’s

great need for them. Dr. Lahey stated that he believed that the medical profession was still not facing the facts as frankly as it should and that the country

was still not convinced that its situation was one of urgent necessity. Mr.

McNutt spoke much more bluntly, saying: “We are not getting enough [doctor]

volunteers.’’ Then, reviewing the armed services’ need for doctors, and pointing out the different fields of civilian medicine where needs were large, he told

the delegates that the careful safeguards that the Procurement and Assignment

Service had set up had apparently slowed down the rate of recruitment. “The

voluntary plan must work and work promptly—or some other more vigorous

plan will have to be produced.” After stating that the medical profession was

the first torequire rationing, he concluded: “The issue is who shall do the rationing, for America must have the doctors it needs.” 20 Although he did not explain what the “more vigorous plan” would be, many believed Mr. NcNutt was

referring to the possibility of draft of doctors.

Dental officers assigned to boards

Since the boards had been commissioning dentists as well as doctors and

since there were few vacancies in the Dental Corps during the first months of

their existence, the efforts of the two original officers on each board filled the

needs. In July 1942, however, when The Surgeon General received authority

to procure 4,000 more dentists, Dental Corps officer was added to each of the

30 boards then operating in 25 States. (In June 1942, the Services of Supply

had ordered additional recruiting boards created in seven of the more populous

States—New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts, California,

and Texas.) 21 The objective was soon reached; the Dental Corps officers were

removed from the boards on September 1942, and the boards were

instructed at that time to process no more dental applications except for men

classified as I-A by selective service—those who might be drafted.22 The

boards did not procure veterinarians or any other Medical Department personnel. In September 1942, the boards were limited to appointing first

lieutenants only, forwarding the papers of applicants for all other grades to

The Surgeon General, who decided whether to commission the applicant.23

“(1) Medicine and the War. J.A.M.A. 119: 647-648, 20 June 1942. (2) McNutt, P. V.:

The Urgent Need for Doctors. J.A.M.A. 119: 605—607, 20 June 1942.

21 See footnote 12 (4), p. 175. 22 (1) Medical Department, United States Army. Dental Service in World War II. Washington

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding Generals,

all Service Commands, July 1942, subject: Dental Corps Member for Certain Medical Department

Recruiting Boards. 23 (1) War Department Memorandum No. S605-5—42, Sept. 1942. (2) Radio, Commanding

General, Services of Supply, to Commanding General, each Service Command, 10 Sept. 1942.
178 PERSONNEL

Civilian reaction

Although the total number enrolled by these boards was gratifying to

The Surgeon General, physicians’ responses to the boards’ appeals varied in

different sections of the country. Some States went far beyond the 1942 quota

set by the Procurement and Assignment Service; others lagged. In some

areas, critical shortages of doctors for civilian care were developing, due in

part to voluntary enrollment and in part to the shifting of population to industrial areas. On the other hand, several populous States, where the number

of doctors wasrelatively large, fell far behind their quotas.

The boards drew criticisms of various kinds, the most frequent being that

they antagonized doctors and threatened them with being drafted if they did

not volunteer.24 Learning of such conduct by the boards, the Director of the

Selective Service System issued strong statement declaring that the System

had not delegated the power to induct and could not if it wished but that, despite this, some boards had told doctors they must accept commission or they

would be drafted. “This is half truth and misrepresentation of the worst

possible kind,” he asserted. 25

On 20 June 1942, the Surgeon General’s Office, possibly forewarned of

the Director’s concern in this matter, had informed the boards that they were

not in position to threaten induction; they might, however, tell physicians

that need for them was so great that Selective Service might consider inducting them. 26

The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, although he had

talked sternly to doctors in June about the Army’s great need for them, testified in the fall of 1942 before the Committee to study the Medical Department

that in many States the boards “use entirely unwarranted methods to scare

doctors into volunteering *, Every possible means was used, short of

shanghaiing, to force the doctors to join up.” He complained to the committee that these boards had paid little attention to essential work doctor

might be doing and that before State Chairmen of the Procurement and Assignment Service could complete their lists of essential doctors in communities, health departments, the staffs of universities and hospitals, and industry, the

boards had taken many essential men. “We have had,” he said, “occasional

instances where they have taken every single person [physician] in the

community *. They have gone in and high-pressured these men.”

In move to regain the control he had lost when others were empowered to

issue commissions, The Surgeon General stated in the fall of 1942 that as his

Office possessed the machinery to handle applications and recommend commissions, the few boards still functioning were to do no more actual commis24 Letter, Chamber of Commerce, Kalamazoo, Mich., to Senator Prentiss W. Brown, 23 Nov. 1942. 25 Letter, Director, Selective Service System, to Brig. Gen. James B. Wharton, Director, Personnel Division, Services of Supply, 22 June 1942. 20 Information Letter, Office of The Surgeon General, to Medical Officer Recruiting Boards, 20 June 1942, subject: Instructions.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 175)

sioning. With all applications for commissions in the Medical Corps passing

through his Office, he could exercise tighter control on the initial rank granted

an officer and on the classification of each man according to his training and

experience. The Officer Procurement Service, established in November 1942

under the Commanding General, Services of Supply, to procure officers for the

entire Army, was willing, however, to have the Medical Officer Recruiting

Boards complete and send applications to The Surgeon General or the Air

Surgeon; those officers then transmitted them to the Officer Procurement Service for consideration and for forwarding to the Secretary of War’s Personnel

Board. 27

Closing of the boards

The recruiting boards were closed at different times, beginning with the

board in South Carolina in June 1942; the last ones were closed in February

or March 1943. As States approached the Procurement and Assignment Service’s quotas of physicians that could be withdrawn from civilian practice, that

Service became concerned that civilian medical care might suffer unduly and

brought pressure on the War Department to close the boards in those States.

Furthermore, in States which had reached their 1942 quota, the Service refused

to declare any more doctors available for military duty. As result of pressure

from this Service, The Surgeon General in July 1942 ordered the boards in 16

States to be closed at the earliest practicable date.28

Control shifted to service commanders

At the end of the same month, General Somervell, on being reminded at

meeting of his service command commanders that the medical officer recruiting boards were under the orders of The Surgeon General, declared that they

were to be “under the Service Commander, and don’t want any direct staff

control any more.” On September 1942, an order was issued to that effect,29

Accordingly, when week later the Procurement and Assignment Service asked

The Surgeon General to close the recruiting boards in additional States which

had reached or nearly reached their quotas, the Surgeon General’s Office suggested other channels.30 On 21 October 1942, War Department directive

terminated the activities of the boards in all remaining States except California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts. 31 Early in 1943,

27 Memorandum, Chief, Procurement Division, Officer Procurement Service, for Chief, Field Operations Branch, Officer Procurement Service, Dec. 1942, subject: Appointment of Doctors of Dentistry, Veterinary Medicine, and Medicine. 28 (1) General Report, Second Service Command, 1943, p. 26. (2) Proceedings, Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 24 July 1942. (This order closed boards in the following States Delaware, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Oklahoma, Indiana,

North Dakota, South Dakota, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, and New Mexico.) 29 (1) Conference of Commanding Generals, Services of Supply, Fourth Session, 30 July-1 August

1942, 31 July 1942. (2) See footnote 23 (1), p. 17T. 30Proceedings of the Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 19-20 Sept. 1942. 31 War Department Memorandum No. S605-14-42, 21 Oct. 1942.
180 PERSONNEL

the Officer Procurement Service was authorized to recruit doctors and dentists, but responsibility for processing applications and recommending their approval

still rested with The Surgeon General.

Direct commissions

During the life of the recruiting boards, doctors and dentists were permitted to apply for commissions directly to The Surgeon General or to the

Procurement and Assignment Service, which would send the papers to The

Surgeon General. In these cases, The Surgeon General did the work of getting

all necessary information from the applicant and evaluating it; if acceptable,

The Surgeon General recommended grade and assignment and, if physically

qualified, requested The Adjutant General to commission the applicant in that

grade and to issue orders placing him on duty at the station specified. In all

instances, whether the applications were received directly or from the boards, The Surgeon General classified the applicants as to specialty, made an assignment, and requested The Adjutant General to issue orders placing them on

duty.32

Indeed, The Surgeon General often went further than merely processing

papers of those who applied for commissions, actively seeking out and persuading candidates. Among those brought into the Medical Department in this way

were number of returned medical missionaries, whose intimate knowledge

of climate, sanitary conditions, and endemic diseases in strategic areas, such as

Okinawa, later proved of inestimable value. Many of these men went into

preventive medicine; others devoted themselves to medical intelligence work.33

In late 1942, the Secretary of War, concerned about the method of appointing noncombat officers in the Army, had had study made of the subject and

created the Secretary of War’s Personnel Board. (This group succeeded one

known as theWar Department Personnel Board.) The new board reviewed all

applications for appointment in the Army of the United States from civilian

life (or from the Army Specialist Corps) before appointments could be made;

it performed final review before recommending commission. 34

Increase in procurement in 1942

The success of the Medical Officer Recruiting Boards and of the Surgeon

General’s Office in getting doctors on duty is indicated by the growth of the

Medical and Dental Corps during the time that the boards were in operation

(table 1). The increase during the first month or so of their operation, significant though it is, cannot be compared with the numbers the boards brought

32 Report, Albert W. Gendebien, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, of Survey of Non-Technical Segments of the Surgeon General’s Office, 24 Sept.-lO Oct. 1942. This survey was made for the benefit of the Committee to Study the Medical Department. 33 Statements of Durward G. Hall, M.D., and Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, USA (Ret.), to the editor 27 May 1961. 34 Memorandum, Deputy Chief of Staff, for Commanding General, Services of Supply, 31 Oct. 1942, subject: Procurement of Officers for Army of the United States From CivilianLife.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 181

on duty later, after they had become accustomed to their work and were bringing the Army’s need for doctors forcibly to the attention of increasing numbers.

So far as the Air Forces was concerned, its most fruitful period for the procurement of doctors was during the months from July to December 1942,

when 4,576 entered the service; in the following 13 months to January 1944,

only 1,102 came in.35

During that portion of 1942 in which the Medical Officer Recruiting Boards

functioned, the strength of the Medical Corps of the Army of theUnited States

increased by 24,252; during 1943, after these boards had been abolished, the

increase was only 4,734, This comparison illustrates, however, not only the

success of the boards as compared with that of the Officer Procurement

Service that followed them, but likewise the increasing scarcity of physicians

whom the Procurement and Assignment Service was willing to declare available in 1943, and the fact that the proportion of doctors whom this Service

declared available but who did not apply for military duty increased as the

scarcity became greater in civilian life.

The Officer Procurement Service

Procedures

The Officer Procurement Service, established on November 1942 under

the Commanding General, Services of Supply, dealt directly with theArmy Air

Forces, Army Ground Forces, and the chiefs of supply and administrative

services. 36 It undertook to obtain not only doctors and dentists, as the Medical

Officer Recruiting Boards had done, but also members for other Medical Department officer components. The Service continued the practice, initiated shortly

before the Medical Officer Recruiting Boards were closed, of sending each

application to the Secretary of War’s Personnel Board for approval before

commission was granted; it never had the power to tender commissions directly

to applicants as had the boards.

The Officer Procurement Service began its work for the Medical Department on 15 January 1943. The program for the procurement of doctors,

dentists, and veterinarians constituted one of its major activities in 1943 and

1944.37 In early 1943, the Service had district offices in 38 large cities throughout the country. In practice, it was country-wide recruiting office, with its

activities at first limited to procuring officers, although later in the war it also

lent its efforts to procuring certain types of enlisted personnel as well.

38 See footnote 17, p. 176. 38 War Department Circular No. 367, 1942. (The Officer Procurement Service did not handle the appointment of graduating aviation cadets, officer candidates, or members of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps.)

37 Memorandum, Central Office, Procurement and Assignment Service, for Col. Robert Cutler,

Officer Procurement Service, Services of Supply, through Lt. Col. D. G. Hall, Personnel Division, Office

of The Surgeon General, 16 Jan. 1943, subject: Correction Paragraph in Covering Letter From

Officer Procurement Service to Officer Procurement District.
182 PERSONNEL

Tlie method of procuring physicians under the Officer Procurement Service appears to have been cumbersome and time consuming. The Office of

The Surgeon General pointed out somewhat later that, although the Officer

Procurement Service had been very cooperative, its functioning had of necessity

lengthened the time required to appoint physicians and dentists from civilian

life. Only the Procurement Service could solicit doctor, dentist, or veterinarian, but before doing so it had to receive an application from him by way of

the Procurement and Assignment Service, which had previously notified him

of his “availability,” ascertained his preference for the Army or Navy, and

checked his professional qualifications and ethics with the Surgeon General’s

Office. The Officer Procurement Service interviewed him to gain information

as to his character, reputation, and other qualifications for commission as an

officer. If these were found satisfactory, it helped him to fill out proper application for commission. Since the Surgeon General’s Office had already

cleared him as to professional standing and ethics, that Office did not believe

the interview by the Procurement Service was necessary. It considered this

step burden on the individual in time and expense, especially in the Middle

West, where the offices of the Procurement Service w’ere too widely dispersed,

and in the densely populated Eastern States, where they too few in number. 38 The Surgeon General recommended to G-l that if by the end of March

1943 procurement of doctors and dentists had not reached satisfactory rate, the

Officer Procurement Service be divested of that function and the Medical

Officer Recruiting Boards be set up again in those States which had not furnished their quotas. 39 G-l did not permit him to restore the boards. The

Officer Procurement Service had two advantages over its predecessor—it saved

the timeof small number of Medical Corps officers who had been in recruiting

duties in the field; it also procured Medical Department officers other than

doctors and dentists and recruited enlisted women as well. But it did not

succeed in speeding the procurement of medical officers.

Procurement lag in 1943

Information from the Officer Procurement Service showed that in the

period from 15 January to 11 February 1943, 24 of its district offices had received the names of 868 doctors cleared by the State Chairman of the Procurement and Assignment Service. Of these, the Officer Procurement Service had

had to abandon action on 302 (34.6 percent) because of their refusal to complete

the papers or for “other reasons.” The names of 103 had been sent to The Surgeon General as ready for his approval. Almost 400 cases (45.6 percent) were

88 (1) Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Lt. Col. Durward G. Hall), for Officers on

Duty in the Office of The Surgeon General, 27 Jan. 1943. (2) Letter, Office of The Surgeon General,

to G-l, through Director, Military Personnel, Services of Supply, 16 Feb. 1948, subject: Procurement

of Physicians and Dentists. (3) War Department Circular No. 367, 1942. (4) Field Transmittal-24,

Officer Procurement Service, to Officer Procurement Districts, 27 Jan. 1943, subject: Revision of FT-15

(1-13-43) Processing Doctors, Dentists, and Veterinarians.

38 See footnote 38 (2).
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 183

in process, awaiting completion. 40 Meanwhile, figures issued by the Procurement and Assignment Service for 31 January 1943 indicated that already few States had reached their second quota, but these were States whose quota was very small. The States with large quotas for 1943 were ranging between only TO and 83 percent of them. 41

During April, when the total Army strength increased by more than

200,000, the number of doctors on duty not only did not keep pace with this

increase, but actually declined (table 1). Some doctors were procured during

this month, but larger number evidently left the service. During the month,

The Surgeon General advised the Procurement and Assignment Service that

the monthly allotment should be revised upward in order to take care of

losses. 42

In July, The Surgeon General reported that between 15 January and

July 1943 the Procurement and Assignment Service had declared 6,357 doctors

available. Of that number, the cases of 2,632 (41.4 percent) had already been

closed because physicians refused to be processed or because they had moved

from State, had already been appointed, were already in process of being appointed, or for like reason. Of the remaining 58.6 percent, experience showed

that slightly over half would be tendered commissions, the others being foimd

unsatisfactory for physical or other reasons. In other words, the yield would

be about 30 percent of the 6,357, or about 1,900. According to The Surgeon

General, the trend was for lower yield from the doctors declared available.43

Meanwhile, The Surgeon General, employing other means to get more

doctors on duty, had, at the suggestion of the Secretary of War, instituted

program of reexamining doctors and dentists previously rejected on physical

grounds, using the lower standards that had been promulgated since their first

examination. These standards included more waivers for physical defects.

Under this “reconsideration program,” he reexamined over 14,000 doctors and

dentists rejected before April 1942 on physical grounds. The result was that

under this program, extended into 1944, 700 doctors were found acceptable and

were tendered commissions.44 The program encountered complications.

After failing their original physical examination, men had been declared

essential to civilian care by the Procurement and Assignment Service; some had

40Memorandum, Field Operations Branch, Officer Procurement Service (Maj. Edward W. Gamble,

Executive Officer), for The Surgeon General, 20 Feb. 1943, subject: Report of Referrals of Doctors,

Dentists *.

41 Memorandum, Procurement and Assignment Service (Maj. Harold C. Lueth, MC, Consultant),

for State and Corps Area Chairmen for Physicians, Mar. 1943, subject: Percentage of Second Quota

for Physicians Attained. 42 Memorandum, The Surgeon General’s Office, for Procurement and Assignment Service, 17 Apr.

1943.

43 Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Lt. Col. D. G. Hall), for Special Assistant to

Secretary of War, July 1943. 44 (1) Annual Report, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army,

1943-44. (2) Letter, Surgeon General Kirk, to Dr. Guy Caldwell, Secretary-Treasurer, American

Board of Orthopedic Surgery, Feb. 1944.
184 PERSONNEL

made arrangements in civilian practice that rendered it difficult for them to

accept military duty; and others simply refused to apply for commission.45

Early in 1943, several individuals, including the Chairman of the Directing

Board of the Procurement and Assignment Service, and the Chairman of the

War Manpower Commission, expressed the belief to The Surgeon General and

the Secretary of War that granting doctors an initial rank higher than that of

first lieutenant would speed procurement. The two latter officials demurred

against holding out such an enticement, on the ground that records indicated

that physicians who refused an appointment as first lieutenant in the Medical

Corps because of the grade alone constituted small proportion of the total

number declared available by the Procurement and Assignment Service.

Neither would such action be fairto others who, with no less civilian experience,

had entered the Army at lower rank. Further, it would stagnate advancement

for doctors already in the Army. The proposal was renewed at the end of 1943,

but was again rejected for much the same reasons. 46

The Reynolds Plan

As the Procurement and Assignment Service could not induce high percentage of available physicians to accept commissions, in May 1943 General

Magee recommended special draft of doctors under the Selective Service Act. 47

However, The Surgeon General and the Procurement and Assignment Service

soon afterward made an agreement which was designed to accelerate the procurement of doctors and which continued voluntary recruiting. 48 Since G-l

preferred this plan, the idea of draft was not followed up for the time being.

The agreement, later known as the Reynolds Plan, after the Director of the

Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, who proposed it, was

concluded on 22 May 1943.

Under this agreement, the Procurement and Assignment Service promised to take the following action: (1) Declare available at once the entire

list of doctors already placed in that category; (2) permit representatives

of the Officer Procurement Service to try to “persuade” the persons so designated to volunteer in the 20 States and the District of Columbia whose

quotas had not been filled; (3) report all eligible doctors refusing commissions to their draft boards for reclassification (thus presumably placing them

in the group under selective service which was available for immediate induction into the Armed Forces as enlisted men) (4) establish at once quotas

45 Letter, New York State Procurement and Assignment Service, to Comdr. M. E. Laphman,

Procurement and Assignment Service, 29 Mar. 1943.

48 (1) Letter, Secretary of War, to Paul V. McNutt, Chairman, War Manpower Commission, May

1943. (2) Proceedings, Joint Session With Representatives of the Several Federal Services and Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 20 Mar. 1943. (3) Letter, Dr. Frank Lahey, War

Manpower Commission, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 23 Dec. 1943. (4) Transmittal

Sheet, Brig. Gen. R. B. Reynolds, Director, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, to The

Surgeon General, 28 Dec. 1943, with endorsement thereto, Jan. 1944. 47 Letter, Surgeon General Magee, to G-l, through Director, Military Personnel Division, Army

Service Forces, 13 May 1943, subject: Procurement of Physicians and Dentists. 48 Disposition Form, G-l, to Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, 24 May 1943.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 185

by States or “other areas'’ to be furnished the Army during 1943; the quota

being arrived at as follows: subtract the total number on duty on 31 May

1943 from 48,000 (the current ceiling strength for doctors in the Army) and consider the remainder as the total number of doctors to be procured,

which would be divided into “area quotas.” The Army, for its part, agreed

(1) to clear each doctor with the Procurement and Assignment Service before

commissioning him, and not even to approach any doctor, such as senior

professor in medical school or certain types of specialists in civilian hospitals, whom the Procurement and Assignment Service had declared irreplaceable; and, further, (2) to reconsider the physical qualifications for appointment as officers. The parties also approved of publicity to stress the

medical needs of the American soldier and sailor. 49

month after this agreement was reached, it was abrogated by the

Procurement and Assignment Service but subsequently (in July 1943) revived

to permit the Army—and the Navy, if it so desired—to solicit physicians for

appointment in Illinois and Massachusetts. The abandonment, or curtailment, of the plan helped to clear the way for the improvement in favor of special draft of doctors.50 However, one point about the plan is worth noting.

The reference in the agreement to “State or other area” meant that instead

of keeping the 1:1,500 physician-civilian ratio on statewide basis, the Procurement and Assignment Service would have permitted the Army to procure doctors in certain well-stocked metropolitan areas, even though the statewide ratio might stand at no more than physician per 1,500 civilians. It

can be seen that by this concession the Procurement and Assignment Service

recognized the irrationality of setting and attempting to maintain any statewide ratio when doctors were concentrated in the cities where the ratio would

be much higher than to every 1,500 of population. It also was clear

admission that the Procurement and Assignment Service lacked power to

“relocate” doctors from areas of plenty to those of scarcity. The Service

in fact frankly admitted that it had no such power of compulsion and, lacking

that power, it must have seemed useless both to the Service and to the representatives of The Surgeon General to insist on statewide ratios of 1:1,500.

Procurement of doctors subsequent to the partially abortive plan of May

1943 showed no marked increase. During the following months, June

through December 1943, 3,801 doctors accepted commissions; and this figure

must have included 1,000 or more interns and residents who came on active

duty in July, after completing their training.

Thus, in 1943, procurement of doctors fell far short of the goal set

by The Surgeon General, The Procurement and Assignment Service designation of “essential” placed on doctors narrowed the field of possible recruits,

Proceedings, Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, June 1943.

so (i) Memorandum, Lt. Col. D. G. Hall, Office of The Surgeon General, for Chief, Personnel

Service, Office of The Surgeon General, 24 June 1943. (2) Memorandum, Director, Military Personnel

Division, Army Service Forces, for Deputy Director, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces,

13 July 1943.
186 PERSONNEL

and of those available, there were many who refused to accept commission.

It would appear that conscription of medical and allied personnel on national basis would have obviated many of these problems.

Special Draft of Doctors Proposed

The failure of doctors to volunteer for Army service in the numbers

which The Surgeon General considered necessary led him to recommend

stronger means of compulsion. Under the existing draft law, very few doctors were being brought into military service by that method—only 217 during

the period from November 1940 to September 1942. Even these included

number of persons whom The Surgeon General would not have recommended for Medical Corps commissions—unethical practitioners, graduates of unapproved schools (drafted before The Surgeon General laid down the

terms on which he would accept them as Medical Corps officers), doctors

who had not been engaged in practice, and others. During the same period,

more dentists (346) and almost as many veterinarians (211) were drafted,

although both were much less numerous in civilian life than physicians. 51

Probably the main reason why few doctors came into the Army by way of

the ordinary draft was that local selective service boards were opposed to depriving their communities of the services of medical men. To induce the

boards to act, the Procurement and Assignment Service in June 1943 agreed

to report to their local draft boards all doctors whom the Service had declared

“available” but who had refused to volunteer for the Army. This plan was

soon very much curtailed, but in any event, it would have left the final decision

in the hands of the local draft boards.

The Surgeon General proposed stronger methods—a “special call” on the

draft boards requiring them to induct physicians. In order to gain his end,

several authorities had to be persuaded of the necessity and legality of the step;

The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, who beginning in December 1942 controlled the Selective Service System, his adviser and subordinate

in medical personnel matters, the Procurement and Assignment Service; and

The Surgeon General’s own superiors in the War Department. In the end, the

decision was made at White House conference.

special draft of doctors had been proposed in the Surgeon General’s

Office as early as November 1942. Nothing was done at that time, and on

16 February 1943, The Surgeon General recommended planning for it as an

eventual step if the procurement of doctors did not move faster. Three

months later (13 May), he counseled the draft of both doctors and dentists

51 (1) For period of months beginning in September 1941 (the month in which the War

Department ordered that appointments in the Officers’ Reserve Corps cease to be made and that all future appointments must be made in the Army of the United States), there appears to have been no recognized way of commissioning drafted veterinarians. In July 1942, however, The Surgeon General

succeeded in obtaining quota of 250 from the General Staff for this purpose. In Medical Department, United States Army. Veterinary Service in World War II. Washington U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1961. (2) Selective Service in Wartime, Second Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1941-42. Washington, 1943.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 187

under 45 years of age as an immediate necessity. 52 On 22 June, staff representatives agreed to the measure in principle and decided that the Secretary

of War should be asked to present proposal to the President. Later,

G-l suggested bringing the Navy into the negotiation, step which was subsequently taken.53

In the following months, further discussion within the War Department

took place, having to do with the number of doctors needed and the legality

of the proposed draft. No occupational group had previously been singled

out for induction in quite the way that was now suggested. However, War

Department authorities decided that this could legally be done within the terms

of the Selective Service Act, and on 18 October 1943, letter signed by the

Secretaries of War and the Navy was sent to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission formally requesting special call on Selective Service for

doctors.

Meanwhile, the Procurement and Assignment Service and the War Manpower Commission had been informed that the Army intended to make such

request. There was some reason to believe that these agencies would support

it. In October 1940, at the time that the Procurement and Assignment Service

was being initiated, the future Chairman of its Directing Board, Dr. Frank H.

Lahey, had stated, in effect, that draft of doctors would be necessary if they

failed to volunteer. Moreover, the future Director of the War Manpower

Commission, Paul V. McNutt, in recommending the establishment of Procurement and Assignment Agency, had proposed that it frame legislation to

draft medical, dental, and veterinary personnel for submission to Congress

if the emergency seemed torequire it.

In July 1943, while the War Department had its own proposal under

consideration, Dr. Lahey expressed the belief that the only way the Procurement and Assignment Service could obtain more doctors for the armed services

was through some means of coercion. 54 On the same day, Mr. McNutt stated

that stronger measures would be taken through Selective Service to bring

doctors into the military forces. After October 1943, he said, every physican

under 45 years of age who was reported to the Selective Service System as

having refused to accept commission after he had been declared available

for military service by the Procurement and Assignment Service would be

called for induction by his local board. At the same time, system of appeals

against the board’s decision enabled the individual to carry his case as high as

the National Headquarters of the Selective Service System, procedure which

might still have enabled good many doctors to avoid military service. 55

52 (1) See footnote 47, p. 184. (2) Memorandum, Commanding General, Army Service Forces,

for Chief of Staff, 11 Sept. 1943, subject: Special Call on Selective Service for Physicians.

63 (1) See footnote 50 (1), p. 185. (2) Memorandum, G-l, for Director, Military Personnel

Division, Army Service Forces, 11 July 1943. 54 Proceedings, Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 31 July 1943.

55 (1) Memorandum, Chief, Procurement Division, Officer Procurement Service, for Director,

Officer Procurement Service, Aug. 1943, subject: Procurement of Physicians. (2) Letter, Col.

Richard H. Fanes, USA (Ret.), to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, Sept. 1952.
PERSONNEL 188

Two months later, September 1943, The Surgeon General made an approach to the problem slightly different from the one he had previously advocated. After agreeing on the terms of this new proposal with officials of the

Selective Service System, who considered special draft of physicians “impracticable,” he presented it in the form of request to G-l through Army Service

Forces headquarters. Instead of special call on Selective Service for doctors,

he asked that:

in the next call placed by the War Department with the National Selective

Service System for the delivery of registrants to the Army for purposes of induction,

7,000 such registrants between the ages of eighteen and forty-four years, inclusive, be

included in said “regular call” who have the following qualifications: a. Are graduates

of school of medicine approved by The Surgeon General of the Army. b. Are physically

qualified in accordance with [Mobilization Regulations], c. Have completed one year of

internship or its equivalent, as determined by The Surgeon General of the Army, after

graduationfrom medical school. 58

This move seems to have brought no results, and The Surgeon General

returned to his original line of action. On October, he and representative

of the Navy met with members of the Directing Board of the Procurement

and Assignment Service, spokesman for the Selective Service System, and

others. The Procurement and Assignment Service felt that it should not initiate special call for doctors, but it would be “glad to endorse and implement”

one if the conditions of the call met with its approval. One indispensable condition, from the viewpoint of the Procurement and Assignment Service, was

that only doctors declared available by it should be drafted. The Surgeon

General was quite willing to accept this as condition. Selective Service

announced that physicians in the 18 to 45 age group could be drafted in given

numbers with given qualifications if the War Department’s request was approved by the Director of the War Manpower Commission, 57

On 16 October 1943, days before the Secretaries of War and the Navy

made their formal request, at meeting of the Directing Board of the Procurement and Assignment Service, an assistant to theWar Manpower Commission’s

Director reported that both Mr. McNutt and the head of Selective Service

thought that there was no present need for special draft—that “the Army is

not that short of doctors.” The Acting Chairman of the Directing Board

pointed out that he had given only qualified support to the plan. “I also

told General Kirk [The Surgeon General of the Army],” he added, “that it

was the feeling of the Board, for all practical purposes, that the military services have obtained just about as many doctors as they are going to get under

58 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. D. G. Hall, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director, Military

Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, Sept. 1943, subject: Inclusion of Physicians and Surgeons

in Regular Selective Service Call for Inductees. (2) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Assistant

Chief of Staff, 6—1, through Director, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, Sept. 1943. 67 (1) Minutes of Session, by Executive Officer, Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment

Service, Oct. 1943. (2) Memorandum, Lt. Col. D. G. Hall, Office of The Surgeon General, for

G. H. Dorr, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, Oct. 1943. (3) Proceedings of Directing

Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 16 Oct. 1943. (4) Memorandum, The Surgeon General,

for G. H. Dorr, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, 30 Nov. 1943.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 189

the present legal setup. There may be 2,000 or 3,000 more, plus the increment

from [medical school] classes.” 58

The Secretaries’ letter to Mr. McNutt stated that “despite the greatest

effort” on the part of their departments “in cooperation with agencies under

your leadership, including successive reductions in ratios of medical officers to

personnel it has been found impossible to induce sufficient number of qualified

physicians to accept appointment as medical officers voluntarily.” The shortage was “so critical as to endanger the health of our forces.” The procurement

measure remained “which the services feel must now be utilized in order to

meet requirements. We are attaching hereto requests for special call on the

Selective Service System for 12,000 physicians (Army, 5,000 Navy,

7,000).” 59

The verbal reaction of Mr. McNutt was hardly propitious; he told G-l

that the Army and Navy “would get such special call only over his dead

body.” 60 The Secretaries’ letter, transmitted to the Procurement and Assignment Service, drew the charge from that agency that the terms of the proposed

special call violated the understanding between the Armed Forces and itself in

two ways: It was not limited to men marked available by the Service, and the

total number of doctors asked for exceeded that “calculated in previous negotiations with the military forces to allow safe reserve for the care of the civil

population.” Accordingly, the Procurement and Assignment Service authorized letter to Mr. McNutt stating that it would approve draft only if one

could be legally formulated which would meet the original conditions; it believed that “at present not more than 7,000 additional withdrawals from the

civilian medical profession would be wise.” While the Procurement and Assignment Service thought that the draft “may prove to be the only method of

securing any considerable number of additional medical officers,” it should first

“be determined that the actual need of the armed services, not merely an assumed or traditional need, is great enough to justify” such “serious change

of policy.” 61

On 23 November 1943, following White House conference attended by

the Surgeons General of the Army and Navy, Assistant Secretary ofWar John

el. McCloy, and Mr. McNutt, Mr. McNutt formally replied to the Secretary of

ar. 62 In this reply, Mr. McNutt stated that special draft of doctors would

be approved if it was possible to formulate one with the restrictions that he

and the Procurement and Assignment Service deemed essential. But they

must first assure themselves by “a thorough study of the present needs of the

military services and constant reevaluation of the manner in which physicians

are employed” that such call was necessary. He added that the Navy seemed

58 See footnote 57(3), p. 188. 59 Proceedings of Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, Nov. 1943. 60Memorandum Routing Slip, 26 Oct. 1943, attached to draft of proposed letter, The Surgeon

General, to Chairman, Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service.

61 Proceedings of Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, and 20 Nov. 1943.

62 Letter, Paul V. McNutt, Federal Security Administrator, to Secretary of War, 23 Nov. 1943.
190 PERSONNEL

to be in more urgent need of doctors than the Army and should therefore have

prior claim on the remaining doctors in civilian life “up to at least 3,000 or

3,500.” This did not mean that “a number of physicians will not be added

to the Army Medical Corps as result of the recruiting campaign now under

way and planned.” While he would not object to draft in the last resort,

survey of the legal situation appears to make it exceedingly doubtful

whether the draft of doctors could be as selective as would be necessary to preserve the

balance of distribution worked out by the Procurement and Assignment Service *.

believe you will agree that it is in the public interest to accomplish our objective or come

close to it without resorting to special call. It has been decided, therefore, that final

action on the special call will be postponed until after the first of the year [1944] at which

time the matter will be reviewed again by our respective staffs and appropriate recommendations made to thePresident.

In commenting on this letter, The Surgeon General felt that one reason

for Mr. McNutt’s rejection of the special call was that the Secretaries had

failed to include in their request the proviso that only doctors declared available by the Procurement and Assignment Service should be drafted. He had

advised including it, but it “was omitted understand, for the reason

that, as Mr. McNutt controlled both Procurement and Assignment Service and

Selective Service, he could take appropriate steps to see that the proper action

was taken to make this plan effective.” As to the magnitude of the numbers

requested, he stated that although theNavy had asked for 7,000, when the White

House conference was called the Surgeon General of the Navy had said that

he could get along with half that number; he himself, on the other hand, having

already cut down his estimate to 5,000, which he considered minimum,felt and

still felt that no further reduction should be made. He rejected Mr. McNutt’s

implication that the requirements of the Army were overstated and insisted

that “the War Department and theWar Department alone should determine the need for Medical Corps officers This office has certain views

relative to the needs of the civil population, but has accepted the arbitrary

figure adopted by the Procurement and Assignment Service which is based

on their opinion solely.” 63

Although there were further discussions of draft of doctors during 1944, The Surgeon General’s efforts in that direction during the remainder of the

war came to nothing.

Procurement in 1944

Recruiting attempts

The number of doctors brought into active duty from civilian practice

became very small during the 12 months preceding November 1944, when the

War Department ordered procurement from that source stopped. Beginning

in the fall of 1943, teams composed of representatives of the Surgeon General’s

Office, the Procurement and Assignment Service (national and State), the

Navy, and the U.S. Public Health Service visited many large cities in an effort

63 See footnote 57 (4), p. 188.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 191

to procure additional civilian doctors. These visits were predicated on the belief that personal appeal would get many who had been declared available to

volunteer. team first informed representatives of local and State medical

associations and leaders in the medical profession of the need for doctors, then

held public meeting of doctors who had been certified as available. Interviews

with these doctors followed the meeting. During the interviews, the members

of the teams were able to clear up many of the problems that had been troubling

these doctors, and according to The Surgeon General’s representative, the

conferences resulted in “a considerablenumber” of applications for active duty

with the Army.

Probably, for several reasons, the success of these teams did not match that of the Medical Officer Recruiting Hoards of 1942. They functioned only in

large cities, where, to be sure, the proportion of doctors to civilian population

was highest. Hut more important was the fact that by this time, and owing

in no small part to the activities of the Boards in 1942, the surplus of doctors

above civilian needs had been drained off. Probably, too, those left in civilian

practice were more confident than ever that draft boards, feeling pressure from

fellow citizens, would not induct them.

Supplementing and abetting the work of these traveling teams, other

means, such as publicity by press and radio, were used to impress upon doctors

the Army’s need for their services. The Surgeon General complained in

December 1943 that most of such publicity up to that time had stressed the need

of retaining sufficient physicians in civilian and industrial practice. He suggested that an organized program pointed directly at doctors and involving

the use of posters, pamphlets, radio announcements and programs, magazine

articles, and other available means should be employed to stress military needs.

Such campaign was launched in early 1944, aimed at procuring nurses as well

as doctors.64

Complaints of doctors’ idleness in Army service continued to be made, and in February 1944, the Surgeon General’s Office took cognizance of their

bad effect on those still in civilian life whom it was endeavoring to persuade to

accept commissions. An officer in The Surgeon General’s Military Personnel

Division admitted to superior that “in many instances officers and Commanding Officers themselves, apparently, have too much free time, which is fact

that is generally known in the civilian profession.” In these circumstances, The Surgeon General decided to draw to such an extent on service command

installations for Medical Corps officers in order to fill table-of-organization

units that those remaining in those installations would “be completely and

economically utilized even though on an overtime basis .” 65

04 (1) Letter, Deputy Surgeon General, to Appointment and Induction Branch, Office of The

Adjutant General, Dec. 1943, subject: Recruiting Publicity Program. (2) Memorandum, Lt.

Col. D. G. Hall, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for The Surgeon General,

Jan. 1944, subject: Procurement and Assignment Meeting With Surgeons General. 05 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. D. G. Hall, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, for The Surgeon General, through Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General,

and Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, Feb. 1944. (2) Routing Slip, Lt.

Col. Hall, to Col. J. R. Hudnall, Col. F. B. Wakeman, and others, Feb. 1944.
192 PERSONNEL

The 9—9—9 plan

As already noted, service in the Army for students graduating from medical school had been deferred for at least the 1-year internship. At the end

of that year, some received further deferment of service for junior residency and following that senior residency. There was no assurance beforehand, however, that such deferments for residencies would be given, with the

result that civilian hospitals, to fill their vacancies for residents, could depend

definitely only on an inadequate number of women and of men who were physically disqualified for military service. change in the system of internships

and residencies, requested in the summer of 1943 by the civilian hospitals, concurred in by the medical schools and the Procurement and Assignment Service,

and implemented by the Armed Forces, altered this situation to the advantage

of the hospitals and at the same time speeded the production of interns and

residents for the benefit of the Army. The new system provided that, beginning on January 1944, internships and each class of residency should run for

only months apiece. This program applied to all personnel, both civilian

and military. Furthermore, one-third of the interns holding military commissions were to be deferred for junior residency and one-half of the latter

number (one-sixth of the total) could be deferred for senior residency.

Thus, the Army got each intern who was not deferred for additional training

months earlier than previously; the greatest possible postgraduate deferment

for military personnel became 27 months instead of the previous 36. It developed specialists not only for the armed services, but for the civilian population as well. Likewise, civilian hospitals received guarantee of getting some

number of both junior and senior residents. Those not under military control—physically disqualified male and all female doctors—although having

9-month limitation for each of the three periods, might be continued on the

staff of civilian hospital as long as the hospital desired them.

When the Directing Board proposed this thing, which came to be known

as the “9-9-9 plan,” The Surgeon General stated that although he would accept it and take officers into the Medical Corps who had only 9-month internship, he would not assume any responsibility for the plan or for persuading

civilian hospitals to accept it. He made one proviso—that civilian hospitals

should seek to fill the internships and residencies only with women and overage, or physically disqualified, men. 66

professional organization—the Association of American Medical Colleges—and individuals, too, criticized the plan, asserting that in shortening the

internship it lowered the standards of medical education. The Council on

Education and Hospitals of the American Medical Association, replying that

while everyone interested in high standards of medical education and medical

service shared the concern felt by critics of the plan, approved it as the best

88Annual Report, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1944.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 193

one under conditions then existing. 67 The Surgeon General for his part

directed (December 1943) that the 9-month interns who entered the Army

be given not only weeks of basic military training (either at the Medical

Field Service School or replacement training center), but an additional

weeks at named general hospital. Nor were they to be sent overseas without

having served minimum of 60 days after completing their basic military

training. 68

After the 9-9-9 program had been underway for year, the American Surgical Association in long appeal to the President requested him to direct that

the military service of resident surgeons in teaching hospitals throughout the

United States be deferred. The Surgeon General stood out against this step,

arguing that an exception could hardly be made in favor of one group when

medical training generally was being curtailed. If the service of surgical residents was deferred, he foresaw “immediate requests for deferment of residents

in all other specialties.” 69 The matter was dropped without action.

Procurement of doctors from all sources during 1944 was only little

larger than it had been in 1943—6,897 as against 6,678. An additional 916

doctors came in from January to June 1945. Almost all of them were recent

graduates; after November 1944, appointment of practicing physicians

virtually ceased.

Training Medical Specialists

Throughout the war, the Army found it more difficult to procure qualified

specialists than general practitioners. Therefore, in order to combat the procurement lag, the Army commissioned general practitioners and then trained

them, either at military installations or in civilian schools, in the various

specialties. While approximately 8,000 doctors completed some specialty

training during the war, there is no record of how many of those 8,000 were

actually classified as specialists at the end of the war or ever served in

specialist capacity.

Pressure From Civilian Sources

While military procurement was not entirely to blame for the decline of

civilian medical service (other factors were the removal of doctors from rural

to urban, and more lucrative areas and the rapid growth of war-boom towns),

it was certainly an important cause and one of growing concern to the civilian

population. The Surgeon General, therefore, encountered attempts to prevent

or offset the effects of procurement of civilian physicians for the Army.

67 (1) Letter, Chairman, Executive Council, Association of American Medical Colleges, to The

Surgeon General, 29 Oct. 1943. (2) Letter to the Editor, the Journal of American Medical Association, Jan. 1944, with reply of Council on Education and Hospitals.

68 Report, The Surgeon General’s Conference With Service Command Surgeons, 10 Dee. 1943.

69 (1) Letter, W. M. Firor, Secretary, American Surgical Association, to President Roosevelt,

19 Feb. 1945. (2) Memorandum, Deputy Surgeon General, for William D. Hassett, Secretary to the

President, Mar. 1945.
194 PERSONNEL

As early as December 1942, subcommittee of the Senate Committee on

Education and Labor conducted hearings on the procurement objectives of the

Army and the adequacy and distribution of doctors remaining in civilian life.70

The subcommittee does not seem to have issued final report. However, even

before it had heard testimony from representatives of the Surgeon General’s

Office, the Procurement and Assignment Service, or any other members of the

medical profession, it released (29 October 1942) preliminary report on the

recruitment of physicians for the armed services. That report shows clearly

that the subcommittee, after almost year of war, was alarmed at maldistribution of doctors in civilian life—some communities having none at all or far

too few—and was concerned by the heavy procurement of doctors for the armed

services.

The report stated that it was submitted at that time “because of the need

of speedy action to prevent an immediate peril to the health of the Nation.”

Conditions were so acute and dangerous, it continued, that this preliminary

report was made public with the recommendation that at the earliest possible

moment the following steps should be taken: (1) The President should order

survey of oversupply and undersupply of medical personnel for both the

Armed Forces and civilian needs; (2) reallocation should be made wherever

it was determined an oversupply or undersupply existed; and (3) the War

Manpower Commission should be ordered to cease its procurement drive for

doctors in all States where quotas had already been attained. The report

further suggested that “an overall civilian authority should be established at

once to supervise and control the drafting and recruiting of doctors,” and

declared that “no recruiting of doctors for the armed forces should be permitted

until this authority was actually functioning.” There is no indication that

any action was taken on this report.

In late 1943, member of Congress proposed to the Secretary of War that

Army doctors be furloughed to civilian life until “a more pressing need for

their services arose [in the Army].” About the same time, the dean of medical school requested the discharge of doctor to replace retiring professor.

The Surgeon General turned down both requests on the ground of the Army’s

acute need for doctors. 71

Eventually, however, the pressure of members of Congress on the War

Department to do something to prevent further draining off of doctors from

civilian practice became so intense that in October 1944 The Surgeon General

asked that the General Staff stop procurement in all but cases involving individuals commissioned for specific vacancies. The request was complied with.72

70 Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. Senate, 77th

Cong., 2d sess., on S. Res. 291, Investigation of Manpower Resources (Washington, 1943), Part 2,

14, 15, and 16 Dec. 1942. 71 (1) Letter, Representative A. Willis Robertson (Va.), to John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary

of War, 23 Nov. 1943. (2) Letter, Lt. Col. P. A. Paden, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to A. Willis Robertson, Dec. 1943. (3) Letter, Surgeon General Kirk, to Dr. William Pepper, Dean, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, Dec. 1943. 72 (1) Memorandum, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, for Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 14 Oct. 1944. (2) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for General Somervell,

14 Nov. 1944.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 195

The discontinuance was not to affect interns who completed the Army Specialized Training Program or residents. Since neither group had been engaged

in civilian practice, they could be commissioned and placed on active duty without further adversely affecting the existing medical provision for civilians.

Naturally, those male medical students who had accepted Medical Administrative Corps commissions pending completion of their medical training were not

affected; they were considered military personnel, not civilians, and would be

commissioned in the Medical Corps upon finishing their training. The Surgeon General also requested that he be permitted to continue to commission

individuals for specific vacancies; what he had in mind was probably highly

trained specialists for the most part.

In these ways, the Army was continuing to draw into its service many

physicians who had just completed their education and who might otherwise

have entered civilian practice. But it could no longer be charged with denuding the civilian community by taking large numbers of physicians who were

already practicing civilian medicine.

DENTAL CORPS

The procurement of dentists did not become serious problem until virtually the end of the war. 73 When, in July 1942, The Surgeon General received

authorization for 4,000 more dentists, he anticipated some difficulty in procuring them and therefore obtained permission from The Adjutant General to make

appointments from groups not previously considered eligible; that is, dentists

who were between 37 and 45 years of age, or who were qualified only for

limited service, or whose training and experience justified an appointment

above the rank of lieutenant. Procurement under this quota was so successful,

however, that between September and November 1942 applications were discouraged. In November, The Surgeon General obtained an additional quota

of 7,500 to bring the total strength of the Dental Corps to 17,248. The Procurement and Assignment Service shortly afterward agreed to declare 400

civilian dentists month available for military service; the remainder were

expected to come from the output of the Army Specialized Training Program,

from recent graduates holding interim Medical Administrative Corps commissions, and from dentists inducted into the service as enlisted men.

The procurement program lagged somewhat in early 1943, but the response

improved by May of that year, and by September the Dental Corps was only

1,700 below the ceiling of 15,200imposed upon it at that time. The procurement

agencies were notified not to accept applications from dentists over 38 years

of age or from those fit only for limited service. Early in 1944, the Dental

Corps was within few hundred of its ceiling strength, and surplus appeared

likely as result of the coming influx of graduates from the Army Specialized

Training Program.

73 See footnote 22 (1), p. 177.
196 PERSONNEL

There were several possible methods of dealing with the anticipated

surplus—the ceiling on the strength of the Dental Corps could be raised,

some dentists already in the service could be discharged and replaced by others

who were graduating under Army control, or the Army could give up its claim

to some of the graduates. The last method would involve reducing the Army’s

commitments under the Army Specialized Training Program, since graduates

of the Program constituted the principal source of supply. To all intents, the

first of these alternatives was not resorted to; the peak strength of the Dental

Corps, readied in November 1944, exceeded the ceiling by only about 100.

Instead, the Army discharged some of its dentists to make way for new men;

it also reduced its commitments under the Army Specialized Training Program. With regard to this latter action, the 900 members of the class of

June 1944 were released from their obligations to the Army and—what was

more important—the Program for dental students who would graduate after

July 1945 was discontinued.

During 1944, out of about 1,400 dentists procured, some 70 percent came

from the Army Specialized Training Program; 23 percent directly from the

civilian profession; and the remainder—aside from handful inducted under

Selective Service—from graduates who had held temporary Medical Administrative Corps commissions.

Early in 1945, although the Dental Corps was near its maximum authorized strength (15,200), prospective replacements from the curtailed Army

Specialized Training Program and from future graduates holding interim

Medical Administrative Corps commissions numbered less than 300. Procurement during January-June was almost precisely the same. After V-E Day,

The Surgeon General suggested certain measures to encourageprocurement and

advised that the Dental Corps be maintained at 15,000 until the end of 1945.

The measures were not expected to produce any large increment of dentists

and, even though adopted, the strength of the Corps declined rapidly to about

9,600 by the end of the year.

At least as late as October 1945, no serious difficulty in meeting the dental

needs of the Army during demobilization seems to have been anticipated,

although the possibility that demobilization might cause temporary increase

in the demand for dental treatment had been mentioned months before. Fullscale demobilization brought the problem to climax, however, and in 1946,

draft of dentists became necessity.

VETERINARY CORPS

Up to the beginning of 1945, the Veterinary Corps was on the whole in

better position with regard to procurement than any other corps of the

Medical Department, mainly because it entered the war with Reserve unusually large in comparison to its needs. Until well into 1942, it drew almost

exclusively on the Reserve for additional active-duty strength. In fact, at
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 197

one time, the Veterinary Corps had placed more of its Deserves on active

duty than it actually needed.

The possible sources of procurement for the Veterinary Corps were veterinarians still in civilian practice, veterinarians who had been drafted as

enlisted men, and graduates of veterinary schools who held student commissions in the Medical Administrative Corps or who had obtained their

education under the Army Specialized Training Program.

In October 1943, G-l, War Department General Staff, restricted procurement of veterinary officers to the latter group, except in special cases

which were to be referred to G-l for decision. Later, however, permission

was granted to commission veterinarians who had entered the Army by way

of the draft. 74

As late as March 1944, The Surgeon General’s Chief of the Veterinary

Service stated that the commissioning of graduates of the Army Specialized

Training Program and those holding temporary Medical Administrative

Corps commissions was more than sufficient to meet the needs of the Veterinary

Corps, and that graduates in these categories for whom no vacancies existed

were being discharged from the Army. 75 In May 1944, the veterinary phase

of the Army Specialized Training Program Avas ordered discontinued after

the graduation of the current senior class and the completion of current terms

for other classes. 76

In January 1945, the newly established ceiling strength of 2,150 was

only 100 above existing strength, but very few additional officers could be

obtained from the permitted sources.77 Consequently, the strength of the

corps never rose above 2,070 during the remainder of the war. The previous

practice of discharging graduates of the Army Specialized Training Program and those holding temporary Medical Administrative Corps commissions when no vacancies existed for them at the time of graduation eventually

made it difficult to find new officers. It also, in the opinion of Col. George

L. Caldwell, VC, (fig. 32), assistant chief of The Surgeon General’s Veterinary Division, caused much dissatisfaction among Keserve officers who

had entered the service early in the war and were compelled to remain in it

till the end of hostilities: “They felt, and quite properly, that these men

who were partly educated at Army expense should repay their government

with active duty service and by so doing permit the release of officers

with long service.” 78

74 (i) Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General, 26 Oct. 1943, subject: Requirements for Veterinarians. (2) Annual Report, Veterinary Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

U.S. Army, 1944. 75 Letter, Maj. Gen. G. F. Lull, to Hon. George H. Mahon, House of Representatives, 23 Mar. 1944.

78 Army Service Forces Circular 164, 13 May 1944.

77 Semiannual Report, Procurement Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army, 1. Jan.—31 May 1945.

78 History of Procurement of Veterinary Corps Officers. [Official record.] For further details

concerning procurement for the Veterinary Corps, see publication cited in footnote 51 (1), p. 186.
198 PERSONNEL

Figure 32.—Col. George L. Caldwell, VC, Assistant Chief.

Veterinary Division, Office of The Surgeon General.

The following numbers of veterinarians accepted Army commissions during the later war years:

September-December 1943 87

January-June 1944 47

July-December 1944 26

January-June 1945 33

Of this total, 174 were described as coming from “enlisted” ranks and

14 from “civil life and other”; were reported as flight officers, and as members of the Officers Reserve Corps. Some few among the 174 were veterinarians

who were commissioned after having been drafted; the rest were graduates of

the Army Specialized Training Program,

DEFERMENT OF PROFESSIONAL STUDENTS

Early Methods

The outbreak of war, with the consequent acceleration of the draft, in

creased the pressure to grant students in all years of dental and veterinary as

well as medical schools some type of status that would not only permit them
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 199

to become practitioners in their chosen held but assure their service in that

capacity in the Armed Forces. About month after Pearl Harbor, the National Director of Selective Service, in an effort to protect the country’s supply

of doctors and dentists, advised his State directors of “the necessity of seriously

considering for deferment” students in specialized professional fields, stating

that the number of doctors and dentists needed by the Army and Navy would

not be available “if those students who show reasonable promise are inducted prior to becoming eligible for commissions.” 79 This put further

damper on drafting students in the medical schools for service as enlisted men

but left where it was the problem of eventually getting them into service as

officers. For the time being, the only solution was to offer more categories of

students military status while permitting them to continue at school.

Medical Administrative Corps commissions

After some discussion, the Secretary of War approved the plan of The

Surgeon General, and on 11 February 1942, corps area commanders received

authority to commission as second lieutenants in the Medical Administrative

Corps, Army of the United States, all physically qualified male citizens who

had been accepted for matriculation at approved medical schools within the

United States. 80 This was later changed to “within or without the United

States,” thus including American students in approved Canadian schools. Officers so appointed would not be ordered to active duty until eligible for appointment as first lieutenants in the Medical Corps, which meant after they

had completed their internship. The authority also stated the circumstances

under which an officer's commission would be terminated, which were essentially

those already in operation for third- and fourth-year students.

There remained, however, the problem of protecting the future supply of

dentists and veterinarians. On IT April 1942, the War Department granted

authority to corps area commanders to appoint as second lieutenants in the

Medical Administrative Corps, Army of the United States, all physically

qualified male citizens who were accepted matriculants in approved dental and

veterinary schools in the United States. The terms were similar to those

previously announced for commissioning medical students.81

As with individuals accepted for medical schools although not entered,

those accepted as dental and veterinary students were likewise to be commissioned. Students in dentistry and veterinary medicine, however, received only

months’ instead of year’s grace after graduation in which to apply for

TOMemorandum 1-347, National Headquarters, Selective Service System, for all State Directors,

12 Jan. 1942, subject: Supplement to Memorandum 1-62: Occupational Deferment of Doctors, Internes, Medical Students, Dental Students, and Instructors (III).

80 (1) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, 23 Jan.

1942. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, to ail Corps Area Commanders and The Surgeon General,

11 Feb. 1942, subject; Commissions for Medical Students. 81 (1) Letter. Secretary of War, to Paul V. McNutt, Office of Defense Health and Welfare Service,

14 Apr. 1942. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, to Corps Area Commanders, 17 Apr. 1942, subject:

Commissions for Dental and Veterinary Students.

663076'—63 15
200 PERSONNEL

commissions in the professional corps, month later, male citizens above the

age of 18 years who were students at approved dental and veterinary schools

outside the United States were included, and although the directive specified

that all such students be physically qualified, it also stated that appointment

would be made wfithout physical examination. 82 It seems inconceivable that

the Army would commission anyone clearly unfit; it must have planned, however, to accept the student’s word that he had no hidden disabilities. The deans

of the schools and the corps area commanders played important roles in the

processes by which these commissions were issued.

The measures to protect medical, dental, and veterinary students raised

certain problems. The provision that student’s commission in the Medical

Administrative Corps would be terminated if he failed to secure an appointment in the Medical, Dental, or Veterinary Corps within specified time after

graduation made it possible for him to obtain his release from the Army simply

by taking no action to convert his commission. The Surgeon General, in fact,

recommended the discharge of certain dental students on these grounds. In

1943, however, the War Department prohibited such discharges and directed

that students who failed to convert their commissions should be called to active

duty in the Medical Administrative Corps.83 Since professional men were

not apt to prefer service in that corps, it is improbable that many delayed

converting their commissions after the order was published.

Another problem, as the Chief of The Surgeon General’s Veterinary

Division saw it, was that the Veterinary Corps would not be able to absorb all

veterinary students graduating with Medical Administrative Corps commissions, since he believed that the Veterinary Corps Reserve contained enough

officers to meet war needs. If on the other hand it should absorb them, he feared

that the civilian supply would be entirely cut off. Accordingly, The Surgeon

General persuaded the War Department to direct that no more graduates be

selected for veterinary and dental commissions than these corps actually

required. 84 Why the Dental Corps was included is not apparent.

Rot all newly eligible students accepted Medical Administrative Corps

commissions, even though physically qualified, probably for much the same

reasons that had deterred many third- and fourth-year medical students. Other

arrangements were made for students then enrolled in Reserve Officers’ Train- ing Corps units in branches other than medical who intended to enter medical

schools. No mention seems to have been made of dental or veterinary schools.

If time permitted them to fulfill requirements for commission, before they

entered medical school, they were to be commissioned in the branch in which

they had been trained. But even if commissioned in another branch, they were

82 Letter, The Adjutant General, to all Corps Area and Department Commanders and The Surgeon

General, 18 May 1942, subject: Commissions for Dental and Veterinary Students. 83 (1) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for The Adjutant General, Aug. 1943, subject; Discharge of Medical Administrative Officers. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General, to all Services (and others) 15 Mar. 1943, subject: Authority to Order to Active Duty.

84 (1) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. R. A. Kelser. Army Veterinary Service, for Chief, Personnel

Division, Office of The Surgeon General, Apr. 1942. (2) See footnote 82.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 201

not be called to active duty until they had completed their medical education.

If they could not complete the requirements for commission before entering

medical school, they were permitted to withdraw from their advanced Reserve

Officers' Training Corps contracts with the Government. Medical units of the

Reserve Officers’ Training Corps were suspended in 1943 for the remainder

of the war. 85

Students who accepted interim commissions received no financial benefit

from the Army. In July 1942, however, Congress appropriated $5 million to

be loaned to students whose education in technical and professional fields,

including medicine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine, could be completed

within years. 86

Enlisted Reserve Corps

The Army and Selective Service insured the scholastic careers not only of

full-fledged students and matriculants in medicine, dentistry, and veterinary

medicine but of students who were in the preliminary stages of their training.

Besides granting interim Medical Administrative Corps commissions, the Army

permitted number of premedical, predental, and preveterinary students to

enter the Enlisted Reserve Corps and retain an inactive status in it while they

continued their schooling. When, in September 1942, the Army announced that

members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps would be called to active duty immediately upon reaching draft age (20 years, reduced months later to 18), it

exempted such of these students as had acceptances from professional schools

for the 1943 and 1944 entering classes. Moreover, in March 1943, the Selective

Service System granted deferment of service to premedical, predental, and

preveterinary students who held acceptances from professional schools and

who would finish their preprofessional training in 24 months.

The Army Specialized Training Program

The Array Specialized Training Program and the Navy College Training

Program (Y-12) were established in December 1942 under the auspices of the

appropriate departments. The Army Specialized Training Program applied

not only to students of medicine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine, but to all

students of specialized or professional subjects who might constitute officer

material for the Army at large. Enlisted men selected for the program were

placed in training units at numerous colleges and universities throughout the

country, where they began (or continued, if already students) the regular

course of instruction.87

85 (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to all Corps Area and Department Commanders, 12 May

1942, subject: Commissions for Medical Students. (2) Information obtained from Albert McIntyre,

Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Unit, Officer Procurement Branch, Personnel Division, Office of The

Adjutant General, October 1953. 88 56 Stat. 562. 87 This section is based, almost in its entirety, on Final Report, Col. Francis M. Fitts, MC, Chief,

Curricular Branch, Army Specialized Training Division, Army Service Forces, subject Training in

Medicine, Dentistry, and Veterinary Medicine, and in Preparation Therefor, Under the Army Specialized TrainingProgram, May 1943 to 31 December 1945.
202 PERSONNEL

Figure 33.—Col. Francis M. Fitts, MC, Director of Military

Training Army Service Forces.

To enter the Army Specialized Training Program, medical students who

were members of the Medical Administrative Corps might resign their commissions and enlist in the Enlisted Reserve Corps, after which they, together

with other medical students who were already members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps, were called to active duty with the program without interrupting

their studies. The medical aspects of the program were handled in the Office

of the Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, by Col. Francis

M. Fitts, MC (fig. 33).

Members of the program had the status and perquisites of privates, or

privates first class, in the Army. The Army likewise defrayed all their expenses, including food, clothing, lodging, and the cost of schooling. For

medical students, school costs, such as tuition, books, and laboratory fees,

amounted to $62.47 per man per month; for dental students, $61.10; and for

veterinary students, $45.50.

Upon graduation, students in these fields were to be commissioned in the

Army of the United States. Graduation from other fields, such as sanitary

engineering, gave students no similar assurance of commission. It did not

preclude them from receiving one, either directly (as may have happened in

some cases) or after successfully completing course at an officer candidate
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 203

school. But the mere fact of graduation did not necessarily enhance their

opportunities in these respects, and the understanding was that unless such

opportunities occurred they would continue to serve in an enlisted status.

Dental trainees were commissioned in the Dental Corps and called to active

duty as soon as they graduated. Since the demand for Veterinary Corps

officers was less acute, students newly commissioned in that corps were called

up as the situation required. Medical trainees, commissioned upon graduation, were not called to active duty until they had completed minimum of

months’ civilian hospital intern training. In order to meet the needs of civilian

hospitals, and so that the military service might profit by the additional postgraduate training, small fraction was not called to duty until after months’

additional experience; an even smaller fraction until after total of 27 months’

graduate training as residents.

At the time the program was set up, The Surgeon General estimated that

the existing body of professional and preprofessional students as they were

graduated would meet his needs until 1947; that is, years longer. If the war

lasted so long, new students brought in by the program would from then on

furnish most if not all of the supply. To obtain the proper quota of graduates

after 1947, large number of new students would have to be placed in the

pipeline of the program considerably before that date. The Surgeon General's Office decided that enough veterinary students had already been blanketed

into the program so that no additional ones were needed. To meet the requirements for doctors and dentists after 1947, students were to be selected from

among those who had successfully completed two or three terms of the “Basic

Curricula” of the program—the introductory course which all new students

had to enter.

By the end of 1943, the Army Specialized Training Program and its Navy

counterpart had absorbed most of the male students of medicine, dentistry,

and veterinary medicine who were in the professional and preprofessional

stages of their training and who were physically qualified for military service.

In addition, they were beginning to take in students of these subjects who were

just entering upon their academic careers; like the others, they were committed

to enter medical service of the Armed Forces upon completion of their studies.

Curtailment of the program

When the War and Navy Departments had first announced the program

much longer war had seemed inevitable. By late 1943, moreover, the men

enrolled were urgently needed for combat duty. The Army Ground Forces

had never expressed enthusiasm for the program, and by then, the Army Air

Forces wanted to use those of their men who were assigned to the program.

In March 1944, theWar Department announced that the entire program would

be cut back from 145,000 men to 35,000.

month later, Army Service Forces headquarters announced that the

Army’s share of the classes entering medical schools during 1945 would be 28
204 PERSONNEL

percent instead of the previously planned 55 percent, and for dental schools

18 percent instead of 35 percent; no commitments would be made at that time

to cover classes to start in 1946.88

Meanwhile, the question of reducing the dental Army Specialized Training Program was becoming involved with that of discharging dentists already

in the service. 89 In March 1944, the Dental Corps reached its ceiling strength

and had in immediate prospect more than enough graduates of the program to

meet its needs in the way of replacements at the existing rate of attrition.

On 18 July, the War Department announced the termination of the dental

Army Specialized Training Program. Only those who were seniors in July

continued under the program, and the dental Army Specialized Training Program came to an end with the classes graduating inApril 1945.

In May 1944, the veterinary phase of the Army Specialized Training Program had been marked for closure with the approval of The Surgeon General.

Apparently, his Veterinary Division considered this program no longer necessary since the Veterinary Corps was near its authorized strength and little

difficulty was to be anticipated in inducing veterinarians in civil life to join

the corps—a source of procurement which, in fact, the Director of the Division seems to have preferred.

The future of the medical phase of the Army Specialized Training Program was matter of more concern to the Surgeon General’s Office. The collapse of Japan brought discussion of whether the Army should continue to

spend money to help meet civilian needs for doctors by maintaining the medical part of the program. Some War Department authorities feared the Army

might be criticized for the lack of medical training during the war period if it

did not continue such training, while others believed that the Army should

limit its medical training to meet its own future needs. 90 General Somervell, believing that the Army could not justify large expenditures in continuing the

Army Specialized Training Program as then contemplated, recommended, among other things, that medical courses be terminated during the school year

1945-46.91 The Surgeon General for his part stated that his policy had been,

and would be for the duration of the emergency, to order to active duty young

medical officers who had received their education at Government expense.

They were being used as replacements, he said, to accelerate the return of those

older medical officers who had served for long periods of time. 92

Two months after the defeat of Japan, the Deputy Surgeon General recommended to G-3 that the program be continued as source of replacements. He

88 Memorandum, Brig, Gen. W. L. Weible, G—3, for The Surgeon General, 18 Apr. 1944, subject:

War Department Policy Governing Training in Medicine and Dentistry Under Army Specialized

Training Program.

89 complete discussion of this phase of the Army Specialized Training Program is contained in the publication cited in footnote 22(1), p. 177. 90 Letter, Maj. Gen. I. H. Edwards, G-3, to Prof. Philip Lawrence Harrison, Bucknell University,

23 Aug. 1945. 91 Memorandum, Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces, for

Chief of Staff, Sept. 1945, subject: Future of Army Specialized TrainingProgram.

92 Letter, Surgeon General Kirk, to Hon. Mendel Rivers, .S. Congressman from North Carolina. 16 Oct. 1945.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 205

said he could not view lightly the potential loss of 5,000 medical officers if the

program terminated in June 1946, as had been suggested. He mentioned the

difficulties experienced in the past in getting volunteers for the Regular Army

Medical Corps.

The Chief of Staff, however, recommended that the medical program be

terminated on July 1946; men who had not graduated by that date should be

dropped as soon as possible, but in accordance with plan that would allow

time for students and schools to make adjustments. 93 This policy was

announced in November 1945. In the same month, the War Department

ordered that Army Specialized Training Program students who were scheduled

to graduate before July 1946 should not be separated for either of two reasons

applicable to other persons—their adjusted service rating score or the possession

of three or more dependent children under 18 years of age. They might, however, be discharged for certain reasons that also applied to others—hardship

(as in the case of enlisted personnel generally) or their importance to the

national health, safety, or interest. Moreover, claim based on the possession

of dependents—though not the standard one just mentioned—might be considered sufficient to warrant their discharge. 94 The Army wanted all others

of this group to graduate as doctors available for service in the Medical Corps,

desire expressed by the Secretary of War not long before. On the other hand,

medical students who were scheduled to graduate after July 1946 were

directed to be separated from the program during March 1946. Enlisted men

so separated who planned to continue their study of medicine and who were

acceptable to an approved medical school upon their request, transferred

to an inactive status in the Enlisted Reserve Corps. They were subject torecall

to active duty if they quit school or made unsatisfactory progress in their

studies. Those who did not plan to continue the study of medicine or who were

unacceptable to an approved school were discharged if eligible or transferred

to other duties upon separation from the program. The latter group of

students could be discharged from the Army when they became eligible. 95

Thus, the medical phase of the Army Specialized Training Program ended

year later than that of the veterinary or dental phases, enabling proportionately more medical graduates to become available for commissions and permitting the Medical Corps to solve its postwar personnel problem with less strain

than the Dental Corps experienced. Assignment was not, however, automatic.

Immediately after the war, the Navy Surgeon General, who was also the President’s personal physician, persuaded the Commander in Chief to divert thousand of these fledgling doctors, justthrough with their internships, to the Navy.

93 Memorandum, Chief of Staff, for Secretary of War, 20 Nov. 1945, subject: Medical Training

Under Army Specialized TrainingProgram.

Disposition Form, Maj. Gen. W. S. Paul, G-l, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces,

through Deputy Chief of Staff, 29 Nov. 1945, subject: Policy Regarding Separation of Army Specialized

Training Program Medical Students.

95 (1) Army Service Forces Circular 7, Jan. 1946. (2) Army Service Forces Circular 56,

Mar. 1946.
206 PERSONNEL

Table 17. The Army Specialized Training Program: Students of medicine, dentistry, and

veterinary medicine assigned, separated, and discharged and transferred through curtailment

of the program

[Figures in parentheses are subtotals]

One of those so transferred turned out to be the son of an Army dentist who

promptly explained to The Surgeon General in two pages of well-chosen words

that he had not raised his boy to be sailor.96 The total enrollment in and

output of professional courses in medicine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine

as result of the Army Specialized Training Program are shown in table 17.

The maximum enrollment of members of the program in these courses

was reached in March 1944, when 21,581 enlisted men were under instruction 14,042 in medicine, 6,143 in dentistry, and 1,396 in veterinary medicine.

The number of students receiving preprofessional training in the same fields

under the program attained its peak in April 1944 with 4,093 enlisted men

enrolled.97 Satisfactory figures for the total number of Army Specialized

Training Program students enrolled in preprofessional courses during the

life of the program are not available, but approximately 3,500 were assigned

to premedical, about 1,400 to predental, and an unknown number to preveterinary studies. 98

THE AFFILIATED UNITS AFTER PEARL HARBOR

The affiliated units constituted one of the most important sources of

officer personnel available to the Medical Department. Many of the physicians who entered the Army by this route were ones who would not have

96 The incident is recalled in letter, Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, USA (Ret.), to Col. John Boyd

Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 31 May 1961. 87 (1) See “Final Report’’ cited in footnote 87, p. 201. (2) Memorandum, G-l (Brig. Gen.

M. G. White), for Combined Chiefs of Staff, 30 June 1943, subject: Training of Female Students

Under Government Program.

93 (1) See “Final Report” cited in footnote 87, p. 201. (2) Letter, Col. Francis M. Fitts, MC,

to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 21 Nov. 1955.

Student status Medicine Dentistry Veterinary

medicine

Assigned 20, 336

15, 216

7, 734

3, 031

(2, 458)

(472)

(101)

4, 703

(4, 651)

(52)

1, 660

Separated 679

By graduation

Bv failure ..

For other reasons __ __

Curtailment

(13, 373)

(1, 045)

(798)

5, 120

(5, 120)

(598)

(41)

(40)

981

Discharged

Transferred

(940)

(41)

Source: (.1) Final Report, Col. Francis M. Fitts, MC, Chief, Curricular Branch, Army Specialized Framing Division, Army Service Forces, subject: Training in Medicine, Dentistry, and Veterinary Medicine, and in Preparation

therefor, Under the Army Specialized Training Program, May 1943 to 31 December 1945. (2) Letter, Col. Francis M.

Fitts, MC, to Col. JohnB. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 15 Nov. 1955.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 207

volunteered as individuals, but were willing to accept military service as

part of familiar organization. The role was rendered more attractive by

the deferment it carried until the unit was actually called up. Only the

officers, however, were procured in peacetime. Nurses and other female elements, and enlisted men, all were added when the affiliated hospitals became

eligible for activation with the actual advent of war.

The Surgeon General directed that nurses for the staff must be obtained

exclusively from the Red Cross Reserve, though at least one hospital enrolled

nurses first and then persuaded them to join the Reserve. Nurses and enlisted technicians could be recruited by these hospitals before activation. The

Surgeon General urged nurses so recruited to volunteer for active duty immediately, thus making their services available anywhere in the Army. He

assured them that they would be returned to their unit when it was activated.

In the case of technicians recruited before activation, the General Staff permitted the units to place them in the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and in this

way to protect them from the draft, pending activation of the unit. If, however, activation did not take place within months, these men would be

called to active duty elsewhere. With this exception, the corps area commander procured enlisted men for the affiliated units through the regular

channels. Women could join these units as dietitians, physical therapists, or

dental hygienists. Female dental hygienists could join them in civilian

status, as could the dietitians and physical therapists before they attained

military status.

Problems Connected With Keeping the Units Intact

Although The Surgeon General and other Army authorities did not commit themselves to policy of untouchability where affiliated units were concerned, such policy was nevertheless implied. In practice, the right of

these units—-or at least their commanding officers—to be consulted before removing any of the officers was recognized, and in general there were few

changes in organization as long as the units remained in the United States.

Keeping them intact had unduly divergent results. On the one hand, the

members, particularly the officers, felt certain esprit de corps, drawn as

they were from single institution. On the other hand, restriction of personnel to single unit limited promotion and could have affected morale,

for once the organization was completed there were no opportunities for

advancement except when vacancies resulting from attrition within the unit

occurred. One method of circumventing this problem was to initially give

the officers grade lower than the highest permitted by their tables of organization, thereby enabling promotions to be given later.

Restrictions on the transfer of personnel also had an adverse effect on

medical service generally, if it prevented man from being placed where he

was most needed. Affiliated units were generally well staffed with specialists—-

sometimes with several of equal professional standing in the same specialty—

663076'"—63 16
208 PERSONNEL

who were in greater demand than were any other category of personnel. If

specialist was kept from being transferred to unit where his talents could be

best utilized, it was distinct loss to the medical service and waste of

personnel.

It is true that by no means all these units were kept intact, especially after

their movement overseas. The Chief Surgeon of the European theater has

stated that he was able to persuade the members of affiliated units within his

jurisdiction to place regard for the needs of the Army above loyalty to their

units and that this enabled him to use the affiliated units partly as specialist

pools from which to staff or strengthen other units less fortunately provided."

In the South Pacific, affiliated units upon arrival were assured that they would

remain intact, but that if they found themselves overstaffed they might apply

to the surgical consultant or theater surgeon for transfer of the excess personnel

to unit where opportunities for promotion existed. This method proved very

effective and was the only one used in that theater for removing surplus of

qualified personnel from the affiliated units. 100

In several instances, The Surgeon General saw fit to cause changes in the

category of certain affiliated general hospitals while they were still in this

country. For example, shortly after Pearl Harbor, three medical schools

responded to his request by forming second unit to be affiliated with the

school, at the same time reducing the bed capacity of the first from 1,000 to

500 beds. Moreover, in 1943, he recommended the disbandment of the 71st

General Hospital, sponsored by the Mayo Clinic, while it was still in this

country; the personnel that had been in that unit then formed two 500-bed

station hospitals. In another case, the 30th General Hospital, activated in 1942

with only 600-bed capacity, was increased to 1,000 after it reached the theater

of operations. 101 Nevertheless, the understanding that affiliated units should

usually be kept intact seems to have prevented the best possible use of all their

members, at least so long as they remained in the United States. Early in

1942, when number of institutions were applying for permission to organize

new affiliated units, The Surgeon General refused many more of these requests

than he approved on the ground that he needed doctors as individuals, available

for assignment when and where they were required, and that he did not believe

that still more doctors should be immobilized in groups. 102

This is not to say that the drawbacks connected with the use of affiliated

units outweighed the advantages; it is likely that if the Army had not virtually

promised to keep these units intact many highly competent professional men

99 Interview, Medical Department historians, with Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, 18 Apr. 1950. 100 Letter, Brig. Gen. Earl Maxwell, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit,

U.S. Army Medical Service, 22 Nov. 1955. 101 (1) Letter, Surgeon General Magee, to Dr. Elliott C. Cutler, Harvard University Medical

School, Mar. 1942. (2) Annual Reports, 42d and 105th General Hospitals, 1942. (3) Memorandum,

Office of The Surgeon General (Lt. Col. D. G. Hall), for Officer Procurement Service, Army Service

Forces, Sept. 1943. (4) Letter, Headquarters, 233d Station Hospital, Charleston, S.C., to The

Surgeon General, 24 June 1943, subject: Inactivation of 71st General Hospital. (5) Annual Report,

30th General Hospital, 1943. 102 Letter, Lt. Col. Francis M. Fitts, MC, Office of The Surgeon General, to David P. Stearns, Boston, Mass., 22 Mar. 1942.
MEDICAL, DENTAL, AND VETERINARY CORPS 209

would have refused to join them, and that the Army would therefore have been

deprived of their services, at least for the time being.

Other Problems

The slow rate at which the affiliated units were activated and sent overseas by the War Department was believed to have had adverse effects on the

procurement of doctors and nurses generally.103 Numerous units, organized

either before or after hostilities began, continued for long periods on inactive

status during the progress of the war. Even when activated, they frequently

waited for many months before being sent overseas, while their personnel

received necessary field training and supplemented the staffs of post, camp,

and station hospital. 104

Of some 70 affiliated hospital units activated during the war, only about

20 were sent overseas within months. Of the remainder, about 20 stayed

in this country for year or more (2 for nearly 18 months), while the rest

averaged about months. 105 Meanwhile, the War Department was urging more

doctors to join theArmy or, if already in the affiliated Reserve, to accept active

duty. Some doctors in the inactive affiliated units refused to heed the call until

their own units were brought into service, probably on the theory that if they

w'ere really needed the units themselves would be called to duty, 106 and that

units already activated would be put to full use. Other doctors were probably

discouraged from entering the Army for much the same reasons; one of The

Surgeon General’s procurement officers stated that activation of the last

affiliated units (in June 1943) would remove an obstacle to procurement.107

problem of internal morale resulted from the length of time that elapsed

between activation of some of the affiliated units and their departure for overseas. One of the original purposes of these units had been to provide the Army

103 Major General Kirk, who became The Surgeon General when the last of these units were being

activated, has stated his belief that the delay resulted from enemy submarine activity and from the

fact that the troops whom these units were expected to serve did not expand in numbers or complete

their training as rapidly as was anticipated. (Letter, Major General Kirk, to Col. ,T. B. Coates, Jr.,

MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 12 Dec. 1955.) Colonel Paden has interpreted the delay in slightly different fashion which may supplement that of General Kirk. In his

opinion, sections of the War Department General Staff responsible for furnishing hospitals to particular

theaters competed with one another for units and often caused affiliated hospitals to be activated

before they were actually needed. (Letter, Colonel Paden, to Col. J. H. McNinch, Office of The Surgeon

General, 17 Jan. 1950. im According to Lt. Col. Paul A. Paden, in his letter (17 Jan. 1950) to Colonel McNinch, “The

Surgeon General’s Office generally (as far as know) and particularly the Personnel Service, did

not know exactly when or where affiliated units were to be employed.” He felt that The Surgeon

General should have had this information. Troop movement bases “were available late in the war, but

these were only very rough estimates, often reflecting the desires of General Staff Section, subject to

frequent change, and late publication and distribution tended to nullify their value.”

105 Smith, Clarence McKittrick The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone

of Interior, United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1956, tables and 7. 108 Letter, Chairman, Ohio Procurement and Assignment Service Committee for Physicians, to

Executive Officer, Procurement and Assignment Service, War Manpower Commission, 26 Mar. 1943,

subject: Base Hospital Unit 25, Cincinnati, Ohio.

107 Address by Chief, Procurement Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, before District Officers, Officer Procurement Service, 17 June 1943.
210 PERSONNEL

with group of medical units which would be ready to function in theater

of operations with minimum of delay, and no doubt the members expected

that their units would go into action promptly once they were activated. As

might have been expected, idleness and delay in shipment caused dissatisfaction. One Medical Department authority reported that “we have had many

letters about people [in the affiliated units] twiddling their thumbs when

Ave knew that they should have been under some kind of training program." 108

Unaffiliated Units

During the emergency period and also after Pearl Harbor, individual

physicians or groups of physicians offered to organize hospitals for service

with the Army. In 1941, The Surgeon General declined these offers on the

ground that he was authorized to accept only groups which were sponsored by

and associated with medical school or hospital capable of furnishing an

adequate staff; in other words, only officially affiliated units were acceptable. 109

In 1942, however, the policy changed. The Surgeon General accepted number

of offers to form unaffiliated units and encouraged the sponsors to recruit staff's

for them. 110 In one instance, he suggested that if the inquirer could recruit

balanced staff of about 16 medical officers for 250-bed station hospital they

could be commissioned and assigned as group to such hospital. However, he

could not guarantee that officers so assigned would be kept together, since

otherhospitals might have greater need for them. 111

It is unlikely that more than very few hospitals were organized in this

manner. One exception was the 61st Station Hospital, formed by group of

physicians and nurses from Camden, N.J. At the intercession of the executive

assistant to the Medical Society of New Jersey, Dr. Norman M. Scott, the

group was accepted and assigned to the 500-bed 61st Station Hospital, constituting its entire professional complement. All the members were drawn from

the staff of the Cooper Hospital, civilian institution, which approved their

enterprise, but the military hospital was never considered formally affiliated

unit. The hospital arrived in North Africa in December 1942, and the group

remained intact, except for two or three members who were evacuated because

of illness, until September 1945, when it was relieved from duty with the 61st

Station Hospital for return to the United States from the Mediterranean

theater. At the request of Dr. Scott, The Surgeon General awarded the unit

the certificate of appreciation customarily granted to affiliated hospitals. 112

108 Report, The Surgeon General’s Conference with Chiefs, Medical Branches, Service Commands,

14-17 June 1943. 109 Letters, The Surgeon General, to Dr. L. A. Andrew, Jr., Winston-Salem, N.C., July 1941; Hon. Charles O. Andrews, Washington, D.C., 29 Dec. 1941 and Mr. C. V. Morris, Snyder, Tex., 30 Dec.

1941.110 Letters, The Surgeon General, to Dr. C. F. Fisher, Clarksburg, W. Va., 18 Aug. 1942; Dr. Addison G. Brenizer, Charlotte, N.C., 28 Nov. 1942 and Dr. A. K. Lewis, Homestead, Pa., Jan. 1943. 111 Letter, The Surgeon General, to Col. Charles P. Stahr, Lancaster General Hospital, Lancaster,

Pa., 22 June 1942. 112 (1) Letter, Dr. Norman M. Scott, to The Surgeon General, Apr. 1946. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, to Dr. Norman M. Scott, 24 Apr. 1946. (3) Letter, Mr. LeRol N. Ayer, to The Surgeon

General, May 1946.
211

CHAPTER VII

Procurement, 1941-45: Other Military

Components

SANITARY CORPS

Among the various specialties represented in the Sanitary Corps, the largest was the group of sanitary engineers. On January 1943, the Procurement

and Assignment Service, at the request of the National Research Council’s

Committee on Sanitary Engineering, extended its jurisdiction over this profession. The committee, in making its request, cited the Army’s large need

for these men and the depletion of State health department rolls through losses

to the military forces and the U.S. Public Health Service. The committee

suggested that system of procurement and assignment should be instituted

promptly, and that the Procurement and Assignment Service should, after

study, recommend the proper allocation of the limited supply. Mr. Abel

Wolman, Professor of Sanitary Engineering at The Johns Hopkins University

and Chairman of the Committee on Sanitary Engineering of the National

Research Council, was made member of the Directing Board of the Procurement and Assignment Service. About June 1943, an Adviser on Sanitary

Engineers was appointed in each State, under the Procurement and Assignment Service; in most States, the Chief Sanitary Engineer of the State health

department was designated the State adviser.

On 30 September 1943, the Sanitary Corps comprised 2,054 officers, having

grown almost 80 percent since the preceding December. Of this number, some

600 were sanitary engineers, the bulk of the members of the profession in the

United States who were of military age and physically fit. As late as January

1945, of the more than 970 sanitary engineers then in the Sanitary Corps,

approximately 75 percent had come from the civilian profession—largely from

State and local boards of health. “rough check” at that time revealed that

about 22 percent had entered the corps from State health departments and

17 percent from city and county health departments. further 20 percent had

come from other governmental health agencies, while 20 percent more had been

consulting engineers. In recognition of the limitations of procurement from

these services, the experience requirement was reduced from to years.

(1) Hardenbergh, W. A.: Organization and Administration of Sanitary Engineering Division,

ch. 8. [Official record.] (2) Mordecai, Alfred History of the Procurement and Assignment Service

for Physicians, Dentists, Veterinarians, Sanitary Engineers, and Nurses—War Manpower Commission. (For some time, Colonel Mordecai served as The Surgeon General’s liaison officer with the Procurement

and Assignment Service.) (3) See table 1. p. 10.
212 PERSONNEL

The Army had to draw upon other sources, however, not only to meet its

need for sanitary engineers but for other types of specialists represented in

the Sanitary Corps. In 1943, it was decided to make use of the Army Specialized Training Program to train enlisted personnel to serve as sanitary engineers. Of the men so trained, 153 became officers in the Medical Department.

Upon completing their college course, they were sent to Medical Administrative Corps officer candidate schools to obtain commissions; after their appointment in that corps, they were detailed to the Sanitary Corps.

From the beginning of the war, it had been possible to commission men

directly, not only from civil life but from the noncommissioned ranks of the

Army, if they possessed special qualifications that would justify their appointment as officers. As part of its effort to enlarge the Sanitary Corps in this

manner, the War Department issued Circular No. 333 on 15 August 1944 to

encourage enlisted men and warrant officers to apply for commissions in the

corps, stating that need existed for sanitary engineers, medical entomologists,

serologists, biological chemists, parasitologists, and industrial hygiene engineers. month later, the Medical Department succeeded in having similar

opportunity offered to enlisted members of the Women’s Army Corps who

could qualify as bacteriologists, biochemists, and serologists. In this case,

however, the successful applicants were not to be commissioned in the Sanitary Corps but in the Women’s Army Corps, being simply assigned to and

immediately detailed to the Sanitary Corps.

In addition, the Medical Department received permission to use Women’s

Army Corps officers who were trained in Sanitary Corps specialties. In

December 1944, the War Department directed that every effort be made to

utilize in medical installations such of these officers as were qualified in technical work appropriate to commissioned rank; the specialties mentioned as

examples were those of laboratory officer, bacteriologist, biochemist, parasitologist, serologist, “and other positions established for Sanitary Corps officers.”

No permission was granted, however, to commission Avomen in the Sanitary

Corps directly from civilian life. These moves followed campaign begun in

the spring of 1944 to recruit members for the Women’s Army Corps to serve

in medical installations.

On December 1944, The Surgeon General stated that the reservoir of

bacteriologists, biochemists, and parasitologists in civilian practice was almost

exhausted and asked the Officer Procurement Service to stop procurement

from this source. Two months later, at his request, the War Department

revoked the section of Circular No. 333 which encouraged applications for

(1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding Generals, Services of Supply, Army Ground

Forces, Army Air Forces (and others), 28 Apr. 1942, subject: Commissions in the Sanitary Corps for

Enlisted Personnel, Army of the United States. (2) Army Regulations No. 605-10. 30 Dec. 1942. (1) Letter, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General, Sept. 1944, subject: Procurement

Objective in the Army of the United States of Sanitary Corps Officers. (2) War Department Circular

No. 370, 12 Sept. 1944.

War Department Circular No. 462, Dec. 1944.

Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director, Officer Procurement Service, Dec.

1944, subject: Procurement of Laboratory Sanitary Corps Officers.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 213

appointment in the Sanitary Corps. Enough applications from the types

of specialists referred to in the circular had been received to meet the existing

needs of the Medical Department.

During the period from September 1943 through June 1945, 649 commissions were granted in the Sanitary Corps. Of these, 392 went to enlisted

personnel, 239 to persons coming directly from civilian life, and the rest to

various others. The corps reached its peak strength of 2,560 in April-May

1945 (table 1). In May of that year, it contained 980 sanitary engineers, 521

bacteriologists, and 342 biochemists, each of the other specialities having

smaller numbers.

In the effort to build up the Sanitary Corps as rapidly as possible, men had

been commissioned who did not have the scientific background to fit them for

such work; they were, however, suitable for the Medical Administrative Corps.

On the other hand, some who did have this background had been commissioned

in the Medical Administrative Corps. In the fall of 1944, approximately 200

misassigned officers in each of the two corps were transferred to the corps for

which their education and experience fitted them, and The Surgeon General

took steps to prevent officers without an education in science from becoming

members of the Sanitary Corps in the future.

PHARMACY CORPS

When the Pharmacy Corps was created in July 1943, 58 members of the

Regular Army Medical Administrative Corps were transferred to it. No new

members were added to it, and the strength of the corps remained the same

throughout that year. During 1944, The Surgeon General brought about the

appointment of 14 officers to the Pharmacy Corps. The American Institute of

Pharmacy, however, complained in 1945 that he was dilatory in building up the

corps to full strength (72, exclusive of members taken over from the Regular

Army Medical Administrative Corps), and that he had failed to make it

corps in function as well as in name by not naming chief administrator.

Further, he had not requested consultative service from pharmaceutical

association. In reply, The Surgeon General pointed out that the new officers

for the corps were to be procured under such regulations and after such exami-

(1) Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Executive Officer), for the Office of The

Adjutant General (Appointment and Induction Branch), 14 Feb. 1945, subject: Revocation of Section X, War Department Circular No. 333. (2) War Department Circular No. 61, 26 Feb. 1945.

Monthly Progress Reports, Army Service Forces, War Department, 30 Sept. 1943-30 June 1945,

Section Personnel.

The other specialties listed were entomologists, general laboratory workers, parasitologists,

serologists, nutritionists, industrial hygienists, supply and other administrators. (Memorandum,

Maj. H. M. Rexrode, Office of The Surgeon General, for Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, 29 May 1943, subject: Semiannual History of the Medical Administrative and Sanitary

Corps.)

(1) Semiannual Report, Classification Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, June-December 1944. (2) Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General

(Executive Officer), for Publication Division, Office of The Adjutant General (through Military

Personnel Division, Array Service Forces), 30 Nov. 1944. (3) See memorandum cited in footnote 8.
214 PERSONNEL

nations as the Secretary of War might prescribe; that officials had promulgated

rules for the expansion of the corps similar to those that existed for the

expansion of other corps and the Regular Army as whole. Examinations

had been given, but The Surgeon General held that “it was not contemplated

that all seventy-two appointments would be made at one time.” He

maintained that to form an integrated corps it was necessary to build it up over

period of years so that it would have new officers coming in year by year to

provide continuity of changing personnel and distribution of ranks and seniority. He reminded critics that the law had not intended that every pharmacist

inducted into the Army should be commissioned. Three thousand men were

engaged in pharmacy work in the Army at that time (1945) approximately

half were registered pharmacists, the remainder being men trained in Army

schools in pharmacy duties directed particularly to Army needs. In addition, he pointed out that Army pharmacy service differed materially from that of

civilian life. Many drugs and prescriptions customarily filled in civilian life

by pharmacists were provided to the Army by the manufacturer ready for use.

Thus, compounding of drugs and medicines by pharmacists was reduced to

minimum, and could be performed satisfactorily by specially selected and

trained enlisted men. The character of this work was not such as to justify

commissioned status. 10

At the end of the war, the strength of the Pharmacy Corps was 68; the

peak strength, YO, was reached in April 1945.

MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS

The Medical Department obtained Medical Administrative Corps officers

from three sources, in addition to calling up those in the Reserve: (1) Civilians

who by reason of their education and experience it believed qualified for commissions, including nonprofessional men who were hospital administrators and

graduates of the American College of Hospital Administration; (2) enlisted

men who, having had several years of Medical Department service, could also

receive direct commissions in the corps; and (3) enlisted men who could be

commissioned as second lieutenants upon completing course in Medical

Administrative Corps officer candidate school. 11 Rank granted to individuals in

the first two groups was not necessarily limited to that of second lieutenant, and

many were given higher initial rank. In the Zone of Interior, the first two

sources, although supplying several hundred officers, furnished very much

smaller group than those who were commissioned after completing course

at an officer candidate school.

10 (1) Letter, American Institute of Pharmacy, to Surgeon General Kirk, 27 June 1945. (2)

Letter, Surgeon General Kirk, to Hon. Andrew J. May, U.S. Senator, July 1945. 11 In addition to enrolling enlisted men who had had at least basic Army training, the officer candidate schools also for short time, beginning early in the war, admitted Volunteer Officer Can- didates. These were men who applied for induction in order to receive this training. They formed but small percentage of Medical Administrative Corps officer candidates. (Army Regulations No 625-5, 26 Nov. 1942.)
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 215

Direct Commissioning of Civilians

In the spring of 1942, The Surgeon General initiated drive to recruit

Medical Administrative Corps officers among civilian hospital administrators.

request for authority to appoint 100 in this category was approved, and The

Surgeon General was directed to expand the field to include qualified hotel and

restaurant managers. These men could be used as assistant executive officers,

hospital inspectors, and medical supply officers in general hospitals and large

station hospitals. By the end of September 1942, when The Surgeon General

asked for an increase in the authorization to 200, 81 appointments had been

recommended. 12

On 13 October 1943, the commissioning of civilians in the corps was

stopped. Some months later, when The Surgeon General needed officers for

his reconditioning program, he was again empowered to commission civilians

in the Medical Administrative Corps, although Army Service Forces headquarters directed him to make his appointments from warrant officer and enlisted ranks as far as practicable. 13

Direct Commissioning of Enlisted Men

Zone of Interior

With regard to the second source, enlisted men having had service in the

Medical Department, the individual must have had minimum of years’

service in the Department, of them as warrant officer or first or master sergeant, technical sergeant, or staff sergeant. In the fiscal year 1943, The Surgeon General commissioned 222 of this group, 138 in the rank of captain or first

lieutenant and 84 as second lieutenants. Finally in October 1943, deciding that

practically all who would make acceptable officers had been commissioned, the

Surgeon General’s Office discontinued the program in the Zone of Interior. 14

Oversea theaters

The Medical Administrative Corps in the theaters also wtis augmented

by direct commissioning of certain warrant officers and enlisted men. Originally, this took place under special authorizations, granted to individual

12 (1) Letter, The Surgeon General, to Personnel Section, Services of Supply, 26 May 1942, subject: Procurement Objective of Medical Administrative Corps. (2) Memorandum, Director, Military

Personnel, Services of Supply, for Chief of Staff, Services of Supply, July 1942, subject: Procurement of Doctors for the Military Establishment. (3) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant

General, 28 Sept. 1942, subject: Increase in Procurement Objective, Army of the United States, for

duty with the Medical Administrative Corps.

13 Diary, Procurement Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, July18 Aug. 1944.

34 (1) Annual Reports, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army,

1942-44. (2) Memorandum, Capt. William Wesche, Military Personnel Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, for Col. D. G. Hall, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

24 Mar. 1944.
216 PERSONNEL

theater commanders early in the war, to commission individuals of warrant or

enlisted status in the Army of the United States. 15 In July 1943, however, the

authority of direct commissioning by theater commanders was restricted to the

commissioning of flight officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men who had demonstrated their fitness for such advancement in actual combat. Furthermore,

the appointments were limited to those needed to fill table-of-organization or

table-of-allotment vacancies within the command. 16

In the North African theater, at least, the restrictions did not prevent the

direct commissioning in the Medical Administrative Corps of personnel from

combat divisions, even if they themselves had not actually participated in combat. The Seventh U.S. Army while in that theater seems to have met most

of its requirements for battalion surgeon’s assistants in that manner. In the

Fifth U.S. Army, over 85 enlisted men received direct combat appointments

in the Medical Administrative Corps between June and December 1944. 17 To

other Medical Department enlisted men, such as those with experience limited

to general and stat ion hospitals, this path to advancement was barred. Even

when in December 1943 general prohibition of noncombat appointments was

relaxed, they gained no relief. At that time, the War Department adopted

policy of permitting limited number of second lieutenant vacancies in noncombat units to be filled by warrant officers and enlisted men who, though without combat experience, had demonstrated competence of an exceptionally high

order in the performance of their duties. The authority to make such appointments was vested in commanding generals already possessing similar power

with regard to persons who had demonstrated their fitness for such appointments in combat. Vacancies in medical units, however, were specifically

excluded from the operation of this provision. 18

Nevertheless, the North African theater, probably because of its lack of an

officer candidate school, was authorized early in August 1944 to make 30 direct

noncombat appointments to the Medical Administrative Corps. 19 Later in the

year, with greatly increased need for Medical Administrative Corps officers and

the inability of the Zone of Interior to meet this need, the War Department,

at The Surgeon General’s request, temporarily empowered the commanders

of various combat theaters to appoint second lieutenants to that corps from

15 (1) Kadio, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Iraq, 27 Nov.

1942. (2) Memorandum, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, to The Adjutant General,

Washlngtln, D.C., 24 Dec. 1942, subject: Appointments. (3) Memorandum, Col. W. P. Ennis, Jr., for

Chief of Staff, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, Apr. 1944. 18Memorandum, Maj. Gen. M. G. White, Assistant Chief of Staff, G—1, for The Adjutant

General, 17 July 1943, subject: Policy Governing Appointment of Officers.

17 (1) Report, Lt. Col. Stewart P. Alexander, Personnel Officer, Surgeon’s Office, Seventh U.S.

Army, of Medical Department Activities in Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 14 July 1945. (2) Annual Report, Surgeon, Fifth U.S. Army, 1944. 18 Memorandum, Deputy Chief of Staff, for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, 24 Dec. 1943, subject:

Extension of Authority Granted Theater Commanders to Appoint Officers.

19 (1) Radio, War Department, to Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, North African Theater

of Operations, 22 Apr. 1944. (2) Radio, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General, U.S.

Army Forces, North African Theater of Operations, 29 Apr. 1944. (3) Radio, Commanding General,

Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy, to War Department, 25 July 1944. (4) Radio, The

Adjutant General, to Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy, Aug. 1944.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 217

among Medical Department warrant officers and enlisted men without combat

experience. Other personnel, including enlisted members of the Women’s

Army Corps, were also eligible for direct appointment, but decisive action on

applications from them was left to the War Department.20

It was under this active encouragement on the part of the War Department that the great bulk of the direct commissioning of oversea personnel in

the Medical Administrative Corps took place. On 15 January 1945, for example, 85 noncommissioned officers and warrant officers in the Pacific were

given commissions in the corps, albeit after brief “refresher” course. 21 Probably about 1,300 or 1,400 warrant officers and Medical Corps enlisted men

in oversea areas became Medical Administrative Corps officers by direct appointment. The number so commissioned in the European theater, it has been

estimated, was as large as 500.

War Department policy opposed the return of enlisted men directly commissioned to their old units, and in the European theater, this policy was observed at least in the communications zone. 22 different procedure prevailed

in the Seventh U.S. Army prior to coming underthe command of the European

Theater of Operations. The medical personnel officer of that command stated:

The War Department offered to send us number of MAG’s as trained assistant battalion surgeons and we did take certain number from the War Department, but most of

our requirements were filled by direct commissions, battlefield commissions, as rule, in

the tactical units. The technical sergeant in the Infantry regiment had been there for

long time and he was qualified for the job.- The man who had done “on the job” work

was commissioned and kept in the same position, and this worked out very satisfactorily.

am not saying that those that came over from the United States were not satisfactory,

because they were, but the units liked the men that were commissioned from within their

own unit. The personnel that were commissioned in this manner had the confidence of the

troops. 23

Officer Candidate Schools Zone of Interior

At the beginning of the war, the only Medical Department officer candidate school was located at the Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks,

Pa. In April 1942, The Surgeon General pointed out that units not included

in the planning for 1942 were being activated and declared that the activation

of these units required the Medical Department to take personnel from other

units that were already operating short of authorized strength. He suggested,

20 (1) Letter, Assistant Adjutant General, U.S. Army Services of Supply, to Commanding General, Base Section, U.S. Army Services of Supply, and Commanding General, Intermediate Section,

U.S. Army Services of Supply, Nov. 1944, subject: Noncombat Appointments of Qualified Warrant

Officers and Enlisted Men as Second Lieutenants in Army of United States for Duty as Medical

Administrative Corps Officers. (2) Letter, Adjutant General, European Theater of Operations, U.S.

Army, to Commanding Generals, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, each Army Group (and others),

Nov. 1944, subject: Appointmentof Second Lieutenants, Medical Administrative Corps.

21 Whitehall, Buell: Administrative History of Medical Activities in the Middle Pacific. [Official

record.]

22 Memorandum for Record, Col. A. B. Welsh, Mar. 1945, subject; Report of Visit to Pacific

Theaters, with enclosure thereto.

23 See footnote 17 (1), p. 216.
218 PERSONNEL

and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and the Services of Supply authorized,

second officer candidate school to produce Medical Administrative Corps

second lieutenants. G-3 originally established the school’s capacity at 750; it

opened in May 1942 at Camp Barkeley, Tex., where Medical Department

replacement training center was located,24 and graduated its first class in July

of that year. The number of second lieutenants commissioned thereupon

stepped up sharply, although not enough to meet all needs.

Eighty-five percent of the peak strength of the Medical Administrative

Corps on duty during World War II were former enlisted men or warrant

officers who had been graduated from officer candidate schools. The great

ma jority of these graduates (74.0 percent of the first 31 of total of 40 classes

turned out by the Camp Barkeley school) were men inducted by selective

service. Many had civilian backgrounds in fields that were of direct use to

the Medical Department; for example, there were laboratory, medical, and

surgical technicians, male nurses, teachers, and men from supply and wholesale firms, whose understanding of warehousing and shipping proved useful in

medical depots. Furthermore, great numbers of them were acquainted at least

in an elementary way with the work of the Medical Department, having been

assigned to it before attending these schools.

The Officer Candidate School located at Carlisle Barracks turned out an

average of 177 per month in 1942. Unfortunately, it became necessary to

close this school on 27 February 1943 to make room for other officer training,

and even an increased output at the Camp Barkeley school failed to attain

what the two schools could have produced.

From July through December 1942, the officers produced by these schools

averaged 670 per month, or total of 4,024. Output, however, did not meet

demand until the fall of 1943 when large numbers of Medical Administrative

Corps officers were in replacement pools in this country. On 31 October 1943, the total strength of the corps was 13,867, enough to justify sharp curtailment

at the Camp Barkeley school.

In March 1944, the decision to substitute Medical Administrative Corps officer for one of the two Medical Corps officers serving as battalion surgeons,

and to make similar replacements in other positions,25 caused heavy drain

on the numbers in replacement pools. The officers chosen to become battalion

surgeons’ assistants were sent to Camp Barkeley for special training. As

class after class was sent to this school, it became evident that the entire

corps would have to be enlarged, and in May and June 1944 both officer candidate schools were reopened. By this time, not only had the facilities been

24 (1) Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. John A. Rogers, Executive Officer), for

Commanding General, Services of Suppl5 11 Apr. 1942, subject: Officer Candidate School. (2) Memorandum for Record, G-3, for Services of Supply, 11 Apr. 1943, subject: Additional Medical Corps

Officer Candidate School.

23 War Department Circular No. 99, March 1944. (In the early part of the war, the Surgeon

General’s Office had planned to substitute dental officer as assistant battalion surgeon, but the

scarcity of dentists in the Army caused their removal before the table of organization was published.

Getter, Maj. Gen. Alvin L. Gorby, MC, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit.

U.S. Army Medical Service, Apr. 1956.)
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 219

scattered, but Medical Administrative Corps officers wanted for instructors

were scarce in the United States. Hence, there was some difficulty in recruiting stalls for the reopened schools.26 In any event, these schools produced no new graduates until September 1944.

The necessity and difficulty of accelerating the production of Medical

Administrative Corps officers in 1944 and 1945 might have been at least partially avoided if the real situation had been appreciated and the demand

foreseen and if, therefore, production had been maintained at constant

rate. The presence, in the United States, of large numbers of Medical Administrative Corps officers in pools during 1943 was deceptive, for although

these officers were presumably free for assignment elsewhere, the service commands had actually been using them and when they were withdrawn for

training as battalion surgeons’ assistants and for other assignments the service commands were left inadequately manned. 27 The Surgeon General’s Office may have hoped in 1943 that enough additional appointees for the Medical Corps could be obtained without supplementing them to much greater

extent by Medical Administrative Corps officers; the Surgeon General’s Office was always conservative in its estimates of how many of them could

be used to replace doctors in administrative work. It is true also that one

officer candidate school had to be closed in 1943 for reasons unconnected with

any supposed surplus of Medical Administrative Corps officers—the facilities

of the Medical Field Service School were converted to training doctors in

military subjects when large number of newly commissioned officers entered the Army as the result of the procurement efforts during the summer

of 1942.

In the period from September 1943 through June 1945, the Medical

Administrative Corps had 6,346 accessions: 28

September-December 1943 1, 713

January-June 1944 590

July-December 1944 1, 038

January-June 1945 3, 005

Of these, 5,328 were graduates of the officer candidate schools, while the next

largest number, 877, were from the ranks of enlisted personnel; other sources

—civilian life, warrant officers, and members of the Officers’ Reserve Corps—-

furnished smaller numbers.

Oversea theaters

The administrative measures which led to the provision of replacements

for Medical Administrative Corps officers included the grant of commissions

to medical enlisted personnel who attended officer candidate schools in the

26 Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Director, Military Personnel Division), to Lt. Col. A. H.

Groeschel, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., July 1944. 27 Report, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Historical Division,

Office of The Surgeon General, summer 1943, subject; Medical Department Personnel.

28 See footnote 7, p. 213.
220 PERSONNEL

European theater and in the Pacific. 29 special branch of the Officer Candidate School in the Southwest Pacific was devoted to the preparation of

Medical Administrative Corps officers. It began to function in March 1943.

By the end of August 1945, the branch school had graduated 153 men, some

of whom may originally have been warrant officers. 30 Eighteen men were

trained as Medical Administrative Corps officers at the Officer Candidate

School in New Caledonia prior to 31 August 1945. In the European theater,

there was no special course for Medical Administrative Corps personnel, but

perhaps as many as 50 men were commissioned in that corps after having

taken the general course for officers.

Figure 34.—Nurses’ duty uniform, 1943.

28 (1) Annual Report, Operations and Training Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European

Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1!)42. (2) Memorandum for Record, signed “E.G.,” July 1945. (3) TWX, CM-IN-2974, New Caledonia, to War Department, Dec. 1942. 30 (1) Essential Technical Medical Data, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, August 1943. (2) Memo- randum, P. H. P[etters], to Commanding General, Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, subject:

Medical Administrative Corps, Officer Candidate School. (3) Memorandum, Col. G. D. France, for Chief

Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, 23 Nov. 1943, subject: Report. (4)

Letter, Lt. Col. A. E. Miller, to Capt. John W. Haverty, Office of Chief Surgeon, U.S. Army Services

of Supply, 20 Mar. 1945.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 221

ARMY NURSE CORPS

During the first years of Avar, the number of nurses in the Army rose

steadily, but never to point where the Army decided it had enough for all

present and future needs. The Personnel Service of the Surgeon General’s

Office supplemented the familiar appeals to the humanity and patriotism of

civilian nurses by active steps that resulted in improvements in the pay and

status of Army nurses and ultimately benefited the whole nursing profession.

The provision of more attractive uniforms (figs. 34 and 35) was another recruiting device. Failure to fill the gap completely by these methods resulted

in several expedients: The reduction of authorized nurses in the tables of

organization, the use of enlisted women without professional training who

could perform some of the minor nursing functions, and improved classification

of Army nurses to make better use of those already in service. It is safe to

say, however, that much of this ancillary personnel would have been brought

in even if the nurse quota had been filled, for it came to be recognized that

such assistants could perform certain duties quite as well as nurses.

Procurement, 1942—43

In the months following Pearl Harbor, the number of nurses placed on

active duty increased sharply, probably as consequence of keener desire

of many to serve their country now that it was at war. An immediate lag in

Figure 35.—Nurses’ dress uniforms, 1943.
222 PERSONNEL

processing applicants was overcome by February 1942 when procurement of

1,219 nurses tripled the figure for December. Over 18,000 nurses ere brought

on active duty in 1943, the peak year for procurement during the war. 31 One

factor that contributed to this was the news that more Americans were fighting

on more fronts and that casualties were beginning to reach the United States

in sizable number. The procurement effort itself, however, together with the

removal of certain obstacles to recruitment, must also have been largely

responsible.

Early procurement agencies, 1942

During the war, the Nursing Division of the Surgeon General’s Office,

headed by the Superintendent of the Army Nurse Corps, continued to have as

one of its functions share in the procurement of nurses. 32 In late 1942, it was

estimated that approximately two-thirds of the nurses who entered the Army

came in by way of the Eed Cross after enrollment in its First Eeserve (renamed

the War Eeserve in December 1942). Membership in this Eeserve, however,

made nurse eligible not only for active duty in the Army but for the Eed

Cross “disaster service,” and some nurses were unwilling to commit themselves

to the hitter. Some also feared that even if brought into Army service they

would be placed in Eed Cross unit and thereby lack the protection which

military status gave them. 33 This fear proved groundless; Eed Cross hospitals

were used in the First but not in the Second World War. For these and other

reasons, the effectiveness of the Eed Cross as procurement agency was somewhat reduced.

Although some members of the Medical Department complained that the

necessity of working through the Eed Cross slowed procurement unnecessarily,

the arrangement continued until after the close of hostilities. In fact, when

testifying before the Committee to Study the Medical Department of the Army

(in the fall of 1942), both The Surgeon General and the Superintendent of the

Army Nurse Corps spoke approvingly of the help received from the Eed Cross.

Asked if he would favor setting up his own organization for the procurement

of nurses, The Surgeon General said: “I would hate to see anything arise to

disrupt that fine recruiting scheme that the Eed Cross has established.”

The function of the Eed Cross in nurse procurement was not limited to

obtaining members for its Eeserve. One of the most valuable services it rendered the Army was the examination of nurses’ credentials for professional

qualifications. Beginning in 1942, the Eed Cross performed that service on

the papers of nurses who entered the Army directly, as it had done previously

in the case of nurses joining the First Eeserve.

31 Strength of the Army, Oct. 1946. Prepared for War Department General Staff by Machine

Records Branch, Office of The Adjutant General, under direction of Statistical Branch. 32 Unless otherwise noted, much of the account of nurse procurement is drawn from Blanchfield,

Florence A., and Standlee, Mary W.: Army Nurse Corps in World War II. [Official record.]

33 (1) Committee to Study the Medical Department, 1942. (2) Kernodle, Portia B.: The Red

Cross Nurse in Action, 1882-1948. New York: Harper Brothers, 1949, p. 163, footnote 10.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 223

Other organizations continued to take part in the drive for nurses. Early

in 1942, the Subcommittee on Nursing of the Medical and Health Committee,

Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, the Federal agency engaged in

such matters, voted to “transfer the further development of plan for initiating

the procurement and assignment of nurses through local nursing councils to

the Nursing Council on National Defense,” the association of nursing

organizations. 34

In April, the Council (renamed at this time the National Nursing Council

for War Service) established Supply and Distribution Committee. This

committee laid down program which included among other tasks that of

helping through its State nursing councils (1) to recruit nurses into the Red

Cross First Reserve and (2) to distribute nurses for civilian needs. The

committee also decided to set State recruiting quotas, thereby giving the States

something definite to aim at; State nursing councils would be responsible for

breaking these quotas down to local ones. The State quotas were “determined

on 75 percent of the number of nurses eligible”; that is, the unmarried nurses

under 40 years of age, as shown in the National Inventory. Presumably, the

figure of 75 percent was chosen to allow for the physically unfit, those with

heavy obligations, or those who could not accept military duty for other

reasons. 35 It was to be understood that these quotas were temporary and would

be raised as needs increased.

Measures to speed procurement

Various steps were taken during the early war period, some along welltried lines, to bring more nurses into the Army. The Army Nurse Corps and

the American Red Cross carried on publicity campaign, using radio and

magazine announcements and nurses’ conventions to broadcast the need for

more Army nurses. Nurses served, too, in various cities with the Army War

Shows, Inc., with view to interesting civilian nurses in Army service. No

figures are available on the numbers of nurses persuaded by these means to

accept Army duty, but the Nurse Corps stated that reports on the Army War

Shows indicated “that interest is being shown in each city visited”; apparently,

too, more nurses applied for assignment to affiliated units as consequence of

these meetings. 36

As another means of filling the gap, the Army Air Forces in September

1942 took steps toward procuring its own nurses. Because of shortages, assignment of the required number of nurses to Air Forces installations was often

delayed. It was usual for new hospitals to be established without an adequate

number of nurses, and at times, there were none for matter of months; it was

necessary to use enlisted men in nursing duties until adequate numbers of

34Minutes, Meeting, Supply and Distribution Committee, National Nursing Council for War Service,

16 Apr. 1942. 35 See footnote 34. 38 Special Report, Army Nurse Corps, to Army Service Forces, Aug. 1942.
224 PERSONNEL

nurses could be assigned. 37 In February 1943, the Air Surgeon’s Personnel

Division began the processing of applications received from nurses. From

that date until March 1944, when recruiting by the Air Surgeon’s Office came

to an end, 4,152 applications were completed and sent to the Nursing Section

for appointment and assignment. 38

About the time that the Air Surgeon was moving to procure his own

nurses, the Secretary of War’s Committee to Study the Medical Department

was somewhat critical of the procurement activities of The Surgeon General’s

Nursing Division. The committee stated that while there was conflicting testimony on the relative merits of procurement through the Red Cross or by the

Army directly, it felt that “with more aggressive leadership and stronger administration in the Army Nurse Corps the present system of recruitment would

in all probability be satisfactory.” Finding that the number of nurses, although adequate at the time, might become critical in the coming year, the

committee believed that the Director of the Nursing Division (the Superintendent of the corps) was too complacent about the future and had apparently

given insufficient thought to the methods by which the number of nurses available for Army duty could be materially increased.

The Surgeon General’s Nursing Division showed somewhat less confidence than the committee in the ability of the Red Cross to produce the number

of nurses required and late in 1942 favored employing another agency to conduct recruiting campaign.39 The Secretary of War disapproved the

proposal.

At this time, also, the Director of the Military Personnel Division, Services

of Supply, instructed the Army Nurse Corps to formulate plan which would

use not more than 50 Army nurses in recruiting activities, this plan to utilize the

services of the Officer Procurement Service and the Red Cross. The Officer

Procurement Service had offices in many cities of the country, which provided

space and facilities, but the Red Cross, still responsible for all publicity and

paper work in connection with the nurse procurement program, furnished

clerical assistance. The Officer Procurement Service acted in an advisory

capacity to the Army nurses, arranging administrative details for conferences

and physical examinations at dispensaries, but it was forbidden to engage in

procuring, processing or presenting for appointment candidates for the Army

Nurse Corps. The Red Cross not only retained these prerogatives, but complained when it believed the Officer Procurement Service was encroaching on

Red Cross functions by using the recruiting nurses for direct recruiting work

rather than as liaison to the Red Cross.40

37 Coleman, Hubert A.; Organization and Administration of the Army Air Forces Medical Service,

Zone of Interior. [Official record.]

38 Annual Report, Personnel Division, Office of the Air Surgeon, 1943-44. 39 Memorandum, Col. Florence A. Blanchfleld, USA (Ret.), for Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The

Surgeon General, 14 July 1952, subject: Medical Department History in World War II. 40 Letter, Gertrude S. Banfleld, Assistant in Charge of Enrollment and Procurement, American

Red Cross, to Lt. Col. Florence A. Blanchfleld, Superintendent, Army Nurse Corps, 23 Mar. 1943.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 225

Various measures were introduced during 1942-43 relaxing nurses’ qualifications and improving their conditions of service, most of which may have had,

or were intended to have, favorable effect on recruitment. Two early restrictions were age and marital status. When the United States entered the war, the Army Nurse Corps would accept neither married women nor women over

30 years of age. In the spring of 1942, the Army raised the age limit from 30

to 45 years for Reserve nurses joining the Army to serve in affiliated units or

in special assignment, such as anesthetist, operating-room supervisor, chief

nurse, and instructor; 41 and the following year, it accepted nurses up to 45

years of age for general assignment, 42 The age for entering the Regular Army

Nurse Corps was not raised above 30 years, but this limitation ceased to have

meaning in January 1943 when procurement of Regular Army nurses was

stopped.

Beginning on October 1942, The Surgeon General at his discretion could

retain in service for the duration of the emergency and months thereafter any

Army nurse who married. The number of discharges from the Army Nurse

Corps declined from the total of 821 in the months prior to October 1942 to

only 265 in the first months of 1943.43

In November 1942, the Army announced that it would accept married

nurses for the duration of the war and months afterward, but stipulated that

they would not be stationed at the same installation as their husbands and that

nurses with minor children would be accepted only after providing for their

care outside military reservations. Later, no married nurses with children

under 14 years of age were accepted. 44

The Procurement and Assignment Service

As shortages of nurses increased in certain areas in civilian life, countrywide control which would effect more equitable distribution both between the

Armed Forces and the civilian community itself came to seem necessary to

more people. Army and Navy representatives stood against such control,

believing it would limit their ability to obtain the numbers needed. The question of how to guarantee nursing service to civilian communities arose during

hearings of the Committee to Study the Medical Department of the Arnry.

One committee member even insisted that the procurement activities of the

Army Nurse Corps gave no consideration to the protection of community needs.

The charge was not sustained by the record, which was good enough, on the

whole, to make understandable the reluctance of the Corps Superintendent to

accept the intervention of the Procurement and Assignment Service.40

41 Letter, Superintendent, Army Nurse Corps (Maj. Julia O. Flikke), to Miss Alma C. Haupt,

Nursing Consultant, Health and Medical Committee, Federal Security Agency, Mar. 1942.

42 Annual Report, Nursing Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1943.

43 (1) War Department Circular No. 317, 1942. (2) See footnote 31, p. 222. 44 (1) War Department Circular No. 365, 1942. (2) See footnote 42. 45 Letter, Col. Florence A. Blanchfleld, USA (Ret.), to Col. John B. Coates, Jr„ MC, Director,

Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 21 Feb. 1956.
226 PERSONNEL

In September 1942, believing that Government assistance was needed, the

National Nursing Council for War Service referred to the Subcommittee on

Nursing of the Health and Medical Committee the question of the supply and

distribution of nurses. In October, the Health and Medical Committee responded with resolution urging that Nurse Supply Board be established

in the War Manpower Commission. After the War Manpower Commission

had suggested review of the proposal, the Subcommittee on Nursing and the

National Nursing Council for War Service voted on 19 December 1942 to make

no change in the original recommendation, which presented fairly cogent

argument as follows:

1. The problem of supply and distribution of nurses was essentially the

same as that of other types of personnel and should be handled by the same

overall agency.

2. Nurses, being women, fell altogether outside the jurisdiction of the Selective Service System—unlike male professional groups—and therefore needed

even more than the latter the consideration of the War Manpower Commission.

3. If supply and distribution system was to function on local, State, and

national levels, the prestige, authority, and money of the War Manpower

Commission were needed.

4. The U.S. Public Health Service was administering $3,500,000 appropriation for nursing education and was using the Subcommittee on Nursing

of the Health and Medical Committee as its advisory group. Needed expansions in this program could be maintained under the Public Health Service with

close liaison with the proposed Nurses Supply Board.46

In January 1943, the Subcommittee on Nursing voted to approve the idea

of the establishment of an advisory committee in lieu of Nurses Supply Board

on the ground that such board would not have fitted in with the War Manpower Commission’s organizational policy. In February 1943, the War

Manpower Commission approved Nursing Supply and Distribution Service, and in May, the Chairman of the Commission announced officially that this

unit was established under the direction of the War Manpower Commission's

Bureau of Placement at the request of the nurses represented by the National

Nursing Council for War Service. Meanwhile, he had appointed an Advisory

Committee to the new Service, choosing members from list of names submitted by the Subcommittee on Nursing.

The Nursing Supply and Distribution Service was originally planned as an

independent unit in the War Manpower Commission, but in June 1943, it was

transferred to the Procurement and Assignment Service, its name changed to

Nursing Division, and the Advisory Committee attached to it. The functions

of the newly formed Nursing Division were (1) to consider the nursing needs

of the Armed Forces and establish quota for each State to meet these needs; (2) to determine the availability for military service or essentiality for civilian

services of all nurses eligible for military service and submit these findings to

48 Proposals for Administration and Operating Organization of the Nursing Supply and Dis- tribution Service, Bureau of Placement, War Manpower Commission, 10 June 1943.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 227

the American lied Cross for use in procuring nurses for the Armed Forces;

(3) to insure maximum utilization of all members of the profession; (4) to

maintain complete roster of the nursing profession; and (5) to carry out

these functions through State and local committees in accordance with policies

and recommendations made by the Directing Board of the Procurement and

Assignment Service. 47

The organization of the Nursing Division followed in general the pattern

of that for physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, with State and county chairmen and committees. In general, the State Supply and Distribution Committees of the National Nursing Council for War Service were redesignated

State Committees of the Procurement and Assignment Service. Two outstanding members of the nursing profession were appointed as members of the

Directing Board of the Procurement and Assignment Service. They were Miss

Katherine Tucker of the University of Pennsylvania, and Miss Laura Grant of

the Yale-New Haven Hospital.

Local boards classified nurses either as available for military duty or as

essential to civilian nursing care. After the State committees had reviewed

these classifications, they sent the names of those considered available for

military service to the Red Cross recruiting committees in the areas where the

nurses resided, and invited the nurses to apply to the Red Cross for military

duty.

The Procurement and Assignment Service encountered difficulties in the

first months of its jurisdiction over nurses. questionnaire sent to State committee chairmen and designed to show how many local Nursing Councils for

War Service already existed, how many were to be organized, where the State’s

copy of the National Inventory of Nurses was kept, and whether the committee

considered the Inventory up to date, brought forth picture of lack of uniformity in organization and uncertainty of knowledge. The National Nursing

Council for War Service found that efforts to notify nurses of their classification presented difficulties. In an effort to relieve State and local committees at time when the urgency to fill military quotas was increasing, the Council

in September 1943 agreed to inform nurses of their classification only if they

were declared eligible for military service, leaving all other nurses to be notified

later. 48

Procurement, 1944—45

The procurement of Army nurses, which had proceeded at fairly rapid

rate during the last months of 1943, fell by somewhat more than half in the

months following, after which it dropped even more sharply. The net

increase in the strength of the Nurse Corps from 31 December 1943 to 31 March

1944 was 1,931; in the succeeding months, the increase was only 3,710 leaving

47 See footnote 1(2), p. 211. 48 (1) News About Nursing: Procurement and Assignment. Am. J. Nursing 43 948-949, October

1943. (2) Letter, L. Louise Baker, to Miss Katherine E. Pierce, Chairman, State Committee for

Nurses, Procurement and Assignment Service, Boston, Mass., 19 Oct. 1943.
228 PERSONNEL

the corps with strength of 42,248 at the end of the year. The slowup probably

resulted in part from doubt occasioned by certain transactions in late 1943 and

early 1944. The supposed cut in the Nurse Corps ceiling, from over 50,000 to

40,000, became widely known in December 1943.

On 21 April 1944, the service commands were notified to cease making

appointments to the Nurse Corps. The fact that week later the War Department raised the authorized strength of the corps from 40,000 to 50,000 and that

The Surgeon General took immediate steps to have the service commands

resume recruiting does not seem to have dispelled doubt on the part of civilian

nurses and their organizations that the Army really needed many additional

nurses; at any rate, procurement continued to lag. This feeling of hesitation

was reinforced by belief that, following the rapid progress of the Allies

through Europe in the summer of 1944, the war would end in the fall. Therefore, although casualties mounted, applications for appointments to the Nurse

Corps decreased. recruiting campaign conducted in September failed almost

completely; 27,000 letters sent to nurses whom the Procurement and Assignment Service had classified as available for military service brought the Superintendent of the Nurse Corps, Colonel Blanchfield, but 700-odd replies, of

which only approximately 200 were from correspondents later found suitable

for Army commissions.

The Surgeon General’s Personnel Service and the Army Nurse Corps

Technical Information Branch were thoroughly alarmed over the failure of

nurses to volunteer. In September, when The Surgeon General was arranging

to evacuate large number of patients from Europe, Colonel Blanchfield

warned the National Nursing Council for War Service that recruitment

activities must be stepped up.

The Surgeon General became increasingly vocal over the nurse shortage

and was concerned about restrictions laid down by theProcurement and Assignment Service. In October, he informed the various procurement groups that

it was time they all pulled together without regard to credit for their

accomplishments.

The Surgeon General’s Military Personnel Division (Personnel Service)

recommended procedures designed to bring more nurses onto active duty. The

division urged, too, that civilian institutions should be restrained from proselytizing cadet nurses and that the Army should exert itself to persuade senior

cadets serving in Army hospitals, of which there were only 486 at that time,

to enter the Army Nurse Corps.

There was little agreement on why nurses were not volunteering in the

numbers desired and on what remedial measures should be taken. The Red

Cross admitted that its own procedures and those of the Army in handling

nurses’ applications took time but did not see how the process could be shortened

in the face of the classification requirements imposed by the Procurement and

Assignment Service. The Procurement and Assignment Service, on the other

hand, believed some recruiting and assignment difficulties arose from lack of

uniform appointment procedures. Certainly, the Army was not blameless, for
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 229

the service commands were not accepting nurses as soon as they applied.

Rather, each service command waited until its own basic training course was

beginning. Although the longest wait thus involved was only month, the

delay permitted people to conclude that the Army still did not urgently need

nurses. It is possible that if at this time The Surgeon General’s Military Personnel Division had been given free hand itmight have simplified appointive

procedures and reduced the delays.

H.R. 2277: the nurse draft

Fanned by public relations releases, the nation’s press was at this time

adopting the nurse shortage as headline material. Beginning in November

1944, increasingly critical articles were appearing, some of them denouncing

what they termed “bureaucratic delays.” On the other hand,rumors of nurse

draft persisted, some coming from members of the Procurement and Assignment Service and the National Nursing Council for War Service, groups which

had discussed such possibility much earlier. Despite the diverse ideas on why

nurses were not volunteering in the desired numbers, the two segments of the

Surgeon General’s Office that were most closely concerned with the problem—- the Nursing Division and the Military Personnel Division—agreed on one

thing—nurses should not be drafted.

On 19 December 1944, however, Walter Lippmann, nationally syndicated

columnist, after conferring with The Surgeon General rote column entitled

“American Women and Our Wounded Men,” which focused the attention of the

American people on the Army’s nurse shortage. In the article which appeared

in the 19 December 1944 issue of the Vashington Post Mr. Lippmann asserted

that he was reporting only the stark truth, which was well known to the Army

and to the leaders of the medical professional, that American soldiers were not

receiving the nursing care they must have. It "was Lippmann’s article that

precipitated the draftissue. Later the same day, the Secretary of War, having

read the article, asked The Surgeon General informally to clarify the nursing

situation. The Surgeon General assured him thatMr. Lippmann actually portrayed nearly hopeless situation. The Secretary ofWar then decided in favor

of draft of nurses. The necessary legislation was prepared on Christmas Eve

by Col. Durward G. Hall, MC, and Mr. Goldthwaite Dorr, Special Assistant to

the Secretary of War, who worked through the night. 49 The proposal to draft

nurses was incorporated into the President’s State of the Union message

delivered to Congress on January 1945. The President told Congress that

recent estimates had increased the total number of Army nurses needed to

60,000. Bills were introduced and hearings held in both Houses of Congress. The

ceiling on the corps, raised from 50,000 to 55,000 about 30 January 1945, w'as

further boosted week later to 60,000, the figure the President had mentioned

49 (1) Memorandum, Henry L. Stimson, for the President, 30 Dec. 1944. (2) Statement of

Durward G. Hall, M.D., to the editor, 27 May 1961.
230 PERSONNEL

in his message to Congress. member of the Army Nurse Corps from the

Personnel Division of the Surgeon General’s Office, testifying before the House

Military Affairs Committee, estimated that before June 1945 the Army would

need 60,000 nurses to assure sick and wounded soldiers adequate nursing care,50

an estimate that the Superintendent of the Army Nurse Corps felt was too

high.51

Late in February 1945, the House Military Affairs Committee approved the

draft bill; as thus approved, the bill left the maximum age at 44 years, but

raised the minimum age to 20 years (instead of 18, as suggested by the President) it provided that all nurses, married and single, were toregister, although

married ones would not be drafted; the Procurement and Assignment Service

was designated as the authority to declare which nurses would be available for

military service; and cadet nurses were to be inducted first. 52 The House

passed the bill on March.

Three weeks later (28 March), the Senate Military Affairs Committee approved draft of nurses, but while bill to that effect awaited further Senate

action, events occurred which indicated that it might not be needed after all.

The response to the President’s message had been immediate. In February,

the monthly increase, which recently had been measured in hundreds and sometimes fewer, reached nearly 1,900; in March, it was over 4,100. Beginning in

April, the rate of increase fell off although the total strength of the corps

continued to increase to the end of August, when it amounted to 55,950, or

13,702 more than the strength at the end of December 1944.

In April while the European theater reported shortage of 2,000 nurses,

it stated that the problem was only potential: There were always enough nurses

in staging areas who could be transferred to units needing temporary assistance.53 At the same time, the chief nurse of the theater, Lt. Col. Ida IV. Danielson, ANC, requested an officer from The Surgeon General’s Military Personnel

Division to report, upon his return to the United States, to the Superintendent

of the Army Nurse Corps that the theater required no additional nurses; so

many were there already that there was no housing at the hospitals for them.54

The Superintendent of the Nurse Corps questioned whether there was any real

shortage of nurses either in the European or the Mediterranean theater at this

50 Am. J. Nursing 45 175, March 1945. 61 The fact that during the hearings the figure was raised by 10,000 so impressed the Directing

Board of the Procurement and Assignment Service that after the war, in commenting on weaknesses in the Army’s program for procuring nurses and others, it pointed this out as an example of rapidly

changing statements of needs. The Directing Board expressed the opinion that “this [Army]

uncertainty made it extremely difficult to undertake sustained, consistent recruitment campaign.”

(Memorandum, Frank H. Lahey, M.D., Chairman, Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment

Service, for Watson B. Miller, Administrator, Federal Security Agency, 26 June 1946. Mr. Miller

sent copy to the Secretary of War on Sept. 1946.)

52 Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings, on H.R. 227, “Nurses

for the Armed Forces.” 63 Semiannual Report, Nursing Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, January-June 1945. 54 Information from ColonelDanielson, Nov. 1959.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 231

time. Early in April 1945, she returned from tour of inspection of these

theaters with assurances from the respective chief surgeons that their requirements for nurses would be limited to prompt replacements. She concluded that even though “there may be shortage of nurses based on T/O allotments

in Medical Department units, there was no shortage based on need at the time

of [her] visit.” 55

Meanwhile, procurement had been so good that on May 1945 the Surgeon General’s Office advised Army Service Forces headquarters that current

assignments then amounted to 52,000 and it was estimated that 1,000 more

would join in the next months. As requirements after the defeat of Germany would amount only to 52,800, the Surgeon General’s Office recommended to Army Service Forces headquarters that the War Department

cease to press for legislation to draft nurses. 56 As consequence, letter

was addressed on 24 May to the appropriate member of the Senate stating

that the War Department believed there was no longer need for special

draft legislation. Some time earlier, action in the Senate had already been

stalled by decision on the part of the acting majority leader not to call up

the draft bill when Senators Edwin C. Johnson and Eobert A. Taft signified

their intention of opposing it. Shortly after these events, recruiting for the

Army Nurse Corps came to an end.

DIETITIANS AND PHYSICAL THERAPISTS

As the expansion of medical facilities continued and the need for dietitians and physical therapists grew more acute, it became apparent that The

Surgeon General needed assistance in recruiting them. Although his Office

was informed as to the availabilities of these personnel, it was unable to exploit them because it lacked the means of publicizing the Army’s needs. 57

Needing salesman, he turned to the Officer Procurement Service of the

Army Service Forces, which performed the task very satisfactorily. By

bringing information to the public about work in dietetics and physical therapy, that agency assisted the Medical Department immeasurably not only in

immediate but in long-range procurement.58 The Officer Procurement Serv58 See footnote 45, p. 225. 56 Memorandum, The Surgeon General, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, May

1945, subject: Nurse Requirements After V—E Day.

5T Unless otherwise noted, this account is based on (1) Manuscript histories of the dietitians and

physical therapists prepared by the Directors of the respective components. (2) Letter, Col. E. B.

Vogel, USA (Ret.), to Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 28 Mar. 1956.

58 (1) Account of interview with Dr. John D. Currence, Director of Physiotherapy, Post-Graduate

Hospital, Columbia University, in Memorandum, Maj. Edwin B. Nash, Officer Procurement Service,

N.Y.C., for Lt. Col. John B. Marsh, July 1943, subject: Physical Therapy Aides Available. (2)

Account of interview with Dr. Don W. Gudakunst, Medical Director, National Foundation of Infantile

Paralysis, N.Y.C., in Letter, 1st Lt. Willard F. Ande, MC, Officer Procurement Service, N.Y.C., to Major Nash, 12 July 1943. (3) Field Transmittal 88, Officer Procurement Service, to Officer Procurement Districts, July 1943, subject: Procedure for Procurement and Processing of Physical Therapy

Aides and Dietitians.

663076 —63 17
232 PERSONNEL

ice succeeded in recruiting about 250 physical therapists for the Medical

Department,

nationwide survey in 1942 demonstrated that the number of dietitians and physical therapists available was inadequate to meet both civilian and military needs. On the recommendation of the Directors of the two groups,

therefore, The Surgeon General undertook the most extensive program of

training in dietetics and physical therapy ever conducted by civilian or

military organization in the United States. Without such action, the Army’s

needs could not have been met. In the course of the war, the Medical Department conducted 10 programs for physical therapists in selected Army

general hospitals, and on contract basis in civilian institutions. It also

established student-apprentice program for dietitians, the students being

trained at four Army general and several civilian hospitals, and the apprentices at other selected Army hospitals. In addition, the Medical Department provided short physical therapy technician courses for enlisted

members of the Women’s Army Corps. Graduates were qualified to relieve

the physical therapist of many nonprofessional duties, thus enabling her to

devote most of her time to the actual care of patients. This program was

undertaken in 1945 when it appeared that the number of fully qualified physical therapists was too small to care for the large number of patients then

arriving from overseas. The program produced 413 trained technicians. 59

Earlier, in 1944, believing that certain number of women, though properly qualified to be commissioned as dietitians and physical therapists, had

entered the Women’s Army Corps, The Surgeon General made arrangements

permitting such women, whether officers or enlisted personnel, to be discharged

from the corps and commissioned as dietitians or physical therapists. 60 In

1945, an opportunity was offered to properly qualified enlisted women to

become second lieutenants in the dietitians group upon completion of

months’ course given by the Medical Department. 61

Despite all the measures taken, the numbers on duty never reached the

largest objective set for them (in May 1945)—2,150 in the case of the dietitians,

1,700 in that of the physical therapists, 62 The peak active-duty strength of the

former was 1,580; of the latter, 1,300 (table 1). Procurement figures for

dietitians and physical therapists, which began only in December 1944, show

the following acquisitions for the 7-month period ending on 30 June 1945:

Dietitians, 205; and physical therapists, 293.

69 Memorandum, Director, Physical Therapists, for Lt. Col. Fred J. Field, Office of The Surgeon

General, 17 Sept. 1945. 60War Department Circular No. 90, 1944. (Under the provisions of this circular, nurses who

were enrolled in the Women’s Army Corps could also be released and appointed in the Army Nurse

Corps, where they could practice nursing. See also War Department Circular No. 208, 1944.) 61 War Department Circular No. 71, 1945. 82Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 30 May 1945,

subject: Requirements for Dietitians and Physical Therapists.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 233

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Enlisted Men, Zone of Interior

The number of enlisted men in the Medical Department increased from

108,674 in November 1941 to peak of 567,268 in August 1944, whence it declined to 454,989 in September 1945 at the conclusion of the war (table 1).

These figures represent men on duty, not authorized strength; in the middle of

1942, for example, The Surgeon General presented figures fo show that the

Medical Department had 35 to 45 percent less than its authorized enlisted

complement. 63

The method of procuring enlisted men for the Medical Department did

not differ greatly during the war years from what it had been previously.

Only comparatively small number of enlisted men were earmarked for the

Medical Department before or at the time they were inducted. Affiliated units

were permitted to enroll technicians in the Enlisted Deserve Corps for future

duty with those units. For short time, persons enlisted voluntarily could

choose the branch of service (medical or other) they preferred, but volunteers

were not accepted after December 1942.

The plan devised before war broke out whereby technicians of value to

the Medical Department registered with the Red Cross with view to being

assigned to medical organizations upon entering the Army probably served to

produce but few trained men for the Medical Department. Early in 1943,

the Acting Surgeon General stated that the “normal” functioning of selective

service did not permit calling civilians into the Army to fill particular need,

although at the same time he expressed confidence that the Army classification

system was funneling the great majority of drafted medical technologists into

the Medical Department. 64 With few exceptions, therefore, enlisted men

found their way into medical units and installations after being drafted and

with no previous claim on them by the Department.

Problem of illiterates

Dependence on the draft was in one way more satisfactory than having

to rely upon volunteers, the system by which the Medical Department had to

fill its officer corps; instead of conducting recruiting campaigns it could bank

with reasonable certainty on receiving each month stipulated number of

enlisted men from reception centers. On the other hand, in recruiting officers, the Department could establish minimum educational and professional qualifications; in accepting enlisted men from The Adjutant General, it had no

direct control over the amount or type of training and experience of those it

63 Report, Albert W. Gendebien, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, of

Survey of Non-Technical Segments of the Surgeon General’s Office, 24 Sept.-lO Oct. 1942. 64 Letter, Acting Surgeon General, to Dr. Albert MeCown, Medical Director, American Red Cross,

IS Feb. 1943.
234 PERSONNEL

received. In fact, the Department’s most serious problem seems to have been

not failure to obtain enough enlisted personnel but the difficulty of obtaining

the right kind and of keeping them after they had been obtained. The low

quality, both physical and mental, of many men assigned to the Medical Department posed continuous problem.

The mental aptitude for Army service of enlisted men caused some concern. Medical cadres shipped to the Air Forces early in the war were filled

largely with men whose scores in the Army General Classification Test—the

device for measuring this aptitude—fell in groups IV and (the lowest categories). At Cotfeyville, Kans., for example, of 97 medical recruits who joined

an initial cadre of less than 30 men, all had scores in groups IV, A", or were

illiterate. At Hondo, Tex., 75 percent of almost 250 medical recruits added to

an initial cadre of 34 “were in group A" or below.” 65 The War Department

took notice of the problem in August 1942 when it limited the percentage of

illiterates (defined as those unable to read and writeEnglish of 4th grade level)

to be included in each shipment of men from reception centers to Services of

Supply replacement training centers. By this order, enlisted men assigned to

the Medical Department were to include percent illiterates. In comparison, the Chemical AVarfare Service, Engineer Corps, Ordnance Department,

Quartermaster Corps, and Signal Corps were each to receive Sy percent of

their enlisted manpower in illiterates. Only the Finance Department and the

Military Police were required to take none at all. 06

Limited-service personnel

Complaints about the equality of enlisted men seem to have centered

chiefly, however, on those who were designated as “limited-service”; that is,

incapable of bearing the full rigors of military duty, especially in oversea

areas. 07 Hospitals frequently charged that this type of personnel was physically unable to do the heavy and long-sustained work required in such institutions or were without previous medical instruction and had to be trained

on their jobs. Some had too low mentality and too little education to absorb

technical training. At first, the Army did not make practice of accepting

limited-service men. Nevertheless, some were inducted, and in December 1941,

the authorities ordered Field Forces units to transfer all their men of that type

to Services of Supply installations, including hospitals and other Medical Department facilities in the Zone of Interior, Unfortunately, in some instances,

the Field Forces seized this opportunity to get rid of their “problem” men and

promoted others before transferring them, thereby creating morale problem

in the installations to which they were sent.

68 See footnote 37, p. 224. 66 War Department Memorandum 615—2-42, 24 Aug. 1942, subject: Limitations on Trainee

Capacity for Illiterates at Services of Supply Replacement Training Centers.

In July 1943, the War Department announced that the term “limited service” would not be

applied to enlisted men. (War Department Circular No. 161.) Army authorities, however, including

those of the Medical Department, continued to apply it informally to them.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 235

Some months later (July 1942), the Army adopted the policy of inducting

limited-service men and sending them exclusively to these Army Service Forces

installations, at the same time requiring the latter to requisition such men in

numbers equal to 60 percent of the assigned strength. This was raised to 80

percent in April 1943. This in effect required Zone of Interior installations

to replace most of their personnel with limited-service men whereas, formerly

the hospitals had absorbed their share of these men by simply adding them to

their existing force. 68

The policy appears to have had an indirect effect on the staffing of oversea

units. In October 1942, The Surgeon General stated that the Medical Department was receiving too many limited-service men in service command installations to permit it to continue to man units destined for overseas with

the type of personnel they required. According to report from The Adjutant General, he stated, medical units intended for theaters of operations were

receiving from 50 to 95 percent limited-service personnel. Moreover, in one

such unit, whose complement was 500 enlisted men, information showed that

of 436 men sent to it, 16 were illiterate and 131 had an Army General Classification Test score below 70; the average test grade for the 436 was 82. score

of 100 was considered normal. In addition, many of the men lacked teeth or

had arthritic joints. General Magee felt that excessive numbers of limitedservice men were being assigned to medical units, and he recommended that

action be taken to correct the situation. Headquarters, Services of Supply,

responded that medical battalions were there receiving their full strength of

general-service men and that evacuation hospitals and hospitals designed for

communications zone were being given varying percentages of limited-service

personnel. Services of Supply reminded The Surgeon General that “the key

to the efficient utilization of limited-service personnel is careful assignment on

the part of the Unit commander.” 69

In December 1942, The Surgeon General tried to obtain commitment

from Services of Supply headquarters that at least 10 percent of the limitedservice men assigned to the Medical Department should have high mental and

educational attainments. The attempt Avas unsuccessful.

In the following April, The Surgeon General established training regiment for 2,400 limited-service men to relieve the hospitals of some of their

problems in using them. The regiment was located at the Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Barkeley. It was planned, after men in it had

completed basic training, to send about 20 percent of them to enlisted technicians’ schools for training in the technical specialties peculiar to the Medical

Department. The regiment was not at first, hoAvever, built up to full strength

as planned. During the first 12-week period after it Avas established, in which

88 Smith, Clarence McKittrick The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone

of Interior. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1956.

69 Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Commanding General, Services of Supply, through

Military Personnel Division, Services of Supply, 16 Oct. 1942, subject: Limited Service Personnel With

Medical Department, with 1st endorsement thereto, 28 Oct. 1942.
236 PERSONNEL

it had been planned to send 2,400 men to it, only about 850 were dispatched.

The remainder of the 2,400 who arrived in that period were classified as general service. 70

Key technicians

The problem of keeping as many able-bodied men as possible in the Medical Department became perhaps most troublesome when highly trained technicians were involved. War Department directive of November 1943 requiring that the use of enlisted men should be based on their physical capacity

was followed months later by an order of Army Service Forces headquarters

dealing with the same subject. The latter directive specified that Army Service Forces enlisted men up to the age of 35 who had been in the Army for

year or longer, who had not served overseas although qualified for duty there,

and who were serving in “operating” positions 71 in the United States were to

be reassigned to units or installations destined for overseas. The order excepted few types of Medical Department enlisted men, such as “those few

rare technical specialists developed through long periods of individual technical training whose special skills cannot be fully utilized in any unit destined

for overseas;” this exception, it was stated, coverd certain key surgical, dental, and laboratory technicians. 72

About the time this directive appeared, The Surgeon General, commenting on the original War Department order, expressed to the Commanding

General, Army Service Forces, the fear that the document might be interpreted

so as to deprive the Medical Department of key technicians capable of oversea

service and replace them by men of limited physical capacity and inadequate

technical experience. He suggested that no medical technician should be removed until fully qualified replacement was available and that replaced technicians should be assigned to medical installations which could properly utilize

them. 73 Perhaps in response to this suggestion, the Commanding General,

Army Service Forces, some weeks later (16 February 1944) “reminded” commanders under his jurisdiction that trained Medical Department enlisted men

would be required in large numbers for assignment to units destined for oversea service and pointed out that many of these men were scarce in civil life as

well as in the Army. He directed that when physically qualified enlisted

technician was judged available for oversea service he be reported to the commanding general of the service command for assignment to medical unit. If there was no appropriate vacancy in unit under the jurisdiction of the com70 (1) Letter, The Surgeon General, to Commanding Generals, Medical Replacement Training

Centers, named general hospitals, and others, 16 Apr. 1943, subject: Utilization of Limited-Service

Personnel. (2) Annual Report, Medical Replacement Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1942—43, pt. 1. 71 The Glossary, Army Service Forces Manual M807, June 1945, defined operating personnel as: “The workers, both military and civilian, who aid the Commanding General, ASF, in the performance

of his assigned mission includes T/O units assigned for functional duty.” 72 (1) War Department Circular No. 293, 11 Nov. 1943. (2) Army Service Forces Circular No. 26,

24 Jan.1944.

73 Memorandum, Surgeon General Kirk, for Commanding General. Army Service Forces, 22 Jan 1944.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 237

mander of the service command, that officer must report the man to The Adjutant General forreassignment. 74

few months later, Army Service Forces headquarters issued another

order directing the removal of enlisted men qualified for oversea service from

its installations and units. On this occasion, however, the Medical Department

succeeded in having most of its key technicians exempted from the order, 75

In April 1941, the General Stall' stipulated that certain qualified enlisted

men who were in the United States might volunteer for duty in the infantry;

scarce category specialists of all branches were excepted, however; hence, although some Medical Department soldiers undoubtedly transferred to the

infantry under this authorization, highly trained technicians were kept in the

Medical Department. 76

The foregoing orders, although they exempted from their operation most

highly qualified Medical Department technicians, resulted in the transfer from

the Department of numerous men who, though less skilled, were nevertheless

trained in medical work. This imposed serious burden on the Medical Department, in view of the increased How of oversea casualties to the United

States. In January 1945, therefore, The Surgeon General urged the Secretary

of War to reconsider “the recent action diverting to the infantry medically

trained personnel in the Zone of Interior, until all current personnel replacements for medical service have been adequately met.” 77

Whether or not this

plea had any effect, it did not alter the fact that many valuable men had already been lost. The results were less severe than they might have been, but

only because, as an Air Forces historian put it, there were “no severe, widespread

epidemics during January and February of 1945, when hospital staffs were in

their leanest period.” 78

The steps taken to insure the Medical Department, and other technical

services, against the loss of their highly trained technicians through transfer

to assignments overseas in which their capabilities could not be fully used were

accompanied by the introduction of new procedure for channeling men of

this caliber who were just entering the Army into the proper branch of the

service, medical and other. Along with this procedure, there also developed

new method by which certain enlisted technicians already at work in the Army

but assigned to jobs outside their specialties could be transferred to tasks

suitable to their training. The procedure was outlined in War Department

Memorandum W615-44 entitled “List of Critically Needed Specialists,” published on 29 February 1944, the first of series. It directed that men well

qualified in the occupations listed should be assigned by reception centers to the

74 Army Service Forces Circular No. 50, 16 Feb. 1944. 75 (1) Army Service Forces Circular No. 193, 26 June 1944. (2) Annual Report, Enlisted Personnel Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, July—30 Sept.

1944, fiscal year 1945. 76 (1) War Department Circular No. 132, Apr. 1944. (2) War Department Circular No. 262,

26 June 1944. 77 Memorandum, Surgeon General Kirk, to Secretary of War, 10 Jan. 1945, subject: Medical

Mission Reappraised.

78 See footnote 37, p. 224.
238 PERSONNEL

replacement training centers of the arm or service that had critical need for

them. The list included some 90 specialties, several of them representing requirements of the Medical Department. Somewhat later, the General Staff

directed that reception centers assign men in the iisted specialties directly to

units as well as to replacement training centers; certain priorities were to be

followed in sending them.

The second list of “Critically Needed Specialists,” dated 29 May 1944,

divided the various types of specialists into two categories, those for which

the need was continuous and those for which it was temporary. Reception centers were to assign those in thefirst category to specified training centers; members of this category who were already in jobs other than their specialty were

to be reported to The Adjutant General for reassignment. None of these persons were to be placed in the infantry simply because they volunteered for it.

Personnel in the category of temporarily needed specialists were to be assigned

to other units in accordance with their specialty only if they were in reception

or reassignment centers.

This list reappeared at frequent intervals and proved extremely valuable

in the proper assignment of Medical Department specialists. The staff officer

in the Surgeon General's Office in charge of enlisted personnel wrote that the

monthly report be submitted requesting that certain types of Medical Department technicians be included in the next issue of the list, was perhaps the most

important one compiled on enlisted personnel. Through the aid of this list,

he asserted, the Army Service Forces was receiving scarce category personnel

from the Army Air Forces and Army Ground Forces; previously, this had

been impossible.79

Army Service Forces maintained an independent list of key military specialists which was of primary concern to its own technical services and staff

divisions. 80 The list was designed to assure the proper utilization of certain

skills that were scarce in the Army Service Forces, but did not meet the definition of critically needed skill within the meaning of the War Department

memorandum; this also helped the Medical Department to obtain the trained

technicians it needed. Moreover, in January 1945, months before Army Service Forces promulgated its own list of specialists, that headquarters “in view of

the increasing need for both officer and enlisted personnel of the Medical Department” ordered all its commands to reassign medical personnel to appropriate medical duties if they were not already so assigned. For that purpose,

Army Service Forces directed its redistribution stations (where soldiers reported upon returning from overseas) to make “continuing search” for

“trained and experienced Medical Department personnel.” It also ordered all other Army Service Forces commands not to transfer such personnel to other

arms or services or to use them in any position that individuals outside the

70 Weekly Diary, Enlisted Personnel Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, 12-16 Aug. 1944. 80 Army Service Forces CircularNo. 100, 21 Mar. 1945.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 239

Medical Department could fill. These instructions appear to have covered not

merely highly skilled technicians but all members of the Medical Department. 81

After the end of hostilities in Europe, the War Department modified its list

of critically needed specialists to include individuals who had skills that were

particularly necessary during redeployment. Such persons were to be retained

in the Army even though normally eligible for separation.82

Enlisted Men, Oversea Theaters

Convalescent patients

In meeting the need for personnel above their assigned strength, hospitals

in oversea areas were able to make some use of convalescent patients. This

practice also was in accordance with traditional Army procedures and was reinforced by the principles of the reconditioning program which aimed to restore

patients to full duty in the shortest possible time.83 At the 42d General Hospital, located in the Southwest Pacific, patients were used from the time this

installation began to operate in September 1943. They helped in the care of

grounds, maintenance of neatness in and around the establishment, food preparation, and dispensing food in dining rooms. Occasionally, they were used

for ward duties, provided that they displayed particular aptitude for such

work. 84 At the 96th General Hospital in the European theater, similar use

was made of patients, who were also employed in clerical tasks.85

Limited-service personnel

The European and Mediterranean theaters were distinguished by intensive

attempts to obtain from the Medical Department enlisted personnel suitable

for combat duty and to replace them through the reinforcement system by men,

regardless of the branch or service to which they originally had been assigned,

who had become incapacitated for such duty. In accordance with War Department policies already mentioned, the theaters began to plan for this interchange early in 1944. 86 By July 1944, certain hospitals ere replacing general81 Army Service Forces CircularNo. 10, Jan. 1945.

82 Davenport, Roy K., and Kampshroer, Felix Personnel Utilization: Selection, Classification, and

Assignment of Military Personnel in the Army of the United States During World War II.

[Manuscript.]

83 On the reconditioning program, see “Developments in Military Medicine During the Administration of Surgeon General Norman T. Kirk,” in Bull. U.S. Army M. Dept. (No. 7) 628—631, July

1947.

Letter, George H. Yeager, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 29 Sept. 1952.

85 Annual Report, 96th General Hospital, 1944. 86 (1) Circular No. 50, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 11 May 1944,

subject: Conservation of Manpower. (2) Circular No. 68, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 12 June 1944, subject: Theater Manpower Board. (3) Annual Report, 6th General

Hospital, 1944.

663076 —63——18
240 PERSONNEL

assignment troops with limited-assignment personnel, but the substitutions at

that time were only small proportions of the hospitals’ enlisted complements. 87

In the European theater, directive of August 19-t-t stated that in military installations of the communications zone it would be “suitable” to have

50 percent of the basic labor strength and 50 percent of certain specified specialist positions filled by limited-assignment personnel, and each communications zone unit was required to submit periodic reports to the Commander,

Ground Force Replacement System, detailing the number of limited-assignment personnel assigned and the number of additional positions to which more

could be assigned. 88

As the drain on general-assignment personnel in the medical installations

of the communications zone continued, they were often replaced by former soldiers of the combat arms released from the theater's hospitals. Replacements

of this kind were not satisfactory for several reasons. Few of them had any

Medical Department training or experience prior to their new assignment;

hence, they had to receive on-the-job instruction after they had been assigned

to the hard-pressed communications zone units. 89 Many of them were not

physically capable of doing the manual labor, such as moving supplies and

patients, which the men they replaced had performed. 90 Furthermore, they

could not perform duties for the Medical Department commensurate with the

rank they had earned in combat arm, and great deal of reshuffling and individual reassignment was made necessary on that account. 91 Finally, high

percentage of these replacements did not want to be “pill-rollers,” objected to

their noncombatant status and the loss of combat pay, and, in general, presented

serious problems of cooperation and discipline. 92

Victims of combat exhaustion were especially difficult to retrain and assimilate, and after unsuccessful attempts to use them in the hospitals of the Advance

Section, Communications Zone, of the European theater, it became necessary to

establish the policy that replacements of this type would not be sent to medical

units located in areas subject to aerial attack, V-bombs, and artillery fire.93

Indeed, as early as 1943, it was noted in the Mediterranean theater that “Class

B” (limited assignment) enlisted men were not satisfactory replacements for

87 (1) Annual Report, 64th General Hospital, 1944. (2) Annual Report, loth Hospital Center,

1944.88 (1) Circular No. 86, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, Aug. 1944,

subject: Limited Assignment Personnel. (2) See footnote 86 (1), p. 239. (3) Circular No. 109, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, Nov. 1944, subject: Limited Assignment

Personnel. 89 (1) Administrative and Logistical History of the Medical Service, Communications Zone—

European Theater of Operations, ch. XV. [Official record.] (2) Semiannual Report, Training

Branch, Operations Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, Jan.-30 June 1945. 90 (1) History, 724th Medical Sanitary Company, Jan.-31 Mar. 1945. (2) Annual Report, 37th

General Hospital, 1944. (3) Report, General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater, Study No. 88. 01 (1) Annual Report, 300th General Hospital, 1944. (2) See footnote 89 (2).

92 (1) See footnote 89 (1). (2) See footnote 90 (2). (3) Annual Report, 70th General Hospital.

1944. (4) See footnote 87 (1). (5) Report, Col. Richard T. Arnest, of Medical Department Activities in Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 12 Feb. 1945. 92 (1) Annual Report, Advance Section, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations,

U.S. Army, 1944. (2) Semiannual Report, 30th General Hospital, Jan.—30 June 1945.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 241

an evacuation hospital, and normally, large numbers of this type of personnel

were not assigned forward of the communications zone. 94

How extensive was the replacement of general-assignment enlisted men by

men who had become disabled for full duty cannot be stated with much precision. There is reason to believe that resistance to the practice was more

extensive and more successful in the European theater than in the Mediterranean. It is certain that, during the period of land combat in the European

theater, not more than one-fifth of the enlisted replacements obtained by the

Medical Department were in the limited-assignment category, that some of

these came from the Zone of Interior, that others came from the Medical

Department itself, and that this maximum proportion would not constitute

more than or percent even of the communications zone medical enlisted

strength (100,680—15 March 1945) in the period approaching V-E Day, It

also appears that the Medical Department was not required to accept significantly larger proportion of replacements unable to perform general duty

than was the Army as whole. Since it may be assumed that the combat arms

received few replacements in this category, the Medical Department apparently

was compelled to take smaller proportion of these than were other services.

That only minority of the enlisted replacements supplied to the Medical

Department were in the limited-assignment category does not mean that all

vacancies created in the Department above the number filled by limited-assignment men were filled by general-assignment personnel, for many vacancies

remained unfilled.95

The resistance of the European theater to the use of limited-assignment

enlisted replacements also did not prevent the development of large body of

personnel in the communications zone medical installations that was incapable

of general duty. As already noted, men in this category comprised nearly 38

percent of the strength of such installations in mid-March 1945. Since the

great majority of these did not reach the units through the theaterreplacement

system, the logical inference is that they came with them from the Zone of

Interior.

This state of affairs contrasted with the situation in the Mediterranean

theater, where, in spite of the probability that the proportion of limitedassignment enlisted men in the medical installations of the communications

zone was even greater, that is, about 50 percent, than it was in the European

theater, the great majority of the men so classified were excombat men provided locally. Units reaching the Mediterranean theater came almost entirely

before the end of 1943, when the manpower situation permitted organiza94 (1) Annual Report, 9th Evacuation Hospital, 1943. (2) Essential Technical Medical Data,

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, for November 1944, dated Dec. 1944. (3) Annual

Report, Headquarters, 3d Infantry Division, 1944. 95 (1) Semiannual Report, 25th General Hospital, Jan.—30 June 1945. (2) Annual Report,

Surgeon, Headquarters, United Kingdom Base, March 1945. (3) Semiannual Report, 803d Hospital

Center, Jan—30 June 1945. (4) Semiannual Report, 814th Hospital Center. January—June 1945.

(5) Semiannual Report, Advanced Section, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations,

January-June 1945. (6) Annual Report, 1st General Hospital, Seine Section, Communications Zone,

European Theater of Operations, 1944.
242 PERSONNEL

tions in the Zone of Interior destined for overseas to be filled very largely

with personnel capable of full duty. On the other hand, many units sent

to the European theater received their personnel when it no longer was possible to be so selective. survey of February 1945 revealed, however, that

the substitution of the less competent limited-service men had occurred at

time when hospitals were not overburdened and that they had been successfully absorbed. Nevertheless, some of the units were not satisfied with the

situation.96

In order to increase the availability of their personnel for replacement

uses, Medical Department units were directed to provide special training for

their members. For example, in April 1943, the Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply (Southwest Pacific Area), issued instructions requiring all

enlisted personnel to act as “medical and surgical nursing assistants, for

possible future assignment in hospitals of the mobile types to replace female nurses when necessary because of the tactical situation.” 97 Some months

later, in November 1943, he issued the following statement:

It is the duty of the Commanding Officer of all hospital units in this theater to

conduct courses of instruction for the training of their enlisted personnel in technical

duties. There are no experienced personnel available in the United States, and hospital

units, especially those on the mainland of Australia, must serve as pools from which

efficient, well-trained personnel may be obtained for units incurring casualties. 98

Enlisted Women, Zone of Interior

Procurement of technicians

In the early part of 1944, The Surgeon General, having many unfilled

requisitions for members of the Women's Army Corps, recommended that

Army Service Forces headquarters initiate program to recruit them directly for the Medical Department." The transfer of numerous trained Medical Department enlisted men to other branches of the Army at that time

made the need for these women more urgent. Hence, in the spring of 1944,

the Women’s Army Corps began program called Procurement of Female

Technicians for Medical Installations. 100

Recruitment under this procurement program was designed to be selective, bringing in only women qualified as bacteriologists, pharmacists, optometrists, psychiatric social workers, orthopedic mechanics, and numerous other

118 (1) Munden, Kenneth W. Administration of the Medical Department in the Mediterranean

Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. Vol. I. [Official record.] (2) Annual Report, 45th General

Hospital, 1944. (3) See footnote 92 (3), p. 240. 97 Letter, Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply, to Surgeons, Base Sections 2, 3, 4, and 7, 29 Apr. 1943, subject: Training of Medical Department Enlisted Men in Nursing.

98 Technical Manual No. 22, U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, Nov. 1943. 99 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. R. W. Bliss, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General,

to Director, Personnel Division, Army Services Forces, 11 Feb. 1944, subject; Recruiting Program

for WAC’s for Medical Department.

100 See footnote 75(2), p. 237.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 243

types of technologists. Specifications were set for education, training, and

experience. As women were exempt from the draft, recruiting campaigns

using various publicity mediums were necessary; to get these technologists,

The Surgeon General turned to the Officer Procurement Service. Women

joining any branch of the Army under this program were beneficiaries of

the Station and Job Assignment Recruiting Plan, which enabled them to

choose not only their station but also their job in the Army. The Army, of

course, determined, on the basis of aptitude and training, whether they were

fit for the job.

Procurement of these women specialists progressed reasonably well considering the relatively high qualifications which the Medical Department had

stipulated. By September 1944, about 1,800 women had joined the Women’s

Army Corps for jobs in the Medical Department, and at that time, about 200

were entering basic training each week. special school to train members

of the Women's Army Corps for Medical Department work was established

at Fort McPherson, Ga.

Another campaign for enlisted women to be trained as medical and surgical

technicians was conducted simultaneously, but by the regular recruiting stations, not by the Officer Procurement Service. This campaign aimed at recruiting women for months’ training as technicians. Prerequisites for dental,

laboratory, and X-ray technicians included graduation from high school, while

others needed only years of high school credit certain minimum scores also

had to be attained in Army tests.101 The women recruited ordinarily had had

little or no experience in matters relating to medicine. The campaign had

progressed well enough by the fall of 1944 that the Surgeon General’s Office

recommended it be stopped. 102

Beginning in September 1944, however, heavy flow of casualties to the

United States and the winter fighting in Europe, which added to the prospective patient load in the United States, made the situation tighter. The position

of the Medical Department planners was not made easier by theknowledge that

they were short of nurses, that the Army had failed to obtain more than few

hundred cadet nurses, and that the Medical Department was being forced to

release enlisted men for training as combat soldiers. The Surgeon General’s

Office accordingly asked for 8,500 enlisted personnel—men or women—to be

trained as technicians to replace men who had been transferred to the Army

Ground Forces. 103 The Surgeon General later recommended that all the

technicians be women.

101 Letter, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, to Commanding Generals of Service Commands and

Military District of Washington, 13 June 1944, subject: Procurement of Female Technicians for

Medical Installations, with enclosure thereto. 102 Except where otherwise noted, the account which follows is largely taken from Treadwell,

Mattie E.: The Women’s Army Corps. United States Army in World War II. Special Studies.

Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.

103 Letter, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, USA (Ret.), to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director,

Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 12 Dec. 1955.
244 PERSONNEL

Organization of Women Army Corps companies

Complaints that women were being used in minor jobs, after joining the

Army with the understanding that they would be medical and surgical technicians, induced Col. Oveta Culp Hobby, Director of theWomen’s Army Corps,

to oppose assigning more women to hospitals unless assurance was given that

recruiting promises could be fulfilled. General Marshall, for his part,

expressed the opinion that sufficient women of the high caliber desired could

not be recruited unless they were guaranteed technical job and rating. If

this guarantee were not given, he refused to sanction any further procurement

of enlisted women for Army hospitals. Since such assurance could not be made

under the current system, he proposed that the new members of the Women’s

Army Corps be assigned to hospitals in table-of-organization companies. Such

unit carried its own allotment of grades and also specified the exact job of

each member. Hospital commanders could change neither the job nor the

grade. Such identical, inflexible units might be expected to work satisfactorily

in general hospitals, since all had similar functions and organizations and all

used technicians.

The tables of organization, as drafted in meeting between representatives

of The Surgeon General and the Women’s Army Corps, called for 100 enlisted

women per hospital company. Since all were to be skilled technicians or clerks,

the lowest rating was technician, fifth grade. Companies were allotted to

named general hospitals in proportion to the number of beds. 104 Each hospital

desiring such company could requisition it and women would be recruited

with assurance of assignment to that hospital and of at least fifth grade

technician’s rating if they performed satisfactorily.

With intensive publicity to promote it, the general hospital campaign was

success. General Marshall solicited the assistance of State Governors; “The

care of the increasing number of casualties arriving in the United States,

together with an acute shortage of nurses and hospital personnel generally,

necessitates urgent measures being taken to recruit and rapidly train women

for service in Army hospitals.” 105 quota of about 6,000 by May 1945 was

established; about halfway through the campaign, it was raised to 7,000.

Nevertheless, recruiters passed that number month ahead of schedule. In

fact, recruiting was so successful that in 1945 the Surgeon General’s Office

was embarrassed by surplus of enlisted women.

total of 120 Women’s Army Corps hospital companies served in this

country, each with table of organization calling for 101 members. So far

as possible, the enlisted women working in hospitals before the companies were

created in early 1945 were absorbed by the new units. Those left out were

generally in assignments not included in the tables of organization of the hos101 Memorandum, Lt. Col. E. R. Whitehurst, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, for Director, Training Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 18 July 1945. 105 Letters, Chief of Staff, to all State Governors, Jan. 1945.
OTHER MILITARY COMPONENTS 245

pital companies. serious drawback to the use of Women’s Army Corps

companies in Zone of Interior hospitals was that they were too large and too

inflexible to meet therequirements of the smaller hospitals.

Enlisted Women, Oversea Theaters

It is doubtful whether the total number of Women’s Army Corps personnel

used by the Medical Department overseas prior to Y-J Day numbered much

more than 400. No Women’s Army Corps hospital companies went overseas, and it is unlikely that any member of the corps arrived there as part of

Medical Department unit. few may have arrived as members of Women’s

Army Corps headquarters company; in that case, they were assigned to the

company and merely allotted to the medical section of the headquarters.

The limited use of Wacs overseas is explained by the small numbers available for such service and the fact that their utilization was being questioned

until the very close of hostilities, with the result that certain of the oversea

authorities, medical and other, were reluctant to use them.106

The majority of the Wacs who served the Medical Department overseas

were employed in nonprofessional types of jobs, such as clerks, typists, and

chauffeurs, located mainly in theater and base headquarters. In the Office of

the Chief Surgeon, European theater, most of the Wacs were concentrated in the Medical Records Section of the Administrative Division. About the

middle of 1944, virtually all enlisted male personnel in the Chief Surgeon’s

Office, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, were replaced by enlisted

members of the Women’s Army Corps, who provided very satisfactory service

and remained in their jobs until the theater was inactivated. At the end of

1944, total of 12 enlisted women were used in the Office. 107

Although most of the Wacs possessing medical skills were needed in the

Zone of Interior, few were used in at least three theaters. In the Southwest

Pacific, during the latter part of 1944, nurses who were needed in hospitals

as result of increased admissions occasioned by the campaign in the Philippines were relieved from duty in dispensaries caring for Wacs and replaced

by Women’s Army Corps medical technicians. 108 At the 133d General Hospital

in the same theater during the first part of 1945, on trialbasis, Wacs were used

as technicians in dental and medical laboratories, but the trial was not successful. 109

During the second half of 1944, the Hastings Air Base Medical Unit,

located in the India-Burma theater, used one WAC dental technician and two

WAC medical technicians. 110

106 Letter, Eli Ginzberg, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 16 Sept. 1952. 107 (1) Annual Report, Surgeon, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, 1945. (2) History of the

Medical Section, Africa-Middle Bast Theater, September 1941-September 1945. [Official Record.]

(3) Annual Report, Administrative Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944.

108 Annual Report, Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, 1944.

109 Letters, Col. I. A. Wiles, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 14 Aug. 1952,

and 17 Sept. 1952.

110 Semiannual Report, Hastings Air Base Medical Unit, June-December 1944.
246 PERSONNEL

On August 1945, 1.7 percent of the Women’s Army Corps enlisted personnel in the European theater were serving as medical or dental laboratory

technicians. 111 Since the number of Women’s Army Corps enlisted personnel

in the theater on that date was 7,007, the number of these technicians must have

been about 130. On July 1945, Women’s Army Corps detachment as

activated at the 116th General Hospital, Nuremberg, Germany, in the same

theater. Wacs were ordinarily assigned to the units in which they worked, but were attached to units of their own (called detachments) for housekeeping

and similar purposes. Not long afterward, this detachment was transferred

to the 98th General Hospital in Munich, Germany. It is not certain, however,

that even majority of the members of the detachment functioned as Medical

Department technicians. 112

111 Percentage by Military Occupational Specialties of WAG Personnel in European Theater of

Operations, Aug. 1945. (Report, General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater, Study No. 11.)

112 (1) Report, WAG Staff Director, Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, Jan. 1945—

Aug. 1945, subject: Women’s Army Corps Personnel, European Theater, 15 Nov. 1945. (2) Annual

Report, 98th General Hospital, 1945. Upon the transfer, this unit consisted of officers and 66

enlisted women.
247

CHAPTER VIII

Procurement of Civilian Personnel

ZONE OF INTERIOR

Overall Employment

considerable number of civilians worked in headquarters offices, most of

them in the Surgeon General’s Office where their numbers in the early stages of

mobilization grew slowly enough to permit an effective classification of skills.

Many who entered the Office at this time developed their own potentials to

point where, before the war was over, they were performing large portion

of the duties normally assigned to officer personnel. It was thus possible to

keep down the requirements for officers, and even to release some officers for

oversea service. It was these civilian employees who furnished the continuity

so necessary to the smooth running of an office, at time when both law and

War Department policy put severe limitations upon the length of time Regular

Army officers might remain in nontroop duty assignments. The tabulation

which follows shows both the rise in the number of civilians employed in the

Surgeon General’s Office, especially during the year ending on 30 June 1941,

and the growing proportion they bore to the officer and nurse personnel assigned to the Office.

Annual Reports of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington; U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1939 to 1941, inclusive.

30 June 1939: Number

Officers 31

Civilians 161

Nurses

Total 195

30 June 1940:

Officers ______ 40

Civilians 201

Nurses

Total 244

30 June 1941:

Officers 98

Civilians ________

717

Nurses

Total 819
248 PERSONNEL

The great expansion of the hospital system after the calling up of the

National Guard and the introduction of selective service in 1940 was largely

responsible for an increase in civilian employment to supplement the supply

of enlisted men assigned to hospitals—an increase bringing the proportion of

civilians on hospital staffs considerably above the 20 percent which The

Surgeon General had considered the maximum desirable.

More than 3,000 civilian employees of the Medical Department at large

were paid from various special funds during the fiscal year 1939. Of these,

595 were paid from the Medical and Hospital Department, Army, appropriation; 600 from Veterans’ Administration funds; and 1,985 were paid by the

Civilian Conservation Corps. These numbers grew rapidly during 1940 and

1941 (table18).

As the figures demonstrate, the most important of these funds as source

of civilian employment during 1939-41 came to be the Medical and Hospital

Department Fund, which was appropriated by Congress to finance strictly

Medical Department activities, exclusive of the pay of military personnel. In

addition, the Veterans’ Administration, lacking adequate hospital beds of its

own, and the Civilian Conservation Corps, wholly dependent for long-term

hospitalization on the Medical Department, each year paid the latter to care

for certain of their patients in the Department’s hospitals; the money could

be used for all expenses incident to patient care, including the pay of civilians.

In addition to the above, number of civilians in hospitals were employed

under the Construction and Repair of Hospitals Fund, another separate appropriation of Congress. Exact figures on civilians paid from this fund are

lacking. Appropriations for the year ending on 30 June 1940, however, were

sufficient to cover 52 “positions.” Budget estimates for the following year

covered 724 positions, but as further appropriations raised the total amount of the fund from $2,892,886 to $4,489,886, the number of civilians employed

may have been considerably higher. The fund was used particularly for

hospital maintenance and was disbursed by the Medical Department. During

this period, however, it was legally Quartermaster fund.

Until 1940, the Office of The Surgeon General acted as the employing

agent for civilians in all installations of the Medical Department and kept

records on them. In September 1940,however, when it became evident that the

numbers employed would increase greatly, the authority to employ civilians in

station hospitals was delegated to the corps area surgeons. The Surgeon GenThe Budget of the United State Government. Washington U.S. Government Printing Office,

Fiscal Years Ending 1942 and 1943.

The U.S. Office of Education also appropriated money to be used by State authorities in conducting vocational courses for servicemen on or off military posts. Some civilian instructors were employed

at the medical replacement training centers information is lacking, however, as to whether any or all of them were paid from this fund. (Letter, The Adjutant General, to Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, and Commanders of Arms and Services, February 1941, subject: Assistance From Civilian Educational Institutions.)
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 249

Table

—Civilians 18.

employed

by

the

Medical

Department

from

various

funds,

March 1940-December 1941

Fund

1940

1941

March

June

September

December

March

June

September

December

Medical

and

Hospital

Department:

District

of

Columbia

150

146

157

239

534

813

954

925

Elsewhere __

724

913

1,

143

3,

572

8,

730

18,

396

22,

297

26,

425

Total-

_______

874

1,

059

1,

300

3,

811

9,

264

19,

209

23,

251

27,

350

Civilian

Conservation

Corps:

District

of

Columbia

138

148

138

122

34

41

17

14

Elsewhere

1,

628

1,

587

1,

376

989

774

751

565

486

Total

1,

766

1,

735

1,

514

1,

111

808

792

582

500

Veterans’

Administration; District

of

Columbia.

84

85

98

102

106

116

359

Elsewhere

495

544

488

409

495

491

513

Total

579

629

586

511

601

607

519

365

Total

Medical

Department: District

of

Columbia.

372

379

393

463

674

970

977

945

Elsewhere ____

2,

847

3,

044

3,

007

4,

970

9,

999

19,

638

23,

375

27,

270

Grand

total

3,

219

3,

423

3,

400

5,

433

10,

673

20,

608

24,

352

28,

215

Source:

Civilian Personnel

Division,

Office

of

The

Surgeon

General,

U.S.

Army.
250 PERSONNEL

eral retaining the right in connection with general hospitals. Under this

arrangement, The Surgeon General continued to control all the funds but

allotted certain amounts to the corps area surgeons; whereas, previously, he

had allotted funds to the individual stations. The Surgeon General’s Office

constructed tables showing job titles, numbers, and grades to guide those actually engaged in staffing installations.

At the end of July 1945, the Department had in its employ more than 70,000

civilians in the United States, most of whom were under the jurisdiction of

the service commands. On 30 June 1945, about 8,100 civilians were

employed in activities under the direct command of The Surgeon General. The majority of these worked in medical depots; others were assigned

to the Army Medical Center, the Army Medical Library, and the Army Medical Museum, all located in Washington, D.C. The Surgeon General’s Office

itself employed 1,402, about 200 of this number being in his Personnel Service,

which at that time included both the Military and Civilian Personnel

Divisions.

Contract Surgeons

Among civilian employees were few’ contract surgeons and specialists,

the latter engaged temporarily for particular cases. Early in 1941, civilian

physicians began to be used for other purposes when the Secretary of War,

acting on the recommendation of The Surgeon General, created the Board for

the Investigation and Control of Influenza and Other Epidemic Diseases in

the Army. The board as composed of outstanding civilian doctors and Medical Corps officers, the former acting as consultants to the Secretary of War to

advise The Surgeon General on problems of infectious diseases in the Army.

Civilian members were to be paid per diem of $20 plus transportation

expenses. Eventually, this board comprised about 200 members, divided into

various commissions. Civilian consultants had been used during the First

World War; the creation of the new board meant the revival of an important

practice which continued throughout World War IT.

Nursing Personnel

To help perform nursing duties for the Army in the United States, sizable

numbers of civilians were obtained. The number of civilian graduate nurses so

(1) Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng), to Surgeons, Corps Areas and

Departments, 12 Sept. 1940, subject: Use of Civilian Personnel in Army Hospitals. (2) Letter, The

Adjutant General, to Commanders of Arms and Services, Commanding Generals, all Corps Areas, and

Commanding Officers of Exempted Stations, 21 Oct. 1940, subject: Provision for Civilian Employees in

Hospitals of Exempted Stations.

Monthly Progress Report, Army Service Forces, War Department, 31 Aug. 1945, Section 5: Personnel and Training.

War Department Civilian Personnel Statistics Bulletin, vol. (12), June 1945, p. 5.

On 30 June 1939, 31 on 30 June 1940, 28 and on 30 June 1941, 36.

Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 27 Dec. 1940, subject: Establishment of

Board for Investigation of Influenza and Other Epidemic Diseases in the Army, and 1st endorsement

thereto, 11 Jan. 1941, reprinted in Bull. U.S. Army M. Dept. No. 64, 1942.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 251

employed amounted to somewhat more than 1,000 in April 1945, figure that

was probably close to the peak, since, with the return of nurses from overseas,

civilian nurses were released from Army hospitals.

The influx of civilian nurses’ aides into Army hospitals was considerably

larger. The Office of Civilian Defense and the American Red Cross cooperated

in training such personnel and, by March 1942, had some 12,000 to 15,000 in

training. In January 1945, The Surgeon General informed the Red Cross

that the quota for paid nurses’ aides was set at an additional 5,000, and he

requested the latter to train and recruit that number; later, however, on War

Department orders, he withdrew the request. An agreement was thereupon

made whereby further recruiting would cease and only those already intraining

would be hired. 10 The peak strength of nurses’ aides—paid and unpaid—-

serving inArmy hospitals reached about 2,000 (in June 1945); 11 it seems likely

that more than half of that number were in the paid category.

The cadet nurse program also furnished large quota. During the period

from 15 June 1944, when the first cadet nurses were placed in Army hospitals,

to October 1945, The Surgeon General received from the Civil Service Commission total of 9,891 cadet nurse applications for service in Army hospitals.

Of this number, 5,688 cadets were accepted and assigned to hospitals; 3,953 of

these completed the course, and 1,674 were on duty on October 1945. total

of 61 were dismissed or resigned during the whole period. There is no record

of the total number who accepted Army Nurse Corps commissions upon completing the course, although it is known that 93 who had had senior cadet

nursing experience in Army hospitals had been commissioned up to January

1945.12 Some, either not physically qualified for or not desiring commission,

served in civilian status after graduation.

Occupational Therapists

At the time the United States entered the war, only 12 graduate occupational therapists were working in Army hospitals. Their numbers increased

only slowly before late 1943. In August of that year, The Surgeon General,

pointing out that their work was of professional character and formed an important part of the treatment given to patients especially in orthopedic and

neuropsychiatric cases, stated that of the 71 then employed in Army hospitals in

CivilianNurses In Army Hospitals. Am. J. Nursing 45 263, April 1945.

10 (1) Letter, Surgeon General Kirk, to Mrs. Walter Lippmann, National Director, Volunteer

Nurses’ Aid Corps, American Red Cross, Jan. 1945. (2) Letter, Surgeon General Kirk, to Basil

O’Connor, Chairman, American Red Cross, Jan. 1945. (3) Memorandum, Deputy Assistant Chief

of Staff, G—1, for Deputy Chief of Staff, 13 Jan. 1945, subject: The Surgeon General’s Campaign for

Red Cross Nurses’ Aides.

11 Information furnished by Resources Analysis Division, Office of The Surgeon General.

(i) Memorandum for Record, Capt. J. D. Boole, MAC, Oct. 1945. (2) Annual Report, Valley

Forge General Hospital, 1945. (3) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. R. W. Bliss. Assistant Surgeon General,

for Director, Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, 27 Jan. 1945, subject: WAC Technician

Program.
252 PERSONNEL

the United States, about 25 were probably not qualified. lie succeeded at that

time in getting the authority to pass upon qualifications of therapists procured

in the service commands by compiling lists of qualified individuals from which

the appointments were to be made. He also obtained the right to pass on the

professional qualifications of those whose names the service commands submitted

to him. However, responsibility and authority for the employment of occupational therapists remained with the service commanders. Procurement

increased rapidly after this date, and in August 1945. the Army was employing

peak strength of 447 graduate occupational therapists and 452 apprentices in

more than TO of its hospitals. 13 None served overseas during the war.

Dietitians and Physiotherapy Aides

Women dietitians and physiotherapy aides served in civilian status until

1942. Their number increased during the emergency until, by May 1941,

dietitians on duty in Army hospitals numbered 103, and physiotherapy aides,

47. At that time, there were 350 vacancies for dietitians and 125 for

physiotherapy aides.

Nonprofessional Personnel

In addition to the professional and trained personnel, the Medical Department employed large numbers of civilians in clinical and administrative positions and as laborers and skilled workmen. The turnover in these jobs was

more rapid than in the professional categories and also required on-the-job

training for many of the people recruited.

Red Cross Workers

The number of Red Cross workers in Army hospitals in the United States

likewise increased. Although statistics are not complete, the American

National Red Cross reported that on 30 November 1942 total of 244 paid staff

workers were serving in 22 general hospitals and 787 in 122 station hospitals

in the Zone of Interior. As regards the volunteer staff, the Red Cross reported

that it would be “fairly accurate to say" that 1,300 were serving in Army hospitals in November 1942 and 7,500 in December 1944, the last month in the war

period for which figures are available. Shortly after the war, there were 1,213

paid workers in 203 station hospitals. Numbers in general hospitals at that

time are not available.

13 (1) Letter, The Surgeon General, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 13 July 1943, subject: Occupational Therapy Personnel, with 2d endorsement thereto, Aug. 1943. (2) Letter, The

Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General and Service Commands, 12 Aug. 1943, subject: Occupational

Therapy Personnel in Zone of Interior General Hospitals. (3) The Surgeon General’s Letter No. 149,

12 Aug. 1943.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 253

Red Cross workers assigned to hospitals overseas were of course not military personnel, but they occasionally performed work in the wards in addition

to preparing patients for the operating room. 14

OVERSEA THEATERS

Under regulations in existence even before the establishment of any theater

of operations, theater commanders were authorized to facilitate the use of local

civilians within their commands to the extent needed to prevent diminution of

the efficiency of their troops. 15 However, while the Surgeon General’s Office

was aware that local labor would be used—as is shown by reference to it in

TOE 8-500, published on 23 April 1944 and revised on 18 January 1945—no

general policies were established which specifically promoted the use of such

manpower sources outside the continental United States. 16

The Medical Department’s use of civilian employees in oversea areas developed in accordance with policies and conditions in these areas. The theater commander established policies applicable to the entire theater and not

solely for the benefit of the Medical Department. By virtue of their location,

relative stability, and type of function, installations in the communications

zone or base sections were able to utilize such personnel on greater scale

than those troops in combat areas. 17 The actual procurement, administration, and payment of extra-Army personnel usually was effected through nonmedical channels, such as base section headquarters.

Types of Personnel Utilized

Civilian labor used by the Medical Department overseas may be divided

into four general classes: (1) Professional (including certain “subprofessional” personnel such as laboratory technicians and nurses’ aides) (2) clerical (including messengers and interpreters); (3) skilled; and (4) unskilled.

The professional category of civilian employees was relatively unimportant, because highly trained civilians were rarely available overseas.

However, in certain emergency situations, they were temporarily helpful.

14 In field hospitals, Red Cross workers “assisted in removing bloody or torn clothing, removing

excess blood from the patient, removing his shoes and washing his face and hands under the guidance

of medical authorities.” Occasionally, where there were not enough psychiatrists on the staff of

convalescent hospital, Red Cross social worker was asked to conduct the interviews in which patients

“ventilated” their personal anxieties. (Letter, C. H. Whelden, Jr., Chief Statistician, American National Red Cross, to Max Levin, Office of The Surgeon General, June 1952, with enclosure thereto.)

15War Department Field Manual 100-10, Field Service Regulations, Dec. 1940, p. 121 and

15 Nov. 1943, p. 151. 16 The oversea portion of this chapter is very largely condensation of manuscript, “Medical

Department Utilization of Civilian and POW Labor Overseas in World War II,” prepared by Cpl. Alan

M. White in the Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, under supervision of the authors of this

volume. The major sources for Corporal White’s work are the periodic reports of medical units and

headquarters, too numerous to list here. 17 (1) Letter, Lt. Col. Irvine H. Marshall, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General,

Aug. 1952. (2) Letter, Col. I. A. Wiles, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 14

Aug. 1952.
254 PERSONNEL

Civilian surgical teams contributed much to the care of casualties at the time

of Pearl Harbor, and in the invasion of Luzon, volunteer Philippine doctors

and nurses worked with Medical Department personnel in certain Army

hospitals which were flooded with casualties. Immediately after the fall

of Home, 12 young Italian-American graduates of the University of Koine

Medical School, who had been interned in Vatican City during the German occupation, together with Italian doctors and medical students recruited

by them, served as prophylactic station attendants in the Italian capital. 18

In Australia, the services of few physical therapy aides were obtained,

and in various theaters, small numbers of Catholic nuns, missionary or native, were utilized as nurses. Civilian nurses’ aides worked in some Army

hospitals in France, the Philippines, and China, and sometimes there were

as many as 50 in single hospital. Laboratory assistants and other technically trained individuals were used when available.

Civilian clerical workers were used in various types of Medical Department units, but particularly in fixed installations. Typists, stenographers,

and clerks were employed in all theaters, but, of course, in such areas as New

Guinea, Burma, parts of Africa, and some of the Pacific islands, the educational level of the population was not high enough to make many available

for service in hospitals.

The skilled workers probably were the most valuable of the Medical

Department’s civilian employees. Especially in the North African theater

and Southwest Pacific Area, the Medical Department had to do great deal

of its own construction because of the shortage of Engineer personnel. Carpenters, plumbers, masons, electricians, and painters were hired in these areas

and elsewhere to supplement the meager strength of the hospitals’ utilities

departments both in construction and in maintenance work. 19 The services

of other skilled civilians, such as barbers, tailors, and cooks, were less essential

but were often used by Medical Department units. Skilled workers were

more plentiful in the North African-Mediterranean and European theaters

than elsewhere and, hence, were used more extensively there, but the 95th

Station Hospital at K’un-ming, China, reported having hired “carpenters,

masons, plumbers, tinsmiths, etc.” in 1944, and the 49th General Hospital in

Leyte, the Philippines, in 1945, listed 49 skilled workers (including carpenters, plumbers, electricians, and mechanics) among its 353 civilian employees.

Unskilled workers were by far the most important category of civilian

employees numerically, not only because the Medical Department needed

great deal of heavy labor but also because this was the category most available; indeed, in most areas, there was very large supply of unskilled labor.

Employees of this class performed such diverse duties as ditching, draining,

spraying, and oiling required in malaria control projects; clearing undergrowth

18 Annual Report, Surgeon, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944. 19Letter, Col. I. A. Wiles, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 17 Sept. 1952. (Although the construction of hospitals in North Africa and Europe usually was accomplished by the

Engineers, great deal of minor construction was left for the unit personnel, and this was often more than the hospital utilities sections could handle.)
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 255

from hospital sites; aiding in construction work; cleaning dirt and rubble from

buildings and grounds; landscaping and gardening; waste disposal and sanitation “kitchen police” and mess help; cleaning of hospital wards; movement of supplies and equipment and litter bearing.

Resultant Savings of Military Personnel

The use of civilians, prisoners of war, and similar local labor made it

possible to release Medical Department enlisted men for service as combat

troops, to relieve such men from unskilled and routine work for more technical

duties within the Medical Department itself, and in certain instances to effect

considerable reductions in the table-of-organization strength of units. By this

means, the 814th Hospital Center, in the European theater, in January 1945,

was able to order its attached general hospitals to reduce their enlisted complements to 400, instead of the 450 allotted by the relevant tables of organization.

It further directed its attached station hospitals and smaller units to reduce

their enlisted strength 20 percent. This resulted in total saving of nearly

800 Medical Department enlisted men. The 815th Hospital Center, located in

the Seine Base Section (Paris), European theater, was able by the employment

of local labor, in 1945, to reduce the aggregate military strength of its general

hospitals by 557 men (table 19).

Table 19.—Economies in enlisted personnel through utilization of local labor, 815th Hospital

Center, European theater, 19^5

The Situation in the Various Theaters

The number of civilians hired by particular Medical Department unit

depended not only on that unites needs in particular situation, but also on

the availability of local labor. In the European theater, an attempt was made

to develop plan for civilian employment in Army hospitals based on the

patient census, but this proved impossible because it was found that unit’s

personnel needs were more dependent on the type of buildings in which it

operated than on the number of patients in its care. The numbers of civilian

employees in Army hospitals overseas thus varied widely from theater to theater

General hospital T/O capacity (number of beds)

Authorized

T/O enlisted strength

Reduced

enlisted

strength

Percent

saving

1st 1, 500 562 450 19.

191st 1, 500 562 450 19.

194th 1, 000 450 375 16.

198th 1, 000 450 375 16.

203d 2, 000 641 550 14.

217th 1, 500 562 450 19.

Source: Annual Report, 815th Hospital Center, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1945.
256 PERSONNEL

and, within theater, from hospital to hospital. Even within particular

hospital, there were substantial fluctuations over relatively brief periods. 20

Southwest Pacific theater

The variety of situations within given major area is illustrated by the

Southwest Pacific. Civilians were used in headquarters and in hospitals in

Australia, but the manpower shortage there did not permit their employment

in great quantity on that continent. In New Guinea, native litter bearers were

used to carry casualties over the rugged Owen Stanley Mountains and to bring

casualties to collecting points on the beaches during amphibious operations

(fig, 36). Few natives, however, were employed by the hospitals, although in

1944 the 2d Station Hospital, west of Lae, had from 15 to 20 native workers

who were used for common labor outside the hospital (fig. 37). At Milne

Bay, approximately 100 natives per month were used by malaria control units

in the summer of 1944.21

Figure 36.-—Native litter bearers carrying wounded American soldier from the frontlines,

vicinity of Buna, New Guinea, November 1942.

20 This is perhaps one reason for lack of comprehensive statistical information concerning employment by the Medical Department of civilians in oversea areas.

21 See footnote 17(2), p. 253.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 257

Figure 37.—Natives building covered bomb shelter, under the direction of medical

technician, Southwest Pacific Area, January 1944.

In the islands north of Australia, the average number of natives employed

per day in 1913 for purposes of malaria control exceeded 1,000 and reached

2,000 in 1911.22 The picture in regard to hospital employment was very different in the Philippines, The 19th General Hospital had 60 workers on

January 1915, 353 on 31 March, 118 on 30 June, and peak of 165 on 30

September 1915. The 125th Station Hospital averaged 180 Philippine employees daily in thefirst quarter of 1915, and 150 in the second.

recent rough estimate based on recollection alone indicates that, at the

peak of activity at Base in Leyte (that is, about the end of 1911 and the

early part of 1915), 2,500 civilians were employed by the Medical Department

within the area covered by that command. 23 This was equal to about percent

of themilitary medical personnel of the entire theater.

South and Central Pacific theaters

In the South and Central Pacific Areas, there were relatively few civilian

employees outside the Hawaiian Islands. This may have been because many

of the natives in the Japanese mandated islands were hostile to the American

forces, because shortages of military labor were infrequent, or because Navy

22 Letter, G. L. Orth, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 17 Sept. 1952.

23 See footnote 17(2), p. 253.
258 PERSONNEL

Figure 38.—Indian laundry workers, 371st Station Hospital,

Ramgarh, India, 28 February 1945.

construction personnel and corpsmen were sometimes used to build and work

in Army hospitals.24

In the Central Pacific, the number of civilians employed by the Medical

Department remained relatively constant throughout the war, totaling 526 in

December 1941 and 464 inAugust 1945. The peak of employment was reached

with 656 in June 1942. Apparently, large proportion of civilian Medical

Department personnel in this area was located at old Tripler General Hospital

or the 218th General Hospital as it was later known. This, the largest hospital

in the Hawaiian Islands, was authorized to employ as many as 168 civilian

employees (including several with strictly medical duties) in 1942.

China-Burma-India theater

The China-Burma-India theater was probably the region with the most

acute shortage of medical personnel, shortage caused in part by its responsibility for the care of Chinese Army personnel, and it seems likely that most

Medical Department units in that theater used natives for common labor (fig.

38).

The 20th General Hospital in 1944 (at Margherita, Assam, India) employed 120 natives in the mess department and 100 more for general mainte24 Two exceptions may be noted: Some native labor was used in construction of the 222d

Station Hospital on Banika Island in the Bussells, and native labor was used to clear ground preparatory to the actual construction work on the 48th Station Hospital at Guadalcanal.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 259

nance. When the 18th General Hospital shifted from Assam to Burma in 1945, it took 165 civilians with it. Only 125 of these were actually employed by the

hospital, however, since 40 were used as “aiyahs” and “personal bearers.” In

1943, the 95th Station Hospital at Ch'ung-ch'ing, China, employed 15 Chinese

nurses in lieu of its American nurse contingent, Army nurses having been excluded from China on General Stilwell’s orders. In its first year of operation

(1942), the 159th Station Hospital atKarachi, India, hired 100 native laborers.

From 100 to 500 laborers were engaged in various malaria control projects in

the Calcutta area in early 1943. In Burma, native litter bearers were used.

During 1944, the number of civilian personnel used by the Medical Department

in the China-Burma-India area was, at the lowest, equal to 10 percent of the

strength of the military elements of the Department in that area.

Africa-Middle East theater

In the Africa-Middle East theater, native employees, used primarily in

malaria control and waste disposal and other sanitary activities, were hired in

considerable numbers. In 1943, there were over 100 employed at the 67th Station Hospital in Accra, and at Roberts Field, Liberia, the employment of over

1,800 natives at all times during 1944—a number considerably greater than the

entire Medical Department military personnel in the Africa-Middle East

area—was estimated to have saved the labor of 800 to 1,000troops. Natives were

used in malaria control operations in the Persian Gulf Command. Civilians

were also employed there in hospital work, and the number in relation to that

of military medical personnel in the Command was considerable (table 20).

Table 20.—Ratio of civilian hospital workers to military medical personnel, Persian Gulf Command, 30 April 1943-31 July 1945

Date Civilian

hospital

workers

Military

medical

personnel

Ratio of hospital workers tomili- tary medical personnel (percent)

1943 30 April 197 1, 812 10.

31 December 419 3, 067 13.

1944 31 August 703 2, 017 34.

31 December 421 1, 980 21.

1945 31 Julv 64 496 12.

From table 13, “Distribution of U.S. Army civilian employees in the Persian Corridor, 1943-45,’ in Motter, T. H.

Vail: The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia. United States Army in World War II. The Middle East Theater.

Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952, p. 500.

From unadjusted data in table 31 for dates shown therein and from pertinent issues of “Strength of the Army” for

other dates.
260 PERSONNEL

North African-Mediterranean theater

In the North African-Mediterranean and the European theaters, possibly

because operating conditions were more uniform than in other areas, various

hospitals of like type tended to engage more equal numbers of civilian employees than did similar hospitals elswhere. Even so, variations in numbers of

civilian personnel utilized by like medical units in both theaters existed. The

number of French and Arab civilians utilized by Army hospitals in North

Africa and the number of Italian civilians used by such hospitals in Italy depended very largely on the availability of Italian service troops, since the

latter, after the organization of Italian service units in late 1918, were almost

universally preferred to the civilians. For general hospital not using Italian

troops, the average number of civilians employed in the North African theater

was probably from 150 to 200, although as many as 275 were used on occasion.

The normal civilian complement for an evacuation hospital in similar circumstances was about 50, but at times well over 100 civilian workers were employed.

Available statistics do not justify generalizations about the number of

civilians normally employed in station and convalescent hospitals and in malaria control and other Medical Department units.25

However, if the average

number of personnel, not including U.S. troops, that were used in Medical

Department installations at the end of the war be taken as criterion of the

strength of civilian employment prior to the use of Italian service personnel, it

is likely that as many as 4,000 civilians were employed in the Medical Department in the North African theater about the time of the invasion of Italy

(table 21). This was equal to percent of the strength of the Medical Department elements in the theater on 31 October 1943.

European theater

The high educational level of the civilian population in Europe, as compared with that of peoples in other parts of the world, meant that it was

possible to utilize European indigenous labor in wider variety of occupations

than elsewhere and to place greater reliance upon their ability to perform

relatively unskilled tasks. This partly explains why the number of civilians

employed by the Medical Department was greater in the European theater

than in any other oversea area. Shortly after Y-E Day, the number of civilians

so employed in medical installations of the communications zone alone exceeded 20,000 (table 22). However, the fact that the Army overseas had its

greatest strength in that theater, helped to produce the same result. Indeed, the number of civilians employed in the communications zone Medical Depart25 Station and convalescent hospitals and malaria control units in the North African theater employed civilians, hut statistics of the number used are available only in isolated instances. The 7th Station Hospital at Oram at one time employed 80 French civilians, and an unspecified number of civilians were used in malaria control work.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 261

Table 21. Utilization of civilian workers and Italian prisoners of war, by Medical Department service-type units, Mediterranean theater, May 1945

ment activities around -E Day was equivalent to about percent of the

number of troops utilized in the entire medical service of the theater, and while

civilians also were used in the combat zone, they probably did not raise this

percentage by very great amount.26 Thus, it appears that in relation to the

military strength of the Medical Department in the European theater the

number of civilians employed by that branch of the Army was less than it

was in many other places.

Since labor was scarce in Great Britain and strictly rationed by the

British authorities, an Army hospital there usually employed no more than

from 20 to 30 civilians. On the Continent, an entirely different situation prevailed. General hospitals in Franee at times had from 600 to 700 civilians in

their employ, although the average may have been somewhat lower. In April

1945, the 11 general and station hospitals of the Seine Section had total of

7,513 civilian employees, an average of 609.9 per general and 268.0 per station

hospital; and in May 1945, the 203d General Hospital established what was

probably an oversea record with 1,248 civilian employees. When they were

not using German prisoners of war instead, most evacuation hospitals in the

European theater employed from 60 to 80 civilians, although as many as 120

26 Letter, Brig. Gen. Alvin L. Gorby, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General,

30 July 1952.

Numberin Civilian workers Italian prisoners of war

Type ofunit theater Number Average per

unit Number Average per unit

General hospital:

2,000-bed 204 102

1,500-bed 119 13. 815 90.

Station hospital:

750-bed 33 33

500-bed 17 219 12. 1, 423 83. 250-bed 223 111. 150-bed 35 35 Malaria survey detachment 170 170

Malaria control detachment. 10 25 2. 1, 707 170.

Medical base depot company 20 224 56

Medical general dispensary 16

Medical general laboratory 65 65 Medical service battalion __ __

10 10 112 112

One medical laboratory, prophylactic platoons, 13 veterinary food inspection detachments, veterinary evacua- tiondetachments, and hospital train used no locallabor.

Source: “Digest ofPrincipal TypeService UnitsUtilized in MTO,” compiled by Q-4Section, Mediterranean Theater

of Operations, U.S. Army; revised November 1945, pp. 8-12.
262 PERSONNEL

Table

22.

—Medical

Department

civilian

labor,

Communications

Zone,

European

theater

(exclusive

of

headquarters), June-December 1945

Type

15

June 1945

15

July 1945

15

August 1945

15

September 1945

15

October 1945

15

November 1945

15

December 1945

General

(all

branches

of

Army):

Number

171,

477

156,

025

154,

787

181,

818

101,

452

89,

151

81,

729

Mobile: Number

38,

908

31,

587

24,

281

21,

887

14,

677

11,

330

12,

212

Percentage of

general

22.

20.

15.

16.

14.

12.

14.

Static; Number

132,

569

124,

438

130,

506

109,

931

86,

775

77,

821

69,

517

Percentage of

general

77.

79.

84.

83.

85.

87.

85.

Clerical: Number

15,

009

15,

323

15.

882

15,

463

13,

545

13,

180

12,

750

Percentage of

general

8.

9.

10.

11.

13.

14.

15.

Male: Number__

6,

419

6,

816

7,

503

7,

581

6,

548

6,

379

6,

236

Percentage of

clerical

42.

44.

47.

49.

48.

48.

48.

Female: Number

8,

592

8,

507

8,

379

7,

882

6,

997

6,

801

6,

514

Non

clerical: Number

__

117,

558

109,

115

114,

624

94,

468

73,

230

64,

641

56,

767

Percentage of

general

__

68.

69.

74.

71.

72.

72.

69.

Medical

Department; Number

20,

099

15,

418

12,

133

10,

220

7,

223

5,

083

3,

650

Percentage of

general.

11.

9.

7.

7.

7.

5.

4.

Mobile: Number

3,

086

2,

170

2,

356

2,

947

1,

051

707

559

Percentage of

Medical

Department civilian

labor.

15.

14.

19.

28.

14.

13.

15.

Percentage of

general

mobile..

7.

6.

9.

13.

7.

6.

4.
CIV LIAN PERSC)XNEL 263

663076 —63 19

Static: Number

__

17,

013

13,

248

9,

777

7,

273

6,

172

4,

376

3,

091

Percentage of

Medical

Department civilian

labor

84.

85.

80.

71.

85.

86.

84.

Percentage of

general

static

.....

12.

10.

7.

6.

7.

5.

4.

Clerical: Number__

963

757

573

519

412

344

341

Percentage of

Medical

Department civilian

static...

4.

4.

4.

5.

5.

6.

9.

Percentage of

general

static

clerical

....

6.

4.

3.

3.

3.

2.

2.

Male: Number

329

231

199

171

139

91

93

Percentage of

Medical

Department clerical

34.

30.

34.

32.

33.

26.

27.

Percentage of

general

static

male

clerical

5.

3.

2.

2.

2.

1.

1.

Female: Number

634

526

374

348

273

253

248

Percentage of

general

static

female

clerical

7.

6.

4.

4.

3.

3.

3.

Non

clerical; Number

....

16,

050

12,

491

9,

204

6,

754

5,

760

4,

032

2,

750

Percentage of

Medical

Department civilian

labor

79.

81.

75.

66.

79.

79.

75.

Percentage of

general

static

nonclerical

13.

11.

8.

7.

7.

6.

4.

Employees

working

from

day

to

day

in

whatever

locality

their

services

were required.

Includes

all

civilians,

other

than

German

nationals,

employed

in

Germany.

Employees

residing in

the

locality

of

their

employment.

Office

workers,

including

clerical

and

administrative

personnel such

as

clerks,

typists,

stenographers, and

accountants. These are not

necessarily

the

total

of

such

workers

since

there

also

may

have

been

office

workers

among

the

mobile

employees.

Source;

(1)

Progress

Report,

Communications

Zone,

U.S.

Army

Forces,

European

Theater,

for

months

shown

(2)

Circular

No.

72,

Headquarters, Communications Zone,

European Theater

of

Operations,

U.S.

Army,

22

May

1945.
264 PERSONNEL

were “profitably” employed in one instance. In the medical units of the

Continental Advance Section, European theater, in February 1945, civilian

labor reached peak of 1,770 workers against an enlisted strength of 7,871, or civilian for every 4.4 enlisted men.

As late as June 1945, the United Kingdom employed 8.9 percent of the

total communications zone Medical Department civilian employees while it

had oidy 5.3 percent of communications zone employees in general. Indeed,

while the two ratios tended to approach each other, this situation was in

existence even at the end of August 1945 (table 23).

Table 23.—Geographic distribution of medical personnel, European Theater of Operations,

Communications Zone, April 19J+5 to October 1945, inclusive

Group 1945

April May June July August October

Total manpower:

General (all branches of

the Army);

Total 1, 076, 445 1, 185, 957 1, 130, 948 1, 134, 845 1, 142, 590 947, 520

United Kingdom:

Number. 114, 729 105, 644 103, 414 88, 542 80, 226 49, 281

Percent of general

manpower. 9. 7. 7.

Medical Department:

Total 183, 632 196, 428 191, 762 142, 892 116, 732 89, 887

United Kingdom;

Number 60, 550 59, 247 50, 595 35, 019 28, 173 12, 135

Percent of Medical

Department manpower. 26. 24. 24. 13.

Total troops:

General (all branches of

the Army):

Total 569, 635 571, 284 522, 211 497, 162 491, 437 458, 581

Percent of total general

manpower 46. 43. 43. 48.

United Kingdom:

Number 93, 479 80, 989 70, 657 57, 925 51, 349 30, 778

Percent oftotal troops. 16. 14. 13. 11. 10. 6.

Medical Department:

Total 125, 868 123, 338 114, 228 86, 393 68, 379 58, 621

Percent of total Medical

Department manpower 59. 60. 58. 65.

United Kingdom:

Number 54, 674 50, 846 41, 292 29, 898 23, 371 10, 305

Percent of Medical

Department troops. 43. 41. 36. 34. 34. 17.

See footnotes at end of table.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 265

Table 23.—Geographic distribution of medical personnel, European Theater of Operations,

Communications Zone, April 19Jf5 to October inclusive —Continued

Group 1945

April May June July August October

Total prisoners of war working:

General (all branches of

the Army):

Total

Percent of total general

manpower

United Kingdom:

263, 318 351, 968 400, 518

35.

454, 625

40.

463, 577

40.

387, 487

40.

Number

Percent of total prisoners of war work20, 755 24, 905 25, 222 23, 501 23, 390 15. 666

ing ---

Medical Department:

7. 7. 6. 5. 5. 4.

Total

Percent of total Medical

Department manpower

United Kingdom:

39, 064 54, 782 53, 882

28.

39, 325

27.

33, 966

29.

24, 043

26.

Number

Percent of total Medical Department

prisoners of war

5, 876 8, 401 7, 518 3, 857 4, 140 1, 549

working

Total Italian service unit

personnel:

General (all branches of

the Army):

15. 15. 14. 9. 12. 6.

Total

Percent of total general

manpower

United Kingdom;

37, 776 38, 712 39, 976

3.

34, 291

3.

32, 789

2.

Number.

Percent of total Italian service unit

personnel

Medical Department:

Total

Percent of total Medical

Department manpower.

United Kingdom:

3, 436 2, 919 3, 559

1.

2, 095

1.

2, 254

1.

Number-.

Percent of total Medical Department Italian service unit personnel

See footnotes at end of table.
PERSONNEL

Table 23.—Geographic distribution of medical personnel, European Theater of Operations,

Communications Zone, April 1945 to October 1945, inclusive —Continued

In 1944 in the South Atlantic, the Medical Department had daily average of 150 employees, used mostly in malaria control work, which was greater

than one-fourth of the average military strength (534) of the Department in

the theater for the year. In the Caribbean Defense Command, the peak civilian-employment totals in 1943 and 1944 included 10 civilians in the Office of the

Surgeon, Antilles Department, and approximately 270 workers engaged in

malaria control duties in the Panama Canal Department. These alone, without

considering hospital workers and sanitation workers in areas outside the Panama Canal Department, were equal to about percent of the mean Medical

Department military strength in the Caribbean during 1944 (4,425). 27

27 Mean strengths are the average of the adjusted strength on 31 January, 30 April, 31 July,

and 31 October 1944, and 31 January 1945 as shown In table 31.

Group 1945

April May June July August October

Total civilian workers:

General (all branches of

the Army):

Total. 20, 516 223, 993 168, 243

14.

148, 767 154, 787

13.

101, 452

10.

Percent of total general

manpower 13.

United Kingdom:

Number 7, 535

4.

7, 116

4.

5, 487 2, 846

Percent of total civilian workers 3. 2.

Medical Department:

Total. 15, 264 15, 387 20, 093

10.

15, 079

10.

12, 133

10.

7, 223

8.

Percent of total Medical Department manpower_

United Kingdom:

Number 1, 785

8.

1, 264

8.

662 281

Percent of Medical

Department civilian workers 5. 3.

All strengths from Progress Report, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, for corresponding months. General and Medical Department data exclude headquarters personnel.

September has been omitted as result of numerous errors in the corresponding issue of the Progress Report.

All data exclusive of civilian workers in the United Kingdom.

Does not include U.S. civiliansor British civiliansemployed on the Continent.
CHAPTER IX

Classification

OFFICERS AND NURSES, 1939-41

Proper classification, in the Army as elsewhere, is major factor in proper

utilization of available resources. This is particularly true where the resources

concerned are highly trained individuals whose total number is strictly limited.

It was clearly recognized by The Surgeon General that, while the Medical

Department must be prepared at all times to carry out its military mission, the

members of the various corps must also keep abreast of civilian professional

developments. The emphasis shifted between military preparedness and professional accomplishment in terms of the current mission of the Army as

whole.

Background of the Classification System

During World War I, while the Medical Department utilized professional

consultants, little if any official classification of its officers took place. Between

the two World Wars, specialization developed greatly in many civilian occupations and professions. The years in the 1930’s were especially important to

the medical profession in the various fields of specialization. In 1935, the first

American specialty board, the American Board of Ophthalmology, was organized, followed by many others in the next few years. The Surgeon General

kept in close contact with civilian medicine, and count of Regular Army

medical officers qualified as specialists shows that their number in 1938, on an

overall percentage basis, was not seriously at variance with that of the civilian

specialists. The distribution did, however, reflect the difference in needs in the

various categories between civilian and military medical practice. Of all the

members of the Medical Corps, 6.71 percent diplomates of specialty

boards, as against percent of all physicians in the country. Nevertheless,

specialization in the peacetime Medical Department was restricted by the

limited number of personnel available to perform all the necessary tasks, and

by the constant awareness that in national emergency involving general

mobilization the officers of the Regular Army would be the nucleus on which the

enlarged forces would be built. The role of leadership that would under emergency or war conditions fall to the officers of the Regular Army Medical

(1) Kubie, L. S. The Role of the Specialist in Military Medicine. Surg. Gynec. Obst. 80:

109-110, January 1945. (2) Kubie, L. S.: Problem of Specialization in Medical Services of Regular

Army and Navy Prior to the Present Emergency. Bull. New York Acad. Med. 20 495-511, September

1944. (3) Correspondence: Letter, Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, USA, Deputy Surgeon General, to

Editor. Surg. Gynec. Obst. 80 448, April 1945.
268 PERSONNEL

Department also required that these officers be thoroughly versed in military

subjects, such as command, tactics, logistics, and medical administration.

Although the pressure to do so was not great, the Medical Department

between World War and 1939 made constant but ineffective efforts to classify

its Reserve officers professionally. On the Army-wide level, the Mobilization

Regulations of September 1939 required that assignments which individuals

would occupy during mobilization should be designated beforehand, and could

be based not only on the qualifications of the individual but also on the requirements of the situation. By that date, neither the Medical Department nor the

War Department General Staff had worked out comprehensive and detailed

system of classifying officers.

Classification of Reserve Officers, 1940

In 1940, however, the War Department ordered classification of Reserve

officers. Under this plan, all Reserve officers of the Army were required to fill

out information forms (W.D., A.G.O. Form No. 178), supplementary information being required from Reserve officers of the Medical Department. These

forms were reviewed in corps area headquarters and in the Office of The

Surgeon General.

Establishment of position categories

The Surgeon General established set of position categories for Medical

Corps officers, necessarily the first element in system of classification for any

group. It distinguished various types of positions and also four degrees of

proficiency within each. symbol was provided for each type of position and

capacity, and the appropriate symbol could be entered in the individual’s

records as guide to assigning him. Thus S-3” stood for general surgeon

in the third degree of capacity, fourth being the lowest “S (Ortho)-l” stood

for an orthopedic surgeon in the highest grade, and so forth, the degree originally based on civilian credentials, education, and length of experience in his

field. After he had been tested by performance in the Army, his classification

could be changed, if necessary, although this kind of change was made more

commonly in the later war period than earlier.

Work of civilian agencies

Various agencies throughout the country assisted the Medical Department

in classifying the Medical Reserve officers. Soon after this work was undertaken in 1940, the American Medical Association, through its Committee on

Medical Preparedness, began its survey and classification of all physicians

Annual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1940.

An officer's classification was different from his efficiency rating. The latter was grade—- “superior,” “excellent,” “satisfactory,” “unsatisfactory”—assigned at intervals to an individual by

his commanding officer and denoting his general value to the service.
CLASSIFICATION 269

throughout the United States. This project supplied much information on

specialty training and type of practice to The Surgeon General. But final

classification could not be made from this information alone. Committees of

the National Research Council began cooperating on this project with the

American Medical Association as early as July 1940. The general plan was

for these committees to send lists of specialists to the American Medical Association, where its committee would record additional information obtained from

its survey or from other sources. Some of the lists submitted by the National

Research Council were graded to show man’s proficiency within his specialty.

The National Research Council sent duplicates of some lists to The Surgeon

General, thus aiding him directly to evaluate members of the Reserve and

National Guard, then coming on active duty.

The system developed by committees of the National Research Council,

for designating the proficiency of men in specialty—assigning them number

from to —was the first one adopted by the Medical Department.

The National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, established

in June 1940, also rendered assistance. The primary function of this agency

was “to provide for the most effective utilization of scientifically and

professionally trained citizens .” Because the American Medical

Association was developing its own lists of physicians, the National Roster

during the early part of its existence undertook to list only the smaller groups

of specialists, such as bacteriologists, immunologists, pathologists, anatomists,

physiological chemists, psychologists, physiologists, zoologists, and entomologists. Colleges of medicine and specialty boards also cooperated in this effort, contributing whatever information they possessed. Of course, those charged

with classifying officers used, in addition to other information, directories of

physicians, such as those of the American Medical Association, the American

College of Physicians, the American College of Surgeons, and the directory of

medical specialists certified by American specialty boards. In the early phases

of the work of classifying officers, The Adjutant General’s Office gave little

assistance, and the systems it devised seem to have been none too effective. 10

Letter, The Surgeon General, to Dr. R. G. Leland, Committee on Medical Preparedness, American

Medical Association, Chicago, 111., 22 Jan. 1941.

(1) Minutes, Meeting of Subcommittee on Cardiovascular Diseases, 23 July 1940, Division of

Medical Sciences, National Research Council. (2) Minutes, Eighth Meeting of Subcommittee on

Venereal Diseases, 20 Sept. 1945, Division of Medical Sciences, National Research Council.

(1) Farrell, Malcolm J., and Berlien, Ivan C. Neuropsychiatry, Personnel. [Official record.]

(2) Special Meeting of Personnel Group, 16 Dec. 1940, Division of Medical Sciences, National Research

Council. (3) Minutes, Meeting of Subcommittee on Tuberculosis, 23 Dec. 1940, Division of Medical

Sciences, National Research Council.

Carmichael, L. The National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel. Sclent. Month.

58 141, February 1944.

(1) Mordecai, Alfred: History of the Procurement and Assignment Service for Physicians,

Dentists, Veterinarians, Sanitary Engineers, and Nurses—War Manpower Commission. (2) See

footnote 6(2).

Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. C. C. Hillman), to Surgeon, each Corps Area,

10 Apr. 1941. 10 Davenport, Roy K., and Kampshroer, Felix: Personnel Utilization: Selection, Classification,

and Assignment of Military Personnel in the Army of the United States During World War II.

[Manuscript.]
270 PERSONNEL

The work of classifying Reserve Medical Corps officers had only been initiated when mobilization began, but was completed by Pearl Harbor. This

classification constituted long step forward in providing the Medical Department with knowledge of its qualitative resources in the Reserve sections.11

Being the first real attempt to classify Medical Department officers, it served

as the basis of the more intensive procedures developed during the war. Had

this classification been completed before mobilization began, the Medical Department would have been in much more advantageous position to make

studies and satisfactory assignments. It is true that formal classification as

guide to filling jobs was less necessary when the number of persons and the

number of places for them were small, as had been true before the great expansion of the Medical Department began. Officers responsible for making

job assignments could be personally familiar with the attainments of each

member of the group and assign him accordingly. Many assignments even

in the early war years continued to be made on the basis of this kind of personal knowledge. Formal classification could not, of course, eliminate all or

perhaps even most of the work in making assignments, for no system of classification—at least none that was devised—could take account of all variations

in jobs (even of the same category) or in the personal qualifications of individuals. Nevertheless, formal classification became practically indispensable

at least as preliminary sifting when large numbers of personnel had to be

dealt with.

OFFICERS AND NURSES, 1941-43

Although The Surgeon General had established system of position categories for Medical Corps officers during the emergency period, no system of

categories covering all types of positions to which officers of the Army at large

were assigned appeared until 1943. In that year, The Adjutant General published such comprehensive series, which included medical categories developed and tested by the Military Personnel Division of the Surgeon General’s Office. Those mainly responsible for it were Lt. Col. Gerald H. Teasley,

MC, and 1st Lt. (later Lt. Col.) Robert W. W. Evans, MC. This classification system, which served throughout the war, was first presented in January

1943 as Army Regulations No, 605-95 (Tentative). Volume of the regulations was entitled “Officer Civilian Classification,” and volume II, “Officer

Military Classification and Job Specifications.” Volume II is the more important to this discussion. Some months after its publication, the Surgeon

General's Office was called upon to furnish additional information. This was

incorporated in War Department Technical Manual 12-406, “Officer Classification, Commissioned and Warrant,” which appeared in October 1943 and

superseded the tentative regulation. The latter listed code number, an MOS

(military occupational specialty), and job specification for nearly 700 Army

11Letter, Lt. Col. Francis M. Fitts, MC, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, to Maj. Gen. C. R. Reynolds, formerly The Surgeon General, 25 June 1941.
CLASSIFICATION 271

jobs. The job specifications consisted of summary statement of duties,

list of typical tasks, special skill and knowledge requirements, military and

civilian occupational experience prerequisites, educational prerequisites, and the civilian jobs whose occupants would be most likely to meet the requirements of the military.

Establishment of the Code Number System

The tentative regulations (and also its successor, the technical manual),

in its listing of job categories for Medical Corps officers, followed that already

in use in the Medical Department, except that it substituted numerical symbols

for the symbols previously used and fitted them into series of job categories for all officers of the Army. Each numerical symbol or code number consisted

of four digits, the first digit (0 to 9), indicating major grouping. The major

grouping for most types of medical jobs was that relating to health, distinguished by the figure “3.” The second digitrepresented subgroup while the

third and fourth digits stood for specialty within that subgroup. Thus, an

orthopedic surgeon, instead of having the symbol “S (Ortho),” now had the code

number 3153. Moreover, in designating degrees of capacity or proficiency

within each job category, theletter A, B, C, or was used instead of 1, 2, 3, or 4,

and “S (Ortho)-l” became xl-3153. Dietitians and physical therapy aides were

listed in the technical manual but not in the earlier regulations, which was issued only month afterthey achieved military status.

In April 1943, it was proposed that after the following May Army officers should be requested by code number, but as Medical Department personnel had not yet been coded, they were not included in the proposal. 12 Apparently, The Surgeon General found the changeover to the numbered coding

system quite time consuming, for not until 1944 did that system supplant the

lettered code.

Since the categories listed in the regulations and the technical manual did

not include every type of position separately, the more difficult aspect in the

whole process of classifying officers was choosing men for an unlisted category.

The classifier would then have to consult the whole record of each of number

of officers and decide which of them fitted the need. There could be no automatic or pushbutton system of classifying officers; individual judgment played

an indispensable part in theprocess.

Role of the Surgeon General’s Office

In the Medical Department, the Surgeon General's Office continued to

do much of the work of classification, and as early as March 1942, there was

Classification Branch in that office. For time, however, it appears to

have lost its identity and to have been reestablished under that name in

12 Keport of conference called by Military Personnel, Army Service Forces, signed by Lt. Col.

Gerald H. Teasley, MC, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 23 Apr. 1943.

663076'—63 20
272 PERSONNEL

March 1943. At the latter date, this branch not only classified officers of

the Medical Corps but recommended their original assignments, searched

for misassignments, and recommended changes. It kept body of records

containing an enormous amount of information on which to base its classifications and its recommendations for assignments—surveys of the ability

and assignments as well as records of the special schools officers had attended

and of their attainments in foreign languages. 13 Classification of officers

other than members of the Medical Corps—and little of this took place during

the early war years—was done not in the Classification Branch but in other

segments of The Surgeon General’s Military Personnel Division.

Role of the Field Commands

Classification was performed not only in the Surgeon General’s Office

but, at least during 1942, in corps area (service command) and Army headquarters as well. Since many Medical Department officers reported directly

to these headquarters from civilian life, which meant that they had received

no classification of any kind, it was necessary to classify them on the basis

of data given on questionnaires and whatever additional information could

be obtained about them.14 Although such methods were necessary in order

that the officers be given assignments, unfortunately they did not always tend

to promote the kind of uniformity The Surgeon General desired.

After the consultant system was established in 1942, some of the tasks

of these specialists concerned the proper classification and grading of personnel. As used by the Medical Department, the word “consultant” applied

not merely to specialists who acted as advisers only, but to those who, as in

this case, had administrative functions. In early 1942, The Surgeon General brought to his Office from civilian life consultant in surgery and

one in medicine and, later in that year, one in neuropsychiatry. As the

Office organization grew in size and complexity, other specialists were assigned to handle subspecialties. In the summer of 1942, beginning was

made in supplying consultant in each of the three aforementioned specialties to each service command. All these men assisted, through their

knowledge of specialists in their fields and through their training and accomplishments, in the proper classification of medical specialists. Those in the Surgeon General’s Office not only aided in initial grading but in reviewing

and revising the classification of officers after they had had an opportunity

to demonstrate proficiency in specified field while on duty with the Army.

Those in the service commands traveled to hospitals, induction stations, and

other installations where, by interview and inspection of the specialist’s work,

13 Annual Report, Classification Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army, 1944. 14 (!) Annual Report, Surgeon, Third U.S. Army, 1942. (2) Committee to Study the Medical Department, 1942.
CLASSIFICATION 273

they were able to make more accurate judgments of ability than those who

had only the records.

Classification Within the Air Forces

The Army Air Forces used similar measures to assure that physician was properly classified according to his qualifications. The Chief of the

Medical Branch and the Chief of the Section on Professional Care of Air Forces hospitals testified before the Committee to Study the Medical Department of the Army that they not only classified officers initially but

also made investigations at Air Forces hospitals and in man’s civilian locality. The former stated that he had “somebody traveling all the time

checking this thing.”

The sources of information made use of by Medical Department classifiers at this period were much the same as those that had been available to

them since 1940—the forms filled out by individual officers and data furnished

by the American Medical Association, the Division of Medical Sciences of

the National Research Council, the Procurement and Assignment Service,

and the American specialty boards. The source that yielded more data than

any other was W.D., A.G.O. Form No. 178-2, “Classification Questionnaire of Medical Department Officers,” published on August 1943. This was

revision of W.D., A.G.O. Form No. 178, published in 1940 when the War

Department had begun to classify Reserve officers.

In helping the Medical Department to classify medical specialists, particularly as to the proper proficiency groups, the American specialty boards performed very useful work. They sent to The Surgeon General (or to his liaison

officer, located at the headquarters of the American Medical Association) the

names of men who had recently passed their examinations and had been certified by the boards as competent specialists. Sometimes, they indicated the

proficiency grade they believed fitting for these men, together with information on whether they in service, whether they were Reserve officers not yet

called to active duty, or, if not committed to Army service, whether they were

willing or unwilling to accept military duty. 15 Thus, they helped incidentally

to procure officers as well as to classify them.

In early 1942, at the suggestion of The Surgeon General, the “Directory of

Medical Specialists” established “control file,” which listed about 10,000 names

of uncertified applicants to the American specialty boards, men who had done

varying amounts of work toward board certification, (These names were in

addition to the 18,000 physicians already certified by American specialty boards

15(1) Letter, Secretary-Treasurer, American Board of Otolaryngology, Omaha, Nebr., to The

Surgeon General, 13 .Tune 1942. (2) Letter, Secretary-Treasurer, American Board of Radiology,

Rochester, Minn., to Col. G. F. Lull, MC, Office of The Surgeon General, 23 June 1942. (3) Memorandum, Surgeon General’s Liaison Officer, American Medical Association, for The Surgeon General,

28 July 1942, subject: List of Recommendations of the American Gastro-Enterological Association.

(4) Letter, American Proctologic Society, to The Surgeon General, 17 Dec. 1942.
274 PERSONNEL

who were listed in the “Directory of Medical Specialists.”) The names in the

central file were listed as “cleared” and “not cleared.” The “cleared” group

consisted of men whose training and other qualifications met board standards

and requirements for admission to their examinations, but who had not yet

gained certification. The “not cleared” group consisted of men who had done

work in specialty but who had not yet been accepted for examination, those

who had had failures requiring complete reapplication for the examination,

and those whose certification had been revoked. set of name cards from

this file was made available to The Surgeon General. He could also ask the

appropriate specialty board for additional information on any man listed, 16

As changes were made in the list of those physicians “cleared” or “not cleared”

the directing editor of the “Directory of Medical Specialists” made the changes

known to The Surgeon General.

The cited sources of information for classifiers applied mostly to data on

physicians. Apparently, during the early part of the war, the organizations of

dentists and veterinarians furnished information as to specialists in these

professions, 17 but methodical and painstaking efforts by the Medical Department to classify any officers other than members of the Medical Corps came

only later in the war.

MALE AND FEMALE OFFICERS, 1943-45

Classification Measures

Throughout the war years, even though considerable emphasis had been

placed by the Army Service Forces upon decentralization generally, an attempt

was made to centralize more of the process of classification of medical officers

in the Office of The Surgeon General. The effort to bring officer classifications

up to date and, for that purpose, to assemble current information on their qualifications appeared in communications from the Surgeon General’s Office and

other agencies in the latter part of 1943 and afterward. large part of this

effort was directed towardrevising the “proficiency” ratings of Medical Corps

officers, which were more apt to be incorrect than placement of these officers in

the larger categories of specialization. It was probably with the “proficiency”

record in mind that The Surgeon General, in letter to service command surgeons referring to changes in initial classification ratings of Medical Corps officers made by his office, advocated revising these ratings whenever competent

professional observers found that the performance of officers, or their ability

to perform, was not reflected in theirratings. 18

16 Letter, Directing Editor (Dr. Paul A. Titus), Board of Directory of Medical Specialists, 1942

issue, to Lt. Col. F. M. Fitts, MC, Office of The Surgeon General, 24 Apr. 1942, subject: Applicants

for Certification by American Boards. 17 Military Preparedness. J.A.M.A. 118 634, 21 Feb. 1942. 18 Letter, The Surgeon General, to Commanding General, First Service Command, attention

Service Command Surgeon, 21 July 1944, subject: Classification of Medical Corps Officers.
CLASSIFICATION 275

At the end of 1944, The Surgeon General was able to induce higher WaxDepartment authority to order an annual review of all Medical Corps officer

classifications. 19 Commanders overseas as well as in the Zone of Interior were

directed to finish the first review by 31 March 1945 and forward the results to

The Surgeon General. fairly complete classification of all Medical Corps

officers based on the latest available information was completed by the end of

June 1945.20 The war ended, however, before any more such reviews could

fall due.

Questionnaires

Officers themselves furnished data for classifications in the foi-m of answers

to the classification questionnaii-e (W.D., A.G.O. Form No. 178-2), whose form

was revised twice during the war—in August 1943 and January 1944. In

November 1943, The Surgeon General advised the service command sm-geons

to have all medical, dental, and veterinary officers complete classification forms.

The next month, War Department circular required officers of these corps

returning from duty overseas to do the same. 21 Some months later, Army

Service Forces headquarters supplemented this directive by ordering all its

officers who had not filled out questionnaires in the past to do so now; the order

was intended to apply to officers returning from duty overseas, graduates of

officer candidate schools, officers newly assigned to Army Service Forces from

other commands, and officers newly commissioned from civilian life or from

the enlisted ranks. 22

Instructions of The Surgeon General

Aside from answers to questionnaires and reports from professional observers, there were other sources of information which The Surgeon General

reminded the service commands to employ as basis for classification. In his

letter of 22 November 1943, he requested the service command surgeons to

“establish pi-ocedure by which infoi-mation can be obtained from the professional consultants, the commanding officers of hospitals, and other available

sources concerning the ability of Medical Department officers.” This and

“other pertinent information” should be “maintained on personnel records in

the Office of the Service Command Surgeon.” The medical officer responsible

for classifying and assigning Medical Department personnel should be encouraged to obtain firsthand information by visiting the installations wher-e such

persons were assigned.

19 War Department Circular No. 460, Dec. 1944. 20 Letter, Brig'. Gen. Harold C. Lueth, USAR, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical

Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 10 Mar. 1956, with enclosure thereto. 21 (1) Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Maj. Gen. G. F. Lull, Deputy Surgeon General), to Commanding General, Second Service Command, attention Service Command Surgeon, 22 Nov. 1943, subject: Classification and Assignment of Medical Corps Officers. (2) War Department Circular No.

33, 24 Dec. 1943. 22 Army Service Forces Circular No. 212, July 1944.
276 PERSONNEL

How information from these sources should be produced and evaluated so

as to permit reestimate of Medical Corps officer’s rating was described in

letter from The Surgeon General to service command surgeons on 21 July

1944. The original recommendations for changes in officers’ ratings could come

either from their commanders, who should be encouraged to submit such proposals, or from the appropriate professional consultants, who should be instructed to make recommendations in the course of their inspections. The consultants should screen and evaluate the recommendations made by officers’

commanders. Their judgment should be based not only on the record of an

officer’s formal training and experience but on an appraisal of his capability.

The Surgeon General’s Office would furnish each service command list of the

Medical Corps officers assigned to it and their current ratings. The service

command consultants were to return the list, marked with the changes in ratings they recommended. The Surgeon General would then take final action. 23

Role of the Classification Branch

In November 1943, The Surgeon General informed the service commands

that his Classification Branch would classify all the medical, dental, and

veterinary officers who were ordered to fill out questionnaires at that time.

The War Department circular of December 1943, which required answers to

the classification questionnaire from all officers of these corps returning from

overseas, directed that the classification forms be sent to The Surgeon General,

who was to distribute them and issue instructions concerning their use. In

August 1944, the War Department directed that each officer of the same three

corps in the Army Air Forces should prepare answers to the classification

questionnaire and send one copy to the Surgeon General’s Office. Whether or

not the latter was to use it in the exercise of any power of classification, however, the circular did not state.24

More effort to centralize the classification of officers was directed at

members of the Medical Corps than at those of any other Medical Department

officer group. proposal of The Surgeon General that his Office make the

initial classification of all Medical Corps officers was agreed to by the Army

Ground Forces in April 1944. In December of the same year, the War Department granted him that authority with respect to any officer thereafter appointed to the Medical Corps.25 As the War Department had stopped the

procurement of doctors from civilian sources some months previously, this

authorization applied mainly, if not exclusively, to future graduates in medicine who were enrolled in the Army Specialized Training Program or who

held student commissions in the Medical Administrative Corps.

The classification of members of certain Medical Department officer components was not centralized in the Surgeon General’s Office—at least not to the

23 See footnote 18, p. 274. 24War Department Circular No. 349, 26 Aug. 1044. 25 (1) Memorandum, Adjutant General, Army Ground Forces, for Chief of Staff, 26 Apr. 1944.

subject; Assignment of Medical Corps Officers and Nurses. (2) See footnote 19, p. 275.
CLASSIFICATION 277

same extent as was that of Medical Corps officers. This was true of Dental

Corps,26 Medical Administrative Corps, and Army Nurse Corps officers. The

Surgeon General carried on classification of Medical Administrative Corps

officers assigned to installations under his own jurisdiction; in the later war

years, members of the corps graduating from officer candidate schools were

classified at the schools where they received their commissions.

Efforts Toward Greater Uniformity in Classification

Manuals

The continuous efforts to promote uniformity in classification of officers

for the whole Army came to fruition with the publication of War Department

Technical Manual 12-406, on 30 October 1943. This manual was supplemented,

so far as itrelated to the Medical Department, by special instructions embodied

in War Department Circular No. 232, 10 June 1944. The groups of standard

qualifications established by these instructions for each of the four degrees of

proficiency within the Medical Corps specialties were stated in broad terms—so

broad, in fact, that they could hardly, of themselves, produce completely

uniform classification of the officers to whom they applied. The four groups

of proficiency qualifications were set forth as follows:

Group (To be substituted for SGO Group 1). Officers with civilian or military

background of recognized and outstanding ability in specialty, for example, officers who

were professors and/or heads of departments and associate professors in large teaching

centers; officers who can function within their specialty without professional supervision.

Group (To be substituted for SGO Group 2). Officers with superior training and

demonstrated ability. Classification in this group indicates probable training period

of one year as an intern and three year residency or fellowship devoted to the specialty

in recognized teaching center. Officers with mature experience and demonstrated ability

may be classified in this group even though they have not had the formal training indicated

above. Diplomates of American Specialty Boards are classified in this group or higher but

absence of certification does not prohibit inclusion in this group. These officers can

function within their specialty without professional supervision.

Group (To be substituted for SGO Group 3). Officers who have recently completed

periods of training including one year as an intern and one year of residency; officers who

have demonstrated some ability in specialty; officers with shorter periods of training

but with minor proportion of practice devoted to specialty such as general practitioners

giving particular attention to the specialty for period of at least three years.

The Air Forces issued its own classification manual in April 1944.27 Every

job category listed in the Air Forces manual for the Medical, Dental, Veterinary, and Army Nurse Corps and for the Hospital Dietitians and Physical

Therapists had appeared in theWar Department manual.28 The only difference

28Report, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Historical Division, Office

of The Surgeon General, summer 1945, subject: Medical Department Personnel. 27 Army Air Forces Manual 35—1, Apr. 1944, subject: Military Personnel Classification and

Duty Assignment.

28 No attempt has been made to compare the job listings in these manuals for members of the

Medical Administrative, Sanitary, and Pharmacy Corps, since the job designations given do not always

clearly indicate whether the post could be filled only by member of one of these corps.
278 PERSONNEL

was that the Air Forces manual listed fewer job categories for some of the components than did the War Department manual, presumably because certain

types of jobs would not be needed in theAir Forces. Both manuals also appear

to have contained the same set of qualifications for each kind of job.

Role of consultants

The Surgeon General, in addition to making full use of the consultants in

his Office, designated the service command consultant in each specialty as the

final authority within the service command for recommending all changes in

the rating of specialists in his field. If the consultant was consistent in maintaining his own standards, this would result in considerable uniformity of

classification within the service command so far as the proficiency ratings were

concerned. Uniformity throughout broader area, however, was desirable;

the task of classification, it was held, must be performed not from the point of

view of single service command,29 but from that of the entire Army.

No doubt, certain uniformity of view among consultants in given specialty

resulted from their similar training and experience. Moreover, if The Surgeon

General’s scheme just mentioned was adhered to, their recommendations as to

changes in ratings were passed upon finally in his own Office, where differences

in standards could be reconciled.

Individual records

Uniformity of classification was also matter of keeping the records up to

date. If changes in men’s capabilities were not promptly recorded, the effect

was the same as if uniform standards were not being applied. It was necessary

too that all records of man’s classification should agree with one another. The

Surgeon General had urged uniformity in that sense when, in calling on the

service commands for questionnaires from all medical, dental, and veterinary officers in November 1943, he had stated that the classification symbols given

these officers by his Classification Branch should be entered on all their records

in the service command surgeon’s office. Almost year later, he emphasized

that revised questionnaires of all Medical Corps officers should be available in his Office and that copies of them should be filed in the service command headquarters. About the same time, representative of The Surgeon General urged

that the same classification should appear on all records used in the assignment

and evaluation of an officer; when the rating was changed, it should be changed on all records simultaneously. It appears that in at least one service command, for time at any rate, two groups of classification data were maintained —one

determined by The Surgeon General, the other by the service command.30

29 Speech, Maj. Robert W. W. Evans, MC, Office of The Surgeon General, “The Classification and

Assignment of Personnel,” 10 Oct. 1944. In Annual Report, Surgical Consultants Division, Office of

The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1945. 30 See footnote 29.
CLASSIFICATION 279

Evaluation of the Classification System

Doctors

The classification process for Medical Corps officers improved gradually,

beginning possibly about the middle of 1943. This was at time when

the number of doctors accepting active duty had for several months been relatively quite small. Specialists who were diplomates of specialty boards probably fared better than others in their initial classification, simply because the

evidence of their training was more readily ascertained and they could be easily

placed in their specialty with proficiency rating of at least B, as the classification manual prescribed. There were of course doctors well trained in some

branch of medicine for which no specialty board yet existed, who therefore

might be classified as nonspecialists. There was also the case of doctors who

had simply not acquired membership in specialty board, even though they

were as competent in the specialty as those who had. On this point, The Surgeon General repeatedly declared that mere lack of board membership would

not place specialist in lower proficiency bracket if he had demonstrated

top professional capacity in his specialty.

Initial classification was not enough. 31 Reevaluations had to be made on

the basis of actual performance. These were sometimes considerably delayed

through lack of opportunity to make them. It was reported that even during

1943, units were arriving in the European theater in which the commanding

officer and the chief of the medical service had had no opportunity to judge

the capacity of officers in the field of internal medicine except by paper evaluation. Presumably, the same held true of officers in the surgical specialties.

period of confusion therefore ensued until reevaluation, based on the

officer's work, could be made.32

Knowledge of the workings of classification was not universal among

Army doctors. In 1944, it as reported that few of them had any idea as to

their own professional classification and that considerable number, especially

among those who had been overseas, were not even aware of the classification

system itself. Their assignments, nevertheless, reflected their military occupational specialties as determined by the Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon

General, and very high percentage of them were better than adequate. 33

Dentists

While the major part of this classification discussion is given to the Medical

Corps, it points up the problems and means of solving them as they relate to

31 Initial classification in the sense of formally placing man in one of the categories, prescribed

by the Army, so that this record would govern all future assignments, might be delayed until after

his commander had examined his credentials and placed him in job. The formal initial classification

was therefore sometimes made on the basis of actual performance.

32 Annual Report, Office of the Chief Surgeon, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations,

U.S. Army, 1944, Exhibit thereto.

33 (1) Memorandum, Maj. Henry McC. Greenleaf, MC, for Colonel Schwichtenberg, MC, Office

of The Surgeon General, 13 June 1944, subject: Informal Report of Trip to Several Zone of Interior

Army Hospitals. (2) See also Chapter X, pp. 289-338, this volume.
280 PERSONNEL

the full officer strength of the Medical Department, even though considerably

less control of classification for the other components was ever centralized in

the Surgeon General’s Office. The classification of Dental Corps officers seems

to have been less satisfactory than that of doctors. The Military Personnel

Division of the Surgeon General’s Office stated inApril 1945 that “incomplete,

insufficient, and improper classification of Dental Corps officers was major

problem throughout the war.” It gave three reasons for poor classification of

these officers during the early part of the war: (1) Dental Corps officers originally did not have to fill out classification questionnaire; (2) in spite of the

fact that instructions to fill out the questionnaire were changed to cover all Medical Department officers, doubt whether this included Dental Corps officers was so

persistent that as late as April 1945 the Surgeon General’s Office considered it

necessary to call thematter to the attention of those concerned; and (3) the early

classification questionnaire did not call for sufficient information to make it

reliable basis for accurate classification. Even when complete information

became available, accurate classification was hampered by several conditions.

In the service commands and oversea theaters, there was considerable variation

in the evaluation of dental skills. The early form of the classification questionnaire authorized the commanding officer of unit to recommend the classification he considered appropriate for his subordinate officers. In the Army

Ground Forces, this was usually line officer who understood little or nothing

of professional standards and qualifications. Later, the senior medical officer

made recommendations, but this did not solve the problem of evaluating dental

specialties in any installations other than the large ones in which the commanding officer, Medical Corps officer, took the time to confer with the chief

of the dental service.

Many Dental Corps classification records dated only from 1943, and classification records on 20 percent of the members of the corps were never received

at all. Classification would certainly have been better for Dental Corps officers, if procedures had been centralized in the Surgeon General’s Office, if classification questionnaires had been submitted annually so that records could be

kept current, and if professional evaluations had been reviewed by qualified

classification officers. Personal visits to dental installations for the evaluation

of the utilization of Dental Corps officers would also have proved useful. 34

“Too much reliance had to be placed on the dentist’s own estimate of his qualifications, so that men with little more than desire to do certain type of work

were designated as specialists, while other trained officers were placed in routine

jobs.” 35

Sanitary Corps officers

Some fault was also found with the classification of Sanitary Corps officers. In February 1945, The Surgeon General’s Classification Branch heard

34 See footnote 26, p. 277. 85 Medical Department, United States Army. Dental Service in World War II. Washington U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1955, p. 107.
CLASSIFICATION 281

of “a pernicious method” of changing their classification—apparently one

service command would sometimes alter an officer's classification simply to

justify his promotion. 36 As regards sanitary engineers, in particular, who

formed substantial part of the corps, some acquired that classification who

were unfitted for it, despite the efforts of The Surgeon General’s Sanitary Engineering Division and the vigilance of the service commands. This was probably because part of the work of classifying was done by surgeons of posts and

commands, who were ordinarily unqualified to judge whether man had the

proper training in sanitary engineering. Some officers were also improperly

classified as entomologists, entomology being another specialty of the Sanitary

Corps.37

Development of Local Classification Systems Overseas

As early as 1942, it became apparent to oversea commanders that the classification system as it applied to medical officers was not adequate. In the first

place, many of these officers had never been classified prior to being shipped

overseas while others who had been classified failed to bring their classification

records with them. 38 Probably more inadequacies existed in the proficiency

rating than elsewhere. 39 Proper classification overseas was no less necessary

than it was at home, but the experience attained by officers abroad and the

opportunity to observe them under field conditions would have called for reclassifications regardless of any classifying that might have been done in the

Zone of Interior. The result was the development within the theaters of local

systems of categorization which were independent of those in the continental

United States.

The North African and European theaters

The North African and European theaters had similar systems based primarily on (1) questionnaires issued to each medical officer arriving in the

theater (the North African theater went one step farther and distributed these

questionnaires to all medical officers already in the theater) 40 and (2) evalua36Weekly Diary, Classification Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

24 Feb. 1945. 37Hardenbergh, W. A. Organization and Administration of Sanitary Engineering Division. [Official record.]

38 Letters, to Col. C. H. Goddard, MC, Office of The Surgeon General, from (1) Theodore L.

Badger, M.D., 25 Sept. 1952; (2) Alan Chalman, M.D., 11 Sept. 1952; (3) John M. Flumerfelt, M.D.,

Sept. 1952 (4) George P. Denny, M.D., 25 Sept. 1952 (5) Garfield G. Duncan, M.D., Sept. 1952

(6) Robert Evans, M.D., Dec. 1952; and (7) Joseph S. Skobba, M.D., 10 Oct. 1952.

39Letters, to Col. C. H. Goddard, MC, Office of The Surgeon General, from (1) Garfield G. Duncan,

M.D., 19 Aug. 1952 and (2) Walter D. Wise, M.D., 23 Sept. 1952. 40 (1) Annual Report, Personnel Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1942. (2) Munden, Kenneth W.: Administration of the Medical Department in the

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. Vol. I. [Official record.] (3) Annual Report,

Surgeon, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1943. (4) Annual Report, Surgeon, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944. (5) Report, Lt. Col. Stewart F. Alexander, MC,

Personnel Officer, Surgeon’s Office, Seventh U.S. Army, on Medical Department Activities in Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 14 July 1945.
282 PERSONNEL

tion by consultants. The latter method had already proved helpful in the

Zone of Interior.

In the European theater, Col. William S. Middleton, MC, Chief Consultant in Medicine, personally interviewed all officers on the medical service in

each hospital unit arriving in the theater, evaluated them, and reported on their

qualifications to the Chief Surgeon. 41 Col. Elliott C. Cutler, MC, Chief Consultant in Surgery, requested the base section consultants to do virtually the

same thing and send their reports to him.42 In addition, as early as 1943,

each officer entering the theater as casual was evaluated, if he had specialty,

by senior consultant from the Chief Surgeon’s Office. 43 The consultants did

not confine their attention to newcomers. As early as 1942, they assessed the

quality of the personnel assigned to the medical and surgical specialties in hospitals. 44 The following year, all units within the theater were evaluated by

the consultants from the Professional Services Division of the Chief Surgeon’s

Office as to the professional capacities of their medical officers. In 1944, Colonel Middleton visited and interviewed the medical officers of 112 general and

13 station hospitals.45

Col. Perrin H. Long, MC, medical consultant in the North African theater,

also used this method, reviewing the qualifications of Medical Corps officers as

soon as possible after the hospitals had reached the theater.46 By the latter

part of 1944, the consultants appear to have classified all of the medical officers

in the theater.

Even in those theaters where classification activities were most advanced,

however, they were marked by failure at least to use classification forms and

job categories established by the Zone of Interior. Furthermore, in the case

of individuals having more than one specialty, local conditions dictated which

of these specialties was to be regarded as primary and which secondary. The

Zone of Interior, for example, considered it important to classify cardiologist

primarily as such and secondarily as an internist whereas in the European theater the opposite was true. Similarly, an obstetrician and gynecologist was

classified primarily as general surgeon in the theater, but at home, his subspecialties were given first place. In each case, the practice was based on the

principle of giving man classification in skills that the Army most needed,

but the necessities of the Zone of Interior, with its comparatively large numbers of older troops, female personnel, and dependents entitled to Army medical

41 Annual Report, Professional Services Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1943. 42 Annual Report, Professional Services Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944. 43 Annual Report, Personnel Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1943. 44 (1) Annual Report, Professional Services Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Arms% 1942. (2) See footnote 43. 45 Middleton, W. S.: Medicine in the European Theater of Operations. Ann. Int. Med. 26 191-200. February 1947. 40 Long, Perrin H. History of the Medical Consultant in the North African and Mediterranean Theaters of Operation. [Official record.]
CLASSIFICATION 283

care, were different from those of the oversea theaters with their preponder

ance of young combat men.47

Efforts Toward Uniformity in Theaters of Operations

The European and Mediterranean theaters

On 13 May 1944, the final plans for demobilization and redeployment were

approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff, based on the October date for the

defeat of Germany. While the plans for redeployment of Medical Department strength were being developed, the necessity for establishing uniformity

among the classification systems of the Zone of Interior and theaters became

apparent. To accomplish this Lt. Col, Gerald H. Teasley, MC, of the Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, and others from the Surgeon

General’s Office were sent to the European and Mediterranean theaters to observe the systems in operation.

As result of this visit, War Department Circular No. 460 was issued on

December 1944, requiring classification of Medical Corps officers in accordance with established procedures. This circular was designed primarily to

promote uniformity in classification procedures for all Medical Department

officers.

The circular further directed that the commanding generals of oversea

theaters and oversea commands were to be given final responsibility for accurate up-to-date classification of all medical officers over whom they had

assignment jurisdiction and were not to delegate this responsibility to field

agencies or lower headquarters. In reviewing classifications, each commanding general, furthermore, was directed to utilize the advice of his surgeon

and the professional consultants. Finally, by 31 March 1945, each pertinent

headquarters was required to furnish each Medical Corps officer over whom it

had assignment jurisdiction copy of W.D., A.G.O. Form 178-2 with publication date of August 1943 or later. By this same date, the first annual

review of the classification of each Medical Corps officer was scheduled for

completion.

As result of War Department Circular No. 460, many officers received

for the first time War Department, or standard classification, number as

opposed to theater classification. 48 And for the first time in the European

Theater of Operations, Medical Corps personnel came under the central classification activities of the theater,49

47 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. J. C. Rucker, MC, for Lt. Col. G. H. Teasley, MC, Nov. 1944,

subject: Personnel Records in the European Theater of Operations. (2) Memorandum, Lt. Col. G. H.

Teasley, MC, for The Surgeon General, 29 Nov. 1944, subject; Report of Trip to Mediterranean Theater

of Operations. (3) Letters, Robert Evans, M.D., to Col. C. H. Goddard, MC, Office of The Surgeon

General, Dec. 1952 and 14 Apr. 1953. 48Letter, Col. Perrin H. Long, MC, to Col. C. H. Goddard, MC, Office of The Surgeon General, 29

July 1952.

49 Annual Report, Personnel Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations,

TJ.S. Army, 1944.
284 PERSONNEL

Difficulties were eventually encountered in carrying out the provisions of

the circular. The supply of forms was short; in the spring of 1945, units

were moving so rapidly and so freely from one command to another that it

was difficult to ascertain which ones had reported; and finally, the “human

factor” entered the picture—to many individuals and unit commanders, this

was “just another form.” As result, fairly complete classification was

not accomplished until June 1945.50

The Pacific and China-1ndia-Burma theaters

The Pacific theaters and the China-Burma-India theater do not appear

to have placed any early emphasis on the classification problem. No individual systems were initiated, as in the European and North AfricanMediterranean theaters. In 1944, in the Central and South Pacific, medical

officers were classified in accordance with the system established by the Surgeon General’s Office.51

In the Southwest Pacific Area, however, nothing was accomplished until

Maj. Eobert W. W. Evans, MC, Chief of the Classification Branch of the

Military Personnel Division in the Surgeon General’s Office was transferred

to the Southwest Pacific at the request of Brig. Gen. Guy B. Denit, Chief

Surgeon. Following the consolidation of commands in the Pacific, Major

Evans became, in the latter part of July 1945, head of the Personnel Division

of the Chief Surgeon’s Office in the Pacific theater.52

The increased availability of consultants also facilitated the work of

classification and reevaluation both in the Pacific and in India-Burma. In

the latter theater, the source of classification data had been information obtained in the Zone of Interior in the early part of the war, and such classification as had been performed in the theater had been accomplished by

nonmedical officer.53

ENLISTED PERSONNEL, 1939-45

The same reservation must be made when discussing the placement of

enlisted personnel as when discussing that of officers—a man assigned to

job that did not call for his best talents cannot be said to have been misassigned if the overriding needs of the Army required him to be used where

he was. With that exception, proper placement will be considered here as

one that fitted the job to the man.

60 Administrative and Logistical History of the Medical Service, Communications Zone—European

Theater of Operations, 1945. Ch. X. [Official record.]

51 (1) Whitehill, Buell: Administrative History of Medical Activities in the MiddlePacific (1946).

[Official record.] (2) Annual Report, Surgeon, Central Pacific Base Command, 1944. (3) Letter,

Verne R. Mason, M.D., to Col. C. H. Goddard, MC, Office of The Surgeon General, 18 Dec. 1952. 52 Annual Report, General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, 1945. 53 (1) Letter, Col. Herrman L. Blumgart, MC, to Col. C. H. Goddard, MC, Office of The Surgeon

General, Aug. 1952. (2) Letter, Hugh J. Morgan, M.D., to Col. C. H. Goddard. MC, Office Of The

Surgeon General, Aug. 1952. (3) Graham, Stephens: History of Professional Surgical Experience

in the India-Burma Theater in World War II (1945). [Official record.]
CLASSIFICATION 285

It was not nearly so important, for the most part, to fit the job to the

man in the case of enlisted personnel as it was in the case of officers. With

few exceptions, jobs for enlisted men in the Medical Department called for much shorter period of technical training than did most jobs for officers.

If necessary, therefore, the Medical Department could train its own enlisted

technicians after they entered the service. great deal of such training

was done, although there were complaints that the quality of the material

was not always adequate—that too many men of limited physical endurance

or mental ability were assigned to the Medical Department. Nevertheless,

in order to economize on the training effort, it was desirable to place men

in jobs for which they were already qualified and to keep them there until

they could be used more effectively elsewhere.

The first essential was to see that enlisted men who were qualified for

distinctly medical work got into the Medical Department—and stayed there—-

instead of being placed in some other branch of the Army, but only comparatively small number were earmarked for medical work upon induction

into the Army. In the vast majority of cases, enlisted men went, after induction, to the reception centers of the Army as draftees without any previous

arrangement as to where they would be used and were only then assigned

to some particular branch of the service. The Medical Department received

its enlisted personnel mainly in this fashion or by transfer from some other

branch of the Army.

Classification Guides

As early as September 1940, the reception centers and other assigning

authorities had better guide for classifying and therefore assigning enlisted

men than for officers. An Army regulation issued at that time contained

list of occupational specialties required in the Army and list of the specifications for those occupations. This regulation included serial number

to identify each specialty. three-digit number designated each job. Thus,

for example, under the heading “medical technician” appeared the specification serial number “123” under which were listed duties in military service,

qualifications, and civilian occupations in which medical technicians would

be found. Male nurses and medical students were placed in the same

category. 54 Later on, the job descriptions were refined, and some of the specification serial numbers were changed. In July 1944, the War Department

replaced its existing guide with War Department Technical Manuals 12-426,

“Civilian Occupational Classification of Enlisted Personnel,” and 12-427,

“Military Occupational Classification of Enlisted Personnel.”

Such guide, though useful, did not insure that all enlisted men would

be either properly classified or assigned. In January 1942, The Adjutant

General, after making general statement on the need to utilize the abilities of

6i Army Regulations No. 615-26, Sept. 1940, subject: Enlisted Men: Index and Specifications

for Occupational Specialists and Index to Military Occupational Specialists. (This list was superseded in December 1941, and still another appeared in September 1942.)
286 PERSONNEL

enlisted men to full capacity, listed several skills that must be carefully conserved. This list, antedating the list of scarce-category specialists published

later in the war, included the following Medical Department enlisted specialties: Dental hygienist, dental laboratory technician, medical technician, surgical technician, optician, orthopedic mechanic, pharmacist, sanitary technician,

veterinary surgical technician, and X-ray technician. The Adjutant General

designated the specialties on this list in which the shortage could be overcome in

part by Army training, 55

Proper classification was necessary, as set forth in Army Regulations Xo.

615-25,3 September 1940, in order that

a. All units and installations obtain proportionate share of the abilities possessed by

personnel coming directly from civil life.

b. Combat units obtain priority in the assignment of personnel possessing military

training and qualities ofleadership.

c. Men with occupational skills are assigned to units or installations requiring those

skills in the proportion and to the extent available, avoiding wastage.

The System in Operation

The system was designed to work as follows: Recruits were to be classified

at the reception centers. Classification was always to be in terms of what the

individual could do best for the Army. On the basis of his score on the Army

General Classification Test and an interview with classifier, each recruit was

to be assigned to the training center of the arm or service which could best utilize his education and experience.

Difficulties encountered

The immediate needs of the Army took precedence, of course, over this

planned method of classifying and assigning. Moreover, the system did not

always operate according to plan. Improper classification and assignment

often occurred in the emergency and early war periods, owing in part to lack

of trained classifiers and to the fact that numbers of individuals were assigned

to branches merely so that quotas could be met.

Another difficulty was that recruits spent an average of only 72 hours at

reception centers, limit imposed by the lack of housing and the rapidity of

mobilization. This was not always enough time to determine where man

could be most properly assigned. It also meant that centers could not retain

man until requisition for his specialty arrived. Particular centers might

not have requisitions for given specialty for several weeks, although the

centers were meanwhile receiving men with the required qualifications. As

the war progressed, procedures were improved, more experienced classification

personnel were available, and more efficient placement ensued.

55 Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General, each Army Corps Chiefs of Arras

and Services, 29 Jan. 1942, subject: Reclassification and Reassignment of Enlisted Personnel.
CLASSIFICATION 287

Continual reevaluations

Whether or not the reception centers did their work efficiently, men would

in many cases have to be reclassified and in most cases reassigned after they left

the centers. The reason, of course, was that some acquired specialized skills

through Army training which entitled them to new classification, and that

most had to be moved about from post to post if not from job to job as the exigencies of the service demanded. In fact, The Adjutant General declared that

classification procedure must be carried out during an enlisted man’s entire

Army career, and in January 1942, all commanders were directed to survey the

classification cards of their enlisted men at least every months for the purpose of improving their placement; commanders were to report any surplus of

men whose skills they could not use “to the utmost.” 50

56 See footnote 55, p. 286.

CHAPTER

Utilization of Personnel

ASSIGNMENT OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL

The accuracy of classification in large measure determined the adequacy

of assignment, which was in turn the key to maximum utilization of the tremendous reservoir of skills and experience that made up the Army Medical

Department in wartime. Only because the classification of both officers and

enlisted men—but particularly that of medical officers, including proficiency

ratings—was by and large an outstanding accomplishment, was it possible to

place very high percentage where each individual’s greatest potential could

be realized.

The Surgeon General actually had assignment jurisdiction over only that

small percentage of Reserve officers who belonged to the Army and Service Assignment Group. During the emergency period and until the creation of the

Services of Supply in 1942, he assigned officers to all named general hospitals

(of which there were 15 by the end of 1941, 10 of them having been established

since the beginning of the emergency), medical supply depots, and the Medical

Field Service School. Most Reserve officers, however, were in the Corps Area

Assignment Group, under the assignment authority of the commanding generals of the corps area, who acted on the advice of their staff surgeons. This

division of authority did not ordinarily prevent proper distribution of assignments. The Surgeon General could communicate with the corps area surgeon through the latter’s commander and tell him what types of personnel could

be made available to him. If the corps area had vacancies for such personnel,

the surgeon could then take steps to obtain them from outside the corps area.

The Problem of Proper Assignment, 1939—41

An officer’s assignment was not always, or entirely, based on bis classification, nor was he always kept fully occupied in the position for which he was

best fitted. This gave rise to complaints of misassignment.

Letters from officers, and from civilians as well, told not only of the misuse

of skills—they told, too, of the waste of physicians’ time in idleness. Medical

associations showed their concern by forwarding copies of these letters to the

Surgeon General’s Office. That Office’s reply to such criticisms was that there

(1) Letter, Mrs. Margaret Black Warres, Harrington, Del., to Brig. Gen. Frederick Osborn,

USA, Washington, D.C., 26 Nov. 1941. (2) Letter, Thomas A. Hendricks, Executive Secretary,

Indiana State Medical Association, Indianapolis, Ind., to Olin West, M.D., Secretary, American

Medical Association (and others), 12 Feb. 1941, with enclosure thereto.
290 PERSONNEL

would be small demand for some specialties during the training program; the

soldiers were of an age at which very littlesurgery, for example, was necessary.

The picture, however, would change entirely if we became engaged in war.

There was little the Medical Department could do to keep many of these

specialists constantly engaged in their own fields. higher proportion of

certain types of specialists existed in civilian life than the Army required

(obstetricians, for example) consequently, some specialists had to perform

duties outside their specialty. Attempts were made to assign them so that they

could do some work in their special field, and they were assigned to hospitals

whenever possible. For time, the position of specialists within the National

Guard was particularly hard. They were inducted with the regimental medical

detachments of which they were members and restrictions on their reassignment prevented their transfer, even if outstanding specialists, from these units

into hospitals giving the type of treatment where full use of their professional

skill could be made. This restriction was not removed until September 1941.

The problem of proper assignment was further complicated by the necessity of finding place for certain officers of the Reserve and the National

Guard who had been promoted to rank higher than their professional capabilities. Finally, the shortage of medical administrative officers until well after

Pearl Harbor compelled the employment of doctors, dentists, and veterinarians

in administrative duties to greater extent than was the case later on. However, the professional groups in the Army, as in civilian life, could at no time

completely escape certain administrative functions.

Sometimes the cause of inappropriate utilization lay with the Medical

Department, sometimes it was outside its control. Especially in the days of

building camps, recruiting personnel, and obtaining equipment, the matching

of need with supply was an intricate and at times impossible task. No doubt,

the Medical Department sometimes erred on the side of safety. If, for example,

medical officers arrived at camp before other men and equipment, it was

probably because the Department judged it better to have physicians present

beforehand than to risk being without them when men needed treatment.

To prevent medical officers serving in field units from losing their skill,

plan of rotation was promulgated in February 1941; it provided that after an

officer had spent months in fixed installation he could take refresher

course and be assigned to tactical unit, or vice versa. The plan affected few

officers, however. It was voluntary, and although the Office of The Surgeon

General was swamped with requests for transfers from field units to fixed

installations, almost no one requested transfer in the opposite direction; hence, the system proved unworkable.

Letter, Col. George F. Lull, Office of The Surgeon General, to Dr. Edwin F. Lehman, Department

of Surgery, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., 25 Nov. 1941.

Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding Generals of all Armies, Army Corps, Divisions,

(and others), 19 Sept. 1941, subject: Transfer and Reassignments—Officers of National Guard of

United States.

Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding Generals, all Armies and Corps Areas, Feb.

1941, subject: Rotation of National Guard and Reserve Medical Department Officers.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 291

Misassignment

Officers

Some of the same factors that hindered proper classification—rapid

procurement during the summer of 1942, insufficient information concerning

the professional qualifications of the doctors procured, and lack of experience

with the established procedure—doubtless interfered with proper assignment;

that is, the placement of officers in jobs that called for their best talents and

that they were physically qualified to fill. In the fall of 1942, the Committee

to Study the Medical Department as one of its “major findings” stated that it

had heard numerous complaints of misassignment of professional personnel

by the Medical Department, involving for one thing “the assignment of doctors,

either part or full time, to clerical or other administrative duties.” Under

established practice, however, most of these duties were the directresponsibility

of Army medical officers.

Although the committee heard complaints about “the assignment of specialists to the practice of general medicine or of other specialties not their

own,” the specialty boards themselves were on the whole well pleased and were

of great assistance to the Personnel Service. The Chief of The Surgeon General’s Personnel Service received conclusive evidence of this in replies to queries

he had directed to them late in 1942—the great majority of officials replying for

the boards expressed satisfaction with the classification and assignment performed by the Surgeon General’s Office. Spokesmen for the Army neuropsychiatrists asserted that, in spite of constant effort to keep neuropsychiatrists in jobs devoted to their specialty, the younger graduates were often assigned

as general practitioners to ground force units or organizations alerted for

oversea movement. The critics attributed this to The Surgeon General’s lack of

power to reassign medical personnel within certain commands, which made it

impossible for him to compel proper use of these specialists. They compared

the Surgeon General’s Office to fire department that procured and pumped

water through hose but was denied the right to direct the nozzle at the fire.

It is true that The Surgeon General lacked authority for some time to

order the reassignment of personnel within any service command, the Air

Forces, the Ground Forces, or the oversea theaters. So far as reassignment

within the service commands was concerned, however, the trouble was perhaps

not entirely the want of authority on the part of the Surgeon General’s Office

but to some extent the situation within the service commands themselves, where

the working of the assignment system seems to have been hampered by lack of

personnel with training adequate to perform the task most efficiently.

Letters, American Specialty Boards, to Col. George F. Lull, Chief, Personnel Service, Office of

The Surgeon General, September-October 1942.

Farrell, Malcolm J„ and Berlien, Ivan C.: Neuropsychiatry, Personnel. [Official record.]

Letter, Robert W. W. Evans, M.D., to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, Dec.

1932, with enclosure thereto. (Dr. Evans was assigned to the Classification Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, from 1942 to 1945, and served as its chief during the later

war years.)
292 PERSONNEL

In spite of certain drawbacks, it is possible that the decentralization of

the power to assign officers was the best system during the early war years. At

that time, The Surgeon General was so largely occupied with adapting his

Department to meet the demands of two-front war and with procuring officers

that he no doubt needed the assistance of others in making assignments. In the

later war years, however, when he had improved classification procedures and

acquired more thoroughgoing statistical information on the distribution of

Medical Department officers, he certainly knew more about the relative needs

for them, both as between the theaters of operations and the United States and

within the United States itself. As this became increasingly apparent to War

Department authorities in the higher echelons, he regained more control of the

personnel of the Medical Department.

Some of the causes of misassignment that had raised difficulties during

the period 1939-41 still operated during the war. Among those which became

more obvious as time went on was one stemming from the Army’s system of

promotion. Men who had entered the service before or in the early part of the

Avar had Idled the higher ranking posts in many units and installations. Those

Avho joined later Avere therefore sometimes placed in subordinate positions regardless of professional ability.

There Avere plenty of reasons why misassignments should occur, but some

of the complaints on that score Avere unjustified. Apparently, some doctors

not only believed they would practice medicine in the Army in much the same

manner as they had in civilian life but understood little of the need for any

time spent in training. When they AAere assigned first for training and later

to job that did not duplicate their civilian practice, many objected that the

Army Avas wasting their professional skills. Others raised the same objection

simply because they overrated their oavu capacity.

An assignment feature Avas the use of officer replacement pools, established by the Army just after the outbreak of Avar. The existence of pools

facilitated the task of meeting promptly the need for officers; they contained

unassigned personnel who could be Avithdrawn for assignment to other units or

installations as the occasion demanded. Many neAvly commissioned officers

were sent to pools pending their initial assignments. As matter of convenience, unassigned officers not available for jobs—for example, persons awaiting

discharge or sick in hospital—might also be placed in the pools. Medical

Department officer pools were located at replacement training centers, certain

general hospitals, and—for theVeterinary Corps—at Quartermaster depots and

ports of embarkation. When pools were first created, the Medical Department

Avas allotted maximum strength of 1,500 for them. This figure Avas changed from time to time as conditions required.

Letter, The Adjutant General, to Chief of each Ground Arm and Service (and others), 19 Dec. 1941, subject: Officer Filler and Loss Replacements for Ground Arms and Services.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 293

Enlisted men

Errors also occurred in the assignment of enlisted men. For example, men

sent to technicians schools to receive specialized training sometimes received

assignments on which such training was unnecessary. In August 1942, The

Surgeon General asserted that this mistake was being made in numerous instances, due, he believed, partly to the errors of medical units in making requisitions on The Adjutant General and partly to the errors of The Adjutant General in filling them. Although he himself lacked personnel who understood

the situation, The Adjutant General nevertheless failed to follow the recommendations of The Surgeon General, who had allocated certain numbers of

technicians to these units. The Adjutant General had even assigned some

graduates to Zone of Interior installations that possessed technicians schools as

their own sources of supply. According to The Surgeon General, 56 percent

of the technicians graduating in July 1942 had been assigned to units and

installations other than those he recommended. He therefore proposed that

Zone of Interior hospitals receive personnel direct from reception centers, that

commanders of theater of operations units submit requisitions for Medical

Department technicians in the numbers authorized by their tables of organization (that is, only for those shown as “rated” in the tables), that the Adjutant

General’s Office follow the recommendations of The Surgeon General in allotting technicians, and that Medical Department officer be assigned to the

Replacement Section of the Adjutant General’s Office “who has knowledge

of permissible substitutions in technical specialties and who will maintain close

liaison with the Office of The Surgeon General in the disposition of trained

technicians.” The response was generally favorable. Headquarters, Services

of Supply, believed it unnecessary to assign Medical Department officer to

full-time duty with the Adjutant General’s Office but suggested that representative of The Surgeon General be designated to assist The Adjutant General

“when occasion demands.” That headquarters also instructed the Adjutant

General’s Office to follow The Surgeon General’s recommendations as to the

disposition of technically trained personnel “so far as possible subject to the

priorities imposed by higher authority.” It approved the remainder of The

Surgeon General’s recommendations and ordered directives to be issued putting

them into effect.

These measures did not settle the question of misassigned personnel, if

only because they covered something less than the whole field. Various efforts were made to cope with the problem, including the occasional reclassification and reassignment of individual enlisted men. 10

»(1) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Director of Training, Services of Supply, 28 Aug.

1942, subject: Dissipation of Trained Enlisted Personnel. (2) Memorandum, Director, Military

Personnel, Services of Supply, for The Surgeon General, 14 Sept. 1942, subject; Request for Filler

and Loss Replacements.

10Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for The Adjutant General, 14 Dec. 1942, subject:

Reclassifications of Enlisted Men.
294 PERSONNEL

It would be difficult to estimate the precise extent of misassignment so far

as Medical Department enlisted personnel were concerned, for one reason because proper assignment was matter of degree and circumstances. An enlisted man was in sense properly assigned to the Medical Department if his

civilian experience or his training in the Army made him useful there, and his

removal from the Department would constitute misassignment. On the

other hand, even if he remained in the Medical Department, he might be improperly assigned, either because he was actually needed more somewhere else

or because the Department was not making the best possible use of his abilities.

The problem of transfers of qualified personnel was serious one to the

Medical Department. For example, in September 1943, The Surgeon General’s Personnel Director cited the cases of 18 noncommissioned officers who

had been transferred to other branches after to 25 years of service with the

Medical Department. The Surgeon General’s Office, he said, heard of only

small percentage of such transfers. Taken together they meant that “a serious

situation has arisen *. It seems uneconomical and foolish to train men for

certain duties and then transfer them to other branches where they know

nothing of the technical work and have to be retrained. To replace them, we

have to train new men.” 11 He pointed out that the transfers were made by

the service commands, and it was their interposition which The Surgeon General’s Personnel Office at the end of the war singled out as being responsible

for transfers of this kind as well as for other personnel practices to which it

objected. That office stated in September 1945:

Distribution of enlisted personnel to installations was satisfactory until branch allotments [that is, bulk authorizations of certain numbers of enlisted men according to

their branch of service] were discontinued during the summer of 1943, and authority was

delegated to local commanders to make suballotments and assign personnel according to

their own policies *. Operatingpolicies were never uniform throughout the commands

at such low level, and the pride, loyalty, and efficiency of medical enlisted men serving

under these conditions was greatly impaired. Perhaps the most demoralizing act was the

transfer of many high ranking noncommissioned officers of long training to other branches

and the transfer of noncommissioned officers of other branches into the Medical Department. Competent though these men undoubtedly were in their previous assignments,

they were so inept, untrained and unskilled in the duties encountered in the Medical Department that some were reduced. 12

Ill the middle of 1943, at any rate, the Director of Military Personnel,

Army Service Forces, felt that the assignment of medical technicians was

satisfactory. His office had investigated the “alleged misassignment” of

technically trained personnel, particularly medical, and found itself in agreement with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, who had stated

11 Letter, The Surgeon General, to Director, Military Personnel, Army Service Forces, 13 Sept.

1943, subject: Transfer of Medical Department Enlisted Men to Other Branches. 12 Report, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Historical Division, summer 1945, subject: Medical Department Personnel. (The statement goes on to say that the Surgeon General’s Office made vigorous effort to recover the men so transferred and that the situation had improved “during the last eighteen weeks [that is, at the very end of the war] but only return to the branch allotment system will fully correct the situation.”)
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 295

that every effort was being made to prevent misassignments, and that when

they did occur it was generally because of temporary surpluses of technicians,

who were appropriately assigned later. This condition, the Director added,

existed “in theServices as well as in the Ground Troops.” 13

The problem of proper assignment was involved with that of the procurement and retention of personnel. The number of men with medical backgrounds who were assigned by the reception centers to the Medical Department

or who were reassigned to it by other branches of the service constituted an

important part of the Department’s procurement. Regulations against the

reassignment of Medical Department personnel to other branches or to jobs

outside the United States might have helped to reduce the amount of procurement that had to be done for the Department, at least in the Zone of Interior.

From the early part of 1944 onward, the increased effort to channel critically

needed medical technicians into the Medical Department both from the reception centers and from nonmedical branches of the Army probably helped to

reduce misassignment not only in the Medical Department but elsewhere.

Assignment Problems in the War Years

Toward the end of 1943, Army Service Forces headquarters, prompted

by report submitted by The Inspector General “and other reports,” ordered

survey of the classification and assignment of all military personnel in its command. Two examples of the findings with regard to Medical Department

officers appear in the surveys conducted at the Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., and in the Fourth Service Command. These surveys give some idea

of how suitably officers were assigned and perhaps also how appropriately they

were classified in the Medical Department as whole up to this time. At the

Army Medical Center, the survey of 427 officers showed that 366 (or 85.7 percent) had good assignments, 44 (10.3 percent) had fair assignments, and 17

(4 percent) had misassignments. The report on this installation pointed out

that there were three kinds of misassignments: (1) An officer might have substantially more skill and experience or substantially more rank than was

required for his assignment; (2) he might have substantially less skill and

experience than were required for his assignment; or (3) he might he assigned

to the wrong occupational field when his skill was needed elsewhere. 14 In the Fourth Service Command, preliminary report covering somewhat more than

half the Medical Department officers showed that about 86 percent had good

assignments, over 13 percent fair assignments, and less than percent misassignments. The surgeon of the command stated that it was difficult to transfer

13 Memorandum, Director, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, to Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, 15 July 1943, subject: Transfer of Medical Department

Enlisted Men. 14 Letter, Maj. Fred J. Fielding, Office of The Surgeon General, to Army Medical Center, 13 Jan. 1944, subject: Officer Assignment Survey.

21
296 PERSONNEL

men discovered to have fair assignments or misassignments as no replacements

were available. 15

The Surgeon General’s Office and the various service command headquarters of Army Service Forces placed considerable reliance on their professional

consultants for assistance in assignment. Consultants in the Surgeon General’s

Office advised personnel officers there on the staffing of units, and in August

1944, this function became mandatory when The Surgeon General ordered that

“assignments of key personnel will be made only with the concurrence of the

appropriate service or division particularly concerned with, or possessing special knowledge as to the qualifications of the officers and the requirements of the

specialty assignments.” 1G While the order did not specifically mention consultants, the “appropriate service or division” would be, in many cases, one of

the sections of the office headed by the consultant (or his equivalent) in professional branch of medicine. At that time, those sections were the Medical

Consultants Division, the Surgical Consultants Division, the Neuropsychiatry

Consultants Division, the Reconditioning Consultants Division, the Preventive

Medicine Service, the Dental Division, theVeterinary Division, and the Nursing

Division,

In the later war years, it continued to be more difficult to assign than

to classify doctors according to their capabilities, if only because the needs of

the Army did not always match the material it had at its disposal. An example

of doctors assigned outside their specialty for unavoidable reasons was the case

of gynecologists and obstetricians. In November 1943, “considerably less than

half” the 650 Army doctors so classified were engaged in that type of

work. Those who were employed in their specialties attended female members

of the Medical Department and the dependents of Army personnel. The use

of larger percentage in their specialty had to await the entrance of large

numbers of Women’s Army Corps members into the Army. Even in assignments requiring their professional skill, Army doctors were not able to devote

all their time to their specialty. Administrative duties took higher proportion of their time than it had done in civilian practice. In addition, some

doctors found the Army system of evacuation unsatisfactory because it

required passing many patients through number of medical units before

definitive treatment was given, and thus prevented the individual physician

from following certain cases through to the end.

There were cases of assignment which not only did not take qualifications

fully into account but which can hardly be excused on the score of Army necessity—as, for example, that of the war surgeon who was classified as neurosurgeon although he had done nothing of the sort in his life. 17 Despite

continuing vigilance on the part of The Surgeon General, there were instances

of misassignment as long as the war lasted. These were sometimes brought

15 Annual Report, Surgeon, Fourth Service Command, 1943. 18 Office Order No. 175, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 25 Aug. 1944. 17 Memorandum, Director, Resources Analysis Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Chief,

Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, 10 June 1945, subject: Visit to England General

Hospital.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 297

to light through the complaints of doctors or members of their families addressed to the American Medical Association or to the White House. Whenever

The Surgeon General learned of an actual case of misassignment he endeavored

to rectify it. 18 This, of course, was more difficult during the early years of the

war prior to establishment of firm classification criteria and when his authority

in connection with assignment and reassignment of Medical Corps officers in

the United States was considerably curtailed.

There is ample testimony that the assignment of doctors who were specialists was on the whole well done. In April 1945, the surgical consultant in

the Surgeon General’s Office reported that, of 922 surgical specialists certified

by specialty boards or having equivalent qualifications who were serving in

Army installations in this country, 96 percent (or 885) were doing surgery in

their own specialty. The other percent (or 37) who were not doing surgery,

he reported, were serving as consultants either in the Surgeon General’s Office

or in the nine service commands. 19 Referring to surgical personnel, the Chief

of the General Surgical Branch of the Surgical Consultant’s Division, Office of

The Surgeon General, wrote: “The competent performance of the surgical personnel who participated in World War II undoubtedly had more to do with the

surgical results achieved than any other single factor. That performance was

made possible, in turn, by the increased availability of such personnel, in comparison with World War I, and by proper assignment.” 20 Likewise, the consultant in neuropsychiatry estimated that at the end of the war only percent

of the specialists in his field were misassigned. 21

When in 1946 the Procurement and Assignment Service was summing up

its wartime experience with the organization and administration of the medical

branches of theArmed Forces, it wrote as follows:

In spite of many difficulties the Office of The Surgeon General has accomplished

notable feat in the general assignment of medical personnel to work for which they have

been especially trained. Much credit is deserved for overcoming an attitude formerly

prevalent, “that any medical officer was medical officer and could do anything equally

well.” The great improvement in results of medical care in this war is due more to the

effective use of highly trained men than to any other single factor. 22

THE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

A'acancies overseas could be filled by direct transfer of personnel from

other units, which in turn created vacancies in those units; from table-of-organization units having an overstrength; and from the Zone of Interior. The

replacement system functioned with regard to enlisted men in the same man18 Letter, Maj. Gen. George F. Lull, Deputy Surgeon General, to Dr. Morris Fishbein, Secretary,

American Medical Association, Nov. 1944. 19 Rankin, F. W.: The Mission of Surgical Specialists in the U.S. Army. Surg. Gynec. Obst. 80

441—444, April 1945.

20 DeBakey, M. E. Military Surgery in World War II; Backward Glance and Forward Look.

New England J. Med. 236 341-350, Mar. 1947. 21 Information from Brig. Gen. William C. Menninger, Office of The Surgeon General, 11 June 1946. 22 Memorandum, Dr. Frank H. Lahey, Chairman, Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment

Service, for Watson B. Miller, Administrator, Federal Security Agency, 26 June 1946.
298 PERSONNEL

ner as it did for officer personnel—the theater commander was responsible for

requisitioning the necessary replacements and the War Department for filling

the requisitions as best it could. Medical Department authorities in the various

theaters had the responsibility for finding suitable positions for such replacements or casuals as were allocated to them; for correcting any errors in assignment made initially by the responsible authorities in the Zone of Interior; and

for transferring personnel, even when satisfactorily located, to assignments

in which they could be of greatest service. 23

Sources of Oversea Replacements

Replacement personnel for the Medical Department came from three main

sources: (1) Personnel released from hospitals; (2) personnel made available

by administrative actions; and (3) casuals from the Zone of Interior.

Personnel released from hospitals

Probably, the chief source of replacement personnel for the Medical Department consisted of individuals who hadbeen hospitalized and dropped from

assignment to their former units. In the European theater, 46 percent of the

officers of the Medical Department entering the Ground Forces Reinforcement

Command during the period of ground combat came from detachments of patients in hospitals. This was higher than the corresponding percentage of all

officers, that is, 38. It was also higher than that of Medical Department enlisted men, that is, 44, which, in turn, exceeded the percentage of all enlisted

personnel by three points (table 24).

In the case of both enlisted men and officers, the percentage of men from

detachments of patients who returned to their old units was greater in the

Army as whole than it was in the Medical Department. For Medical Department enlisted men, the percentage was 53, while that of theArmy in general

was 60. Corresponding percentages for officers were, respectively, 51 and 63.

Among the replacements supplied to the Medical Department by the

Ground Forces Reinforcement Command in the European theater, smaller

proportion of the officers than of the enlisted men appear to have been limited

assignment personnel. The proportion of such officers seems to have been

larger than that which the Command provided theArmy as whole.

Because of the lengthy professional education required for medical, dental,

and veterinary officers, it is probable that very few officers, other than Medical

Administrative Corps officers, whether suited for limited assignment or otherwise, were transferred to the Medical Department from any source outside itself.

23 (1) War Department Field Manual, 100-10, Field Service Regulations, Dec. 1940 and 15 Nov.

1943. (2) Annual Report, Surgeon, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1943.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 299

Table 24.—Movement of Medical Department personnel in and out of Ground Forces Reinforce- ment Command, European Theater of Operations, D-day to V-E Day

{6 June 1944-S May 1945)

See footnotes at end of table.

Groups Total

officers Medical Department officers

Total enlisted

men Medical Department

enlisted men

Input

Total 55, 966 2, 484 1, 259, 046 45, 002

On hand, June 1944 4, 520 122 71, 506 2, 749

Arrivals:

Total. 51, 446 2, 362 1, 187, 540 42, 253

From ZI;

Number 24, 428 801 511, 620 6, 318

Percent of total arrivals 47. 48 33. 91 43. 08 14. 95

From theater sources;

Detachments of patients:

Number 19, 766 1, 079 484, 873 18, 547

Percent of total arrivals 38. 42 45. 68 40. 83 43. 90

OCS graduates:

Number __ 792

Percent of total arrivals. 1. 54

Other sources:

Number. __ 6, 460 482 191, 047 17, 388

Percent of total arrivals 12. 56 20. 41 16. 09 41. 15

Output

Total. _____

49, 633 3, 120 1, 073, 378 38, 331

Shrinkage;

Number 3, 686 404 48, 873 6, 238

Percent of total output. 6. 59 16. 26 3. 88 13. 86

Shipped for service in theater:

Total 45, 947 2, 716 1, 024, 505 32, 093

Percent of total output 92. 57 87. 05 95. 45 83. 73

Returnees to units:

Number 12, 495 550 291, 870 9, 839

Percent of total shipped 27. 19 20. 25 28. 49 30. 66 White;

General assignment._ 11, 934 485 266, 647 8, 843

Limited assignment._ 248 24 11, 920 711

Negro:

General assignment._

Limited assignment __

39 9, 146

519

86

Category unknown __ 274 40 3, 638 190

Others: Number. ... 33, 452 2, 166 732, 635 22, 254

Percent of total shipped. 72. 81 79. 75 71. 51 69. 34

White: General assignment. 25, 465 1, 233 564, 002 16, 039

Limited assignment 2, 984 211 111, 491 3, 432
300 PERSONNEL

Table 24.—Movement of Medical Department personnel in and out of Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, D-day to V-E Day

(6 June 1944-S May 1945)—Continued

Groups Total

officers Medical Department officers

Total enlisted

men Medical Department

enlisted men

Output—Continued

otal-—Continued

Others: —Continued Negro:

General assignment 165 11 13, 090 488 Limited assignment.

Category unknown 4, 832 711

1, 474

42, 578

67

2, 228

Percent of general assignment

in number shipped 18. 84 63. 70 83. 25 79. 32

Percent of limited assignment

in number shipped 7. 05 8. 65 12. 24 13. 15

On hand, May 1945 __ 6, 157 152 188, 669 8, 425

Excess of output and on hand (8 May 1945)

over input -176 788 3, 001 1, 754

Arrivals from the detachment of patients who are scheduled for return to units (but also

includes those limited assignment men not eligible for return to combat units and who subsequently

were assigned to other units).

Enlisted men who became officers during the period of the report.

Losses through absent without leave, transfer to detachment of patients, evacuation to Zone

of Interior, and like reasons also 4,056 Medical Department enlisted men retrained under infantry

retraining program and 16 Medical Department enlisted men sent to officer candidate school.

Individuals from detachments of patients who were returned to the units in which they served

prior to hospitalization. They are designated as “casuals” in the source. Unreported as to race or ability to fill general or limited assignment. Represents shipments

only from 10th Depot in United Kingdom for period from June to 31 December 1944.

Designated as “reinforcements” in the source. The following explanation of the discrepancies between output and input occurs in the source

“4. The violent flow of stockage through the Command precluded any attempt to account for all

assignments outside of the originally reported branch to another branch *. further factor

lies in the fact that the opening inventory (D-day) included approximately 35,600 men in packages

prepared for Invasion Operations. Approximately 15,000 were returned to stockage after estimated

requirements were found to he too high. good portion of these men who were carried in packages

as infantry, were members of branches other than infantry who subsequently shipped out in their

original branches. Exact accounting of these transactions is not available. FA [Field Artillery]

and TD [Tank Destroyer] were the branches principally affected *.”

The above quotation probably helps to explain the discrepancy in the case of Medical Department

enlisted men and, perhaps, officers. In the case of the Medical Department officers it is also possible

that certain number entered the replacement system as members of nonmedical services or arms and

then were assigned to administrative duties with the Medical Department. It is doubtful, however,

whether these would account for the entire discrepancy.

Source Headquarters, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations,

“Flow of Enlisted and Officers Stockage for Period D-Day to V—E Day (6 June 1944 to May 1945),”

in History of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army,

pt. II, ch. VI.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL

In the Southwest Pacific, theater headquarters in late 1944 and the early part of 1945 attempted to make arrangements under which limited service officers

no longer fit for duty in their original branches would be made available for

service in the Medical Administrative Corps. The scheme was carried into

effect to some extent but it not only aroused opposition on the part of the

services losing the officers but also failed, because of inexperience of the officers

transferred in matters pertinent to the jobs to be filled, to arouse much

enthusiasm in the Medical Department. 24

Personnel made available by administrative actions

Units developed an overstrength in given types of personnel as consequence of table-of-organization changes. This overstrength might be used by

other units. In the European theater, for example, the reorganization of general hospitals under T/O 8-550, July 1944, made available for other assignments particularly in units arriving from the Zone of Interior short of Medical

Corps officers or specialist personnel, 450 Medical Corps officers. Indeed, it

was with view to meeting the needs of such units that the War Department

directed this reorganization. 25

By directive of 30 November 1944, Headquarters, Communications Zone.,

European Theater of Operations, ordered 92 general hospitals in that theater

to be reorganized with substantial decreases in the authorized nursing and

enlisted personnel permitted for each and with minor reductions in male

officer strength. The personnel thus made available was to be reported by

the hospital commanders to the Commanding General, Ground Forces Replacement System, through base or section headquarters, for transfer to an

appropriate replacement depot, 20 As of 30 November 1944, the reorganization

of station hospitals under T/O 8-560, 28 October 1944, had made surplus,

according to an estimate prepared in December of that year, total of 477

medical officers in all theaters. 27

In certain cases, units were abolished in order to supply personnel for

others. Deactivation of six station hospitals in the North African theater

made it possible to provide specialized personnel for the enlargement of general hospitals in that theater in 1944.28

In particularly pressing circumstances, certain medical units gave up

personnel, without abolishing the pertinent positions, to units considered to

be in greater need of the personnel than themselves. In 1942, units in the

2i Memorandum, Deputy Chief Surgeon, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, to Chief Surgeon, 12 Apr.

1945.

25 Administrative and Logistical History of the Medical Service, Communications Zone, European

Theater of Operations. [Official record.]

28 Organization Order 68, Headquarters, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations,

30 Nov. 1944. 27 Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (R. J. Carpenter, MC), to War Department, Assistant

Chief of Staff, G—1, through Commanding General, Army Service Forces (attention Director, Military

Personnel Division), Dec. 1944, subject: Memorandum of Transmittal.

28 Logistical History of NATODSA-MTOUSA, 11 August 1942-30 November 1945. [Printed in

Naples, Italy, by G. Montanino, 1945.]
302 PERSONNEL

European theater designated to participate in the invasion of North Africa

were brought up to strength by drawing upon other medical establishments

which were to remain behind in the United Kingdom. 29 Subsequently, in

1944, when the cross-channel invasion of France was undertaken, personnel

assigned to communications zone installations in the theater was sent forward into the combat zone in order to provide medical care in field units.

When, on 22 June 1944, the First U.S. Army, spearheading the invasion of

France, found it necessary to requisition 46 Medical Corps officer replacements, they were obtained not only from replacement depots located in the

United Kingdom but also by transfer from general and station hospitals

situated therein. Forty-eight hours after the requisition had been submitted, the replacements began to arrive and continued to do so until 30 June.30

At the time of the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944 and January

1945, there again was heavy demand for both officer and enlisted replacements, and communications zone units were found to be virtually the only

source of such personnel. Despite the fact that conditions at the front were

doubling and tripling their patient loads, these installations were called upon

for and did supply more than 300 medical officers for frontline units. 31

Within month and half, more than 3,100 enlisted men also were sent

forward to help provide the combat zone medical service. On several occasions, the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, despite its responsibility to provide medical service to the personnel passing through the replacement system, supplied Medical Department officers to satisfy the more urgent

needs of combat units.32

Some time in 1945, apparently, the Personnel Division of the Chief Surgeon’s Office, European theater, stated that base section might be rendered

understrength by as much as percent of its total medical strength in order

to fill requisitions from an army.33

Shifts also took place within the combat zone. Not long after D-day,

the First U.S. Army found that it had shortage of 28 medical officers within

its corps and divisions. Consequently, each 400-bed evacuation hospital in

the army was asked to designate two medical officers and each 150-bed evacuation hospital was requested to designate four to aid in filling the vacancies.

In this way, the needed replacements were obtained with great rapidity. 34

Personnel obtained through transfers, overstrength, and deactivations of

units constituted 20 percent of the whole number of Medical Department

officers entering the European theater Ground Forces Reinforcement Command between D-day and V-E Day, but only 13 percent of the whole number

29 Information from Col. James B. Mason, Feb. 1952. 30 First United States Army: Report of Operations, 20 October 1943-1 August 1944, Book VII, pp. 106-107.

31 See footnote 25, p. 301. 32 Annual Report, Surgeon, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 23 Oct. 1943-30 June 1945. 33 Memorandum, Col. A. Vickoren, MC, for Colonel Liston, Mar. 1945, subject: Reference Cable

UK 27386.

See footnote 30, p. 302.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 303

of Army officers entering this command. The proportion of Medical Department enlisted men thus entering the Reinforcement Command was very much

greater than that of Medical Department officers and vastly in excess of the

corresponding proportion of enlisted men in general.

In the case of medical officers at least, the personnel made surplus by these

procedures were not always satisfactory replacements. As rule, the reorganizations which produced the surpluses were designated to relieve such officers

of administrative duties which could be performed by members of the Medical

Administrative Corps and thus permit the former to practice medicine. Yet, in many cases, the men thus relieved were precisely those least fitted to take up

professional duties, for in the course of holding administrative posts, they had

lost skills and acquired rank which greatly reduced their eligibility to fill

vacancies for men of professional competence. The change in the table of

organization of general hospitals by War Department Circular No. 99 of 1944

provided for the substitution of lieutenant colonel of the Medical Corps by

lieutenant colonel of the Medical Administrative Corps in the position of executive officer. In the European theater, however, it was noted in June 1944 that,

while this reorganization would render 79 medical officers surplus, only about

14 of these would be qualified to fill professional assignments suitable to their

rank, since the great majority of them had been promoted strictly on the

basis of their administrative ability.35

Even when officers made surplus through reorganization of hospitals were

fully qualified to do professional work, there was difficulty in placing them

where the need for them was greatest. In the European theater, for example,

“the acute shortages that most needed to be filled and filled quickly,” were positions of company grade in ground force combat units. The revision of the

tables of organization, however, created overstrengths which consisted largely

of field grade officers who had served in positions “totally foreign to combat

medical assignments,” The result was that the “needs were just as acute after

reorganization of hospitals as they had been before.” 36 Such difficulties account at least partly for the fact that some of the officers made surplus by

table-of-organization changes were returned to the United States.

Casuals from the Zone of Interior

Comprehensive data on the number of Medical Department replacements

that actually were provided by the Zone of Interior for oversea areas are

lacking for most of the war period, completely so for the year 1942. We know,

however, that because of the buildup of strength for the North African invasion, it was not until the end of that year that any significant number of nontable-of-organization personnel arrived in the European theater.37 Statistics

are available for the period March-November 1943 when total of 2,737

35 Memorandum, Col. C. D. Liston, for G—1, European Theater of Operations, 17 June 1944. 36 Annual Report, Personnel Division, Officer of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations,

U.S. Army, 1944. 37 See footnote 25, p. 36.

663076'—63 22
304 PERSONNEL

Medical Department officers and 14,820 Medical Department enlisted men were

dispatched overseas as replacements. During the year 1944, 2,906 male Medical Department officers were shipped overseas to all theaters, decline from

1943.

In March to November of the latter year, the monthly shipments of

such officers averaged 0.46 percent of the male Medical Department officer

strength throughout the world and 1.89 percent of the same strength overseas.

In the European theater, the monthly rate of shipments of Medical Department

officer replacements in March-November 1943 was 1.26 percent of the mean

strength of such officers in the theater. From the beginning of 1944 to the end

of June 1945, total of 1,096 officers arrived from the Zone of Interior as

Medical Department replacements or casuals for use in other than units of the

Army Air Forces. 38 This amounted, on monthly basis, to 0.204 percent of the

mean strength serving in Ground Forces and Services of Supply units in the

theater within the dates mentioned. For the period from the beginning of the

invasion of the Continent to Y-E Day, the average monthly shipment was

equal to 0.214 percent. Not only was the rate of shipment lower than it had

been in 1943, but it was vastly lower than that of the service and ground forces

as whole; this, however, should occasion no surprise since these forces taken

together had far greater combat losses, proportionally, than did the Medical

Department.

Scattered information from other theaters also indicates the existence of

meager replacement shipments in stage of the war when they were needed

most. Replacements for the Mediterranean Theater of Operations were

scarce through nearly all of the campaign inItaly. 39

The China-Burma-India theater in the summer of 1944 complained to the

War Department of shortage of 91 Medical Corps officers. Not only was

that theater then told that under revised tables of organization this shortage

amounted only to 12, but it also was informed that no more than men would

be shipped from the Zone of Interior to meet this shortage. The shipment was

to take place during October; when the rest of the deficit would be wiped out

was not stated. The theater was urged to report to the War Department

shortages of other types of medical personnel although it was told that nurses,

physical therapy aides, and dietitians might not be available until after

January 1945.40

38 (1) Memorandum, Army Service Forces, for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, War Department General Staff (attention: Colonel Stevenson), subject; Report of Overseas Replacements for the

Period 16 September 1942 through 28 February 1944. (2) See footnote 32, p. 302. 39 Statement of Maj. Gen. Joseph I. Martin to the author, 19 Feb. 1952. 40 Smith, Robert G.: History of the Attempt of the. United States Army Medical Department to Improve the Efficiency of the Chinese Army Medical Service, 1941-1945, vol. II, pp. 159-160. [Official record.] (The theater complaint was based on the fact that nearly all hospitals were operating far above rated capacities *. In the largest hospitals patients of the Chinese Army comprised

from one-third to one-half of their totals. The shortage of medical officers (and units) at that time

was so serious that the Theater Surgeon was sent by the Theater Commander to Washington for

these conferences. Letter, Brig. Gen. Robert P. Williams, to Col. J. B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director,

Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 22 Dec, 1955.)
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 305

Aside from the difficulties occasioned by lack of personnel, the provision of

replacements by the Zone of Interior was complicated by delays in the requisitioning process. Requisitions went through channels to the theater G-l, or

the replacement command, before being forwarded to the Zone of Interior,41

Thus, although the surgeon of the Southwest Pacific theater submitted requisition for 50 dental officers during December 1944, he was informed by

letter from the Office of The Surgeon General, dated April 1945, that that

Office had not yet received the requisition although it would be filled upon

receipt.

The average waiting period for the arrival of replacement in the Mediterranean theater was months. 42 In that theater, at least, it was not possible

to reduce the delay in filling requisitions by anticipating needs and calling

for personnel from the Zone of Interior before vacancies actually existed for

such personnel. requisition for seven Dental Corps officers submitted in

November 1944 by the Twelfth Air Force in anticipation of the establishment

of new service groups and expectation of losses occasioned by hospitalization

and other factors of attrition was disapproved on the ground that the theater

would not requisition replacements unless table-of-organization vacancy

actually existed. 43

Lack of replacements from the Zone of Interior and difficulties in obtaining

such as were available forced the theaters increasingly toresort to local sources

of supply to fill vacancies in units or to establish new organizations. Obviously,

the closer the source of supply the less was the likelihood of delay in obtaining

what as needed. Thus, in the course of the war, the importance of careful

check of personnel requisitions by representatives of the Medical Department

on each level of an oversea command in order to make certain that all available

personnel as utilized before resorting to higher echelon or the Zone of Interior became manifest. It appears, however, that even in late stages of the

war, this was not always done. 44

Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that greater proportion of

oversea replacements came from theater sources than from the Zone of Interior,

and that the proportion was larger than in the case of Army replacements in

general. There can be little question of this as regards the European theater,

particularly during the period of ground combat.

41 (1) Letter, Col. Homan E. Leech, to Department of Army General Staff, Personnel and

Administrative Division, 23 Oct. 1947, subject: Replacement System Study. (2) Semiannual Report,

Surgeon, Twelfth Air Force, June—December 1944. (3) Semiannual Report, Personnel Division,

Office of The Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, January—June 1945, with

enclosure thereto. 43 Munden, Kenneth W. Administration of the Medical Department in the Mediterranean Theater

of Operations, U.S. Army. [Official record.]

43 See footnote 41(2), p. 305.

44 (1) See footnote 25, p. 301. (2) Letter, Lieutenant General Devers to all concerned, Aug.

1944, subject: Unit Personnel Requisitions for Medical Department Officers. (3) Pacific Conference,

Panel III, Personnel, 31 July 1945.
306 PERSONNEL

Temporary Personnel

Personnel temporarily attached to unit for training or in order to be

provided with administrative services might be used as source of manpower

above the assigned strength. In May 1943, for example, the percentage of the

total Services of Supply Medical Department strength in the European theater

that was classified as “attached” exceeded 13 percent, dropping sharply as the

time for the cross-channel invasion approached. The corresponding percentages for the Army as whole were always higher than those of the Medical

Department (table 25). similar situation prevailed in the Southwest

Pacific Area, where the 118thGeneral Hospital, which complained of shortages

of personnel in all categories, found, during the second quarter of 1943, that

it was able to tide over several difficult periods as result of temporary attachment of personnel of other organizations. The staff of the 9th Portable Surgical Hospital, consisting of officers and 25 enlisted men, was attached to the

general hospital for purposes of training for period of about months.

Both the officers and men were utilized in operating the general hospital.

Another method of obtaining additional personnel above assigned unit

strength was to “borrow,” on temporary duty from other organizations. This

was particularly the case when it was desired to meet the requirements of

frontline units. Thus, during periods of severe combat, personnel from corps

and army medical units in the European theater were attached for temporary

duty to divisional organizations. Litter bearers, company aidmen, and medical

and surgical technicians were prominent among those attached.45 On occasion,

general or station hospitals in the Mediterranean theater were drawn upon for

dental officers to serve temporarily in units lacking such personnel. 46 In

general, it was the practice in that theater to fill vacancies temporarily with

individuals from units that were not operating at full capacity.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES

During the emergency and war periods, various methods were developed

which led to more efficient utilization of medical personnel. Primary among

these were measures permitting freer use to be made of personnel, such as the

extensive use of Medical Administrative Corps officers to relieve medical,

dental, and other professional personnel of nontechnical duties; the use of

trained medical technicians; and the shifting of minor nursing functions

from Army nurses to nurses’ aides and to some extent to members of the

Women’s Army Corps. The use of stenographers at certain hospitals to aid

the doctors in preparing clinical records relieved the latter of much routine

45 (1) Annual Report, Surgeon, Ninth U.S. Army, 1944. (2) Annual Report, Surgeon, Third U.S.

Army, 1944. 46Report, Col. Lynn H. Tingay, of Dental Activities in North African Theater of Operations, 29 Dec. 1944.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 307

clerical work, although such assistance was never widely furnished. Other

expedients to meet the growing demands of the Army without lowering the

standard of medical service or unduly increasing the number of medical personnel employed included undermanning of theater of operations units in

training; changes in the Zone of Interior hospital system and its procedures;

readjustment of personnel allowances to theater of operations units and Zone

of Interior installations; redistribution of Medical Department officers among

major commands in the Zone of Interior; and shipment of hospitals overseas

with less than full complements.

Undermanning Theater of Operations Units in Training

policy of deferring the assignment of part of the officer complement of

newly activated theater of operations medical units and detachments which

was gradually put into effect in 1942-43 doubtless resulted in some saving of

personnel. Before this, it had been the practice to assign full complement

of officers to these units immediately upon activating them. This meant that

while the unit or detachment was taking unit training and waiting to go into

operation, the officers were not fully occupied, since there was little professional

work for them to do unless they could be used to assist the station complement

of the hospital at that post. This constitued waste of professional personnel,

and the complaints of officers so assigned was one reason for the change of

policy.

The new policy was applied first to affiliated hospitals when in May 1942

The Adjutant General issued directive providing for the assignment of only

small percentage of the authorized officer strength to these hospitals wdiile in

training. 47 Similar steps were taken to conserve the supply of medical officers

in nonaffiliated hospitals—officers were to be assigned to these units only in

the numbers needed and as they were needed. 48 The heavy demand for medical

officers dictated the application of this policy to nonmedical units having

assigned medical personnel.

In March 1943, War Department directive announced that each table

of organization calling for attached medical and dental officers would be

revised to include notation that this personnel was to be furnished only as

required and available within the continental limits of the United States, but

would be furnished infull prior to departure for oversea duty.49

47 Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, Services of Supply, and others, 29 May 1942, subject: Allotment of Officer Personnel to Medical Units of the Field Forces, Continental United States. 48 (1) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Officers Branch, Office of The Adjutant General,

19 Dec. 1942. (2) Memorandum, Col. Francis M. Fitts, Office of The Surgeon General, Jan. 1943, subject: Plans for Bringing Theater Hospital Units and Named General Hospitals to T/O or to Authorized Allotted Strengh.

49 Memorandum, Deputy Chief of Staff, for Commanding General, Services of Supply, 10 Mar. 1943, subject: Availability of Physicians.
308 PERSONNEL

Table

25.

—Monthly

Medical

Department

strength

in

Services

of

Supply

Communications or

Zone,

European

Theater

of

Operations

(exclusive

of

Iceland),

30

September 1942-31 October 1944

Date

and

personnel

General

strength

Medical

Department strength

Theater

Services

of

Supply

Communications or

Zone

Theater

Services

of

Supply

Communications or Zone

Total

Net

Attached

Total

Attached

Number Percent of

theaterstrength

Total

Percent of

theaterstrength Number Percent of

Services

of

Supply

or

Communi-cations Zone strength

Percent of

net

Number Percent of

theaterMedicalDepart- ment strength

Number Percent of

Services

of

Supply or

Communi-cations ZoneMedicalDepart- mentstrength

30

September 1942

188,

497

49,

715

26.

37

49,

715

26.

37

10,

188

20.

49

20.

49

13,

031

3,

930

30.

16

102

2.

60

Officers_.

14,

513

4,

653

32.

06

4,

653

32.

06

880

18.

91

18.

91

2,

138

854

39.

94

47

Enlisted..

173,

984

45,

062

25.

90

45,

062

25.

90

9,

308

20.

66

20.

66

10,

893

3,

076

28.

24

98

3.

19

31

October 1942

223,

794

52,

299

23.

37

52,

299

23.

37

11,

325

21.

65

21.

65

15,

792

4,

096

25.

94

515

12.

57

Officers..

18,

142

4,

941

27.

23

4,

941

27.

23

1,

003

20.

30

20.

30

2,

586

863

33.

37

100

11.

59

Enlisted

205,

652

47,

358

23.

03

47,

358

23.

03

10,

322

21.

80

21.

80

13,

206

3,

233

24.

48

415

12.

84

30

November 1942

170,

227

43,

169

25.

36

43,

169

25.

36

11,

471

26.

57

26.

57

13,

257

6,

990

52.

73

830

11.

87

Officers

16,

374

4,

878

29.

79

4,

878

29.

79

962

19.

72

19.

72

2,

762

1,

393

50.

43

103

7.

39

Enlisted

153,

853

38,

291

24.

89

38,

291

24.

89

10,

509

27.

45

27.

45

10,

495

5,

597

53.

33

727

12.

99

31

December1942

134,

808

44,

827

33.

25

44,

827

33.

25

12,

361

27.

57

27.

57

9,

988

6,

042

60.

49

519

8.

59

Officers

13,

877

4,

591

33.

08

4,

591

33.

08

980

21.

34

21.

34

2,

087

1,

296

62.

10

105

8.

10

Enlisted

120,

931

40,

236

33.

27

40,

236

33.

27

11,

381

28.

29

28.

29

7,

901

4,

746

60.

07

414

8.

72

31

January

1943.

122,

097

49,

841

40.

82

49,

841

40.

82

13,

780

27.

65

27.

65

10,

738

6,

704

62.

43

413

6.

16

Officers..

14,

564

5,

532

37.

98

5,

532

37.

98

1,

063

19.

22

19.

22

2,

465

1,

607

65.

19

101

6.

29

Enlisted

107,

533

44,

309

41.

21

44,

309

41.

21

12,

717

28.

70

28.

70

8,

273

5,

097

61.

61

312

6.

12
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 309

28

February 1943

104,

510

46,

352

44.

35

46,

352

44.

35

14,

016

30.

24

30.

24

10,

333

7,

610

73.

65

815

10.

71

Officers

11,

086

5,

303

47.

84

5,

303

47.

84

1,

081

20.

38

20.

38

2,

298

1,

786

77.

72

193

10.

81

Enlisted

93,

424

41,

049

43.

94

41,

049

43.

94

12,

935

31.

51

31.

51

8,

035

5,

824

72.

48

622

10.

68

31

March1943

109,

549

47,

863

43.

69

47,

863

43.

69

13,

619

28.

45

28.

45

10,

528

7,

793

74.

02

827

10.

61

Officers

12,

084

5,

517

45.

66

5,

517

45.

66

1,

147

20.

79

20.

79

2,

370

1,

848

77.

97

197

10.

66

Enlisted97,

465

42,

346

43.

45

42,

346

43.

45

12,

472

29.

46

29.

45

8,

158

5,

945

72.

87

630

10.

60

30

April

1943

no,

818

47,

204

42.

60

47,

204

42.

60

13,

318

28.

21

28.

21

10,

855

6,

593

60.

74

816

12.

38

Officers

12,

709

5,

643

44.

40

5,

643

44.

40

1,

044

18.

50

18.

50

2,

464

1,

803

73.

17

197

10.

93

Enlisted ..

98,

109

41,

561

42.

36

41,

561

42.

36

12,

274

29.

53

29.

53

8,

391

4,

790

57.

08

619

12.

92

31

May

1943

132,

776

52,

189

39.

31

49,

155

37.

02

18,

161

34.

80

36.

95

11,

329

7,

083

62.

52

935

13.

20

Officers

14,

874

5,

854

39.

36

5,

753

38.

68

1,

207

20.

62

20.

98

2,

593

1,

889

72.

85

249

13.

18

Enlisted

117,

902

46,

335

39.

30

43,

402

36.

81

16,

954

36.

59

39.

06

8,

736

5,

194

59.

46

686

13.

21

30

June

1943

184,

015

69,

743

37.

90

65,

570

35.

63

20,

299

29.

11

30.

96

15,

899

9,

833

61.

85

1,

017

10.

34

Officers

19,

347

7,

379

38.

14

7,

239

37.

42

1,

250

16.

94

17.

27

3,

406

2,

592

76.

10

265

10.

22

Enlisted

164,

668

62,

364

37.

87

58,

331

35.

42

19,

049

30.

54

32.

66

12,

493

7,

241

57.

96

752

10.

39

31

July

1943

238,

028

97,

473

40.

95

93,

514

39.

29

23,

642

24.

25

25.

28

18,

278

11,

516

63.

00

1,

127

9.

79

Officers

23,

964

9,

026

37.

66

8,

858

36.

96

1,

174

13.

01

13.

25

3,

765

2,

815

74.

77

324

11.

50

Enlisted

214,

064

88,

447

41.

32

84,

656

39.

55

22,

468

25.

40

26.

54

14,

513

8,

701

59.

95

803

9.

23

31

August 1943

278,

742

102,

210

36.

67

97,

589

35.

01

22,

312

21.

83

22.

86

21,

043

12,

919

61.

39

881

6.

82

Officers

27,

758

9,

663

34.

81

9,

474

34.

13

1,

059

10.

96

11.

18

4,

188

3,

091

73.

81

220

7.

12

Enlisted

250,

984

92,

547

36.

87

88,

115

35.

11

21,

253

22.

96

24.

12

16,

855

9,

828

58.

31

661

6.

73

30

September 1943

361,

794

144,

706

40.

00

135,

802

37.

54

24,

558

16.

97

18.

08

30,

319

19,

155

63.

18

862

4.

50

Officers

33,

917

12,

495

36.

84

12,

091

35.

65

1,

147

9.

17

9.

49

6,

114

4,

462

72.

98

213

4.

77

Enlisted

327,

877

132,

211

40.

32

123,

711

37.

73

23,

411

17.

71

18.

92

24,

205

14,

693

60.

70

649

4.

42

31

October 1943

466,

562

175,

858

37.

69

168,

065

36.

02

27,

412

15.

59

16.

31

38,

084

24,

431

64.

15

434

1.

78

Officers

43,

295

15,

058

34.

78

14,

560

33.

63

1,

215

8.

09

8.

34

7,

586

5,

579

73.

54

110

1.

97

Enlisted

423,

267

160,

800

38.

00

153,

505

36.

27

26,

197

16.

29

17.

07

30,

498

18,

852

61.

81

324

1.

72

30

November 1943

637,

521

232,

995

36.

55

221,

305

34.

71

41,

787

17.

93

18.

88

52,

095

28,

949

55.

57

847

2.

93

Officers

57,

820

18,

976

32.

82

18,

373

31.

78

2,

066

10.

89

11.

24

9,

684

6,

610

68.

26

205

3.

10

Enlisted See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.

579,

701

214,

019

36.

92

202,

932

35.

01

39,

721

18.

56

19.

57

42,

411

42,

339

52.

67

642

2.

87
310 PERSONNEL

Table

25.

—Monthly

Medical

Department strength

in

Services

of

Supply

Communications or

Zone,

European

Theater

of

Operations

(exclusive

of

Iceland

),

30

September 1942-31 October1944 —Continued

Date

and

personnel

General

strength

Medical

Department strength

Theater

Services

of

Supply

Communications or

Zone

Theater

Services

of

Supply

Communications or Zone

Total

Net

Attached

Total

Attached

Number Percent of theaterstrength

Total

Percent of

theaterstrength Number Percent of

Services

of

Supply or

Communi-cations Zone strength

Percent of

net

Number Percent of

theaterMedicalDepart-ment strength

Number Percent of

Services

of

Supply

or

Communi-cations ZoneMedicalDepart- ment strength

31

December 1943

773,

753

263,

915

34.

11

243,

221

31.

43

43,

723

16.

57

17.

98

65,

876

31,

238

47.

42

948

3.

03

Officers

68,

235

21,

623

31.

69

19,

682

28.

84

2,

133

9.

86

10.

84

11,

618

7,

094

61.

06

213

3.

00

Enlisted

705,

518

242,

292

34.

34

223,

539

31.

68

41,

590

17.

17

18.

61

54,

258

24,

144

44.

50

735

3.

04

31

January

1944

937,

308

319,

266

34.

06

289,

221

30.

86

45,

972

14.

40

15.

90

81,

616

40,

593

49.

74

416

1.

02

Officers

80,

197

26,

622

33.

20

24,

311

30.

31

2,

283

8.

58

9.

39

14,

359

9,

300

64.

77

99

1.

06

Enlisted

857,

111

292,

644

34.

14

264,

910

30.

91

43,

689

14.

93

16.

49

67,

257

31,

293

46.

53

317

1.

01

29

February1944

1,

084,

057

339,

536

31.

32

304,

301

28.

07

39,

826

11.

73

13.

09

96,

320

42,

201

43.

81

422

1.

00

Officers

92,

702

29,

197

31.

50

26,

388

28.

47

2,

145

7.

35

8.

13

17,

089

9,

712

66.

83

98

1.

00

Enlisted

991,

355

310,

339

31.

30

277,

913

28.

03

37,

681

12.

14

13.

56

79,

231

32,

489

41.

01

324

1.

00

31

March1944

1,

199,

077

372,

507

31.

07

333,

329

27.

80

46,

930

12.

60

14.

08

111,

024

51,

873

46.

72

518

1.

00

Officers

106,

334

30,

855

29.

02

28,

586

26.

88

2,

445

7.

92

8.

55

19,

819

11,

829

59.

69

98

83

Enlisted __

1,

092,

743

341,

652

31.

27

304,

743

27.

89

44,

485

13.

02

14.

60

91,

205

40,

044

43.

91

420

1.

05

30

April

1944

1,

422,

276

448,

899

31.

56

389,

438

27.

38

56,

905

12.

68

14.

61

125,

729

61,

477

48.

90

521

88

Officers

125,

028

35,

720

28.

57

32,

146

25.

71

3,

042

8.

52

9.

46

22,

550

13,

643

60.

50

40

29

Enlisted

1,

297,

248

413,

179

31.

85

357,

292

27.

54

53,

863

13.

04

15.

08

103,

179

47,

834

46.

36

481

1.

00
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 311

31

May

1944

1,

526,

965

502,

443

32.

90

409,

242

26.

80

42,

932

8.

55

10.

49

133,

364

63,

820

47.

85

412

64

Officers

135,

453

39,

112

28.

87

33,

562

24.

78

2,

427

6.

21

7.

23

23,

839

14,

012

58.

78

35

25

Enlisted

1,

391,

512

463,

331

33.

30

375,

680

27.

00

40,

505

8.

74

10.

78

109,

525

49,

808

45.

48

377

76

30

June

1944 __

1,

635,

200

587,

664

35.

94

430,

636

26.

34

53,

833

9.

16

12.

50

146,

323

72,

198

49.

34

1,

419

1.

97

Officers

148,

531

47,

338

31.

87

35,

038

23.

59

2,

986

6.

31

8.

52

26,

132

15,

611

59.

74

110

70

Enlisted,

1,

486,

669

540,

326

36.

34

395,

598

26.

61

50,

847

9.

41

12.

85

120,

191

56,

587

47.

08

1,

309

2.

31

31

July

1944

1,

770,

845

648,

570

36.

62

476,

953

26.

33

50,

802

7.

83

10.

65

159,

282

84,

550

53.

08

1,

099

1.

30

Officers

162,

286

52,

020

32.

05

40,

593

25.

01

2,

668

5.

13

6.

57

28,

425

17,

993

63.

30

98

54

Enlisted

1,

608,

559

596,

550

37.

09

436,

360

27.

13

48,

134

8.

07

11.

03

130,

857

66,

557

50.

86

1,

001

1.

50

31

August 1944

1,

905,

261

723,

550

37.

98

169,

672

Officers

175,

070

29

789

Enlisted

1,

730,

191

139

883

30

September 1944

2,

041,

023

771,

632

37.

81

544,

839

26.

69

27,

468

3.

56

5.

04

183,

634

95,

466

51.

99

900

94

Officers.

178,

782

60,

231

33.

69

46,

856

26.

21

1,

788

2.

97

3.

82

31,

657

20,

298

64.

12

246

1.

21

Enlisted

1,

862,

241

711,

401

38.

20

497,

983

26.

74

25,

680

3.

61

5.

16

151,

977

75,

168

49.

46

654

87

31

October1944.

2,

196,

785

823,

446

37.

48

606,

871

27.

63

68,

235

8.

29

11.

24

198,

410

101,496

51.

15

1,

160

1.

43

Officers

187,

837

62,

723

33.

39

49,

801

26.

51

3,

847

6.

13

7.

72

34,

183

21,

467

62.

80

107

50

Enlisted __

2,

008,

948

760,

723

37.

87

557,

070

27.

73

64,

388

8.

46

11.

56

164,

227

80,

029

48.

73

1,

053

1.

32

Basic

data,

unless

otherwise

specified,

from

successive

issues

of

“Progress

Report,”

Headquarters, European Theater

of

Operations

U.S.

Army.

Comprehends

all

persons

assigned or

attached

to

the

command.

Includes

both

assigned

and

attached

personnel,

but

not

personnel

in

headquarters

installations,

except

prior

to

30

April

1943,

when

personnel

in

base

section

headquarters may

be

included.

Data,

thus,

are

not

strictly

comparable to

data

pertaining

to

general

Services

of

Supply

Communications or

Zone

strength

or

net

strength,

since

both

of

these

Include

headquarters

personnel. Includes

all

personnel

assigned or

attached

to

the

command except

nonoperating

personnel

for

the

period

after

30

April

1943.

The

nonoperating

personnel

comprised replacements

and

members

of

detachments of

patients

and

prisoners. An

“in

transit”

group is

Included

in

the

nonoperating

category

for

the

period

beginning

with

30

June

1944;

this

included

patients en

route

to

the

United

Kingdom from

the

European Continent

and

replacements en

route to

units.

To

what

extent

nonoperating

personnel entered

into

the

statistics

nrior

to

May

1943

is

not

known.

From

Strength

of

the

Army”

for

dates

shown or

approximations thereto

with

the

following

exceptions;

30

April

1944,

from

source shown

in

table

31

footnote

Februarv-March 3;

1944,

obtained

by

prorating on

the

basis

of

data

for

January and

April

1944;

30

June

1944

equals

average

of

data

for

31

May

and

31

July

1944.
312 PERSONNEL

Changes in the Zone of Interior Hospital System

Use of specialty centers

As the Army and therefore the number of patients increased, greater

diversity of specialty centers in the general hospitals was established for the

treatment of particular diseases, wounds, and injuries. In such center,

patients requiring highly specialized type of care were concentrated in order to make the best use of the available specialists. Several centers of this

sort had been in operation before the war; others were added in 1942, and the

number was further increased in 1943, when the practice was announced as

settled policy. The system, which continued throughout the war, permitted

the Army to place its limited number of specialists to the best advantage. 50

Creation of convalescent hospitals

In April 1944, the War Department authorized convalescent hospitals,

as distinct from convalescent centers, annexes, and facilities, which had been

in operation since the preceding June. It was felt that the convalescent

patient did not need the highly specialized care he was receiving in general

hospital and that theremoval of patients from general to convalescent hospitals

would permit fuller use of the former’s highly specialized staff. guide for

the utilization of personnel in convalescent hospitals in the Zone of Interior

was recommended by The Surgeon General and approved by the War Department (see table I). 51 Comparison of this table with the guides for named

general hospitals (table 6) will indicate the saving in Medical Corps officers

that could be made by placing convalescents in the new type of hospital instead

of keeping themin general hospitals.

Closure of station hospitals

Early in 1944, as the military population in the Zone of Interior was

shrinking due to oversea movement of troops, The Surgeon General effected

the closure or reduction in size of station hospitals. As this was done, doctors

assigned to these hospitals could be reassigned either to hospitals scheduled

for oversea service or to general hospitals in the Zone of Interior. Although

in 1944, the General Staff sanctioned the establishment of so-called regional

hospitals in the Zone of Interior by both the Army Air Forces and the Army

Service Forces, general hospitals remained under the jurisdiction of the Army

60 Memorandum, Director, Resources Analysis Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Deputy

Surgeon General, 19 Aug. 1945. Bi (1) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. R. W. Bliss, Assistant Surgeon General, for Commanding General,

Army Service Forces, attention Director, Personnel Division, 18 Apr. 1945, subject: Personnel Guides

for Convalescent Hospitals. (2) War Department Circular No. 170, June 1945.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 313

Service Forces, more exclusively for the care of highly specialized cases and

of patients brought homefrom overseas. 52

Reduction of time of hospitalization

During the war, the Medical Department initiated number of measures

designed to reduce the period of hospitalization to the absolute minimum.

This released not only beds for incoming patients, but the personnel to care

for them. In addition, The Surgeon General succeeded in having convalescent furloughs granted for periods not to exceed 90 days. On June 1945,

there were approximately 70,000 patients on furlough from the general and

convalescent hospitals for whom otherwise beds would have had to be

provided.53

Readjustment of Personnel Allowances

Oversea units

The overall personnel requirements of the Army are set forth in published

tables of organization by type of unit. Revisions of the medical tables for

oversea theaters during 1940-41 were made on the basis of World War

experience and partly as means of adjusting medical units to the new triangular organization of the combat divisions. 54 The 1942-43 revisions reflected

the difficulty in procuring Medical Corps officers and therefore authorized

smaller percentage of such personnel in proportion to the rapidly expanding

xVrmy as whole (tables and 10).

When the number of personnel available in certain categories proved insufficient to meet the requirements of all units that were being activated under

these revised tables, further revisions were made during the later war years.

For example, after it became permissible to substitute Medical Administrative Corps officer for one of the two Medical Corps officers who served as

surgeons in every infantry battalion, the tables of organization of the infantry

regiment were revised to that effect (table 9).55 Table shows personnel

changes in the tables of organization for selected hospitals. In all but two

cases, the number of Medical Corps officers, nurses, and enlisted men was reduced while the number of Medical Administrative Corps officers was increased.

52 Smith, Clarence McKittrick The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone

of Interior. United States Arn.~ in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1950. 53 (1) War Department Circular No. Ill, Apr. 1945. (2) Memorandum, Director, Hospital Division, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. A. H. Schwichtenberg), for Director, Historical Division,

Office of The Surgeon General, through Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, 18

June 1945, subject: Additional Material for Annual Report Fiscal Year 1945, with Tab thereto.

54 (1) Letter, Maj. Gen. Alvin L. Gorby, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit,

U.S. Army Medical Service, Apr. 1956. (2) See footnote 56, p. 314.

B5 (i) TOE 7-11, June 1945, Infantry Regiment. (2) TOE 7-95, 12 July 1944, Infantry

Battalion (Separate).
314 PERSONNEL

The tables issued in 1943 and 1944 also show for the first time small numbers of

dietitiansand physical therapists as military personnel.

Another device for making the most efficient use of the limited personnel

available was the development of the “team” or “cellular” concept, which grew

out of the auxiliary surgical groups and attained its most general usefulness in

the 8-500 series of tables of organization. The basic principle was to so balance

specialists and technicians in teams for specific purposes that each man’s skills

were extended by the complementary skills of those who worked with him.

Such groups as malaria control units, dental operating detachments, and food

inspection detachments were refined under the new concept of specialized group

effort. Carried over into civilian medicine, the team concept has spread

throughout the profession. 56

Zone of Interior installations

In 1943, the War Department Manpower Board, in investigating all Army

installations in the Zone of Interior to determine where savings in personnel

could be made, developed “yardsticks” or criteria for manning various types of

installations.

The General Staff used the yardsticks in making its bulk authorizations of

personnel for the Army Service Forces and, to provide guide for subordinate

commanders, developed manning tables for hospitals of various sizes which

were promulgated as War Department Circular No. 209, 26 May 1944. In general, these manning tables, or guides, agreed with the Manpower Board’s yardsticks and the recommendations of the Inspector General’s Office. They were

not, however, meant to be followed as rigorously as tables of organization, and

if in any particular case they failed to provide enough personnel for adequate

medical care, written request for increases could be submitted. The guides

were announced as subject to correction by any future surveys made by the

Manpower Board (tables and T). In general, these guides indicate that the

greater the extent to which beds could be concentrated in large hospitals, the

greater would be the saving in medical officers and in certain other categories of

personnel.

The issuance of manning tables seems to have achieved considerable success in conserving medical personnel so far as general hospitals in the Zone of

Interior were concerned. In July 1943, the number of personnel (military and

civilian) assigned to these hospitals per 100 authorized beds was 94. By June

1944, the number had fallen to 68.6 and by July 1945, it had risen to 71.1; in

the former month, however, less than half the beds were occupied, while in the

latter month the general hospitals were operating at 122 percent of their rated capacity. 57

50 Statement of Durward G. Hall, M.D., to the editor, 27 May 1961. 67 See footnote 52, p. 313.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 315

Redistribution of Medical Department Officers

As has been noted, when in 1942 the Army Air Forces were authorized

to procure their own doctors, their recruiting program was more successful than that of Army Service Forces. As result, The Surgeon General felt that

some of these medical officers should be transferred to understrength Army

Service Forces installations in this country or to units scheduled for overseas. 58

However, there was no single authority to distribute doctors to the Army Service Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army xlir Forces according to need,

and the Deputy Chief of Staff at first refused to take any action leading to the

transfer of doctors from the Air to the Service Forces. He was said to believe that some general hospitals (all of which were under the jurisdiction of the

Army Service Forces) were overstaffed and that the Service Forces should

“make thorough canvass of the situation” to utilize to the best advantage

all its own doctors before calling on either the Ground or Air Forces for any

of theirs. Army Service Forces headquarters thereupon urged The Surgeon

General to continue his survey of medical personnel with view to releasing

the number necessary for oversea duty and at the same time retaining the minimum required to operate U.S. establishments. 59

In the fall of 1943, when The Surgeon General declared that he did not

have in Army Service Forces enough doctors to man all the hospital units

scheduled for oversea movement the following January, he recommended that

the Air Forces be directed to supply the doctors needed for nine such

hospitals.60 Approximately 10 days after these recommendations, the Air Forces having lost certain of their hospital functions, voluntarily transferred

200 Medical Corps officers to the Army Service Forces.61

Shortly after this the Personnel Planning and Placement Branch, Office

of The Surgeon General, submitted report on the numbers of medical specialists available and required in the Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces in

this country; it showed that the Air Forces had 3,271 available against 1,271 required, whereas the Service Forces required 8,014 and had available only

6,571. The report showed no excess in Army Ground Forces. Based on this

study, the General Staff ordered the Air Forces to transfer 500 Medical Corps

officers to the Service Forces. 62 Of the 700 transferred altogether, large

58 Memorandum, Lt. Col. Francis M. Fitts, Office of The Surgeon General, for Colonel Lull, Office

of The Surgeon General, 11 Jan. 1943, subject: Availability of Physicians. 59 Memorandum, Maj. Gen. W. D. Styer, Services of Supply, for The Surgeon General, Oct. 1943. 60 Memorandum, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, for The Surgeon General,

17 Nov. 1943, subject: Filling Officer Shortages in Medical Units Committed, with 1st endorsement

thereto, 26 Nov. 1943. 61 Memorandum, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, for Commanding General, Army Service

Forces, attention Military Personnel Division, 30 Nov. 1943. 62 (1) Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Maj. Fred M. Fielding), for G—1, 28 Dec.

1943. (2) Memorandum, G—1, for Chief of Staff, Jan. 1944, subject; Requirements for Medical

Corps Officers. (3) Letter, Brig. Gen. J. M. Bevans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, to Commanding

General, Army Service Forces, 26 Jan. 1944, subject: Reassignment of Medical Corps Officers to Army Service Forces, with endorsements thereto.
PERSONNEL

proportion were specialists, whom the Service Forces most needed to staff units

destined for overseas. Other transfers of doctors occurred throughout the

war period. 03 In addition to its relinquishment of doctors, the Air Forces

during the year ending on 30 June 1945 transferred approximately 1,500 Army

nurses, 72 Medical Administrative Corps officers, and 17 Medical Department

dietitians to theArmy Service Forces. 04

Shipment of Hospitals With Less Than Full Complements

When, in 1944, The Surgeon General concluded that, despite all efforts to

make the personnel supply meet the demand, the Army would not have enough

medical specialists and nurses to staff both Army Service Forces hospitals in

this country and units yet to be shipped abroad, he used the expedient of shipping some hospitals without their full table-of-organization complement of

specialists and nurses. While no theater chief surgeon ever agreed that he

possessed an excess of specialists, The Surgeon General considered this expedient feasible because the theaters in his judgment did possess relative excess

of specialists who could be used to balance the staffs of these hospitals. Accordingly, in early 1944, The Surgeon General received permission to ship general

hospitals overseas with full complement of doctors but with general practitioners in place of seven of the specialists authorized by the tables of organization; that is, the chiefs of medicine, surgery, orthopedic surgery, neurosurgery,

psychiatry, radiology, and laboratory service. This policy was followed for

several months; eventually, certain units were sent overseas with even fewer

specialists.65

By July 1944, with an accelerated shipment of approximately 53 general

hospitals requested by the European theater, it was considered impossible to

staff all these units at full table-of-organization strength even by substituting

nonspecialists. Consequently in that month, The Surgeon General recommended to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, that general hospitals be shipped to the European theater with only 16 instead of the authorized

32 Medical Corps officers, until the excess of such personnel in the theater should

be absorbed. This recommendation was returned informally without action.

Later, however, units were shipped with only 16 doctors, but with attempts to

balance the staffs. Proper classification and accurate accounting procedures

enabled The Surgeon General to make such adjustments.

03 Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General, Army Air Forces, 23 Sept. 1944, subject Medical Officer Requirements. (2) Weekly Diary, Operations Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for week ending Mar. 1945. (3) Letter, Military Personnel

Division, Army Air Forces, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 17 July 1944, subject:

Transfer of Medical Corps Officers. 64 (1) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 11 Feb. 1944, subject: Army Nurse

Corps. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, to The Adjutant General, 18 May 1944, subject: Designation of Medical Corps Personnel for 124th and 125th General Hospitals. (3) Annual Report, Personnel Division, Air Surgeon’s Office, 1944-45. 63 Memorandum, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Colonel Love,

Historical Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 19 Oct. 1944.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 317

The procedure of shipping hospitals without all of their Medical Corps

officers was continued until practically the end of hostilities against Germany.

In March 1945, The Surgeon General informed the Operations Division, General Staff, that orthopedic surgeons of grade or better were not available to

the European theater in April of that year and added that they would not be

available for shipment from the United States at any future date.06 The next

month, April 1945, he recommended that general hospitals, short 16 Medical

Corps officers each, be shipped to the Pacific Ocean Areas. lie based this

recommendation on his knowdedge that that theater had more doctors per 100

hospital beds occupied than either the Southwest Pacific Area or the Zone of

Interior; and stated that in August or September he would ship sufficient

Medical Corps officers to staff the hospitals fully. 67

The Surgeon General also felt compelled to ship certain hospitals without

nurses, thereby permitting the assignment of nurses to these hospitals from

excess numbers resulting from cuts in tables of organization. In 1944, he

received approval to ship several general hospitals without nurses to the European theater. (At that time, 1,000-bed general hospital carried complement

of 83 nurses.) At least two general hospitals lacking nurses were shipped to

the Southwest Pacific Area. 68

UTILIZATION OF NEGRO PERSONNEL

In late 1940, when Selective Service was about to bring large numbers of

Negroes into the Army, the Medical Department contained only few Negro

enlisted men and no Negro officers or nurses on active duty. Negro patients

in Army hospitals were therefore attended by white doctors and nurses, and

there was no segregation of Negro from white patients. In September 1940,

the Medical Department Officers Reserve contained small number of Negro

officers eligible for service (that is, physically qualified and not overage) 60

Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Corps officers. About the same time, 40

nurses were in the Reserve maintained for the Army by the Red Cross. 09

When, in 1940, it became likely that the Army would take in many more

Negroes, the Surgeon General’s Office made plans to place its share of the new

personnel in the Medical Department. The Surgeon General recognized his

responsibility in memorandum to the General Staff in October 1940: “It ap66 Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, through

Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Mar. 1945, subject: Inclusion of Orthopedic Surgeons

for Staffs of General Hospitals.

67 Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Commanding General, Army Service Forces, attention

Director of Plans and Operations, 20 Apr. 1945, subject: Staffing of the 303d, 304th, 308th, 309th,

and 310th General Hospitals.

68 Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Brig. Gen. Bliss, Chief, Operations Service), to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, May 1944, subject: Staffing of Medical Units of July, with

endorsement thereto, 31 May 1944. 69 (1) Memorandum, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, for Chief of Staff, 28 Sept. 1940. subject:

Use of Negro Reserve Officers Under 1940-41 Military Program, Tab C. (2) Blanchfleld, Florence A.

and Standlee, Mary W.: The Army Nurse Corps in World War II. [Official record.]
318 PERSONNEL

pears that the Medical Department will have to utilize around

4,000 Negro enlisted men and several hundred officers.” 70 Six months later,

The Surgeon General and his advisers had agreed among themselves that the

Medical Department would be prepared to go as far in the use of Negro troops

as any other service and could conform to any Army-wide policy of employing

Negroes segregated from or in combination with whites. The Department,

however, would “not willingly accord to policy whereby any detachment will

be part White and part Black unless this policy is adopted not only by the

services but by the ine.” The Medical Department did, in fact, go further than

any other service in the use of Negro officers. 71

During the course of the war, the Medical Department used Negro enlisted

men and male Negro officers in the medical detachments of all-Negro combat

divisions, in number of all-Negro theater of operations hospitals, in sanitary

companies, in the Negro wards of certain Zone of Interior hospitals, and in at

least two all-Negro hospitals in the United States. The Department used

Negro members of the Nurse Corps in number of hospitals at home and overseas and Negro members of the Women’s Army Corps in some Zone of Interior

hospitals. Negro Medical Department personnel constituted, at its wartime

peak, about 4.2 percent of the Medical Department’s overall strength. In the

Medical Corps, the highest proportion was about 0.76 percent; in the Dental

Corps, 0.78 percent; in the Veterinary Corps, 0.39 percent; in the Sanitary

Corps, 0.34 percent; in the Medical Administrative Corps, 1.1 percent; in the

Nurse Corps, 0.88 percent; and among enlisted men, percent (tables and 26).

In the assignment of Negro medical personnel, Dean John W. Lawlah of the

Howard University Medical School was of inestimable assistance to The

Surgeon General. 72

Hospital Personnel

As early as October 1940, the Surgeon General’s Office proposed the establishment of Negro wards in certain hospitals in the United States. 73 When such wards were organized in the hospitals at Fort Bragg, N.C., and Camp

Livingston, La., in May 1941, twice as many medical officers were at first allotted

to them as were customarily assigned to ward duty. The commanders of both

hospitals, however, later found that one Negro doctor instead of two per ward was sufficient, and the Surgeon General’s Office revised its estimates accord70 Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for The Adjutant General, 25 Oct. 1940, subject; Plan for Utilization of Negro Officers, Nurses, and Enlisted Men in the Medical Department, 1940-41 Military Program.

71 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. C. B. Spruit, Office of The Surgeon General, for Colonel Love, Office of The Surgeon General, 10 Apr. 1940, subject: Use of Negroes in the Medical Department Under the PMP. (2) Letter, Maj. Ulysses G. Lee, Jr., Office of the Chief of Military History, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 22 Aug. 1952. 7? Statement of Durward G. Hall, M.D., to the editor, 27 May 1961. 73Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (General Love), for The Adjutant General, 22 Oct. 1940, subject: Assignment of Negro Medical Officers.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL

Table 26.—Negroes in the Medical Department, 1943-43

ingly. 74 This separation into white and Negro wards was abandoned before

the end of the war.

At the same time, The Surgeon General recommended establishing allNegro hospitals in the Zone of Interior and commissioning Negroes as Medical

Administrative and Sanitary Corps officers. The General Staff informed him

that no all-Negro hospital was planned and that commissioning Negroes in the

two corps named was “not favorably considered.” 75 Later on, however, Negroes were commissioned in the Medical Administrative Corps, and two allNegro hospitals were eventually established.

The Air Forces Station Hospital at Tuskegee, Ala., activated in 1911, was

the first of these two hospitals to receive its personnel, and played an important

part in utilizing Negro doctors and nurses. It also supplied some of the first

personnel to report to the Negro Station Hospital at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.,

which began operations in 1942.76

Letter, Secretary, General Staff, to Judge William H. Hastie, Civilian Aide to Secretary of War,

1941, subject: Redistribution of Negro Medical Department Personnel. 75 3d endorsement, The Adjutant General, to The Surgeon General, 31 Jan. 1941, to memorandum

cited in footnote 70, p. 318. 76 til See footnote 52, p. 313. (2) See footnote 71 (2), p. 318.

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320 PERSONNEL

Fort Huachuca was the training center for the 93d (Negro) Infantry

Division. The National Medical Association (the Negro counterpart of the

American Medical Association) was requested to assist in procuring medical

officers for its hospital, which by the end of 1942 had 676 beds and staff of

37 Medical Corps officers, Sanitary Corps officer, Medical Administrative

Corps officers, 100 nurses, and 243 enlisted men. At that time, also four Negro

Dental Corps officers had been assigned to the hospital dental clinic, which

functioned under the post dental surgeon. Two Veterinary Corps officers were

assigned to the post surgeon’s office at that time. The commanding officer of

this hospital from June 1942 until his return to civilian life in October 1945 was

Lt. Col. Midian O. Bousfield. Chief of the medical service until March 1943

was Maj. Harold W. Thatcher. Both of these men, as well as many others on

the Fort Huachuca hospital staff, made outstanding records under particularly

difficult circumstances.

Sanitary Companies

In October 1940, also, The Surgeon General recommended new type of

unit which was to absorb most of the Negro enlisted increment and some Negro

officers as well.77 This was the “sanitary company” authorized in November

1940 for the purpose of performing “such general duties as the commanding

officer [of the theater of operations general hospital to which company was

assigned] may prescribe.” 78 The Surgeon General’s Office insisted that activation of these companies should not reduce the medical department’s overall

requirements for enlisted men.79

The sanitary companies, established under T/O 8-117 (November 1940).

found difficulty in obtaining useful work. In July 1942, after several had

completed their training, The Surgeon General adopted the policy of assigning

one to eacli named general hospital and Medical Department Replacement

Training Center in this country. Large numbers of these companies remained

unemployed, however, because the theaters and defense commands refused to

requisition them when informed by The Surgeon General that they were ready

for shipment. 80

In January 1943, the Commanding General, Services of Supply, directed

The Surgeon General to consider widening the scope of the work to be performed by the companies in order to obtain more useful employment for them.

The Director of The Surgeon General’s Sanitary Engineering Division voiced

belief that these companies could do valuable work in environmental sanitation at larger War Department installations, particularly in the South. He

77 (1) Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. A. G. Love), for Executive Officer, Office

of The Surgeon General, Oct. 1940, subject: Policy of The Surgeon General re Colored Troops (9%). (2) See footnote 75, p. 319. 78 T/O 8-117, Nov. 1940. 79 Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for Assistant Chief of Staff, G—1, May 1941, subject:

Plan for the Use of Colored Personnel in the Medical Department.

80 Letter, The Surgeon General, to all Surgeons, Defense Commands, and U.S. Army Forces in Oversea Bases, 18 Nov. 1942, subject: Sanitary Companies.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 321

suggested that such work might consist, among other things, of mosquito and

other insect control; constructing, maintaining, and operating the sanitary

demonstration areas; and maintaining proper conditions at the incinerator, the

dump, and the sewage disposal plant.81 This recommendation led to revision

(June 1943) of the table of organization which would appear to have these

companies used largely on mosquito control. In the new table, each of the two

platoons now had two drainage, two oiling, and two spraying teams. None

of the other suggested functions were ever incorporated in table of

organization.

Medical Administrative Corps Officers

In the Medical Administrative Corps, Negro officers almost without exception obtained their commissions on graduating from officer candidate school

instead of by direct commissioning either from civil life or from the enlisted

ranks of the Medical Department. By April 1945, the school located at Camp

Barkeley, had graduated 158 Negroes. At that time, total of 189 had been

admitted to the Medical Administrative Corps, some of whom had undoubtedly

been commissioned by the school at Carlisle Barracks. 82

The Surgeon General experienced difficulty in placing Negro members of

the Medical Administrative Corps. In early 1943, the War Department, at

his suggestion, established pool of 100 Negro Medical Department officers at

Fort Huachuca. The Surgeon General controlled the assignment, relief, and

transfer of officers assigned to the pool. Those in it were used in the local

station hospital, the 93d Infantry Division, and in other duties at that station

while awaiting transfer to other posts. 83 But The Surgeon General had

trouble in finding assignments elsewdiere for many Medical Administrative

Corps officers in the pool. His Office finally arranged with the Army Ground

Forces to have certain numbers attend the special basic course for infantry

officers. The understanding was that those who completed the course satisfactorily would be detailed to the infantry; at least IB and possibly more were

so detailed; the remainder were returned to the pool at Fort Huachuca. 84

81 (1) Memorandum, Services of Supply (Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations), for The Surgeon

General, 16 Jan. 1943, subject: Sanitary Companies. (2) Memorandum, Col. W. A. Hardenbergh,

Office of The Surgeon General, for Brig. Gen. L. B. McAfee, Office of The Surgeon General, 25 Jan.

1943, subject: Use of Medical Sanitary Companies.

82 (1) Annual Reports, Army Service Forces Training Center, Camp Barkeley, Tex., 1944—45.

(2) Strength of the Army, Apr. 1945. Prepared for War Department General Staff by Machine

Records Branch, Office of The Adjutant General, under direction of Statistical Branch.

83 (1) Memorandum, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. F. B. Wakeman, Director of Training),

for Director of Training, Services of Supply, 10 Mar. 1943, subject: Training Pool for Colored Medical

and Dental Officer Personnel, with endorsement thereto, June 1943. (2) Memorandum, Lt. Col.

D. G. Hall, Office of The Surgeon General, for Colonel Wickert, Office of The Surgeon General,

20 Mar. 1943. (3) War Department Circular No. 132, June 1943.

si (i) Weekly diary, Sanitary Corps and Medical Administrative Corps Section, Classification

Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for weeks ending Mar. and

11 May 1945. (2) Semiannual History of Medical Administrative Corps and Sanitary Corps, Military

Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Jan.-31 May 1945. (3) Semiannual

Report, Records and Statistics Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

U.S. Army, July-31Dec. 1944.
322 PERSONNEL

When hostilities came to an end in August 1945 and there appeared to be

little likelihood of any demand for these Medical Administrative Corps officers, the Surgeon General’s Office took steps to release them as being surplus

to the needs of the Army.85

Army Nurse Corps

As to Negro members of the Army Nurse Corps, the Secretary of War in late 1943 committed himself to enlarging this group, which then consisted of

about 200 individuals. The Surgeon General’s Office, however, argued that

there was no apparent demand for more on the part of commanders and suggested that, before additional Negro nurses were commissioned the service

commands and oversea theaters should be asked how many more they could

use. 8(5

Whether or not this suggestion was followed, more Negro nurses were

actually brought in, especially during the recruiting drive at the beginning

of 1945.

During the early years of the war, Negro nurses had been restricted to

the care of Negro patients and had therefore served with white nurses only in the two hospitals that for time possessed wards devoted exclusively to the

care of Negroes. Later, however, Negro nurses were assigned to work alongside white nurses in at least 16 hospitals in the United States, where they

attended not only Negro but white patients. According to the report of one

of these hospitals, “no case was found where white patient objected to

colored nurse taking care of him.” 87

Women’s Army Corps

The early campaigns to recruit Women’s Army Corps members for the

Medical Department seem to have resulted in the acceptance of few Negro

women but there was Women’s Army Corps detachment composed of Negroes

stationed in at least one general hospital (Halloran) in 1943.88 Six and possibly more Women’s Army Corps hospital companies were formed of Negroes in 1945 after the War Department General Statf had authorized this type of

unit. They functioned at the following general hospitals: Lovell, Fort

Devens, Mass.; Tilton, Fort Dix, N.J.; Halloran, Staten Island, N.Y.; Wakeman, Camp Atterbury, Ind.; Thomas M. England, Atlantic City, N.J.; and

Gardiner, Chicago, 111.89

85 Memorandum, Chief, Classification Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, to Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General (attention Procurement, Separation, and Reserve Branch, Office of The Surgeon General), Sept. 1945, with endorsement thereto,

Oct. 1945. (2) War Department Circular No. 290, 22 Sept. 1945. 80 (1) Memorandum, Maj. Gen. W. D. Styer, Army Service Forces, for The Surgeon General,

14 Dec. 1943, subject: Utilization of Negro Nurses. (2) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. R. W. Bliss, Chief, Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for Commanding General, Army Service Forces

(attention: Planning Division), 27 Dec. 1943, subject; Utilization of Negro Nurses. 87 (1) See footnote 52, p. 313. (2) Annual Report, Station Hospital, Camp Livingston, La., 1944. 88Annual Report, Halloran General Hospital, N.Y., 1943. 80 Directory of the Army of the United States (Exclusive of Army Air Forces and Attached Services), Sept. 1945.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 323

This did not represent any great demand for Negro enlisted women on the

part of Medical Department commanders. The Enlisted Branch of the Surgeon General’s Military Personnel Division reported in the fall of 1944 that

with one exception there had been practically no demand for these women and

“it has been found almost impossible to find suitable assignments for the few

that had been enlisted. Many of the few installations that do have colored

WAC’s seem desirous of releasing them.” 90 On the other hand, the surgeon of

one service command reporting for 1943 declared: “Especial mention should be

made of the success had in this service command with colored enlisted

women.” 91

Demands for Use of More Negro Medical Officers

During the emergency period and the war, Negro leaders and others urged

that more Negro members of the medical profession, especially doctors and

nurses, should be brought into the Medical Department. 92 The Surgeon General’s Office gave number of reasons why the use of Negroes was limited as

to numbers and range of jobs. One was the substandard ratings of the Negro

professional schools.93 Another as the results of the Army General Classification Tests, which ere unfavorable to Negroes. These and the proposed

demobilization of certain Negro combat units for lack of intelligence were

cited as reasons for assigning most of the Medical Department’s quota of

enlisted Negroes to the sanitary companies.94

Moreover, with reference to Negro doctors, the Ofiice of The Surgeon

General had pointed out even earlier that the Army’s requirements would have

to be considered in relation to civilian needs and that the ratio of physicians to

population was smaller in the case of Negroes than in that of whites. 95

In the course of the war, it became plain that, despite the insistence by

Negro doctors and their professional organization that the Army accept them,

the country’s total supply of Negro doctors w’as not great enough to spare

many from civilian life. Estimates of the number of Negro physicians in the

country ranged from about 3,300 to about 5,000. As late as October 194.2,

using figure of 3,800, the Assistant Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War,

Truman Gibson, stated that about 25 percent of the 1,900 who were practicing

in the North “could be rather easily spared for Army service” and that about

percent of the 1,900 practicing in the South could be spared. This would

give total of 570, in addition to those already in service, although itis almost

90 History, Enlisted Personnel, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S.

Army, July—September 1944.

91 Annual Report, Surgeon, Fifth Service Command, 1943. 02 Memorandum, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, The Surgeon General, for Assistant Chief of Staff,

G—1, 17 Mar. 1941, subject: Synopsis of Meeting Held Between The Surgeon General and Representatives of Negro Medical Association, Mar. 1941.

93 Letter, Brig. Gen. Albert G. Love, USA (Ret.), to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director,

Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 29 Nov. 1955.

91 See footnote 79, p. 320. 95 Memorandum, The Surgeon General (Col. G. F. Lull), for Colonel Wharton, G—1, 28 Dec. 1940.
324 PERSONNEL

certain that not all of these could have qualified physically for Army service

or would have volunteered for it, even though the Procurement and Assignment

Service had classified them as available. The Chief of The Surgeon General’s

Personnel Service confirmed the 25-percent estimate of availables in June 1943

when he stated that 75 percent of the names of applicants which he submitted

to member of the Subcommittee on Negro Health of the Procurement and

Assignment Service were turned down as being needed in their respective

communities. 96

UTILIZATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND NATIVE LABOR TROOPS

Zone of Interior

In accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929, the

Medical Department as well as other branches of the Army used captured

enemy personnel as they became available in this country. The two categories

of such personnel assisted the Medical Department in different ways. “Protected” personnel, which included enemy nationals who had been employed

in medical work, took over to an increasing extent the care of the sick and

wounded of their own nationality, under the administration and supervision

of members of the U.S. Army Medical Department. Except in cases of emergency, protected personnel were not to treat U.S. Army personnel who might

be patients in the same hospital.97 “Nonprotected” prisoners of war were used

for other types of work according to their capabilities, the Medical Department’s need, and the stipulations of the Geneva Convention as to the kind of

duties they might perform.

In 1945, the War Department directed that protected personnel should be

assigned to each service command in the ratio of doctors, dentists, and

enlisted men for each 1,000 prisoners. This quota did not include protected

personnel in general hospitals that cared for sick and wounded prisoners of

war. 98 As early as November 1943, the Secretary of War had directed that

maximum use be made of enemy personnel in the care and treatment of

prisoners of war of their own nationality and that so far as possible U.S. medi- cal personnel should be relieved from duty in prisoner-of-war hospitals, wards

and dispensaries. 99 In 1945, the question arose as to whether this injunction

was being followed to the letter.

The two general hospitals devoted exclusively to the care of prisoners of

war (Prisoner of War General Hospital No. at Camp Forrest, Tenn., and

96 Report of the Surgeon General’s Conference With Chiefs, Medical Branch, Service Commands 14-17 dune 1943. 07 War Department Technical Manual 19-500, “Enemy Prisoners of War,” Oct. 1944, with changes thereto. 98 Annual Report, Prisoner-of-War Liaison Unit, Office of Provost Marshal General, 1945. 09 War DepartmentPrisoner-of-War Circular No. 0, Nov. 1943.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 325

Glennan General Hospital, Okmulgee, Okla.) for time possessed duplicate

stall's of American and German personnel. 100 Liberal use of American personnel along with protected personnel also seems to have characterized other

hospitals receiving prisoner-of-war patients, for in February 1945 The Surgeon

General sent message on the subject to four service commands. Data in his

Office, he stated, showed continued assignment of considerably more Americans to prisoner-of-war hospitals than appeared to be necessary if protected

personnel were fully utilized; the needs of American patients made it essential

that all American personnel at these hospitals beyond the minimum required

for supervision be assigned elsewhere. The Surgeon General seems to have

found it necessary to repeat this admonition five months later, in July 1945.

At that time, total of 345 officers and 3,300 enlisted men had been certified as

protected personnel in the nine service commands, 101

“Nonprotected” prisoners of war as distinct from protected personnel

performed variety of tasks in hospitals and other Medical Department

installations. One service command reported that it was using them to the

number of 191 officers and 2,875 enlisted men for cleanup work, care of grounds,

landscaping, and mess duties. Hospital authorities seem to have found the

work of prisoners of war generally satisfactory. The Director of Personnel

at Valley Forge General Hospital, Pa., Capt. Francis E. Baker, MAC, went

so far as to say: “As the prisoners of war learned their assigned jobs and

became accustomed to the required standards, their services became invaluable

and in almost every instance supervisors preferred them to any other type

of personnel.” 102

Oversea Theaters

As in the Zone of Interior, the Medical Department overseas availed itself

of the services of prisoners of war, using them in construction as well as in the

operation and maintenance of medical installations. Prisoners of war used

in these ways were in addition to those protected personnel who were generally

assigned only to prisoner-of-war hospitals or to prisoner-of-war Avards in Army

hospitals. Prisoner-of-war labor, as long as hostilities endured, was important

only in the European and North African theaters, since few or no Japanese

captives were used by the Medical Department until after —J Day, except

to care for Japanese prisoner-of-war patients. 103

100 See footnote 52, p. 313.

101 See footnote 98, p. 324. 102 (1) Annual Report, Eighth Service Command, 1943. (2) Annual Report, Valley Forge General

Hospital, Pa., 1945. (3) See footnote 52, p. 313.

los (i) Letter, Col. I. A. Wiles, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 17 Sept. 1952,

and letter. Col. Paul O. Wells, to Col. C. H. Goddard, 26 Sept. 1952. (2) The sections which follow,

dealing with prisoners of war and native labor troops, are based largely on manuscript account of

“Medical Department Utilization of Civilian and POW Labor Overseas in World War II,” prepared

under the supervision of the authors of this volume by Cpi. Alan M. White.
326 PERSONNEL

Italian service troops

After the Italian armistice on September 1943, Italian prisoners of war

were organized into “Italian service units” under tables of organization and

equipment established by the War Department. Some of these organizations,

including “Italian sanitary companies” set up under TOE 8-1IT (the only

Medical Department table of organization utilized to establish Italian service

units), were assigned to Army hospitals and other medical units throughout

the communications zone, largely to supply common labor; although, occasionally, these units contained medical technicians or skilled artisans whose services

were especially valuable.

Normally, at least one Italian sanitary company, consisting of approximately officers and 115 enlisted men, would be assigned per general hospital,

and frequently this company would be augmented by platoon or more of

second. Such assignments usually meant the discharge of at least an equal

number of Arab, French, or Italian civilians since it was more advantageous

for the Medical Department to use personnel under military control who

could be given longer and more thorough training in their duties. The fact

that they could be required to work longer hours than civilian employees and

could be moved with units to new locations probably reinforced their acceptability. Many commanders felt that Italian troops exhibited superior efficiency

and more cooperative attitude than civilians. Few, if any, disciplinary

problems were encountered in the use of these troops, and they were described

as “honest, industrious, and faithful,” “willing and cooperative,” and having

“rendered inestimable service.”

In addition to the Italian troops, Yugoslav service troops, who had been

brought by the Germans to Sardinia as forced labor, “because,” by all accounts,

“the most effective and dependable source of labor available in the theater,” when their “detested” Italian officers were replaced by Americans and they

were given proper nourishment and medical care.

On May 1945, medical service-type units in the Mediterranean theater

employed more than 400 civilians and approximately 5,000 prisoners of war

(table 21).

The invasion of southern France in August 1944, which was based on the

North African theater, brought some Italian service troops into the European

theater. However, they played comparatively insignificant role in the latter

area. In June 1945, they accounted for but 1.8 percent of the entire Medical

Department communications zone personnel (exclusive of headquarters installations), the corresponding figure for the Army as whole being 3.5 percent

(table 23).

German prisoners of war

During the Normandy campaign (June and July 1944), German prisoners

of war were used as litter bearers, sanitary details, and other “general work”

at the evacuation hospitals of the First U.S. Army. Usually, 40 of these
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 327

men were assigned to each evacuation hospital. In August and September

1944, the Third U.S. Army used 40 prisoners of war per 400-bed evacuation

hospital, 50 prisoners of war per 750-bed evacuation hospital, and about twice

that number in each medical depot company. The general policy of the theater

was that prisoners of war in the evacuation hospitals could be retained days

only, at the end of which period they had to be exchanged for new group of

prisoners. However, after October 1944, evacuation hospitals and medical

depots in the Third U.S. Army were permitted to retain prisoners “after

proper screening” for an indefinite length of time. The successful use of

prisoners of war in the First U.S. Army evacuation hospitals during the early

stage of continental operations suggested their further use in communications

zone medical installations, and they were used extensively at general hospitals

and depots on the Continent.

Probably, the average number of German prisoners used per general

hospital was 250-300, although there are many instances where more were

assigned. The 813th Hospital Center at Mourmelon, France, in 1945 had

7,321 German prisoners of war working in its 10 general hospitals. In April

1945, German prisoners of war working for the Medical Department in nonheadquarters installations of the communications zone of the European Theater

totaled nearly 40,000. In May, this number increased considerably, perhaps

because of redeployment of Medical Department troops. At the end of August,

it amounted to 29 percent of the entire Medical Department personnel of the

zone. Nevertheless, this proportion was smaller than the equivalent ratio

for all branches of the Army, the same being true of all other months between

June and October. The actual number used also began to decline after May,

and whereas in the months April-June, inclusive, the Medical Department

was utilizing in the vicinity of 13-15 percent of all nonheadquarters communications zone prisoner-of-war labor, this percentage fell well below 10 percent

in subsequent months (table 23).

In the United Kingdom Base Section, the original plan was for 10

hospitals to use 250 German prisoners each and 30 hospitals to use 50 each; it was later decided that 100 was the minimum number that could be profitably utilized in single hospital. In this base section, however, the Medical Department made little use of such labor until March 1945, but, thereafter, its

importance increased greatly. 104 Even in May 1945, however, when more

than 40 percent of nonheadquarters Medical Department communications zone

troops were stationed in the United Kingdom, only slightly more than 15

percent of the German prisoners used in nonheadquarters communications

zone medical installations were located there (table 23).

German prisoners of war performed the same general duties for the

Medical Department as did civilian employees; that is, primarily manual

labor (fig. 39). Sometimes this included ward duties although, generally, they were not employed in such duties. Enlisted prisoners with experience

104For the firs fi if 1945 the hospital employment figures were as follows January, 317 Feb- ruary, 415 March, 2,525 April, 5,726 May, 8,228 and June, 7,236.

663076 —63 23
328 PERSONNEL

Figure 39.—German prisoners of war assist in unloading hospital

train. Liege, Belgium, 18 March 1945, Hospital Train No. 8.

in repair and maintenance of medical equipment were assigned to many of the

medical depot companies in the theater.

In 1944 on the Continent, medical units drew their prisoner labor from

the nearest prisoner-of-war stockade. In the communications zone, such enclosures were constructed at or near most general hospitals. As the need for

prisoner labor increased, the European theater organized it in more formal

manner than previously. directive of October 1944 assigned to the base

section commanders of the communications zone the responsibility for “formation of POW’s into labor companies of approximately 250 each,” and “military

labor service companies” were organized accordingly. U.S. officer and enlisted

personnel were attached to the prisoner-of-war labor companies for administration and supervision. 105 Displaced persons were recruited to replace American units on guard duty with the prisoners-of-war labor companies. In 1945,

the 10 general hospitals of the 813th Hospital Center employed 935 Dutch

guards and 788 Polish women.

105 Lewis, George G., and Mewha, John History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the U.S. Army,

1776-1945. Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955. [DA Pamphlet 20-213.]
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 329

In Italy, German prisoners of war were available only in isolated cases

for Medical Department work before the end of the fighting in that country

(2 May 1945) but many were used to replace civilians and Italian troops in

Army hospitals in the summer of 1945. Indeed, German prisoners of war

were regarded as the most skillful, efficient, and cooperative of all local labor

groups at least inEurope.

Native labor troops

In addition to displaced persons and prisoners of war the Medical Department was able to obtain the services of native labor troops in certain areas.

During the latter part of the war, such troops were sent into Assam from

southern India and used by medical supply depot, 100

After the capitulation of Italy and the assumption by the Italian Government of quasi-Allied status, that government supplied troops to the

Medical Department who, unlike the Italian service unit personnel, were not

technically prisoners of war. These were used in the combat zone of the Mediterranean theater; as has been stated, the service units were not expected to

serve in that zone. Most evacuation hospitals in that theater had from 30 to

60 Italian soldiers working for them. Some Italian soldiers were reluctant

to serve as litter bearers in forward areas but others performed this function

with skill and courage. The attachment of the so-called military companies

to Army malaria control detachments, where “they were organized as labor

crews for ditching, larviciding and house spraying,” was said to be “very

satisfactory” and to have “enabled the control units to increase their work

schedules many fold.”

MORALE FACTORS IN EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL

Living and working conditions in the Army were sufficiently different

from those in civilian life as to require considerable adjustment on the part of

the new officer or soldier, whatever his branch of service. Conditions overseas

might make the problem of adjustment good deal more difficult. Very frequently prolonged service in unfamiliar surroundings was in itself depressing

factor. Even year overseas was long enough for some Medical Department

officers to reveal distinctly “fed-up” attitude toward their environment, although the dissatisfaction appeared more often after period of 18 months.

The extent to which the condition manifested itself differed among individuals and probably many escaped it altogether. Others showed loss of interest

in routine duties, irritability, and general inefficiency. Nurses found the

first year of their service overseas both interesting and stimulating despite the

attendant hardships and discomforts. At the end of 18 months of service,

108 Letter, Lt. Col. Irvine H. Marshall, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, Aug.

1952.
330 PERSONNEL

however, nurses serving in forward hospitals began to display signs of rest- lessness and homesickness. Enlisted men of the Medical Department dis- played similar signs of discomfort, but when these most frequently appeared

has not been ascertained.

Methods of Combating Morale Problems Overseas

Value of continued professional activity

Despite war weariness, the effect of long stays overseas was mitigated

in the case of nurses if they had sufficient amount of satisfactory work to

keep them busy. Morale remained at high level when the patient load and

demands for the services of these women were heaviest. When there was little

to do, it dropped drastically even after hostilities had ceased, as in the European theater in July 1945. Nurses were also anxious to care for battle casualties. Those who found themselves on protracted duty in Panama, for example,

were unhappy because they had no opportunity to do so. Thus, although

nurses could expect to withstand the conditions in rear areas for as long as

years without suffering harm, they were eager for forward duty, and their

morale sagged when it was denied them. Many combat unit nurses were reluctant to move into rear areas, although they were unable to escape the wearing

effects of the service they were performing. 107

The value in terms of morale of keeping personnel busy in the professional

tasks to which they were primarily suited was not confined to nurses. It was

of demonstrated weight in the case of medical officers and others. When the

immediate professional duties were not sufficient for the purpose, as well as

at other times, library facilities, the circulation of professional journals, clubs

for the discussion of such periodicals, and professional conferences and meetings all served to bolster morale. In the European theater, before D-day,

number of opportunities for professional refreshment were afforded:

theatermedical society and several area medical societies meeting at short intervals an Inter-Allied medical society which met in London every month and to

which the Chief Surgeon could order 200 medical officers, thus affording them

transportation; and weekly visits to the great teaching hospitals in London

for 10 officers at time. After V-E Day, groups from the European theater were sent to medical centers all over westernEurope. 108

In 1943, the Twelfth Air Force reported from the North African theater

that among its medical personnel flight surgeons, being intensely interested in

aviation medicine and flying, had shown the least staleness and loss of morale.

107 (1) History of Medical Department Activities in the Caribbean Defense Command in World

War II. [Official record.] (2) See footnote 45(2), p. 306. (3) Parsons, Anne F. History of the

Army Nurse Corps in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 1942-45. [Official record.] (4)

Annual Report, 814th Hospital Center, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1945. (5) Report,

Lt. Col. Alan P. Parker, MC, Executive Officer, 38th General Hospital, on Medical Department

Activities in the MiddleEast, 23 Dec. 1943. 108 Letter, Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, USA (Ret.), to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director,

Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 12 Mar. 1956.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 331

On the other hand, dental officers in the Air Forces, although they were engaged in work quite similarto that which had occupied them in civilian life, still

developed mental depressions of varying degree. Even the interest of flight

surgeons in their work began to wane after they had been overseas in excess

of 20 months. 109 It was in respect to nurses that the value of continued professional activities as means of maintaining morale was considered greatest;

nevertheless, even in their case, these activities served only to retard the cumulative effects of prolonged oversea service. 110

Recreation

Personnel of the Medical Department, under other than combat conditions

and just as in other branches of the Army, usually had access to various types

of recreational facilities, including officers’ and enlisted men’s clubs, which

were provided as means of maintaining morale and alleviating the adverse

conditions under which troops had to live in oversea theaters. Indeed, because

of their proximity to the facilities provided for patients, Medical Department

troops were perhaps better off in regard to spectator activities than those of

most other arms and services. Recreational facilities of course were not always

available. This was true particularly on some of the small islands in the Pacific.

On Guam, for example, there were few recreational facilities and no club. 111

Leaves, furloughs, and reassignments

Besides steady occupation and proper recreation, another means of restoring morale and efficiency was temporary or permanent relief from assigned

duties. This could be accomplished without discharging man from the service, by various administrative means which were used by the Medical Department as by other branches of the Army. Only scattered data are available

as to the extent to which these devices were used overseas. Among them were

leaves of absence for officers and their equivalent, furloughs, for eulisted men,

both of which however were probably of much shorter duration, as rule, than

the standard days in months suggested by the field service regulations.

Several medical officers who saw service in the Pacific and Mediterranean

theaters believe that medical personnel in those areas fared about the same as

others with respect to leaves and furloughs, although distances in the Pacific

sometimes made return from leave areas unpredictable. 112

109 (1) Report, Col. Abram J. Abeloff, MC, on Medical Department Activities in the Persian Gulf

Command, 29 May 1945. (2) Flick, John B. Activities of Surgical Consultants, Pacific Theater,

In History of Pacific Ocean Areas and Middle Pacific. [Official record.] (3) Annual Report, Surgeon,

Twelfth Air Force, 1943. (4) Letter, Col. W. F. Cook, Surgeon, to Maj. Gen. D. N. W. Grant, Air

Surgeon, Army Air Forces, Aug. 1944.

110 (1) Stone, James H. History of the Army Nurses, Physical Therapists, and Hospital Dietitians in India and Burma. [Official record.] (2) Annual Report, 36th General Hospital, 1944.

111 (1) See footnote 109. (2) The annual reports of hospitals during the war mentioned the

sharing of facilities with patients.

112 (1) Letter, L. K. Pohl, MC, USAF, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General,

Aug. 1952. (2) Letter, G. H. Yeager, to C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 29 Sept.

1952. (3) Letter, T. C. Keramides, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 12 Sept.

1952.
332 PERSONNEL

Reassignment in or outside an individual’s organization and detached

service or temporary duty away from it were other means ofrelief from assignments involving heavy strain, although, unlike leaves and furloughs, they

served various additional purposes. Reassignment was practiced extensively

within the Medical Department overseas as well as in the United States and

between the United States and oversea areas.

Rotation

In popular parlance within the Army, some of the forms of transfer or

reassignment—such as placing oversea personnel on temporary duty in the

United States when that practice was instituted as policy toward the end of

the war—were loosely comprehended in the term “rotation.” As defined by

War Department Circular No. 58, February 1944,rotation was “the exchange

of personnel in theaters for replacements furnished from the United States as

substitutes therefor in accordance with advance requisitions submitted periodically by theater commanders.” Rotation within the theaters, to which the

directive also referred, was presumably to be understood as also requiring the

provision of substitutes for persons being sent elsewhere, in accordance with

advance requisitions submitted by the units from which the transfers were to

be made. An earlier directive (28 June 1943) was the beginning of an Armywide rotation policy. Among the persons it specified as eligible for transfer

to theUnited States were (1) those “whose morale or health has been adversely

affected by prolonged periods of duty under unusually severe conditions, even

though not requiring hospitalization,” and (2) those whose experience and

training would make them useful “in the training and formation of new units, or for other purposes.” Tine directive of February 1944 added third

category—“personnel considered by the theater commander as deserving of

such return.” Both circulars provided that persons in the first category be

returned to theUnited States only when their effectiveness could not be restored

by rotation within the theater. In general, theater commanders were directed

to rofate personnel within their jurisdiction in order to maintain the efficiency

of their commands.

The Medical Department had practiced intratheater rotation to some

extent even before the Army-wide policy was instituted. In the European

theater, program involving temporary exchanges of medical officers of company grade between the 5th General Hospital and tactical units training in Northern Ireland was carried on as early as 1942. Although the advantages

of the scheme were generally acclaimed, wider application of it did not

follow for long time. 113

On 30 September 1943, months after the first War Department directive

favoring intratheater rotation appeared, instructions to apply it to medical

n3 Middleton, W. S.: Medicine in the European Theater of Operations. Ann. Int. Med. 26 191-200, February 1947.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL

officers in the China-Burma-India theater were issued by the theater commander. Under these regulations, officers of the Medical Corps who had served

with troops in the field for more than 12 months might apply for transfer to

hospital duty, and officers with at least the same amount of service in hospitals

might request transfer to combat unit. In general, however, such rotation as

not to be applied to specialists and flight surgeons, nor were applications for

transfer to be approved if the transfer would lower the efficiency of unit engaged in combat or one about to become so engaged. Each commander was directed to effect transfers within his own command if it was possible to do so, and

if applications were not forthcoming, he was instructed to initiate such transfers as he believed good for the service. 114

It was not until year later that this policy was formally adopted by the

Medical Department in the European theater. Two types of intratheater

rotation were formulated by the theater surgeon. Permanent rotation from

ground force units to communications zone installations was provided for

officers and men ho had served with line units for extended periods and whose

value to the medical service in the opinion of the respective army surgeons

would be enhanced by such reassignment. At the same time, rotation of

specialists was introduced. Specialists were to be transferred for months’

tour of duty from general and station hospitals to field and evacuation hospitals and auxiliary surgical groups operating in the army area, or vice versa.

This program was adopted primarily for professional purposes, being designed to enable medical officers to follow the progress of their patients

through various echelons of treatment. 115

Precisely how much advantage was taken of these programs is not known,

but it is certain that they were curtailed as result of the German counteroffensive of December 1944, At that time, as has been stated the communications zone was called upon to supply large numbers of officers and men to army

units without receiving replacements in return. The permanent type of rotation was especially affected by this development, 116

Nevertheless, on January 1945, theater headquarters again authorized rotation of Medical Department officers and enlisted men between army area and communications zone

units. The minimum period of service in field army unit required to establish eligiblity for such rotation was year, of which months had to be subsequent to D-day. The age limit for men transferred to an army was fixed

at 35, except in special cases, and they were to possess grades and professional

or technical qualifications similar to those of the men they ere replacing.

Before man could be transferred from an army to the communications zone,

his replacement had to be immediately available. The monthly quota of trans114 Circular No. 75, Headquarters, Rear Echelon, U.S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India, 30 Sept.

1943, subject: Rotation of Officers. 113 (1) See footnote 36, p. 303. (2) Annual Report, Professional Service Division, Office of The

Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944.

118 See footnote 36, p. 303.
334 PERSONNEL

fers for each army was fixed at Medical Corps officers, other Medical Department officers, and 25 enlisted men. 117

Intratheater rotation of medical officers was practiced in the North

African-Mediterranean theater as early as 1943. Company grade officers in

combat units who were more than 35 years of age were moved to communications zone units and replaced, insofar as possible, by general service officers

under 30. In most cases personnel wounded in combat or otherwise hospitalized also were reassigned to the communications zone if they so desired. Two

or more years of constant field service, especially if part of this was rendered

in combat, gave an individual strong claim to rotation from field unit to

communicat ions zone hospital. 118

In the Mediterranean theater, it was reported that, up to March 1945,

365 Medical Corps officers had been rotated between field units and communications zone hospitals. The impression of former consultant in the theater was

that more officers moved from field units to hospitals than in the opposite direction and that the losses of the former were made up by requisitioning replacements from the Zone of Interior. 119 In view of the charge that Zone of Interior replacements in the theater were scarce during the Italian campaign,

there is some doubt as to how well the process of replacement was

accomplished.

In the European theater, the exchange of personnel within the theater was

not without its morale problems. Difficulties arose when men with relatively

high rank who had served in forward units were rotated to establishments

further in the rear where they outranked personnel with greater experience

and talent in specialized work, 120 This situation has been attributed at least

in part to the fact that interchangeability of personnel, as regards rank, was

less possible in table-of-organization general hospitals than in evacuation

hospitals. 121

Not much information is available about the amount of rotation of Medical

Department personnel between the theaters and the Zone of Interior. In early

1945, The Surgeon General asserted that the rate of rotation of medical officers

from oversea theaters had been much higher than that of any other arm or

service. 122 Yet there were complaints that the rotation of both medical officers

117 Letter, Brig. Gen, R. B. Lovett, Adjutant General, European Theater of Operations, to Commanding General, each Army Group, and Commanding General, each Army, Jan. 1945, subject:

Rotation of MedicalPersonnel Between Communications Zone and Armies. 118 Letter, Stewart F. Alexander, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, Dec. 1955. 110 Letter, E. D. Churchill, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, Sept. 1952, with extract from Lt. Col. M. E. DeBakey, for The Surgeon General, Mar. 1945, subject: Report

of Visit to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. 120 (1) Letters, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, from J. S. Skobba, M.D.,

10 Oct. 1952 T. L. Badger, M.D., Sept. 1952 M. B. DeBakey, M.D.. Aug. 1952; and C. S. Drayer, Sept. 1952. (2) Annual Report, Professional Service Division, Office of The Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1945. 121 Letters, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, from W. S. Middleton, M.D.,

26 Aug. 1952; Alan Challman, M.D., 1,1 Sept. 1952 J. M. Flumerfelt, M.D., Sept. 1952 and C. H. Bramlitt, M.D., 24 July 1952. 122 Letter, The Surgeon General, to Dr. Olin West, Secretary and General Manager, American Medical Association, 31 Mar. 1945.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 335

and other medical personnel was insufficient. About March 1944, the Surgeon

of the Twelfth Air Force (Mediterranean theater), expressing his belief that

“the rotation policy has not been adequate,” called attention to the fact that

since the inception of that Force only one dental officer in it had been returned

to theUnited States for any reason except medical. 123

In answer to criticism of the low rate of rotation of nurses, the Deputy

Surgeon General pointed out that the rotation policy for these women was the

same as that for other personnel. 124 He stated that although the Surgeon General's Office had concurred in special policy proposed by the Mediterranean

theater whereby 30 nurses would be returned to the United States each month,

sufficient replacements for these women could not be supplied. As there were

approximately 2,500 nurses in the Mediterranean theater in November 1944, it

is readily seen that 30 rotations month would have benefited only small

percentage of the nurses in the theater.

Despite widespread agreement on the physical and professional benefits of

rotation, various medical commanders in the theaters saw drawbacks in the

practice. They were disturbed by the prospect of losing an experienced member of team and having to spend time training an inexperienced replacement.

Such task would, of course, be more difficult if the hospital or other type of

unit was operating with heavy patient load. The theaters, as already noted,

had to wait until replacement arrived before permitting man to leave for

the United States. Although authorities in the United States endeavored to

send men with the same qualifications as those they were to replace, instances

occurred in which the replacement lacked the attainments of the man being

relieved. 125

The North African theater refused to rotate within the theater man of

particular value in either combat zone or communications zone assignment. 126

With reference to oversea rotation, the theater surgeon in statement issued in

early 1944, declared that “only under unusual circumstances should key professional personnel be recommended for rotation. Chiefs of professional services, psychiatrists, surgeons, medical or surgical specialists should be considered

as key professional personnel.” 127 There was feeling in the theater that the

policy of rotation had resulted in the loss during 1943 of many well-trained, experienced medical officers, and that replacements frequently had been relatively

inexperienced men,128 As result of this feeling, and of the theater surgeon’s

directive, the more competent officers ceased to be nominated forrotation, which

thus became reward to the less deserving.129 Indeed, in the European theater,

the Chief Surgeon’s Office, while not actively discouraging intratheater rotation, long looked upon it with suspicion because itmight lend itself to efforts of

123 See footnote 109 (3), p. 331.

124 Letter, Maj. Gen. George P. Lull, Deputy Surgeon General, to Hon. Edith Nourse Rogers, 16 Feb.

1945.125 Annual Report, 15th Field Hospital, 1944. 128 See footnote 118, p. 334. 127 Annual Report, Surgeon, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944, vol. I. 128 Annual Report, Surgeon, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 1944, vol. II. 129 Annual Report, 70th General Hospital, 1944.

663076 —63 24
336 PERSONNEL

commanders to rid themselves of undesirable officers or to create promotion

opportunities for personnel within an establishment by requisitioning replacement in grade lower than that of the individual to be rotated out of the

unit. 130

Toward the end of the war, the War Department adopted an alternative

to rotation in the form of temporary duty in the United States. This gave the

persons so assigned break in oversea service without ending it for them entirely. One method by which this was accomplished, particularly in the case

of nurses, was to assign the officers as medical attendants of patients being

evacuated to the Zone of Interior and upon their arrival in the United States to

grant them emergency leave. 131

Many officers in the Mediterranean theater preferred temporary duty in

the United States to rotation, for they wished to continue as members of their

units rather than be separated from them and risk being sent to another theater.132 Commanding officers recognized certain advantages to this temporaryduty assignment, for it not only permitted them to give their subordinates

leave at home without the necessity of obtaining replacement beforehand, but

also assured them of the return of experienced personnel after time. 133 In

the very merits of the system, however, lay its disadvantages, for the same

commander might be deprived of valuable officer’s service for period of 60

to 90 days without any kind of substitute. 134

Thus, in the Mediterranean theater at least, commanding officers became

increasingly favorable to rotation as method which was more likely than

temporary duty to provide them with replacements. 135 Perhaps they also felt

that it was better to have fresh personnel than war-weary veterans of oversea

service, even after period of leave at home, particularly since the approaching

termination of the war made it less necessary than formerly to depend on experienced officers.

Although rotation was of limited scope, its influence, according to Col.

Stewart F. Alexander, former chief personnel officer in the medical service of

the North African theater and the Seventh U.S. Army, “was vital factor in

maintenance of morale *, The benefits extended far beyond the

actual number of men rotated. The men in forward or unfavorable areas often

were dominated by the thought that they were doomed in perpetuity to their

assignments. Rotation was very concrete expression that higher echelons

were interested in their problems, and was potent influence for good. This

was particularly true in that rather small but very important groups were de130 Memorandum, Col. D. E. Liston, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations,

for Adjutant General, Personnel, European Theater of Operations, 11 Mar. 1944. 131 (1) Annual Report, Chief Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, |,944. (2) Annual Report, Surgeon, United Kingdom Base, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944. 132 (1) Annual Report, 43d General Hospital, 1944. (2) Annual Report, Surgeon, Fifth U.S.

Army, 1944. 133 See footnote 131 (2), above. 131 (1) Annual Report, Surgeon, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944, vol. II.

(2) See footnote 132 (2), above. 133 (1) See footnote 132 (2). (2) Annual Report, Surgeon, Fifth U.S. Army, 1945.
UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL 337

tailed overseas early in the war, when neither the physical aids nor the incentives of imminent victory were present.” 136

Authorization of medical badge

Promotion was not the only reward for exceptional service. In 1945, the

Medical Department’s enlisted men and lower ranking officers who were serving

with troops in combat received something approaching the recognition that had

already been accorded infantrymen. For the latter, the War Department in

October 1943 had authorized an Expert Infantryman Badge and Combat

Infantryman Badge, and in June 1944, Congress had awarded $5 month extra

pay to holders of the first and $10 month to holders of the second. 137 In late

1944, Medical Department observer returning to the Surgeon General’s Office

after visit to the European theater proposed serious consideration of increased

pay for medical troops in the infantry. He added that many infantry companies made special arrangements by which medical aidmen were paid out of

company funds, and said it was generally felt that such men did daily what,

if the infantryman did it, would have brought him Bronze Star award.

As it happened, special badge had already been proposed for the medical

aidmen. On March 1945, the General Staff authorized Medical Badge to

be worn by Medical Department officers of company grade, warrant officers, and

enlisted men who were “daily sharing with the infantry the hazards and hardships of combat.” The badge could be temporarily withdrawn when the bearer

was transferred or assigned outside the Medical Department to duties in which

he might come into contact with the enemy. This, it was explained, was

ordered so as not to impair the protected status of regularly assigned Medical

Department personnel. In such cases, the right to wear the badge was restored

on relief from combat duties or on reassignment to the Medical Department.

The badge was of oxidized silver and showed stretcher placed horizontally

behind caduceus with cross of the Geneva Convention at the junction of the

wings, the whole enclosed by an elliptical wreath inch in height and iy inches

in length. Like all ground badges, it was worn on the left breast of the service

coat, jacket, or shirt. 138 At first, these badges were not awarded posthumously;

later, the badge might be awarded to any individual eligible to receive it who

had been killed in action or died as result of wounds received in action on or

after December 1941. In 1945, Congress authorized pay of $10 per month

to enlisted men (but not officers) entitled to wear the badge. 139

For bravery in action, in World War II, as well as for meritorious service,

many personnel of the Medical Department received citations ranging from the

highest award conferred by the U.S. Government, the Congressional Medal of

Honor, to the Bronze Star medal—as well as decorations from foreign governments. At least nine of these unarmed soldiers received the Congressional

Medal of Honor (fig. 40).

136 See footnote 118, p. 334. is? (i) War Department CircularNo. 269, 27 Oct. 1943. (2) 58 Stat. 648.

138Army Regulations No. 600-70, 18 Apr. 1948.

iao (i) War Department Circulars No. 66, Mar. 1945, and 151, 23 May 1945. (2) 59 Stat. 462.
PERSONNEL

Figure 40.—Medical Department enlisted men awarded the Congressional Medal of

Honor, in World War II. Upper row, left to right: Pfc. Desmond T. Doss, Okinawa; Pvt.

Harold A. Carman, France; Pfc. Lloyd C. Hawks, Italy. Center row, left to right: Cpl.

Thomas J. Kelly, Germany; Pvt. William B. McGee (died of wounds), Germany; Pfc.

Frederick C. Murphy (killed in action), Germany. Lower row, from left to right: T4g.

Laverne Parrish (died of wounds), Luzon, Philippine Islands Pfc. Frank J. Petrarca (died

of wounds), New Georgia, Solomon Islands; T5g. Alfred L. Wilson (died of wounds),

France.
CHAPTER XI

Strength and Distribution of Military Personnel

OVERALL STRENGTH

Overall strength of the Medical Department and its military components

during the emergency and war periods, in comparison with the strength of

the Army as whole, is shown in table 1. The figures include sizable number of Medical and Dental Corps officers who, though placed on active duty in

1944, served in the Veterans’ Administration and, therefore, were not available for Army duty (table 27).

DISTRIBUTION, OVERSEAS AND IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR

Prior to the passage of the Selective Service Act in September 1940 and

the Federalization of the National Guard, approximately 16 to IT percent of

the Medical Department’s personnel were serving overseas (table 28). With

the expansion of the Army, large numbers of men were assigned to the Medical Department, but since the vast majority of these remained in the Zone

of Interior for training purposes, the proportion of the medical strength in

Table 27.-—Number of Medical Department officers assigned to the Veterans’ Administration,

January 19^-June 1946

Month

1944 1945 1946

Medical

Corps

Dental

Corps MedicalCorps DentalCorps MedicalCorps DentalCorps

400 1, 647 150 1, 310 160

500 1, 673 150 1, 195 150

March 600 1, 669 155 1, 154 143

750 ], 674 160 826 110

May 856 79 1, 677 165 663 87

June --

951 103 1, 676 165 569 78

July 998 115 1, 676 165

August 1, 124 122 1, 671 165

September 1, 180 130 1, 645 165

October 1, 237 141 1, 565 165

November 1, 237 141 1, 495 170

December. 1, 622 149 1, 356 160

Source: “Time Series on Medical Department Personnel by Corps, 1942-46,” furnished to Historical Division, Office

of The Surgeon General, by Resources Analysis Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 24 January 1950.
340 PERSONNEL

oversea areas was considerably smaller in the months preceding Pearl Harbor

than it had been year earlier. The ratio of medical troops, and of service

troops, in general, to total oversea strength also was low (table 29). After

December 1941, the shipment of service troops abroad was accelerated, and

the proportion of medical personnel to total oversea strength likewise increased

very considerably (tables 29 and 30). When, in January 1944, major emphasis again was placed on provision of combat troops, the rate of augmentation

of medical personnel, in contrast to the earlier period, generally exceeded that

of service troops as whole (table 29). The ratio of medical to general Army

strength overseas declined only slightly prior to V-E Day (table 31). Once

the initial lag in shipment of medical troops was overcome, the percentage of

total Army strength and the percentage of total Medical Department strength

stationed in oversea areas were fairly equal (table 31).

Table 28.—Oversea strength of the Medical Department, 30 June 1939 and 30 June 1940

Group

Oversea strength Percent of worldwide strength

30 June 1939 30 June 1940 30 June 1939 30 June 1940

Medical Corps. ... 183 229 16. 14.

Dental Corps 42 57 19. 16.

Veterinary Corps __ 17 18 13. 10.

Army Nurse Corps 110 138 16. 14.

Enlisted personnel 2, 556 17.

Annual Reports of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939 and

1940. For worldwide strength, see table 1. To enlisted strength as shown there, 310 Philippine Scouts have been added.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 341

Table 29.—Development of Medical Department strength overseas, as compared with development of service strength, November 1941-September 1945

End of month

Total Army Service strength Medical Department

Oversea

strength

(percent

increase)

Number Percent of total oversea

Army Percent

increase

Percent of total oversea Army Percent

increase

1941 November 40, 234 24. 4.

1942 March 98. 87, 178 26. 116. 5. 138.

June 83. 207, 266 34. 137. 7. 124.

September 36. 303, 808 36. 46. 7. 37.

1943 January 36. 462, 049 41. 52. 7. 49.

April 25. 618, 398 44. 33. 8. 28.

July ___ -- 27. 822, 167 46. 33. 7. 23.

October-, 20. 1, 059, 839 49. 28. 8. 28.

1944 January. 31. 1, 376, 992 48. 29. 8. 32.

April 26. 1, 695, 822 47. 23. 8. 25.

July 15. 1, 957, 559 47. 15. 8. 14.

October. 13. 2, 148, 669 46. 9. 8. 13.

1945 January 10. 2, 366, 840 46. 10. 8. 9.

April 5. 2, 463, 761 45. 4. 8. 4.

July. -9. 2, 389, 223 49. -2. 8. -8.

September -15. 2, 044, 607 49. -14. 7. -21.

Forpurposes ofcomparability, all data for April, July, and September 1945 exclude personnel under the command

of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Forbasic data, see table 31.

For basic data, see table 31.

Basic data for30 November 1941 provided by The Adjutant General’s Strength and Accounting Branch, Time 1958.

All other basic data from “Strength of the Army” for dates corresponding to those shown; includes, in addition to the

Medical Department, the following categories as shown in the sources: Chemical Warfare Service; Corps of Engineers;

Signal Corps, Adjutant General’s Department; Chaplains Corps; Finance Department; Judge Advocate General’s

Department; Ordnance Department; Quartermaster Corps; Inspector General’s Department; Military Intelligence;

General Staff Corps; Warrant Officers; Transportation Corps (September 1942-September 1945); Military Police Corps

(March 1942-September 1945); Specialists Reserve (June 1942-April 1945); Army Specialist Corps (September 1942);

WAAC or WAC (January 1943-September 1945); Detached List and/or Detached Enlisted Men’s List (November 1941-

October 1944);Not Member of Branch/or Branch Immaterial dime 1942-September 1945); unassignedand miscellaneous

detachments (November 1941-March 1942). Personnel shown under “service strength” minus those in the Corps of

Engineers, Signal Corps, and Chemical Warfare Service. Theseoriginally were grouped with the combat arms.
342 PERSONNEL

Table

30.

—Movement

of

Medical

Department troops

overseas, compared

with

movement

of

all

Army,

all

combat,

and

all

service

troops,

July

1942-

August 1945

cr

September •-J 4h £L Ei S' Oq CD

CD

cr

CD

CD

cr

CD

cr

CD

"I

rq 1942 July-Decem- cc

C- C- co Jr* C+- vr CO |_l

[onth

and

year

4^ Oi h-i

CO to 05 00 CO oo Number 00 05 4. Oi 05 00

H-l >■ C4- 4— 00 VJ CD to to 00 to to o> -v| CO oo CO CO C5 CO

increasePercent

CO

CO 05 to 00 4- to Or 4- Oi to

Total 5° 4^ oo 4^ Ol 05 05

r> Or Or Oi CO to

4^ 4- Or 4- Oi 00 cr 4^ CO CO CO ZO

Oi 4- CO 4- Oi Oi CO 4- 05 05 Oi CO oo 4- to shipments Armytotal ofPercent to Oi 00 CO 05 CO

increase Percent

to

JSC

00 to

00 4- 05 CO CO 4^ Oi

Number VI CO CO JO

CO Oi CO 00 00 to 00 to 05 (X) Or 00 to 00

4^ 05 4^ 4- 05 Or Percent CO CO 4- CO 05 Oi ~vj §a Army total of

H- 45- shipments CO 00 Or to cd CL

era

Percent increase

to

to

4^ CO 4- to to CO CO

VI to

VI

VI

to

4-

to 05

00 05

umber 4»-

oo 4- 05 Or 05 4^

§: to Or oo to Cn

CO CO to to 4^ CO §a Army total ol Percent 45- 05 00 CO 05 00 Oi

05 00 Or CO 4- 4^ CD shipments CL

S£ CQ

CD

<1

increase Percent

4^ CO to CO

Number •P CO Oi 4^ 05 CO 05

05 00 CO Oi 05 C5 => to

CO 00 CO 4- CO oo CO 00 4- 05 CO 05 05

total of Percent 05 Oi Or 4*. Or VI Or *3

Oi 00 4- 4- Cn to to 4- CD shipments Army CL

increase Percent CD

*d

CO

h-*

Number CO CO Cn 4^ *v| CO CO 4* to to CO t— 00

increase Percent cd
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 343

1943

Total,

JanuaryJune.

660,

802

25.

298,

794

45.

22.

362,

008

54.

27.

285,

026

43.

43.

44,

627

6.

45.

2,

814

136.

January

80,

526

26,

726

33.

53,

800

66.

40,

213

49.

7,

006

8.

478

February

84,

412

36,

256

43.

48,

156

57.

40,

903

48.

5,

079

6.

258

March

70,

399

28,

875

41.

41,

524

59.

35,

445

50.

5,

081

7.

152

April

150,

038

78,

036

52.

72,

002

48.

61,

181

40.

11,

857

7.

803

May

142,

787

65,

417

45.

77,

370

53.

59,

235

41.

8,

788

6.

588

June

132,

640

63,

484

47.

69,

156

52.

48,

149

36.

6,

816

5.

535

Total,

July-December. 1,

120,

376

69.

550,

364

49.

84.

570,

012

50.

57.

464,

549

41.

63.

86,

562

7.

94.

7,

297

159.

July

159,

904

72,

126

45.

87,

178

54.

59,

243

37.

10,

111

6.

701

August

154,

489

66,

021

42.

88,

468

57.

70,

556

45.

15,

070

9.

1,

699

September

159,

755

87,

215

54.

72,

540

47.

61,

914

38.

14,

574

9.

1,

409

October

229,

787

129,

546

56.

100,

241

43.

84,

807

36.

13,

578

5.

962

November

152,

483

63,

700

41.

88,

783

58.

79,

327

52.

11,

082

7.

1,

162

December

263,

958

131,

156

49.

132,

802

50.

108,

702

41.

22,

147

8.

1,

364

1944

Total,

JanuaryJune.

1,

428,

115

27.

787,

239

55.

43.

640,

876

44.

12.

533,

440

37.

14.

108,

537

7.

25.

7,

163

-1.

January

248,

245

125,

633

50.

122,

612

49.

106,

953

43.

17,

670

7.

1,

412

February

273,

858

159,

072

58.

114,

786

63.

95,

669

50.

21,

075

7.

1,

484

March

278,

631

148,

789

53.

129,

842

46.

101,

434

53.

23,

771

8.

2,

166

April

241,

571

142,

518

59.

99,

053

41.

84,

904

35.

15,

995

6.

965

May.

211,

715

112,

138

53.

99,

577

47.

86,

821

41.

13,

310

6.

519

June

174,

095

99,

089

56.

75,

006

43.

57,

659

33.

16,

716

9.

617

Total,

July-Decem-ber

1,

471,

015

3.

941,

826

64.

19.

529,

189

36.

-17.

455,

121

30.

-14.

91,

210

6.

-16.

7,

171

July----

269,

384

181,

303

67.

88,

081

32.

75,

342

28.

18,

509

6.

1,

582

August

238,

160

158,

745

66.

79,

415

33.

67,

336

28.

11,

081

4.

682

September

235,

025

153,

955

65.

81,

070

34.

64,

516

27.

13,

068

5.

649

October

268,

858

152,

338

64.

116,

520

43.

106,

532

39.

20,

876

7.

2,

059

November

234,

568

168,

821

70.

69,

747

29.

57,

577

24.

10,

257

4.

507

December

225,

020

130,

664

58.

94,

356

41.

83,

818

37.

17,

419

7.

1,

692

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
344 PERSONNEL

Table

30.

—Movement

of

Medical

Department troops

overseas,

compared

with

movement of

all

Army,

all

combat

and

all

service

troops,

July

19^2-

August 1945

—Continued

Month

and

year

Army

Combat

troops

Service

troops

Total

Army shipments

Total

shipments Army total of Percent

increasePercent

Total

includingmiscellaneous

Total

excludingmiscellaneous

Medical

Department

Number

increase Percent

Number

Army total of Percent

shipments

increasePercent

Number

of Percent Army total

shipments

increase Percent

Total

Nurses

Number

totalof Percent

shipments Army

increase Percent

Number

increase Percent

1946

Total,

JanuaryJune_

1,

043,

377

-29.

691,

060

66.

-26.

352,

317

33.

-33.

262,

439

25.

-42.

49,

671

4.

-45.

3,

658

-49.

January- _____

278,

852

202,

727

72.

76,

125

27.

60,

769

21.

12,

381

4.

285

February

225,

562

133,

204

59.

92,

358

40.

69,

189

30.

12,

145

5.

404

March

199,

660

136,

159

68.

63,

501

31.

39,

471

19.

8,

313

4.

836

April

134,

803

89,

601

66.

45,

202

33.

31,

442

23.

5,

691

4.

418

May__

88,

519

60,

260

68.

28,

259

31.

21,

150

23.

4,

464

5.

959

June

115,

981

69,

109

59.

46,

872

40.

40,

417

34.

6,

677

5.

756

Total,

July-August238,

462

-77.

169,

822

71.

-75.

68,

640

28.

-80.

52,

766

22.

-79.

9,

941

4.

-80.

2,

680

-26.

July

79,

619

47,

927

60.

31,

692

39.

23,

804

29.

4,

556

5.

1,

047

August

158,

843

121,

895(76.

36,

948

23.

28,

962

18.

5,

385

3.

1,

633

Basic

data

from

“Troops Embarked by

Arms

and

Services,” .n

Army

Service

Forces,

Statistical Review, World

War

II,

pp.

123-124. Includes

troops

embarked

by

the

Transportation

Corps

only.

Personnel shown

for

each

arm

or

service

is

primarily the

strength

of

the

units

belonging

to

these

arms

and

services

and

therefore

includes

troops

not

assigned to

the

branch.

In

the

case

of

the

Medical

Department, for

example,

the

numbers

shown

do

not

include

attached

medical

personnel

in

infantry

and

similar

units;

on

the

other

hand,

chaplains

are

included

in

the

strength

of

the

medical

personnel.

It

is

not

known whether

casuals

are

included.

Air

Corps,

Coast

Artillery,

Armored

Force,

Field

Artillery,

and

Infantry.

Includes

Chemical

Warfare,

Engineers,

“Medical Corps”

(that

is,

Medical

Department other

than

nurses),

Army

Nurse

Corps,

Ordnance,

Quartermaster Corps,

Signal

Corps,

and

Transportation

Corps.

“miscellaneous” category

also

is

included

in

the

source, but

its

content

is

not

known. If

it

includes

all

branches

other

than

those

specifically

mentioned,

it

should

be

added

to

the

service

category

since

all

the

combat

arms

have

been

shown.

On

the

other

hand,

if

it

also

includes

casuals,

it

may

include

combat troops. For

this

reason,

the

service

troops

are

shown

both

with

the

miscellaneous

category

and

without

it.

Percentage of

increase

over

previous

summary period

shown.

Includes

Army

Nurse

as

shown

in

column

of

this

table

so

headed.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 345

Table

—Oversea 31.

strength

of

the

Medical

Department

and

oversea Negro

medical

strength,

by

area,

31

July

1941-30

September 1945

Area

Army

Medical

Department

Negroes—

Army

Negroes—Medical Department

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength per

1,000troops

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Percent

of

MedicalDepart- ment strength

Worldwide- .. Overseas En

route ... Foreign North

America Alaska Caribbean __ SouthAtlantic

31

July

1941

1,

531,

012 135,

722 190 135,

532 4,674 9,946 58,534

100.

00 8.

86 01 8.85 31 65 3.82

127,

221 5,

276 5,276 172 280 2,

121

100.

00 4.

15 4.

15 14 22 1.

67

83 39 39 37 28 36

82,

037 259 259

100.

00 32 32

Europe North

Africa Africa-Middle East

Persian Gulf

China-Burma-India Total

Pacific areas

Southwest Pacific Area

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces62,

378 22,493 40,

214

4.

07 1.

47 2.

63

2,

703 1,158 1,

545

2.

12 91 1.

21

43 51 38

Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces Commanding

General,

Army

Service

Forces

War

Department Groups

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
346 PERSONNEL

Table

31.

—Oversea

strength

of

the

Medical

Department

and

oversea Negro

medical

strength,

by

area,

31

July

1941-30

September 1945

—Continued

Area

Army

Medical

Department

Negroes—

-Army

Negroes— Medical

Department

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength per

1,000troops

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Percent of

MedicalDepart- ment strength

30

November 1941

Worldwide

1,

644,

210

100.

00

131,

586

100.

00

81

98,

664

100.

00

Overseas

165,

155

10.

04

7,

992

7.

36

48

939

95

En

route

904

05

Foreign

164,

251

9.

99

7,

992

7.

36

49

939

95

North

America

11,

051

67

1,

352

1.

03

122

Alaska

21,

461

1.

31

1,

124

85

52

Caribbean

57,

467

3.

50

2,

379

1.

81

41

939

95

South

Atlantic Europe. North

Africa Africa-Middle East

Persian Gulf

China-Burma-India Total

Pacific areas

74,

272

4.

52

3,

137

2.

38

42

Southwest Pacific

Area..

31,

030

1.

89

1.

623

1.

23

52

Pacific

Ocean

Areas.__

43,

059

2.

62

1,

514

1.

15

35

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces

_______ Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 347

Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces

War

Department Groups

Worldwide. Overseas. En

route Foreign North

America Alaska Caribbean South

Atlantic Europe North

Africa

31

March1942

2,

386,

138

328,

113 4,

306 323,807 23,261 33,

221 86,

828 11,

495 13,811

100.

00

13.

75 18

13.

57 97 1.39 3.64 06 58

201,

162 19,093 41

19,

052 1,880 1,

364 4,

466 119 1,

624

100.

00 9.49 02 9.

47 93 68 2.

22 06 81

84 58 10 59 81 41 51 80 118

143,

556 3,324 3,324 1,161

100.

00 2.32 2.

32 81 00

3,

812 20 20

100.

00 52 52

1.

89 10 10

Africa-Middle East

Persian Gulf

China-Burma-India Total

Pacific areas

3,

216 161,875 62,500 97,970

13 6.78 2.62 4.

11

119 9,

480 3,330 6,

150

06 4.

71 1.

66 3.06

37 59 53 63

Southwest Pacific Area

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces ...

884 1,278

62 89

20

52

33

Commanding

General,

Array

Ground Forces Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces

War

Deoartment Grouos

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
348 PERSONNEL

Table

31

.—Oversea

strength

of

the

Medical

Department

and

oversea Negro

medical

strength,

by

area

31

July

1941-30

September 1945

—Continued

Area

Army

Medical

Department

Negroes—

-Army

Negroes—

Medical

Department

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength per

1,000troops

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Percent of

MedicalDepart- ment strength

30

June

1942

Worldwide

3,

074,

184

100.

00

253,

707

100.

00

83

178,

708

100.

00

5,

939

100.

00

2.

95

Overseas.

601,

777

19.

58

42,

770

16.

86

71

33,

869

18.

95

626

10.

54

1.

46

En

route ..

81,

056

2.

64

4,

536

1.

79

56

10,

254

5.

74

201

3.

38

4.

43

Foreign

520,

721

16.

94

38,

234

15.

07

73

23,

615

13.

21

425

7.

16

1.

11

North

America

45,

573

1.

48

2,

702

1.

07

59

3,

685

2.

06

77

1.

30

2.

85

Alaska

50,

845

1.

65

2,

218

87

44

1,

159

65

37

62

1.

67

Caribbean

103,

403

3.

36

5,

726

2.

26

55

3,

631

2.

03

95

1.

60

1.

66

South

Atlantic

1,

623

05

117

05

73

Europe

54,

667

1.

78

3,

856

1.

52

71

754

42

North

Africa. Africa-Middle

East

217

01

Persian Gulf

China-Burma-India

7,

474

24

620

24

82

439

25

Total

Pacificareas.

256,

929

8.

36

22,

995

9.

06

89

13,

947

7.

80

216

3.

64

94

Southwest Pacific

Area

92,

668

3.

01

10,

238

4.

04

no

6,

944

3.

89

78

1.

31

76

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

165,

649

5.

39

12,

757

5.

02

77

7,

003

3.

92

138

2.

32

1.

08

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces ... Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces ...
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 349

Commanding

General,

Army

Service

Forces

War

Department GroupsWorldwide

30

September 1942

3,

971,

016 822,

962 52,719 770,

243 65,

554 76,005 109,650 2,012 186,

195 9,

273 456 13,

453 307,

421 105,

295

202,

126

100.

00

20.

72 1.

33

19.

40 1.65 1.91 2.

76 05 4.69 23 01 34 7.

74 2.

65 5.

09

349,

253 58,827 3,926 54,901 4,391 3,010 5,962 159 13,031 517 21

1,

100 26,

707 11,

399 15,308

100.

00

16.

84 1.

12

15.

72 1.

26 86 1.

71 05 3.

73 15 006 31 7.64 3.

26 4.38

88 71 74 71 67 40 55 79 70 56 46 82 87 108 76

255,

545 45,300 1,431 43,869 4,938 3,610 11,

406 1,376 2,434 20,

105 8,

157 11,

948

100.

00

17.

72 56

17.

16 1.

93 1.

41 4.

46 54 95 7.87 3.19 4.68

Overseas En

route Foreign North

America Alaska Caribbean South

Atlantic Europe North

Africa Africa-Middle

East

Persian Gulf

China-Burma-India Total

Pacificareas

Southwest Pacific

Area..

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

Commanding General,

Army

Air

Forces....

991 66 925 120 66 156 114 46 423 168 255

1.

68 1.68 1.69 2.73 1.

11

1.

20

22.

05 4.

18 1.58 1.

47 1.

67

Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces. Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces

War

Department Groups.

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.

224

06

13
350 PERSONNEL

Table

31.

—Oversea

strength

of

the

Medical

Department

and

oversea Negro

medical

strength,

by

area

31

July

1941-30 September 1945

—Continued

Area

Army

Medical

Department

Negroes—

-Army

Negroes—

-Medical

Department

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwidestrength

Strength per

1,000troops

Strength

Percent

of

worldwidestrength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwidestrength

Percent

of

MedicalDepart-ment strength

31

January

1943

Worldwide

5,

824,

517

100.

00

497,

252

100.

00

86

435,

487

100.

00

18,

279

100.

00

3.

68

Overseas

1,

119,

903

19.

23

88,

041

17.

71

79

63,

357

14.

55

1,

311

7.

17

1.

49

En

route

28,

602

49

3,

703

74

129

1,

504

35

38

20

1.

03

Foreign.

1,

091,

301

18.

73

84,

338

16.

96

77

61,

853

14.

20

1,

273

6.

97

1.

51

North

America

70,

214

1.

21

4,

622

93

66

3,

995

92

96

53

2.

08

Alaska

97,

985

1.

68

4,

975

1.

00

51

1,

202

28

Caribbean

118,

829

2.

04

6,

583

1.

32

55

2,

335

54

50

27

76

South

Atlantic

3,

270

06

202

04

62

Europe

120,

372

2.

07

10,

738

2.

16

89

9,

541

2.

19

114

62

1.

06

North

Africa__

260,

771

4.

48

20,

836

4.

19

80

10,

697

2.

46

245

1.

34

1.

18

Africa-Middle East

25,

405

44

2,

506

50

99

1,

879

43

204

1.

12

8.

14

Persian

Gulf10,

949

19

1,

072

22

98

2,

559

59

17

09

1.

59

China-Burma-India

18,

796

32

1,

276

27

68

2,

644

61

12

07

94

Total

Pacific areas

364,

451

6.

26

31,

525

6.

34

86

27,

001

6.

20

535

2.

93

1.

70

Southwest

Pacific

Area

118,

005

2.

03

12,

994

2.

61

110

7,

884

1.

81

137

75

1.

05

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

246,

446

4.

23

18,

531

3.

73

75

19,

117

4.

39

398

2.

18

2.

15

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces Commanding

General,

Army

Ground

Forces
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 351

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.

Commanding

General,

Army

Service

Forces

War

Department Groups.

259

12

30

April

1943

Worldwide

6,

719,

827

100.

00

588,

330

100.

00

87

534,

496

100.

00

26,

330

100.

00

4.

48

Overseas

1,

399,

643

20.

83

113,

213

19.

24

81

102,

670

19.

20

2,

126

8.

07

1.

88

En

route

100,

648

1.

50

9,

080

1.

54

90

9,

953

1.

86

238

90

2.

62

Foreign

1,

298,

995

19.

33

104,

133

17.

70

80

92,

717

17.

33

1,

888

7.

17

1.

81

North

America

75,

719

1.

13

5,

153

88

68

2,

707

51

72

27

1.

40

Alaska

104,

878

1.

56

5,

700

97

54

1,

888

35

33

13

58

Caribbean.

115,

771

1.

72

6,

855

1.

17

59

2,

326

43

47

19

69

South

Atlantic

4,

908

07

453

08

92

Europe

111,

506

1.

66

10,

855

1.

86

97

5,

188

97

57

22

53

North

Africa

395,

461

5.

88

31,

164

5.

30

79

35,

269

6.

59

657

2.

50

2.

11

Africa-Middle

East

37,

272

55

3,

447

59

92

2,

099

39

321

1.

22

9.

31

Persian Gulf

18,

513

28

1,

812

31

98

5,

152

96

55

21

3.

04

China-Burma-India

30,

110

45

4,

286

73

142

4,

143

77

47

19

1.

09

Total

Pacificareas

404,

385

6.

02

34,

404

5.

80

85

33,

945

6.

35

599

2.

27

1.

74

Southwest

Pacific

Area

140,

577

2.

09

14,

276

2.

43

101

9,

148

1.

71

159

60

1.

11

Pacific Ocean

Areas.

263,

808

3.

93

20,

128

3.

42

76

24,

797

4.

64

440

1.

67

2.

19

Commanding General,

Army

Air

Forces Commanding

General,

Army

Ground

Forces Commanding

General,

Armv

Service

Forces

War

Department Groups.

472
352 PERSONNEL

Table

31.

Oversea

strength

of

the

Medical

Department and

oversea Negro

medical

strength, by

area,

31

July

1941-30

September 1945—' Continued

Area

Army

Medical

Department

Negroes—

-Army

Negroes—

-Medical

Department

Strength

Percent

of

worldwidestrength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength per

1,000troops

Strength

Percent

of

worldwidestrength

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Percent of

MedicalDepart- ment strength

31

July

1943

Worldwide

7,

126,

818

100.

00

628,

360

100.

00

88

576,

886

100.

00

29,

403

100.

00

4.

68

Overseas.__

1,

779,

688

24.

97

139,

564

22.

21

78

135,

150

23.

41

2,

401

8.

17

1.

72

En

route.

50,

925

71

5,

881

94

115

6,

670

1.

16

116

40

1.

97

Foreign

1,

728,

763

24.

26

133,

683

21.

27

77

128,

480

22.

25

2,

285

7.

77

1.

71

North

America

80,

688

1.

13

4,

683

75

58

2,

766

48

75

26

1.

60

Alaska

138,

882

1.

95

8,

663

1.

38

62

3,

406

59

36

12

42

Caribbean.

114,

191

1.

60

6,

063

96

53

2,

296

40

48

16

79

South

Atlantic

5,

707

08

452

07

79

Europe

239,

254

3.

36

18,

278

2.

91

76

17,

730

3.

07

286

97

1.

56

North

Africa

528,

608

7.

42

42,

092

6.

70

80

44,

953

7.

79

742

2.

52

1.

76

Africa-Middle

East

39,

163

55

2,

882

46

74

2,

240

39

192

65

6.

66

Persian Gulf

27,

320

38

2,

636

42

96

5,

246

91

31

11

1.

18

China-Burma-India

34,

902

54

4,

999

80

143

4,

110

71

57

19

1.

14

Total

Pacific areas

519,

514

7.

29

42,

929

6.

80

83

45,

733

7.

92

818

2.

78

1.

91

Southwest Pacific

Area

200,

841

2.

82

19,

408

3.

09

97

12,

653

2.

19

177

60

91

Pacific

Ocean

Areas.

318,

673

4.

47

23,

521

3.

74

74

33,

080

5.

73

641

2.

18

2.

73

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces

War

Department Groups

534

11

31

October 1943

Worldwide

7,

333,

474

100.

00

615,

102

100.

00

84

610,

687

100.

00

25,

976

100.

00

4.

22

Overseas.

2,

238,

799

30.

53

179,

914

29.

25

80

181,

450

29.

71

3,

388

12.

85

1.

86

En

route-..

__

100,

589

1.

37

5,

474

89

54

4,

171

68

115

44

2.

10

Foreign

2,

138,

210

29.

16

174,

440

28.

36

82

177,

279

29.

03

3,

273

12.

60

1.

88

North

America

61,

023

83

3,

867

63

63

254

04

Alaska-.

127,

976

1.

75

8,

517

1.

39

67

4,

447

73

36

14

42

Caribbean

106,

953

1.

46

5,

562

91

52

2,

264

37

41

16

74

South

Atlantic

6,

940

09

453

07

65

Europe..

460,

502

6.

28

38,

084

6.

19

83

40,

252

6.

59

915

3.

53

2.

40

North

Africa __

632,

744

8.

63

54,

425

8.

85

86

56,

448

9.

24

867

3.

35

1.

59

Africa-Middle East

25,

488

35

2,

490

41

98

2,

145

35

223

86

8.

96

Persian Gulf

29,

545

40

2,

774

45

94

4,

824

79

55

21

1.

98

China-Burma-India

70,

661

96

7,

303

1.

19

103

12,

434

2.

04

205

79

2.

81

Total

Pacificareas

615,

338

8.

39

50,

946

8.

28

83

54,

211

8.

88

931

3.

60

1.

11

Southwest Pacific

Area

263,

120

3.

59

25,

034

4.

07

95

18,

485

3.

03

279

1.

08

2.

52

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

352,

218

4.

80

25,

912

4.

21

74

35,

726

5.

85

652

2.

52

1.

83

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces__ Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces. Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces

War

Department Groups

1,

040

01

19

18

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
354 PERSONNEL

Table

31.

—Oversea

strength

of

the

Medical

Department and

oversea Negro

medical

strength,

hy

area,

31

July

191/1-30

September 191/5

Continued

Area

Army

Medical

Department

Negroes—

-Army

Negroes—

Medical

Department

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength per

1,000troops

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Percent of

MedicalDepart- ment strength

31

January

1944

Worldwide

7,

556,

157

100.

00

628,

758

100.

00

83

646,

800

100.

00

26,

229

100.

00

4.

17

Overseas

2,

814,

658

37.

25

238,

914

38.

00

85

243,

503

37.

65

5,

246

20.

00

2.

20

En

route

84,

435

1.

12

5,

730

91

68

8,

851

1.

37

542

2.

07

9.

46

Foreign__

2,

730,

223

36.

13

233,

184

37.

08

85

234,

652

36.

28

4,

704

17.

93

North

America

54,

584

72

3,

264

52

60

Alaska_____

114,

225

1.

51

7,

681

1.

22

67

4,

727

73

71

27

92

Caribbean.

89,

727

1.

19

5,

266

84

59

South

Atlantic.

7,

890

10

601

09

76

Europe__

935,

346

12.

38

81,

616

12.

98

87

77,

580

11.

99

1,

586

6.

05

1.

94

North

Africa

621,

831

8.

23

51,

692

8.

22

83

59,

394

9.

18

949

3.

62

1.

84

Africa-Middle East

16,

411

22

1,

811

29

110

788

12

152

58

8.

39

Persian Gulf__

29,

445

32

2,

700

43

92

4,

020

62

46

18

1.

70

China-Burma-India

107,

595

1.

42

9,

945

1.

58

92

15,

711

2.

43

248

95

2.

49

Total

Pacific areas

752,

056

9.

95

68,

590

10.

91

91

72,

432

11.

04

1,

652

6.

30

2.

41

Southwest Pacific

Area_

329,

372

4.

36

33,

186

5.

28

100

27,

695

4.

28

395

1.

51

1.

19

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

422,

684

5.

59

35,

404

5.

63

84

44,

737

6.

92

1,

257

4.

79

3.

55

Commanding General,

Army

Air

Forces ._ Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 355

Commanding

General,

Army

Service

Forces

War

Department Groups

1,

113

01

18

30

April

1944

Worldwide,

7,

848,

172

100.

00

651,

162

100.

00

83

686,

220

100.

00

25,

556

100.

00

3.

92

Overseas,

3,

552,

485

45.

27

300,

502

46.

15

85

325,

960

47.

50

9,

875

38.

64

3.

29

En

route,__

78,

664

1.

00

4,

916

75

62

3,

770

55

672

2.

63

13.

29

Foreign,

3,

473,

821

44.

26

295,

586

45.

39

85

322,

190

46.

95

9,

203

36.

01

3.

11

North

America.

47,

908

61

3,

024

46

63

Alaska

91,

546

1.

17

4,

762

73

52

5,

922

86

143

56

4.

73

Caribbean

84,

013

1.

07

5,

024

77

60

South

Atlantic

6,

991

09

567

09

81

Europe

1,

421,

908

18.

12

125,

729

19.

31

88

114,

691

16.

75

3,

087

12.

08

2.

45

North

Africa

697,

785

8.

89

55,

211

8.

48

79

77,

686

11.

32

1,

506

5.

89

2.

73

Africa-Middle East

15,

951

20

1,

396

21

88

722

11

83

32

5.

95

Persian Gulf

29,

300

37

2,

468

38

84

3,

987

58

45

18

1.

82

China-Burma-India __

150,

101

1.

91

11,

344

1.

74

76

16,

910

2.

46

270

1.

06

2.

38

Total

Pacific areas

927,

045

11.

81

86,

036

13.

21

93

102,

272

14.

90

4,

069

15.

92

2.

70

Southwest

Pacific

Area

448,

165

5.

71

47,

259

7.

26

105

37,

781

5.

51

1,

277

5.

00

4.

73

Pacific Ocean

Areas

478,

880

6.

10

38.

777

5.

96

81

64,

491

9.

40

2,

792

10.

93

7.

20

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces

__ Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces Commanding

General,

Army

Service

Forces.,

War

Department Groups,

1,

273

02

25

20

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
PERSONNEL

Table

31.

—Oversea

strength

of

the

Medical

Department and

oversea Negro

medical

strength,

hy

area,

31

July

1941-30

September 1945

—Continued

Area

Army

Medical

Department

Negroes—

-Army

Negroes—

-Medical

Department

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Strength per

1,000troops

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Percent

of

MedicalDepart- mentstrength

31

July

1944

Worldwide

8,

049,

770

100.

00

679,

561

100.

00

84

699,

666

100.

00

21,

902

100.

00

3.

22

Overseas

4,

095,

129

50.

87

343,

931

50.

61

84

382,

999

54.

74

10,

228

46.

70

2.

97

En

route

107,

716

1.

34

6,

301

93

58

9,

712

1.

39

17

07

27

Foreign

3,

987,

413

49.

53

337,

630

49.

68

85

373,

287

53.

35

10,

211

46.

62

3.

02

North

America

26,

815

33

1,

696

25

63

Alaska

71,

181

88

4,

055

60

57

4,

141

59

98

45

2.

42

Caribbean

72,

172

90

4,

265

63

59

South

Atlantic

3,

462

04

529

08

153

Europe

1,

770,

614

22.

00

159,

282

23.

40

90

154,

157

22.

03

3,

510

16.

03

2.

20

North

Africa

724,

057

8.

96

55,

998

8.

24

77

77,

017

11.

01

1,

247

5.

69

2.

28

Africa-Middle

East

_.

9,

603

12

1,

190

18

124

752

11

94

43

7.

90

Persian Gulf

28,

296

35

2,

218

33

78

3,

998

57

45

21

2.

03

China-Burma-India

142,

640

1.

77

12,

324

1.

81

86

17,

190

2.

46

269

1.

23

2.

18

Total

Pacific areas__

1,

056,

804

13.

13

94,

437

13.

90

89

114,

282

16.

33

4,

948

22.

59

5.

24

Southwest Pacific

Area_

664,

508

8.

26

60,

140

8.

85

91

73,

078

10.

44

3,

184

14.

54

5.

29

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

392,

296

4.

87

34,

297

5.

05

87

41,

204

5.

89

1,

764

8.

05

5.

14

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces __

80,

160

1.

00

1,

600

24

20

1,

750

25

Commanding

General.

Army

Ground Forces.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 357

Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces__ War

Department Groups

1,

609

02

36

22

31

October 1944

Worldwide.__

8,

103,

376

100.

00

687,

501

100.

00

84

701,

660

100.

00

21,

245

100.

00

3.

09

Overseas..

4,

635,

763

57.

21

391,

120

56.

89

84

438,

407

62.

48

12,

742

59.

98

3.

26

En

route

132,

710

1.

64

11,

681

1.

70

88

14,

878

2.

12

455

2.

14

3.

90

Foreign

4,

503,

053

55.

57

379,

439

55.

19

84

423,

529

60.

36

12,

287

57.

83

3.

24

North

America

22,

180

27

1,

254

18

57

Alaska.

58,

654

72

3,

523

51

60

4,

207

60

106

50

3.

01

Caribbean

69,

266

85

3,

720

54

54

4,

075

58

34

16

91

South

Atlantic

2,

711

03

458

07

169

Europe

2,

203,

583

27.

19

198,

410

28.

86

90

178,

866

25.

49

4,

382

20.

63

2.

21

North

Africa

712,

218

8.

79

55,

500

8.

07

80

85,

306

12.

16

1,

922

9.

05

3.

46

Africa-Middle East

9,

286

11

1,

156

17

124

776

11

92

43

7.

96

Persian Gulf

27,

710

34

2,

031

30

73

3,

895

56

61

29

3.

00

China-Burma-India

159,

414

1.

97

15,

275

2.

22

96

18,

502

2.

64

384

1.

81

2.

51

Total

Pacific areas

1,

116,

983

13.

78

95,

896

13.

95

86

125,

174

17.

84

5,

306

24.

97

5.

53

Southwest Pacific

Area..

701,

035

8.

65

61,

625

8.

96

88

76,

559

10.

91

3,

359

15.

81

5.

45

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

415,

948

5.

13

34,

271

4.

99

82

48,

615

6.

93

1,

947

9.

16

5.

68

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces

119,

235

1.

47

2,

169

32

18

2,

728

39

Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces

War

Department Groups.

1,

813

02

47

00

26

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
PERSONNEL 358

Table

31.

—Oversea

strength

of

the

Medical

Department and

oversea Negro

medical

strength,

hy

area,

31

July

1941-30

September 1945

—Continued

Army

Medical

Department

Negroes—

Army

Negroes

Medical

Department

Area

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength per

1,000troops

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Percent

of

MedicalDepart- ment strength

31

January

1945

Worldwide

8,

070,

929

100.

00

667,

188

100.

00

83

683,

338

100.

00

20,

410

100.

00

3.

06

Overseas

5,

122,

748

63.

47

429,

823

64.

42

84

481,

092

70.

40

14,

150

69.

33

3.

29

En

route

81,

402

1.

01

5,

020

75

62

7,

419

1.

09

140

69

2.

79

Foreign

5,

041,

346

62.

46

424,

803

63.

67

84

473,

673

69.

32

14,

010

68.

64

3.

30

North

America

19,

085

24

1,

108

17

58

Alaska.

47,

685

59

2,

652

40

56

4,

410

65

100

49

3.

77

Caribbean

70,

231

87

3,

828

57

55

3,

571

52

28

14

73

South

Atlantic...

2,

653

03

369

06

139

Europe.

2,

829,

039

35.

05

255,

599

38.

31

90

231,

249

33.

84

5,

739

28.

12

2.

25

North

Africa

507,

668

6.

29

38,

539

5.

78

76

70,

996

10.

39

1,

982

9.

71

5.

14

Africa-Middle East.

9,

330

12

1,

147

17

123

720

11

91

45

7.

93

Persian Gulf...

26,

082

32

1,

958

29

75

2,

721

40

25

12

1.

28

China-Burma-India

187,

256

2.

32

18,

095

2.

71

97

23,

380

3.

42

715

3.

50

3.

95

Total

Pacificareas

1,

170,

251

14.

50

97,

678

14.

64

83

133,

700

19.

56

5,

330

26.

11

5.

46

Southwest Pacific

Area..

_.

749,

454

9.

29

62,

662

9.

39

84

81,

261

11.

89

3,

444

16.

87

5.

50

Pacific

Ocean

Areas ..__ Commanding

General,

Army

Air

420,

797

5.

21

35,

016

5.

25

83

52,

439

7.

67

1,

886

9.

24

5.

39

Forces. Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces.

165,

468

2.

05

3,

781

57

23

2,

926

43
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 359

663076 —63 25

Commanding

General,

Army

Service

Forces

War

Department Groups

6,

598

08

49

74

30

April 1945

Worldwide

8,

248,

780

100.

00

671,

967

100.

00

82

700,

304

100.

00

19,

752

100.

00

2.

94

Overseas

5,

455,

076

66.

13

463,

488

68.

97

85

511,

493

73.

04

13,

429

67.

99

2.

90

En

route

_____ 50,

237

61

3,

392

50

68

6,

002

86

62

31

1.

83

Foreign

5,

404,

839

65.

52

460,

096

68.

47

85

505,

491

72.

18

13,

367

67.

67

2.

92

North

America

16,

935

20

1,

014

15

60

Alaska

38,

806

47

2,

177

32

56

5,

401

77

118

60

5.

42

Caribbean

67,

169

81

3,

706

55

55

3,

895

56

28

14

76

South

Atlantic

2,

763

03

372

06

135

Europe

3,

065,

505

37.

16

268,

798

40.

00

88

258,

050

36.

85

5,

482

27.

75

2.

04

North

Africa

493,

876

5.

99

37,

704

5.

61

76

68,

458

9.

78

1,

943

9.

84

5.

15

Africa-Middle East

11,

618

14

1,

634

24

141

799

11

107

54

6.

55

Persian Gulf

15,

793

19

974

14

62

1,

072

15

04

82

China-Burma-India

198,

830

2.

41

19,

819

2.

95

100

25,

360

3.

62

713

3.

61

3.

60

Total

Pacific areas

1,

257,

098

15.

24

105,

022

15.

63

84

139,

450

19.

91

4,

947

25.

04

4.

71

Southwest Pacific

Area.

__

806,

128

9.

77

66,

416

9.

88

82

82,

513

11.

78

3,

161

16.

00

4.

76

Pacific

Ocean

Areas__

450,

970

5.

47

38,

606

5.

75

86

56,

937

8.

13

1,

786

9.

04

4.

63

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces

197,

670

2.

40

4,

688

70

24

3,

006

43

21

10

45

Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces

25

00

Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces ....

31,

609

38

14,

121

2.

10

446

War

Department Groups

7,

142

09

67

94

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
360 PERSONNEL

Table

31.

—Oversea

strength

of

the

Medical

Department and

oversea Negro

medical

strength,

hy

area

SI

July

IdJtlSO

September 19Jf5

—Continued

Area

Army

Medical

Department

Negroes—

-Army

Negroes—

Medical

Department

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength per

1,000troops

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

<>

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Percent of

MedicalDepart- mentstrength

31

May

1945

Worldwide....

8,

291,

336

100.

00

666,

710

100.

00

80

694,

379

100.

00

19,

693

100.

00

2.

95

Overseas

5,

406,

779

65.

21

455,

068

68.

26

84

510,

326

73.

49

13,

426

68.

11

2.

95

En

route

44,

373

54

1,

367

21

31

3,

313

48

62

31

14.

54

Foreign...

5,

362,

406

64.

67

453,

701

68.

05

85

507,

013

73.

02

13,

364

67.

80

2.

95

North

America

15,

465

19

872

13

56

Alaska

38,

423

46

2,

008

30

52

5,

357

77

116

59

5.

78

Caribbean

63,

132

76

3,

499

52

55

3,

312

48

26

13

74

South

Atlantic

2,

789

03

369

06

132

Europe

3,

021,

483

36.

44

264,

487

39.

67

88

254,

154

36.

60

5,

354

27.

19

2.

02

North

Africa.

445,

373

5.

37

34,

729

5.

21

78

64,

807

9.

33

1,

858

9.

43

5.

35

Africa-Middle

East.

12,

265

15

1,

565

23

128

675

10

92

47

5.

88

Persian Gulf...

16,

063

19

975

15

61

1,

059

15

10

1.

03

China-Burma-India

199,

035

2.

40

20,

025

3.

00

100

25,

217

3.

63

652

3.

31

3.

26

Total

Pacific areas

1,

296,

005

15.

63

106,

270

15.

94

82

148,

711

21.

42

5,

233

26.

57

4.

92

Southwest Pacific Area

840,

171

10.

13

69,

276

10.

39

82

86,

259

12.

42

3,

408

17.

31

4.

92

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

455,

834

5.

50

36,

994

5.

55

81

62,

452

8.

99

1,

825

9.

26

4.

93

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces.

212,

909

2.

57

4,

766

71

22

3,

714

53

21

11

44

Commanding

General,

Army

Ground

Forces

27

00
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 361

Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces.

War

Department Groups.

31,

939 7,

508

39 09

14,

057 79

2.

11 01

440 11

01

30

June

1945

Worldwide.

8,

266,

373

100.

00

663,

898

100.

00

80

694,

818

100.

00

19,

674

100.

00

2.

96

Overseas.

5,

239,

722

63.

38

443,

696

66.

83

85

510,

376

73,

45

12,

803

65.

08

2.

89

En

route

81,

588

99

5,

301

80

65

12,

395

1.

78

72

37

1.

36

Foreign

5,

158,

134

62.

40

438,

395

66.

03

85

497,

981

71.

67

12,

731

64.

71

2.

90

North

America

12,

211

15

776

12

64

Alaska

37,

923

46

1,

935

29

51

5,

247

76

116

59

5.

99

Caribbean

64,

343

78

3,

525

53

55

3,

580

52

26

13

74

South

Atlantic

2,

816

03

369

06

131

Europe

2,

811,

820

34.

02

250,

280

37.

70

89

242,

412

34.

89

4,

712

23.

95

1.

88

North

Africa

404,

242

4.

89

33,

196

5.

00

82

61,

957

8.

92

1,

798

9.

14

5.

42

Africa-Middle East

11,

352

14

1,

385

21

122

807

12

84

43

6.

06

Persian Gulf

13,

547

16

698

11

52

167

02

14

China-Burma-India

194,

558

2.

35

19,

424

2.

93

100

23,

369

3.

36

573

2.

91

2.

95

Total

Pacificareas

1,

328,

114

16.

07

107,

181

16.

14

81

156,

376

22.

51

5,

400

27.

45

5.

04

Southwest Pacific

Area

866,

214

10.

48

69,

665

10.

49

80

89,

587

12.

89

3,

692

18.

77

5.

30

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

._

461,

9C0

5.

59

37,

516

5.

65

81

66,

789

9.

61

1,

708

8.

68

4.

55

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces__

237,

386

2.

87

5,

345

81

23

4,

066

59

21

11

39

Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces

29

00

Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces

32,

694

40

14,

202

2.

14

434

War

Department Groups

7,

099

09

79

01

11

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
362 PERSONNEL

Table

31

.-

-Oversea

strength

of

the

Medical

Department and

oversea Negro

medical

strength, by

area,

31

July

1941-30

September 1943

—Continued

Area

Army

Medical

Department

Negroes-

-Army

Negroes—

-Medical

Department

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength per

1,000troops

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Percent

of

MedicalDepart- mentstrength

31

July

1945

Worldwide

8,

186,

444

100.

00

659,

853

100.

00

81

702,

758

100.

00

19,

995

100.

00

3.

03

Overseas

4,

922,

309

60.

13

423,

120

64.

12

86

505,

279

71.

90

13,

028

65.

16

3.

07

En

route

59,

746

73

4,

260

64

71

5,

619

80

206

1.

03

4.

84

Foreign

4.

862,

563

59.

40

418,

860

63.

48

86

499,

660

71.

10

12,

822

64.

13

3.

06

North

America

9,

952

12

630

10

63

Alaska

39,

022

48

1,

959

30

50

4,

780

68

112

56

5.

72

Caribbean,

66,

873

82

3,

479

53

52

3,

431

49

28

14

80

South

Atlantic

2,

753

03

394

06

143

Europe

2,

509,

719

30.

66

230,

058

34.

87

92

229,

050

32.

59

4,

730

23.

66

2.

06

North

Africa

351,

761

4.

30

29,

866

4.

53

85

55,

927

7.

96

1,

583

7.

92

6.

30

Africa-Middle

East

11,

086

14

1,

336

20

121

770

11

85

43

6.

36

Persian Gulf

9,

173

11

496

08

54

134

02

China-Bur

ma-India

189,

223

2.

31

18,

678

2.

83

99

23,

778

3.

38

575

2.

88

3.

08

Total

Pacific areas

1,

389,

010

16.

97

112,

725

17.

08

81

178,

062

25.

34

5,

687

28.

44

5.

05

Southwest Pacific

4rea

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces.

242,

363

2.

96

5,

725

87

24

3,

728

53

22

11

38

Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces.

28

00
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 363

Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces

War

Department Groups.

34,

519 7,081

42 .09

13,

441 73

2.

04 01

389 10

31

August 1945

Worldwide

8,

023,

304

100.

00

637,

684

100.

00

79

695,

264

100.

00

20,

285

100.

00

3.

18

Overseas...

4,

623,

365

57.

62

377,

072

59.

14

82

475,

950

68.

46

12,

702

62.

62

3.

37

En

route

134,

054

1.

67

5,

444

85

41

6,

879

99

150

74

2.

76

Foreign..

4,

489,

311

55.

95

371,

628

58.

28

83

469,

071

67.

47

12,

552

61.

88

3.

38

North

America

7,

440

09

450

07

60

Alaska

37,

785

47

1,

896

30

50

4,

726

68

106

52

5.

59

Caribbean...

63,

992

80

3,

592

56

56

2,

763

40

27

13

75

South

Atlantic

2,

866

04

398

06

139

Europe

2,

164,

161

26.

97

188,

488

29.

56

87

181,

620

26.

12

4,

131

20.

36

2.

19

North

Africa

244,

656

3.

05

20,

456

3.

21

84

43,

747

6.

29

1,

301

6.

41

6.

36

Africa-Middle East

11,

103

14

1,

291

20

116

585

08

74

36

5.

73

Persian Gulf

6,

922

09

395

06

57

80

01

China-Burma-India

195,

840

2.

44

19,

642

3.

08

100

23,

892

3.

44

552

2.

72

2.

81

Total

Pacific areas

1,

458,

911

18.

18

116,

208

18.

22

80

206,

512

29.

70

6,

330

31.

21

5.

45

Southwest Pacific

Area

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces

253,

949

3.

17

5,

805

91

23

5,

146

74

31

15

5.

34

Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces

23

00

Commanding

General,

Army

Service

Forces__

34,

991

44

12,

939

2.

03

369

War

Department Groups

6,

672

08

68

10

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
364 PERSONNEL

Table

31.

—Oversea

strength

of

the

Medical

Department and

oversea Negro

medical

strength,

hy

area

31

July

1941-30

September 1943— Continued

Area

Army

Medical

Department

Negroes-

-Army

Negroes—

-Medical

Department

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength per

1,000troops

Strength

Percent

of

worldwide strength

Strength

Percent of

worldwide strength

Percent of

MedicalDepart- ment strength

30

September 1945

Worldwide

7,

564,

514

100.

00

593,

644

100.

00

79

653,

563

100.

00

19,

328

100.

00

3.

26

Overseas

4,

158,

810

54.

98

331,

261

55.

80

80

417,

948

63.

95

11,

411

59.

04

3.

44

En

route,

44,

456

59

2,

205

37

50

2,

343

36

147

76

6.

67

Foreign

4,

114,

354

54.

39

329,

056

55.

43

80

415,

605

63.

59

11,

264

58.

28

3.

42

North

America

4,

869

06

335

06

69

Alaska

36,

345

48

1,

825

31

50

4,

774

73

104

54

5.

70

Caribbean

62,

580

83

3,

491

59

56

2,

763

42

27

14

77

South

Atlantic__

1,

748

02

233

04

133

Europe

1,

790,

817

23.

67

152,

700

25.

72

86

137,

428

21.

03

3,

783

19.

57

2.

48

North

Africa

189,

994

2.

51

15,

967

2.

69

84

36,

047

5.

52

1,

009

5.

22

6.

32

Africa-Middle East

__

10,

734

14

1,

266

21

118

591

09

74

38

5.

85

Persian Gulf

6,

922

09

395

07

57

80

01

China-Burma-India.

181,

338

2.

40

16,

865

2.

84

93

21,

874

3.

35

350

1.

81

2.

08

Total

Pacific areas

1,

552,

303

20.

52

120,

300

20.

26

77

206,

477

31.

59

5,

917

30.

61

4.

92

Southwest Pacific Area

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces __

240,

613

3.

18

5,

340

90

22

5,

540

85

Commanding

General,

Army

Ground Forces

20

00
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 365

For

statement

of

the

territory

within

the

areas

shown,

see

appendix to

this

table.

For

all

dates

other

than

31

March 1942, area

strengths are from

“Monthly

Foreign

Strength

of

the

Army

by

Command,”

in

“Strength

of

the

Army,”

Oct.

1945,

pp.

62-63,

except

for

Southwest

Pacific

and

Pacific

Ocean

Areas,

which

are from

“Strength

of

the

Army”

for

dates

shown or

dates

approximate thereto.

This

accounts

for

such

failure

of

the

strength

of

these

two

areas

to

equal

total

Pacific

strength as

occurs. Strength on

31

March 1942

for

the

Pacific

(including

both

areas)

from

“Areas

of

Strategic

Responsibility and

U.S.

Army

Overseas

Deployment,

April1942”— in

Matlofl,

Maurice,

and

Snell,

Edwin

M.:

The

War

Department: Strategic

Planning

for

Coalition

Warfare.1941-1942. United

States

Army

in

World

War

II;

Washington;

U.S.

Government Printing

Office, 1953. For

other

areas

on

the

same

date

from

“Strength of

the

Army” or

strength

returns

(Strength

Returns

by

Grade,

WD

AGO

Form

No.

323)

from

departments

and

bases

for

the

same date

(records of

AGO

Statistical

and

Control

Branch). These

have

been

used

because

of

double

counting

of

certain

personnel

and

other errors in

data

for

31

March1942

shown

in

the

time

series

mentioned.

Worldwide

strength

from

“Monthly

Strength

of

the

Army

Continental

United

States”

and

“Monthly

Foreign

Strength

of

the

Army

Foreignand In

Route”

in

“Strength of

the

Army,”

Oct.

1945,

except

for

31

March 1942

which

has

been

corrected

in

accordance with

the

changes

made

with

respect to

oversea areas. (The

strength

on

the

same

date

as

reported in

“Strength

of

the

Army,”

Jan.

1947

was

2,387,746.)

Worldwide

strength

for

31

July

1941 based

on

data

of

The

Adjutant

General’s

Office

supplied

by

the

Army

Comptroller’s

Office,

January

1956; based

on

table

for

30

November 1941-30

September 1945,

from

table

1.

Data

for

China-Burma -India

for

March 1942

represent the

troop

and

Medical

Department

strength

of

the

7th

Bombardment Group

and

the

51st

Fighter

Group,

Army

Air

Forces, which

arrived

in

Karachi on

12

March

1942;

all

other

area

strengths

prior

to

October 1943

as

well

as,

partly,

for

April 1944

from

strength returns

(Strength

Returns

by

Grade,

WD

AGO

Form

No.

323,

July

1941,

No.

323,

Nov.

1941,

and

No.

323A,

Jan.

1943)

from

departments and

bases

(records

of

the

AGO

Statistical

and

Control

Branch)

for

corresponding

dates;

for

October

1943-September 1945,

except

as

noted,

from

“Strength

of

the

Army.”

Since,

in

virtually

all

instances,

the

oversea strengths

shown

are

those

used

by

the

Office

of

Tne

Adjutant

General

in

compiling

its

worldwide

figures,

the

differences between

the

worldwide

strengths

of

the

Medical

Department as

stated

by

the

Office

of

The

Surgeon

General

and

The

Adjutant

General’s

Office

(table

1)

are

attributed

almost

exclusively

to

the

Zone

of

Interior.

This

is

justified by

the

fact

that

the

variation

between

the

two

sets

of

figures

arose

primarily

through

differences in

methods

of

recording movement

in

and

out

of

the

Army,

process

which

mainly

affected

the

continental

United

States.

It

should

be

noted,

nevertheless,

that

the

medical

strengths

credited

to

the

oversea areas

by

the

Office

of

The

Adjutant

General rarely

agreed

with

the

strengths

as

stated

by

the

oversea Medical

Department

authorities, who

charged

that

the

War

Department was

wont

to

credit

them

with

strength

greater

than

that

which

they

actually

possessed.

(Unrecorded interview,

Medical

Department historian

with

Ralph

Casteel,

Veterans’

Administration,

April

1953.)

Worldwide

strength

for

31

July

and

30

November 1941

from

“Strength

of

the

Army”

for

corresponding dates.

Strengths

for

other

dates

from

“Monthly

Negro

Strength

of

the

Army,”

“Strength of

the

Army,”

Jan.

1945,

p.

47;

and

“Quarterly

and

Monthly

Negro

Strength

of

the

Army,”

“Strength

of

the

Army,”

Jan.

1946.

Area

strengths

from

“Strength

of

the

Array”

and

other sources of

area

strength

shown

in

footnote

3.

Fromsources of

area

strengths

shown

in

footnote

3.

Commanding

General,

Army

Service Forces

29,

641

39

10,

280

1.

73

346

29

War

Department Groups

6,

430

09

59

00
366 PERSONNEL

From

the

geographic point

of

view,

the

data

in

this

table

are

organized

for

the

most

part

in

accordance with

the

scheme

used

in

the

time

series

entitled

“Monthly

Foreign

Strength

of

the

Army

by

Command,”

in

“Strength

of

the

Army,”

Oct.

1945,

pp.

62-63.

This

time

series

purports

to

show

the

troop

strength

of

each

major

geographic command,

except

the

China

and

India-Burma theaters,

existing

at

that

time

from

date

which,

in

number

of

cases,

is

as

early

as

July

1941.

This

disregards the

fact

that

some

of

the

commands

listed

were not

even

in

existence

at

certain

periods

in

which

strength is

attributed

to

them;

in

other

words,

the

strength

shown,

with

some

exceptions,

is

that

of

the

area

later

covered

by

the

command

in

question.

The

Persian Gulf

Command,

although

it

was

once part

oi

the

Middle

East

theater

is

always

treated

separately,

and

the

strength

of

the

Africa-Middle

East

theater

is

correspondingly

reduced for

the

period

when

the

Persian Gulf

was within

its

jurisdiction.

Similarly,

Iceland

is

credited

to

the

Eastern

Service

Command

for

all

dates

despite

the

fact

that

for

time

it

was in

the

European

Theater

of

Operations.

However,

China

and

India-Burma,

although

separate commands at

the

time

of

publication

of

the

time

series,

nevertheless are

grouped

together

therein.

Furthermore, the

principle of

geographic

consistency

had

not

been

uniformly

observed.

For

example,

contrary

to

the

practice

adopted

in

the

case of

Iceland,

southern

France,

although

credited

to

the

Mediterranean

theater

for

the

period

prior

to

November 1944,

is

subsequently allotted

to

the

European theater.

Similarly,

North

Africa

is

attributed

to

the

North

African-Mediterranean

theater

before

March 1945 and,

thereafter,

to

the

Africa-Middle East

theater.

To

the

categories as

established

in

the

time

series,

breakdown of

the

Pacific

into

Southwest

Pacific Area

and

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

has

been

added

to

take

account

of

the

fact

that

throughout

almostthe

entire

period

covered,

the

Pacific area

was

divided

among

more

than

one

command.

As

used

in

this

and

other

tables,

the

Southwest Pacific Area

includes

the

Philippines

before

the

entrance

of

the

United

States

into

the

war

as

well

as

the

territory

subject

to

the

jurisdiction of

U.S.

Army

Forces in

the

Far

East

subsequent

to

that

event.

The

Pacific Ocean

Areas

include

all

commands

of

the

Pacific

independent

of

the

Southwest

Pacific

Area.

Under

this

arrangement,

the

strength

of

certain

commands

subject

to

the

South

Pacific

command

which

were

transferred

to

the

Southwest

Pacific

in

1944

is

first

credited

to

the

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

and

subsequently

to

the

Southwest

Pacific.

In

contrast

to

the

handling

of

the

Pacific,

personnel

in

Iceland

and

areas

subject

to

some commands

in

theWestern

Hemisphere

have

been

combined

into

North

American group which

contains,

besides

elements

in

the

Northwest Service

and

Eastern

Defense

Commands

not

serving

in

the

continental

United

States,

personnel

in

every part

of

that

hemisphere

outside

Alaska,

the

Caribbean,

and

the

South

Atlantic.

(As

used

in

the

tables,

the

Caribbean

comprehends

the

Antilles,

Trinidad,

Aruba,

British

Guiana,

Panama,

Venezuela,

and

Peru,

and

the

South

Atlantic

includes

not

only

Brazil

but

also

Ascension.

Both

Bermuda

and

the

Bahamas are

counted

as

part

of

North

America.)

In

accordance with

the

time

series

noted

above

and

other

sources used

in

the

preparation

of

table

40,

certain

of

the

personnel

stationed

in

oversea areas

are

credited

in

the

table

to

commands

existing

in

the

Zone

of

Interior;

that

is,

the

War

Department as

whole,

the

Army

Service Forces, the

Army

Air

Forces. The

War

Department groups, consisting

of

members

of

military

missions

as

well

as

other

personnel, are

so

credited

from

the

earliest

date

shown.

In

the

case

of

the

Air

Forces, on

the

other

hand,

the

practice was not

adopted

until

May

1944.

As

result

of

the

change, some of

the

figures

shown

in

the

table

for

the

period

beginning

with

31

July

1944

are

not

entirely

comparable

with

corresponding

figures

for

earlier

dates.

Beginning with

that

date,

the

Air

Transport

Command

and

much

smaller group of

other

personnel are

charged

to

the

Commanding

General,

Army

Air

Forces;

whereas,

at

earlier

dates,

they

are

included

in

the

strength

of

the

areas

where

they

were

stationed. Their

subtraction

from

the

strength

of

these

areas

increases

the

medical

troop

ratios

of

each

area,

since

Air

Forces

troops

contained

lower

proportion

of

medical

troops

than

did

the

Army

in

general

(see

table

39).

While

the

change

has

only

negligible

effect

on

the

rates

of

large

theaters,

it

results in

marked

alterations

of

the

rates

of

small

theaters such

as

the

South

Atlantic

and

Africa-Middle East

where

the

number

of

troops

lost

sometimes

exceeds

those

that

remain.

Much

can

be

done

to

restore the

comparability

of

the

data

by

adding

for

each

date

after

April 1944

shown

above

the

strength

of

the

Air

Transport

Command

in

each

area

to

the

Army

strength

for

that

area.

This

has

been

done

in

the

table

entitled“Adjusted Medical

Department

Strength

in

Individual Oversea

Areas”

below,

and

the

result

is

there

referred to

as

“Adjusted

Strength-Total.”

To

compute

medical

ratio

for

APPENDIX

TO

TABLE

31
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 367

this

adjusted

strength-total,

the

medical

strength

of

each

area

as

reported

above

also

must

be

increased

by

the

amount of

medical

personnel among

the

Air

Transport

Command

troops.

This

in

most

cases is

unknown.

For

the

sake

of

adjustment, however,

it

has

been

assumed that

it

is

the

same proportion

of

the

Air

Transport

Command strength

as

the

medical

strength

under

the

Commanding General,

Army

Air

Forces shown

in

the

table

above

for

the

particular date

is

of

the

entire

oversea personnel

under

his

command.

Considerable justification for

this

procedure

exists

in

the

fact

that

the

Air

Transport

Command

constituted very

substantial

proportion

of

this

strength.

Although

the

proportion declined,

the

rate

did

notchange

materially.

The

percentages of

the

total

strength

held

by

the

Air

Transport

Command were

as

follows:

Based on

data

from

“Strength

of

the

Army”

for

relevant dates.

It

is

of

course entirely

arbitrary

to

assume that

the

ratio

of

medical

personnel

to

Air

Transport

Command strength

was the

same in

every

area,

but

the

fact

that

these

rateswere

generally

low

reduces the

amount

of

influence

that

errors arising

as

result

of

the

procedure

followed

may

have

on

the

adjusted

rates

shown

below.

Nevertheless,

neither

these

ratesnor

the

medical

strengths on

which

they

are based can

be

assumed

to

be

more

than

approximations to

the

true

ones. For

example,

the

medicalstrength

of

the

Air

Transport

Command in

the

South

Atlantic

on

31

August 1945

is

known

to

have

been

191,

whereas

the

figure

reached

by

the

procedure described here

is

140.

The

medical

strength ratio

of

the

area,

using

the

figure

191,

therefore

is

66

per

1,000

troops rather than

60

per

1,000

as

shown

below.

On

31

March

1945,

the

medical

strength

of

the

Air

Transport

Command

in

the

same

theater was

72

per

1,000, and

if

the

same total

existed

on

30

April

1945,

the

strength

ratio

on

that

date

was

88

per

1,000; the

figure

stated

below

is

84

per

1,000.

(For

the

medical

strength

of

the

Air

Transport

Command in

the

South

Atlantic

see

Medical

History

World

War

II,

U.S.

Army

Forces, South

Atlantic,

p.

58.

[official

record.])

Personnel outside

the

Zone

of

Interior who

were

under

the

direct

jurisdiction of

the

Commanding General

of

the

Army

Service Forcesor

the

Army

Ground Forcesare

reported

separately

beginning

in

April

1945.

In

the

case

of

the

former,

at

least,

the

personnel so

reported were not

hitherto

reported as

part

of

the

strength

of

any

oversea area.

They

consisted

of

the

personnel

operating

hospital

ships

and

roop

transports

navigating

between oversea areas

and

the

Zone

of

Interior.

As

may

be

seen,

medical

personnel

constituted very

substantial

proportion

of

this

group. In

order

to

make

the

oversea strength

of

the

Army

and

the

Medical

Department for

the

period

after

March 1945

comparable

with

the

strength

prior

to

that

time,

the

following

adjustments

of

the

percentages of

each

group

overseas are

necessary:

Medical

Date

Army

Department

31

July

1945

59.71

62.09

31

Aug.

1945

57.

19

57.

10

30

Sept.

1945

54.

59

54.

07

1945

—Continued May

47

June

48

July

47

August

40

September

41

1944: July

62

October.

60

1945;

January

52

April.

46

Medical

Date

Army

Department

30

Apr.

1945

65.

75

66.

87

31

May

1945

64.

82

66.

15

30

June1945-.-

62.99

64.69
368 PERSONNEL

Appendix to Table 31—Continued

Adjusted Medical Department strength in individual oversea areas, SI July September 19j5

Area

Adjusted strength Air Transport Command strength

Total Medical Total* Medical

Number Rate Number Rate

31 July 1944

North America 36,494 1,344 52 9,679 194 5.0

Alaska 74,749 4,126 55 3,568 71 .9

Caribbean 72,803 4,278 59 631 13 .2

South Atlantic 6,063 581 96 2,601 52 9.0

Europe 1, 773,891 159,348 90 3,277 66 .04

North Africa 729,084 56,099 77 5,027 101 .1

Africa-MiddleEast 15, 746 1,313 83 6,143 123 8.0

Persian Gulf 28, 774 2,228 77 478 10 .3

China-Burma-India 157,540 12,622 80 14,900 298 2.0

Southwest Pacific Area .... 666,568 60,181 90 2,060 41 .06

Pacific Ocean Areas 395,854 34,368 87 3,558 71 .2

31 October 1944

North America 33,004 1,449 44 10,824 195 6.0

Alaska 62,502 3, 592 57 3,848 69 1.0

Caribbean 69, 836 3,730 53 670 10 .1

South Atlantic 5,035 500 99 2.324 42 8.0

Europe 2, 208, 756 198,503 90 5,173 93 .04

North Africa 719,324 55,628 77 7,106 128 .2 Africa-MiddleEast 16,839 1,292 77 7,553 136 8.0

Persian Gulf 28,572 2,047 71 862 16 .6 China-Burma-India 182, 562 15,692 86 23,148 417 2.0

Southwest Pacific Area 705.529 61, 706 87 4,494 81 .1

Pacific Ocean Areas 422, 482 34,389 81 6, 534 118 .3

31 January 1945

North America 29,847 1,355 45 10,762 247 8.0 Alaska 51, 542 2,741 53 3,857 89 2.0 Caribbean 70,787 3,841 54 556 13 .2 South Atlantic ..

4,907 421 86 2,254 52 11.0 Europe 2,836,481 255, 770 90 7,442 171 .06 North Africa 517,470 38,764 75 9,802 225 .4 Africa-MiddleEast 17,263 1,329 77 7,933 182 11.0 Persian Gulf 27,409 1,989 73 1,327 31 1.0 China-Burma-India 216,368 18, 864 87 29,102 769 4.0 Southwest Pacific Area.. 753,816 62, 762 83 4,362 100 .1 Pacific Ocean Areas .. 427,086 35,160 82 6,289 14 .3

See footnotes at end of table.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

Appendix to Table 31—Continued

AdjustedMedical Departmentstrength in individual oversea areas, 31 July 1944-30 September 1945

Adjusted strength Air Transport Command strength

Area

Total Medical Total* Medical

Number Kate Number Rate

30 April 1945

26,882

42,415

67,750

1,253 47 9,947 239 9.0

2,264

3,720

427

53 3,609

581

87 2.0

55 14 .2

5,039

3,073,133

496,083

27,353

17,213

231,597

811,505

84 2,276 55 11.0

269,161

37,757

2,012

1,008

20,605

66, 545

38, 793

87 7,628 183 .06

76 2,207 53 .1

74 15,735 378 14.0

59 1,420 34 2.0

89 32, 767 786 3.0

82 5,377 129 .2

458,757 85 7, 787 187 .4

31 May 1945

26,406

41,947

1,113 42 10, 941 241 9.0

2,086

3,613

50 3,524 78 2.0

63,301

5,096

3,029,589

447,690

30, 547

17,487

57 5,169 114 2.0

420 82 2,307 51 10.0

264,665 87 8,106 178 .06

34, 780 78 2,317 51

1,967 64 18,292 402 13.0

1,006

20,739

58 1,424 31 2.0

231,495

845, 756

463,945

90 32,460 714 3.0

69,398

37,172

82 5, 585 122 .1

80 8, 111 178 .4

30 June 1945

23,598

41,104

1,038 44 11,387 262 11.0

2,008 49 3,181 73 2.0

74,997 3, 770

511

50 10,654 245 3.0

8.998 57 6,182 142 16.0

2,821,012

406, 534

250, 491 89 9,192 211 .07

32, 249 79 2,292 53 .1

27, 455

15, 048

228, 485

872,070

470.547

1,755 64 16,103 370 13.0

733 49 1,501 35 2.0

20, 204 88 33,927 780 3.0

69, 800 80 5,856 135 .2

37, 715 80 8,647 199 .4

See footnotes at end of table.
370 PERSONNEL

Appendix to Table 31—Continued

Adjusted Medical Department strength in individual oversea areas, 31 July 191,1,-30 September 19/,5

Area

Adjusted strength Air Transport Command

strength

Total Medical Total

Medical

Number Rate Number Rate

31 July 1945

North America 20, 935 892 43 10,983 262 13.0

Alaska -- --- 42, 321 2,038 47 3, 299 79 2.0

Caribbean .. __. 76, 625 3,689 48 9,572 230 3.0

South Atlantic ... 9,064 545 60 6,311 151 17.0

Europe, 2,517,653 230,248 91 7,934 190 .08

North Africa 354,092 29,922 85 2, 331 56 .2

Africa-MiddleEast 31,374 1,823 58 20, 288 487 16.0

Persian Gulf., _____ 10,686 523 50 1,513 36 3.0

China-Burma-India, 223,433 19,499 87 34,210 821 4.0

Total Pacific ._ 1, 404,140 113,088 81 15,130 363 .3

31 August 1945

North America 18,637 708 38 11,197 258 14.0

Alaska 40, 755 1,964 47 2,970 68 2.0

Caribbean .. ... 72, 842 3,778 52 8,850 186 3.0

South Atlantic 8,969 538 60 6,103 140 16.0

Europe ... 2,172,100 188,671 87 7,939 183 .08

North Africa 247,020 20,510 83 2,364 54 .2

Africa-Middle East 28,918 1,701 59 17,815 410 14.0

Persian Gulf.. 8,198 424 52 1,276 29 4.0

China-Burma-India 231,470 20,461 88 35,630 819 4.0

Total Pacific 1,473,868 116,552 79 14,957 344 .2

30 September 1945

North America.. 14,035 520 37 9,166 185 13.0

Alaska 38, 166 1,865 49 1,821 40 1.0

Caribbean 67, 021 3.589 54 4,441 98 1.0

South Atlantic 5, 518 316 57 3, 770 83 15.0

Europe 1, 798, 244 152,863 85 7,427 163 .09

North Africa 192,326 16,018 83 2,332 51 .3 Africa-Middle East.. 23,993 1,566 65 13,619 300 13.0

Persian Gulf 7,809 415 53 887 20 3.0

China-Burma-India 214,732 17,600 82 33,394 735 3.0

Total Pacific 1,573,170 120,759 77 20,867 459 .3

Per 1,000 troops adjusted strength.

From PersonnelHandbook, Headquarters, Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces, for dates shown.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 371

Distribution by Corps and Groups

Overall percentage statistics for Medical Department personnel serving

overseas in nowise give true picture of Medical Department activities overseas

inasmuch as percentages varied widely among corps and between officers and

enlisted men (charts 5, 6, and 7, and tables 31 and 32). For example, enlisted

men constituted more than 80 percent of the strength of the medical service

overseas (table 5); whereas, the maximum percentage of Medical Department

officers stationed overseas at any time was only about 56 percent, in January

and April 1945, making the percentage of the entire Medical Department

approximately 58 percent (April 1945). And in the officer corps, the percentage of medical officers and nurses was considerably higher than that of Medical

Department officers as whole, being 60.8 percent in the case of medical officers

(April 1945) and 63.3 percent in case of nurses (January 1945). The corresponding percentage of the Medical Administrative Corps was about equal to

that of the entire officer group, but in all the remaining officer components, the

percentage was lower. In the Dental Corps, the maximum was 48.3 percent

reached in May 1945, percentage that reflected both an actual increase in the

number of dentists overseas and decline in their worldwide strength (tables

and 32). As for the Veterinary Corps, its oversea strength failed to reach

35 percent.

Chart 5.—Percent of total Army and Medical Department strength, in oversea areas, on

selected dates, 1941-45

PERCENT

MEDICAL DEPT ENLISTED

MEDICAL DEPT

OFFICERS TOTAL ARMY

OFFICERS enlisted
372 PERSONNEL

Chart 6.—Percent of total Army strength and Medical Department officers, hy corps

Medical, Dental, Veterinary, and Medical Administrative), in oversea areas, on selected

dates, 1941-45

PERCENT PERCENT

total medical

DEPARTMENT MED AOMIN

CORPS

MEDICAL CORPSdental

CORPS

TOTAL ARMY

STRENGTH

VETERINARY CORPS

Chart 7.—Percent of total Army strength and Medical Department officers, l)y corps {Sanitary and Army Nurse), and Hospital Dietitians and Physical Therapists, in oversea areas,

on selected dates, 1941-45 PERCENT PERCENT

ARMY

NURSE

CORPS

TOTAL MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

SANITARY

CORPS

TOTAL ARMY

STRENGTH

Corps not existent on this date.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 373

Table 32.—Oversea strength of the Medical Department corps and other officer components,

31 July 19Jfl-30 September 19-^5

Date Strength

Percent of

worldwide corps

strength

Rate per

1,000 troops

Medical Corps

1941 31 July. 521 3. 84

30 November 779 6. 4. 72

1942 31 March 1,804 14. 5. 50

30 June._ ._ 3, 611 20. 6. 00

30 September.. .... 4, 945 15. 6. 01

1943 31 January._ __ 7, 462 20. 6. 66

30 April 9, 424 25. 6. 73

31 July 11,068 28. 6. 22

31 October 13, 209 32. 5. 90

1944 31 January _. 16, 631 39. 5. 91

30 April 20, 393 47. 5. 74

31 July __ __

22, 648 51. 5. 53

31 October ... 24, 835 54. 5. 36

1945 31 January ... 26, 456 56. 5. 16

30 April 28, 457 60. 5. 22

31 May 27, 639 50. 5. 11

30 June ... .. 26, 849 57. 5. 12

31 July 24, 790 51. 5. 04

31 August 21, 755 46. 4. 71

30 September 19, 135 42. 4. 60

Dental Corps

1941 31 July 135 0. 99

30 November ._ 175 5. 1. 06

1942 31 March .... .. 286 8. 87

30 June ... 535 11. 89

30 September 798 9. 97

See footnotes at end of table.
374 PERSONNEL

Table 32. Oversea strength of the Medical Department corps and other officer components,

31 July 19Jtl-30 September 19^5—Continued

Date Strength

Percent of

worldwide corps

strength

Rate per

1,000 troops

Dental Corps-—Continued

1943 31 January 1, 273 12. 1. 14

30 April 1,642 15. 1. 17

31 July 1, 910 15. 1. 07

31 October __ 2, 556 18. 1. 14

1944 31 January ___ 3, 301 23. 1. 17

30 April 4, 167 28. 1. 17

31 July 4, 858 32. 1. 19

31 October 5, 577 36. 1. 20

1945 31 January 6, 264 42. 1. 22

30 April 7, 080 48. 1. 30

31 May __

7, 103 48. 1. 31

30 June 6, 919 46. 1. 32

31 July 6, 576 45. 1. 34

31 August- __ 6, 190 43. 1. 34

30 September 5, 334 38. 1. 28

Veterinary Corps

1941 31 July __ 38 0. 30

30 November 37 5. 22

1942 31 March __ ___

45 5. 14

30 June 64 6. 11

30 September 97 6. 12

1943 31 January 152 9. 14

30 April 250 14. 18

31 July. 298 16. 18

31 October __ _______ 338 17. 15

See footnotes at end of table.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 375

Table 32.—Oversea strength of the Medical Department corps and other officer components,

31 July 19Jfl-30 September 19Jf5—Continued

Date Strength

Percent of

worldwide corps

strength

Rate per 1,000 troops

Veterinary Corps—Continued

1944 31 January. 471 24. 17 30 April 542 26. 15 31 July 594 28. 15 31 October 602 30. 13

1945 31 January.. ___ _.

675 33. 12 30 April 707 34. 12 31 May 705 34. 13 30 June ___ __ ___

693 34. 13 31 July.. 657 32. 13 31 August 629 30. 14 30 September.-. 594 29. 14

Sanitary Corps

1941 31 July _____

01 30 November 3. 05

1942 31 March 11 3. 03 30 June 25 3. 04 30 September 47 4. 06

1943 31 January.. __

79 6. 07 30 April 167 10. 12 31 July __

263 14. 15 31 October __

394 18. 18

1944 31 January 538 23. 19 30 April__ 718 31. 20 31 July 1, 080 42. 26 31 October _______

1, 071 43. 23

See footnotes at end of table.
376 PERSONNEL

Table 32.—Oversea strength of the Medical Department corps and other officer components,

SI July 1941-30 September 1945—Continued

Date Strength

Percent of

worldwide corps

strength

Rate per

1,000 troops

Sanitary Corps—Continued

1945

31 January __

__ 1, 233 49. 0. 24

30 April 1, 321 51. 24

31 May 1, 288 50. 24

30 June 1, 272 50. 24

31 July 1, 253 49. 25

31 August. ___

1, 163 46. 25

30 September 1, 039 43. 25

Medical Administrative Corps

1941

31 July. __ 43 0. 32

30 November 64 5. 39

1942

31 March 129 7. 39

30 June. __ 403 18. 67

30 September 590 16. 72

1943 31 January. __ 1, 037 13. 93

30 April 1, 539 15. 1. 10

31 July __ 2, 003 15. 1. 13

31 October. __ __ 2, 921 21. 1. 30

1944 31 January 3, 746 24. 1. 33

30 April 4, 980 33. 1. 40

31 July 6, 296 41. 1. 54

31 October 7, 782 50. 1. 68

1946 31 January __ __ __ __ 9, 250 51. 1. 81

30 April __ 10, 768 56. 1. 97

31 May. __ 10, 936 56. 2. 02

30 June__ _____ 10, 828 55. 2. 07

31 July 10, 426 52. 2. 12

31 August. 9, 708 48. 2. 10

30 September 8, 692 44. 2. 09

See footnotes at end of table
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

Table 32.—Oversea strength of the Medical Department corps and other officer components,

31 July 19Jfl-30 September 19Jf5—Continued

Date Strength

Percent of

worldwide corps

strength

Rate per

1,000 troops

Pharmacy Corps

31 Julv_ 1941

30 November.. __

31 March

1942

30 June __

...

30 September.

31 January

1943

30 April

31 July.

31 October 6. 001

31 January

1944

10. 002

30 April 15. 002

31 July.. 10. 001 31 October 10 16. 002

31 January

1945 16 23. 003

30 April 25 35. 004

31 May 21 35. 003

30 June 22 37. 004

31 July 23 40. 004

31 August ___ ____

22 32. 004

30 Sent ember 21 34. 005

Army Nurse Corps

31 July

1941 236 74

30 November 349 5. 2. 11

31 March

1942 1, 306

2, 880

10. 3. 98

30 June 16. 4. 79

30 September. 3, 803 19. 4. 62

See footnotes at end of table.
378 PERSONNEL

Table 32.—Oversea strength of the Medical Department corps and other officer components,

31 July 19Jfl-30 September 19J/5—Continued

Date Strength

Percent of

worldwide corps

strength

Rate per

1,000 troops

Army Nurse Corps—Continued

31 January

1943 5, 778 24. 5. 16

30 ApriL_ 7, 647 27. 5. 46

31 July 9, 649

13, 203

16, 958

31. 5. 42

31 October 37. 5. 90

31 January

1944 44. 6. 02

30 April 20, 958

22, 735

25, 433

51. 5. 90

31 July __ 56. 5. 55

31 October 61. 5. 49

31 January

1945 27, 170 63. 5. 30

30 April 28, 546 54. 5. 23

31 May 28, 842 53. 5. 33

30 June 27, 966 51. 5. 34

31 July __ 28, 127

25, 499

22, 445

50. 5. 71

31 August 45. 5. 52

30 Sentember 42. 5. 40

Hospital Dietitians

31 July

1941

30 November

31 March

1942

30 June __

30 Seotember

31 January

1943

30 April.

31 July

31 October __

64

117

185

11.

15.

19.

0. 05

07

08

1944 31 January

30 April

31 July

31 October

See footnotes at end of table.

326

432

552

631

29.

36.

43.

44.

0. 12

12

13

14
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

Table 32.—Oversea strength of the Medical Department corps and other officer components,

31 July 1941-30 September 19^5—Continued

Date Strength

Percent of

worldwide corps

strength

Rate per

,000 troops

Hospital Dietitians Continued

1945 31 January. 680 46. 13 30 April ______ 749 49 14 31 May 757 48. 14 30 June. __ 782 50 15

31 July. 698 44. 14 31 August _. 628 39. 14 30 September. __ 538 34. 13

Physical Therapists

1941 31 July

30 November

1942 31 March_ __

31 June,

30 September __ __

1943 31 January

30 April 48 15. 0. 03

31 July 93 21. 05

31 October ._ __ 145 29. 06

1944 31 January __ 241 43. 09

30 April 300 46. 08

31 July __ 371 47. 09

31 October ._ ._ 468 50. 10

1945 31 January __ 512 47. 0. 10

30 April 539 46. 10

31 May 546 45. 10

30 June. __ 521 43. 10

31 July 514 40. 10

31 August 431 32. 09

30 September 414 32. 10

From sources for oversea data shownin table 31, footnote 3. Revised oversea strength data for nurses published by

the Office of The Adjutant General (“Monthly Strength of the Army Foreign and En Route,” Strength of the Army,

Oct. 1945, p. 59) show the following variations from corresponding strengths stated here: July 1941, 263; November 1941,

463; March 1942, 2,689; June 1942, 4,406; and July 1944, 22,807. Since the same source reveals decline between June 1942

and July 1942 to 2,608 and failure to equal the June figure until 30 November 1942, at least some of these figures may be

regarded with considerable skepticism.

Worldwide corps strength on 31 July 1941 from “Strength 01 the Army”; available for nurses only. Worldwide

strength for subsequent datesis strength stated in table 1.

For troop strength, see table 31.
380 PERSONNEL

major factor in the variation of oversea strength was the changing of

requirements, both in the Zone of Interior and overseas, as the war progressed.

During the middle part of the war, specifically, much of 1943, the proportion

of Medical Department officers overseas was higher than the proportion of

the Department strength as whole. Toward the end of the conflict, when

large numbers of battle casualties began to be concentrated in the Zone of

Interior, this situation was reversed. This as particularly true after V-E

Day as the numbers of bed patients overseas decreased rapidly.

In addition, the Zone of Interior was responsible for the final, definitive

type of treatment for many patients which required highly trained professional

personnel and for rendering the new inductees physically fit for military duty.

Since the Zone of Interior was the source of most of the manpower supply,

it presumably had more control over distribution, particularly the movement

of Medical Department officers abroad. When the dental standards ere

lowered after Pearl Harbor, higher proportion of its personnel was retained

in theZone of Interior. (See tables and 32.)

The inspection activities pertinent to food procurement also were largely

confined to the continental United States, this area being the major source of

food for the Army. Although more animals were used overseas than in the

Zone of Interior for transporting supplies, the theaters did not require enough

veterinary officers for animal care to counterbalance the domestic need for

these same officers in food inspection work. As result, the oversea contingent

of the Veterinary Corps, proportionately speaking, was smaller than that of

any other Medical Department group.

The extent to which various elements could be sent overseas also was

controlled to some degree by the number of replacements available. In the

case of enlisted personnel, civilians, prisoners of war, and other military personnel could release many for oversea assignments. However, uncertainties

in the supply of local extra-Army labor made it impossible to withhold shipments of enlisted men to the oversea areas to the extent that the actual use of

substitute labor might have permitted. Furthermore, itis unlikely that savings

in enlisted men would have redounded very much to the benefit of the Zone

of Interior medical service; the men probably would have been transferred

to other branches of the Army.

Civilian registered nurses, cadet nurses, nurses’ aides, members of the

Women’s Army Corps, and enlisted personnel made possible the oversea shipments of nurses to care for the rapidly increasing number of bed patients.

The availability of Medical Administrative Corps officers as battalion surgeon’s

assistants and executive officers for certain types of medical units and installaFoster, William B.: History of the Medical Department, World War II, Physical Standards,

1946. [Official record.]

Information from Lt. Col. E. B. Miller, VC, 22 Dec. 1953.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 381

tions may explain similar phenomena in the Medical Corps. Medical Administrative Corps members, on the other hand, also were in demand in oversea areas,

and when the Zone of Interior was unable to supply these areas with such

officers late in the war, direct commissioning overseas proved to be one solution.

The groups which remained most closely bound to the Zone of Interior

were those for which replacements probably ere most difficult to find. This

is perhaps especially true in the case of dentists and sanitary engineers. Yet,

this is not the sole explanation for their failure to move abroad to greater

extent. The feasibility of utilizing female personnel in certain oversea areas

was seriously questioned at times. In the European and North African

theaters, nurses habitually moved with their units into forward areas. In

certain others, however, the theater commanders were reluctant to permit

women either in combat areas or in those wherein material comforts were few.

Such opposition does not seem to have reduced the percentage of nurses overseas to marked degree, for even if they did not accompany their units into

the more forward positions, they generally were permitted to enter the theaters.

In the case of physical therapists and dietitians, the difficulties of getting

overseas were greater. They were assigned mainly to rear areas (that is, in

general and station hospitals and, in the case of dietitians, few evacuation

hospitals). Again, the utilization of this personnel overseas was questioned

at times.

The buildup overseas of Sanitary Corps officers was slow in some theaters

due to lack of appreciation of the need for men of their skills. About 60

percent of the entomologists and 50 percent of the sanitary engineers served

in oversea theaters at sometime during the war.

The inability of the Zone of Interior authorities to furnish medical officers

in sufficient numbers forced table-of-organization changes which were mainly

responsible for the increasing use of Medical Administrative Corps officers

overseas during the course of the war. Although some opposition to such use

The proportion of medical officers to troops in oversea areas began to exceed the corresponding

worldwide ratio when Medical Administrative Corps officers emerged in great numbers from the officer

candidate schools.

(1) Vogel, Emma E.: Physical Therapists of the Medical Department, United States Army.

[Official record.] (2) Medical Department Dietitians, Middle Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas.

[Official record.] (3) Physical Therapy History of Pacific Ocean Areas and Middle Pacific. [Official

record.] (4) Berger, Florence M.: History of the Medical Department Dietetics Service in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1942—45. [Official record.] (5) Stone, James H.:

History of the Army Nurses, Physical Therapists, and Hospital Dietitians in India and Burma.

[Official record.] (6) Letters, Col. Emma E. Vogel, USA (Ret.) to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC,

Director, Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 28 Mar. 1956, and November 1957.

(1) Annual Report, Surgeon, 1st Infantry Division, 1944. (2) Hardenbergh, William A.

Water Purification. Jn Medical Department, United States Army. Preventive Medicine in World

War II. Volume II. Environmental Hygiene. Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955.

Hardenbergh, W. A.: Organization and Administration of Sanitary Engineering Division.

[Official record.] (This may indicate greater appreciation of the need' for Sanitary Corps men in

malaria control than in other phases of Medical Department work.)

Letter, Col. David E. Liston, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director, Historical Unit, U.S.

Army Medical Service, Jan. 1956.
382 PERSONNEL

was encountered, the employment of members of this corps in many positions,

including that of battalion surgeon’s assistant, gained widespread approbation

in oversea areas. Indeed, the Fifth U.S. Army surgeon was instrumental in

having the use of Medical Administrative Corps officers as battalion surgeon’s

assistants extended to infantry regimental medical detachments and to medical

detachments of tank battalions, rather than confining the use of these officers

to units less exposed to battle losses. The fact that commanders overseas

were able to promote enlisted men to commissioned status in the corps also

tendedto increase the number of such officers overseas.

In the final analysis, therefore, it would appear that the strength overseas

of these groups was largely limited by their basic overall numbers and by the

fixed requirements in the Zone of Interior. The nonacceptance of certain

groups, such as female personnel, was in all probability only minor contributingfactor to the size of the oversea shipments.

Regional Strength Overseas

By and large, Medical Department personnel were assigned overseas in

the same proportion as Army personnel in general (table 31). In fact, the

difference between the percentages of the total Army strength and the total

Medical Department strength in an area rarely equaled points and ordinarily

was no more than point. The largest concentration of Medical Department

strength outside the continental United States existed in the great combat

theaters—the North African-Mediterranean theater, the Central and South

Pacific or Pacific Ocean Areas, the Southwest Pacific, and, above all, the

European theater. Each of these major combat theaters had at least percent

of the entireMedical Department strength; in the case of the European theater,

it was 40 percent. The China-Burma-India theater obtained no more than

3.08 percent, and no other region attained more than percent. This was

true even though that area as well as Alaska and the Africa-Middle East

region had some combat history.

liespecting the relation of Medical Department strength to total troop

strength, the pattern among the oversea areas was much less simple. Three

small theaters, all in the Western Hemisphere—North America, Alaska, and

the Caribbean—were consistently fairly low in the proportion of medical

(1) Report, Lt. Col. Stewart F. Alexander, Personnel Officer, Surgeon’s Office, Seventh U.S. Army, of Medical Department Activities in Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 14 July 1945. (2)

See footnote 5(1), p. 381. (3) Annual Report, Surgeon, 44th Infantry Division, 1944. (4) Semiannual Report, 515th Clearing Company, January-June 1945. (5) Unfavorable reactions are contained in (a) Letter, Brig. Gen. F. A. Blesse, Surgeon, North African Theater of Operations, U.S.

Army, to Maj. Gen. N. T. Kirk, The Surgeon General, 17 Nov. 1943 (b) Letter, Maj. Gen. M. C. Stayer,

Surgeon, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, to Maj. Gen. N. T. Kirk, The Surgeon

General, Sept. 1944 and (c) Annual Report, 54th Medical Battalion, 1944. Smith, Clarence McKittrlck The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 383

personnel. On the other hand, the China-Burma-India region frequently

maintained high percentage during most of 1943, the proportion being far

in excess of that characterizing any other area. 10

In 1943 and the first part of 1944, the proportions in two other small

theaters, that is, Africa-Middle East and the Persian Gulf, generally were

among the higher ones, and in January 1944, the proportion in the former

theater was highest among those in all theaters. Even the small South Atlantic theater attained high proportions of medical personnel at times; in mid1944 it probably had higher proportion than that of any other region. The

major theaters seldom had the highest ratios of medical personnel to troop

strength but the Southwest Pacific was an exception to this rule. For most

of the earlier war period it held the leadership in this respect. In the earlier

part of 1943 the proportion of medical troops in the European theater increased greatly as result of the shipment of combat forces. This proportion was not long maintained but was approached again as the preparations

for the invasion of the Continent were accelerated. After the middle of 1944,

the European theater replaced the Southwest Pacific in having the highest

ratio of medical personnel to troop strength in major combat theater. This

was the result not only of an increase in the European theater, but also of

decline in that of the Southwest Pacific. The primary reason for the decline

in that theater was shift in jurisdiction over personnel in the Northern

Solomons and in Emirau from the South Pacific to the Southwest Pacific. 11

The shift involved much greater proportion of the general troop strength

of the South Pacific than of the medical strength of that area.

The North African theater, except in the early stages of the Italian campaign, almost invariably had lower proportion than the general oversea rate

until after hostilities ceased in Europe. The shift of jurisdiction over southern France from the North African to the European theater in November

1944 helped to keep the proportion down, for it involved the transfer of

greater proportion of medical than of nonmedical personnel. On the other

hand, the Mediterranean theater gained slightly when it lost control over

North Africa to the Africa-Middle East theater as of March 1945.12 At

that time, it gave up proportionately more nonmedical than medical personnel

with resultant sharp decline in the proportion in the theater which acquired

the most personnel.

Like the Mediterranean theater, the Pacific Ocean Areas rarely attained

proportion of medical troops which was as high as that maintained by the

oversea regions combined. The proportion, however, was considerably greater

in 1944 and in 1945 than it had been earlier; this partly resulted from the

10 This percentage rate was in relation to the strength of U.S. troops alone. The American forces

also were supporting large body of Chinese troops.

11 Monthly Summary of Operations, June 1944, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. 12 Vickery, Eugene L.: History of the Medical Section, Africa-Middle East Theater, September

1941—September 1945.
384 PERSONNEL

Table 33.—Authorized allotment of Medical Department officers to oversea areas (less Reserve

officers assigned to duty with the Air Corps for the fiscal year 19^2

transfer of some of its personnel to the jurisdiction of the Southwest Pacific

already noted (table 31), 13

At no time did anyone in the Zone of Interior or in the oversea areas

either attempt to establish quota for medical officers in the theaters or determine the proper proportion of medical strength to overall troop strength.

Prior to Pearl Harbor, officers were assigned overseas by the War Department

General Staff or, in the case of Air Corps personnel, by the Chief of the Army

Air Corps.14 Throughout the war, Medical Department officers were assigned

to the Panama Canal, Puerto Rican, Hawaiian, and Philippine Departments

and the Alaskan Defense Command on much the same basis (table 33), but in

the combat theaters, the strength of the Medical Department components was

based directly on the number and types of table-of-organization units which

in turn determined the overall strength of the theater. Basically, therefore,

the medical strength of each theater depended on decisions of the Zone of

Interior authorities and the theater commander as to how many units containing medical personnel should be allocated to it. These decisions were largely

controlled by the demands of the missions of the armies in the areas and the

medical needs created by the local environment in competition with requirements of other areas. To some extent, however, willingness of the War Department to provide units was dependent upon the arguments and powers of

persuasion of the theater Medical Department authorities themselves. 15

13 The unadjusted rate of the Pacific Ocean Areas was 82 per 1,000 on 31 May 1944. (Basic

data from “Strength of Foreign Commands by Arms and Services as of 31 May 1944,” in “Strength

of the Army,” 31 May 1944, p. 15.) By 31 July 1944, it had increased to 87. 11 Memorandum, War Department General Staff, G-l, for The Adjutant General, 28 July 1941, subject: Allotment of Officers for Oversea Departments and Alaska, Fiscal Year 1942. 15 These factors are more germane to the volumes on oversea medical service now in preparation

in the Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, than to the present work and will be scarcely more

than alluded to here.

Area Medical

Corps Dental

Corps Veterinary

Corps SanitaryCorps

Medical Ad- ministrative Corps

Alaska 124 20

Puerto Rico 76 20

Panama. 176 37

Hawaii. 130 39 14

Philippines 114 28 12 11

Source Letter, The Adjutant General, War Department, to the Commanding Generals, All Overseas Departments and Alaskan Defense Command, 16 Aug. 1941, subject: Allotment of Officers for

Overseas Departments and Alaska, Fiscal Year 1942.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 385

Table 34.—Estimated table-of-organization strength of attached medical personnel and divisional

medical battalions in oversea areas, 30 September 1944

The theater medical authorities had nothing to say about the nonmedical

units having medical troops, that is, attached medical personnel and, in the

case of combat divisions, organic medical battalions, as well as the attached

medical personnel. Naturally, this element of strength was greatest in the

combat zones (table 34), where ground force troops predominated (table 35). 16

At the height of the war, this personnel constituted quarter of the entire

oversea medical strength.

The medical units that were not an organic part of the combat units

accounted for the majority of the medical strength in virtually all theaters

(table 36). In certain theaters, at times, these units were larger proportionately than all units containing medical personnel in other theaters.

While surgeons at various levels of command had considerable latitude

in obtaining Medical Department personnel, they were influenced to large

extent by the requirements for medical service created by the mission of the

16 As of 30 September 1944, in oversea areas, medical troops accounted for 15 per 1,000 Air

Forces, 11 per 1,000 Service Forces, and 37 per 1,000 Ground Forces troops. (For the medical

strength, see table 34 for the troop strength of the various major commands, see “Troop List for

Operations and Supply, Oct. 1945.” The troop strengths exclude personnel of the Air Transport

Command and other personnel not subject to the jurisdiction of the theater commanders.)

Area

Total Ground Forces Service Forces Air Forces

Strength Rate per 1,000

troops Strength Rate per

1,000

troops

Strength Rate per

1,000

troops

Strength Rate per

1,000

troops

North America 172 55 117

Alaska 988 15 586 238 164

Caribbean 983 14 763 14 0. 206

South Atlantic 15 15

Europe, __ 41, 507 20 29, 560 14 5, 088 6, 859

North Africa 14, 274 20 11, 351 16 1, 572 1, 351

Africa-Middle East 30 30

Persian Gulf 199 23 0. 176

China-Burma-India 2, 376 14 669 260 1, 447

Southwest Pacific Area, 18, 558 27 14, 906 21 1, 447 2, 205

Pacific Ocean Areas 10, 554 25 9, 343 22 531 680

Total 89, 656 21 67, 201 16 9, 396 13, 059

Data are based on the summaries of various types of units in the theaters on 30 September 1944 shown in “Troop

List for Operations and Supply, October 1944.’’ In ascertaining the medical strength, it was not always possible to

discover table-of-organization corresponding to that shown on the list; therefore, another table (prior to 30 September

1944) was used in suchcases. This probably resulted in some errors, but itis believed that the errors were on the side of

conservatism. Rates are based on adjusted troop strength as shown in table 31.
386 PERSONNEL

Table 35.—Percentage distribution of Army strength among ground-, air-, and service-type

units and overhead in theaters of operations, 30 September 1944

Army in each area and the environment of that area. In this connection, the

amount of hospital service that the Medical Department was expected to provide in particular region was of utmost importance. The personnel assigned

to hospital establishments constituted the vast bulk of the strength of Medical

Department units. This accounted for the high proportion of medical personnel in the South Atlantic and the China-Burma-India areas in the late war

period, and for the increase in the proportion in the European theater (table

36).

Hospital strength was influenced in turn by such factors as combat missions, anticipated disease rates, and the presence of special groups for which

the Medical Department was required to provide medical care. Hence, it is

not difficult to see why most of the American theaters, with low disease rates

and limited combat duties or none at all, were consistently low in their total

medical strength. 17 The high disease rates in the China-Burma-India area and

the obligations of the Medical Department to personnel of the Chinese military

forces also explain the high proportion in that region. 18

17Although Alaska was combat theater until the middle of 1943, both the preparations for combat in that region and the hospitalization of casualties were handled to large extent in the Zone

of Interior. See McNeil, Gordon H. History of the Medical Department in Alaska in World War II. [Official record.] In September 1944, nevertheless, Alaska had an unusually large proportion of hospital personnel (table 36).

18 (1) Smith, Robert S. History of the Attempt of the U.S. Army Medical Department To

Improve the Efficiency of the Chinese Army Medical Service. [Official record.] (2) Medical Department, United States Army. Organization and Administration in World War II. Washington: U.S.

GovernmentPrinting Office, 1963.

Area Air Forces Ground

Forces ServiceForces Overhead

North America 24 30 24 23

Alaska 22 37 24 18

Caribbean 22 53 14 11

South Atlantic 35 12 16 37

Europe, -- 22 50 22

North Africa. __ 25 48 23

Middle East. 24 11 49 17

Persian Gulf 30 63

China-Burma-India __ __ 45 23 23

Southwest Pacific Area.. 25 52 20

Pacific Ocean Areas _____ 15 58 21

Source: Troop List for Operations and Supply, Oct. 1944.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 387

Table

36.—

Operating

strength

of

Medical

Department units

in

oversea areas

30

April1943-31 August 1945

Theater

Aggregate

Type

Function

Air

Ground

Service

Hospitalization

Preventive

Animal care

Miscellaneous

Supply

Fixed

Mobile

Total

Malaria

Food

inspection

Total

Air

Ground

Service

30

April 1943

Total overseas Strength__

67,

015

905

16,

078

50,

032

1,

920

46,

257

10,

843

38

18

20

320

7,

684

410

4,

989

2,

285

Rate

52

0.

12

39

36

0.

03

0.

01

0.

02

0.

0.

North

America: Strength

3,

002

3,

002

47

2,

941

20

20

41

41

Rate

40

40

0.

39

0.

0.

0.

0.

Alaska; Strength

3,

493

82

206

3,

205

18

3,

146

329

64

206

59

Rate

33

0.

31

0.

30

0.

0.

Caribbean: Strength

2,

394

415

1,

979

1,

970

415

415

Rate

21

17

0.

08

17

South

Atlantic: Strength

328

328

328

Rate

67

67

67

Europe: Strength

7,

734

156

430

7,

148

401

6,

370

963

430

533

Rate

69

64

57

North

Africa-Mediterranean theater: Strength

19,

833

345

8,

625

10,

863

743

8,

808

6,

444

3,

838

261

2,

181

1,

396

Rate

50

87

22

27

22

16

10

0.

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
388 PERSONNEL

Table

36.

—Operating

strength

of

Medical

Department units

in

oversea areas,

30

April

August

Idlfi

—Continued

Type

Function

Theater

Aggregate

Hospitalization

Preventive

Miscellaneous

Air

Ground

Service

Supply

Fixed

Mobile

Total

Malaria

Food

inspection Animal care

Total

Air

Ground

Service

30

April

1943—Continued

Total overseas

Africa-Middle

East:

Strength.

2,

424

40

2,

384

40

2,

377

Rate

65

64

64

0.

0.

Persian

Gulf: Strength

1.

529

45

101

1,

383

45

1,

383

101

101

Rate.

83

75

75

China-Burma-India: Strength

3,

324

131

1,

271

1,

922

208

1,

824

655

102

535

514

21

Rate

110

42

64

61

22

17

17

0.

Southwest Pacific

Area:

Strength

11,

996

21

3,

598

8,

377

285

7,

974

2,

954

18

18

144

621

500

121

Rate _.

85

0.

26

60

57

21

0.

0.

0.

Pacific

Ocean

Areas: Strength

10,

958

85

1,

432

9,

441

124

9,

136

790

74

834

85

642

107

Rate

...

42

0.

36

0.

35

0.

0.

0.

30

September 1944

Totaloverseas Strength

237,

079

5,

413

53,

370

78,

296

5,

733

161,

863

22,

462

2,

560

2,

230

330

700

43,

793

3,

816

25,

800

13,

577

Rate

55

12

42

38

0.

0.

0.

08

0.

10

0.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 389

North

America: Strength

879

879

839

40

40

Rate

25

25

24

Alaska: Strength

2,

860

38

2,

822

46

2,

736

17

17

Rate

43

0.

43

41

0.

0.

Caribbean; Strength

1,

910

1,

910

1,

805

105

105

Rate

27

27

25

South

Atlantic: Strength

432

43

389

364

25

25

43

43

Rate

79

71

67

Europe: Strength

121,

076

2,

759

27,

759

90,

558

2,

913

83,

828

9,

461

122

122

24,

732

2,

259

15,

743

6,

730

Rate

59

13

44

41

0.

06

0.

06

12

North

Africa-Mediterranean theater: Strength._______

38,

587

884

10,

714

26,

989

762

25,

160

5,

020

367

282

85

154

7,

124

632

5,

250

1,

242

Rate

54

15

38

35

0.

0.

0.

0.

10

0.

Africa-Middle East:

Strength

1,

093

1,

093

917

111

111

65

65

Rate.

67

67

56

Persian Gulf: Strength

1,

657

123

1,

534

33

1,

498

36

36

90

90

Rate

58

54

52

China-Burma-India: Strength

12,

360

485

3,

533

8,

342

670

7,

843

1,

855

306

306

264

1,

422

380

869

173

Rate..

72

21

49

46

0.

Southwest

Pacific

Area:

Strength

35,

245

344

8,

628

26,

273

760

21,

667

4,

946

1,

296

1,

183

113

167

6,

409

174

2,

902

3,

333

Rate

51

0.

12

38

31

0.

0.

0.

Pacific

Ocean

Areas: Strength

20,

980

860

2,

613

17,

507

549

15,

208

1,

160

297

287

10

115

3,

146

311

946

1,

889

Rate

50

42

37

0.

0.

0.

02

0.

0.

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
PERSONNEL 390

Table

36.

—Operating

strength

of

Medical

Department units

in

oversea areas,

30

April

August

l9/

Continued

Type

Function

Theater

Aggregate

Hospitalization

Preventive

Miscellaneous

Air

Ground

Service

Supply

Fixed

Mobile

Total

Malaria Food inspection Animal care

Total

Air

Ground

Service

31

December1944

Total overseas Strength

273,

133

4,

056 0.

65,

200

203,

877

7,

250

183,

654 38

28,

382

2,

784 0.

2,

355 0.

419

925

50,

238 10

2,

978 0.

30,

680

16,

580

Rate

57

14

43

0.

09

0.

North

America: Strength822

822

782

40

40

Rate

33

33

32

Alaska: Strength

1,

856 33

15

1,

841

46

1,

747

63

15

48

Rate.

0.

33

0.

31

0.

0.

Caribbean: Strength

1,

735

1,

735

1,

593

12

12

130

130

Rate

25

25

23

0.

0.

South

Atlantic: Strength

288

288

263

25

25

Rate

58

58

53

Europe: Strength

165,

173 61

2,

001

42,

631

120,

541

4,

052

109,

050

17,

282

124

24

100

154

34,

511 13

1,

553

21,

863

11,

095

Rate

0.

16

45

40

0.

05

0.

01

0.

04

0.

06

0.

North

Africa-Mediterranean theater: Strength

24,

226

784

5,

366 11

18,

076 36

563

16,

932

2,

553

328

258

70

3,

850

542

2,

668

640

Rate

48

0.

33

0.

0.

0.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 391

Africa-Middle G63076'—-63 27

East:

Strength.

1,

054

1,

054

884

111

111

59

59

Rate

49

49

41

Persian Gulf: Strength

1,

638

123

1,

515

33

1,

479

36

36

90

90

Rate

59

54

53

China-Burma-India; Strength

15,

176

540

4,

393

10,

243

545

9,

567

1,

751

485

365

120

451

2,

377

370

1,

816

191

Rate

74

21

50

46

0.

12

0.

Southwest

Pacific

Area:

Strength_____.

39,

941

500

10.

343

29,

098

1,

519

25,

128

5,

779

1,

378

1,

249

119

90

6,

047

324

3,

366

2,

357

Rate

53

0.

14

39

34

0.

0.

0.

Pacific

Ocean

Areas: Strength

21,

224

216

2,

344

18,

664

492

16,

229

1,

017

285

275

10

230

3,

071

174

877

2,

020

Rate

____

51

0.

45

39

0.

0.

0.

02

0.

0.

30

April 1945

Total overseas Strength

295,

351

4,

295

71,

877

219,

179

7,

764

199,

580

31,

189

3,

216

2,

622

414

1,

025

53,

941

3,

301

34,

184

16,

456

Rate

56

0.

14

42

38

0.

0.

0.

08

0.

10

0.

North

America: Strength

672

672

632

40

40

Rate

25

25

24

Alaska: Strength

1,

354

15

1,

339

44

1,

194

116

15

101

Rate

32

0.

35

31

28

0.

Caribbean: Strength

1,

679

1,

679

1,

539

12

12

128

128

Rate

25

25

23

0.

0.

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
392 PERSONNEL

Table

36.

—Operating

strength

of

Medical

Department units

in

oversea areas,

30

April

August 19^5

Continued

Theater

Aggregate

Type

Function

Air

Ground

Service

Hospitalization

Preventive

Animal care

Miscellaneous

Supply

Fixed

Mobile

Total

Malaria

Food

inspection

Total

Air

Ground

Service

30

April

1945

—Continued

Total overseas

South

Atlantic: Strength

271

271

246

25

25

Rate

54

54

49

Europe: Strength

181,

914

2,

018

49,

307

130,

589

4,

220

120,

227

20,

557

66

24

30

154

36,

636

1,

594

25,

120

9,

922

Rate

59

0.

16

42

39

0.

02

0.

01

0.

01

0.

05

12

0.

North

Africa-Mediterranean theater: Strength

..

25,

038

831

5,

936

18,

271

529

16,

781

2,

979

366

133

65

86

4,

297

622

2,

749

926

Rate

50

12

37

34

0.

0.

0.

0.

Africa-Middle East:

Strength__

1,

343

1,

343

1,

105

136

111

25

102

102

Rate

49

49

40

0.

Persian

Gulf: Strength

841

27

814

27

778

36

36

Rate

49

47

45

China-Burma-India; Strength

16,

154

681

4,

237

11,

236

568

10,

116

1,

918

641

496

146

643

2,

267

510

1,

422

335

Rate

70

18

49

44

0.

10

Southwest Pacific

Area:

Strength

42,

629

447

9,

269

32,

913

1,

605

30,

038

4,

700

1,

419

1,

295

124

90

6,

196

314

3,

359

2,

523

Rate

53

0.

11

41

37

0.

0.

0.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 393

Pacific

Ocean

Areas: Strength Rate

23,

456 51

303 0.

3,

101

20,

052 44

771

16,

924 37

1,

035

515

490

25 0.

52 0.

4,

159

261 0.

1,

519

2,

379

Totaloverseas

31

August 1945

Strength

247,

295

2,

715

62,

139

182,

441

6,

162

163,

845

28,

224

3,

549

2,

686

689

862

44,

653

2,

081

28,

620

13,

952

Rate

57

0.

14

42

38

0.

0.

0.

0.

10

0.

North

America: Strength.

348

348

308

40

40

Rate

19

19

17

Alaska: Strength

1,

339

1,

339

44

1,

194

10]

101

Rate

33

33

29

Caribbean: Strength

1,

641

1,

641

1,

481

12

12

148

148

Rate

23

23

20

0.

0.

South

Atlantic: Strength

271

271

246

25

25

Rate..

30

30

27

Europe: Strength

139,

446

1,

217

40,

718

97,

511

2,

559

89,

398

17,

730

128

37

91

149

29,

482

1,

011

20,

797

7,

674

Rate North

Africa-Mediterranean thea64

0.

19

45

41

0.

06

0.

02

0.

04

0.

07

14

0.

10

ter: Strength

16,

808

132

3.

886

12,

790

308

12,

047

2,

121

275

72

35

86

1,

971

56

1,

557

358

Rate Africa-Middle

East:

68

0.

16

52

49

0.

0.

0.

0.

Strength

1,

143

1,

143

869

129

98

25

136

136

Rate

40

40

0.

30

sl

0.

71

ol

ol

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
394 PERSONNEL

Table

36.

Operating

strength

of

Medical

Department

units

in

oversea areas,

SO

April

194S-31

August 19

If

—Continued

Type

Function

Theater

Aggregate

Hospitalization

Preventive

Animal care

Miscellaneous

Air

Ground

Service

Supply

Fixed

Mobile

Total

Malaria

Food

inspection

Total

Air

Ground

Service

31

August 1945

-Continued

Totaloverseas

Persian Gulf: Strength

301

301

289

12

12

Rate

37

37

35

China-Burma-India; Strength

15,

176 66

737

2,

841 12

11,

598 50

740

9,

950 42

1,

513

814

559

255

487

1,

672

566

431

675

Rate Pacific

Ocean

Areas: Strength

70,

822 48

629

14,

694 10

55,

499

2,

502

48,

063

6,

860

2,

154

1,

871

283

140

11,

103

448

5,

835

4,

820

Rate.

0.

38

33

0.

0.

09

0.

Basic

data

for

.April

1943

from

Troop

Section,

Logistics

Group,

Operations

Division,

War

Department General

Staff,

Overseas

Troop

Basis,

May

1943: for

all

other

dates

from

Troop

List

for

Operations

and

Supply

for

dates

approximate thereto;

all

data

include

non-Medical Department

personnel.

Data

for

April

1943

comprise

actual

strength;

data

for

all

other

periods

comprise

“operating

strength”

which

is

either

table-of-organization strength

or

strength

authorized

within

the

theater.

April

1943

data

also

include

non-table-of-organization

organizations,

and

Air

Transport

Command

personnel.

Divisional medical

units

are

not

included

at

any

time.

All

rates

greater than

unity

are rounded to

the

nearest

whole

number.

Rates

for

April

1943

are

per

1,000

troop

strength

for

that

date

as

shown

in

table

31

and

rates

for

April

and

August 1945

are

per

1,000

adjusted

troop

strengths

shown

for

these

dates

in

table

31,

appendix.

Rates

for

September

and

December 1944

are

based on

adjusted

strengths, determined in

mannersimilar

tothat

used

in

determining April

and

August 1945

rates, as

follows:
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 395

Area

Army

Medical

Department

Rate

Unadjusted strength

Air

Transport Command

Adjusted strength

Unadjusted strength

Air

Transport Command

Adjusted strength

30

September 1944

North

America

24,290

10,

216

34,

606

1,334

184

1,518

44

Alaska

63,495

3,

727

67,222

3,563

67

3,

630

54

Caribbean

70,

556

577

71,133

4,008

10

4,

018

56

South

Atlantic

2,989

2,453

5,442

479

44

523

96

Europe

2,053,

417

3,698

2,057,

116

183,

634

67

183,

701

89

North

Africa

712,

915

6,

675

719,

590

54,932

120

55,

052

77

Africa-Middle

East

9,

354

7,026

16,380

1,159

126

1,285

78

Persian Gulf

27,

739

855

28,594

2,009

15

2,024

71

China-Burma-lndia.

149,

014

22.

866

171,

880

13,

052

412

13,

464

78

Southwest

Pacific

Area

689,

804

3,871

693,

675

60,

895

70

60,965

88

Pacific Ocean

Areas

412,

618

3,748

416,

366

34,

388

67

34,455

83

31

December 1944

North

America

19,223

5,458

24,681

1,140

120

1,260

51

Alaska

52,

024

3,630

55,

654

3,112

80

3,192

57

Caribbean

70,

070

567

70,

637

3,816

12

3,828

54

South

Atlantic

2,715

2,291

5,006

432

50

482

96

Europe....

2,

699,

467

7,

516

2,

706,

983

247,

377

165

247,

642

91

North

Africa

498,

675

9,182

507,

857

36,972

202

37,174

73

Africa-Middle

East

9,321

12,

092

21,413

1,147

266

1,413

66

Persian Gulf

26,

647

1,214

27,861

1,980

27

2,007

72

China-Burma-India.

180,

405

25,642

206,

047

17,892

564

18,456

90

Southwest

Pacific

Area

744,

373

4,668

749,

041

63,473

103

63,

576

85

Pacific

Ocean

Areas

408,

085

5,948

414,033

33,789

131

33,920

82

Fromsource of

area

data

reported

in

table

31,

footnote

2.

for

30

September 1944.

2.2

percent

of

Air

Transport

ComFromsource shown

in

table

31,

appendix,

footnote

2.

mand

general

strength

for

31

December 1944.

From

“Strength of

the

Army,”

for

dates

approximate to

Ratio

of

adjusted

medical

strength per

1,000

troops

of

those

shown.

adjusted

Army

strength.

1.8

percent

of

Air

Transport

Command general

strength

Total

“Oversea”

strength

is

the

aggregate

of

strengths

shown

for

individual

areas.
396 PERSONNEL

The veterinary care of animals was more important function of the

Medical Department in the China-Burma-India area than elsewhere, but even

there it did not increase the proportion more than few points (table 36). The

prevention of disease is one of the major functions of the Medical Department

yet, in terms of special personnel for the purpose, it too increased the proportion only slightly in most areas. In certain small theaters, however, it was of

considerable significance primarily because of the malaria control and survey

teams which were stationed there. This results from the fact that the need for

antimalaria personnel is more matter of geography than of the troop strength

to be served.

Besides the organizations directly concerned with hospitalization, most

theaters possessed Medical Department units whose functions were accessory to

the provision of hospital service. Among such units were dispensaries of various types, ambulance companies, medical depots, medical laboratories, clearing

companies, collecting companies, medical gas treatment battalions, and sanitary

companies. In the European theater in the. latter part of the war, they constituted substantial element of medical strength which helped to give that area

its preeminent position in this respect among the major theaters and its high

position among all of them. The European theater utilized more types of

Medical Department units (including hospitals) than any other theater (table

37), distributed among air, ground, and service force units.

For the most part, Medical Department personnel in oversea areas were

assigned to and served in table-of-organization units. Some medical personnel

were in units that had been set up overseas under the non-table-of-organization

allotments of the various theaters. Although the maximum number of medical

officers who might come under the allotment as fixed by the War Department,

Table 37. Types of Medical Department units in use in the various theaters of operations,

hy area, 30 September 194-4

Area Total Air Ground Service

North America

Alaska

Caribbean

South Atlantic _. ..

Europe .. 35 14 17

North Africa 33 14 16

Africa-Middle East

Persian Gulf

China-Burma-India ... .. .. 21 12

Southwest Pacific Area 29 15 10

Pacific Ocean Areas 21 10

Source: Troop List for Operations and Supply, Oct. 1944.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 397

Table 38.—Estimated additions by Air Transport Command to theater medical strength per

1,000 troops, 1944

othertypes of officers could be substituted. In the case of nurses, no substitutes

could be made. In either case, the theater surgeon could make representations

concerning the size of these allotments, and this was one of the few opportunities he had to deal directly with strength; that is, strength consisting of individuals rather than strength composed of units. Thus, the chief surgeon of U.S.

Army Forces, Far East, dispatched an emissary after Y-E Day on successful

mission to obtain large increase in the overhead allotment of medical officers

for the Southwest Pacific. 19 Yet, it does not appear that the theater surgeons

materially augmented the medical strength ratios of the areas under their jurisdiction through increases in medical allotments. In the larger theaters, especially, it would have been difficult to do so because of the relatively small role

played by overhead in the strength of such theaters.

The medical personnel of the Air Transport Command, the Airways Communication System, and certain other troops under the command of the Army

Air Forces were counted as part of the strength of the individual theaters only

in the early part of the war. From the limited statistics available, it would

appear that they contributed substantial proportion of the strength in the

South Atlantic and Africa-Middle East theaters and to lesser degree in the

North America and China-Burma-India areas. In the major theaters, on the

other hand, they were of infinitesimal importance (table 38). 20

19 (1) Memorandum, Maj. Gen. G. B. Denit, Surgeon, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, to Colonel

Pincoffs, 22 May 1945. (2) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. R. W. Bliss, Assistant Surgeon General, for

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, 23 June 1945, subject: Revised Authorization of Medical Corps

Officers for Army Forces Pacific Overhead. (3) Memorandum, Maj. Gen. B. M. Fitch, Adjutant General, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, for The Adjutant General, 11 Aug. 1945, subject: Theater Overhead

Authorized Grades and Strengths.

20 See appendix to table 31 for further discussion of this matter.

Area 30 September 1944 31 December 1944

North America

Alaska

Caribbean

South Atlantic 10

Europe 03 06

North Africa

Africa-Middle East 12

Persian Gulf _. 2.

China-Burma-India

Southwest Pacific Area

Pacific Ocean Areas

For the estimated medical strengths of the Air Transport Command on the dates shown and the adjusted theater

strengths on the same date, see table 36, footnote 1.
398 PERSONNEL

Distribution of Oversea Strength by Major Commands

At the end of September 1944, approximately 5.7 percent of all oversea

medical personnel excluding overhead were serving with the Air Forces, 36.9

percent with the Ground Forces, and 57.8 percent with the Service Forces or

in communications zone installations.21 The percentage of medical strength

actually assigned to the Air Forces but month earlier was 7.74, but this

included overhead personnel (table 39). It represented decline from

higher percentage prevalent in 1943. At all times, however, the percentage

was lower than the Air Forces fraction of the worldwide Medical Department

strength. The ratio of medical Air Forces strength to total Air Forces

strength was always lower than the ratio of medical strength to general Army

strength both worldwide and overseas, but because of the lack of Air Forces

hospitals abroad, the strength of the Medical Department personnel assigned

to Air Forces organizations in oversea areas was always lower proportionately

than the like strength in the Zone of Interior.

While the majority of oversea medical personnel served in the Services of

Supply or communications zones, the proportionate strength of such personnel

fluctuated greatly. For example, in the European theater in September and

October 1942, during the buildup for the North African invasion, medical

personnel comprised approximately 30 percent of totalpersonnel in the Services

of Supply. After the invasion of North Africa, the total Services of Supply

strength in the theater declined approximately 20 percent while Medical Department Services of Supply strength increased by nearly 60 percent (table 35).

During November, number of medical units had landed in the United Kingdom because, although they were destined for North Africa, port facilities

which would have made possible their debarkation in the Mediterranean area

had not yet become available, and were therefore probably counted as part of

the European theater strength. 22

As 1943 progressed, however, emphasis was placed on supplying Air Forces

and Engineer troops to the British Isles. The result was decline of the percentage of medical troops in the Services of Supply from the peak attained in

February 1943. Despite resumption of shipments of medical units in the latter

part of the year, the influx of ground troops in preparation for invasion of the

Continent led to continued decline of the percentage of medical personnel under the Services of Supply.23 Before the end of the year, it had fallen below 50

percent.

21 The percentages are based on the strength of Medical Department units shown in table 36 and the strength of attached and divisional medical personnel shown in table 34. These statistics are based on authorized strengths since actual strength figures for oversea areas by major commands are lacking.

22 Information from Col. James B. Mason, Oct. 1942. 23 Kuppenthal, Roland G.: Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I. United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. Washington U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1953, table 5, p. 232.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 399

Table

39.

—Strength

of

Medical

Department

personnel

assigned

to

Air

Forces,

30

September 1942-31 May

1945

663076''—63 28

Date

Total strength

Air

Forces

Total strength

Air

Forces

Strength

Percent of

total

strength

Rate

per

1,000 Air

Forces

troops

Strength

Percent of

total

strength

Rate

per

1,000

Air

Forces

troops

Army

Medical

Department

30

September 1942:

Worldwide

3,

971,

016

1,

122,

208

28.

26

349,

253

38,

260

10.

95

34.

10

Overseas.

822,

962

186.

843

22.

70

58,

827

2,

914

4.

95

15.

60

30

June

1943:orldwide

6,

993,

102

2,

114,

175

30.

23

619,

020

86,

714

14.

01

41.

00

Overseas

I,

637,

419

421.

763

25.

76

129,

955

11,

208

8.

62

26.

60

31

January 1944:

Worldwide

7,

556,

157

2,

310,

673

30.

58

628,

758

89,

159

12.

50

42.

90

Overseas.

2,

814,

658

740.

605

26.

31

238,

914

19,

508

8.

17

26.

30

31

August 1944;

Worldwide

8,

102,

545

2,

392,

364

29.

53

688,

537

86,

076

12.

50

36.

00

Overseas

4,

262,

247

1.

066.

240

25.

02

354,

379

27,

446

7.

74

25.

70

31

May

1945:Worldwide

8,

291.

336

2,

316,

805

27.

94

666,

710

71,

179

10.

68

30.

72

Overseas

5,

406

779

1.

181.

804

21.

86

455,

068

27,

627

6.

07

23.

38

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
400 PERSONNEL

Table

39.

—Strength

of

Medical

Department

personnel

assigned

to

Air

Forces,

30

September 1942-31 May

1945

—Continued

Date

Total strength

Air

Forces

Total strength

Air

Forces

Strength

Percent of

total

strength

Rate

per

1,000

Air

Forces

troops

Strength

Percent of

total

strength

Rate

per

1,000 Air

Forces

troops

Medical

Department officers

Medical

Corps

30

September 1942:

Worldwide

65,

922

6,

627

10.

05

5.

91

31,

309

Overseas

10,

280

466

4.

53

2.

49

4,

946

342

6.

92

1.

80

30

June

1943:Worldwide

93,

994

13,402

14.

26

6.

34

37,

189

Overseas

23,

882

2,

136

8.

94

5.

06

10,

302

1,

509

14.

65

3.

60

31

January

1944:

Worldwide

113,

634

21,

644

19.

05

9.

37

41,

859

8,

686

20.

75

3.

80

Overseas

42,

218

3,

748

8.

88

5.

06

16,

631

2,

236

13.

44

3.

00

31

August 1944:Worldwide.

121,

269

20,

844

17.

19

8.

71

44,

726

8,

480

18.

96

3.

50

Overseas

60,

739

5,

583

9.

19

5.

24

23,

522

3,

186

13.

57

3.

00

31

May

1945:Worldwide.

142,

378

18,

797

13.

20

8.

11

46,

750

7,

711

16.

49

3.

33

Overseas..

77,

837

6,

005

7.

71

5.

08

27,

639

3,

092

11.

19

2.

62

Dental

Corps

Veterinary

Corps

30

September 1942:

Worldwide

8,

432

1,

408

Overseas

798

92

11.

53

0.

50

97

6.

19

0.

03
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 401

30

June

1943:Worldwide

12,

048

1,

839

Overseas

1,

859

322

17.

32

80

289

19

6.

57

05

31

January

1944:

Worldwide

14,

193

3,

845

27.

09

1.

70

1,

957

44

17.

83

20

Overseas...

3,

301

552

16.

72

70

471

349

9.

34

06

31

August 1944;

Worldwide

15,

121

3,

960

26.

19

1.

70

2,

024

355

17.

54

10

Overseas

4,

980

928

18.

63

90

572

47

8.

22

04

31

May

1945:Worldwide

14,

705

3,

826

26.

02

I.

65

2,

050

352

16.

15

14

Overseas.

7,

103

1,

089

15.

33

92

705

58

8.

23

05

Sanitary

Corps

Medical

Administrative

Corps

30

September 1942:

Worldwide

983

3,

646

Overseas

47

4.

26

0.

01

590

14

2.

37

0.

07

30

June

1943:Worldwide

1,

755

11,

630

Overseas. ..

242

3.

72

02

1,

843

126

6.

84

30

31

January

1944:

Worldwide

2,

246

207

9.

22

10

14,

990

2,

060

13.

74

90

Overseas

538

16

2.

97

02

4,

746

289

7.

71

40

31

August 1944;

Worldwide

2,

350

271

11.

53

10

14,

902

2,

029

13.

62

80

Overseas

995

69

6.

93

06

6,

695

477

7.

12

40

31

May

1945:Worldwide

2,

560

292

11.

41

13

19,

385

2,

318

11.

96

1.

00

Overseas

1,

288

89

6.

91

08

10,

936

821

7.

51

69

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
402 PERSONNEL

Table

39.

—Strength

of

Medical

Department

personnel

assigned

to

Air

Forces? SO

September 1942-31 May

1945

—Continued

Air

Forces

Air

Forces

Date

Total strength

Strength

Percent of

total

strength

Rate

per

1,000

Air

Forces

troops

Total strength

Strength

Percent

of

total

strength

Rate

per

1,000

Air

Forces

troops

Army

Nurse

Corps

Hospital

Dietitians

30

September 1942;

20,

144 803

1,

733

8.

60

1.

54

10

26

05

30

June

1943:Worldwide

28,

423 9,

189 36,672

4.

633

16.

30

2.

20

666

96

15.

97

0.

05

Overseas.

151

1.

64

35

93

31

January

1944:

Worldwide

6,

286 604

17.

14

2.

70

1,

100

176

16.

00

007

Overseas

16,

958

3.

56

80

326

1.

53

08

31

August 1944;

Worldwide

39,

970

5,

519 868

13.

81

2.

30

1,

312

183

13.

95

005

Overseas

22,

970 54,

128 28,

842

3.

78

80

569

88

08

31

May

1945;Worldwide...

4,

028 755

7.

44

1.

74

1,

550

148

9.

55

06

Overseas__

2.

62

64

757

13

00
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 403

Physical

Therapists

Medical

Department enlisted

30

September 1942:

Worldwide___

(N

OC

(M

31,

633

11.

16

13.

Overseas

48,

547

2,

448

5.

04

28.

30

June

1943:Worldwide

403

20

4.

96

0.

009

525,

026

73,

312

13.

97

21.

Overseas

65

106,

073

9,

072

8.

55

34.

31

January

1944:

Worldwide

559

35

6.

26

02

515,

124

67,

515

13.

11

20.

50

Overseas

241

83

003

196,

696

15,

760

8.

01

29.

20

31

August 1944:Worldwide __

807

47

5.

82

02

567,

268

65,

232

11.

50

20.

50

Overseas

427

70

003

293,

640

21,

863

7.

45

27.

30

31

May1945:Worldwide

1,

190

50

4.

20

02

524,

332

52,

382

9.

99

22.

61

Overseas

546

00

00

377,

231

21,

622

5.

73

18.

30

No

Pharmacy

Corps

personnel were assigned to

Air

Forces

organizations on

any

date

shown

except

May

1945,

when

there

were

two

in

the

Zone

of

Interior.

Worldwide

strength

from

tables

and

45.

Oversea

strength

fromsource shown

in

table

31,

footnote

2.

Oversea

strength

from

“Officers

and

Enlisted Men

Strength

of

the

Departments and

Bases.

Recapitulation by

Arm

or

Service.

Assigned

to

Air

Corps

and

Other

Than

Air

Corps”

(records

of

AGO

Statistical

and

Control

Branch,

Office

of

The

Adjutant

General),

for

all

dates

shown

prior

to

1945

or

dates

approximate thereto;

from

“Personnel

Assigned

to

Air

Forces

Organizations

by

Arms

and

Services

by

Command,”

in

“Strength

of

the

Army,”

June

1945,

pp.

24-25,

for

31

May

1945.

Worldwide

strength

equals

oversea strength

plus

continental

United

States

strength

as

shown

in

“Strength

of

the

Army”

for

dateslisted

or

dates

approximate thereto.

Worldwide

strength

(including

personnel

assigned

to

Veterans’

Administration)

from

tables

and

27.

Oversea

strength

from

sources stated

under

this

heading

in

footnote

3.

Oversea

strength

from

sources for

oversea strength

shown

in

footnote

3.

Worldwide

strength

equals

oversea strength

plus

continental

United

States

strength

as

shown

in

“Strength

of

the

Army”

for

dates

listed

or

dates

approximate thereto.

Fromsources shown

in

footnote

5.

However, no

data

on

continental

United

States

strength

for

September 1942

and

June

1943

are available.

Consequently, it

is

not

possible

to

state

worldwide

strengths

on

these

dates.
404 PERSONNEL

After the invasion of Normandy began, however, it was necessary to increase the rear echelon medical support of the campaign and more fixed hospital installations were brought into the theater. 24 The percentage ascended

somewhat above the 50 percent mark although it may have been held down by

the reduction of table-of-organization strength of fixed hospital units. By

mid-March of 1945, the Medical Department strength in the communications

zone of the European theater was less than 45 percent of the total medical

strength in the theater. This was exclusive of headquarters personnel, but it is

unlikely that even with such personnel it reached 50 percent. 25 By that time,

the theater had returned much of its patient load to the Zone of Interior. 26 Use

24 Data from monthly “TroopLists for Operationsand Supply.”

25 Computationsbased upon communications zone strength (122,100) as shown in “Unit Strength—

ComZ—BTOUSA. Comparison of Actual and T/O—15 Mar. 1945”, in Progress Report, Communications Zone, ETO —USA, 31 March 1945, p. 4. Theater medical strength used here equals the

mean of strengths shown in “Strength of the Army” for Mar. and Apr. 1945. 25 See footnote 9, p. 382.

Table 40.—Strength of Medical Department by Army components,

Group Worldwide Total Alaska North America Caribbean

January August January August January August January August January August

Regular Army

Male personnel, Army:

Strength 543,954 677,423 108,275 194,407 10,884 14,790 10, 559 20,118 48,389 47,337

Percent of Army male... 29.4 16.5 58.5 26.6 46.9 20.7 80.8 31.7 64.4 44.6 Male personnel, Medical Department:

Strength 33, 638 34,302 5,333 9,558 653 858 836 1,302 1,897 1,899

Percent of Medical Department male 24.0 11.8 57.7 19.1 64.2 29.5 83.7 32. 48.9 33.5

Officers, Army;

Strength 14, 759 14,312 2,768 3,308 193 241 153 309 843 690 Percent of Army officers 12.1 5.9 21.1 7.8 17.3 7.6 22.2 10.7 18.8 10.8

Officers, Medical Department:

Strength 1,668 1,692 285 397 15 16 14 31 109 106 Percent of Medical Department Officers 10.5 4.8 19.9 6.8 11.7 5.5 12.2 6.5 19.1 12.9

Enlisted men, Army;

Strength 529,195 563,111 105, 507 191,099 10,691 14, 549 10,406 19,809 47,546 46,647

Percent of Armyenlisted. 30.6 17.3 61.3 27.8 48.5 21.4 84.0 32.7 67.4 46.7

Enlisted men, Medical

Department:

Strength -- .. 31,970 32,610 5,048 9,161 638 842 822 1,271 1,788 1,793

Percent of Medical Department enlisted 25.7 12.8 64.7 20.8 71.7 32.1 93.0 35.9 54.0 37.0

Nurses:

8,670 1,229 15 176 111

60.0 40.0 22.1 64.9 34.7

See footnotes at end of table.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 405

of civilians and prisoners of war also may have reduced the proportion of military personnel in the Communications Zone medical service.

COMPOSITION OF THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OVERSEAS

Army Components

For some time after mobilization began in 1940, the majority of U.S.

troops overseas were Regular Army due to the time element necessary to train

the other components. At the same time, the proportion of Regulars in the

Army as whole was greater than it was in the Medical Department. This was

true overseas in the early part of 1942 although the reverse had been the case

in the middle of 1941 (tables 40 and 41). But as the relative strength of the

Regular Army declined in the Medical Department overseas, that of every other

component increased, at least for time.

worldwide and overseas, 31 January and 31 August 1943

Overseas

South

Atlantic

Europe AfricaMiddle

East

Persian

Gulf

ChinaBurmaIndia Pacific Ocean

Areas

SouthwestPacific

Area

War Depart

ment

groups

En

route

August January August August August Augus January August January August August August

445 102 37,460 1,538 105 5,165 4,637 43,869 33,704 20,982 101 2,497

24.1 3.0 24.0 17.6 38.6 38.7 17.2 23.0 77.6 20.7 45.3 14.0

60 26 1,704 65 253 1, 239 2,192 682 1,182 37

37.7 8.5 14.9 14.0 25.0 25.1 65.5 15.8 59.5 11.8 33.3 9.0

842 43 100 670 574 907 368 101 25

6.0 2.0 7.9 7.1 8.0 9.1 21.0 6.0 25.7 5.8 45.3 2.3

85 61 83 85 60

.0 10.0 6.7 9.1 .0 6.3 20.5 5.8 27.7 4.7 33.3 .0

438 100 36, 618 1,495 97 5,065 3,967 43,295 32, 797 20,614 2,472

25.3 3.0 25.1 18.4 56.4 41.3 16.7 23.8 82.3 21.7 .0 14.8

60 25 1,619 59 244 1,178 2,109 597 1,122 37

42.8 8.4 15.9 14.9 62.5 28.2 73.8 17.0 71.1 12.8 .0 10.4

35 36 269 587

.0 .0 100.0 .0 39.6 30.5 55.6 .0 .0
PERSONNEL

Table 40.—Strength of Medical Department by Army components,

Group Worldwide Total Alaska North America Caribbean

January August January August January August January August January August

National Guard

Male personnel, Army:

Strength 214,480 213,520 19,283 78,455 5,258 11,697 48 2, 716 6,317 7,072

Percent of Armymale 11.6 6.1 10.4 10.7 22.7 16.4 .4 4.3 8.4 6.7

Male personnel, Medical Department:

Strength 13,167 11,859 680 4.989 105 402 116 237 309

Percent of Medical Department male 9.4 4.1 7.4 10.0 10.3 13.8 .2 2.9 6.1 5.5

Officers, Army;

Strength 17,468 14, 570 1,304 4, 351 286 583 137 430 529

Percent of Army officers. 14.4 6.0 9.9 10.3 25.6 18.3 .4 4.7 9.6 8.3

Officers, Medical Department:

Strength 1,428 1,163 64 420 10 27 30 38

Percent of Medical Department officers 9.0 3.3 4.5 7.2 7.8 9.2 .0 1.9 5.3 4.6

Enlisted men, Army:

Strength ...

197,012 198,950 17,979 74,104 4,972 11,114 45 2,579 5,887 6,543

Percent of Army enlisted. 11.4 6.1 10.5 10.8 22.6 16.3 .4 4.3 8.3 6.6

Enlisted men, Medical

Department:

Strength 11,739 10,696 616 4,569 95 375 107 207 271

Percent of Medical Department enlisted 9.4 4.2 7.9 10.3 10.7 14.3 .2 3.0 6.3 5.6

Reserves

Male personnel, Army:

Strength 134,107 211,416 9,491 38,169 638 3,280 519 3,884 3,669 5,224

Percent of Army male... 7.2 6.0 5.1 5.2 2.8 4.6 4.0 6.1 4.9 4.9

Male personnel. Medical DepartmentStrength 16,443 27,035 1,094 5,264 103 280 98 523 441 647

Percent of Medical Department male ... 11.7 9.3 11.8 10.5 10.1 9.6 9.8 13.0 11.4 11.4

Officers, Army;

Strength 87,029 138,984 8,887 29,370 638 2,206 519 2,136 3,089 1,419

Percent of Army officers. 71.5 56.9 67.8 64.6 57.1 69.2 75.2 74.1 68.8 69.0

Officers, Medical Department:

Strength ..

12, 565 20,135 1,076 4,488 103 244 98 392 432 631

Percent of Medical Department officers. ..

78.8 56.9 75.3 76.7 80.5 83.6 85.2 82.4 75.6 76.8

Enlisted men, Army;

Strength 47,078 72,432 604 8, 799 1,074 1,748 580 805

Percent of Army enlisted— 2.7 2.2 .4 1.3 .0 1.6 .0 2.9 .8 .8

Enlisted men, Medical

Department:

Strength 3,878 6,900 18 776 36 131 16

Percent of Medical Department enlisted

See footnotes at end of ta

3.1

ble.

2.7 .2 1.8 .0 1.4 .0 3.7 .3 .3
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 407

worldwide and overseas, 31 January and 31 August 1943 —Continued

Overseas

South

Atlantic

Europe

AfricaMiddle

East

Persian

Gulf

ChinaBurmaIndia Pacific Ocean Areas Southwest Pacific

Area

War

Department

groups

En

route

August January August August August August January August January August August August

313 1,688 11.773 137 16 441 4,277 27,288 1,695 15,479 1, 523

17.0 49.0 7.5 1.6 5.9 3.3 15.9 14.3 3.9 15.3 .0 8.5

14 121 982 16 119 1,824 96 1,288 34

8.8 39.4 8.6 .6 5.0 1.6 6.3 13.2 8.4 12.8 .0 8.3

16 49 828 11 23 310 1,319 226 851 50

13 50.0 7.8 1.8 4.0 2.1 9.7 13.8 6.4 13.4 .0 4.6

124 15 103 112

10.5 10.0 9.8 3.0 .0 .7 5.0 7.2 2.6 8.8 .0 3.7

297 1.639 10,945 126 12 418 3,967 25,969 1,469 14,628 1,473

17.2 49.1 7.5 1.6 7.0 3.4 16.7 14.3 3.7 15.4 .0 8.8

12 120 858 15 101 1,721 88 1,176 32

8.6 40.4 8.4 .3 12.5 1.7 6.5 13.9 10.5 13.4 .0 9.0

97 51 7,101 408 71 1,039 2,199 8,969 2,415 7,163 110 823

5.3 1.5 4.5 4.7 26.1 7.8 8.2 4.7 5.6 7.1 49.3 4.6

16 15 902 46 146 221 1,374 216 1,275 45

10.1 4.9 7.9 9.9 40.0 14.5 11.7 9.9 18.8 12.7 66.7 11.0

81 44 6,391 344 91 930 2,197 7,288 2,400 4,867 110 527

69.2 44.9 60.3 57.0 71.0 84.6 68.8 76.3 67.9 76.5 49.3 48.2

16 88 810 45 124 221 1,185 214 998 33

84.2 80.0 64.1 68.2 66.7 86.7 74.2 83.3 69.7 78.6 66.7 61.1

16 710 64 109 1,681 15 2,296 296

.9 .2 .5 .8 .0 .9 .0 .9 .0 2.4 .0 1.8

92 22 189 277 12

.0 2.4 .9 .3 .0 2.5 .0 1.5 .3 3.2 .0 3.4
408 PERSONNEL

Table 40.—Strength of Medical Department by Army components.

Group Worldwide Total Alaska North America Caribbean

January August January August January August January August January August

Reserves—Contiu icd

Nurses:

5,158 1,843 53 95 209

35. 60.0 77.9 35.1 65.3

Army of United States

Male personnel, Army;

Strength 130,748 395,089 885 39, 780 153 3,269 175 2,509 172 9,487

Percent of Armymale ...

7.1 11.3 .5 5.4 .7 4.6 1.3 3.9 .2 8.9

Male personnel, Medical Department;

Strength 3,913 30,813 29 2,051 68 164 10 314

Percent of Medical Department male 2.8 10.6 .3 4. .2 2.3 .4 4.1 .3 5.5

Officers, Army:

Strength 2,448 76,007 160 5,206 157 15 303 126 758

Percent of Army officers. 2.0 31. 1.2 12.3 .0 4.9 2.2 10.5 2.8 11.9

Officers, Medical Department;

Strength 288 12,383 542 44 47

Percent of Medical Department officers 1.8 35.0 .3 9.3 .0 1.7 2.6 9.2 .0 5.7

Enlisted men, Army:

Strength 128,300 319,082 725 34, 574 152 3,112 160 2,206 46 8, 729

Percent of Army enlisted... ..

7.4 9.8 ,4 5.0 .7 4.6 1.3 3.6 .0 8.7

Enlisted men. Medical

Department:

Strength 3, 625 18,430 25 1,509 63 120 10 267

Percent of Medical Department enlisted _. 2.9 7.2 .3 3.4 .2 2.4 .1 3.4 .4 5.5

Nurses:

613

4.3 .0 .0 .0 .0

Selectees

Army:

Strength 828, 207 2,103,315 47,180 381, 248 6, 222 38, 263 1,767 34,319 16,622 37,080

Percent of Army male. .. 44.7 60.1 25.5 52.1 26.9 53.7 13.5 54.0 22.1 34.9

Percent of Armyenlisted.. 47.9 64.6 27.4 55.3 28.2 56.1 14.3 56.5 23.5 37.2

Medical Department:

Strength 73,079 186,303 2,103 28,133 155 1,305 59 1,916 1,291 2,500

Percent of Medical Department male 52. 64.2 22.8 56.3 15.2 44.8 6.7 47.6 33.3 44.1

Percent of Medical Department enlisted 58,9 73.1 26.9 63.7 17.4 49.8 5.9 54.0 39.1 51.6

Basic data from “Strength of the Army” for dates shown.

Includesall personnel not shown underanother heading.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

worldwide and overseas, 31 Januaryand 31 August 1942 —Continued

Overseas

Africa- China- War South Europe Middle Persian Burma- Pacific Ocean Southwest Pacific Depart- En Atlantic East Gulf India Areas Area ment route

groups

August January August August August August January August January August August August

351 55 612 468

.0 100.0 .0 60.4 69. 44.4 .0 .0

120 7, 469 2,344 25 528 305 6,845 76 4,855 12 2,317

6.5 .2 4.8 26.9 9.2 4.0 1.1 3.6 .2 4.8 5.4 13.0

23 452 94 32 13 477 381 42

14.5 .0 3.9 20.3 20.0 3.2 .7 3.4 .0 3.8 20.0 10.2

13 2,552 206 17 46 15 376 275 12 491

11.1 3.1 24.0 34.1 17.0 4.2 3.9 .0 4.3 6.4 44.9

246 13 53 101 19

5.3 .0 19.4 19.7 33.3 6.3 .3 3. 73 .0 7.9 .0 35.2

107 4,917 2,138 482 290 6,469 76 4,580 1,826

6.2 .0 3.4 26.3 4.7 3.9 1.2 3.6 .2 4.8 .0 10.9

22 206 81 23 12 424 280 23

15.7 .0 2.0 20.4 .0 2. .8 3.4 .0 3.2 .0 6.5

.0 .0 .0 .0 .0

871 1,591 92,449 4,298 55 6,179 15,489 104,044 5,489 53,003 10,687

47.1 46.3 59.2 49.2 20.2 46.2 57.6 54.4 12.7 52.1 .0 59.9

50.4 47.7 63.5 52.9 31.9 50.5 65.4 57.4 13.8 55.7 .0 63.7

46 145 7,408 255 562 301 7,977 152 5,910 252

28.9 47.2 64.7 55.1 10.0 55.6 15.9 57.7 13.3 58.9 .0 61.5

32.9 48.8 72.8 64.1 25.0 64.0 18.7 64.2 18.1 67.4 .0 70.7
410 PERSONNEL

Table 41.—Strength of male personnel by Army components, worldwide and overseas, on

31 July 1941

The actual size of the components, however, cannot be traced beyond the

early part of 1943 except in the case of Regular Army officers. In April 1944,

Regular Army officers, numbering 618, constituted 2.01 percent of the male

Medical Department officer strength in foreign areas. The corresponding

figure for all male officers (6,323) was 2.37 percent. 27

It can be said with certainty, however, that by the closing days of the war

at least 80 percent of the oversea medical enlisted strength comprised selectees

and not less than half of the male Medical Department officers abroad were

so-called Army of the United States personnel; that is, neither Regulars,

National Guardsmen, nor reservists.

The trend of Army components among nurses probably was the same as

that among male officers until about the middle of 1942. At that time, large

reclassification of members of the Army Nurse Corps took place, and many

who had been considered reservists were given Regular Army status. Some

delay occurred, however, in the reclassification of those nurses who were abroad

or at least in the recording of this reclassification. Thus, on 31 August 1942,

27 On 30 April 1944, the Regular Army strength of the male Medical Department officer corps

overseas and the percentage of Regulars in the total oversea strength of each corps were as follows

Medical Corps, 509 (2.5 percent) Dental Corps, 66 (1.6 percent) Veterinary Corps, 35 (6.5 percent)

Pharmacy Corps, (88.8 percent). Basic data are from AG Machine Records Branch, Military

Strength of Bases. Recapitulation by Arm or Service by Station, Officers and Enlisted Men, 30 Apr.

1944.

Component Total Army Medical Department

Number Percent Number Percent

Worldwide __ 1, 524, 375

508, 383

280, 333

65, 143

670, 516

122, 913

100, 534

7, 472

4, 118

10, 789

100.

33.

18.

4.

44.

100.

81.

6.

3.

8.

120, 914

32, 255

17, 261

11, 567

59, 831

4, 761

3, 919

154

490

198

100.

26.

14.

9.

49.

100.

82.

3.

10.

4.

Regular Army

National Guard

Reserves

Selectees

Overseas

Regular Army

National Guard

Reserves

Selectees. __

Basic data from “Strength of the Army,” 31 July 1941.

Includes approximately 22,000 Army of the United States enlisted men or 1.4 percent of the

worldwide Army male strength. See table 12, footnote 18.

Includes approximately 750 Army of the United States enlisted men or 0.6 percent of the worldwide Medical Department male strength. See table 12, footnote 18.

It is uncertain whether Army of the United States enlisted men are included. Since in January

1942 the number of such enlisted men serving overseas was only 725 (see table 40), the number

on 31 July 1941 could not have been large.

It is uncertain whether Army of the United States enlisted men are included. In January 1942,

the total oversea strength of such personnel was 25 (see table 40) hence, they could hardly have

been more than handful in July 1941.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 411

the proportion of nurses serving in oversea areas and who were reported to be

in the Regular Army was considerably smaller than the corresponding worldwide ratio (table 32). By the end of October, this situation had changed, and

by 30 April 1944, the proportion of Regular Army personnel among nurses

serving in foreign areas was not much different from the corresponding ratio

among other personnel.

Negroes

In the early part of the war, proportionately fewer Negroes were shipped

overseas by the Medical Department than whites, partially because of the

reluctance of theater authorities to utilize such personnel. Manpower shortages together with the War Department policies to better utilize Negro personnel and to ship abroad personnel that had not seen foreign service reversed

the proportion of Negro and white Medical Department personnel overseas. 28

For much of the period between October 1911 and the end of hostilities, the

number of Medical Department Negroes overseas was proportionately greater

than the oversea portion of the Medical Department as whole. Contributing

to this change was decline in the Medical Department’s overall Negro

strength, decline which was relatively greater than the corresponding loss

to the Army as whole.

While every Negro table-of-organization hospital unit organized in the

Zone of Interior eventually went overseas,29 the number of such units did

not exceed five. The increasing use of Negro medical personnel outside

the United States was perhaps primarily manifested in regard to sanitary

companies. As late as June 1948, only two of these companies were abroad;

one, the T08th, had gone overseas in 1942 and was operating in the North

African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, and the other, 716th, had arrived

on Guadalcanal in the spring of 1943. Between August and December 1943,

only live more sanitary companies were shipped abroad, three to the European

theater and two to the Pacific. In 1944, however, at least 35 medical sanitary

companies were moved overseas; in January 1945, one additional company was

activated in Hawaii. Thus, if January 1945 be taken as the month marking

the peak oversea Negro medical strength (14,150), it may be assumed that at

least 5,000, or more than one-third of this oversea strength, were allotted to sanitary companies (tables 31 and 42). Virtually all of the companies were concentrated in the European theater and the Pacific (table 42). These were the

areas which were receiving the largest number of personnel of all types and this

at time when the War Department policies to promote oversea use of Negroes

were becoming effective.

The sanitary companies were trained primarily for the purposes of

malaria control, but even in the Pacific, many were occupied in hospital construction and some were used as pools of Medical Department common labor.30

28 Information from Mr. Ulysses G. Lee, Jr., 24 July 1953.

29 See footnote 9, p. 382.

00 Quarterly Report, 714th Medical Sanitary Company, July 1944.
412 PERSONNEL

Table 42.—Negro Medical Department units overseas, Pearl Harbor to V-J Day

In the absence of serious malaria problem in the European theater the personnel of the sanitary companies serving therein, though used principally

as litter bearers, were also used to guard prisoners of war occupied as Medical

Department labor, to perform elementary carpentry and masonry tasks, to

handle mail, and to pack supplies as well as operate small dispensaries and

carry out basic sanitary measures in the vicinity of Medical Department

units. 31 Among other Negro Medical Department organizations that served

overseas, the most important from numerical point of view were the motor

ambulance companies. Many of these units were employed in the European

theater and lesser numbers in the North African theater and in the Southwest

Pacific (table 42).

31 (1) Annual Report, 726th Medical Sanitary Company, 30 June 1945. (2) Periodic Report

(1 Apr.-lO May 1945), 274th Medical Sanitary Company, 23 May 1945. (3) Annual Report, Surgeon,

Normandy Base Section, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, for 1944. dated 31 Jan. 1945. (4) Periodic Report (1 Jan.-30 June 1945), 703d Medical Sanitary Company, 15 Aug. 1945.

Type TOE Europe North AfricaMiddle ChinaBur ma- Pacific

Authorized

strength

Africa East India Officers Enlisted men

Medical Sanitary Company 8-117 17 26 132 4, 928

Station Hospital 8-560 130 244

Medical Prophylactic Platoon. 8-500

Medical Battalion 8-15 72 858

Motor Ambulance Company.. 8-317 10 60 1, 275

Malaria Survey Unit 8-500 24

Malaria Control Unit 8-500 22

Veterinary Company 8-99 20 236

Veterinary Animal Service

Detachment 8-500

Medical Supply Platoon

(Aviation) 8-497 17

Compiled chiefly fromcopies ofunit cards, W.D., A.G.O. Form 016,1 Feb. 1942.

1944 TOE has been selected, ifpublished in that year. In all other cases, TOE prior to 1944 was used. In many cases—particularly in the 8-500 series—the T/O was totally changed during the war.

All units listed in this column were in Liberia.

Certain units sawservice inboth the Pacific OceanAreas and in the Southwest Pacific. However, the one station

hospital and the threemalaria controlunits served exclusively in the Southwest Pacific and the veterinary animalservice

detachment operated only in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Some of the other units also may have served in only one of the

theaters.

T/O strengthtimes numberof units. Totals thereforeare merely approximations toactual strength, particularly in

view of changing T/O’s, theundetermined number of white officers utilized, and overstrengths.

The 168th Station Hospital, with white officers and enlisted men. is not included in the unit tabulation, but the

Negro nurses in that unit are counted in the “Authorized strength” column.

The medical battalions were the largest medical units staffed with Negro personnel in World War II. The 318th

supported the 93d Infantry Divisionin the Pacific; the 317th supported the 92d Infantry Division in Italy.

Includes warrant officers.

One Negro veterinary company movedfrom the North Africanto the Europeantheater with the invasion of southern France in August 1944.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 413

Distribution by Sex

For much of the period of hostilities, female personnel of the Medical

Department serving in oversea areas constituted larger percentage of total

Medical Department strength in such areas than they did of total Medical

Department strength worldwide (tables 43 and 44). This situation existed

until the threat of draft brought the Army Nurse Corps up to authorized

strength. Furthermore, Medical Department female personnel constituted

the large majority by far of military female personnel in oversea areas during

brld War II. In the Zone of Interior, this ceased to be true as early as

January 1943 (table 43).

Table 43.—Proportion of Army female personnel in the Medical Department

Medical Department Medical Department

Date Total Armyfemale

personnel Percent of

total Army

female

personnel

Percent of total Medical Department

personnel

Total Army

female

personnel

percent of total Army female personnel

Worldwide Overseas

1942

30 September 23, 841 84 5. 3, 803 100

1943 31 January 45, 126 52 4. 5, 978 97

30 April 79, 059 35 4. 8, 033 97

31 July 92, 146 33 4. 10, 796 91

31 October 89, 485 40 5. 15, 716 86

19

31 January 98, 932 39 6. 19, 872 88

30 April 109, 822 37 6. 26, 566 82

31 Julv 121, 341 35 4. 32, 464 73

31 October 132, 697 33 6. 39, 947 66

1945 31 January 137, 929 33 6. 42, 644 66

30 April 153, 991 36 8. 45, 876 65

31 July 152, 882 38 8. 46, 374 63

30 September 141, 306 39 9. 37, 161 63

Femalestrength is that of the female components and excludes the small number of women who served in the

Medical Corps. For worldwide strength of women doctors, see table 1, footnote 3. In oversea areas, probably no more

than 18 women doctors saw service.

Aggregate of worldwide Medical Department female personnel as shown in table and WAAC and WAC personnel

as shown in “Strength of the Army,” Jan. 1947, pp. 44-45.

For basic data on Medical Department strength, see table 1.

For Medical Department strength, sec table 1.

Aggregateoversea Medical Department femalepersonnel as shown in table 44and oversea WAAC and WAC personnel as reported in “Strength of the Army,” Jan. 1947.

For basic data on Medical Departmentfemale personnel overseas and the percentage of Medical Department oversea

strength in female components, see table 44.
414 PERSONNEL

Table 44 .—Oversea strength of Medical Department —male and female officer components, 30

September 1943-30 September 1945

Officer Strength

Overseas, as in the Zone of Interior, the Medical Department contained

greater proportion of officers than did the Army in general, and between 16

and 19 of every 100 officers serving overseas were members of the Medical

Department. For reasons already set forth, however, officers ordinarily constituted somewhat smaller percentage of the Medical Department’s strength

overseas than they did of its worldwide strength. The year 1943 witnessed

an exception to thisrule (table 45).

Male officer corps Femaleofficer corps

Date

Strength

Percentage

of total Medical Department

strength

Strength

Percentage

of total Medical Department

strength

1942 30 September- __ ____ 6, 477 11. 3, 803 6.

1943 31 January.- __ __ ____ ... 10, 003 11. 5, 779 6.

30 April.. 13, 008 11. 7, 759 6.

31 July. 15, 543 11. 9, 859 7.

31 October. 19, 422 10. 13, 533 7.

1944 31 January ... 24, 693 10. 17, 525 7.

30 April... 30, 809 10. 21, 690 7.

31 July.. .... 35, 482 10. 23, 658 6.

30 September 37, 884 10. 24, 360 6.

31 October ... 39, 877 10. 26, 532 6.

1945 31 January. 43, 894 10. 28, 362 6.

30 April 48, 358 10. 29, 834 6.

31 May. __ ...

47, 692 10. 30, 145 6.

30 June ... 46, 583 10. 29, 269 6.

31 July.. ._ ___ 43, 725 10. 29, 339 6.

31 August. 39, 467 10. 26, 558 7.

30 September _____ 34, 815 10. 23, 397 7.

From table 32. Medical Departmentstrength from table 31.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 415

Table 45.—Medical Department officer strength, worldwide and overseas, 30 November

lOJfl-30 September 19Jf5

Date and area Number

Percentage

of total

Army

strength

Number

Percentage

of worldwide

Medical Department

officer

strength

Rate per 1,000

troops

Percentage

of Army

officer

strength

Percentage

of total Medical Department

strength

Army officer strength Medical Department officer strength

30 November 1941:

121,094

10,217

7.4 23,484

1,412

14 19.4 17.8

Overseas 6.2 6.0 13.8 17.7

31 March 1942;

157,867

21,475

6.6 31,535

3,581

13 20.0 15.7

Overseas--, 6.5 11.4 11 16.7 18.8

30 June 1942:

214,151

36, 393

7.0 43,755

7, 518

14 20. 17.2

Overseas 6.0 17.2 12 20.7 17.6

30 September 1942:

307,009

54,797

7.7 65,922

10,280

17 21.5 18.9

Overseas 6.7 15.6 13 18.8 17.5

31 January 1943:

438,499 7.5 79,948

15,782

14 18.2 16.

Overseas 83,384 7.4 19.7 14 18.9 17.9 30 April 1943:

525,669

110,474

7.8 88.673 13 16.9 15.1

Overseas,,, 7.9 20, 767 23.4 15 18.8 16.

31 July 1943:

602,831

143,911

8.5 99,000

25,402

14 16.4 15.8 Overseas 8.1 25.7 14 17.6 18.2

31 October 1943;

660,892

182,209

9.0 107,491

32, 955

15 16.3 17.4

Overseas 8.1 30.7 15 18.1 18.3

31 January 1944: 707,828

231,610

9.4 113,634

42,218

15 16.1 18.1

Overseas 8.2 37.2 15 18.2 17.7

30 April 1944:

743,075

296,141

9.5 118,391

52,499

15 15.9 18.2 Overseas 8.3 44.3 15 17.7 17.5

31 July 1944:

784,726

352,850

9.7 120,748

59,140

15 15.4 17.8

Overseas 8.6 49.0 14 16.8 17.2

30 September 1944:

815,691

383,590

10.1 122,532

62,244

15 15.0 18.0

Overseas 8.1 50.8 14 16.2 16.9

31 October 1944.

815,709

397,547

10.1 124,712

66, 409

15 15.3 18.1

Overseas 8.6 53.3 14 16.7 17.0

31 January 1945:

844,646

431,299

10.5 129,904

72,256

16 15.4 19.5

Overseas 8.4 55.6 14 16.8 16.8

30 April 1945:

879,775

465,932

10.7 139,938

78,192

17 15.9 20.8

Overseas 8.5 55.9 14 16.8 16.9

31 May 1945:

892,167

465,636

10.8 142,378

77,837

17 16.0 21.4

Overseas

See footnotes at end of tabl

8.6 54.7 14 16.7 17.1
416 PERSONNEL

Table 45.—Medical Department officer strength, worldwide and overseas, 30 November 1941- 30 September 1945—Continued

Quality

Medical Corps

By the middle of 1945, the great majority of Medical Corps officers—-

amounting to at least 69 percent of the peak strength of the corps—had seen

service overseas. The early shipment overseas of medical officers in affiliated

units resulted in decided improvement in the professional quality of medical

care in those areas. Medical officers in these units were by experience and professional training highly skilled physicians. At the same time, the gains

obtained in oversea theaters by the acquisition of these officers were loss to

Zone of Interior installations. Many older specialists who had served long

in the Zone of Interior as specialists were transferred by their own request

to oversea assignments. In mid-1945, about half the medical officers over

the age of 50 who were not Regular Army personnel were overseas. sizable

majority of this age group serving in the Zone of Interior were assigned to

the Veterans’ Administration. In the entire medical service, including both

Regulars and non-Regulars, the majority of the group in the over-50 category

were overseas.

Date and area Number Percentageof total

Army

strength

Number

Percentage of worldwide

Medical Department officer

strength

Rate per 1,000

troops

Percentage

of Army

officer

strength

Percentage

of total Medical Department

strength

Army officer strength Medical Department officer strength

30 June 1945;

890, 798

440,311

10.8 142,616

75,852

17 16.0 21.5

Overseas 8.4 53.2 14 17.2 17.1

31 July 1945:

896,611

415,205

10.9 145,342

73,064

18 16.2 22.0

Overseas 8.4 50.3 15 17.6 17.3

31 August 1945:

897,929

393,943

11.2 144,475

66,025

18 16.1 22.7

Overseas 8.5 45.7 14 16.8 17.5

30 September 1945:

879,542

357,131

11.6 138, 655

58,212

18 15.8 23.4

Overseas 8.6 42.0 14 16.3 17.6

Includes all commissioned officers as well as warrant officers, flight officers, and WAAC officers. Worldwide

strengthexcept for March 1942 is worldwideofficer strength as shownin “Strengthof the Army,” for October 1945, minus

worldwide Medical Department officer strength as shown in table plus worldwide Medical Department officerstrength

as shown here. Worldwide strength for March 1942 consists of Medical Department officer strength shown here plus

worldwide non-Medical Department officer strength as determined in accordance with procedures for determining all

strengths on that date described in table 31, footnote 2. Oversea strength for all months except March 1942 from

“Strength of the Army,” October 1945. Overseastrength for March 1942 determined in accordance with procedure for

ascertaining all oversea strength on that date described in table 31, footnote 2.

For worldwide total Army strength, see table 1; for the same strength overseas, see table 31.

Oversea strength is the sum of the oversea strength of the individual officer corps as shown in table 32. Worldwide

data from table 1.

For worldwide Medical Departmentstrength, see table 1; forthe same strengthoverseas, see table 31.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 417

On the other hand, in the Zone of Interior, as large medical requirements

for definitive and specialized care built up during the war, it was necessary

concurrently to retain highly qualified specialists in the United States and,

in fact, to return some from oversea theaters.

In the early part of the war, despite the departure of affiliated units, the

Zone of Interiorretained more specialists than itreleased for oversea shipments.

As the war progressed and the Zone of Interior installations were stripped of

their specialists, the oversea theaters were considerably better staffed. Toward

the end of the war, with the return of some specialists to the Zone of Interior

and the induction of others, the two areas became approximately equal in

quality. After Y-E Day, the Zone of Interior again was better staffed.

greater proportion of its doctors were specialists than was the case overseas,

and greater proportion of these also had proficiency ratings above the minimum of D. What was more significant was the fact that this advantage was

centered in the and categories (table 46).

Table 46.—Strength and proficiency ratings of Medical Corps specialists, worldwide and

overseas, 20 June 19J+5

It is very difficult to compare with any degree of accuracy the overall

quality of the medical officers in the individual theaters. In the early part of

the war, because of the military strategy adopted, the Mediterranean and

European theaters were favored from qualitative point of view. But as the

war progressed, efforts were made to raise the level of professional quality in

the Pacific and in China-Burma-India as those theaters gained in military

importance.

Group Worldwide Overseas

Medical Corps strength 47, 938 25, 449

Total specialists 26, 525 12, 679

Percent of specialists in total strength 55. 33 49. 82

Specialists rated A:

Number 197 79

Percent of total specialists ______ 74 62

Specialists rated B;

Number 4, 989

18. 81

2, 033

Percent of total specialists. 16. 03

Specialists rated C:

Number 9, 124

34. 40

4, 559

Percent of total specialists 35. 96

Specialists rated D:

Number 12, 215

46. 05

6, 008

Percent of total specialists 47. 39

Basic data from “Summary Sheet, Specialists Inventory Report Form as of 20 June 1945”in “Classification Count”

(prepared in the Personnel Service, MilitaryPersonnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General).

Strengths vary considerably from those shown for approximate dates in tables and 32.
418 PERSONNEL

Dental Corps

In the early part of the war, the distribution of dental personnel according

to quality probably resembled that of the Medical Corps. The alliliated units

which went overseas early contained highly skilled dentists as well as doctors.

But the dental service overseas was never augmented to the same degree that

the medical service was. One reason for this may be the fact that the Dental

Corps never had as much as half its strength abroad, with the consequent

likelihood that great many of its members failed to see oversea service. It

is also possible that the need for high quality dental personnel in oversea areas

was relatively limited. Thus, the Zone of Interior managed to retain more

of its highly qualified dental personnel than it sent overseas. 32

Enlisted personnel

There may have been tendency for brief period early in the war to

retain the better type of Medical Department enlisted man in the Zone of

Interior and to send abroad the misfits and other less desirable persons. One

observer, at least, found that in the Southwest Pacific certain station hospitals

activated just before departure for that area in 1942 contained what he considered an “abnormally high proportion” of problem cases. 33 The same

observer noted, however, that many other units were not staffed in this manner

and that the personnel authorities in the Office of The Surgeon General made

vigorous efforts to prevent the objectionable practice. The various regulations

covering oversea service of enlisted men issued after the beginning of 1944

increased the difficulty of retaining higher quality medical enlisted personnel

in Zone of Interior installations. It is significant that The Surgeon General

stated in October 1944 that the personnel most suited to be commissioned in

the Medical Administrative Corps were warrant officers and Medical Department noncommissioned officers serving overseas. 34

Late in the war, conditions overseas leading to large-scale exchange of

enlisted personnel between the Medical Department and the combat branches

served to lower the quality of the enlisted personnel in the oversea medical

service. similar exchange and like deterioration also was taking place in

the continental United States, Hence, it is difficult to determine whether, at

the end of the war, the quality was higher at home or abroad. The later stages

of the war also witnessed tendency to send limited-service men overseas,

particularly as members of communications zone units. Thus, in the communications zone of the European theater, there were 36,042 Medical Department

32 Letters, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, from (1) Brig. Gen. L. H. Tingay,

DC, Brooke Army Medical Center, 20 Sept. 1952 (2) Col. E. W. Cowan, DC, 15 Sept. 1952 (3) D. J.

Holland, D.D.S., Boston, Mass., 18 Sept, and 21 Oct. 1952 and (4) Col. T. A. McFall, DC, Oct. 1952. 33 Letter, M. C. Pincoffs, M.D., Baltimore, Md., to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon

General, 29 Aug. 1952. 34 Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for War Department, Assistant Chief of Staff, G—1,

Oct. 1944, subject: Medical Officer Requirements and Availabilities.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

enlisted men who, as of 15 March 1945, were so classified and who constituted

nearly 38 percent of the total strength of such personnel in the zone. The

corresponding percentage for all the theater personnel was somewhat under

22 percent.35 It need not be assumed, however, from the fact that large

numbers of Medical Department enlisted men were regarded as unable to

perform general duty, that they could not accomplish the tasks assigned to

them in satisfactory manner. Furthermore, it is likely that the limitedassignment Medical Department enlisted personnel in the communications

zone constituted the great bulk of such personnel in the theater; in relation to

the total Medical Department enlisted strength in the broader area, they were

less than 16 percent.

Non-Medical Department Personnel Overseas

As in the Zone of Interior, chaplains, engineers, and other officer specialists worked in Medical Department installations overseas although, as already

indicated, itis difficultto state the strength of such personnel with the precision

possible in the case of Medical Department personnel proper. 36 similar

group comprised the workers of the American Red Cross Hospital Service—-

field directors, assistant held directors, medical social workers, recreation

workers, staff aides, and their assistants—who were assigned to or worked with

Army medical units in virtually every oversea area. As in the continental

United States, the Red Cross personnel handled patients’ communications with

their homes, aided soldiers with their financial and personal problems, and, in

general, did all kinds of welfare work for members of the Army. They not

only set up recreation programs in the hospitals, but also obtained social

histories of the patients for their own or the medical officers’ use.

It was originally planned that Red Cross personnel assigned to the Army

for service overseas should be placed only in general and station hospitals, but

the importance of field, evacuation, and convalescent hospitals made it desirable

fo assign workers to these units too, and this at least in the case of evacuation

hospitals was done within the theaters. Normally, Red Cross personnel were

assigned to Army hospitals as follows: workers per 1,000-bed general hospital,

with more for each additional 500 beds; per station hospital (between 500

and 1,000 beds) 10 per convalescent center (in the European theater) and

for each field and 400-bed evacuation hospital. In cases where more workers

were available, more might be assigned. Smaller medical units were usually

covered by Red Cross field directors.

Available statistics do not differentiate Red Cross personnel working in

Army hospitals from those employed overseas in Navy and civilian medical

35 “Unit Strength—ComZ—ETOUSA. Comparison of Actual and T/O —15 Mar. 1945,” in

Progress Report, Communications Zone, ETO—USA, 31 March 1945, p. 4. 36 The number of table-of-organization positions for chaplains in oversea hospitals on 30 April

1945 was 1,050. (Data from “Troop List for Operations and Supply, May 1945.”) This was

figure in excess of the number of veterinary officers, dietitians, or physical therapists serving abroad

on that date (table 32).
420 PERSONNEL

installations, but it is safe to assume that the bulk of oversea hospital workers

of the American Red Cross worked inArmy establishments. The totalnumber

of these workers increased from 73 in mid-1942 to 2,197 in the middle of 1945

(table 47). 37

Table 47. The American National Red Cross: Oversea hospital workers on duty and en route,

1942-46

Members of the Women’s Army Corps, civilians, and prisoners of war also

swelled the strength of the medical service overseas beyond the figures revealed by statistics of Medical Department elementsproper.

PERMANENT LOSSES OF PERSONNEL

Influences Affecting the Rate of Loss

Factors tending to reduce the Medical Department’s temporary as well

as permanent losses, in comparison with those of the Army at large, were the

location of the great bulk of medical personnel overseas in Army service areas,

various communications zones, and base sections where the hazards of combat,

though not absent, were minor, and the location of large numbers of personnel

in the Zone of Interior. The extent to which these factors operated to reduce

the dangers of combat is indicated by comparison of the battle-casualty rates

of the Medical Department with that of the Army as whole (table 48). For

officers, the Army rate was 36.6, while the Medical Department rate was 3.2; for enlisted personnel, the Army rate was 32.6, the Medical Department rate,

11.6; for officers and enlisted men combined, the Army rate was 32.6, the

Medical Department rate, 10.1. (See also tables 49, 50, and 51.)

87 (1) Letter, D. C. Smith, American National Red Cross, Washington, to the Office of The Surgeon General (attention: Lt. Col. Markowitz), 16 June 1952, with enclosures thereto. (2) Annual

Report, Personnel Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S.

Army, 1943.

Type of worker 1942 1943 1944 1945

Supervisory and administrative field staff 24 24

Field director and assistant field director 78 165 231

Staff aide and assistant to field director 260 568

Medical social worker 86 192 190

Recreation worker 47 183 557 711

Recreation consultant

Hospital visitor 34

Clerical, stenographic, secretarial 21 114 366 466

Total 73 495 1, 564 2, 197

Source: “Oversea Hospital Workers on Duty and Enroute as of June30 (or nearest comparable date) 1943through June

30,1949,” enclosure to letter, C. H. Whelden, Jr., Chief Statistician, The American National Red Cross, National Headquarters, to Historical Unit, Office of The Surgeon General. June 1952.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 421

Table

48.

—Battle

casualties

of

the

Medical

Department, officers

and

enlisted men: Total

battle

casualties, deaths

among battle

casualties,

and

killed

in

action,

December1941-31 December1946

Strength

Total

battle

casualties

Deaths

among

battle

casualties

Killed in

action

Area

and

group

Median

Number

of

months

of

exposure

Number

Annualrate

per 1,000

Number

Annualrate

per 1,000

Number

Annualrate

per 1,000

Total

overseas

Total

Army

2,

526,

729

46

936,

259

96.

234,

874

24.

189,

696

19.

Officers

206,

910

46

95,

998

121.

35,

984

45.

30,

157

38.

Enlisted

2,

319,

819

46

840,

261

94.

198,

890

22.

159,

539

17.

Medical

Department

209,

414

46

23,

962

29.

4,

922

6.

3,

690

4.

Officers

37,

587

46

1,

339

9.

321

2.

196

1.

Enlisted

171,

828

46

22,

623

34.

4,

601

7.

3,

494

5.

Regional

Alaska: Total

Army

64,

918

46

1,

875

7.

877

3.

853

3.

Officers

4,

007

46

290

18.

175

11.

170

11.

Enlisted

60,

297

46

1,

585

6.

702

3.

683

3.

Medical

Department

3,

267

46

74

5.

30

2.

29

2.

Officers

480

46

2.

1.

1.

Enlisted

2,

825

46

69

6.

28

2.

27

2.

Caribbean

and

South

Atlantic:

Total

Army

89,

669

46

57

38

36

Officers

6,

474

46

10

Enlisted

83,

824

46

47

33

31

Medical

Department

4,

690

46

Officers.__

1,

051

46

Enlisted

4,

098

46

European theater: Total

Army

935,

346

44

586,

628

171.

135,

576

39.

116,

991

34.

Officers

79,

897

44

56,

804

193.

19,

152

65.

17,

393

59.

Enlisted

855,

449

44

529,

824

168.

116,

424

37.

99,

598

31.

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
422 PERSONNEL

Table

48

.-—Battle

casualties

of

the

Medical

Department, officers

and

enlisted men: Total

battle

casualties, deaths

among battle

casualties

and

killed

in

action,

December 19

1-31 December19Jf6

—Continued

Area

and.

group

Strength

Total

battle

casualties

Deaths

among

battle

casualties

Killedin

action

Median

Number of

months

of

exposure

Number

Annualrate

per 1,000

Number

Annualrate

per 1,000

Number

Annual rate

per 1,000

European theater

—Continued Medical

Department

81,

616

44

14,

589

48.

2,

763

9.

2,

265

7.

Officers__

14,

359

44

618

11.

128

2.

99

1.

Enlisted

67,

257

44

13,

971

56.

2,

635

10.

2,

166

8.

Mediterranean

theater;

Total

Army_

518,

138

34

175,

107

119.

40,

455

27.

35,

313

24.

Officers

47,

428

34

19,

079

142.

6,

371

47.

5,

638

42.

Enlisted.

473,

361

34

156,

028

116.

34,

084

25.

29,

675

22.

Medical

Department

38,

122

34

3,

755

34.

608

5.

517

4.

Officers

7,

104

34

191

9.

43

2.

38

1.

Enlisted

33,

212

34

3,

564

37.

565

6.

479

5.

Africa-Middle East:

Total

Army____

11,

352

39

3,

959

107.

1,

031

27.

930

25.

Officers..

1,

097

39

1,

636

458.

462

129.

407

114.

Enlisted

9,

989

39

2,

323

71.

569

17.

523

16.

Medical

Department

1,

396

38

2.

Officers

311

38

1.

Enlisted

1,

085

38

2.

China-Burma-India: Total

Army

107,

595

42

6,

925

18.

3,

727

9.

2,

723

7.

Officers

12,

530

42

2,

295

52.

1,

480

33.

1,

106

25.

Enlisted _____

95,

065

42

4,

630

13.

2,

247

6.

1,

617

4.

Medical

Department

9,

945

42

95

2.

42

1.

17

Officers

1,

869

42

20

3.

11

1.

Enlisted

8,

076

42

75

2.

31

1.

16

Pacific: Total

Army._

683,

697

46

157,

938

60.

50,

385

19.

30,

538

11.

Officers

51,

239

46

14,

512

73.

7,

260

37.

4,

536

23.
663076 —63 29

STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

Enlisted

632,

458

46

143,

426

59.

43,

125

17.

26,

002

10.

Medical

Department

59,

768

46

5,

405

23.

1,

427

6.

812

3.

Officers,

9,

858

46

502

13.

136

3.

55

1.

Enlisted

49,

911

46

4,

903

25.

1,

291

6.

757

4.

U.S.

Army

Strategic

Air

Forces:

Total

Army.

61,

900

15

2,

897

37.

2,

148

27.

1,

795

23.

Officers,

8,

285

15

1,

289

124.

1,

016

98.

857

82.

Enlisted

..

53,

615

15

1,

608

24.

1,

132

16.

938

14.

Medical

Department Officers..Enlisted,,_. En

route: Total

Army

725

491

475

Officers

53

33

33

Enlisted

672

458

442

Medical

Department

56

41

41

Officers

(*)

Enlisted

55

41

41

Theater

Unknown: Total

Army

148

146

42

Officers

30

30

12

Enlisted

118

116

30

Medical

Department OfficersEnlisted, Basic

data,

unless

otherwise

noted,

from

“Battle

Casualties

by

Duty,

Branch,

Type,

and

Disposition:

December1946“ in

Department of

the

Army

“Army

Battle

Casualties

and

Nonbattle

Deaths

in

World

War

II.

Final

Report

December1941-31 December 1946

pp.

48-69.

full

explanation

of

the

categories

of

casualties

is

found

in

the

same

document

pp.

to

4,

inclusive.

Although

casualty

data,

as

reported in

this

source,

are

cumulative,

December1941-31 December 1946,

it

is

here

assumed that

all

casualties were

incurred

prior

to

October 1945,

since

the

number

reported as

having

occurred

subsequent

to

that

date

is

negligible.

(See

pp.

10-11 of

the

report.)

Median

strength

is

based on

end-of-month

strength on

the

following

dates:

30

November 1941;

31

March,

30

June,

and

30

September 1942;

31

January, 30

April,

31

July,

and

31

October

1943;

31

January, 30

April,

31

July,

and

31

October 1944; and

31

January, 30

April,

31

July,

and

30

September 1945.

In

determining

the

median

strength

for

any

group

or

area, the

first

of

these

dates

chosen

was the

first

to

show

strength

for

such

group

or

area in

the

following sources: For

the

Army

in

general

and

the

Medical

Department, both

in

oversea areas

as

whole

and

in

individual

theaters,

table

31

(unadjusted data);

for

Medical

Department officers

and

enlisted

men in

oversea areas

as

whole,

tables

and

45,

for

Army

officers

and

enlisted

men

in

oversea areas as

whole.

tables

and

45,

with

the

addition, in

the

case

of

officers,

of

WAAC

officers

and,

in

the

ease

of

enlisted

personnel, of

WAAC

and

WAC

enlisted

women,

as

shown

in

“Strength

of

the

Army,”

and

for

officers

and

enlisted men in

individual oversea

areas,

including

the

Army

as

whole

and

the

Medical

Department, the

sources for

the

corresponding

total

(unadjusted) strengths

in

such

areas reported in

table

31.

The

final

date

for

the

median

strength

in

all

cases

was

30

September 1945.

Time

of

exposure

was

dated

from

the

first

month

following

the

date

on

which

strength was first

shown

for

the

group

or

area

involved

in

“Strength

of

the

Army”

or

the

sources thereof.

The

terminal

date

in

each

instance

is

30

September 1945.

All

persons killed

in

action,

dead

as

result

of

wounds

or

injuries received in

action

declared

dead

from

missing

in

action,

and

dead

of

nonbattle causes while

in

battle

casualty

status

of

captured,

interned, or

missing

in

action.

Rate

per

1,000

of

median

strength.

Information

not

readily

available.
PERSONNEL 424

Table

49.

—Battle

casualties

of

the

Medical

Department, officers

and

enlisted men: Wounded

and

injured

in

action

December1941-31 December

1946

Total

Died

of

wounds

and

Evacuated to

the

United

States

Returned to

duty

Area

and

Group

injuries

Total

Died

of

wounds

Returned

in

theater

Number

Annualrate

per 1,000

Number Percent of

wounded in

action

Number

Percent of

wounded in

action

Annual rate

per 1,000

Number Percent of

evacua- tion

to

duty(number)

Number

Percent of

wounded in

action

Totaloverseas

Total

Army

592,

170

61.

26,

225

4.

43

182,

749

30.

86

18.

84

0.

05

182,

665

383,

196

64.

71

Officers

38,

504

48.

2,

109

5.

48

12,

648

32.

85

15.

11

09

12,

637

23,

747

61.

67

Enlisted

_. 553,

666

62.

24,

116

4.

36

170,

101

30.

72

19.

73

04

170,

028

359,

449

64.

92

Medical

Department

15,

977

19.

723

4.

53

4,

909

30.

73

6.

4,

909

10,

345

64.

75

Officers

703

4.

43

6.

12

246

34.

99

1.

246

414

58.

89

Enlisted

15,

274

23.

680

4.

45

4,

663

30.

53

7.

4,

663

9,

931

65.

02

Regional

Alaska: Total

Army

933

3.

16

1.

71

179

19.

19

179

738

79.

10

Officers

91

5.

2.

20

36

39.

56

2.

36

53

58.

24

Enlisted

842

3.

14

1.

66

143

16.

98

143

685

81.

35

Medical

Department

45

3.

2.

22

6.

67

41

91.

11

Officers

1.

100.

00

Enlisted

42

3.

2.

36

7.

14

38

48

Caribbean

and

South

Atlantic:

Total

Army

22.

22

11.

11

66.

67

Officers

100.

00

Enlisted

33.

33

16.

67

50.

00

Medical

Department OfficersEnlisted European theater: Total

Army

381,

350

111.

16,

264

4.

26

125,

417

32.

89

36.

125,

417

239,

669

62.

85

Officers

23,

808

81.

1,

287

5.

41

8,

238

34.

60

28.

8,

238

14,

283

59.

99
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 425

Enlisted

357,

542

114.

14,

977

4.

19

117,

179

32.

77

37.

117,

179

225,

386

63.

04

Medical

Department

10,

016

33.

452

4.

51

3,

208

32.

03

10.

3,

208

6,

356

63.

46

Officers

391

7.

28

7.

16

140

35.

81

2.

140

223

57.

03

Enlisted

9,

625

39.

424

4.

41

3,

068

31.

88

12.

3,

068

6,

133

63.

72

Mediterranean

theater;

Total

Army

111,

125

75.

3,

993

3.

59

26,

279

23.

65

17.

26,

279

80,

853

72.

76

Officers

7,

770

57.

342

4.

40

2,

127

27.

37

15.

2,

127

5,

301

68.

22

Enlisted

103,

355

77.

3,

651

3.

53

24,

152

23.

37

18.

24,

152

75,

552

73.

10

Medical

Department

2,

753

25.

83

3.

01

693

25.

17

6.

693

1,

957

71.

09

Officers

129

6.

3.

10

44

34.

11

2.

44

81

62.

79

Enlisted

2,

624

27.

79

3.

01

649

24.

73

6.

649

1,

876

71.

49

Africa-Middle East:

Total

Army

536

14.

17

3.

17

117

21.

83

3.

117

402

75.

00

Officers

196

55.

3.

06

48

24.

49

13.

48

142

72.

45

Enlisted

340

10.

11

3.

24

69

20.

29

2.

69

260

76.

47

Medical

Department

33.

33

66.

67

33.

33

Officers

_.

Enlisted

33.

33

66.

67

33.

33

China-Burma-India: Total

Army

2,

597

6.

192

7.

39

617

23.

76

1.

617

1,

788

68.

85

Officers.

407

9.

42

10.

32

105

25.

80

2.

105

260

63.

88

Enlisted

2,

190

6.

150

6.

85

512

23.

38

1.

512

1,

528

69.

77

Medical

Department

54

1.

7.

41

16.

67

41

75.

93

Officers

100.

00

Fin

listed

48

1.

8.

33

18.

75

35

72.

92

Pacific: Total

Armv

95,

021

36.

5,

707

6.

01

29,

923

31.

49

11.

29,

923

59,

391

62.

50

Officers

6,

076

30.

422

6.

95

2,

045

33.

66

10.

2,

045

3,

609

59.

40

Enlisted

88,

945

36.

5,

285

5.

94

27,

878

31.

34

11.

27,

878

55,

782

62.

72

Medical

Department

3,

100

13.

183

5.

90

990

31.

94

4.

990

1,

927

62.

76

Officers

173

4.

11

6.

36

61

35.

26

1.

61

101

58.

38

Enlisted

2,

927

15.

172

5.

88

929

31.

94

4.

929

1,

826

62.

38

U.S.

Army

Strategic

Air

Forces:

Total

Army__

407

5.

13

3.

19

102

25.

06

1.3

102

292

71.

74

Officers

129

12.

5.

43

33

25.

58

3.

33

89

68.

99

Enlisted

278

4.

2.

16

69

24.

82

1.

69

203

73.

02

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
426 PERSONNEL

Table

49.

—Battle

casualties

of

the

Medical

Department, officers

and

enlisted

men:

Wounded

and

injured

in

action,

December1941-31

December1946

—Continued

Area

and

Group

Total

Died

of

wounds

and

injuries

Evacuated to

the

United

States

Returned to

duty

in

theater

Total

Died

of

wounds

Returned to

duty(number)

Number

Annual rate

per 1,000

Number Percent of

wounded in

action

Number

Percent of

wounded in

action

Annualrate

per 1,000

Number Percent of

evacua- tion

Number

Percent of

wounded in

action

U.S.

Army

Strategic

Air

Forces

Continued Medical

Department OfficersEnlisted En

route: Total

Army

100

13

13.

00

30

30.

00

30

57

57.

00

Officers

12

41.

67

58.

33

Enlisted

88

13

14.

77

25

28.

41

25

50

56.

82

Medical

Department

66.

67

33.

33

Officers

100.

00

Enlisted

60.

00

40.

00

Theater

unknown: Total

Army

92

8.

70

84

91.

30

()

Officers

12

8.

33

11

91.

67

Enlisted

80

8.

75

73

91.

25

Medical

Department OfficersEnlisted For

basic

data, see footnote 1.

table

48.

Comprehends

“only

those

wounded

or

injured

in

action

personnel

requiring

hospitalization,

except

that

those

who

died

of

wounds

or

injuries

after

reaching some

type

of

medical

treatment

facility

but

before

reaching

hospital

are

also

included.”

Rate

per

1,000

of

median

strength.

information

not

readily

available.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

Table

50.

—Battle

casualties

of

the

Medical

Department, officers

and

enlisted men:

Captured

and

interned

December1941-31 December1946

Total

Died

Area

and

group

Total

Killed in

action

Died

of

wounds

Nonbattle causes

Returned to

military

Number

Annualrate

per 1,000

Number

Percent of

capturedand

interned

Number

Percent of

died

in

captivity

Number

Percent of

died

in

captivity

Number

Percent of

died

in

captivity

control(number)

Totaloverseas

Total

Army.

124,

079

12.

12,

653

10.

20

3,

102

24.

52

453

3.

58

9,

098

71.

90

111,

426

Officers

21,

593

27.

1,

726

7.

99

900

52.

14

189

10.

95

637

36.

91

19,

867

Enlisted

102,

486

11.

10,

927

10.

66

2,

202

20.

15

264

2.

42

8,

461

77.

43

91,

559

Medical

Department

3,

748

4.

444

11.

85

162

36.

49

29

6.

53

253

56.

98

3,

304

Officers

409

2.

79

19.

32

46

58.

23

6.

33

28

35.

44

330

Enlisted

3,

339

5.

365

10.

93

116

31.

78

24

6.

58

225

61.

64

2,

974

Regional

Alaska: Total

Army__

48

48

Officers.

23

1.

23

Enlisted

25

25

Medical

Department Officers.. Enlisted Caribbean

and

South

Atlantic:

Total

Army-. Officers Enlisted Medical

Department Officers--Enlisted See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
428 PERSONNEL

Table

—Battle 50.

casualties

of

the

Medical

Department, officers

and

enlisted men:

Captured

and

interned,

December1941-31 December1946

Con.

Area

and

group

Total

Died

Returned to

military control(number)

Total

Killed in

action

Died

of

wounds

Nonbattle causes

Number

Annualrate

per 1,000

Number

Percent of

capturedand

interned

Number

Percent of

died

in

captivity

Number

Percent of

died

in

captivity

Number

Percent of

died

in

captivity

European

theater; Total

Armv

73,

759

21.

950

1.

29

224

23.

58

194

20.

42

532

56.

00

72,

809

Officers

13,

920

47.

134

96

66

49.

25

43

32.

09

25

18.

66

13,

786

Enlist

ed

59,

839

19.

816

1.

36

158

19.

36

151

18.

50

507

62.

13

59,

023

Medical

Department.

1,

997

6.

30

1.

50

20.

00

10.

00

21

70.

00

1,

967

Officers

121

2.

83

100.

00

120

Enlisted

1,

876

7.

29

I.

55

17.

24

10.

34

21

72.

41

1,

847

Mediterranean

theater:

Total

Army

20,

182

13.

171

85

64

37.

43

63

36.

84

44

2o.

20,

011

Officers

3,

894

29.

39

1.

00

10

25.

64

21

53.

85

20.

51

3,

855

Enlisted

16,

288

12.

132

81

54

40.

91

42

31.

82

36

27.

27

16,

156

Medical

Department

363

3.

55

100.

00

361

Officers

22

1.

4.

55

100.

00

21

Enlisted

341

3.

29

100.

00

340

Africa-Middle East;

Total

Army.

1,

590

43.

19

66.

67

33.

33

1,

587

Officers

668

187.

30

100.

00

666

Enlisted

922

28.

11

100.

00

921

Medical

Department OfficersEnlisted. China-Burma-India: Total

Army

679

1.

337

49.

63

274

81.

31

1.

19

59

17.

51

342

Officers

254

5.

86

33.

86

59

68.

60

27

31.

40

168

Enlisted

425

1.

251

59.

06

215

85.

66

1.

59

32

12.

75

174

Medical

Department

19

IS

94.

74

17

94.

44

5.

56
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 429

Officers

10

1.

90.

00

100.

00

Enlisted

100.

00

88.

89

11.

11

Pacific: Total

Army

27,

465

10.

11,

107

40.

44

2,

473

22.

27

182

1.

64

8,

452

76.

10

16,

358

Officers

2,

688

13.

1,

431

53.

24

737

51.

50

121

8.

46

573

40.

04

1,

257

Enlisted

24,

777

10.

9,

676

39.

05

1,

736

17.

94

61

17.

94

7,

879

81.

43

15,

101

Medical

Department

1,

365

6.

392

22.

72

135

34.

44

26

6.

63

231

58.

93

973

Officers

256

6.

68

26.

56

35

51.

47

7.

35

28

41.

18

188

Enlisted

1,

109

5.

324

29.

22

100

30.

86

21

6.

48

203

62.

65

785

U.S.

Army

Strategic

Air

Forces:

Total

Army

334

4.

72

21.

56

58

80.

56

11.

11

8.

33

262

Officers

133

12.

28

21.

05

24

85.

72

7.

14

7.

14

105

Enlisted

201

3.

44

21.

89

34

77.

27

13.

64

9.

09

157

Medical

Department Officers Enlisted En

route: Total

Army

22.

22

100.

00

Officers Enlisted

66.

67

100.

00

Medical

Department Officers Enlisted Theater

unknown: Total

Army

12

11

91.

67

63.

64

18.

18

18.

18

Officers

100.

00

66.

67

33.

33

33.

33

Enlisted

83.

33

100

00

()

Medical

Department

100

00

100

00

Officers Enlisted

100.

00

100.

00

For

basic

data,

see footnote 1,

table

48.

All

persons known to

have

been

taken

prisoner

by

opposing

forces

or

taken

into

custody

by

the

authorities

of

neutral

country

as

internees.

Rate

per

1,000

median of

strength.

Information not

readily

available.
430 PERSONNEL

Table 51.—Battle casualties of the Medical Department, officers and enlisted men: Missing

in action, December 1941-31 December 1946

See footnotes at end of table.

Area and group

Total

Died

Returned

to duty

(number)

Total Declared dead Nonbattle

causes

(number) Number Annual

rateper 1,000 Number Percentof missing in actionNumber Percentof missing in action

Total overseas

Total Army 30, 314 3. 6, 216 20. 51 6, 058 19. 98 158 24, 098

Officers 5, 744 7. 1, 981 34. 49 1, 974 34. 37 3, 763

Enlisted 24, 570 2. 4, 235 17. 24 4, 084 16. 62 151 20, 335

Medical Department 547 65 11. 88 61 11. 15 482

Officers 31 9. 68 9. 68 28

Enlisted 516 62 12. 02 58 11. 24 454

Regional

Alaska:

Total Army 41 19. 51 19. 51 33

Officers 50. 00 50. 00

Enlisted 35 14. 29 14. 29 30

Medical Department

Officers

Enlisted

Caribbean and South Atlantic:

Total Army_ 11 11

Officers

Enlisted 10 10

Medical Department

Officers

Enlisted

European theater;

Total Armv 14, 528 4. 1, 371 9. 44 1, 361 9. 37 10 13, 157

Officers. 1, 683 5. 338 20. 08 338 20. 08 1, 345

Enlisted 12, 845 4. 1, 033 8. 04 1, 023 7. 96 10 11, 812

Medical Department 311 1. 16 5. 14 16 5. 14 295

Officers

Enlisted 304 1. 16 5. 26 16 5. 26 288

Mediterranean theater:

Total Armv_ 8, 487 5. 978 11. 52 978 11. 52 7, 509

Officers 1, 777 13. 352 19. 81 352 19. 81 1, 425

Enlisted 6, 710 5. 626 9. 33 626 9. 33 6, 084

Medical Department 92 6. 52 6. 52 86

Officers

Enlisted 90 1. 6. 67 6. 67 84

Africa-Middle East:

Total Army 903 124. 81 8. 97 81 8. 97 822

Officers 365 102. 47 12. 88 47 12. 88 318

Enlisted 538 16. 34 6. 32 34 6. 32 504

Medical Department

Officers 1.

Enlisted.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 431

Table 51.—Battle casualties of the Medical Department, officers and enlisted men: Missing

in action, December 1941-31 December 1946—Continued

663076 —63 30

Total Died

Area and group

Total Declared dead NonRe- turned

to duty

Number Annual

rate per

1,000 Number Percent

of missing in actionNumber Percentof missing in action

battle

causes

(number)

(number)

China-Burma-India: Total Army 926 2. 475 51. 30 473 51. 08 45,

Officers 528 12. 246 46. 59 244 46. 21 282

Enlisted 398 1. 229 57. 54 229 57. 54 169

Medical Department

Officers

60. 00

33. 00

60. 00

33. 33

Enlisted 100. 00 100. 00

Pacific;

Total Army 4, 914 1. 3, 033 61. 72 2, 889 58. 79 144 1, 881

Officers 1, 212

3, 702

6. 871 71. 86 867 71. 53 341

Enlisted 1. 2, 162 5. 84 2, 022

36

54. 62 140 1, 540

Medical Department

Officers

128

18

40 31. 25

11. 11

28. 13

11. 11

88

16

Enlisted no 38 34. 55 34 30. 91 72

U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces:

Total Army 361 4. 268 74. 24 267 73. 96 93

Officers 170 16. 124 72. 94 123 99. 19 46

Enlisted 191 2. 144 75. 39 144 75. 39 47

Medical Department

Officers

Enlisted

En route:

Total Army

Officers

141 71 71 140

Enlisted-. 139 72 72 138

Medical Department- __

Officers

Enlisted--

Theater unknown:

Total Army 50. 00

Officers

Enlisted 50. 00

Medical Department

Officers

Enlisted

For basic data, see footnote 1, table 48.

Persons originally reported as missing in action who have not been classified as killed in action, wounded or injured

in action, or captured or interned.

All persons previously reported as missing in action who were no longer presumed to be living and in whose cases

finding of death was made by the Chief of the Casualty Branch, Office of The Adjutant General, pursuant to Section

of Public Law 490, 77th Congress, March 1942, as amended. Findings of death were made upon or subsequent to 12

months in missing-in-action status and were withheld so long as the person was presumed to be living.

Rate per 1,000 of median strength.

‘Information notreadily available.
432 PERSONNEL

The battle-casualty rates for individual officer groups of the Medical

Department were: Medical Corps, 5.2; Dental Corps, 2.2; Veterinary Corps,

1.3; Sanitary Corps, 0.3; Pharmacy Corps, 0; Medical Administrative Corps,

3.5; Army Nurse Corps, 1.0;Dietitians, 0; Physicial Therapists, 0.

Location in rear areas not only reduced the dangers of combat but the

likelihood of diseases and injuries that were more prevalent at the front than

elsewhere—for example, malaria and cold injury. Little information is available on the incidence of noncombat injury in the Medical Department, but

figures for nonbattle deaths amply bear out this statement (table 52). On the

other hand, the Medical Department contained higher than average proportion of women, limited-service troops, and persons of high age level, many

of whom had waived disabilities, all factors that tended to raise the rate of

loss through hospitalization or discharge.

Types of Permanent Loss

Permanent losses of the Army comprised not only persons who were

formally relieved from active service but those who, though nominally still in

service, were absent from their duties because they were hospitalized, imprisoned for misconduct, captured by the enemy, missing in action, absent without leave, or had deserted. The total numbers of Medical Department personnel who were captured and missing in action have been determined (tables

50 and 51), but how many in either group were restored to the service before

the end of hostilities is unknown. No figures are available for those who were

permanently hospitalized, imprisoned as deserters, or absent without leave,

but it is known that very considerable number of persons hospitalized remained undertreatment until the end of the war.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 433

Table

—Nonbattle 52.

deaths

in

the

Medical

Department

Actual,

December1941-31 December197,6;

estimated,

December1941-30

September

1945

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*4 4* Oi CO tc 4- 05 CO to Number

4* tc — 4- -I Oi Oi C5 JC 1C to 4- §r£. CO CO CD 4- —

!“* Rate tOi 4* Oi 05 4^ CO

Oi Oi

Total to Oi Oi cc 4* tc

tc 05 •*4 to 4- 05 tc

00 CD 4— >—Oi 05 to

4- 4i- 4|

&o c* Number Oi -1 4* CO ce tc 4-. to Cn CO Oi 1C tc 05 CO 05 *4 05 05 Oi 4-

Rate CO Oi CO 05 Ci Oi tc to to to CO 4*-
434 PERSONNEL

Table

52.

Nonbattle deaths

in

the

Medical

Department: Actual,

December1941-31 December1946;

estimated, December1941-30 September

1943

—Continued

Group

Strength

All

nonbattle

deaths

Accidental deaths

Died

of

disease

Other causes

All

accidental deaths

Total

Aircraft

December Median September 1941-30 1945

of months of Number

exposure

Total

Ad- justed

Total

Ad- justed

Ad- justed

Total

Ad- justed

Total

Ad- justed

Number

Rate

Number

c3PC?

Number

ad- of Percent

justed accidental

Number

Rate

Number

03

Medical

Department Con.

Officers

Continued Dental

Corps:Worldwide

13,

776

46

91

77

1.

25

18

0.

33

56

49

0.

10

10

0.

Overseas

2,

929

46

32

27

2.

13

10

50

16

14

1.

Sanitary

Corps:

Worldwide

2,

178

46

68

Overseas

466

46

1.

1.

50

Veterinary

Corps:

Worldwide

1,

963

46

13

12

1.

57

Overseas

405

46

3.

2.

50

1.

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps:

Worldwide

14,

385

46

76

59

1.

27

20

15

36

31

13

Overseas

3,

334

46

29

23

1.

13

10

20

12

10

Army

Nurse

Corps:

Worldwide

35,

381

46

199

159

1.

98

81

45

41

51

81

60

20

18

Overseas

15,

081

46

101

82

1.

73

61

1.

38

35

57

22

16

Physical

Therapists:Worldwide

783

30

1.

1.

Overseas

371

30

2.

2.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 435

Enlisted; Worldwide

511,

061

46

2,

838

2,

500

1.

1,

227

1,

072

85

80

1,

243

1,

119

368

309

Overseas

171,

828

46

1,

555

1,

380

2.

776

672

1.

76

70

10

591

556

188

152

Basic

data,

unless

otherwise

specified,

from

“All

Army

Deaths

by

Duty

Branch

and

Type

of

Deaths:

December1941-31 December1946,” in

Department of

the

Army,

“Army

Battle

Casualties

and

Nonhattle

Deaths

in

World

War

II.

Final

Report

December1941-31 December1946,”

pp.

112,114.

Hospital dietitians incurred

but

one

nonbattle

death.

This

occurred

in

the

Zone

of

Interior

and

was caused

by

an

aircraft

accident.

For

the

means

of

determining median

strength, see table

48,

footnote

Worldwide 2.

and

oversea strength

of

the

Army

at

large

and

the

Medical

Department

based

on

data

in

table

31.

Worldwide and

oversea strength

of

Army

officers

at

large

determined from

data

in

table

45,

plus

WAAC

officers as

shown

in

“Strength of

the

Army.”

Worldwide

strength

of

Army

enlisted

men

at

large

derived

from

data

in

table

66,

plus

WAAC

and

WAC

enlisted

personnel as

reported in

“Strength

of

the

Army.”

Medical

Department officer

and

enlisted

strength,

worldwide

and

overseas, based on

strengths

shown

in

tables

45

and

56.

Determined

according

to

criteria

stated

in

table

48,

footnote

2.

Number

of

cases between

December 1941

and

31

December 1946.

Deaths

from

December 1941

to

30

September 1945.

Data

are

from

basic

source in

the

following

instances:

Total

Army,

worldwide

and

overseas for

all

types

of

deaths;

total

Army

officers;

total

Army

enlisted;

Army

Nurse

Corps;

and

physical

therapists,

all

worldwide,

for

the

entire

number

of

non battle

deaths.

In

all

other

cases,

the

figures

are

estimates.

In

the

case of

Medical

Department officer

groups, the

number

in

each

worldwide

category

has

been

attained

by

subtracting

from

the

number

of

deaths

reported in

such

category

in

the

basic

source the

number

of

deaths

shown

for

the

corresponding

category

during

the

period

October 1945-31 December 1946

in

monthly

reports

both

current

and

supplementary (OTM

53

and

OTM

55)

on

file

in

the

Statistics

Section,

Statistical

and

Accounting

Branch,

Office

of

The

Adjutant

General.

For

the

oversea categories,

the

numbers

shown

in

the

basic

source have

been

reduced by

percentage equal

to

the

corresponding

worldwide

percentage as

determined by

the

procedure just

described. This

results

in

very

conservative

estimate

of

the

number

of

deaths

prior

to

30

September 1945

since

the

reduction of

oversea strength

of

Medical

Department officers

between

that

date

and

the

end

of

1946

was

much

more rapid

than

the

worldwide reduction of

the

same

group. However,

knowledge available

in

the

Office

of

The

Surgeon

General

has

been

used

to

some extent

in

determining

oversea

deaths

in

the

Veterinary

Corps

and

among

physical

therapists.

The

total

number

of

nonbattle

deaths

among Medical

Department officers

(and

the

number

in

the

Medical

Department as

whole)

to

30

September 1945

must

be

increased

by

one,

which

occurred

among

the

Hospital Dietitians in

the

Zone

of

Interior

as

result

of

an

aircraft

accident.

(Data

from

basic

source.)

In

the

case of

Medical

Department enlisted

men,

the

estimates

of

worldwide

losses

between

December 1941 and

30

September 1946 have

been

attained

by

reducing the

numbers reported in

each

category in

the

basic source by

the

percentage

that

losses

in

the

same categories

among

all

Army

personnel from

October 1945

to

31

December 1946 constitute

in

relation to

corresponding

losses

between

December1941

and

31

December 1946

as

shown

in

this

table.

Oversea

losses

have

been

estimated

by

using

the

equivalent oversea data.

To

estimate

the

nonbattle

deaths

of

officers

and

enlisted men in

the

Army

at

large

prior

to

October 1945,

the

same procedures were utilized.

However,

while

all

adjustments

pertaining to

the

Medical

Department

have

been

made

consistent

with

the

data

from

the

basic

source,

this

procedure

has

not

been

followed

in

the

present

cases.

Nevertheless, no

marked

variation in

rates

shown

would

follow

if

the

procedure were used.

The

total

number

of

estimated

officer

nonbattle deaths

is

19,308

—or 7.4

per

1,000

per

annum.

The

equivalent

for

enlisted

men

is

63,462

or

2.5

per

1,000

per

annum.

Annual

rate

per

1,000 of

median

strength.
436 PERSONNEL

Deaths

In the Medical Department, the death rate from enemy action was little

more than one-fourth that in the Army as whole, although there was great

variation in rate among the several Medical Department components (table

53).

Table 53. Deaths from enemy action: Medical Department and Army as whole, December

1941-30 September 1945

Basic data on deaths are in tables 50 and 52.

Comprises killed in action, died of wounds and injury, died of wounds while in captivity, and missing in action

and declared dead.

Group Battle deaths Killed in action

Number Rate Number Rate

Army 225, 618 7. 189, 696 6.

Officers 35, 340 13. 30, 157 11.

Enlisted personnel 190, 278 7. 159, 539 6.

Medical Department 4, 665 2. 3, 690 1.

Officers 293 196

Medical Corps 203 1. 129

Dental Corps 25 18

Veterinary Corps 05 01

Sanitary Corps

Pharmacy Corps

Medical Administrative Corps 45 34

Army Nurse Corps 16 14

Dietitians

Physical Therapists

Enlisted personnel 4, 372 2. 3, 494 1.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

Returns to civilian life

The basic reasons for returns to civil life were physical and mental disabilities, the attainment of certain age, inefficiency or misconduct, hardship

and civilian needs, and demobilization in its early stages. Statistics on these

causes for the entire war period are available only in the case of male Medical

Department officers. breakdown so far as enlisted men are concerned is

available only for the period October 1943-Juue 1945 (tables 54, 55, 56, and

57).

Table 54. —Returns to civil life: Officers of the Medical Department and of the Army as whole,

December 19J+1-30 September 194-5

Group Median Returns

strength Number Rate

All Officers:

Army 684, 360 89, 510

16, 887

33.

Medical Department 110, 563 40.

Male officers:

Army_ 641, 188 78, 711

7, 288

31.

Medical Department 73, 602 25.

Medical Corps 40, 983 4, 060 25.

Dental Corps 13, 776 2, 280 43.

Veterinary Corps. .. 1, 963 155 20.

Medical Administrative Corps 14, 385 655 11.

Sanitary Corps and Pharmacy Corps 2, 236 138 16.

Female officers:

WAAC and WAC officers only 5, 754 1, 200 65.

Medical Department;

Army Nurse Corps .. 35, 381 9, 358 69.

Dietitians and Physical Therapists 2, 066 241 46.

From table 52 for all officers, Army and Medical Department, as well as for Medical, Dental, Veterinary, Medical

Administrative, and Army Nurse Corps, individually. All other median strengths were computed on the basis of the

dates used in computing the median strengths of the groups already mentioned. Strength data constituting the course

for the determination of the median strengths of the combined male Medical Department personnel, the combined Sanitary and Pharmacy Corps, and the combined Dietitians and Physical Therapists are in table 1. Corresponding data

for WAAC and WAC andall Armymale officersappear in “Strengthof the Army,” Jan. 1947.

Basic data for the Medical Department are from table 55; for the nurses, dietitians, physical therapists, and the

Army in general, from “Strengthof the Army,’’ Oct. 1950. Basic data in this issue of “Strength of the Army” may be

more complete than that in table 55; hence, the figures for male Medical Department officers may be somewhat higher

than those shown here.

Per 1,000 per annum of median strength.
438 PERSONNEL

Physical and mental disability.—The rates of discharge of Medical

Department personnel for physical and mental disability were frequently high

in comparison with those of the Army as whole, particularly in the case of

officers. The rate for male officers in general was 11.1. The higher rates of

discharge were concentrated almost entirely in the Medical and Dental Corps;

the Medical Administrative Corps and the combined Sanitary and Pharmacy

Corps had rates well below those of male officers in the Army at large (tables

55 and 58).

It will be noted that in the latter part of 1943 the rate of discharge for

medical and dental officers was particularly high despite the fact that at that

time the regulations authorizing release on physical grounds were less lenient

for them than for other Army officers: In July of that year, the General Staff

authorized the release of line officers qualified only for limited service, but

specifically excepted doctors and dentists from the terms of its directive.38

Late in 1943, the rate at which male Medical Department officers of all

corps were being granted discharges for physical reasons caused an investigation. At that time, theAssistant Chief of Staff, G-l (personnel) of the War

Department General Staff, called the attention of Army Service Forces headquarters to the fact that in September 1943 the rate of discharge for Medical

Department officers on grounds of physical disqualification was almost four

times that for the rest of the Army. It was intimated that more careful

scrutiny of doctors under consideration for discharge on those grounds might

lead to theirretention in limited-service capacity. 39

At the request of Army Service Forces headquarters, The Surgeon

General appointed board of officers to investigate the matter. The board

reported that careful review of the 143 separations for physical causes in

September 1943 showed the action of retiring boards to be justified in 84 percent of the cases and unjustified in the remaining 16 percent. With regard to

the latter groups, the board emphasized that, in the review, professional

judgment rather than rigid interpretation of existing regulations .was used to evaluate the officers’ status. In the group of 123 whose separation appeared

justified, 49 were retired because of defects which had existed prior to appointment. It was evident, the board declared, that none of the 49 should have

been commissioned. “The chief apparent explanation of the acceptance of

doctors who later had to be separated from the service lay in the fact that the

urgent need for medical officers made it necessary frequently to commission

individuals who did not meet the strict physical requirements of Army

regulations.” 40

38 Medical Department, United States Army. Dental Service In World War II. Washington:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955. 89 Memorandum, Maj. Gen. Miller G. White, G-l, for Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces,

12 Oct. 1943, subject: Medical Department Officer Separations.

40 The board did not mention that examining officers may not always have been familiar enough

with the physical standards required for commissions. This was very likely the case with at least some members of the Medical Officer Recruiting Boards, which lacked centralized direction but which had brought in large numbers of officers in 1942.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 439

Table

55.-

—Returns

of

male

Medical

Department officers

to

civilian

life,

December

1941~Seplemher 1945

Component

Mean strength

Total

returns

Physical disqualifi-cations

Over

38,

no

suitableassignment

Hardship

Keyman in

industry

and

Government

Reclassifi- cation

Dishonorable discharge

Others*

All

male

Medical

Department officers:

December1941-30 June

1943-

39,

510

1,

311

1,

020

12

264

July-December 1943

70,

737

1,

001

861

25

98

January-June 1944

76,

720

720

509

31

32

13

132

July-December

1944

80,

241

1,

007

635

179

22

152

January-June

1945

84,

908

2,

196

1,

504

391

35

24

14

223

July-September

1945

85,

557

1,

053

627

86

42

20

10

263

Total

7,

288

5,

156

687

92

44

120

57

1,

132

Medical

Corps:December1941-30 June

1943-

25,

532

949

755

177

July-December

1943

39,

638

703

618

70

January-June 1944

42,

960

413

312

10

81

July-December

1944

45,

217

388

261

12

10

92

January-June

1945_

46,

824

952

723

29

27

11

153

July-September

1945

46,

930

655

416

10

28

11

185

Total

4,

060

3,

085

52

67

24

47

27

758

Dental

Corps:December1941-30 June

1943__

7,

135

247

195

49

July-December 1943

13,

462

199

173

13

January-June

1944

14,

685

161

130

14

July-December

1944

15,

075

424

280

113

24

January-June

1945

14,

813

1,

000

618

333

33

July-September

1945

14,

253

249

145

67

11

23

Total See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.

2,

280

1,

541

521

21

29

156
440 PERSONNEL

Table

55.

—Returns

of

male

Medical

Department

officers

to

civilian

life,

December194

1-September

1945 —Continued

Component

Mean strength

Total

returns

Physical disqualifi-cations

Over

38,

no

suitableassignment

Hardship

Keyman in

industry

and

Government

Reclassifi- cation

Dishonorable discharge

Others

Veterinary

Corps:December1941-30 June

1943.

1,

241

33

20

10

Julv-December 1943

1,

929

17

12

January-June 1944

1,

995

28

20

July-December

1944

2,

025

27

11

January-June 1945

2,

044

39

24

July-September 1945

2,

053

11

Total

155

90

22

30

Medical

Administrative

Corps:

December1941-30 June

1943__

4,

724

67

39

24

July-December 1943

13,

626

71

48

14

January-June 1944

14,

947

100

41

11

11

32

July-December 1944

15,

468

127

70

23

28

January-June 1945

18,

640

172

118

13

28

July-September 1945_

19,

767

118

50

47

Total

655

366

52

32

21

173
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 441

Sanitary

and

Pharmacy

Corps:

December1941-30 June

1943__

878

15

11

July-December

1943.

2,

082

11

10

January-June

1944

2,

133

18

July-December 1944

2,

456

41

13

22

January-June

1945

2,

587

33

21

July-September

1945

2,

554

20

13

Total

138

74

40

15

From

recordson

file

in

Personnel Statistics

Unit,

Statistics

Section,

Statistical

and

Accounting

Branch,

Office

of

The

Adjutant

General.

Average

of

monthly

mean strength

within

the

periods

shown,

obtained

by

averaging the

strength

at

the

end

of

the

month

with

the

strength

at

the

end

of

the

preceding

month,

both

as

stated

in

table

1.

Includes

the

following

categories shown

in

the

sources: Reclassification, honorable;

reclassification, other

than

honorable;

and

reclassification, honorable or

other

than

honorable.

“Other

than

honorable”

probably

includes dishonorable

discharges.

Additional

to

those

that

may

be

included

under

“reclassification” and

categories

covered

by

“other.”

Contains

the

following

separations:

December1941-30

September 1945

as

shown

in

the

sources; Medical

Corps;

retirement, 129;

overage, 20;

honorable

discharge, 53;

less

than

months’

service

(honorable

discharge

under

AR

605-10),

1;

less

than

months’

service

(other

than

honorable

discharge, under

AR

605-10),

3;

resignation, 223;

conditions

other

than

honorable,

75;

expiration

of

tour,

6;

confidential

instruction,

2;

convenience

of

Government,

1;

Reserve

appointment expired

(not

reappointed), 2;

declination

or

cancellation

of

appointment,

2;

to

enter

U.S.

Military

Academy,

32;

by

action

of

service

commander

(specific cause not

reported),

unsatisfactory

service,

6;

necessary to

national

and

community

health,

75;

relief

of

retired officer

at

own request, 70;

demobilization under

RR

1-5,

49;

Dental

Corps:

retirement, 16;

overage, 4;

honorable

discharge,

5;

resignation, 74;

conditions

other

than

honorable,

29;

confidential

instructions,

1;

Reserve

appointment expired

(not

reappointed), 1;

to

enter

U.S.

Military

Academy,

5;

by

action

of

service

commander

(specific cause not

reported),

1;

unsatisfactory

service,

2;

necessary to

national

and

community

health,

1;

relief

of

retired officer

at

own request, 10;

demobilization under

RR

1-5,

6;

Veterinary

Corps:

retirement, 11;

overage,

2;

resignations, 8;

conditions

other

than

honorable,

3;

expiration

of

tour,

1;

to

enter

U.S.

Military

Academy,

2;

relief

of

retired officer

at

own request, 3;

Medical

Administrative

Corps;

retirement, 2;

overage, 2;

honorable

discharge, 3;

less

than

months’

service

(other

than

honorable

discharge

under

AR

605-10),

4;

resignation, 90;

conditions

other

than

honorable,

21;

convenience

of

Government, 1;

necessary to

national

and

community

health,

3;

relief

of

retired officer

at

own request, 8;

demobilization under

RR

1-5,

30;

surplus

under

Circular

No.

290,

1;

Sanitary

and

Pharmacy Corps:

retirement, 1;

overage, 1;

resignation, 7;

conditions

other

than

honorable,

3;

less

than

months’

service

(ether

than

honorable

discharge

under

AR

605-10),

1;

relief

of

retired officer

at

own request, 1;

demobilization under

RR

1-5,

1.
442 PERSONNEL

Table 56.—Returns of Medical Department enlisted men to civilian life, October 1943-June 1945

Table 57.—Returns to civil life: Enlisted men of the Medical Department and of the Army as

whole, October 1943-June 1945

Honorable discharges DisDate Mean strength Total

releases Physical and

mental

disqualifications

Overage Retired Demobilization Miscellaneous

Transfer

to in- active

status

charges

other

than honorable

1943 510,282 15,586 13,662 136 369 466 295 658

1944 527,048

558,469

12,135

25,103

8,371 44 678 1,522

7,136

578 942 16,857 72 412 617

1945 January-June 532,729 19, 787 11,051 1,980 69 4.942 917 345 483

Total 72,611 49, 941 2,169 1,188 4,942 10,041 1,630 2,700

All data from Monthly Progress Reports, Army Service Forces, War Department, November 1943 to July 1945,

inclusive, Section 5; Personnel.

Dates are theperiods in which processingof the pertinent papersby the Office of the Adjutant General wascompleted.

Average of monthly mean strength within the periods shown, obtained by averaging the strength at the end of the

month with the strength at the end of thepreceding month, both as stated in table 1.

Includesreleases for inaptitude.

From November 1943 through June 1944 also includes “dropped held for unterminated enlistment” and “dropped

from the rolls resulting from AWOL.” After June 1944, “dropped held for unterminated enlistment” are included in miscellaneous; “dropped from the rolls resulting from AWOL” are not included at all. Data, which cover the Army as whole but not the Medical Department specifically, show that during the period when “dropped” were grouped with

retired, the retired were only 7.5 percent of the combined categories. (The percentage is determined by comparing the

combined figures in the contemporary reports with revision, published in Monthly Progress Report, Army Service

Forces, War Department, December 1944, showing retirements alone.)

November and December oidy. Transfers to inactive status in October are included in “miscellaneous,”

Date

Army Medical Department

Number Rate Number Rate

October-December 1943

January—June 1944

195, 128

173, 128

262, 902

288, 803

117.

50.

73.

80.

15, 586

12, 135

25, 103

19, 787

123.

46.

89.

74.

July-December 1944

January—June 1945

Revised figures exist for the Army, indicating that some revision of the Medical Department figures isalso needed

The revised Army figures (from “Strength of the Army,” Jan. 1950) are as follows; October-December 1943, 190,187

(rate, 114.2); January-June 1944, 159,853 (rate, 46.0); July-December 1944, 262,958 (rate, 73.1); January-June 1945, 340,920

(rate, 94.5). The Army and Medical Department figures in the text are contemporaneous, both being drawn from data

in the Monthly Progress Reports, Army Service Forces, forthe periods shown. The same data for the Medical Department appear in table 56, wherethe mean strengths of medical enlisted personnel are shown. The mean strengths of Army

male enlisted personnel were: October-December 1943, 6,664,339; January-June 1944, 6,949,670; July-December 1944,

7,193,678; January-June 1945, 7,217,133. Mean strengths are the average of the monthly means for the periods covered.

Monthly means are the average of end-of-month strength of the particular month and the strength at the end of the preceding month as shown in “Strength of the Army,” Oct. 1945.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 443

Table 58. Rates of discharge for mental and physical disability: Male officers of the Medical Department and of the Army as whole, December 1941-September 1945

The board report also stated that “the racial distribution of medical

officers separated by reason of physical disability may be significant,” but it

did not explain this statement further. Although admitting it was conceivable

that professional relations between members of disposition board and the

officer whose record was under review could have been factor in the high

rate of Medical Department officer separation, the board considered this “highly

improbable.”

The board also suggested that the high discharge rate of Medical Department officers in general was attributable partly to the fact that they were

older, on the average, than other officers. report on Medical Department

officers retired in September, October, and November 1943 added the following

points: 41

There is relative excess of Medical Corps officers among the Medical Department

officers retired.

There is relative excess of 1st lieutenants in the group *.

The average period served by retired Medical Department officers was approximately

14 months.

In nearly 90 percent of cases the disability leading to retirement was judged not

contracted in line of duty.

The types of disability leading to retirement and their incidences were similar to

those in the retirement of non-Medical Department officers.

The rate of discharge of Medical Corps officers for physical disability

was markedly lower in the first half of 1944 than it had been previously.

Possible reasons for the decline may have been the influx into the corps of

younger men of greater stamina from the medical schools, the elimination

41 Reports, Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Morgan, Office of The Surgeon General, 15 Nov. 1943 and 31 Dec.

1943.

Date All

officers

(male)

Total

Medical

Department offi- cers (male)

Medical

Corps DentalCorps

Veterinary

Corps

Sanitary

Corps and Pharmacy Corps

Medical

Administrative

Corps

December 1941-June 1943

Julv-December 1943

January-June 1944

Julv-December 1944

January-June 1945

July-September 1945

7.

11.

10.

14.

17.

22.

16.

24.

13.

15.

35.

29.

18.

31.

14.

11.

30.

35.

17.

25.

17.

37.

83.

40.

10.

12.

20.

10.

23.

5.

7.

9.

5.

10.

16.

20.

5.

7.

5.

9.

12.

10.

Basic data on disqualifications of all male officers are from “Strength of the Army,’’ Oct. 1950; of Medical Department officers, from table 55. Mean strengths for male officers in general, including warrant and flight officers, were com- puted from monthly means of end-of-month strengths shown in “Strength of the Army,” Jan. 1947. These

mean strengths are as follows: December 1941-June1943, 286,887: July-December 1943, 602,393; January-June 1944, 668,487; July-December 1944, 708,695; January-June 1945, 811,693; July-September 1945, 831,028. For mean strengths of male

Medical Department officers, see table 55.
444 PERSONNEL

earlier of some officers who might otherwise have been discharged during this

period, and perhaps also less liberal attitude on the part of reviewing boards

in consequence of criticism. The rate of discharge of dental officers declined

at the same time, though not so sharply as that of doctors, and in the last half

of 1944, it leaped upward while the rate for doctors continued to decline. The

policy of discharging dentists to avoid surplus had been inaugurated as early

as April 1944, and in the same month, the authorization to discharge limitedservice officers had been extended, under certain conditions, to dentists.

The upward trend in discharges for disability during 1945 among male

officers throughout the Army no doubt represented, in part, the effect of

physical deterioration as the war was prolonged. The fact that the rate was

so much higher in the Medical Department than in the Army as whole

probably reflects the higher age level of the group, as well as its larger

proportion of men who had waived disability in entering the Army.

So far as enlisted men were concerned, the disability-discharge rate from

October 1943 until June 1945 was not greatly different in the Medical Department from what it was in theArmy as whole (table 59).

Physical and mental disability caused most of the separations of male

Medical Department officers from service during the war period. The same

is true of separations of Medical Department enlisted men during the period

from October 1943 to June 1945; in this case, physical and mental disability

caused two-thirds of the discharges (table 56).

Data on discharges resulting from this cause exist for all three women’s

officer components of the Medical Department for the period September

1944-30 June 1945 and also for the following months. One cause of the

great disparity between these two periods in the rates of discharge is the fact

that during the first period the reporting was very incomplete. Since pregnancy caused the great majority of disability discharges, the rates for that

cause are shown separately in table 60.

Table 59.—Disability-discharge rate: Enlisted men of the Medical Department and of the

Army as whole, October 19^3-June 19^5

Rate

Date Army Medical Department

October-December 1943 107. 100.

January-June 1944 36. 31.

July-December 1944 60. 60.

January-June 1945 41. 41.

Basic data on Army discharges are from Monthly Progress Reports, Army Service Forces; on Medical Department

discharges, Irom table 53. For mean strengths of Army enlisted men, see footnote to table 54. For mean strengths of

Medical Department enlisted men, see table 55. Revised figures for medical discharges of enlisted men of the Army as

whole are given in“Strengtn of the Army,” Oct. 1950, as follows: October-December 1943,167,148 (rate, 100.3); .Tanuary-

•Tunc 1944, 120,570 (rate, 36.4); July-December 1944, 262,958 (rate, 60.2); January-July 1945, 162,022 (rate, 44.9).
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION 445

Table 60.—Discharges for disability: Army Nurse Corps, Dietitians, and Physical Therapists, September 1944~30 September

Attainment of certain age.—Age alone caused the discharge of very

few male officers of the Medical Department. Retirements, which also included retirements for physical disability after 20 years’ service, occurred at

the rate of 0.56 not materially different from the rate of 0.6T for male Army

officers in general. 42 Another basis for the discharge of officers was “overage

in grade.” Of the very few male Medical Department officers released for

this reason, the majority came from the Medical Corps (table 55).

In December 1943, the War Department authorized the discharge of all

Army officers 45 years of age and over for whom no suitable assignment

existed. month later the age limit was lowered to 38.43 At the end of

1944, the age limit for discharges on this ground was removed, but it was

indicated that persons over 38 would be given more consideration than others.

Actually, the great majority discharged afterward under this rule were over

38. In the approximately 21 months of war during which the rule was in

operation, more male Medical Department officers were released through its

workings than were discharged throughout the war for any other reason

except physical and mental disability, and more than 80 percent of those so

42Basic data for Medical Department are from table 55, and for Army from “Strength of the

Army,” Oct. 1950. Data for the Medical Department are not so complete as for the Army at large.

If the figures were complete, the Medical Department rate would probably equal or exceed the Army

rate. For median strengths, see table 54. Here and in subsequent references, rates are figured on the

basis of number per annum per 1,000 median strength for the period of December 1941 to 30 September

1945.43Letters, The Adjutant General, to Divisions of War Department General Staff, Dec. 1943 and

12 Jan. 1944. subject: Relief From Active Duty of Officers for Whom No Suitable Assignment Exists.

44 War Department Circular No. 485, 29 Dec. 1944.

Femaleofficers

Sept. 1944-30 June 1945 July 1945-30 Sept. 1945

Total discharges

for disability Pregnancy

discharges Total discharges

for disability

Pregnancy

discharges

Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate

Army Nurse Corps

Dietitians

Physical Therapists

318 8.

6.

5.

269 7.

4.

4.

690

17

50.

43.

22.

615

14

44.

35.

20.

Basic data are from records in Statistical and Accounting Branch. Statistical Section, Personnel Statistics Unit,

Office of The Adjutant General.

Includes pregnancy discharges.

Annual rate per 1,000 of mean strength for the period shown. Mean strengths arc the average of monthly mean

strengths computed by averaging the end-of-month strength for particular month with the strength at the end of the

preceding month, both as shown in table 1. The mean strengths are as follows: September 1944-Junc 1945—Army Nurse

Corps, 45,560; Dietitians, 1,465; Physical Therapists, 1,030; July-September 1945—Army Nurse Corps, 55,091; Dietitians,

1,571; Physical Therapists, 1,265.
PERSONNEL

released were members of the Dental Corps. The rates for the various corps

were as follows:

Medical Department male officers 2.44

Medical Corps .33

Dental Corps 9.87

Veterinary Corps .29

Sanitary Corps and Pharmacy Corps .47

Medical Administrative Corps .97

Nevertheless, the Medical Department rate for most of this period was much

lower than that for male officers of the Army at large. Thus, the Medical

Department rate for January-June 1944 was 0.8; the Army rate, 9.2; for

July-December 1944, the rates were 4.5 and 11.5; and for January-June 1945,

9.2 and 8.0.

The return of enlisted men to civilian life for reasons involving age included retirements. Comparative figures on retirements are available only for

the year July 1944-30 June 1945. They show slightly higher rate for the

Medical Department 0.3) than for the Army as whole (0.2) (table 56).

Beginning in December 1942, the Army permitted the release of enlisted

men over 38 years old who were less useful to the Army than to industry

and who could show that job was waiting for them in an essential war

industry. Under this rule, men were discharged outright, but at least as

early as 1943 they could be transferred to the Enlisted Reserve Corps,45

although some continued to be discharged. Then, in April and May 1945,

when the war in Europe was ending, successive directives 46 permitted the

discharge of enlisted personnel, at first over 42 years of age and then over

40, almost without restriction. Figures for the Army at large show heavy

discharges in the age category for the months following December 1942, and

then decline. In the last few months of 1943, when comparative figures

for the Medical Department first became available, the rates for the Army

and the Medical Department were on the way to becoming insignificant until

they shot upward during the period when the directives of April and May

1945 took effect. Comparative rates for October-December 1943 were: Medical Department 1.07, Army 0.23; for January-June 1944, Medical Department 0.16, Army 0.14; for July-December 1944, Medical Department 0.03,

Army 0.04; and for January-June 1945, Medical Department 7.43, Army 7.08.

Meanwhile, the rates of transfer to the Enlisted Reserve Corps, at first

much higher than the rate of discharges, descended without break. In this

case, the comparative rates for November-December 1943 were: Medical Department 3.5, Army 5.0: for January-June 1944, Medical Department 2.2,

Army 2.4; for July-December 1944, Medical Department 1.5, Army 1.2; and

45 (1) War Department Circular No. 397, Dec. 1942. (2) War Department Circular No. 92,

Apr. 1943. 40 (1) War Department Circular No. 125, 25 Apr. 1945. (2) War Department Circular No. 151,

23 May 1945.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

for January-June 1945, Medical Department 1.3, Army 1.4.47 The majority

were transferred for reasons of age. Among the minority transferred for

other reasons, probably most returned to active duty before the end of

hostilities.

Inefficiency and misconduct.—Among male officers of the Medical Department, 324 were discharged specifically for inefficiency and misconduct

during the course of the war (table 55). Of these, 120 were separated from

the service through the action of reclassification boards. Another eight were

discharged for unsatisfactory service, presumably without such proceedings.

Of the remainder, 139 were given discharges without honor and 57 received

dishonorable discharges; as already noted, these are to be understood as separations in addition to those resulting from action by reclassification boards,

although the latter could recommend any type of discharge—honorable, dishonorable, or without honor. These boards, which existed throughout the

Army, could propose (among other things) the separation of officers brought

before them on allegations of inefficiency, misconduct, or undesirable habits and

traits of character. The person involved might be returned to his command

for trial by court martial. board was to recommend honorable discharge

if it found the officer to be merely incompetent; it could recommend dishonorable discharge or one without honor in case of misconduct or undesirable habits

or traits. 48

For both officers and enlisted men, the rates of discharge for misconduct in the Medical Department were lower than those for the Army as whole,

reflecting, in part, greater degree of professionalism and higher age and

maturity level; in part, the psychological effect of feeling thatthey were saving

rather than taking lives. Another important factor was the fact that Medical

Department personnel were less subject to the hazards and strains of combat.

Hardship and civilian needs.—Very few male Medical Department officers were separated from the service because of “undue hardship” to themselves

or their families, the pertinent annual rate being only 0.3 per 1,000. Somewhat more were discharged on the score of their importance to the Government or the community in civilian capacity. Provision was made for releasing individuals who were “keymen in industry and Government” or who

were essential to “the national health, safety, or interest." Both provisions

applied to enlisted personnel as well as officers. Only 19 male officers of the

Medical Department were released under them up to the end of 1944. Well

before that time, the Procurement and Assignment Service had advocated

releasing physicians who came from communities where there was shortage,

but this plan failed to obtain tangible results. After conference in January

1945 between representatives of the Army and the Procurement and Assignment Service, the Army announced its new policy: Medical officers over 39

47 Basic data for the Army are from Monthly Progress Reports, Army Service Forces for the

Medical Department, from table 56. 48 Army Regulations No. 605—230, 25 Aug. 1941, 24 Dec. 1942, and June 1943.
448 PERSONNEL

years of age who were qualified for general service or who were practicing

specialty in the Medical Department, who were deemed “worthy cases” could

be discharged. This procedure resulted in virtually no discharges before the

end of June 1945, but by 30 September of that year, total of 75 medical officers and other male Medical Department officers had been discharged under

the “National and community health” provision. By the same date, 44 male

Medical Department officers, mostly members of the Medical and Medical Administrative Corps, had obtained release as “keymen.” 441686 factors produced an annual rate of loss among male Medical Department officers amounting to 0,5 per 1,000. The number of enlisted men discharged for the same

reasons is not available.

Demobilization.—Among the permanent losses of the Medical Department during the war must be counted that group of personnel discharged in

accordance with established demobilization procedures, limited as they were,

between May 1945, when these regulations went into effect, and the end of hostilities. The regulations apparently had no effect on the discharges of male

Medical Department officers before July 1945, and by the end of September

had caused the release of less than 90 officers. For nurses, on the other hand,

the demobilization regulations were operative as early as May; up to the end

of September, somewhat more than 200 nurses had been discharged under

them.49 The number of Medical Department eidisted men demobilized before

the end of the war is available only through June 1945; by that date, it

amounted to 4,942 (table 56).

Transfers to other branches of the Army

Transfers of Medical Department personnel to other branches of the Army

represented another type of Medical Department loss. Although figures on

this point are lacking, transfers of officers from the Medical Department were

necessarily less than that of Medical enlisted personnel, the highly specialized

training of most of the Department’s officers and the fact that large proportion of them were women made it difficult and inadvisable to transfer them.

The majority of those transferred were Medical Administrative Corps officers

who were transferred to combat or other service branches of the Army.

Transfer of enlisted men, on the other hand, was considerably more important numerically; the repeated efforts of medical authorities to stop the

How of medically trained eidisted men out of the Department are an indica- tion that the loss was substantial. This was particularly true toward the end

of the war when personnel were desperately short. In the Mediterranean

theater in November 1944 to February 1945, 25 percent of general-assignment

enlisted men in station and general hospitals were replaced by limited-service

men.

40 Data on male officers are from table 55 on nurses, from records in Statistical and Accounting

Brandi, Statistics Section, Personnel Statistics Unit, Office of The Adjutant General.
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

This impression is confirmed by the experience of the European theater.

There the number of enlisted men scheduled to be given up in the latter part

of 1944 and in 1945 was in excess of 12,000, and even though by special arrangements the great majority of these eventually were retained in the medical service, more than 4,000 were transferred out of it.50

50 (1) Administrative and Logistical History of Medical Service, Communications Zone, European

Theater of Operations. Chapter X. [Official record.] (2) Report, Operations Division, Office of the

Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, Jan.-30 June 1945. f3) Annual Report,

Surgeon, Third U.S. Army, 1944.

CHAPTER XII

Rank, Promotion, and Pay

The Surgeon General was keenly aware of the morale factors involved in

problems of rank, promotion, and pay. He understood, also, that in such

matters he could not hope to win the approval of everybody in the Medical

Department. Policies concerning rank and promotion necessarily varied

somewhat from corps to corps. The way in which these policies were applied

or took effect might also vary to certain extent from one command to another.

Personnel in oversea areas, for example, did not always fare the same in matters

of promotion as did their opposite numbers in the Zone of Interior. Pay increased with length of service, and extra compensation came to be given for

service overseas. But for the most part, pay followed rank, and promotion

therefore was of vital interest to Army personnel not only because of the

added prestige but because of the higher pay that went with it.

ZONE OF INTERIOR

Emergency Period

Officers

In the early part of the emergency period, when selective service had not

yet been introduced, and even reservists could not be compelled to accept

active duty, many physicians resigned from the Reserve, the reason given being

the disparity between civilian income and Army pay. It must be assumed,

too, that some resigned for other reasons, notably an unwillingness to accept

active duty, but gave the insufficiency of pay and allowances as an excuse.

Whatever their real reasons, in the year ending on 30 June 1941, 1,937 Medical

Corps Reserve officers resigned. No raise in base pay was granted until 1942,

and even then only second lieutenants and enlisted personnel received an increase. Since doctors entered the Army as first lieutenants or higher, the

increase did not affect them.

The commissioning of men in the Reserve directly from civilian life in

the same grade or even higher than that held by members who had belonged

to the Reserve for period of time did not sit very well with the Reserve officers, particularly those on active duty. Men had spent time and effort in

the Reserve during peacetime expecting that in an emergency or war they

would receive higher recognition than those who were newcomers. The GenAnnual Report of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Washington U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1941.
452 PERSONNEL

eral Staff resisted any change in the existing system on the ground that it

was protecting the interest of reservists. The Medical Department, therefore, had to point out that there was then need for more professional specialists

than were available from the Reserve or National Guard and as most of those

in civilian life had advanced themselves professionally by postgraduate study,

in order to obtain their services, it was necessary to offer the inducement of

higher rank. The General Staff' acquiesced in this line of reasoning so far

as to permit certain number of appointments of the kind desired, but it was

not until after Pearl Harbor that sizable groupof civilians was brought in with

advanced rank. That these new men were specialists (most of them members

of affiliated units) did not lessen the dissatisfaction of other reservists.

It would also appear that promotions came more readily to National Guard

officers in Federal service than to medical officers in the Regular Army, Objections to this policy were expressed by Reserve officers, who were being called

to active duty without comparable promotion policy.

Meanwhile, promotion had been authorized in 1940 for Reserve officers

who had been on active duty for year, but only the relatively small number

who had been placed on active duty in 1989 were affected. In August 1941,

the Secretary of War listed certain temporary promotions, but again, as with

the promotion of 1940, relatively few benefited from this action. The authority covered Reserve officers with at least year’s service ending not later than

August 1941, and on the date nearest the beginning of that period for which

figures are available (80 August 1940), only 64(5 Reserve officers of the Medical Department were either on active duty or had had orders requested for

them by The Surgeon General. Of these, 450 were in the Medical, 121 in the

Dental, 52 in the Veterinary, IT in the Medical Administrative, and in the

Sanitary Corps. By 30 June 1941, however, month before the authority

became effective, 11,477 were on active duty, and undoubtedly, the number

was larger by August 1941.

After careful consideration, the Secretary of War on 26 December 1941

directed The Surgeon General to submit list of not to exceed 860 captains

and 1,620 first lieutenants of the Medical Corps, without regard to component,

whom The Surgeon General recommended for temporary, one-grade promotion. On this basis, The Surgeon General recommended and the General

Staff approved the promotion of 351 captains and 1,277 first lieutenants.

(1) Committee to Study the Medical Department, 1942. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, to

The Adjutant General, 24 Aug. 1940, subject: Appointment in Medical Department Reserve, with 1st

endorsement thereto, Sept. 1940.

Letter, Lt. Col. Laurence Mickel, to Executive Officer, Ohio Military Area, 25 Mar. 1941, subject:

Medical Reserve Officers.

See footnote 1, p. 451.

Disposition Slip, G-l, to The Surgeon General, 26 Dec. 1941, subject: Promotion of Captains and

First Lieutenants of Medical Corps.

Memorandum, Lt. Col. Paul A. Paden, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General,

for Col. A. G. Love, Director, Historical Division, Office of The Surgeon General. 14 Mar. 1944.
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 453

Since by that time new regulations had been issued, conferring on local commanders the right to promote, The Surgeon General suggested that these

authorities handle further promotions.

The Surgeon General had not recommended, nor did the Secretary of

War grant, the authority to promote officers other than those of the Medical

Corps. The advent of war somewhat dulled the edge of the question, but the

War Department’s new policies after Pearl Harbor did not change the feeling

of many physicians, that they were not receiving their due. Nevertheless,

this action began process of removing restrictions on promotion that had

had the effect of lowering morale among Medical Corps officers.

Nurses

During the emergency period, Army pay was no greater inducement for

Reserve nurses to go on active duty than it was for many doctors. At this

time, those in the grade of “nurse,” which included the great majority of

reservists, were paid only $840 year plus maintenance. Although nurses

who had served or more years on active duty received more, few of those

brought on duty beginning in 1940 could have qualified for the higher rates,

as there had been little or no opportunity for active duty in the preceding

years. The low pay of nurses was emphasized by War Department plan

to use male nurses with noncommissioned rank in theater of operations hospitals during wartime. These men were to lie paid substantially more than

female nurses were receiving in 1941. The Surgeon General called attention

to this inequality, even though no action on the plan was taken.

On 13 June 1941, in answer to letter of complaint from nurse on

active duty, The Surgeon General stated that he had recommended to the War

Department an increase in nurses’ pay “on several occasions.” The following day, he repeated the recommendation. representative of the Surgeon

General’s Office reported that in many Army hospitals “third-rate civilian

ward employees” were receiving $85 month as against the Army nurse’s

$70.10 The Superintendent of the Army Nurse Corps believed that personnel requirements could not be met without an increase in pay.11 But efforts

to secure an increase did not succeed until June 1942 when Congress approved

an upward revision for all members of the Armed Forces. 12

Letter, The Surgeon General, to Hon. Charles A. Clason, U.S. House of Representatives (Mass.),

23 June 1941.

Letter, The Surgeon General, to 2d Lt. Birdie B. Daigle, ANC, 13 June 1941.

Memorandum. The Surgeon General, for The Adjutant General, 14 June 1941.

10 Report, Perrin Long, M.D., of Visit to Station Hospital No. 3, Fort Bragg, N.C., 30 Aug. 1941. 11 Memorandum, Maj. Julia O. Flikke, Superintendent, Army Nurse Corps, for The Surgeon General, Dec. 1941. Cited by Blanchfleld. Florence A., and Standlee, Mary W. Organized Nursing and

the Army in Three Wars. [Official record.1 12 56 Stat. 359.
454 PERSONNEL

Early War Years, 1941-43

Officers

The outbreak of war brought with it need for temporary promotions

in the Army of the United States for all officers, medical and otherwise.

Hence, an Army regulation, dated January 1942, one of the basic orders

affecting promotion that were issued during the war, suspended most peacetime promotion regulations; advancement was thereafter based on (1) completion of minimum of months in grade except for second lieutenants,

who could be promoted sooner; (2) recommendations from superiors, attesting to the officer’s qualifications; and (3) existence of vacancy in the desired

grade. The regulation stipulated that “normally” no officer except second

lieutenant would be recommended for promotion until he had been assigned

to position calling for the higher grade and had actually performed the

duties of the higher grade for period of at least months. This regulation,

applying to officers of the Army of the United States, governed temporary promotions only; Regular Army Medical Department officers continued throughout the war to receive their permanent promotions in the

Regular Army under conditions laid down in peacetime. As promotion in

the Army of the United States was more rapid than in its Regular component,

the vast majority of Regular officers held two different grades throughout

the war and for some time afterward—a temporary one in the Army of the

United States (the higher one) and permanent one in the Regular Army.

They wore the insignia, had the command powers and duties, and drew the

pay of the higher grade. National Guard and Reserve officers did not receive permanent promotions in those components during the war.

This January 1942 regulation gave the power to recommend promotions

for personnel under their command to the commanding generals of armies,

defense commands, corps areas, chiefs of services, and similar major elements

of the Army. The Surgeon General thereby lost the power to control promotions of all Medical Department officers except those (relatively few) who

were serving in one of the installations under his command. 13 At that time, these included the named general hospitals, the Army Medical Center, the

Medical Field Service School, and medical replacement training centers. He

later lost command of the medical replacement training centers and the general hospitals, except Walter Reed, which was part of the Army Medical

Center. This order was one of the first if not the very first of many that

decentralized the control of personnel, taking much of it from The Surgeon

General and giving it to the corps area, army, and defense command commanders. 14

13 similar measure affecting the promotion of enlisted men deprived The Surgeon General of all

power to make such promotions, vesting it in local medical authorities (War Department Circular No. 17, 22 Jan. 1942). year earler, his power in that respect had already been limited to promotions

in the two highest noncommissioned grades (War Department Circular No. 5, Jan. 1941).

14 (1) War Department Circular No. 1, 1942. (2) See footnote 6. p. 452.
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 455

Meanwhile, in July 1942, Congress raised the limit of rank in the Medical Administrative Corps from that of captain to temporary ranks as high

as colonel. 15 During the war, at least one officer of this corps—Edward Reynolds, chief of The Surgeon General’s Supply Service—was appointed brigadier general. Before the law was passed, few Medical Administrative

Corps officers had received temporary promotions to the grade of major,

although they were not permitted to draw major’s pay until the passage of

the act, which made this pay retroactive to September 1940.

In March 1943, at the suggestion of The Surgeon General, the Deputy

Chief of Staff issued an order revising the tables of organization which increased the possibility of promoting members of the Medical and Dental Corps

from first lieutenant to captain. 16 This provided an opportunity to promote

approximately 8,082 medical and dental lieutenants then authorized; the troop

basis for the remainder of 1943 called for an additional 4,065 first lieutenant

positions in the two corps which were thereupon changed to captain or first

lieutenant positions. The Surgeon General meanwhile had proposed extending the policy to all medical units and detachments. At the same time, he

recommended that all first lieutenants of the Medical and Dental Corps be

promoted to the rank of captain upon the completion of months’ satisfactory

service. The Army Service Forces, without rejecting these ideas entirely,

postponed consideration of them until promotions had been made under the

policy already adopted. 17

An extension of this policy to all table-of-allotment units 18 took place months later (July 1943). 19 First lieutenants of the Veterinary Corps in table-of-organization units or in table-of-allotment or manning-table organizations were given the same opportunity for promotion later in the war.20

The effect of this new policy on table-of-organization units was immediate,

but some difficulty seems to have been encountered in installations working

under manning tables or tables of allotment since service commands were restricted to certain numbers of officers in each grade, and they hesitated to

advance Medical Department officers when such action would prevent promotions desired for qualified officers of other branches of service. 21

The new policy gave members of the Medical and Dental (and later the

Veterinary) Corps better chance of promotion to the grade of captain than

15 56 Stat. 663. 18 Memorandum, Deputy Chief of Staff, for Commanding General, Services of Supply, 10 Mar. 1943,

subject: Availability of Physicians.

17 (1) Memorandum, The Surgeon General, for General Somervell, 22 Apr. 1943. (2) Memorandum, Army Service Forces, for The Surgeon General, 10 May 1943, subject: Promotion for Medical Corps

and Dental Corps Officers. 18 Since all or nearly all units and activities were operating under either table of organization,

table of allotment, or manning table, these two orders made all but negligible percentage of

Medical and Dental Corps lieutenants eligible for promotion.

19 War Department Circular No. 169, 24 July 1943. 20 Army Regulations No. 605-12, Feb. 1944.

21 Medical Department, United States Army. Dental Service in World War II. Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955.

663076^—63—31
456 PERSONNEL

that possessed by officers of other corps. But officers in the grade of captain

or higher in many table-of-organization units still found themselves blocked

from promotion. Whenever the table of organization was filled and all officers

had the maximum grade allowed by it, there could be no further promotion

without transfer to new unit in which an opportunity for promotion existed.

Transfer could and did solve the problem for some officers. For example, the

Chief of Personnel in the Surgeon General’s Office was able to arrange

number of promotions for Medical Corps officers, particularly in the grades

of lieutenant colonel and colonel by permitting the Surgeon, Army Ground

Forces, to suggest commanding officers for new units being activated. By

selecting competent and deserving officers whose rank was lower than that

called for by the new position, promotion could be effected. Thus, many

able men who came to the Army Ground Forces as division surgeons and

organic medical battalion commanders, and were frozen in the grade of lieutenant colonel in consequence, achieved their colonelcies by being named hospital commanders.

Aside from inequalities in the promotion policy so far as it affected individuals, there was lack of uniformity, if not of equity, in the distribution

of rank among the several Medical Department corps (table 61). The percentage distribution of field grades in the Medical and Veterinary Corps differed markedly from that in the Dental Corps. In each of these

three grades (colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major), the Medical and Veterinary Corps had much higher percentage of officers than the Dental Corps.

Possibly, the high percentage of Veterinary Corps officers in field grades

is accounted for by their holding staff position in numerous headquarters.

At each headquarters, as one might expect, Medical Corps officer served

as the senior Medical Department representative in that headquarters. Commanders of most Medical Department units and installations were also Medical

Corps officers.

The distribution of general officers in the expanding Medical Department was also heavily weighted in favor of the Medical Corps. As of 30

June 1942, The Surgeon General was the only major general in the Department, and the three brigadier generals included the chiefs of the Dental and Veterinary Corps. year later, there was still only major general, and only the nonmedical brigadier generals, but the number of Medical

Corps brigadiers had jumped from to 33. The chief of the Dental Corps won an additional star in September 1943, but by 30 June 1944, there were

eight additional Medical Corps major generals and three more brigadier

generals, including in the latter category an Assistant Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service. There were thus altogether 47 general

officers in the Medical Department as of 30 June 1944, an increase of 43. or

more than 1,000 percent in years.22

22 (1) Annual Report, Commissioned and Enlisted Division, Personnel Service, Office of The Sur- geon General, U.S. Army, 1942. (2) Annual Report, Military Personnel Division, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1944.
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 457

Table

61.

—Rank

of

Medical

Department officers, 1939-45

Date

Colonel

Lieutenant colonel

Major

Captain

First

lieutenant

Second

lieutenant

Number

Percentage of

component Number

Percentage ofcomponent Number

Percentage ofcomponent

umber

Percentage of

component Number

Percentage of

component Number

Percentage ofcomponent

SO

June

1939

Total

Army: Male

793

6.

12

1,

605

12.

38

2,

858

22.

04

4,

094

31.

57

2,

146

16.

55

1,

471

11.

34

Female Medical

Department: Male

126

8.

38

556

36.

97

91

6.

05

502

33.

38

205

13.

63

24

1.

60

Medical

Corps

109

9.

96

384

35.

10

68

6.

22

402

36.

75

131

11.

97

Dental

Corps

13

5.

91

99

45.

00

14

6.

36

42

19.

09

52

23.

64

Veterinary

Corps

3.

17

73

57.

94

7.

14

35

27.

78

3.

97

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps

23

35.

94

17

26.

56

24

37.

50

Female__ Army

Nurse

Corps

SO

November 1941

Total

Army: Male

2,

380

1.

98

5,

712

4.

75

9,

680

8.

04

21,

194

17.

61

40,

033

33.

26

41,

373

34.

37

Female

01

35

50

365

5.

18

6,

642

94.

31

Medical

Department: Male

234

1.

41

712

4.

29

1,

214

7.

31

4,

341

26.

14

9,

611

57.

87

495

2.

98

Medical

Corps

183

1.

62

536

4.

73

897

7.

92

2,

910

25.

69

6,

801

60.

04

Dental

Corps

30

97

106

3.

42

226

7.

29

872

28.

12

1,

867

60.

21

Veterinary

Corps

20

2.

89

62

8.

95

52

7.

50

153

22.

08

406

58.

59

Sanitary

Corps

44

3.

54

21

9.

29

70

30.

97

126

55.

75

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps

18

1.

43

336

26.

67

411

32.

62

495

39.

29

Female

01

35

50

365

5.

18

6,

642

94.

31

Army

Nurse

Corps

01

35

50

365

5.

18

6,

642

94.

31

See

footnotes

at

end

of

list.
PERSONNEL

Table

61.

—Rank

of

Medical

Department officers,1939-45 —Continued

Date

Colonel

Lieutenant colonel

Major

Captain

First

lieutenant

Second

lieutenant

Number

Percentage of

component Number

Percentage ofcomponent Number

Percentage of

component Number

Percentage ofcomponent Number

Percentage ofcomponent Number

Percentage ofcomponent

28

February 1943

Total

Army: Male

6,

553

1.

55

13,

895

3.

29

31,

628

7.

49

78,

629

18.

62

117,

068

27.

73

174,

417

41.

31

Female

007

004

03

182

64

1,

528

5.

35

26,

833

93.

97

Medical

Department: Male.

765

1.

38

1,

803

3.

24

6,

796

12.

22

18,

059

32.

48

22,

765

40.

95

5,

408

9.

73

Medical

Corps

603

1.

73

1,

459

4.

18

5,

325

15.

27

13,

903

39.

87

13,

577

38.

94

Dental

Corps

112

1.

14

234

2.

39

920

9.

40

2,

442

24.

94

6,

082

62.

12

Veterinary

Corps

48

3.

27

59

4.

02

223

15.

18

414

28.

18

725

49.

35

Sanitary

Corps

17

26

2.

20

116

9.

82

357

30.

23

680

57.

58

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps

25

30

212

2.

56

943

11.

38

1,

701

20.

52

5,

408

65.

24

Female

004

004

035

90

35

1,

048

4.

02

24,

905

95.

59

Army

Nurse

Corps

__

004

004

027

90

35

1,

048

4.

13

24,

250

95.

48

Physical

Therapists ..

48

208

99.

52

Hospital

Dietitians__

22

447

99.

78

SO

September 1943

Total

Army: Male__

7,

681

1.

31

17,

569

3.

00

42,

086

7.

20

110,

925

18.

97

161,

625

27.

64

244,

784

41.

87

Female.. __

005

18

047

75

567

1.

48

2,

734

7.

12

34,

997

91.

15

Medical

Department: Male__

900

1.

28

2,

374

3.

38

8,

648

12.

30

26,

785

38.

09

23,

268

33.

09

8,

350

11.

87

Medical

Corps.

734

1.

84

1,

967

4.

94

6,

811

17.

11

19,

171

48.

15

11,

130

27.

96

Dental

Corps...

102

78

262

2.

00

1,049

8.

02

4,

910

37.

56

6,

750

51.

63

Veterinary

Corps..

59

3.

18

66

3.

56

288

15.

53

566

30.

53

875

47.

20

Sanitary

Corps

20

37

1.

84

163

8.

09

657

32.

62

794

39.

42

359

17.

82

Pharmacy

Corps

2.

94

12

35.

29

18

62.

94

8.

82

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps.

....

30

22

319

2.

36

1,

478

10.

92

3,

719

27.

47

7,

991

59.

03
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 459

Female

003

18

05

48

14

202

58

1,

736

4.

95

33,

069

94.

28

Army

Nurse

Corps

__

003

18

05

46

14

195

58

1,

551

4.

59

31,

945

94.

64

Physical

Therapists

23

Q2

73

16

74

ft9

Hospital Dietitians

11

34

112

12.

70

766

86.

85

SI

December1943

Total

Army: Male__

7,

861

1.

27

19,

076

3.

08

46,

752

7.

54

124,

963

20.

16

175,

069

28.

24

246,

148

39.

71

Female.

005

22

05

101

23

712

1.

65

3,

670

8.

52

38,

555

89.

53

Medical

Department: Male

951

1.

30

2,

566

3.

50

9,

511

12.

98

30,

842

42.

08

21,

076

28.

76

8,

340

11.

38

Medical

Corps

770

1.

91

2,

129

5.

28

7,

405

18.

38

21,

310

52.

90

8,

673

21.

53

Dental

Corps

113

80

290

2.

06

1,

215

8.

63

6,

338

45.

03

6,

118

43.

47

Veterinary

Corps

61

3.

15

61

3.

15

305

15.

77

652

33.

71

855

44.

21

Sanitary

Corps

23

38

1.

73

191

8.

70

763

34.

76

738

33.

62

460

20.

96

Pharmacy

Corps

3.

08

21

32.

31

33

50.

77

6.

15

3.

08

4.

62

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps.

27

18

362

2.

46

1,

775

12.

05

4,

690

31.

84

7,

877

53.

47

Female.

003

22

06

56

15

222

60

2,

320

6.

24

34,

585

92.

96

Army

Nurse

Corps

003

22

06

54

15

215

60

2,

056

5.

76

33,

363

93.

42

Physical

Therapists

20

80

109

21

80

77

90

Hospital Dietitians

10

30

155

15.

58

836

84.

02

31

May

1944

Total

Army: Male...

8,

405

1.

25

21,

952

3.

26

54,

273

8.

06

147,

925

21.

97

193,

529

28.

74

247,

368

36.

73

Female ...

004

46

10

176

37

1,

223

2.

59

7,

499

15.

88

38,

286

81.

06

Medical

Department: Male

1,

066

1.

37

3,

188

4.

09

10,

938

14.

02

36,

814

47.

18

18,

958

24.

30

7,

041

9.

03

Medical

Corps

876

2.

01

2,

673

6.

12

8,

609

19.

70

24,

270

55.

55

7,

262

16.

62

Dental

Corps

114

76

346

2.

31

1,

305

8.

72

8,

479

56.

64

727

31

57

Veterinary

Corps

66

3.

31

69

3.

46

333

16.

71

786

39.

44

739

37.

08

Sanitary

Corps

31

45

1.

97

212

9.

27

879

38.

42

643

28.

10

502

21.

94

Pharmacy

Corps

3.

77

19

35.

85

28

52.

83

5.

66

1.

89

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps.

01

36

.24

451

3.

00

2,

397

15.

97

5,

587

37.

22

6,

538

43.

56

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
460 PERSONNEL

Table

61.—

Rank

of

Medical

Department officers,1939-45 —Continued

Date

Colonel

Lieutenant colonel

Major

Captain

First

lieutenant

Second

lieutenant

Number

Percentage of

component Number

Percentage ofcomponent Number

Percentage of

component Number

Percentage ofcomponent Number

Percentage ofcomponent Number

Percentage of

component

31

May

1944

—Continued Medical

Department —Con.

Female

003

38

09

117

28

607

1.

47

5,

573

13.

47

35,

045

84.

69

Army

Nurse

Corps

003

38

10

115

29

596

1.

51

5,

133

12.

98

33,

659

85.

12

Physical

Therapists

16

78

171

26.

64

465

72.

43

Hospital

Dietitians

08

50

269

22.

47

921

76.

93

31

December1944

Total

Army: Male

9,

690

1.

32

25,

534

3.

47

63,

947

8.

69

174,

327

23.

69

238,

172

32.

37

224,

158

30.

46

Female __

003

68

13

281

56

1,

899

3.

76

13,

128

25.

97

35,

178

69.

58

Medical

Department: Male

1,

224

1.

47

3,

647

4.

37

12,

209

14.

64

40,

924

49.

06

18,

633

22.

34

6,

781

8.

13

Medical

Corps

1,

017

2.

18

3,

058

6.

54

9,

501

20.

32

25,

703

54.

98

7,

468

15.

98

Dental

Corps

124

82

372

2.

46

1,

439

9.

52

9,

815

64.

96

3,

360

22.

24

Veterinary

Corps

73

3.

58

73

3.

58

355

17.

42

1,

018

49.

95

519

25.

47

Sanitary

Corps

21

43

1.

80

198

8.

30

919

38.

52

591

24.

77

630

26.

40

Pharmacy

Corps

3.

03

22

33.

33

26

39.

40

6.

06

3.

03

10

15.

15

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps

02

79

46

690

4.

04

3,

465

20.

30

6,

693

39.

21

6,

141

35.

97

Female

002

58

13

168

38

1,

045

2.

34

10,

449

23.

49

32,

928

73.

67

Army

Nurse

Corps

002

58

14

166

39

1,

014

2.

40

9,

871

23.

37

31,

138

73.

70

Physical

Therapists

10

11

1.

11

245

24.

75

733

74.

04

Hospital

Dietitians--

07

20

1.

37

383

26.

21

1,

057

72.

35
RANK. PROMOTION, AND PAY 461

31

August 1945

Total

Army: Male

11,

027

1.

42

29,

356

3.

79

70,

958

9.

16

197,

495

25.

49

305,

989

39.

49

159,

958

20.

64

Female

005

116

18

463

73

2,

933

4.

63

33,

884

53.

46

25,

980

40.

99

Medical

Department: Male

1,

404

1.

62

4,

256

4.

90

13,

818

15.

92

43,

483

50.

09

18,

002

20.

74

5,

842

6.

73

Medical

Corps

1,

186

2.

48

3,

547

7.

41

10,

622

22.

21

26,

597

55.

60

5,

882

12.

30

Dental

Corps

131

91

426

2.

97

1,

618

11.

26

10,

167

70.

75

2,

028

14.

11

Veterinary

Corps

69

3.

26

84

3.

97

397

18.

76

1,

169

55.

25

397

18.

76

Sanitary

Corps

37

52

2.

12

269

10.

95

1,

010

41.

12

708

28.

83

408

16.

61

Pharmacy

Corps

5.

88

22

32.

35

24

35.

30

5.

88

4.

41

11

16.

18

Medical

Administra- tive

Corps

02

125

63

888

4.

45

4,

536

22.

72

8,

984

45.

01

5,

423

27.

17

Female

002

96

17

301

52

1,

803

3.

13

30,

175

52.

36

25,

251

43.

82

Army

Nurse

Corps

002

96

18

299

55

1,

704

3.

11

28,

695

52.

38

23,

984

43.

78

Physical

Therapists

08

41

3.

23

550

43.

38

676

53.

31

Hospital Dietitians

06

58

3.

67

930

58.

86

591

37.

41

Unless

otherwise

specified,

basic

data

are

from

issues

of

“Strength

of

the

Army”

corresponding

to

the

dates

shown.

Percentage distributions by

rank

therefore

are

based

on

The

Adjutant

General’s

figures

rather

than

those

of

The

Surgeon

General (table

1).

In

accordance with

the

principles

governing

the

preparation

of

these

tables,

general

officers are not

covered

by

any

of

the

figures

presented

here.

Figures

for

male

officers

include

the

female

members

of

the

Medical

Corps,

whose

distribution by

rankwas:

Colonel

Lieutenant colonel

Major

Captain

First

lieutenant

Number

of

Percent

of

Number

of

Percent of

Number

of

Percent

of

Number

of

Percent of

Number

of

Percent

of

Date

women

doctors

women

doctors

women

doctors

women

doctors

women

doctors

31

December 1943

7.14

18

42.86

21

50.00

31

May

1944

5.88

26

50.98

22

43.

14

31

December 1944^

6.

67

38

50.

67

32

42.67

31

August 1945

1.39

5.56

51

70.83

16

22.22

Basic

data

on

Medical

Department

ranks

from

Annual

Report

of

The

Surgeon

General,

U.S.

Army, 1939.

Basic

data

on

rank

of

male

officers

in

general

are

from

Annual

Report

of

the

Secretary

of

War,

1939.

Only

Regular

Army

personnel are

covered

in

either

figure.

Approximate

date.

Basic

data

for

the

entire

Army

and

for

nurses

are

for

31

December 1941

and

were

provided

by

Statistics

and

Accounting

Branch,

Statistics

Section,

Office

of

The

Adjutant

General,

on

21

February1958.

Basic

data

on

Medical

Department

male

officers

cover Regular

Army

and

Reserve

personnel on

active

duty

as

of

December 1941

and

Army

of

the

United

States

and

National

Guard

personnel as

of

November 1941.

Memorandum,

F.

M.

Fitts,

for

Colonel

Lull,

29

Oct.

1942,

subject:

Status

of

Medical

Department

Officers

as

of

Dec.

1941, addendum to

History

of

Military

Personnel

Division,

Personnel Service,

1939-April 1944.

Figures

for

31

March

1943,

from

“Strength of

the

Army,”

Feb. 1947.

Basic

data

from

Annual

Report,

Nursing

Branch,

Military

Personnel

Division,

Office

of

The

Surgeon

General,

1944.

“Strength of

the

Army,”

Feb. 1947.
462 PERSONNEL

Nurses

In the Nurse Corps, the percentage of personnel in the grade of second

lieutenant was far higher than in either of the male officer corps having

members in that grade—the Medical Administrative Corps and the Sanitary Corps; of these three corps, the percentage was lowest in the Sanitary

Corps (table 61). Up to December 1942, the grades of colonel, lieutenant

colonel, and major in the Nurse Corps were not authorized as general rule,

although exception had been made in the cases of the superintendent and

her chief assistant, who had been granted the grade of colonel and lieutenant

colonel, respectively. In December 1942, Public Law 828 authorized appointments in the grades of lieutenant colonel and major. During the remainder

of the war, however, no appreciable percentage reached higher rank than

that of captain.

After Congress had granted the dietitians and physical therapists relative rank (December 1942), the War Department on the recommendation of

The Surgeon General established the following table of grade distribution

for each group: In addition to one major, the number of captains was not

to exceed percent; the number of first lieutenants not to exceed 15 percent;

the remainder were to be second lieutenants.23 During the rest of the war,

each group possessed an actual percentage in the grade of first lieutenant

much larger than that authorized; during most of the period, the percentage

in the grade of captain was also larger (table 61).

In the early war years, Congress increased the pay of most members

of the Armed Forces, and male personnel of the Medical Department received

the same increases, rank for rank, that were simultaneously accorded to those

in other branches of the Army. In March 1942, Congress passed law which

included, among other provisions, extra compensation for oversea or sea duty

amounting to 10 percent of base pay for commissioned officers and 20 percent

for warrant officers, enlisted men, and female nurses. 24 Another law, enacted in June 1942, raised the pay of all enlisted men; privates, for example,

whose base pay had been increased from $21 to $30 month by the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,25 received further increase to $50.

The base pay of warrant officers was also raised.

The new scale for commissioned officers involved partly readjustment

of base pay and partly added compensation for subsistence and rental of

quarters. In the case of most Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Corps officers,

the increase took the form of higher allowances for subsistence and quarters.

In no case did the increase accorded Army officers amount to more than

few hundred dollars year, 26 an addition which, so far as doctors in particu23 Letter, Col. Emma E. Vogel, USA (Ret.), to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General,

June 1952. 24 56 Stat. 143. 25 54 Stat. 885. 26 56 Stat. 359.
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 463

lar were concerned, did little or nothing to close the gap between Army pay

and income from civilian practice.

Members of the Army Nurse Corps, although their compensation was

gradually increased, did not achieve the full pay and allowances of Army

officers until they attained full commissioned rank. Nevertheless, their compensation was high enough so that the majority of nurses were not reluctant

to accept it until the establishment of the more highly paid Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps in May 1942.27

As nurses entered the Army or were induced by higher wages to take

nonnursing jobs in industry, fewer remained in civilian practice, so that wages

rose there too (until they were frozen in 1942). slight rise in pay for

Army nurses came from the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, effective on

.Tune 1942, Nurses also received monthly quarters and subsistence allowances equal to those of second lieutenant, but unlike male officers, they did not

receive increased allowances as their rank increased.28 In spite of improvements, the pay still seemed inequitable, for the same act set enlisted men’s pay

rates at such levels that an intelligent soldier with little or no civilian training

might in the course of year be earning as much as nurse who had spent

years in nursing school.29

The increase in pay did not satisfy all Army nurses or civilian nurses

who considered entering the service. To add to their belief that the Army

was not only underpaying but actually discriminating against nurses were

the provisions in the act creating the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps in

May 1942 which fixed generally more liberal pay scale.30 When questioned

by members of the Committee to Study the Medical Department in the fall

of 1952, the Superintendent of Nurses answered that the nurses were not

properly paid, and mentioned the salary of the Women’s Auxiliary Army

Corps as “hindrance,” presumably to the procurement of nurses.

The dissatisfaction of the nurses, coupled with support by their friends

outside the corps, was partly responsible for further improvements in the

position of Army nurses. These 31 included pay increase in December 1942,

which gave nurses remuneration substantially equal to that of commissioned

officers.32 By its terms, nurses received the same military base- and longevitypay and allowances for subsistence, rental of quarters, mileage and other travel

allowances as commissioned officers were receiving. Subsistence and quarters

allowances increased according to rank, and they henceforth received only

10-percent increase in base pay (not 20 as previously) for oversea or sea duty,

the same increase as that given to commissioned officers. Thus, although

27 Memorandum, Colonel Blanehfleld (Ret.), for Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General,

14 July 1952, subject: Medical Department History in World War II. 2S See footnote 26, p. 462. 20 Memorandum, Chief, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Colonel

Nugent, G—1, Oct. 1942. 20 56 Stat. 278. 31 For other concessions to the nurses at this time, see chapter VIII, pp. 247-266. 32 56 Stat. 1072.

663076'—63 32
464 PERSONNEL

they held only relative rank, Army nurses had now attained the same pay

schedule as commissioned officers, except for the allowance for dependents.

They received that allowance and other privileges when in June 1944 they

were accorded full commissioned rank in the Army of the United States.

Dietitians and physical therapists

The act of December 1942 raising the pay of Army nurses, “militarized”

two other groups of women, the hospital dietitians and the physical therapists, giving them, along with “relative rank,” the same pay as nurses. Before they were given military status, women in these two groups received

salary of $1,800 to $2,300 year, while the two superintendents each received $3,200. 33

As before the war, the pay of civilian employees of the Medical Department conformed to the wage scales of all employees of the Federal Government, except that for time certain Medical Department civilian personnel

did not receive the higher pay for overtime work which, after 1940, some of

those scales had allowed.34 The reason was that, since not all classes of civilian

workers were entitled to such rate, the commanders of hospitals, in order

to avoid morale problem and also because only few members of their civilian staffs were entitled to it, did not request this rate for them. In May

1943, however, Congress granted almost all Federal employees higher pay

inlieu of specific pay for overtime work. 35

Later War Years, 1943-45

jficers

Inequalities (or inequities) in the system of promotion and in the distribution of rank among Medical Department officers caused concern and criticism

during the later war years. At the same time, some progress was made toward

removing the basis for complaint.

As regards promotion, there was tendency to restrict it at this period,

both by lengthening the time an officer must spend in his current rank and

by preventing his promotion above the rank authorized for his job. The

War Department in 1942 made officers’ promotions to each grade possible

after months had been spent in the lower grade; the only exception was in

favor of second lieutenants, who could be promoted in less than months.

This regulation applied throughout the Army, as did succeeding regulations

during 1943-46 which increased the waiting time in all grades. It will be

observed that the increases in waiting time struck the higher grades first and

were greater in them than in the lower grades. In July 1944, however, the

33 Memorandum, Maj. Helen B. Gearin, for Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, 23

June 1952, subject; Draft of Material To Be Included in History of World War II. 34 (1) 54 Stat. 1205. (2) 55 Stat. 241. 35 57 Stat. 75.
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 465

War Department granted extra credit to all officers overseas; it stipulated

that for time-in-grade purposes, service outside the United States would be

counted as time and half.36

Working within the confines of these Army-wide policies, Army Service

Forces likewise tended to restrict promotions, particularly in the higher grades,

within its own domain. On 26 February 1944, Army Service Forces headquarters, under whose jurisdiction fell large percentage of Medical Department officers stationed in the United States, published Circular No. 59 which

showed its desire to prevent indiscriminate promotions of officers. It stated

at that time that the two principal considerations in promoting an officer were

the importance of the position and the merits of the individual. The promotion of any group or individual at rate faster than was prevalent throughout

the Army, especially in combat units, could be justified only in the most exceptional circumstances. Medical Department authorities believed that existing

regulations did not give medical and dental officers enough opportunities for

promotion, and during the later war years, they succeeded in having special

instructions issued to favor members of those corps. 37

In June 1945, the General Staff declared its desire and intent to be that

all first lieutenants of the Medical, Dental, Veterinary (and Chaplains) Corps

occupying positions established for an officer of these services in the grade

of captain or first lieutenant should be promoted to captain—providing, of

course, that the officer was qualified for and deserving of promotion and had

served the required time in grade and position. For this purpose, the order

authorized each command concerned larger number of captains’ ratings in

each of the corps just mentioned—a number equal to the combined total of

hitherto authorized captains’ and first lieutenants’ ratings in the corps. The

order applied to ratings established both by tables of organization and from

bulk allotment sources.38

Surgeon General Kirk had already complained that the promotion of

medical officers of higher as well as lower rank had not kept pace with their

responsibilities, as indicated by the growing patient load. Many outstanding

specialists from civilian life who chiefs of services in general hospitals,

he declared, were only majors or lieutenant colonels. Many officers had been

in company grade for or years without promotion. Pointing out the

amount of time that medical, dental, and veterinary officers had spent in getting their education, he said that many of these men after years of Army

service were still in the grade of lieutenant, despite the provisions of Army

regulations. Actually, although changes in regulations had made lieutenants

36 Army Regulations No. 605-12, Feb. 1944, with Changes No. 1, 24 July 1944. 37 (1) Memorandum, Surgeon General Kirk, for General Styer, Army Service Forces, 24 Nov. 1943,

subject: Failure to Promote 1st Lieutenants of the Medical and Dental Corps. (2) The Surgeon

General’s Conference With Service Command Surgeons, commencing 10 Dec. 1943. (3) Army Regulations No. 695—12, 17 Aug. 1944. 38 Letter, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 30 June 1945,

subject: Temporary Promotions in the Army of the United States of 1st Lieutenants, Medical, Dental,

Veterinary, and Chaplains Corps.
466 PERSONNEL

eligible for promotion to captain, they had not made such promotions mandatory, and presumably not all commanding officers had recommended their

Medical and Dental Corps lieutenants for these promotions. 39

Shortly afterward, The Surgeon General initiated move to have the

chiefs of services and sections of Zone of Interior general hospitals promoted.

Stating that these officers had big workload and grave responsibilites, he

pointed out that if the chiefs of services in hospitals having capacity of

1.500 beds or more had been so assigned in table-of-organization hospitals of

the same size they would, without exception, have been authorized to hold

the rank of colonel. He showed that only 29 chiefs of medical and surgical

services in these Zone of Interior hospitals were colonels, whereas 87 were

lieutenant colonels, and 16 were only majors. (At the end of April 1945,

few months before The Surgeon General furnished this information, only

about of the 65 general hospitals in this country had capacities of less than

1.500 beds.) Moreover, table showing the grade of chiefs of sections in

such hospitals listed colonels, 66 lieutenant colonels, 114 majors, 35 captains,

and first lieutenants. The chiefs of the larger sections, such as laboratory,

neuropsychiatry, X-ray, and eye, ear, nose, and throat would rank, he asserted

(presumably referring again to table-of-organization general hospitals), either

as majors or lieutenant colonels, depending upon the workload of the hospital. Somewhat later, he submitted list of officers who were chiefs of

services in Zone of Interior general hospitals and urged that they be promoted

as rapidly as possible to grade commensurate with their professional

assignments. 40

In this effort, The Surgeon General, besides invoking justice for these

highly trained officers, was endeavoring to correct situation which, he stated,

would inevitably result in hard feelings toward the Army in the future on

the part of individuals whose work was not rewarded. Undoubtedly, many

of those concerned wielded considerable influence in the medical profession,

and he may have feared the effects of their criticism based on the Medical

Department’s failure to obtain promotions for them. The War Department

finally granted his request. General Kirk was then able to recommend onegrade promotion for many of the medical officers who were serving as chiefs

of services and sections in Zone of Interior hospitals.41 He did not secure

this authorization, however, until after the end of Hostilities, and by that time,

39 Army Service Forces Seventh Semiannual Service Command Conference, 28 -30 June 1945. 40 (1) Memorandum, Surgeon General Kirk, for General Somervell, Commanding General, Army

Service Forces, July 1945. (2) Memorandum, Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, for Commanding General, Army Service Forces (attention: Director, Military Personnel Division),

10 July 1945, subject: Promotions of Chiefs of Services in Zone of Interior Hospitals. (3) Memorandum, Deputy Surgeon General, for Director, Military Personnel Division, Array Service Forces.

16 Oct. 1945, subject; Promotion of Chiefs of Services in Zone of Interior General Hospitals.

41 (1) Memorandum, Surgeon General Kirk, for G—1, 28 Feb. 1946, subject: Promotion of Selected

Officers. (2) Letter, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. H. W. Doan), to Commanding General, Army

Service Forces (attention: Military Personnel Division), 19 Apr. 1946, subject: Promotion of Certain

Medical Officers.
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 467

undoubtedly, some of the officers for whose promotion he had worked so diligently had returned to civilian life.

In November 1945, The Surgeon General recommended that about 100

specialists needed in hospitals in this country be retained on active duty regardless of their eligibility for separation from the Army and that all of them

who were not already colonels be given one-grade promotion. These men

were promoted. 42

Nurses

Some complaints were made about the delay or lack of promotion not only

for male Medical Department officers but also for nurses—in the case of the latter, promotions from second to first lieutenant in particular. Pressure originated from nurses’ families, from nursing and allied organizations, and from the

press. The critics alleged that nurses were dispirited at their own lack of

promotion in comparison to the rise of at least some members of the Women’s

Army Corps, of whom less formal training was required than of nurses; that

some nurses served long periods overseas in the same grades as recent graduates or remained second lieutenants while others at home were promoted.

Partly, no doubt, in order to placate so many critics, the Medical Department increased its exertion, in the later war years, to get higher grades for

its nurses. In November 1943, revisions of many tables of organization for

various kinds of hospitals and for certain other types of medical units raised

the number of nurse first lieutenants in those units while lowering the number

of second lieutenants. 43 As with otherregulations concerning rank or promotion, this one did not make the new proportions of grades mandatory, and it

is possible that for one reason or another many of the first lieutenant vacancies created by it were filled slowly, if at all. In any case, as late as November

1944, 31,116 nurses—75 percent of the total Nurse Corps strength—were still

in the grade of second lieutenant.44

move to increase the opportunity for promotion of second lieutenants,

not only of the Army Nurse Corps but of all other components of the Army,

took shape at the end of 1944. In December of that year, the War Department announced that any second lieutenant who had completed 18 months of

service in that grade might be promoted to the grade of first lieutenant without table-of-organization or table-of-allotment vacancies in that grade, provided he (or she) was qualified for and worthy of promotion. This authorization was not to be used for the automatic promotion of all second lieutenants

who had served 18 months in that grade, but was reserved for those denied

43 (1) Information from Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 17 Mar. 1947.

(2) Letter, Acting Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General (Col. Francis F. Mintz), to

Commanding Officer, Valley Forge General Hospital, Pa., 11 Dec. 1945, subject: Promotion of Officers. 43 War Department Circular No. 306, 22 Nov. 1943.

44 Strength of the Army, Dec. 1944. Prepared for War Department General Staff by Machine

Records Branch, Office of The Adjutant General, under direction of Statistical Branch.
468 PERSONNEL

Table 62.—Army Nurse Corps first lieutenants and second lieutenants: Numbers in grade and

numbers of promotions, September 19J+I+-August 1945

merited advance solely because they were not in positions established for the

higher grade.45 In the Medical Department, the directive applied to all officer

components except the three which contained no second lieutenants—that is,

the Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Corps. It meant ultimate promotion

for large numbers of nurses, dietitians, physical therapists, and Medical Administrative Corps officers, and for smaller numbers of the Sanitary and Pharmacy Corps. By the early part of 1945, the change of policy was beginning

to stimulate the promotion of sizable numbers of Army-nurse second lieutenants (table 62).

Dental Corps

At the urgent recommendation of the American Dental Association, and

of the dental profession generally, The Surgeon General agreed in September 1943 to promote the chief of his Dental Division from brigadier general

45 (1) Army Regulations 605-12, 17 Aug. 1944, with Changes No. 1, Dec. 1944. The same regulations also permitted promotion without regard to position vacancies for officers returned to the

United States from status of missing in action, evading capture in enemy controlled territory,

internee, or prisoner of war, provided the officer’s case presented unusually meritorious or exceptional

circumstances justifying waiver of the normal requirements for promotion. This permitted one-grade

promotion of the 66 nurses, dietitians, and physical therapist who had been prisoners of the

Japanese in the Philippine Islands and who were returned to this country in early 1945 after their

recovery by the forces under General MacArthur. (2) History of Nursing Branch, Military Personnel

Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Jan.-31 May 1945. (3) Quarterly History of

Medical Department Dietitians, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army,

Mar.—31Mar. 1945. (4) Quarterly History of Physical Therapy Branch, Military Personnel Division.

Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Apr.-31 May 1945.

Date Second lieutenants First lieutenants Promotions to grade of first lieutenant

19U

September 31, 468 7, 753 213

October 31, 653

31, 116

8, 565 636

November 9, 276 622

December 31, 138 9, 871 632

19^5 January 30, 810 10, 790

13, 752

16, 528

973

February 29, 601 2, 350

3, 126

3, 670

3, 723

March 30, 871

April 30, 870

29, 497

19, 490

22, 826

26, 330

28, 028

28, 695

May

June 26, 013 4, 369

1, 914

1, 388

July 25, 629

August 23, 984

“Strength of the Army” for dates approximate to those shown.

“Strength of the Army,” Sept. 1945.
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 469

to major general, and to consider recommending the appointment of one or

more brigadier generals in the Dental Corps. Only one was actually appointed, in February 1945; and he was reduced to the rank of colonel some

months after the end of the war. There was also some improvement in rank

so far as the mass of dental officers was concerned, as comparison of the

situation in late 1943 with that in 1945 (table 61) will show. Nevertheless, their position continued to lag behind that of Medical Corps officers. 46

Medical Corps

In the Medical Corps, problem of rank was sometimes involved when

an officer had as his subordinate man of lower rank but of higher proficiency

rating, and therefore presumably of greater professional ability, in the specialty to which both were assigned. By virtue of his rank, the man of higher

grade could give orders in technical as well as administrative matters to his

subordinate and could either accept or refuse his advice. In cases such as

these, it would have been better from the professional standpoint if the positions had been reversed, but under existing Army practices, there was no

way this could be accomplished. Sometimes the purpose was achieved, however, in the case of specialists when the ranking officer accepted his subordinate’s advice or permitted him virtually to issue the orders. If this

was not done voluntarily, informal means were occasionally used to overcome the difficulty; ranking officers were asked to accept orders and advice

from subordinates of superior competence. The Surgeon General’s Military

Personnel Division reported at the end of the war that success had occurred

only in cases where the ranking officers recognized that the ability of those

under them completely surpassed their own.47 The problem might also have

been solved by relieving certain ranking officers from active duty, but since

the procurement of medical officers was still going on, the War Department

did not permit such action.

Sanitary Corps

During the war, members of the sanitary engineering profession exerted

great pressure on The Surgeon General to promote members of the corps to

rank commensurate with their experience. In June 1943, bill was introduced in Congress providing for an Assistant to The Surgeon General in the

person of Sanitary Corps officer with the rank of brigadier general. The

Secretary of War, however, contended that such promotion should be made

only when the War Department considered the duties and responsibilities of

Sanitary Corps officer justified it. He furthermore stated that permanent

46 For detailed discussion of the reasons for this discrepancy, see publication cited in footnote 21, p. 455.

4T Report, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to HistoricalDivision, autumn 1945, subject: Medical Department Personnel.
470 PERSONNEL

legislation affecting the peacetime Army should not be enacted in time of

war. 48 The bill did not pass.

Enlisted personnel

Late in the war, the War Department took steps to promote privates—

Medical Department as well as others—who through no fault of their own

had not received promotion—just as it did second lieutenants. In May

1945, regulations provided that commanding officers who were authorized to

appoint privates, first class, might aive the requirement of an authorized

vacancy to appoint enlisted men or women to that grade if they had completed one year of satisfactory service or had served outside the United States

(a few exceptions listed in the latter case). The War Department

admonished that this authority was not to be used for the automatic promotion

of all privates in those categories but was to be reserved for those who -were

qualified for promotion but were denied it because of lack of position vacancies. At the same time, oversea commanders and the commanding generals

of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces

were authorized to aive the requirements of an authorized vacancy to appoint

to the next higher grade any persons below the grade of first or master sergeant

who wtis returned to U.S. military control after having evaded capture by the

enemy or after having been missing in action, interned, or taken prisoner.

Such promotions ere limited, however, to those w-ho presumably would

have been promoted except for their absence from the Army.49

PROMOTION OVERSEAS

Officers

During the early part of the war, the rank held by Medical Department

officers 50 overseas was the rank they had acquired before leaving the Zone

of Interior. For one thing, the oversea theaters were limited as to the number of high-ranking positions they could set up. The theaters throughout

the war lacked the function of supervising the worldwide medical service

48 (1) Letter, Arthur D. Weston, Chief Sanitary Engineer, Department of Public Health, Boston,

Mass., to Abel Wolman, Professor of Sanitary Engineering, The Johns Hopkins University, 22 Apr.

1948. (2) Letter, Deputy Surgeon General, to Abel Wolman, 30 June 1943. (3) Letter, Secretary of

War, to Robert R. Reynolds, Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs, U.S. Senate, 31 May 1944.

49 Army Regulations No. 615-5, Changes No. 6, 23 May 1945.

50 In the section which follows, the term “Medical Department officers,” unless qualified, includes

nurses. On the other hand, officers above the rank of colonel are not included in the term. Probably

not more than 20 general officers of the Medical Department were overseas at any time. Sixteen (3

major generals and 13 brigadier generals) are listed in “The Surgeon General’s Notebook,” vol. I,

under date of 28 July 1945.
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 471

that characterized the Surgeon General’s Office, nor did they have the responsibility to the same degree of definitiveness, of providing specialized treatment, as did medical facilities in the continental United States. Both of these

functions formed the basis for positions with the highest ranks. Thus, it

was only on rare occasions that any Medical Department corps had percentage of its oversea strength in the rank of colonel equal to or greater than

that which it possessed in the Zone of Interior (table 63). In the Dental

Corps, this inherent advantage of the Zone of Interior extended down into

ranks as low as that of major, for the concentrations of dental officers necessitated by large amount of remedial work on new recruits was lacking in

oversea areas. 51

However, even had the higher positions existed, the possibilities of promotion into them would have been few and far between in the earlier years.

Promotions at the time were greatly dependent upon the existence of vacancies.

Conditions overseas, however, were not such as to give rise to great many

vacancies that could be filled by promotion. In the Zone of Interior, until the

middle of the war, units were constantly activated with personnel recently

drawn from civilian life; fresh jobs were continuously established, and many

of the new posts could be filled by promotion. In the theaters, on the other

hand, such organizations as were activated generally were staffed with the personnel of units that had been disbanded or reorganized, and the total number of jobs remained substantially unchanged. Nor did the establishment of

non-table-of-organization units provide many vacancies to be filled by promotion since many casuals arrived from the Zone of Interior with grades appropriate to the positions which arose in this fashion. Casuals also could be used

to replace losses which, moreover, were fairly low particularly because the U.S.

Forces were not yet fully committed to combat. Finally, transfers between

units often were carried out on grade-for-grade basis. Though promotions

as rule depended on the existence of vacancies, possibility of advancement

also existed when man held position for which the table of organization

of his unit authorized higher rank than the one he possessed. Overseas, as in

the Zone of Interior, however, some commanders both in the line as well as in

the Medical Department, who had spent many years in the military service

without advancement in grade, frequently were unwilling to accord their

juniors rapid promotion. 52

51 (1) Letter, Brig. Gen. L. H. Tingay, DC, Brooke Army Medical Center, to Col. C. H. Goddard,

Office of The Surgeon General, 20 Sept. 1952. (2) As late as 31 May 1944, no hospital dietitian or

physical therapist was serving abroad in any grade above that of first lieutenant (table 63).

52 (1) Report, Maj. John B. West, 14 Apr. 1944, on Medical Department Activities in Liberia.

(2) King, Arthur G.: Medical History of Esplritu Santo (New Hebrides) Service Command, pp. 55-56.

[Official record.] (3) Letter, Brig. Gen. Robert P. Williams, to Col. John B. Coates, Jr., MC, Director,

Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service, 22 Dec. 1955. (4) Information from Col. Florence A. Blanchfield, USA (Ret.), 13 Mar. 1952.
472 PERSONNEL

Table

63.

—Ranh

of

Medical

Department officers overseas {excluding

general

officers),

31

July

1941-31 May

1944

Component

and

date

Colonel

Lieutenant colonel

Major

Captain

First

lieutenant

Second

lieutenant

Number

Percent of

component in

rank

Number

Percent of

component in

rank

Number

Percent of

component in

ank

Number

Percent of

component in

rank

Number

Percent of

component in

rank

Number

Percent of

component in

rank

31

July

19

41

Total

Army

officers.

128

1.

85

465

6.

70

640

9.

22

1,

228

17.

69

2,

023

29.

15

2,

455

35.

38

Total

Medical

Department

officers

15

1.

54

47

4.

82

69

7.

08

276

28.

32

336

34.

46

232

23.

79

Male

Medical

Department

officers__

15

2.

03

47

6.

36

69

9.

34

273

36.

94

328

44.

38

95

Medical

Corps

1.

73

35

6.

72

51

9.

79

194

37.

24

232

44.

52

Dental

Corps

1.

48

5.

93

11

8.

15

47

34.

81

67

49.

63

Veterinary

Corps

10.

63

10.

53

10.

53

16

42.

11

10

26.

32

Sanitary

Corps

50.

00

50.

00

Medical

Adminis- trative

Corps

4.

65

15

34.

88

19

44.

19

16.

28

Female Medical

Department

officers

1.

27

3.

39

225

95.

34

SO

November 1941

Total

Army

officers

135

1.

38

522

5.

35

735

7.

53

1,

841

18.

89

3,

305

33.

87

3,

216

32.

96

Total

Medical

Department

officers__

14

99

44

3.

12

87

6.

16

402

28.

47

518

36.

69

347

24.

57

Male

Medical

Department

officers

14

1.

32

44

4.

14

87

8.

18

400

37.

63

506

47.

60

12

1.

13

Medical

Corps

1.

03

32

4.

11

71

9.

11

289

37.

10

379

48.

65

Dental

Corps

1.

74

4.

57

11

6.

29

74

42.

29

79

45.

14

Veterinary

Corps

8.

11

10.

8.

11

17

45.

95

10

27.

02

Sanitary

Corps..

12.

50

25.

00

62.

50

Medical

Adminis- trative

Corps

1.

56

18

28.

13

33

51.

56

12

18.

75
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 473

Female

Medical

Department officers

57

12

3.

44

335

95.

98

30

September 1942

Total

Army

officers

921

1.

83

1,

800

3.

57

4,

009

7.

95

11,

039

21.

90

16,

726

33.

18

15,

914

31.

57

Total

Medical

Department

officers

66

64

229

2.

23

859

8.

36

2,

584

25.

14

2,

492

25.

27

3,

944

38.

37

Male

Medical

Department

officers

66

1.

02

229

3.

54

858

13.

2,

575

39.

76

2,

598

38.

47

257

3.

97

Medical

Corps

56

1.

13

196

3.

96

751

15.

2,

120

42.

87

1,

822

36.

84

Dental

Corps

50

21

2.

63

70

8.

77

272

34.

09

431

54.

01

Veterinary

Corps

6.

18

9.

28

25

25.

36

37.

11

21

21.

65

Sanitary

Corps

4.

26

12.

13

27.

66

26

55.

32

Medical

Adminis- trative

Corps

17

1.

02

134

22.

71

192

32.

54

257

43.

55

Female

Medical

Department

officers.

03

24

106

2.

79

3,

687

96.

95

28

February1948

Total

Army

officers

1,

463

1.

73

2,

889

3.

41

6,

498

7.

68

17,962

21.

22

26,

237

30.

99

29,

598

34.

96

Total

Medical

Department

officers

122

73

390

2.

34

1,

434

8.

61

4,

329

25.

98

3,

860

23.

16

6,

529

39.

18

Male

Medical

Department

officers

122

1.

17

390

3.

73

1,

434

13.

72

4,

318

41.

32

3,

638

34.

81

548

5.

24

Medical

Corps

109

1.

41

354

4.

59

1,

250

16.

20

3,

492

45.

26

2,

511

32.

54

Dental

Corps

47

21

1.

65

111

8.

71

502

39.

40

634

49.

76

Veterinary

Corps

3.

54

12

6.

06

41

20.

71

55

27.

78

83

41.

92

Sanitary

Corps

3.

19

11

11.

70

28

29.

78

51

54.

26

1.

06

Medical

Adminis- trative

Corps

21

1.

80

241

20.

63

359

30.

74

547

46.

83

Female

Medical

Department officers

11

18

222

3.

57

Oftl

96.

25

See

footnotes

at

end

of

table.
474 PERSONNEL

Table

63.

—Rank

of

Medical

Department officers

overseas (excluding general

officers),

SI

July

19J+1-S1 May

1944 —Continued

Component

and

date

Colonel

Lieutenant colonel

Major

Captain

First

lieutenant

Second

lieutenant

Number

Percent of

component in

rank

Number

Percent of

component in

rank

Number

Percent of

component in

rank

Number

Percent of

component in

rank

Number

Percent of

component in

rank

Number

Percent of

component in

rank

31

December1943

Total

Army

officers.

2,

474

1.

21

6,

186

3.

03

14,

747

7.

21

43,

529

21.

29

61,

734

30.

19

75,

805

37.

07

Total

Medical

Department

officers

263

67

893

2.

26

3,

297

8.

34

12,

621

31.

91

5,

595

14.

15

16,

878

42.

67

Male

Medical

Department

officers

263

1.

13

891

3.

82

3,

293

14.

13

12,

551

53.

86

4,

672

20.

05

1,

631

7.

00

Medical

Corps

241

1.

54

791

5.

05

2,

884

18.

40

9,

503

60.

63

2,

254

14.

38

Dental

Corps

10

31

66

2.

05

212

6.

59

2.

146

66.

70

774

24.

07

Veterinary

Corps

12

2.

65

17

3.

75

89

19.

65

168

37.

09

167

36.

86

Sanitary

Corps

1.

69

32

6.

78

199

42.

16

178

37.

71

55

11.

65

Medical

Adminis- trative

Corps

26

70

2.

01

534

15.

36

1,

298

37.

34

1,

565

45.

02

Pharmacy

Corps

50.

00

16

66

8.

33

28.

00

Female

Medical

Department officers

01

02

70

43

923

5.

68

15,

247

93

85

Army

Nurse

Corps

01

03

70

44

849

5.

38

14

862

94

14

Hospital

Dietitians

39

14.

66

227

88.

33

Physical

Therapists.

35

18.

13

158

81.

87
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 475

SI

May

19u

Total

Army

officers

3,

495

1.

13

9,

594

3.

11

22,

252

7.

21

68,

455

22.

19

96,

669

31.

33

108,

077

35.

03

Total

Medical

Department

officers

382

71

1,

375

2.

54

4,

722

8.

74

18,

558

34.

34

8,

143

15.

07

20,

860

38.

60

Male

Medical

Department

officers

382

1.

19

1,

372

4.

26

4,

686

14.

55

18,

250

56.

68

5,

451

16.

93

2,

055

6.

36

Medical

Corps

346

1.

63

1,

197

5.

65

4,

096

19.

34

13,

431

63.

41

2,

111

9.

97

Dental

Corps

13

29

118

2.

65

288

6.

46

3,

323

74.

54

716

16.

06

Veterinary

Corps

20

3.

77

31

5.

84

109

20.

56

218

41.

13

152

28.

68

Sanitary

Corps

40

12

1.

61

55

7.

36

348

46.

58

222

29.

72

107

14.

32

Medical

Adminis- trative

Corps

11

21

135

2.

56

929

17.

62

2,

250

42.

67

1,

948

36.

94

Pharmacy

Corps

42.

85

42.

85

14.

29

Female Medical

Department

officers.

01

36

16

308

1.

41

2,

692

12.

32

18,

805

86.

09

Army

Nurse

Corps

01

36

17

308

1.

46

2,

546

12.

06

18,

219

86.

30

Hospital

Dietitians

76

17.

31

363

82.

68

Physical

Therapists.

70

23.

89

223

76.

11

Basic

data

from

sources shown

in

table

31

footnote*

Comprises

Army

Nurse

Corps

only.
PERSONNEL 476

It is true that Regular Army promotions continued, and it can be assumed

that in this respect the oversea areas had an advantage owing to the fact that

they had greater proportion of regulars in their officer strength than did the

Zone of Interior (table 41). When special regulations to permit promotions

in the Army of the United States were issued, the oversea areas also had an

advantage in view of the greater seniority of their officers. Such regulations,

however, were of extremely limited scope in the emergency and especially in

the early war period.

Thus it is that the arrival of large numbers of second lieutenants from the

Zone of Interior in 1942 caused the first significant wartime alteration in the

distribution of rank among Medical Department officers overseas; that is,

general lowering of the level of grades. Most of the second lieutenants who

came were members of the Army Nurse Corps, whose numbers overseas increased tenfold between Pearl Harbor and 30 September 1942, while those of

male Medical Department officers grew less than seven times. considerable

increment of Medical Administrative Corps officers also helped to account for

the increase in the proportion of second lieutenants (tables 32 and 64).

Whereas the proportion of the oversea membership of this corps in the lowest

rank had been less than 20 percent in November 1941, it was 43.55 percent in

September 1942. The change as of such proportions that it reversed the

relationship with regard to the grade of second lieutenant that had prevailed

prior to Pearl Harbor between Medical Department officers and officers in

general. The Medical Department overseas now had, and continued to have

until at least May 1944, ratio of second lieutenants that was larger than that

possessed by the entire Army abroad. Among male Medical Department

officers alone, the proportion of second lieutenants also increased, but it is

clear that overseas as at home the proportion continued to be smaller than was

the case among the other male officers until the end of the war. The fact that

the Medical Corps, Dental Corps, and Veterinary Corps had no members in

the grade of second lieutenant accounts for this situation.

similar process was taking place in the Zone of Interior. Intensive

commissioning of Medical Administrative Corps officers beginning in 1942

and heavy recruiting of the professional corps during the same period accounts for the substantially greater proportions of worldwide strength in

second and first lieutenants as compared with oversea strength.

The latter part of the war witnessed very marked improvement in

promotion rates among oversea Medical Department officers. This development began to manifest itself among the male components of the group toward

the middle of 1943. During 1944, the pace slackened, but in 1945 rates were

attained which surpassed the levels reached in 1943 (table 65). Although
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 477

pressure by Surgeon General Kirk upon oversea authorities in mid-1944 gave

some impetus to promotions of members of the Army Nurse Corps, the monthly

rate of these promotions abroad even during the third quarter of that year was

0.1 per 1,000, whereas the worldwide rate was 3.4 (table 65) 53

In 1945, however, great promotion activity was manifested among the

members of the female components in the Medical Department overseas. The

most important factors in the improvement of the promotion rates of Medical

Department ollicers were the special regulations making possible advancements in grade regardless of the existence of vacancies. However, directive

of October 1943 authorizing promotion of second lieutenants of the Nurse

Corps to the rank of first lieutenant irrespective of openings in the higher

grade was of little influence at least until the invasion of Normandy since

they were applicable only to personnel serving with combat forces engaged

in foreign areas. 54

Promotions through the creation of vacancies also increased in the later

war period. Higher attrition rates, rotations, arrival of units from the Zone

of Interior without qualified incumbents in highly specialized jobs, and changes

in tables of organization to permit replacement of medical officers by members of the Medical Administrative Corps all swelled the number of vacancies

in oversea areas, although in many cases obstacles were raised to filling these

vacancies by promotion. Among such obstacles was the requirement that

an officer rotated to the Zone of Interior be replaced by an officer from that

area holding the same rank. In the North African theater, regulations issued

in August 1944 provided that replacement for Medical Department officer

be requisitioned in the same grade as the individual to be replaced and that

when vacancy was to be filled by promotion no action to that effect be taken

until replacement was obtained for the officer to be promoted. In the Southwest Pacific, medical officers transferred to headquarters in order to serve

as consultants, remained on the rolls of their parent units, thus blocking promotion opportunities in such units. 55

53 (1) Letter, Maj. Gen. Kirk, to Maj. Gen. M.C. Stayer, Chief Surgeon, North African Theater of

Operations, U.S. Army, 30 Nov. 1944. (2) Letter, Maj. Gen. Kirk, to Maj. Gen. P. R. Hawley, Chief

Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 30 May 1944.

54 Promotions under the regulation were subject to demonstration of the fitness of the subject for

advancement. She must also have served at least months as second lieutenant, no less than

months of this being in theater of operations. Moreover, the number of first lieutenants in tableof-organization unit might not exceed 50 percent of all lieutenants in the unit. Finally, the authorization applied only to specified theaters. Memorandum, The Adjutant General, to Commanding General,

Army Ground Forces, Oct. 1943, subject; Promotions of Second Lieutenants, Army Nurse Corps, in

Active Theaters. Also Annual Report, Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply, 1943.

55 (1) Annual Report, Surgeon, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944. (2) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. G. B. Denit, Cheif Surgeon, Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, for Colonel

Pincoffs, 22 May 1945.
478 PERSONNEL

Table

64.

—Temporary

promotions

of

Medical

Department officers,

worldwide

and

overseas,

January

1943-September 1945

January-31

March

April- 30

June

July30

September

October- 31

December

January-31

March

April-30

June

July30

September

October- 31

December

January-31

March

April-30

June

July30

September

Component

NumRate

NumRate

NumRate

NumRate

NumRate

NumRate

NumRate

NumRate

NumRate

NumRate

NumRate

her

her

ber

ber

ber

ber

ber

ber

ber

ber

ber

1943

1944

1945

All

Army

officers

Worldwide

80,029

34.7

66,

693

28.2

93,540

38.3

99,858

39.8

56,395

22.7

49,

775

43.3

45,059

35.9

61,595

44.4

75,632

57.3

34,

651

32.3

Male

Army

officers:Worldwide

56,427

41.5

70,653

45.2

66,330

37.7

65,

578

35.2

63,969

32.4

74,151

35.7

78,885

36.5

64,096

29.0

85,566

37.7

86,812

37.5

51,

549

36

Overseas, ...

334

1.3

18,133

51.0

15,

575

35.2

18,871

33.1

25,481

34.6

36,862

41.4

49,

704

48.6

43,469

39.4

57,261

46.9

65,953

56.9

31,

710

33.7

Female Army

officers;

1,444

7.9

2,597

17.1

7,974

46.4

13,046

69.2

4,846

25.7

71

.9

1,590

18.2

4,334

47.0

9,

679

106.6

2,941

40.0

Women’s

Army

Corps:

Worldwide

557

31.8

553

31.5

737

41.4

544

31.0

1,178

67.8

710

41.3

469

27.5

10

14.5

29

17.6

64

30.8

89

35.4

187

66.8

186

61.4

92

27.7

Medical

Department officers

Worldwide

5,511

15.0

7,141

18.6

13,302

32.5

18,

994

44.4

9,213

22.

Overseas.

2,298

12.3

4,232

19.9

8,919

38.3

14,484

63.7

5,213

29.9

Male,

excluding

Pharmacy

Corps:Worldwide

4,936

27.

5,639

29.2

8,032

37.5

8,009

36.3

7,782

33.2

5,711

24.0

5,149

21.1

5,088

19.9

6,506

26.0

6,

658

25.4

4,836

19.0

Overseas..

35

1.0

795

18.2

1,783

33.8

2,007

28.6

2,176

24.7

2,340

23.3

2,291

20.2

2,

731

21.4

4,772

33.3

4,991

35.7

2,364

22.6

Medical

Corps:

Worldwide

3,239

29.3

4,058

36.4

4,210

35.1

4,244

35.1

4,080

31.3

2,819

21.4

2,260

16.9

2,231

15.9

2,744

19.5

3,218

23.0

2,721

20.1

Overseas....

26

1.0

628

20.3

1,279

35.9

1,460

31.0

1,328

22.7

1,349

20.5

1,238

17.1

1,296

16.6

2,254

26.7

2,576

32.0

1,125

19.6
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 479

Dental

Corps:

Worldwide

901

28.9

1,059

29.3

2,008

49.3

1,824

42.4

1,813

40.8

1,201

26.9

961

21.4

846

18.7

737

16.6

718

16.2

738

20.0

Overseas

1.2

105

18.8

422

61.2

416

43.1

357

30.

360

26.8

281

18.0

330

18.3

412

19.3

467

22.4

369

23.

Veterinary

Corps:'

Worldwide

212

43.3

152

27.6

135

23.6

138

22.9

159

26.7

176

28.8

140

23.1

121

19.8

106

17.3

124

20.3

210

34.3

Overseas

4.5

16

18.5

15

15.4

30

22.2

41

26.3

60

35.8

69

40.4

49

25.

73

35.6

74

36.1

51

28.6

Sanitary

Corps:

Worldwide

176

40.5

154

29.2

105

17.0

180

27.2

220

31.6

185

25.3

206

29.0

202

28.2

336

44.4

340

44.6

192

26.7

Overseas

7.0

18

17.6

28

19.8

41

19.7

62

23.5

58

19.2

102

28.5

226

61.1

234

61.3

126

40.4

Medical

Administrative Corps:Worldwide..

408

14.8

216

6.2

1,574

37.6

1,623

36.7

1,510

33.6

1,330

29.7

1,582

35.0

1,688

33.0

2,583

45.9

2,258

38.4

975

16.6

Overseas..

.3

41

7.4

49

6.6

73

7.0

409

29.0

509

30.4

645

30.6

954

36.5

1,807

57.1

1,640

50.5

693

26.6

Army

Nurse

Corps:

Worldwide

407

3.4

2,053

16.2

6,

796

46.3

12,336

75.7

4,377

27.6

1,501

18.

4,147

48.5

9,493

113.

2,849

42.3

Physical

Therapists;

27

9.

129

39.6

221

62.8

Overseas ....

14

9.2

95

59.0

146

93.4

Hospital

Dietitians:

36

8.2

215

47.9

372

76.4

18

9.0

120

54.4

249

106.

Average

monthly

rate

per

1,000

of

the

mean

strength

of

the

component during

the

quarter.

Exclusive of

physical

therapists

and

hospital

dietitians but

including

Pharmacy Corps.

Rates per

1,000

troops

based

on

addition

of

strength

utilized

in

determining rate

for

total

male

Army

officers

to

that

used

in

ascertaining

rate

for

total

female

Army

officers.

Basic

data

and

rates

from

“Temporary

Promotions of

Male

Officers

by

Arms

and

Services,”

in

“Strength

of

the

Army,

July

1945,

pp.

104

-105,

for

the

years

1943

and1944: from

table

with

same

title

in

“Strength of

the

Army,”

November 1945,

p.

97,

for

subsequent

dates.

No

adjustment

to

take

account of

revised Medical

Department strengths

used

in

this

volume

(see

table

31)

was

made

in

determinin rates.

Includes

Pharmacy Corps.

Army

Nurse

Corps

plus

Women’s

Army

Corps.

Basic

data

from

“Monthly

Summary

of

Temporary Promotions, Women’s

Army

Corps,”

in

Strength

of

the

Army,’

November 1945,

pp.

104-105. Rates

based

on

end-of-quarter

strengths

shown

in

“Strength of

the

Army”

for

actual

dates

listed or

dates

approximate thereto.

Male

Medical

Department officers

plus

Army

Nurse

Corps.

Does

not

include

Pharmacy

Corps,

for

which no

data

are available.

Basic

data

and

oversea rates

from

sources mentioned

in

footnote

3.

Worldwide

rates

based on

strengths

shown

In

table

in

addition

to

strength

of

personnel

assigned

to

Veterans’

Administration.

Basic

data

from

“Monthly

Summary

of

Temporary Promotions, Army

Nurse

Corps,”

in

“Strength of

the

Army,’

November 1945,

p.

107.

Oversea

rates

based

on

end-ofquarter

strengths

reported in

‘Strength

of

the

Army”

for

actual

dates

shown

or

dates

approximate thereto.

Worldwide

rates

based on

end-of-quarter

strengths

shown

in

table

1.

Basicdata

from

source shown

in

table

13,

footnote

1.

Data

for

October-December 1944

cover

November

and

December only.

Rates

based

on

end-of-quarter

strengths

from

sources noted

in

this

table,

footnote

8.
480 PERSONNEL

Table

65.

Temporary

promotions

of

Medical

Department officers

by

rank

by

corps, and

by

other

components,

worldwide and

overseas, November 19

to

June

1945,

inclusive

Components

Totalpromotions

To

colonel

To

lieutenant

colonel

To

major

To

captain

To

first

lieutenant

Number

Percent of

allpromotions Number

Percent of

allpromotions

Number

Percent of

allpromotions Number

Percent of

allpromotions

Number

Percent of

allpromotions

All

Army

officers: Worldwide.

238,

854

2,

249

0.

8,

111

3.

19,

131

8.

53,

443

22.

155,

920

65.

Overseas

168,

986

1,

506

5,

916

3.

14,

048

8.

37,

727

22.

109,

789

65.

Male

Army

officers:

Worldwide.

215,

095

2,

249

1.

8,

067

3.

18,

907

8.

52,

109

24.

133,

763

62.

Overseas

153,

184

1,

506

1.

5,

891

3.

13,

902

9.

37,

100

24.

94,

785

61.

Female

Army

officers:

Worldwide

23,

759

44

224

1,

334

5.

22,

157

93.

Overseas

15,

802

25

146

627

4.

15,

004

95.

Medical

Department officers:

Worldwide

37,

838

288

1,

104

3.

3,

271

8.

8,

363

22.

24,

812

65.

Overseas

26,

961

201

825

3.

2,

358

8.

5,

850

21.

17,

727

65.

Male,

excluding

Pharmacy

Corps: orldwide

16,

322

288

1.

1,

070

6.

3,

116

19.

7,

434

45.

4,

414

27.

Overseas______

11,

605

201

1.

802

7.

2,

242

19.

5,

330

45.

3,

030

26.

Medical

Corps:

Worldwide

7,

466

249

3.

874

11.

2,

285

30.

4,

058

54.

Overseas

5,

676

170

3.

655

11.

1,

620

28.

3,

231

56.

Dental

Corps:Worldwide

1,

982

27

1.

110

5.

400

20.

1,

437

72.

Overseas

1,089

22

2.

88

8.

278

25.

700

64.
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 481

Veterinary

Corps;

Worldwide Overseas

310 182

19 15

77

24.

208

67.

2.

8.

60

33.

103

56.

Sanitary

Corps:

Worldwide

806

23

2.

113

14.

264

32.

401

49.

Overseas

525

14

2.

90

17.

184

35.

233

44.

Medical

Administrative

Corps:

Worldwide

5,

758

02

44

241

4.

1,

467

25.

4,

005

69.

Overseas

4,

133

02

30

194

4.

1,

112

26.

796

67.

Female: Worldwide

21,

516 15,356 20,516 14,

714 377

34

0.

155

0.

929

4.

20,

398

94.

Overseas

23

116

520

3.

14,

697

95.

Army

Nurse

Corps:

Worldwide

34

155

862

4.

19,

465

94.

Overseas

23

116

517

3.

14,

058

95.

Physical

Therapists: Worldwide

27

7.

350

92.

Overseas

255

255

100.

Hospital Dietitians: Worldwide

623

40

6.

583

93.

Overseas

387

384

99.

Basic

data,

unless

otherwise

specified,

from

“Promotions,”

Monthly

Statistical

Summary

(processed),

prepared

in

Promotion Section,

Officers

Branch,

Office

of

The

Adjutant

General.

All

male

officers

as

well

as

Array

Nurse

Corps

officers,

physical

therapists,

hospital

dietitians, and

WAC’s.

Basic

data

from

“Temporary Promotions of

Male

Officers

by

Rank,”

(April1943-October 1945),

in

“Strength of

the

Army,”

Nov.

1945,

pp.

98-99.

Army

nurses, physical

therapists,

hospital

dietitians, and

Wacs.

So

shown

in

source. May

represent

(in

part)

dental

students

originally

commissioned

in

Medical

Administrative

Corps

as

second

lieutenants

who

became

first

lieutenants

upon

commissioning

in

Dental

Corps.
482 PERSONNEL

Some commanders also retained their prejudice against rapid promotions.

On the other hand, in Esplritu Santo and probably in many other places there

were commanders who, upon hearing reports of high initial ranks being granted

to men entering the medical service in the United States, went to the opposite

extreme and tried, although perhaps with not much success, to fill all vacancies by promotion even before they had an opportunity to observe the beneficiaries in action. For similar reasons, commanders were more willing than

formerly to permit individuals to attain the rank authorized for their jobs

by tables of organization.

In spite of obstacles, at least 19.4 percent of all Medical Department promotions during the period from November 1944 to June 1945, inclusive, resulted from assignments to vacancies or from advancement to authorized rank.

In each of the Medical Department’s male officer corps, the percentage was

much higher (table 65).

In the latter part of the war, promotion rates of Medical Department

officers overseas at times exceeded the corresponding worldwide rates. There

were several reasons for this. The special regulations favoring promotion

had their initial application in the Zone of Interior and attained their peak

effect overseas when their influence at home was waning. Certain regulations,

such as the time-and-a-half credit for service abroad, quite rightly favored

oversea personnel. Promotion requirements in the continental United States

became more stringent. Finally, few new units were being activated in the

Zone of Interior, and in those that were activated, the new jobs were given

more and more to the former members of disbanded or reorganized establishments or to men who had been rotated home from overseas who already had

ranks appropriate to the vacancies created.

Although the rate of promotion of oversea Medical Department officers

increased, it exceeded the rate of all officers in the theaters only during the

second quarter of 1945. The reason for this generally lower rate was the

fact that attrition was much greater influence in the Army in general than

it was in the Medical Department. The contrast is better illustrated when

male officers alone are compared. At no time did the promotion rate of

male Medical Department officers overseas even closely approach that of the

corresponding group in the Army as whole despite the increased medical

losses experienced in 1945 and all the other aids to promotion activity. Indeed,

promotion rates of the two groups were closer together in 1943 than they were

at later dates.

Even though promotions overseas increased during the latter part of

the war, it can be assumed that only about half of all Medical Corps officers

who served overseas prior to the end of hostilities received promotions there.

Many officers, of course, received promotions before going abroad, but the

fact nevertheless remains that considerable numbers of medical officers who
HANK. PROMOTION, AND PAY 483

saw service overseas never were promoted at all or not until late in their Army

careers. 56

Decentralization of promotions

Decentralization of promotion in wartime had many advantages. It obviated heaping upon central headquarters the vast amount of paperwork

necessary to the promotion of officers, both of high and of low rank. In removing the necessity of sending all recommendations for promotions through

military channels to central headquarters (for the Medical Department this

was the Surgeon General’s Office), decentralization speeded promotions greatly. This acceleration tended to foster officers’ morale. Undoubtedly, The

Surgeon General was content to have others promote officers in the lower

grades. Lack of attention in certain instances to qualifications when promoting officers to the grade of colonel overseas, however, posed serious problems for him when men who lacked either the professional or the military

experience to justify that rank for assignment to any type of job were returned

to the Zone of Interior. Often, particularly in the later war years, he had

difficulty in persuading commanding generals of service commands and others

to accept young, inexperienced or ineffectual men who held that rank.

centralized control over promotions to the rank of colonel, in the hands of

The Surgeon General, might possibly have tended to eliminate such difficulties. 57 But this procedure was unthinkable. Theater commanders had the

authority to promote up to and including the rank of colonel. This was based

on the recommendations of major commanders and availability of TOE vacancies and the proved competence of the individual concerned.

Enlisted Personnel

Between 31 July 1941 and the end of May 1944, the percentage of Medical Department enlisted men who were in grades above that of private increased from 49 to 68, and above the grade of private, first class, from 19

to 45 percent. Even in ranks above that of corporal, the increase was substantial, being from 15 to 21 percent (table 66). In terms of pay, however,

these improvements were less significant than they seem to be. Prior to

June 1942, certain Medical Department enlisted men in the grades of private

and private, first class, had specialist ratings which made their pay equal

to that of soldiers in higher ranks. What proportion of the number in each

of these grades they constituted is unknown, but it seems probable that they

comprised more than 31 percent of all Medical Department enlisted men

58 Letters, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The Surgeon General, from (1) T. L. Badger, M.D.,

Sept. 1952; (2) Col. B. G. Billings, 23 Sept. 1952; (3) Col. H. L. Blumgart, Aug. 1952; (4) Col.

G. G. Duncan, 19 Aug. 1952 (5) C. S. Drayer, M.D., Sept. 1952 (6) G. H. Gowen, M.D., 10 Sept.

1952 and (7) Col. George G. Finney, Sept. 1952.

57 Letter, Col. Paul A. Paden, Percy Jones Army Hospital, to Col. C. H. Goddard, Office of The

Surgeon General, June 1952.
PERSONNEL

Table

66.

—Rank

of

Medical

Department enlisted men

overseas, 31

duly1941-31 May

1944

Master sergeant

First sergeant

Technical sergeant

Staff

sergeant

Sergeant

Corporal

Private, first

class

Private

Date

Number Percent ofstrength in

rank

Number Percent ofstrength in

rank

Number Percent ofstrength in

rank

Number Percent ofstrength in

rank

Number Percent ofstrength in

rank

Number Percent ofstrength in

rank

Number Percent of

strength in

rank

Number Percent ofstrengthin

rank

SI

July

1941

Total

Army

961

0.

77

874

0.70

1,762

1.40

4,220

3.36

9,665

7.

71

11,

554

9.21

33,399

26.63

62,

999

50.

22

Medical

Department

26

.60

.21

75

1.74

188

4.37

328

7.

63

202

4.70

1,271

29.

56

2,201

51.

19

30

November 1941

Total

Army

1,136

.74

1,098

.71

1,969

1.28

5,415

3.52

12,637

8.21

14,

777

9.60

40,858

26.

56

75,962

49.

37

Medical

Department

45

.68

25

.38

97

1.47

248

3.

77

494

7.51

386

5.87

1,888

28.

69

3,397

51.63

SO

September 1942

Total

Army

4,990

.65

4,115

.54

10,195

1.33

34,261

4.46

82,

638

10.

76

124,311

16.

19

171,

803

22.37

335,

738

43.

71

Medical

Department. ..

168

.35

216

.44

533

1.10

2,480

5.11

4,213

8.

68

7,391

15.22

11,880

24.

47

21,666

44.63

SI

January

1943

Total

Army

7,252

.70

5,527

.53

16,176

1.56

55,478

5.35

120,

156

11.59

193,

408

18.66

236,

881

22.86

401,

452

38.74

Medical

Department.-

244

.34

319

.44

797

1.10

3,105

4.30

7,409

10.25

13,

647

18.

89

17,733

24.

54

29,005

40.

11

SI

December I94S

Total

Army

19,536

.81

13,200

.55

48,100

2.00

55,

747

6.

49

320,

695

13.37

517,

470

21.57

551,328

22.98

773,

383

32.

23

Medical

Department

673

.37

725

.40

2,174

1.20

10,178

5.60

22,

515

12.

39

41,

440

22.

80

43,893

24.

15

60,164

33.

10

31

May

1944

Total

Army

29.549

.87

18,731

.55

80,443

2.36

246,

654

7.22

466,

609

13.67

721,718

21.14

796,

861

23.

34

1,053, 584

30.86

Medical

Department.

1,033

.40

1,065

.41

3,105

1.20

16,

565

6.43

33,584

13.03

60,976

23.65

59,852

23.22

81,625

31.66

Basic

data

from

sources

shown

in

table

31,

footnote

3.

After

1941 includes

technicians, 3d

grade.

After

1941

includes

technicians,

4th

grade.

After

1941

includes

technicians,

5th

grade.
RANK, PROMOTION, AND PAY 485

in oversea areas. After June 1942, the specialist ratings were abolished, and

although minority of the men who had held them remained in the ranks

of private and private, first class, the bulk of the specialists were automatically

placed in the newly created ranks of technician, 5th grade, and technician, 4th

grade. Their rank was thus brought up to the level of their pay rather

than vice versa. Despite this immediate monetary limitation, the level of

pay of Medical Department troops nevertheless increased considerably over

period of time through gains in the level of grades. Between 30 September 1942, by which time the conversion of the grades of enlisted specialists

had been completed, and 31 May 1944, the proportion in grades above that

of private increased by nearly one-fourth; above that of private, first class,

by about one-half; and above that of corporal by somewhat smaller ratio.

What proportion of this relative rise in rank of Medical Department

enlisted men took place overseas cannot be precisely determined. As in the

case of officers, attrition and special regulations favoring oversea personnel

undoubtedly had some effect on promotion rates in the late stages of the war,

but not enough to put the Medical Department on par with the Army as

whole in this respect. The medical soldier continued to have less chance of

promotion to higher rank, with accompanying increase in pay, than had his

enlisted counterpart elsewhere in the Army.

CHAPTER XIII

Redeployment, Retraining, and Demobilization

PERIOD OF PARTIAL DEMOBILIZATION

As early as January 1943, the Army had begun work on demobilization

planning, By April, it became obvious that only partial demobilization could

follow the defeat of the Axis and that plans for redeployment of troops from

the European and Mediterranean theaters to the Pacific would have to be

included in the overall demobilization plans.

Criteria for Release of Officers

In deciding which persons should be released as means of reducing the

forces, the intention of the War Department was to consider number of

factors in addition to those already operating to remove personnel from the

Army. One of these factors was the adjusted service rating, which might also

aid in determining whether, even if man stayed in the Army, he was to be

transferred from one area to another. This rating was point score to be given

each individual shortly after the surrender of Germany. The score was the

sum of his credits for length of service in the Army (1 point for each month

since 16 September 1940), length of service overseas (1 point for each month),

number of combat awards and decorations (5 points each), and number of

children he possessed under 18 years of age up to limit of three (12 points

each). The score must reach certain total (the “critical score*’) to be considered as factor working toward his release from the Army.

As part of the plans for redeployment of medical personnel, The Surgeon

General, weeks after Y-E Day, requested and received authority for the

transfer of 1,000 Medical Corps officers from the European and Mediterranean

theaters to the United States so as to help care for the expected concentration

of patients in the United States after the end of hostilities in Europe. lie also

obtained approval for certain other policies concerning the redistribution of

members of the Medical Department. The War Department planned to send

some medical units to the Pacific by way of the United States, and The Surgeon General obtained authority to restaff these units by exchanging theirhighscore personnel for low-score personnel in the United States before shipping

them to the Pacific. To this end, complete census was taken of all personnel

stationed in the United States.

For detailed account of demobilization Army-wide, see Sparrow, John C.: History of Personnel

Demobilization in the United States Army. Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952. (DA

Pamphlet 20-210.)

663076'—63——33
488 PERSONNEL

On the basis of this census and in the light of experience to date, criteria

were established for withdrawing personnel from units passing through this

country and for assigning personnel then in the United States to the units

scheduled for the Pacific. Thus, Medical Corps officers in returning units

would be withdrawn if they were 45 years of age or over, or had an adjusted

service rating of 75 or over, or had had 12 months’ service overseas. The age

and oversea service criteria for all other Medical Department officers were

lower—40 years and months, respectively. The critical figure for the adjusted service rating was also lower, being 50 for all other male Medical Department officers and 30 for all female officers of theDepartment.

The Surgeon General also planned to speed the exchange of personnel

with the Pacific as soon as part of the surplus from the European and Mediterranean theaters should return to the United States. Finally, he recommended

that the European theater, which had more low-score specialists than the

Mediterranean theater, should exchange them with high-score specialists from

the latter. This would enable the Mediterranean theater to send units directly

to the Pacific, properly balanced with specialists, and yet avoid keeping

high-score men in oversea service. Presumably, the latter would be returned

to the United States.

The Surgeon General’s Office also developed method of selecting the

Medical Department officers to be separated from the Army in helping to carry

out partial demobilization. According to War Department readjustment regulations, which were given the force of directives upon the defeat of Germany,

all Medical Department officers who were returned to the United States as

surplus from oversea theaters and defense commands were to be placed under

the jurisdiction of Army Ground Forces, Air Forces, or Service Forces, depending on which of these commands was responsible for the unit in the troop

basis with which the particular officer had last served. If these officers were

needed by the Air or Ground Forces, they were to be retained by them. If

not, they and other surplus Medical Department officers from those commands

were to be turned over to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, for

decision as to their essentiality to the Army. The regulations stated that in this decision “military necessity must be the controlling factor,” but that other

considerations should also be weighed—efficiency, the officer’s desire as to

retention, and his adjusted service rating. The Army was permitted to keep

officers otherwise qualified for release if they wished to be retained and had

satisfactory records.

On May 1945, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, delegated his responsibility for determining the essentiality of Medical Department officers to The Surgeon General, although he retained certain amount of control in that respect. week before this, The Surgeon General in accordMedical Department Redeployment and Separation Policy, as revised, August 1945. In Annual Report, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1946. Readjustment Regulations 1—5, 30 Apr. 1945.
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION 489

ance with prior planning had established board of medical officers, composed

in part of representatives of Army Ground and Air Forces, to deal with the

question.

By the end of July, the Surgeon General’s Office had evolved method

of selecting the officers who were to be kept in service and those who were to be

released. This method took into consideration the essentiality not of individual officers but of numbers—the number that would be needed and the number

that could be dispensed with in each of eight officer components and in each

of certain specialties within the Medical Corps.

The Surgeon General’s Office adopted age and the adjusted service rating

as the factors which might give officers claim to separation. Keeping in mind

the number needed in each component and specialty, it set the age or point

score at such figure that the number who could qualify would not exceed the

number that could be dispensed with. It might happen, however, that certain

persons with “irreplaceable experience,” even though they were eligible for

release on other grounds, needed to be retained; in such cases, their release

could be deferred by applying the principle of military necessity directly to

them as individuals. It appears that before the surrender of Japan the point

score for release was not arrived at by any very exact calculation as to how

many officers would be made eligible for discharge by the figure adopted; in

the case of specialists, at any rate, the point score fixed upon was to be retained

so long as the number of releases under it “would not endanger the efficiency of the medical service,” after which it would presumably be raised or the whole

procedure abandoned.

Although The Surgeon General recommended the release of Medical and

Dental Corps officers who were 50 years of age or over, Army Service Forces

headquarters did not put this provision into effect immediately. Many such

men had been retained in the United States throughout their period of service

and so had been unable to accumulate many points. The minimum point

score required for members of the Medical Corps was 100 (120 for specialists

in gastroenterology, ophthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, cardiology, dermatology, allergies, anesthesiology, neuropsychiatry, thoracic surgery, plastic surgery, orthopedic surgery, neurosurgery, clinical laboratory work), The mini- mum separation ages or point scores required for members of other officer

components were as follows: Veterinary Corps, 50 years or 110 points; Medical

Administrative and Sanitary Corps, 45 years or 90 points; Kurse Corps, 40

years or 65 points; dietitians and physical therapists, 50 years or 65 points.

(1) Army Service Forces Circular No. 175, May 1945. (2) Personnel Service Plan for Period I,

Action 66, Office of The Surgeon General. (3) Office Order No. 105, Office of The Surgeon General,

U.S. Army, 11 May 1945.

Members of the Pharmacy Corps, all of whom were officers of the Regular Army, did not fall

under this program.

See footnote 2, p. 488.

Letter, Chief, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, to Chief, Historical Division,

Office of The Surgeon General, 14 Aug. 1945, subject: Criteria for Separation of Medical Department

Officer Personnel.
490 PERSONNEL

Criteria for Release of Enlisted Personnel

Few special provisions concerning Medical Department eidisted personnel

appeared in the rules governing the release of the Army’s enlisted members

as phase of partial demobilization. It will be recalled that shortly after

V-E Day the War Department permitted the release of all enlisted persons

40 years of age or over almost without restriction. About the same time, the

Secretary of War announced that the critical score for enlisted personnel

would be 85 points; military necessity, however, might dictate that men having

that score—particularly those possessing special skills—would be held until

qualified replacements arrived. The readjustment regulations provided that

the essentiality of enlisted personnel would be determined at reception centers

where surplus personnel from the United States and overseas were to be collected. There, the liaison officer of the Commanding General, Army Service

Forces, would pass upon members of the Medical Department, with the possible exception of personnel assigned to the Air Forces and certain other combat branches of the Army. The regulations permitted persons to remain in

the Army if they chose to do so, providing they had satisfactory records.

Problems Encountered in Redeployment and Separation

By the early part of August 1945, months after Y-E Day, the carrying

out of some of these plans had not gone as far as might have been anticipated.

The thousand Medical Corps officers from the European and Mediterranean

theaters, authority for whose return The Surgeon General had requested in

May, had not yet all arrived in the United States. The remainder were en

route, but the peak patient load in the U.S. hospitals had already been reached

and passed. The explanation for the delay was that “tremendous personnel

shifts in the theaters and the uncertainties regarding individual scores [that

is, adjusted service ratings] which were not available until almost weeks

after V-E Day, made it difficult for the theater to return personnel as rapidly

as desired.”

In addition, The Surgeon General’s plan to restaff units passing through

this country to the Pacific was not too successful, since few units had been

shipped back by early August. His efforts to speed replacements to the Pacific

in order to relieve personnel who had been there for long time were achieving more success; arrangements had been made to bring back large numbers

of nurses and replace them with fresh members of the Nurse Corps. The

policy of exchanging low- for high-score specialists between the European

and Mediterranean theaters had also, after some delays, been put into effect.

On the other hand, the separation of Medical Department personnel from

the service as phase of partial demobilization had no more than begun. In

Readjustment Regulations 1—1, 12 Feb. 1945, par. 12, and Changes No. 1, May 1945, par.

12a(1).

See footnote 2, p. 488.
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION 491

July, the chairman of Senate subcommittee investigating the Army’s use

of doctors had charged that surplus Army doctors in Europe were not working “more than an hour or two day” and declared that they should be

brought home torelieve the shortage of civilian doctors.

The Surgeon General’s Office gave reasons why few Medical Department

personnel were being discharged from the Army. It pointed out that very

large numbers of patients continued to come back to the United States even

after the fighting ended in Europe, so that the patient load at home might

be expected to remain at or near the peak until the fall of 1945. It stated

that while Medical Department personnel in Europe no longer had to care

for combat casualties they were occupied with closing hospitals, treating displaced persons for sickness and injuries in territories overrun by the American

armies, and finally moving toward the United States or the Pacific. 10

FULL-SCALE DEMOBILIZATION

The capitulation of Japan on 14 August 1945 put an end to redeployment

as shift from two- to one-front war. The process of transferring units

from Europe to the Pacific either directly or by way of the United States

was abandoned. Gradually, vast movement of men from overseas to the

United States set in, with smaller movement outward of fresh personnel to

maintain the occupation forces. Partial demobilization, which had hardly

started, gave way to full demobilization.

Reduction of Criteria for Demobilization of Enlisted Personnel

Officers as well as enlisted men who possessed the critical score could no

longer be held in the Army on the ground of military necessity, except in special instances. Adjusted service ratings were recomputed as of September

1945. The critical score of enlisted men was then reduced from 85 to 80

points, and enlisted men 35 years of age and over who had had at least years’

service were ordered released on their application; the age for automatic release of those with less than years’ service remained at 38, having been

reduced from 40 earlier. Within the next months, the critical score for

enlisted men was brought down by successive cuts from 80 to 55, while new

alternatives of years’ service or the possession of three dependent children

also qualified men for discharge.

Medical Department enlisted technicians in certain specialties were excepted from the rule that men could not be held in the Army for reasons of

military necessity if they were otherwise eligible for release. Six months

was the maximum length of time for which these technicians could be retained.

Orthopedic mechanics were among those so held. 11 In the fall of 1945, the

13 See footnote 2, p. 488. 11 Memorandum, Surgeon General Kirk, for Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 22 Oct.

1945, subject: Shortage of Medical Department Enlisted Personnel for Zone of Interior Installations.
492 PERSONNEL

Medical Department was training 75 of these technicians; The Surgeon General stated that when they completed their training those being held on duty

would be discharged. Expressing his belief that when men were held beyond

the date at which they became eligible for discharge their morale went down,

he also urged service command surgeons to consider seriously one-grade

promotion for those being retained. 12 In late November, promotions were

authorized for orthopedic mechanics.

In early December, The Surgeon General stated that information available to his Office indicated that the situation had improved in the last weeks,

but he warned the Army Service Forces headquarters at the same time that

additional replacements would have to be forthcoming as the discharge criteria were lowered in the future. 13 few days later, he reluctantly advised

the same headquarters that effective on January 1946 men in four critically

needed enlisted specialties might be authorized for discharge—medical and

dental laboratory, X-ray, and orthopedic technicians—provided they had 50

points on the adjusted service record or had been in the Army for 31/2 years. 14

These same criteria were announced the next day by the War Department as

those that would govern the discharge of enlisted men generally after 31 December 1945.

As late as February 1946, the Surgeon General’s Office was still trying

to make good the losses by recommending that G-l make enlisted men available to the Medical Department for training to replace scarce category personnel, specifically men in the four critical specialties. 15 All specialists were

taken off the list of those critically needed by July 1946 in order to comply with the Chief of Staff’s statement that all enlisted personnel with 2f3 years’

service or 45 points be discharged by 30 April 1946 and all with years’ service

or 40 points by months later. At the same time, The Surgeon General asserted that the situation had become increasingly worse. He admonished

service command surgeons that they must make exceptional effort immediately

to employ soldiers as civilians upon their discharge. Furthermore, they were

to hold enlisted specialists as long as possible. 16

12 (1) Memorandum, Chief, Enlisted Branch, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, for Director, Military Personnel Division. Office of The Surgeon General, 14 Nov. 1945, sub- ject Survey of Medical Department Enlisted Situation, Eighth Service Command, with Comment No. 2, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, to Legislative and Liaison Division,

War Department General Staff, 23 Nov. 1945. (2) Letter, The Surgeon General, to Surgeon, each

service command, 28 Nov. 1945. 13 Memorandum, Deputy Surgeon General, for Commanding General, Army Service Forces (atten- tion Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands), Dec. 1945, subject: Medical Department Enlisted Personnel. 14 Memorandum, Director, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, for Director, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, IS Dec. 1945, subject: Scarce Categories and Critically Needed Specialists.

15 Memorandum, Deputy Surgeon General, for G-l, Feb. 1946, subject: Scarce Category Enlisted Personnel, Medical Department.

16 Letter, Deputy Surgeon General, to Col. John A. Isherwood, Surgeon, First Service Command, Feb. 1946.
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION 493

Reduction of Criteria for Demobilization of Officers

Following Y-J Day, the criteria for demobilizing Medical Department

officers also were reduced. The first reduction occurred on 10 September 1945. The new criteria did not entitle certain Medical Corps specialists

having an A, B, or proficiency rating to release; moreover, The Surgeon

General could hold individual specialists who were essential to the proper

care of patients. For others, the minimum point score was considerably reduced. Age, which had not previously been an alternative for Medical and

Dental Corps officers, was now added for them, while length of service became second alternative for all except female officers (nurses, dietitians, and

physical therapists). The criteria for age and length of service were so

high, however, that few officers could qualify for separation under them.

Consequently, the speed with which doctors were being demobilized met with

considerable criticism.

Congressional reaction

On November 1945, Senator Clyde M. Reed of Kansas submitted

resolution to the Senate in which he pointed out that the Army had more

doctors on its rolls on September 1945, weeks after fighting had ceased,

than on the previous January, when two-front war was waging. The

Senator also charged that “from many sources, testimony of undoubted reliability has come to members of the Senate indicating an incredible degree

of incompetency, inefficiency, and general neglect on the part of the Office of

The Surgeon General of the Army, in dealing with the return of the doctors

and surgeons from the Army service where they are not needed, to communities

where the civilian need for proper medical attention is very great.” Actually, the number of doctors in the Army was about the same on September

as it had been months earlier and by the time the Senator spoke, it had

fallen by 8,000. Furthermore, over 11,000 had been discharged between

May and November. The Surgeon General might have pointed out that

in addition to the medical skills still needed to provide definitive treatment

in Army hospitals even though fighting had ceased, some 2,000 doctors had

to be stationed in separation centers to perform the final physical examinations so that other troops could be promptly released. Senator Reed’s resolution requested the Secretary of War to appoint board to investigate the

situation, fix responsibility, and “take immediate steps to remedy the injury

done to the doctors, surgeons, and dentists as individuals and to the communities affected.” 17

The Surgeon General had let it be known that he would welcome such

an investigation, as an opportunity to present his own case to the American

people. At the same time, he promised to do everything in his power to speed

17 S. Res. 184, 79th Cong., Nov. 1945 (legislative date, 20 October).
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the overall demobilization. The firm position of The Surgeon General, with

its implied promise to expose the organized groups then seeking to influence

the Congress, strengthened the hand of the Secretary of War, who was able

to persuade the senatorial sponsors of the resolution to drop it. In return, the

Secretary promised to give his personal attention to the problem of discharging at the earliest possible date all doctors and dentists not actually needed by the Army. In memorandum of 21 November 1945 to the Chief

of Staff, he set forth certain steps to achieve that end; they included determination by the General Staff of the number of doctors and dentists each

theater required, the appointment of mission to the European and Mediterranean theaters to report on ways of speeding the process of returning their

surpluses to the United States, priority of transportation for these surpluses,

and investigation of the three major commands in the United States to see

that their staffs were cut as fast as their workload permitted and that the

criteria for discharge were kept adjusted so as to release the surplus without

delay. Col. Durward G. Hall, Chief of The Surgeon General’s Personnel

Service, himself headed the mission to the European and Mediterranean theaters, and took with him Lt. Col. Bolling R. Powell, Jr,, Congressional

Legislative Liaison Officer, on the War Department Special Staff. The mission traveled on orders from the Secretary of War, with authority to expedite

the return of critical category medical personnel. 18 Although much pressure

continued to be brought for the release of individual doctors, no further

public attacks were made by Senator Reed or his associates.

While the threat of congressional investigation did not change basic

medical demobilization plans, it probably hastened the execution of them.

Only week before the Secretary of War took action, The Surgeon General

had informed G-l that the release of 13,000 doctors by Christmas in fulfillment of promise made weeks earlier “should relieve undue pressure from

Congress and other sources.” 19 But by the end of December, 22,000 had been

released in an orderly manner. Nevertheless, it was not until then that the

criteria were substantially reduced. After that, reductions occurred on February, July, and September 1946. Although the demobilization of critical

category personnel, including shipment from oversea theaters, was an outstanding achievement, it was undoubtedly too rapid from the standpoint of

good medical care. 20

Differences in criteria for medical and nonmedical officers

The principal criteria for the discharge of Medical Department officers

differed from those for other Army officers, which after V-J Day were for

18 Statement of Durward G. Hall, M.D., to the editor, 27 May 1961. 19 The promise of 13,000, or slightly more, separations was made on 31 August. The Deputy

Surgeon General later (17 October) promised 14,000 separations and hoped that that figure could be

exceeded. (House of Representatives, Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, “The Demobilization of the Army of the U.S.,” 28 and 31 Aug. 1945 Senate, Hearings before the Committee

on Military Affairs, “The Demobilization of the Armed Services,” 17 and 18 Oct. 1945.)

29 See footnote 18.
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION 495

the most part uniform. As already indicated, the medical authorities were

permitted to set their own criteria after as well as before the surrender of

Japan, and the function continued to be exercised by The Surgeon General

on the advice of board representing his own Office, the Ground Forces, and

the Air Forces.

From early September 1945,at the beginning of the demobilization period,

until 31 August 1946, when the point score was abolished as criterion for

release, the minimum score set for doctors, dentists, and veterinarians was

always (except for the first weeks in October) lower than that for nonMedical Department officers. The difference varied from to 10 points.

When in favor of Medical Department officers, it tended to equalize their situation with that of other officers, since smaller proportion of the former than

of the latter had had the opportunity to serve overseas, and oversea service

plus battle decorations counted in the score. Until it was abolished, the

minimum point score for the separation of male Medical Department officers was never allowed to fall below 60, figure reached on February 1946.

The Surgeon General’s separation board believed that to have reduced it

further would have weighted the criterion too much in favor of officers

possessing children, and would then have promoted the release of the older

professional group.21

Length of service (apart from the point score) became an alternative

criterion for the release of male Medical Department officers in early September 1945 and for all other Army officers (except dietitians, to whom it was

granted on February 1946) at the beginning of December 1945. The criterion was revised downward from time to time, but until September 1946,

it was always considerably lower for Medical Department officers than for

others. The attainment of certain age, third alternative for release under

demobilization regulations, as applicable to officers of the Medical Department only. In the case of members of the Medical Corps, it was set at 48

years in early September 1945 and reduced to 45, months later, where it

remained until abolished on September 1946.

OFFSETTING FACTORS

Administration of Demobilization

Before making each successive reduction in criteria, authorities in the

Surgeon General’s Office had of course to compute how many officers would

be eligible for separation if criteria were reduced by certain amount. Whenever possible they would forewarn the service command surgeons, and the

commanders of those relatively few installations which were directly under

The Surgeon General’s jurisdiction, who would then report to the Surgeon

General’s Office how many officers and what types of specialists they would

21 Memorandum, unsigned, for Deputy Surgeon General, Jan. 1945 [46], subject: Separation of

Medical Corps Officers.

663076 —63 34
496 PERSONNEL

need after the proposed cut. Thus it was that, through close cooperation,

the service command surgeons were enabled to make certain that no hospital,

post, or body of troops wtis, through the separation of its Medical Department officers, left without adequate medical and allied attention. One saving

clause that tended to keep this task from becoming even more troublesome

and demanding was provision that regardless of Medical Department

officer’s eligibility for separation, he could be retained until replacement

became available.22 Thus, military necessity took precedence over an individual’s eligibility for separation.

Likewise, The Surgeon General had to exercise care that, regardless of

the level at which the criteria were fixed, the oversea commands always had

sufficient Medical Department strength to care for Army personnel remaining there. As the time involved in transporting officers was so great, this

aspect of demobilization w’as probably more difficult than that of keeping

service commands in the United States properly manned. During this period, there was also more necessity to juggle personnel than had been needed

when whole units were being sent to theaters of operations. The fact that

separation criteria were being repeatedly lowered during this period caused

difficulty in getting the right men overseas. An officer or enlisted man might

be slated for shipment when lowered set of criteria would make him eligible

for separation. As the Chief of Staff pointed out to Congress, the Army

had to suffer the inevitable delay between the date of recruiting new personnel and the time it could put them to work.

New Officer Procurement

During the period of demobilization, various factors helped partially to

offset the losses produced by it or to prevent it from proceeding as rapidly

as possible. One such factor was the continuous procurement of new officers.

Dentists

In the case of dentists, however, the number fell far short of the demand.

Unlike the Medical Corps, the Dental Corps could no longer rely on graduates

of the Army Specialized Training Program to take up the deficit, for the dental

phase of the program had ended in April 1945. The medical phase ran until

June 1946 and was the main source of procurement for the Medical Corps

during demobilization. Most if not all of the doctors it produced were held

for years’ service in the Army; those who had spent little of their student

career in the program complained that they were compelled to serve as long

after graduation as those who had spent much time in it.23 The case was dif22 Memorandum, Executive Officer, Office of The Surgeon General, for Chiefs of Services, Directors

of Divisions, and others, Office of The Surgeon General, 13 Sept. 1945, subject: Criteria for Separation

of Medical Department Officer Personnel. 23War Department, Information and Education Division, Report No. 12-310, Nov. 1946, subject:

Attitudes of A.S.T.P. Medical Officers Toward Service in the Regular Army.
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION

ferent with students who had received part of their education through the

program but had not been permitted to continue in it long enough to graduate. They had been relieved of all obligation to serve after finishing their

course, and no effort was yet made to compel these men in particular, or even

the dentists among them, to come to the relief of the Medical Department.

Instead, more general measure of compulsion was introduced—a draft of

dentists—the first time in American history that professional group had

been singled out for conscription. As already stated, such measure had been

agitated before, for doctors and nurses, but it had been avoided even in wartime.

On 17 May 1946, The Surgeon General in memorandum to the Assistant

Chief of Staff, G-l, stated that only 15 dentists had joined the Army in the

past months, from which he concluded that volunteering alone would not

yield sufficient recruits. Accordingly, he recommended that the Selective

Service System be requested to deliver enough dentists to meet the procurement objective of 1,500, preferably, “both from the War Department’s point

of view and probably from that of the community at large dentists in

the youngest age groups who have not yet been firmly established in civilian

practice.” 24 His advice was accepted and Selective Service issued its call.

However, only very few dentists, probably not more than four, were actually

drafted, others who were called preferring to accept commissions instead. 25

Nevertheless, the drafting of dentists had established precedent for applying

conscription to professional groups, precedent that was followed years

later in the case not only of dentists, but of doctors as well.

Physicians

Before this latter event took place, another piece of evidence indicated

that it might become necessary to draft physicians. In November 1946, the

War Department conducted poll of Medical Corps officers—former members

of the Army Specialized Training Program—to discover the attitude of graduates of the program toward volunteering for the Regular Army Medical

Corps. All but of the 385 who answered the questionnaire stated that they

were not planning to apply for commissions in the Regular Army. Among

the main reasons given were dissatisfaction with assignments, inadequate opportunities for training, insufficient financial compensation, and dissatisfaction

with living conditions. Also, 267 of the 385 said they would like to get out

of the Army at once, if possible. 26

Effects of procurement

Procurement for most of the Medical Department officer components did

little or nothing to offset losses through demobilization and other factors be24Memorandum, Surgeon General Kirk, for G—1, subject: Procurement Objective for Dental Corps

Officers. 25 Medical Department, United States Army. Dental Service in World War II. Washington:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955. 23 See footnote 23, p. 496.
498 PERSONNEL

Table 67.—Medical Department officers separated, V-E Day-31 December 1946 cumulative

tween August or September 1945 and March 1946, the period when the greatest

losses occurred. This is indicated by comparison of the strength figures

(table 1) with the figures for separations, by month, in tabie 6T. 27 The Medical Administrative Corps, however, obtained enough new recruits to make up

for most of its losses through November 1945, after which it too lost members

more rapidly than it gained them. No figures are available for procurement

or losses of Medical Department enlisted personnel after June 1945.

Reference to table will show that the ratio of Medical Department officer strength to Army strength increased markedly during the period of heaviest demobilization. Since procurement was at very low ebb, this means

that Medical Department officers were being discharged more slowly than

members of the Army in general. similar lag occurred in the case of mem27 In comparing these two tables, it will be noticed that in number of instances the decline in

strength shown is greater than the number of separations. As it is unlikely that losses from causes other than separations amounted to any appreciable number, especially after hostilities had ceased,

some of the figures must be inaccurate. In fact, those in the table on separations and some of those

in the strength table are obviously mere approximations.

End of month Medical

Corps DentalCorps VeterinaryCorps SanitaryCorps Medical

Administrative Corps

Army

Nurse

Corps

Hospital

dietitians Physical

therapists

1945 May 230 50 10 10 220 300 10

June_ 570 115 30 30 330 600 20 10

July 1, 140 450 60 60 490 900 30 20

August 2, 170 610 80 100 720 1, 200 40 30

September 4, 220 1, 025 130 195 1, 250 4, 200 80 70

October 11, 750 2, 530 330 565 3, 420 15, 900 310 225

November 17, 630 3, 960 520 905 5, 790 24, 000 530 370

December 22, 590 5, 185 730 1, 265 8, 500 29, 300 680 500

1946 January 27, 100 7, 375 900 1, 400 11, 140 33, 600 790 685

February 30, 750 8, 950 1, 075 1, 530 13, 230 36, 600 810 765

March 32, 900 9, 750 1, 225 1, 700 15, 370 39, 700 1, 020 835

April 34, 750 10, 290 1, 425 1, 900 17, 200 41, 925 1, 075 875

May 37, 000 10, 825 1, 475 2, 025 17, 290 43, 750 1, 120 930

June 39, 000 11, 500 1, 500 2, 100 17, 500 45, 600 1, 180 1, 030

July. 40, 950 12, 100 1, 550 2, 200 17, 800 46, 850 1, 205 1, 080

August 42, 000 12, 540 1, 600 260 18, 100 47, 725 1, 225 1, 110

September 42, 775 13, 175 1, 650 2, 320 18, 400 48, 350 1, 255 1, 130

October 43, 900 13, 450 1, 700 380 18, 600 48, 900 1, 280 1, 150

November 44, 500 13, 850 1, 750 2, 440 18, 800 49, 850 1, 305 1, 170

December 45, 050 14, 200 1, 770 2, 460 18, 900 50, 325 1, 325 1, 190

figures for Veterinary and Sanitary Corps are estimated.

Source: Chart, “Medical Department Officer Separations since V-E Day-30 June 1947 (cumulative),

Analysis Division, Office of The Surgeon General.

Resources
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION 499

Table 68. Civilians and prisoners of war employed in medical activities within Army Service

Forces in the United States, 30 March 1945-30 April 1946

bers of the individual Medical Department officer components. On the other

hand, Medical Department enlisted men, and also officers and enlisted men

taken together, were apparently being released more rapidly than members

of the Army as whole, for their ratio to Army strength, which had been

declining since November 1944, continued to decline throughout the period of

heaviest demobilization.

During the same period, decline also occurred in the number of civilians

and prisoners of war employed in Medical Department activities within Army

Service Forces in the United States, as is shown in table 68.

Voluntary Continuance

Another offsetting factor was the choice of various officers and enlisted

men to remain in the Army. Since the beginning of demobilization, men

of both categories had been permitted to extend their terms of service under

Month Civilians Prisoners of war Total

1945 March .. .. 72, 690 15, 237 87, 927

April _. 73, 096 17, 098 90, 194

May 73, 313 20, 322 93, 635

June__ (75, 258) (20, 528) (95, 785)

July 77, 202 20, 733 97, 935

August- 75, 353 20, 485 95, 838

September. 72, 714 18, 518 91, 232

October 72, 492 16, 731 89, 223

November 67, 407 14, 767 82, 174

December 61, 021 11, 992 73, 013

1946 January 60, 337 10, 678 71, 015

February 59, 990 9, 491 69,481

March _. .. 54, 512 6, 054 60, 566

April 51, 354 5, 063 56, 417

Figures obtained by adding figures for civilians in the following tables of Army Service Forces

Monthly Progress Reports: (1) “Service Command Operating Personnel and Prisoners of War” (subhead “Hospital and Medical Activities”) (2) “Technical Service ZI Operating Personnel and Prisoners of War, by activity” (subheads “Station Medical at Staging Areas” and “Debarkation Hospital

and Station Medical at Ports”) (3) “ASF Personnel Authorizations and Strengths” (subhead “Surgeon General”).

Figures obtained by adding figures for prisoners of war in the following tables of Army Service

Forces Monthly Progress Reports: (1) “Technical Service ZI Operating Personnel and Prisoners of

War” (subhead “Hospital and Station Medical Activities”) (2) “Service Command Operating Personnel and Prisoners of War by Activity” (subhead “Hospital and Medical Activities”).

Figures in parentheses indicate the interpolation of figure halfway between those immediately

following and preceding it for one that was obviously incorrect.

Source Monthly Progress Reports, Army Service Forces, War Department, for the dates indicated.
500 PERSONNEL

certain conditions if they so chose. In December 1945, the War Department required statement from each non-Regular Army officer as to whether

he wished to be released at once, to be kept on active duty indefinitely, or to

remain for specified time. In the last mentioned case, the stated discharge

date was to be 31 December 1946, 30 June 1947, or some other date agreed

upon between the individual and his commanding officer that involved continuance of at least 60 days but would not be later than 30 November 1946.

For medical and dental officers, as we shall see in the following section,

one of the inducements to remain in the Army for an additional period was

program of refresher training for those about to return to civilian practice.

PROFESSIONAL RETRAINING

In addition to the technical and military training that was continuing

function of the Medical Department throughout the war, there were two

phases of professional training that were carried out primarily by the Personnel Division of the Surgeon General’s Office rather than by the Training

Division. One of these was the retraining of Army of the United States

officers returning to civilian life. The other was the preparation of Regular

Army officers, most of whom had been serving in administrative rather than

professional capacities, to resume the complete responsibility for the medical

care of the Army as whole that was their peacetime mission. These Regular

Army medical officers would also be called upon to care for the thousands

of casualties of the war who would remain in Army hospitals long after the

specialists who first treated them had returned to civilian practice.

Army of the United States

Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, The Surgeon General had been

faced with the problem of uneven distribution of professional opportunities

for Medical Corps officers on active duty for year or two and its resultant

effect on morale. After the declaration of war, he became increasingly concerned about the failure of his efforts to produce an effective rotation system

which would permit an exchange of medical officers between hospital and

tactical assignments. This was due in large measure to the decentralization

of control of military personnel which, while no doubt responsible for the

acceleration of the war efforts, posed peculiar problems for the Medical

Service.

Tradition and history agree that great scientific advancement occurs during war between major powers. General Kirk was not alone in believing

that the pressures of World War II had advanced medical science out of all

proportion to the duration of the conflict. All of this professional advancement did not take place in the large hospitals. Much of it was in the field

of preventive medicine, such as the development of Atabrine (quinacrine

hydrochloride) and DDT; and some was by way of improvisations on the
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION 501

field of battle in the treatment of shock or the management of various types

of wounds. There were improvements in medical supplies and equipment,

and decided advances in the fashioning of artificial eyes and limbs. It was

nevertheless the work going on in the large hospitals, and particularly in

the specialty centers, that enticed young officers who had been primarily

on field duty in the forward areas.

The Surgeon General fully sympathized with the desire of these young

doctors to take back with them to civilian practice the best of wartime gains

in medicine and surgery and was prepared to give them every encouragement,

both to strengthen civilian medicine the country over and to insure for the

next emergency nucleus of men widely experienced in the special requirements of military medicine. With these purposes in mind, various means

were explored well before the war was over whereby the professional advances stemming from the conflict might be made available to the largest

possible number of Army of the United States officers. 28

The American Medical Association was also interested in various phases

of planning for the return to civil life of the doctors in the military service.

Among its recommendations was further education to supplement the training available in the military service and to facilitate reorientation to civilian

practice.

On July 1944, The Surgeon General constituted committee to formulate plans for postwar refresher courses for medical officers scheduled to be

separated from the military service. It was understood that at first most

of these would be leaving for physical reasons; later, the general demobilization would take place. At the committee’s first meeting, Lt. Col. (later Col.)

Durward G. Hall, MC, Chief of Personnel, was appointed chairman. Under

his leadership, the committee undertook to survey the various possibilities relating to types of courses, where they should be conducted, and the means

of financing them. It was later determined that this committee should

handle both the inservice refresher courses and the postwar courses.

During the summer of 1944, the Chief of the Personnel Service and representative of the Training Division wmrked closely together. By 20 September, they were agreed on who should be eligible for the proposed training,

in terms of rank, previous assignments in the Army, and type of work they

had done in civil life. Consideration was given both to on-the-job training and to didactic courses, as well as to the feasibility of sending officers

still in the service to civilian institutions. Among the numerous problems

that arose, one of the most threatening was requirement that officers could

be detailed to the Military District of Washington for duty in excess of 30

days only with the concurrence of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff. 29 Be28 One direction of Medical Department thinking along these lines is exemplified by 4-week refresher course offered to Medical Corps officers of the Army Ground Forces at various general hospitals

early in 1944. Designed primarily for junior officers who were scheduled for combat duty after

year or more in training units, the course reviewed the principles of medicine and surgery as they

related to battle casualties, including treatment of burns, tropical diseases, and psychiatric cases. 29 War Department Memorandum W—500-A4, 13 Mar. 1944.
502 PERSONNEL

cause of this requirement, it was necessary to get special approval to send

five officers at time to Walter Reed Hospital for professional medical

training.

On 30 November 1944, in accordance with the recommendations of The

Surgeon General, hospitals were designated within each service command at

which 12 weeks of on-the-job training would be given. quota, divided

between medical and surgical services, was established for each hospital. The

limit was set at six officers for either medical or surgical refresher training

at any one hospital at the same time, and it was stipulated that no additional personnel or facilities would be granted for the purpose. Officers

returning from overseas were first to participate in this instruction. Applications were processed by the Personnel Service, and selection was made with

the advice of one of the professional consultants. Only those officers whose

assignments had removed them from responsibility for the professional care

of patients for 12 months or longer were considered eligible. After the German surrender, similar refresher courses were set up in the European theater

for men awaiting redeployment or return to the United States. Instruction

was given in medical and surgical specialties for those who had had little

opportunity for hospital practice, while qualified specialists were given an

opportunity for furthering their education in their own specific fields.

In March 1945, the Dental Division of the Surgeon General’s Office took

steps to provide courses for the professional retraining of dental officers whose

military assignments had removed them for 12 months or more from the direct

practice of dentistry. The program was approved by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, in April. Courses were approved the following

month for the retraining of laboratory officers of both Medical and Sanitary

Corps under conditions comparable to those laid down for doctors and dentists.

Regular Army

The Medical Corps of the Regular Army went underground professionally

during the war. Its shining hour in that respect was to come later, on January 1947, when the Army Medical Residency Program which lias brought so

much favorable attention to the Army Medical Service was officially launched.

In between is story of unusual courage and loyalty in response to an almost

cruel demand.

Soon after the outbreak of World War II, The Surgeon General had

available the cream of the medical profession with which to staff the hospitals

of the Army. Outstanding doctors from civilian life were appointed in the

Medical Corps by the thousands. This rapid growth brought with it tremendous demand for Medical Corps officers to fill administrative, command,

staff, and training assignments. The almost inevitable decision was made that

the Regular Army officers were the best fitted for these positions.

It had been planned that, after year or two, when Army of the United

States officers had had the opportunity to demonstrate their command and
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION 503

administrative abilities, at least some of the Regular Army officers would be

returned to professional assignments in the large hospitals in the Zone of Interior where they could share in the unusual professional opportunities then

available, and receive instruction and guidance from some of the outstanding

doctors who would then be on duty in these installations. The wisdom of the

decision is still debatable. The premise that the Regular Army medical officer

would fill the administrative and command positions with credit was amply

sustained. On the other hand, there was no question but that few Regular

Army medical officers could have made much greater contribution to the war

effort had they remained on purely professional duty. While leadership can

be developed, it must be based on an inherent characteristic. The record does

not show that this was an exclusive possession of the Regular Army officer.

Many Army of the United States medical officers made outstanding contributions to the war effort in medical staff and command positions. As the theaters

became virtually autonomous and the war spread around the globe, it never

became possible to reassign any substantial number of Regular Army medical

officers to professional work. All those who were physically qualified were

used in administrative, tactical, or command assignments throughout the war.

When the decision was made to place all Regular Army medical officers in

staff or command assignments, they were given corresponding primary MOS

(military occupational specialty) classification. Even though they were well

established professionally, the professional consultants in the Office of The

Surgeon General were reluctant to award them secondary MOS indicating

any appreciable degree of proficiency on the theory that, as most of them

lacked formal specialty training and there was no opportunity to observe them

professionally, they could not be properly evaluated. Only if an officer had

been certified by one of the professional specialty boards was he given “B”

prefix to his secondary MOS. Thus, for most of the Regular Army medical

officers, there was no official record of professional ability in the Classification

Branch. The Surgeon General able, nevertheless, to convince the various

civilian medical organizations concerned that the professional potential of the

Regular Army was great enough to justify graduate program comparable to

those offered in the approved civilian teaching hospitals.

It was important that plans be formulated in time to utilize the professional skill then available to the best advantage. Early in the year 1945, the

Personnel Service prepared study for the consideration of The Surgeon General. It was for planning purposes only, designed to show what could be done

professionally with the then current Regular Army Medical Corps by way of

staffing nine permanent hospitals with view to training Medical Corps officers for board certification. The study showed both those certified and those

who, though not certified, were sufficiently experienced to qualify in specialty.

It also showed the total number of board members needed to staff the hospitals where approval for residency training was desired, and the boardcertified officers who might serve within their appropriate specialties. Included in this group were names of men who obviously would remain in admin-
504 PERSONNEL

istrative work. The consultants in the office aided in the preparation of the

list. It was through the results of this study that The Surgeon General was

able to make rather convincing presentation to the Council of Medical Education and Hospitals of the American Medical Association in seeking approval

of Army hospitals for formal training. 30

Long before Y-E Lay, it was apparent that considerable preparation

would be needed before the Regular Army medical officer would be able to

take over completely the professional care of the Army. Necessary deviations

from Department of the Army and Army Service Forces policies were authorized, and on July 1945, Professional Training Committee was appointed

by The Surgeon General. Two months later, by Office Order No, 223, The

Surgeon General assigned to the various divisions of his Office specific responsibilities for the problem.

In August 1945, letter was addressed to all Regular Army officers by

the Deputy Surgeon General stating that the Chief of Staff had approved

plan for courses of instruction in professional training for Regular Army

Medical Corps officers, that the plan called for the assignment of these officers

to installations where professional training leading eventually to board certification would be carried out and also for training in outstanding civilian

installations. 31 The plan contemplated that those qualified as potential chiefs

and assistant chiefs of service would initially be assigned to such positions

as understudies, and that officers with less training and experience would

receive selected professional assignments based upon their qualifications with

the opportunity under competitive selection to receive the training that would

eventually lead to board certification. Each Regular Army officer was requested to submit statement to the Chief of Personnel, Office of The Surgeon

General, giving his preference as to either professional or administrative assignment and including specific training.

During the latter part of 1945, those who had indicated desire for specialized professional training were placed in the program as they returned

from overseas. Among the large number still out of the country, however,

were many who would have to seek certification by one of the specialty boards

at an early date if the formal training program was to start within the next

few years. The Surgeon General, early in January 1946, persuaded the

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, to have radiograms sent to the various theaters,

Defense Commands, and Departments asking for the return of certain named

officers at the earliest possible date. General Kirk supplemented this radiogram in some instances with direct communication either to the commanding

general or to the surgeon concerned. Most of the men requested were returned

within the next few months to begin their arduous course of preparation. It

was not easy for men in their late 40’s and even early 50’s, who were long out

30 Army Regulations No. 350—1010, 11 Feb. 1946. 31 The date was rubber stamped, and varied somewhat. The actual distribution of the letter was questionable. Certainly, many officers overseas never received it.
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION 505

of school, to undertake the strenuous study that would be needed to pass searching oral and written examinations before civilian boards.

It should be remembered that the Regular Army officers had not the same

economic reasons for seeking certification as civilian specialists. good many

were already in the grade of colonel, so rank was not factor. They had

been separated from their families, some over years, and were weary from

their war experience. What they quite honestly needed was some rest and

quiet, rather than intensive study with always the fear of failure haunting

them. They were some of the unsung heroes of the war, and to their credit,

most of them willingly accepted the challenge and came through with flying

colors.

In their efforts, they had tremendous assist from outstanding members

of the medical profession-men who not only verbally supported the idea,

but stayed on active duty in its interest well beyond the time that they were

eligible for discharge and frequently at considerable inconvenience to their

families and financial loss to themselves. Several of these later became the

nucleus of the consultant group, who from the very beginning lent their knowledge and prestige to the teaching program. Aid and encouragement also

came from those Regular Army medical officers who carried the full burden

of administrative responsibility while their fellow officers were in training.

Needless to say, the graduate professional training program could not have

been established nor carried on without the continuing aid and cooperation

of civilian medicine. The Council on Medical Education and hospitals of

the American Medical Association, the American College of Surgeons, the

Advisory Boards of the American Specialty Boards and the various specialty

boards, all rendered invaluable service.

POSTWAR PLANNING

Two important aspects of postwar planning, both growing directly out

of the needs and the experience of the conflict, properly belong in this volume.

These are the program for integrating Reserve officers into the Regular Army,

officially called the Regular Army Integration Program, and the establishment

of the Career Management Plan for Regular Army officers.

The Integration Program

Realizing that postwar conditions would necessitate an Army considerably

larger than that of prewar days, the War Department recommended and Congress authorized late in 1945 an increase in the commissioned strength of the

Regular Army to 25,000. 32 The act provided that appointments in the various

32 (1) 59 Stat. 663. (2) Memorandum, Maj. James H. Mackin, MSC, Office of The Surgeon General, for Chief, Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 24 June 1948, subject: Commissioning of Male Officers in the Various Corps of the Medical Department During the Integration

Period, 1946-47.
506 PERSONNEL

corps of the Regular Army were to be made in the grades of second lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, and major, subject to certain conditions and

limitations. One condition was that these appointments were to be made not

later than months following the date of the enactment of the act. This limitation of time was placed in order to attract as many officers as possible who had

served in World War II before they had returned home and become reestablished in civil life. Their combined experience was invaluable to the military

service, gained as it was infighting all over the world, in every kind of climate

from the tropics to thearctic, and under most difficultfield conditions.

The War Department moved immediately to implement the new law by

establishing eligibility for appointment and setting up rules for determiningservice credit and grades to which individual appointments would be made.

No officer was to be appointed in the Regular Army in grade higher than that

which he held during wartime.33 Less than months later, on August 1946,

Congress authorized the procurement of additional male officers to increase the

commissioned strength of the Regular Army to 50,000. 34 It is of interest to

note that separate means for determining qualifications for appointment were

not established for any corps of the Medical Department, thus doing away

with the longstanding requirement that applicants must pass written or oral

professional examination.

The Surgeon General was charged with final responsibility for selecting

applicants for the various corps of the Medical Service. To carry out this

responsibility, the Central Medical Department Examining Board was designated to make suitable recommendations regarding each applicant.35 There

was also screening board and review committee in the Surgeon General's Office, and an Integration Section was established in the Procurement Separation

and Reserve Branch of the Personnel Division which was responsible for the

necessary recordkeeping, processing of cases, and preparation of finalized

appointment lists. The Army Service Forces Review Board reviewed the

cases of all applicants whose appointments were not recommended by The

Surgeon General. This board was appointed by the Secretary of War to

assure that the integration program was conducted on fair and impartial

basis. This function was later taken over by the Secretary of War’s Personnel

Board.

Throughout the integration period, the vast majority of those of the Medical Corps whose age required their appointment in the grade of major were

selected because of outstanding professional qualifications and in most cases

were required to be diplomates of one of the American specialty boards. This

policy undoubtedly resulted in passing over many applicants in the older age

groups who, though they had rendered highly satisfactory wartime service,

were not established professional specialists.

33 War Department Circular No. 392, 29 Dec. 1945. 34 60 Stat. 925. Implemented by War Department Circular No. 289, 24 Sept. 1946. 33 War Department Special Orders No. 255, 25 Oct. 1945.
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION 507

Medical and Dental Corps

The last appointments into the Medical Corps of the Regular Army prior

to the integration program were made in 1944. The strength of the corps on

January 1946 was 1,214. Integration gains amounted to 374, while losses

during the period amounted to 367. Thus, the integration period produced

net gain of only seven officers for the Medical Corps. Although 3,000 of the

50,000 officer spaces under the two integration statutes had been allotted to the

Medical Corps, only 1,221 had been assigned as of 31 December 1947, leaving

1,779 vacancies.

The last appointments into the Dental Corps, Regular Army, prior to the

integration program, were made in January 1944. The strength of the corps

on January 1946 was 261. Integration gains amounted to 234, while losses

during the period amounted to 60. Thus, the integration period produced

net gain of 174, but left the corps still short by 308 officers of its authorized

strength of 743.

The results of the integration program as it related to the Medical and

Dental Corps in no way compared with the results for the Regular Army

as whole. Of the more than 45,000 eligible medical officers who had served

in World War II, only slightly over 500, hardly more than percent, had

seen fit to apply for Regular Army commission. The program did, however, provide new vigor for this corps as good many of the losses were

retirements for age or physical disability while the new appointees were

either professional specialists trained in some of the best medical centers of

the United States, or young officers with high military potential. It served

to keep the corps afloat while new legislation to make it more attractive to

the medical profession was being planned, and professional training programs established. While the Dental Corps filled larger percentage of its

new authorizations, much of the above discussion is also applicable. Indeed, the situation was not peculiar to the Army. The Navy and the Public

Health Service were encountering the same retention and procurement problems. This created an awareness, not only in the top levels of the military

service but also among members of Congress, that in order for the military

services to maintain Medical and Dental Corps of suitable size and quality,

some special provision would have to be made for their members to compensate for the extra time and money invested in their education and training,

and permit them to have standard of living at least closer to that of their

civilian counterparts.

On the recommendation of the Secretary of War, the necessary legislation

was enacted on August 1947.36 It increased the pay of doctors of medicine

and dentistry in the military services by $100 per month and authorized the

procurement of officers in all grades up to and including the grade of colonel.

36 61 Stat. 776 War DepartmentBulletin 21, 1947.
508 PERSONNEL

This was the first major legislative breakthrough in the specific interest of

these corps.

Veterinary Corps

The Veterinary Corps was in more favored position than the Medical

or Dental Corps in that it experienced an excess of qualified applicants over

the number of vacancies available. The strength of the corps as of January

1946 was 113. Integration gains amounted to 118, while losses during the

period amounted to 31, producing net gain of 87. The strength of the

corps had been established at 186. In order to permit the integration into

the Regular Army of as many qualified veterans of World War II as possible, authority was granted to carry temporary overstrength of 14 officers, giving strength of 200 as of 31 December 1947.

Medical Service Corps and its components

While provision was made in the law for appointment in the Medical

Administrative Corps up to the grade of captain, Circular 392 authorized

the appointment of Medical Administrative and Sanitary Corps officers of

the Army of the United States in the Pharmacy Corps, under the provisions

stated for that corps. This authority was the result of strong recommendations by The Surgeon General that these officers be given the advantage of

the higher ranks available in the Pharmacy Corps. As this was an interim

measure pending the securing of legislation authorizing the Medical Service

Corps, the special educational requirements for the Pharmacy Corps had to

be waived and additional ones added.

This corps was in the most favored position of all. It was considered

an extremely good “buy” in relation to the line. Consequently, it attracted

the interest of many officers who had served in various corps, other than those

in the Medical Department, during the war. Over 2,500 individuals applied

for commissions in the Pharmacy Corps, approximately 2*A times the ultimate number of vacancies.

The strength of the corps on January 1946 was 66. Integration gains

amounted to 727, while losses during the period amounted to 30, thus producing net gain of 697. The authorized strength of the corps as of January

1946 was 72. This was increased to 1,022 when the allocation of the 50,000

officers was made. As of 31 December 1947, there were 763 assigned and

259 vacancies. In the meantime, on August 1947, Congress passed the

Army-Navy Medical Service Corps Act of 1947 which established the Medical Service Corps and abolished the Medical Administrative Corps, Sanitary

Corps, and Pharmacy Corps.37

One might wonder why all the vacancies were not filled in view of the

large number of qualified applicants. This is accounted for by the fact that

37 G1 Stat. 734.
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION

the vast number of applicants for commissions in the Medical Service Corps

were qualified only for appointment in the Pharmacy, Supply, and Administration Section of the corps, which had been tentatively allocated only 60

percent of the position vacancies, the remaining 40 percent being distributed

between the Allied Science Section, Sanitary Engineering Section, and Optometry Section. The vacancies existing at the conclusion of the program

were in these three sections. It was not considered desirable to fill these

vacancies with individuals who were not qualified for one of these three sections, since should qualified individuals become available later for appointment there would be no position vacancies in which they could be placed.

Several attractive programs were then under consideration with view to

procuring officers for these sections. Some involved additional education at

Government expense. Most were eventually put into effect.

Career Management Program

All the advances during World War II were not made in the professional

or scientific fields. As the war in Europe progressed satisfactorily, and action

was being taken toward speeding up the contemplated invasion of Japan,

the one alarming shortage that appeared on the horizon was not of arms, food, or strategic material, but of manpower. This shortage was not limited

to the military services but was being keenly felt in many of the industries

and factories of the country. While some personnel management courses

were available in several of the colleges and universities prior to the war,

it was considered new and somewhat untried field. Many large business

organizations with modern, streamlined programs in other fields had completely ignored this one or were just becoming aware of its potentialities. The

Army’s plan, while not archaic, could hardly have been called progressive.

During the war, however, many studies were made on various levels which

brought out the need for more advanced thinking in this regard. “You’re

in the Army now” could no longer be accepted as the standard reply to any

young officer’s request for information concerning his job or its future.

It had been clearly demonstrated that most young Americans really are,

as often stated, rugged individualists and that they make better contribution in field in which their interests lie, or for which they have particular

aptitude or skill. It also showed that job classification not only improved

morale but increased production levels. Consequently, after the MOS system of job descriptions had been published and the success of the classification system seemed assured, the War Department made plans for the establishment of career management program for the Regular Army. The

chiefs of the various arms and services were called upon for assistance in

the development of the plan. The Surgeon General welcomed this opportunity. Such program would fit naturally into the already conceived Professional Training Program for the development of the specialists needed in the

Medical Service and would permit The Surgeon General, for the first time, to
510 PERSONNEL

give some assurance to the young physician, dentist, or allied scientist that

throughout most of his career in peacetime he would continue in the specialty

of his choice.

By way of implementation, The Surgeon General prepared and submitted to the War Department graphic representation of pattern for

each corps under his jurisdiction. Each pattern showed the various types

of assignment and training available to the members of that particular corps

during specific time intervals within 30-year period. Later, it was contemplated that similar personal pattern for each officer would be prepared

showing not only the opportunities in his particular field but also those for

transfer to broader fields as he advanced in rank and experience. While

the program was not officially announced until June 1948 by The Adjutant

General, it was one of the better byproducts of the war and, no doubt, was

tremendous factor later in procurement for, and retention in, the Regular

Army of many outstanding and especially qualified young officers,38 who were

to prove their worth in Korea.

Thus, well before the end of hostilities, The Surgeon General had turned

his attention not only to planning for the orderly return of personnel to civilian

life, and for maintaining large and qualified Reserve group composed of

both active and inactive members, but also to strengthening of the Regular

Army. All factors were assessed and gains consolidated. The Surgeon General, together with members of his staff and representatives of various echelons

of the War Department, had envisioned changes and planned necessary legislation that would result within the next or years in tremendous increase in the authorized strength of each corps of the Regular Army, and adequate

provision for the Reserve Corps, and would give to the Medical Department

large Medical Service Corps, composed of many outstanding administrative

and managerial officers as well as those qualified in the allied sciences. The

changes brought about also permitted nurses, physical therapists, dietitians, and occupational therapists to become an integral part of the Regular Army.

much closer liaison with civilian medical and allied professions was established-, and plans were well underway for excellent and modern professional

and military training and career guidance programs.

38 War Department Technical Manual 20-605, Career Management for Army Officers.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Although some materials used in the preparation of this volume came from civilian

sources and from other Government agencies, the vast bulk of the documentation both in

manuscript and in printed form is to be found in Army records located within the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. For matters pertaining to the Zone of Interior and the

determination of broad personnel policies, the best single source was the central files

of the Office of The Surgeon General for the war years, now deposited in the National

Archives. Here were copies of incoming and outgoing correspondence, reports, memorandums for record (often containing invaluable summaries of long or complex courses

of action), and minutes of conferences.

The Historical Division of the Surgeon General’s Office (now known as the Historical

Unit, UArmy Medical Service) collected documents during and after the war which

were especially useful in tracing the applications of policy and in following the personnel

history of particular areas at home and overseas. This material includes diaries, correspondence, and reports emanating from the various segments of the Surgeon General’s

Office. Among them are number of reports to the Historical Division showing the

highlights of personnel administration for various periods of the war. The material also

includes annual reports of medical units and medical sections of headquarters as well as

manuscript histories of some areas prepared, in most cases, under the direction of the

surgeons of theaters and field armies; for certain theaters, there is considerable material

of other types., such as orders, correspondence, and circular letters. These documents were

of special value in the preparation of the chapters dealing with manpower sources.

Also deposited in the Historical Unit are number of useful manuscript histories of

various components of the Medical Department. These include “Organized Nursing and

the Army in Three Wars,” by Col. Florence A. Blanchfield (Ret.) and Mary E. Standlee;

Lt. Col. Everett B. Miller’s history of the Veterinary Corps; Col. William A. Hardenbergh’s

“Organization and Administration of the Sanitary Engineering Division (Office of The

Surgeon General)”; Col. Emma Vogel’s “Physical Therapists of the Medical Department”;

and the work entitled “History of the Army Dietitian.” The Historical Unit’s, file of

annual reports of The Surgeon General to the Secretary of War yielded important data

concerning personnel administration. These reports ceased to be published after the

fiscal year 1941, but during the war years, annual summaries of events prepared by the

Historical Division for Army Service Forces headquarters to some extent took the place of

the published reports.

The Historical Unit at one time housed histories, reports, and correspondence accumulated in the Office of the Air Surgeon. These are now in the custody of the historical office

of the Surgeon General of the Air Force.

The files of The Surgeon General’s Resources Analysis Division contained material

of value for personnel history during the latter part of the war. They were arranged

both chronologically and by subject and since the elimination of that Division have been

distributed among The Surgeon General’s Personnel Division, Executive Office, and Comptroller’s Office. Other extremely useful sources of information were the files of the

Adjutant General’s Office, the General Staff (particularly G-l), and Army Service Forces

headquarters, which contained material regarding medical personnel matters involving

those agencies. Manuscript and “processed” histories on file in the Office of the Chief of

Military History, Department of the Army, as well as printed volumes of the “official”

history, were also used, both to obtain additional data pertaining to the Medical De-
512 PERSONNEL

partment and to gain fuller understanding of developments which affected that Department in common with other branches of the Army.

Statistical materials were obtained in all of the groups of records mentioned, but

certain sources of such data deserve special mention. Of particular significance for

discussions of strength, promotions, and rank was the series originally prepared in mimeographed form by the Returns Section, Miscellaneous Division, Adjutant General’s Office,

in 1940 and known as the Quarterly Station Strength Report, Continental and Foreign.

This became monthly publication during the later emergency period and eventually

was issued in printed form under the title “Strength of the Army” (STM-30) by the

Machine Records Branch, Office of The Adjutant General.

Another important publication of similar character was issued from October 1942

to May 1946. It was known as Personnel Section No. Monthly Progress Report until

August 1945 when the title was changed to Personnel and Training No. Monthly Progress

Report. From October 1942 through January 1943, it was prepared by the Control Division, Army Service Forces; from 28 February through 31 August 1943, by The Adjutant

General’s Office; and from 30 September 1943 through 31 May 1946, by the Director

of Personnel, Army Service Forces. It has been used mainly for data concerning strength

of civilian personnel of the Medical Department. For authorized strengths of Medical

Department units and medical complements of other organizations the “troop bases”

and “troop lists” were used; these were published as early as 1941. For the purposes

mentioned, the most extensive use was made of the “Troop List for Operations and Supply,”

prepared monthly, from July 1944 until after the end of hostilities, by the Strength

Accounting and Reporting Office of the War Department.

Data pertaining to strength and replacements in the European theater also were

obtained from serial document issued by the theater’s Services of Supply (and successor

commands) beginning in July 1942. Under the title “Statistical Summary” and later

“Progress Report,” this appeared several times month until 1945, when it was issued

monthly and renamed “Progress Report, Section 1.” Parts of this series are filed in

the Record Center at Kansas City and in the Historical Unit, U.S. Army Medical Service.

Additional data on strength and rank were derived from one of the sources of

“Strength of the Army,” that is, the reports on W.D., A.G.O. Form No. 323 which are

now in the custody of the Departmental Records Branch of the Adjutant General’s

Office. Another source of “Strength of the Army,” the monthly statistical summary

prepared in processed form by the Promotion Section, Officers Branch, Office of The

Adjutant General, from November 1944 to June 1945 also was utilized. This series

is on file in the Promotion Section, Personnel Actions Branch, Adjutant General’s Office.

Finally, considerable use has been made of the Department of the Army’s “Army Battle

Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II, Final Report, December 1941-

31 December 1946” [Washington, D.C., June 1943].

Records of civilian agencies of the Government were studied primarily for the history of personnel policies. They included printed material; for example, transcripts

of Congressional hearings, the Statutes at Large of the United States, and unpublished

correspondence and minutes of meetings of the Directing Board and subordinate committees of the Procurement and Assignment Service of the War Manpower Commission.

Medical, dental, and similar journals revealed the attitudes taken by professional organizations toward Army and Medical Department personnel policies and, in letters to the

editors, the views of individuals who were affected by these policies.

Despite the vast number of War Department records pertaining to medical personnel matters that were produced during World War II. many decisions were made

by officers and civilian employees of the Department either in conference or by telephone

without written record of what took place. To help fill the gaps in the record as well
REDEPLOYMENT, RETRAINING, AND DEMOBILIZATION 513

as to reconcile conflicting evidence and to develop proper perspective, many such individuals were interviewed in person or by telephone for their knowledge and opinions

concerning various matters. similar use was made of correspondence, now filed in

the Historical Unit. Information obtained in this way has been used especially in

the oversea sections of the chapters on strength and utilization of personnel. Finally,

the chapters have been circulated in draft form among persons responsible for decisions

taken on the subjects discussed in this study and their comments have been taken into

account in the preparation of the final version.

Index

Abell, Dr. Irvin, 149

Absent without leave, personnel loss to

Army due to, 432

Accra, 259

Act of April 1939-122-123

authorized strength of Regular Army officer corps fixed by, 122

modification of, 122

Act of 13 December 1941, tour of active duty

extended by, 130,167

Acting Surgeon General, 65, 66, 233

Activation, of field medical units, 59

Active-duty strength, of Medical Department groups, by Army components, 112

Adjusted service rating scores

abolishment of, 494

for enlisted personnel, 491, 492

for female Medical Department officers,

488

for male Medical Department officers, 488

for Medical Department enlisted technicians, 491, 492

for redeployment, 487, 488

forrelease, 487, 488, 499

Adjutant, Medical Administrative Corps officer serving as,

Adjutant General, The, 21, 33, 58, 111, 112,

143, 146, 152, 160, 173, 175, 176, 233,

235, 510

assignments made by, 293, 307

classification system of, 270, 287

duty orders issued by, 122, 180

list of scarce specialists published by,

285-286

Medical Corps officers relieved from nonprofessional duties by, 79

reassignment by, 236, 238

Adjutant General’s Office, The, 269

Replacement Section of, 293

Administration:

for personnel matters, 21-52

authority for, 21

in theaters of operations, 47-52

in Zone of Interior,

of demobilization, 495-496

Administrative actions, replacement personnel made available by, 301-303

Administrative Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 23

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Administrative duties, medical officers relieved from, 78, 303

Administrative functions:

for professional groups, 290, 296

of Medical Department, 1-2

Advance Section, Communications Zone,

European theater, 240

Advisory Commission, to Council of National

Defense, 156,161

Advisory Committee, to Nursing Supply and

Distribution Service, War Manpower

Commission, 226

Affiliated hospital units, 3,168

commanding officers of, 144

deferment of active duty for members of,

146-148

enlisted personnel for, 143

In European theater, 208

in South Pacific, 208

Medical Corps Reserve officers in, 146

Medical Department officers in, 147

organization of, 143-145

organized for call to service, 168

problems with:

delay in activation of, 209

keeping units intact, 207-208

morale, 209

revival of, 62,141-145

source of officer personnel, 206

technicians for, 233

undermanning of, 307

use of,

women elements of, 207

Africa, 254

Africa-Middle East theater, 382, 383

native labor employed in, 259

Age, 490

as criteria for release, 488, 489

discharge for, 445—447

for assignment to Army Nurse Corps, 225

for induction into military service, 167, 201

forregistration for military service, 167

for return to civilian life, 437

limit of, on Medical Department Reserve

officers, 123
516 INDEX

Age-in-grade, removal of restrictions on,

167

Aides:

nurses’, 251, 254, 380

occupationaltherapy, 165

physiotherapy, 165, 252, 254, 271, 304

Aidmen, Medical Badge for, 337

Air Corps, 21, 38

organization of, for personnel administration, 26-27

See also ArmyAir Forces.

Air CorpsReserve, 57

Air Forces Station Hospital, Tuskegee, Ala.,

319

Air Surgeon, 38, 69, 179, 223, 224

procurement by, 176

Air Surgeon’s Office, organization of, 38

See also Office of the Air Surgeon.

Air Transport Command, 397

Airways Communication System, 397

Alaska,108, 382

Alaskan Defense Command, 384

Alexander, Col. Stewart F., 336

Alien physicians, requirements of, for commission in Army of the United States, 152

Allied assault landing,plans for, 68

Allies, 228

Allocation of Medical Personnel Committee,

Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 170,172

Allotment:

control of, 37

of enlisted men, 63, 64

of officers, 55

to oversea areas, 1942—384

Allowances, resignation for insufficiency of,

451

Allowances of personnel:

readjustment of, 313-314

oversea units, 313-314

Zone of Interior, 314

system of bulk authorizations for, 43-45

Ambulance companies, 396

American Alumni of British Medical

Schools, 149

American Board of Ophthalmology, 267

American College of Hospital Administration, 214

American College of Physicians, 269

American College of Surgeons, 141, 269, 505

American Dental Association, 162, 171, 172,

468

American Institute of Pharmacy, 213

American Jewish Congress, 148

American Medical Association, 141,148, 159,

160, 162, 170, 171, 172, 176, 177, 269,

273, 297, 501

Bureau of Medical Economics of, 73

Committee on Medical Preparedness of,

149, 156-159,161, 171, 268

contribution of, to procurement, 156, 158,

159

Council on Education and Hospitals of,

192, 503, 505

American National Red Cross. See Red

Cross.

American Nurses Association, 164

American Public Health Association, 172

American Red Cross Hospital Service, 419

American specialtyboards: in classification of Medical Corps officers,

273

percent of Medical Corps officers diplomates of, 267

American Surgical Association, 193

American Veterinary Medical Association,

171

“American Women and Our Wounded Men,”

229

Animals, veterinary care of, 7, 396

Antilles Department, 266

Applicants:

Cadet nurses, 251

for Army Nurse Corps, 134, 228

for Medical CorpsReserve, 139

Appointment(s)

in Medical CorpsReserve, 148

of The Surgeon General,

qualifications for, to—

Army Nurse Corps, 8-9

Sanitary Corps Reserve,

suspension of, in Dental Corps Reserve, 57

Arm and Service Assignment Group, 22, 127,

160, 289

Armed Forces, 19, 74, 172, 173, 176, 199,

203, 225, 297, 453

Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives. See House Armed Services

Committee.

Army Air Corps. See Army Air Forces.

Army Air Forces, 26, 33, 43, 98, 99, 175, 181,

203, 223-224, 234, 238, 276, 312, 397, 470,

488

allotments to, 72

classification manual of, 277

classification of medical officers in, 273—

274

commanding general of, 47
INDEX 517

Army AirForces —Continued

creation of, 40

doctors recruited by, 315

medical personnel assigned overseas, 398,

399

medical specialists in, 315

Army animals, veterinary care of, 7, 396

Army General Classification Test scores, 235,

286

of medical recruits, 234

of Negroes, 323

Army Ground Forces, 98, 153, 181, 203, 238,

243, 276, 280, 315, 470, 488

allotments to, 72

Commanding General of, 294

creation of, 40

medical specialists in, 315

Office of the Surgeon of, 81

Army hospitals, training in, 503-504

Army Medical Center, 43, 99, 250, 295, 454

Army Medical Library, 250

Army Medical Museum, 43, 250

Army Medical Residency Program, 502

Army-Navy Medical Service Corps Act of

1947, establishes Medical Service Corps,

508

Army Nurse Corps, 1, 56, 84-87, 101, 131,

134-135, 221-231, 225, 277, 413, 476

age for, 225

cadet nurses commissioned in, 251

composition of, 8-9

discharges from, 225

grades in, 462-463

increase in ceiling of, 87

male officers appointed in,

marital status for, 225

Negro personnel, 318, 322

pay in, 453

procurement for, 135

measures to speed, 223-225

1942-43—221-231

1944-45—227-231

Procurement and Assignment Service

in, 225-231

Red Cross in, 222

promotions in, 467, 468

qualifications for appointment to, 134

ratio of, to—-

beds, 86

overall Army strength, 84

Reserves of,

separation from;

age, 489

point score, 489

Army Nurse Corps—Continued

strength of, 54,112, 227, 228, 229, 230

ceiling, 229-230

1939—112

overseas, 371, 373

superintendent of, 84, 222, 225, 228, 230

Technical Information Branch of, 228

uniforms, 221

See also Nurses.

Army of the United States, 5, 9, 17, 47, 102,

111, 130, 151, 152, 155, 174, 181, 202,

215,464

female physicians commissioned in, 155

Medical Administrative Corps section of,

professional students commissioned in,

199-201

professional retraining for medical officers in,500-502

promotion in, 454

strength of, worldwide and overseas, 404,

405, 410

Army Regulations:

No. 140-33, 30 July 1936, pertaining to

candidates for Medical Corps Reserve,

148

No. 615-25, Sept. 1940, on classification

of enlisted men, 286

No. 40-2035, 18 Dec. 1942, governing veterinarians, 77

No. 605-95, January 1943, on classification

of officers, 270

Army Service Forces, 31, 98, 202, 215, 231,

274, 296, 312-313, 314, 315, 438, 455,

470, 488, 492

Army Air Forces medical officers transferred to, 33

bulk-authorization system established by,

43-45

commanding general of, 34, 40, 41, 42, 84,

87, 236, 316, 490, 502

creation of, 40

directs officers to complete classification

forms, 275

directs The Surgeon General to modify

plan for utilization of medical officers,

72

jurisdiction over general hospitals, 312

jurisdiction over surplus Medical Department officers, 488

medical specialists in, 315

Military Personnel Division of, 87, 294

Officer Procurement Service of, 231

promotion restrictions of, 465
518 INDEX

Army ServiceForces—Continued

proper utilization of personnel directed

by 238

representative of, on Committee to Study

the Medical Department,

sets ceiling on Dental Corps strength, 76

survey of military personnel in, 295

Army Service Forces Circular No. 59, 26

Feb. 1944, on promotion of officers, 465

Army Service Forces Review Board, 506

Army Specialist Corps, 79

abolished, 102

Army Specialized Training Program, 8, 195-

196, 197, 201-206, 212, 276, 496

curtailment of, 203-206

dental phase, 204

medical phase, 205-20(5

veterinary phase, 204

discontinuance of veterinary phase of, 197

enrollment of professional students in, 206

establishment of, 201

output of professional students, 206

status of members of, 202

Army War Shows, Inc., 223

Assam, 258, 329

Assignment(s), 289-297

consultants in, 296

decentralization of, 292

during war years, 295-297

enlisted men, 29? -297

to Medical Department, 165

factor of classification in, 289

ofcadet nurses, 251

of Negro Medical Administrative Corps

officers, 321

of personnel,

officer replacement pools in, 292

problem of, 289-291

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l—58, 67, 132,

173, 438

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2—152

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3—217

Assistant Civilian Aide, to Secretary of

War, 323

Assistant Secretary of War, 153, 189

Assistant Surgeon General, U.S. Public

Health Service, 456

Assistants, for The Surgeon General,

Association of American Medical Colleges,

192

Association of Collegiate Schools of Nursing,

164

ASTP. See Army Specialized Training

Program.

Atabrine, 500

Atlantic Refining Corporation, 30

AUS. Sec Army of the United States.

Australia, 254, 256, 257

Authorizations, bulk, system of, 43-45, 314

Authorized officer strength of Medical Department, in 1939—53

Auxiliary surgical group(s), 314

5th—107

Availability, of personnel;

data on supply of, 35

for military service, 173,185-186, 187,195

Aviation medical examiner, rating as, 47

Axis Powers, 67

defeat of, 487

Bacteriologists, 212, 242

Baker, Capt. Francis E., 325

Base K, Leyte, 257

Base Section, United Kingdom, 327

“Basic Curricula,” of Army Specialized

Training Program, 203

Basic military training, 192

Basis for calculation of nurse requirements.

55

Battalion surgeon’s assistant(s), Medical

Administrative Corps officers as, 218, 380

Battalions, medical. See Field medical

units.

Battle casualty rates, of Medical Department, compared with total Army, 420-430

Battle of the Bulge, 107, 302

Biochemists, 212

Blanciifield, Col. Florence A., 228

Bliss, Maj. Gen. Raymond W., 36

Board for the Investigation and Control

of Influenza and Other Epidemic Diseases

in the Army, 250

Bousfield, Lt. Col. Midian W., 320

"Branch immaterial” officers, (50, 79

Bronze Star Medal, award of, 337

to Medical Department personnel, 337

Bulk authorizations, system of, 43-45, 314 Bureau of Medical Economics, American

Medical Association, 73

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 156

Bureau of Placement, War Manpower Commission, 169, 226

Burma, 254, 259

Burns, Helen C., 16

Cadet nurses, 101, 228, 243, 380

in Army hospitals, 251

induction of, 230

Calcutta, 259

Caldwell, Col. George L., 197
INDEX 519

Camps. See Military installations.

Captains, of Medical Corps, promotion of,

452

Capture, of Medical Department personnel,

427, 432

Cardiologist, 282

Career Management Program, 509-510

Caribbean Defense Command, 266

Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 326

See also Military installations.

Carstens, Col. Henry K., 344

Casuals:

for oversea replacements, 303-305

from Zone of Interior, 471

Catholic nuns, utilized as nurses, 254

Central Medical Department Examining

Board, 113, 506

Central Pacific Area, 308. 257, 258, 382

classification system in, 284

Certificate of appreciation, awarded to 61st

Station Hospital, 210

Chairman, War Manpower Commission, 74

Chaplains, in Medical Department, 3. 439

Chemical laboratory technicians, 165

Chemical Warfare Service, 234

ChicagoCollege of Medicine, 151

Chief(s), of—

Military Personnel Division, 23

Personnel Service, 27, 30

Preventive Medicine Division, 29

Professional Service Division, 23

Staff. 21, 47, 68,126, 129, 205

VeterinaryDivision, 197, 200

Chief Consultant in Medicine, European

theater. 282

Chief Consultant in Surgery, European

theater, 282

Chief Surgeon:

European theater, 176, 208, 282

Southwest Pacific Area, 284

U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 397

Chief Surgeon’s Office, U.S. Army Forces in

the Middle East, 245

Children’s Bureau, Department of Labor, 172

China, 254, 259

China-Burma-India theater. 382, 383, 386

classification system in. 284

natives utilized in, 258-259

rotation in, 332-333

shortage of Medical Corps officers in, 304

Chinese military forces, medical care for,

386

Chiropractors, 156

fi03076 —63 .35

Ch’ung-Ch’ing, China, 259

Cincinnati College of Eclectic Medicine, 351

Circulars, War Department, on—-

authorizations of personnel, 314

change of table of organization of general

hospitals, 303

classification procedures for Medical Department officers, 283

commissions in Sanitary Corps, 212, 213

policy of rotation, 332

proficiency qualifications of officers, 277

See also specific War Department Circular.

Citizenship, in relation to State licensing

examinations, 152

Civil Service Commission, 101, 251

Civilian components, of Medical Department, 19

Civilian Conservation Corps, 5-6,125, 248

Medical Department officers assigned to,

5-6

Civilian Defense, Office of, 251

Civilian employees, in Medical Department

installations, 43

Civilian medical profession, survey of, by

Committee on Medical Preparedness, 156

Civilian medical service:

medical personnel for, under war conditions, 160

ratio of physicians to population recommended for, 74

Civilian needs:

determination of medical manpower for,

172

discharge for, 447

forreturn to civilian life, 437

Civilian nurses, 221

Civilian nurses’ aides. 101, 254

Civilian occupational classification of enlisted personnel, guide for, 285

Civilian personnel, procurement of, 247-266

Civilian Personnel Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 27, 29

functions of, 29

organization of, 29

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Civilian Personnel (Field) Subdivision, Finance and Supply Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 23

Civilian physicians, available for military

service, roster of, 160

Civilian reaction, to Medical Officer Recruiting Boards,

Civilian strength, of Medical Department,
520 INDEX

Civilian workers, utilization of, in Medical

Department units, Mediterranean, theater,

260, 261

Civilians, 100-102, 420

direct commissioning of, for Medical Administrative Corps, 214, 215

employed by Medical Department, 63, 499

pay of, 464

enlisted personnel replaced by, 63, 64

guide for employment of, in event of mobilization, 65

problems in hiring of, 63, 64

saving of military personnel effected by

utilization of, 255

substitutes for military personel, 100

Classification, 3, 267-287

assistance of Committee on Medical Preparedness in, 159

directive on procedures of, 283

enlisted personnel, 284—287

factor of, in assignment, 289

female officers, 1943-45—274-284

improvements in,

male officers, 1943-45—274-284

measures of, 274—277

instructions of The Surgeon General,

275-276

questionnaires,275

nurses:

1939-41—267-270

officers:

1939-41—267-270

1941-43—270-274

role of Classification Branch in, 276-277

role of consultants in, 278

system of: background, 267-268

development of, overseas, 281-283

evaluation of, 279-281

uniformity of, in theaters of operations,

283-284

uniformity in, 277-278

“Classification Questionnaire of Medical Department Officers,” AVD AGO Form No.

178-2—129, 273, 275

Clearing companies, 396

Clerical workers, civilian, 254

Code number system, establishment of, in

classification of officers, 271

Collecting companies, 396

College training, of officer candidates, 212

Combat divisions, triangular organization

of, 313

Combat Infantryman Badge, 337

Combat missions, factor of, in determining

hospital personnel strength, 386

Combat Team, 442d Regimental, 153

Command functions, of Medical Corps officers,

Commander, Ground Forces Replacement

System, 239

Commander in Chief. See Roosevelt, Franklin Delano.

Commanders, in oversea theaters, personnel functions of, 47-49

Commanding General: Army Air Forces, 47

Army Ground Forces, 294

Army Service Forces, 34, 40-42, 84, 87,

236, 316, 488, 490, 502

Ground Forces Replacement System, European theater, 301

Services of Supply, 179, 181, 320

Commissioned officers, legislation increasing

pay of, 462

Commissioned status:

for female doctors, 154-155

for minority groups, 156

rejected, for women dentists, 155

See also Military status.

Commissioned Subdivision, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, 22, 27

renamed as division, 27

Commissioning, of interns, 138

Commissions:

direct, 168

for alien physicians, 152

for female doctors and dentists, 154—156

for graduates of foreign schools, 148-150

for graduates of unapproved American

medical schools, 150-152

for Japanese-American medical personnel, 153-154

Committee on Allocation of Medical Personnel, Procurement and Assignment Service, 73

Committee on Education and Labor, U.S.

Senate, report of subcommittee of, on

procurement of doctors for armed services, 194

Committee on Medical Preparedness, American Medical Association, 149, 156-

159, 161, 171

classification of physicians, 268-269

survey of physicians, 156, 268-269
INDEX 521

Committee on Sanitary Engineering, National Research Council, 211

Committee to Study the Medical Department

of the Army, 154, 178, 222, 225, 273, 463

appointment of,

complaints to, on misassignment of professsional personnel, 291

critical of procurement activities of Nursing Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, 224

members of,

ratio of doctors for the U.S. Army studied

by, 69

recommendations of, on—-

replacement of Medical Corps officers, 79

use of Wacs, 99

Communications Zone, European theater,

217, 239, 260, 301

prisoner-of-war labor in, 327

Company grade officers, Medical Department, Medical Badge authorized for, 337

Components, of U.S. Army, 5, 111

Composition, of Medical Department, 1-19

civilian components, 19

introduction, 1-4

military components, 4-18

overseas, 405-420

Armycomponents, 405-411

by sex, 413

Negro personnel, 411-412

Comptroller of the United States, 155

Compulsory military service, extension of;

to special groups,

Congress, 53, 54, 55, 58, 60, 112, 122, 125,

130, 133, 187, 194, 201, 229, 248, 337, 453,

455, 462, 464, 505-506

on demobilization criteria for Medical

Department officers,

passes peacetime selective service act, 54

responsibility of, for Medical Department

personnel strength, 53

Congressional Medal of Honor, to Medical

Department personnel, 337

Conservation, of manpower,

Construction and Repair of Hospitals Fund,

248

Consultant system:

establishment of, 272

factor of, in assignment and utilization of

personnel, 46

Consultants:

civilian, 250

in classification of officers, 278

role of, in personnel assignment, 296

Continent, the, 261, 304, 327, 328

invasion, 383

Continental Advance Section, European

theater, 264

Continental United States. See Zone of

Interior.

Contract surgeons, 6, 250

female doctors serving as, 154

Control Division, Army Service Forces, 31,

70

Convalescent furloughs, period of, 313

Convalescent hospitals;

creation of, 312

guide for utilization of personnel in, 312

in Zone of Interior, 88

Convalescent patients, utilization of, in

hospital activities, 239

Corps Area Assignment Group, 22, 127, 289

strength of, 30 June 1939—26

Corps area commander(s), 24, 25, 55, 123,

158

applications for commission in Medical

Department Reserve Corps submitted

to, 111

authorized to commission professional

students in Medical Administrative

Corps, Army of the United States, 199-

201

authorized to procure Reserve nurses, 135

See also Service command commander(s).

Corps area committees, of Procurement and

Assignment Service, 170

Corps area headquarters, 268

Corps area surgeon (s), 159, 289

authority of, to

appoint applicants to Reserve Corps, 132

employ civilians for station hospitals,

248

responsibility of, for medical personnel

functions, 24-25

See also Service command surgeon(s).

Corps areas, organization of, for personnel

administration, 24-26

See also Service commands.

Corps of Chaplains, 55

Council of Medical Education and Hospitals,

American Medical Association, 503, 505

Council of National Defense

Advisory Commission to, 156,161

Health and Medical Committee of, 161

Council on Education and Hospitals, American Medical Association, 192

County committees, of Procurement and

Assignment Service, 170
522 INDEX

Criteria, for—-

recruitment of professional personnel, 173

release of enlisted personnel, 490

release of officers:

congressional reaction to, 493-494

differences in for medical and nonmedical officers, 494-495

during partial demobilization,

reduction of, 493-495

Critical score. Sec Adjusted service rating

score.

Criticism(s)

of Medical Officer Recruiting Boards, 178

of “9-9-9 plan,” 192

on assignment of medical officers, 289

on rotation of nurses, 335

Curtailment, of Army Specialized Training

Program, 203-206

Cutler, Col. Elliott C., 282

Dalton, Brig. Gen. Joseph N., 44-45

Danielson, Lt. Col. Ida W., 230

)-day, 107, 302, 330, 333

DI )T,500

Death rate, Medical Department personnel,

436

Decentralization, of personnel administration, 40-45, 454

Decorations:

Bronze Star Medal, 337

certificate of appreciation, 210

Combat InfantrymanBadge, 337

Congressional Medal of Honor, 337

Expert Infantryman Badge, 337

Medical Badge, 337

Defense Health and Welfare Services, Office

of, 162,169

Demobilization, 4, 437, 487-510

administration of, 495-496

discharges, 448

factor of, in personnelplanning, 36

full-scale, 491-495

new officer procurement during, 496-499

partial, 487-491

reduction of criteria for, 493-495

voluntary service continued during, 499

Denit, Brig. Gen. Guy B., 284

Dental Corps, 1. 4, 56, 59, 75-76, 177, 203, 277

ceiling for, 76

classification in, 279-280

deficits in, 58

discharge rates in, 438

establishment of,

field grades in, 456

general officers in, 456

Dental Corps—Continued

Negro personnel in, 318

of Regular Army, integration gains in,

507-508

pay increase in,507, 508

procurement for, 195-196

sources of, 195-196

promotions in, 455, 469

strength of, 53, 180-181, 196, 204

overseas, 371

vacancies in, 112

Dental Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 7, 23, 28,132, 296, 502

director of, 75

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Dental hygienists, 165, 286

for affiliated hospital units, 207

Dental laboratory technicians, 286, 492

Dental mechanics, 165

Dental officers:

assigned to Medical Officer Recruiting

Board, 177

duties of, 6-7

morale of, in oversea theaters, 330

pay of, adjustments in,

rank of, adjustments in,

ratio of, to enlisted strength, 75

refresher courses for, before separation,

502

Dental phase, of Army Specialized Training

Program, termination of, 204

Dental students:

commissioned in Medical Administrative

Corps, Army of the United States, 199-

200

deferment of, for occupational reasons. 139

discontinuance of Army Specialized

TrainingProgram for, 196

in Army Specialized Training Program

commissioning of, upon graduation, 202-

203

school costs for, 202

with Reserve commissions, transferred to

Medical Administrative Corps Reserve,

137

Dentistry Committee, Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 170

Dentists, 169, 381

classification of, 279-280

direct commissions for, 180

draft of, 134

induction of, as enlisted men, 132, 133
INDEX 523

Dentists —-Continued

procurement of, 496—497

See also Dental Corps; Dental officers.

Department of Agriculture, 172

Department of Justice, 152

Department of Labor, 172 Dependents, of Army personnel, medical

care for, 2, 282-283, 296

Depots, medical supply, 59

Deputy Chief of Staff, 69, 72. 86, 455

Deputy Surgeon General, 204. 335

Desegregation,in U.S. Army,

Desertion, personnel loss to Army due to, 432

Detachments of patients, replacement personnel from, 298

Diehl, Dr. Harold S., 73

Dietitians, 84, 88-90, 155, 165, 271, 304

civilian, 29, 42, 252

for affiliated units, 207

grade distribution for. 462

in World War 1,16

military status of, 154

officer status for, 9-17

pay for, 464

procurement of, 231-232

objective, 232

Officer Procurement Service in, 231 rank of, 17

ratio of, to hospital beds, 88

requirements for, 90

separation of:

age for, 489

point score for. 489

strength of, 90, 232

overseas, 371

student-apprenticeprogram for, 232

Superintendent of. 16

Women’s Army Corps members commissioned as, 232

Direct commissions, for—-

doctors, 168

Medical Administrative Corps, 214, 215,

215-217

medicalpersonnel, 180

Sanitary Corps, 212

Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 69, 150, 162, 188, 211

advisory committees of, 170

Chairman of. 169,176,184,187

committees of, 172

members of nursing profession appointed

to, 227

proposal of “9-9-9 plan,” 192

Director:

Dental Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, 75

Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, 184

Military Training, Army Service Forces,

202

Selective Service System, instructions of,

to Medical Officer Recruiting Boards,

178

War Manpower Commission, 69

Women’s Army Corps, 244

“Directory of Medical Specialists,” 273

Discharge(s)

civilian needs, 447

demobilization,448

for age, 445

for disability, 438-444

for hardship, 447

for physical and mental disability, 438

from ArmyNurse Corps, 225

inefficiency, 447

misconduct, 447

of dental students, for failure to convert

commissions, 200

of medical students, 205

Disease(s):

immunization against, as function of Medical Department,

prevention of, as function of Medical Department, 306

Disease rates, factor of, in determining hospital personnel strength, 386

Dispensary (ies), 396

general, 59

Displaced persons, utilized in Medical Department activities, 328, 329

Distribution of personnel:

control of, 37

overseas, 339-405

Zone of Interior, 339-405

District committees, of Procurement and

Assignment Service, 170

District of Columbia, 148,151

Division of Medical Sciences, National Research Council, 161, 273

Doctors, 169

classification of, 279

direct commissions for, 180

draft of, 72, 177. 185, 186-190

ratio of, to Army strength, 72

training of, in military subjects, 219

See also Contract surgeons; Medical

Corps Medical officers; Physicians.
INDEX 524

Dorr, Goldthwaite, 229

Draft, of—-

dentists, 196

doctors, 72,184, 185, 186-190

nurses, 229-231

Draft boards, 132

deferments granted by, 138, 139

nurses classified by, 227

See also Selective service boards.

Draft law. See Selective Training and

Service Act.

Eanes, Col. Richard H., 131

Effect of selective service legislation, on

procurement, 131-134

E. I. Dupont de Nemours, 30

Eighth U.S. Army, authorized and actual

strength of medical personnel in, 107

Eligibility for separation, criteria of, for—-

enlisted personnel, 490

officers, 487-489

Emergency Management, Office for, 169

Emergency measures, for procurement of

Medical Department officers, 124

Emirau, 383

Engineer Corps, 234

Engineers, in Medical Department, 1, 419

England, 54, 154

Enlisted Branch, Office of The Surgeon General, 91

Enlisted men, 56, 60-65, 91-98

age for discharge of, 446

assignments of, 293-295

combat recognition for, 337-338

commissions for, 166

direct commissioning of, in Medical Administrative Corps, 214, 215-217

in oversea theaters, 215-217

in Zone of Interior, 215

for affiliated units, 143

in Medical Department,

Medical Badge authorized for, 337

of Regular Army, quotas for, 53

pay increase for,

legislation for, 462

procurement of:

during emergencyperiod, 164-166

in oversea theaters, 239-242

in Zone of Interior, 233-239

replacement of, by civilians, 63. 64

table-of-organization allotment of. 94

training for, 165

Enlisted personnel:

classification of, 284-287

difficulties encountered in. 286-287

guides for, 285

operation of, 286-287

reevaluations of, 287

criteria for release of, 490

reduction of,

of Medical Department,

procurement of, 233-246

promotion for, 470

Enlisted Reserve, Medical Department, 165

Enlisted Reserve Corps, 201, 205, 207, 446

technicians enrolledin, 233

Enlisted Subdivision, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 22,

23,27

Enlisted technicians:

recruitment of, for affiliated units, 207

schools for, 235

Enlisted women. 99

in Medical Department:

oversea theaters, 245-246

Zone of Interior, 242-245

Enlistment, voluntary, in Medical Department, 164

Enrollment:

in Registry of Medical Technologists, 165

of professional students, in Army Specialized Training Program, 206

Entomologists, improper classification as,

281

Espiritu Santo. 482

Essentiality of professional personnel, in

civilian community, 173,185

Europe, 54, 108, 228, 239, 243, 329

cessation of hostilities in, 383, 487

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army,

48, 83, 105, 217, 239, 240. 255, 279, 298,

301, 303, 316, 317, 382, 383, 386, 487

affiliated units in, 208

cessation of hostilities in, 330

civilians employed in medical installations in 254, 260-261, 262

classification system in, 281-283, 284

general hospitals reorganized in. 301

Ground Forces Reinforcement Command

of, 302-303

limited-assignment personnel replacing

general-assignment personnel in, 239, 240

Medical Department strength in. 306

non-table-of-organization allotment for,

103-104

Office of the Chief Surgeon of, 52
INDEX 525

European Theater of Operations—Con.

organization for personnel administration in, 52

rotation in, 332, 333, 334

shortages of Medical Department officers

in, 107

shortage of nurses in, 230-231

station hospitals reorganized in, 301

surplus of medical officers in, 301

Evacuation, 296

Evacuation hospitals, 59

See also Field medical units; Hospitals,

evacuation.

Evans, Lt. Col. Robert AA'. AA ., 270, 284

Executive Office of the President, 169

Expansion of Medical Department, problems

of,

Expert Infantryman Badge, 337

Factors, affecting determination of requirements, 58-66

Federalization, of National Guard, 58, 124,

339

Female dentists, 155-156

Female dietetic personnel. See Dietitians.

Female doctors, 154—155

service of, as contract surgeons, 154

Female Medical Technicians campaign, 242-

243

Female officer components of Medical Department, 3, 17

Female personnel, proportion of, in Medical

Department, 413, 414

Field commands, role of, in classification of

officers, 272-274

Field medical units:

activation of, 59

ambulance battalion, 61

medical battalions, 59

hospitals:

evacuation, 59, 61

general, 59

station, 59

surgical, 59, 61

laboratory, medical, 59

personnel for, 59

regiments, medical, 59, 61

squadron, medical, 61

See also evacuation hospitals.

Fielding, Col. Fred J.. 83

Fifth U.S. Army, 216, 382

Finance and Supply Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 23

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Finance Department, 234

First lieutenants, of Medical Corps, promotion of, 452

First Reserve, of the Red Cross, 135, 222, 223

First U.S. Army, 302, 326

First World War. See WorldWar I.

Fitts, Col. Francis M., 202

Fixed installations in oversea theaters, civilian clerical workers in, 254

Flight surgeons:

morale of, 330

rating as, 47

Food inspection, as function of Medical Department,

Foods, of animal origin, inspection of, by

Veterinary Corps officers,

Foreign medical schools, graduates of, 148-

150

standards for,

utilization of,

Fourth Service Command, survey of Medical

Department officers at, 295

France, 143, 254, 261, 302, 327

Functions, of

Medical Department, 1-2

Procurement and Assignment Service,

170-173

Resources Analysis Division, 36-37

Furloughs, in effective utilization of personnel, 331

G-l (personnel), 21, 40, 55, 58, 63, 72, 79,

85, 86, 87, 132, 159, 173, 182, 184, 187,

188, 197, 438, 492

See also War Department General Staff.

G-2 (intelligence), 152

See also War Department General Staff.

G-3 (operations) 63, 64, 84, 204, 217

See also War Department General Staff.

G-4 (logistics), 65

See also AVar Department General Staff.

General hospitals:

for care of prisoners of war, 324-325

manning tables for, 314

Negro AVAC hospital companies in, 322

oversea shipment of, 316

Protective Mobilization Plans for number

of, 62

reorganization of, under T/O 8-550, July

1944—301

The Surgeon General employs civilians

for, 248

War Department directive on change of

table of organization of, 303

See also Hospitals, general.
526 INDEX

General Staff. See War Department General Staff.

Geneva Convention of 1929—324

German control of Europe, 54

German prisoners of war, for Medical Department activities, 327-329

Germany, 37, 90, 143, 231,246, 283, 487

defeat of, 87, 488

Gibson, Truman, 323

Ginzberg,Eli, 35, 37

Glennan General Hospital, Okmulgee, Okla.,

325

Goethals, Col. Thomas R., 144

Governors. See State Governors.

Grades, for female medical technicians, 244

Graduates, of —•

foreign medical schools:

standards for,

utilization of,

unapproved medical schools, commissions

for, in Medical Corps, Army of the

United States, 150-151

Grant, Laura, 227

Great Britain,

ratio of physicians to population in, 68,

261

Ground Forces Reinforcement Command,

European theater, 302-303

Medical Department personnel supplied

by, 298

Ground Forces Replacement System, European theater, 239

commanding general of, 301

Ground Surgeon, 69

Groups, Medical Department, 112

Growth, of Medical Department, before

Pearl Harbor,

Guam, 331

Guardsmen:

geographic restriction on use of, 54,124

removal of, 167

induction of, into Federal service, 58

Guides, for—-

classification of enlisted personnel, 285-

286

utilization of personnel. See Manning

guides.

Gynecologists,282, 296

Hall, Col. Durward G., 30, 229, 494, 501

Hardship:

discharge for. 447

return to civilian life for, 437

Hasting Air Base, 245

Hawaiian Department, 384

Hawaiian Islands, 257, 258

Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 33, 203

elements of:

Control Division, 31, 79

Military Personnel Division, 87, 184, 294

Military TrainingDivision, 202

See also Army Service Forces.

Health and Medical Committee, Council of

National Defense, 161, 162

National Nursing Council for War Service, 226

Subcommittee on Medical Education, mi

Hobby, Col. Oveta Culp, 244

Hollandia, 52

Hospital center(s)

813th—327, 328

814th—225

815th—255

Protective Mobilization Plans for number

of, 62

Hospital Dietitians,

creation of.

oversea strength of, 371

See also Dietitians.

Hospital Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, 35

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Hospital internship, 192, 193

Hospital staffs, civilians on, 248

Hospital system:

changes in, to economize on personnel, 31,

312

expansion of, 248

Hospitalization:

personnel loss to Army due to, 432

reduction of time of, 313

Hospitals:

Negro personnel for, 318-320

shipment of. with less than tahle-of-organizationcomplement, 316-317

WAC table-of-organization companies in,

244-245

Hospitals, affiliated. Sec Affiliated hospital

units.

Hospitals Committee, Directing Board. Procurement and Assignment Service, 170

Hospitals, convalescent, 312

Red Cross workers assigned to, 419

table of organization for. 95

Hospitals, evacuation;

affiliated, 142.144

Red Cross workers assigned to, 419

See also evacuation hospitals; field medical units.
INDEX

H.R. 227, the nurse draft, 229-231

Hudnall, Col. James R., 30

Hutter, Col. Charles G., 158

Illiterates, definition of, 234

Immigration and Naturalization Service,

Department of Justice, 152

Immunization, as function of Medical Department,

Imprisonment, for misconduct, personnel

loss to Army due to, 432

Inactive Reserve, 122

India, 258-259, 329

India-Burma theater, 245

Inductees, period of service for, 54

Industrial Health and Medicine Committee,

Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 170

Industrial hygiene engineers, 212

Inefficiency:

discharge for, 447

return to civilian life for, 437

Infantry Division, 93d—320, 321

Infantrymen, combat recognition for, 337

Information Committee, Directing Board,

Procurement and Assignment Service, 170

Information forms. See Questionnaires. Insect and rodent control, as function of

Medical Department,

Inspector General, 85

Inspector General’s Office, 314

Instruction (s)

in medical techniques, 165

of Director, Selective Service System, to

Medical Officer Recruiting Boards, 178

of The Surgeon General:

on classification of officers, 275-276

to Medical OfficerRecruiting Board, 174 Integration program, 505-508

Interns, 139

commissioning of, 138

effect of selective service on military

status of, 137

military obligations of, 137

Intratheater rotation of medical officers,

332-334

Ireland, 332

Italian armistice, 326

Italian campaign, 334, 383

Italian service troops, for

Medical Department activities, 326

Medical Department units, 260

Italy, 260,304.329

Japan, 204, 205, 489, 494, 509

Hospitals, field, Red Cross workers assigned

to, 419

Hospitals, general:

affiliated, 142,144,208

named:

Gardiner, 322

Glennan, 325

Halloran, 322

Lovell, 322

Percy Jones, 101

Thomas M. England, 322

Tilton, 322

Valley Forge, 325

Wakeman, 322

Walter Reed, 16, 454, 502

numbered:

3d—109

5th—332

6th—144

17th—144

18th—258

19th—144

20th—258

30th—208

42d—239

46th—144

49th—254, 257

71st—208

96th—232

98th—246

116th—246

118th—306

133d—245

203d—261

218th—258

table of organization for, 94

Hospitals, portable surgical, 9th—306

Hospitals, station;

affiliated, 142

manning guides for, 91

numbered:

2d—256

61st—210

67th—259

95th—254, 259

125th—257

159th—259

tables of organization for, 91

Hospitals, surgical, affiliated, 142,144

House Military Committee. 230

Housing sanitation, as function of Medical

Department,

Howard University Medical School, 318

663076—63 36
528 INDEX

Japanese-American medical personnel, 153-

154

dentists, 153

nurses, 153-154

physicians, 153

utilization of, in Medical Department,

Jeffcott, Col. GeorgeF., 76

Job categories,in classification system, 282

Job specifications, for Army jobs, 270-271

Johns Hopkins University, 211

Johnson, Senator Edwin C., 231

Journal of the American Medical Association, 158-159

Judge Advocate General, 129

Karachi, India, 259

Kenner, Maj. Gen. Albert W., 30

Kenner Board, 30

Kirk, Maj. Gen. Norman T., 31, 37, 80, 82,

84, 465, 466, 501, 504

See also Surgeon General, The.

Korea, 570

Kristal, Dr. J. John, 149

K’un-ming, China, 254

Labor, local: availability of, 255-256

saving of military personnel effected by

utilization of, 255

Labor troops, native, for Medical Department activities, 329

Laboratory, medical, 59

See also Field medical units.

Laboratory officers, refresher courses for,

before separation, 502

Laboratory technicians, 165

Lae, New Guinea, 256

Lag, in procurement of nurses, 228

Laiiey, Dr. Frank II., 169, 176, 187

Lawlah, Dean John W., 318

Leaves, in effective utilization of personnel,

331

Legislation:

active-duty tour extended by, 130, 167

for manpower in the Army, 167

Medical Service Corps established, 508

on Army Nurse Corps grades, 462

on pay increase, 462, 463

on selective service, 131-134

pertaining to commissioning of licensed

female physicians, 155

pertaining to reservists, 122,124

compulsory active duty, 129

proposed, for draft of nurses, 229-231

strength of Regular Army officer corps

authorized by, 122

Leland, Dr. Rosco G., 73

Leyte, 254

Liaison, between

Office of The Surgeon General and Committee on Medical Preparedness, 159

Procurement and Assignment Service and

Selective Service System, 170

Liaison officers, 158,162

Liberia, 259

Limited-service personnel, 167, 231—236

Army policy concerning, 235

in oversea theaters, 239-242

transfer of, to Medical Department. 29S

with Medical Department, 235

Lippmann,Walter, 229

List, of critically needed specialists, 237,

238, 239

Liston, Col. David E., 82

Litter bearers, 306

German prisoners of war utilized as, 326

natives utilized as, 256, 259

Local draft boards. See Draftboards.

Local labor:

availability of, 255-256

saving of military personnel effected by

utilization of, 255

London, 330

Long, Col. Perrin H., 282

Losses, 420-449

factors affecting rate of, 420-432

permanent, 432-449

deaths, 436

return to civilian life, 437, 439-442

Love, Brig. Gen. Albert G., 149

Low Countries, 143

Lueth, Lt. Col. Harold C., 158

Lull, Maj. Gen. GeorgeF., 23, 27. 30

Luzon, 254

McCloy, John J., 189

McIntire, Vice Adm. Ross T., Surgeon General of the Navy, 74

McNutt, Paul V., 74, 162, 169, 175, 177, 187,

188,189

on special draft of doctors, 189

Magee, Maj. Gen. James C., 17, 37. 61, 62,

63, 64, 65, 67, 69, 74, 142, 143, 144. 184

See also Surgeon General. The.

Malaria control units, natives utilized in,

235, 256, 257, 258, 259

Male nurses, in Army Nurse Corps,

Male officer components, of Medical Department,
INDEX 529

Male officers, appointment of, in Army Nurse

Corps,

Manning guides, 90

for dietitians, 88

for physical therapists, 88

for Zone of Interior hospitals, 91, 312

Manpower, conservation of,

Manpower Board, War Department, 32, 314

Marine Corps, 77

Marital status, for Army nurses, 225

Marshall, Gen. George C., 244

Mayo Clinic, 208

Meat and dairy hygiene inspectors, 165

Medical Administrative Corps, 1, 7, 17, 56,

78-84, 124, 166, 195, 212, 214-220, 277, 462, 476

abolishment of, 508

authorized strength of, 53

dischargerate in, 438

misassignment of officers to, 213

Negro personnel, 318, 321-322

officers of:

assigned as battalion surgeon’s assistants,

80

substituted for Medical Corps officers, 70,

80, 81, 82. 218

oversea strength of, 371, 373

procurement for;

by direct commissioning of civilians,

214, 215

by direct commissioning of enlisted men,

214,215-217

officer candidate schools, 217-219

rank in, 455

reservists of:

response of, to active duty, 126

substitutes for Medical Corps reservists, 60

separation from: age for, 489

point score for, 489

strength of, 218, 219

training for, 81,126

transfer of limited-service officers to, 298

vacancies in, 112

Medical aidmen, Medical Badge authorized

for, 337

Medical and Health Committee, Office of

Defense Health and Welfare Services,

Subcommittee on Nursing of. 163-164, 223

Medical and Hospital Department Fund,

Army, 248

Medical Badge, authorization of, 337-338

Medical Corps, 1, 6, 56, 58, 67-74, 111, 146,

150-151,168-195, 205, 277

classification of officers of, 274-275

criteria for release from, reduction of,

493

deficits in, 58

discharge rates in, 438

field grades in, 456

general officers in, 456

Negro personnel, 318

of Regular Army:

appointment of women doctors in,

integrationgains, 507-508

pay increase in, 507-508

position categories established in, 268

procurement for:

by direct commissions, 180

control of, shifted to service command

commanders, 179

in 1944-190-193

increase in, in 1942—180-181

lag in, during first months of the war,

168

lag in, in 1943-182-184

Medical Officer Recruiting Boards in,

173-181

“9-9-9 plan,” 192-192

Officer Procurement Service, in 181-182

Procurement and Assignment Service

in, 169-173

special draft of doctors proposed, 186-

190

the Reynolds Plan, 184-185

promotion in, 453, 455

rank In:

of women doctors, 155

problem of, 469

reservists of, response to active duty, 126

separation from:

age for, 489

point score for, 489

strength of, 180-181

in 1939—53

in 1943—72

maximum, 73

overseas, 371, 373

vacancies in, 112

Medical Corps Reserve, 451, 452

Army regulations pertaining to candidates for, 148

Medical students applying for commissions in, 139

promotions in, 452

resignation from, 451
530 INDEX

Medical Department, 132, 137, 151, 155, 156,

163, 166, 168, 171, 212, 215, 232, 268,

270, 274, 290, 294

active-duty strength of, by Army components, 112

additional sources of professional personnel for, 148-156

battle casualty rates of. 420-430

civilian employees of, 101

contract surgeons, 250

contribution of, 102

dietitians, 252

employing agent for, 248

funds for payment of. 248, 249

geographic distribution of, 264-266

nonprofessional personnel, 252

nursing personnel, 250-251

occupational therapists, 251-252

physiotherapyaides, 252

Red Cross workers, 252

strength of, 250

types utilized in oversea theaters, 253-

255

components added to,

composition of, 1-19

overseas, 405-420

Congressional Medal of Honor awarded

to personnel of, 337

enlisted men in, 233

illiterates, 233-234

key technicians, 236-239

limited-service, 234-236

oversea theaters, 239-242

rank of, 483, 485

enlisted personnel of: criteria for release of, 490

distribution of, 95

ratio of, to total Army strength, 62

specialists, 492

Enlisted Reserve of, 165

enlisted strength of, 54, 1(54

of total Army strength, 91, 92

enlisted women in:

as technicians, 99

in oversea theaters, 245-246

in Zone of Interior, 242-245

functions of, 1-2, 396

general officers in. 456

increase in supply of officers for, 125

Japanese-Americans in,

military components of, 9-18

Negro personnel, 4, 318

non-Medical Department personnel in,

419-420

MedicalDepartment—Continued

officer candidate schools of, 217-219

officer components of, 1, 3,

strength of, 53-54

officers of:

allotment of, to oversea areas, 1942—384

assigned to Veterans’ Administration,

339

in affiliated medical units, 146

shortages, 58-59

Officers Reserve Corps, procurement objectives for, 55

personnel of field forces utilized in, 64

personnel offices of, 49-52

physical therapists recruited for, 231

Procurement and Assignment Service in

personnel procurement program of, 73,

74

professional retraining by, 500-505

rank in, 456

redistribution of officers of, 315-316

Reserve officers allotted to, 55

responsibilities of,

retention of trained noncommissioned officers in, 166

specialization restricted in, in peacetime,

267

strength of, 339-449

in 1939—53

in 1944—1

in oversea areas, 105

on Dec. 1941—9

transfer of qualified noncommissioned officers from, 294

units of, 396

Negro, 411, 412

operating strength of, in oversea theaters, 385, 387

Wacs trained for work of, 243

War Department responsibilities for personnel for, 54-57

Medical Department enlisted men. See Enlisted men.

Medical depots, 396

Medical Division, Office of Chief of Air

Corps, 21, 26

Medical Education Committee, Directing

Board, Procurement and Assignment

Service, 170

Medical entomologists, 212

Medical Field Service School, 217, 218, 219,

289, 454

Medical gas treatment battalions, 396
INDEX 531

Medical installations;

Air Forces Station Hospital, Tuskegee,

Ala., 319

Negro Station Hospital, Fort Huachuca,

Ariz., 319

Medical laboratories, 59, 396

See also Field medical units.

Medical missionaries, commissioned in Medical Department, 180

Medical Officer Recruiting Boards, 173-181,

191

accomplishment of, 175,180

Air Forces medical officers on duty with,

176

civilian reaction to, 178-179

closing of, 179

dental officers assigned to duty with, 177

establishment of, 173

instructions of Director, Selective Service

System, to, 178

instructions of The Surgeon General to,

174

procedures for, 173-174

Procurement and Assignment Service reaction to, 176-177

testimony of Chairman, War Manpower

Commission, on, 178

The Surgeon General’s control of, 175

Medical officers:

duties of,

morale of, in oversea theaters, 330

pay of,

rank of,

ratio of, to enlisted strength, 68

refresher courses for, before separation,

501

relieved of administrative duties, 78, 303

transfer of, from Air to Service Forces,

315

Medical Practice Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 28

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Medical Preparedness Committee. American

Medical Association, 149,156-159,171

Medical regiments, 59, 61

See also Field medical units.

Medical replacement training centers, 60,

80. 217. 235, 292, 320, 454

establishment of, 165

See also Military installations.

Medical schools, foreign, graduates of, 1,

Medical Section, Mediterranean theater, 52

Medical service:

ofNational Guard, 58

United States standards of, comparedwith

that of GreatBritain, 68

Medical Service Corps:

establishment of, 508

integration gains in, 508

Medical Society of New Jersey, 210

Medical specialists training, 193

Medical students, 136-138

commissioned in Medical Administrative

Corps, 199

deferred, for occupational reasons, 139

effect of selective service on military

status of, 137

in Army SpecializedTrainingProgram

commissioning of, upon graduation,

202-203

school costs for, 202

military obligations of, 137

supply of,

with Reserve commissions, transferred to

Medical Administrative Corps Reserve,

137

Medical supply depots, 59

Medical supply officer, Medical Administrative Corps officer serving as,

Medical technicians, 218, 236, 244, 286, 306,

492

assignmentof, 295

channelling of, to Medical Department,

295

Wacs trained as, 243

Medical technologists, 165

Medicine:

consultant in, inEuropean theater, 282

North African theater, 282

Office of The Surgeon General, 272 supply of students of,

Medicine and Surgery, Bureau of, 156

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S.

Army, 47, 240, 382, 487

classification system in, 283-284

limited-assignment personnel replacing

general-assignment personnel in, 239-

240

organization for personnel administration

in, 52

replacements for, 304

rotation in, 334

shortage of nurses in, 230-231

skilled civilian workers for Medical Department in, 254
532 INDEX

Memorandums, War Department:

on critically needed specialists, 237

See also specific War Department Memorandum.

Mental disability:

dischargefor, 438

for return to civilian life, 437

Mess officer, Medical Administrative Corps

officer serving as,

Middle Pacific Area, shortages of medical

and surgical specialists in, 108

Middlesex University College of Medicine,

151,152

Middleton, Col. William S., 282

Military components, of Medical Department, 4—18

prewar period, 1939-41—5-9

Army Nurse Corps, 8-9

Ilental Corps, 6-7

enlisted personnel,

Medical Administrative Corps,

Medical Corps,

Sanitary Corps,

Veterinary Corps,

Physical Therapists, 9-17

Dietitians, 9-17

Pharmacy Corps, 17-18

Physical Therapists, 9-17

Military District of Washington, 99, 501

Military Establishment, 67, 77

Military installations: Camp Atterbury, 322

Camp Barkeley, 80, 81, 165, 217, 218, 219,

235, 321

Camp Forrest, 324

Camp Grant, 60, 80,165

Camp Lee, 60,165

Camp Livingston, 318

Camp Pickett, 80

Camp Shelby, 153

Carlisle Barracks, 126, 217, 218, 318, 321

Fort Bragg,318

Fort Devens, 322

Fort Dix, 322

Fort Huacbuca, 319, 320, 321

Fort McPherson, 243

Military Intelligence Service, 152

Military necessity, in demobilization, 495-

496

Military occupational classification of enlisted personnel, guide for, 285

Military occupational specialty, 270-271,

279, 503

Military Personnel Division, Army Service

Forces, 87,184, 294

Military Personnel Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 32

chief of, 22, 23

organization of, 27

redesignation of, 27

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Military Personnel Division, Services of

Supply, 173, 224

Military Police, 324

Military preparedness program, 54

Military service: age for, 167

change from voluntary to involuntary,

124-125

deferment of, for—-

members of affiliated units, 146-148

reservists, 127-129

extension of compulsory,

inventory, 125

Military status, of

medical students, 137

physical therapists, 154

residents, 137

Military strength, of Medical Department,

Milne Bay, 256

Minority groups, commissioned status for.

156

Misassignment(s), 289, 291-295, 296

causes of, 292

of enlistedmen, 293

extent of, 294

of officers, 291-292

in Medical Administrative and Sanitary

Corps, 213

Misconduct:

discharge for, 447

for return to civilian life, 437

imprisonment for, 432

Missing in action, personnel loss to Army

due to, 430, 432

Missionaries, medical, commissioned in

Medical Department, 180

Mobilization, beginning of, 405

system of classification, 270

Mobilization guide, for employment of civilians, 65

Mobilization planning, responsibility for

health and medical aspects of,

Mobilization Regulations 1-10, Mar. 1943

47
INDEX 533

Morale:

factor of, in efficient utilization of personnel, 329-337

in affiliated units, 209

Mourmelon, France, 327

Munich, 246

National Association of Colored Graduate

Nurses, 164

National Board of Medical Examiners, 148

National Defense Act, of

1916—7, 53

1920—53, 54, 60, 91, 111

National Guard, 5, 9, 63, 111, 112, 159, 164,

248, 269, 290, 452, 454

call to active duty of physicians in, 168

compulsory active duty for, 129

federalization of, 58,124, 339

geographic restriction on use of, 54, 125

removal of, 167

Medical Department officer corps in,

promotions in, 452

strength of: changes in, 112

worldwide and overseas, 404, 405, 410

National Guard-Reserve Act of 27 Aug.

1940—54

National Inventory of Nurses, 227

National League of Nursing Education, 164

National Medical Association, 320

National Nursing Council for War Service,

164, 227, 228, 229

organizations representedby, 164

Subcommittee on Nursing of Health and

Medical Committee of, 226

Supply and Distribution Committee of,

223

National Organization for Public Health

Nursing, 164

National Red Cross, American. See Red

Cross

National Research Council, 170, 269

Committee on Sanitary Engineering of,

211

Division of Medical Sciences of, 161, 273

in classification of officers, 269

National Roster of Scientific and Specialized

Personnel, 170, 171

established, 269

function, 269

in classification of officers, 269

National Survey of Registered Nurses, 164,

171

Native labor troops, for Medical Department activities, 329

Naturalized physicians, requirements of, for

commissions in Army of the United States,

152

Naval Reserve, female physicians commissioned in, 155

Navy College Training Program (V-12),

201, 203

Navy Department, 203

Navy Surgeon General, 71

Negro Health Committee, Directing Board,

Procurement and Assignment Service, 170

Negro infantry division, 320, 321

Negro personnel:

hospital personnel, 318-320

in Army Nurse Corps, 322

in Medical Administrative Corps, 321-322

in Medical Corps, 318

in sanitary companies, 320-321

in Women’s Army Corps, 322-323

strength, 411-412

utilization of, 3, 4, 317-324

Neuropsychiatrists, 291

Neuropsychiatry, consultant in, Office of The

Surgeon General, 272

New Caledonia, 220

New Guinea, 52, 254, 256

Newspapers:

article on nurse shortages, 229

criticism in, on rejection of Nisei nurses,

154

“9-9-9 plan,” in Medical Corps:

criticism of, 192

procurement, 192-193

Nisei nurses, military duty for, 153-154

Nonafflliated units, 307

Noncommissioned officers, of Medical Department, 166

Nonprofessional personnel, of Medical Department, 252

“Nonprotected” personnel, category of prisoner of war, 324, 325

See also Prisoners of war.

Non-table-of-organization personnel, for European theater, 303

Normandy campaign, 326

North Africa, 210

medical units for invasion of, 302

North African theater, 48, 216, 217, 331, 382,

383

civilian personnel in medical units of,

260-261

classification system in, 281-283

deactivation of station hospitals in, 301

rotation in, 334
534 INDEX

North African theater—Continued

skilled civilian workers for Medical Department in,254

surplus of Medical Department personnel

in, 108

See also Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army.

North America, 382

Northern Ireland, 332

Norway, 143

Nuremberg, 246

Nurse Corps. See Army Nurse Corps.

Nurses, 155,169, 207, 304

civilian, 380

classification of:

code number system in, 271

directives on, 270

during 1939-41—267-270

during 1941-43—270-274

distribution of, 88

draft of, 87

proposed legislation, 229-231

duties of,

failure of, to volunteer, 228, 229

for affiliated units, 207

full officer status for, 17

morale of, in oversea theaters, 330

of Japanese ancestry, policy for commissioning of, 153-154

of Regular Army, authorization for, 54

pay of:

during emergency period, 453

increase in,462,463, 464

rank of,

recruitment of, 135

Nurses’ aides, 254, 380

quota for, 251

strength, 251

training of, 251

Nursing Advisory Committee, Directing

Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 170

Nursing Council for National Defense, 171

Nursing Division, Directing Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 170

functions of, 226-227

organization of, 227

Nursing Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 23, 84, 222, 224, 229

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Nursing profession, organization of, for defense, 163-164

Nursing Service, of the Red Cross, 134

Nursing Supply and Distribution Service,

War Manpower Commission, 226

Advisory Committee to, 226

See also Nursing Division, Procurement

and Assignment Service.

Nutrition,

Obstetricians, 282, 296

Occupational groups, exempted from selective service, 131

Occupational specialists, Medical Department

bacteriologists, 212, 213, 242-243

biochemists, 212, 213

dental hygienist, 286

dental laboratory technicians, 236, 243,

245, 246, 286, 492

entomologist,281

industrial hygiene engineers, 212

laboratory officer, 212

laboratory technicians, 218, 236, 243

medical entomologists, 212

medical technicians, 218, 236, 243, 244,

245, 246, 286, 306, 492

optician, 286

optometrists, 242-243

orthopedic mechanic, 242, 286

orthopedic technicians, 492

parasitologists, 212, 213

pharmacists, 242-243, 286

psychiatric social workers, 101

sanitary engineers, 211, 213, 280-281

sanitary technician, 286

serologists, 212

surgical technicians, 218, 236, 243, 244,

286, 306

veterinary surgical technician, 286

X-ray technicians, 243, 286, 492

Occupational therapists, 102, 251-252

Occupational therapy aides, 165

Office for Emergency Management:

Office of Defense Health and Welfare

Services of, 169

War Manpower Commission of, 169

Office of Civilian Defense, 251

Office of Defense Health and Welfare

Services, 162

Director of, 169

Medical and Health Committee of, 164. 223

Procurement and Assignment Service of,

169

Office of the Air Surgeon:

organization of, for personnel administration, 38
INDEX 535

Office of the Air Surgeon—Continued

subordinate elements of:

Nursing Section, 38

Personnel Division, 38, 40, 224

Office of the Chief of Air Corps, Medical

fivision of, 21, 26

Office of the Chief Surgeon, European theater, 52, 245

Personnel Division of, 302

Professional Services Division of, 282

Office of the Secretary of War, 127

Office of the Surgeon, Antilles Department,

266

Office of the Surgeon, Army Ground Forces,

81

Office of The Surgeon General, 3, 16, 19, 62.

63, (54, 90, 95, 133, 143, 154, 162, 170, 173,

178, 182, 190, 203, 204, 231, 248, 253, 268,

274, 290, 296, 305, 317, 323, 335, 488, 489

civilians in, 247

consultants in:

medicine, 272

neuropsychiatry, 297

surgery, 297

control of medical personnel reestablished

in, 45

discontinues direct commissioning of enlisted men, 215

estimates of, on nurse requirements, 84

liaison with Committee on Medical Preparedness, 158

organization of, for personnel administration, 21-24

January 1939—27

August 1942—28

February 1944—37, 38, 39

May 1945—37, 38, 39

reorganization of, 27-37

role of, in classification of officers, 271-272

revision of organization of,

subordinate elements of:

Administrative Division, 23

Civilian Personnel Division, 250

Classification Branch, 271-272, 276, 278,

280, 284

Commissioned Division, 27

Dental Division, 7, 23, 28, 75, 132, 296,

502

Enlisted Branch, 91, 323

Finance and Supply Division, 23

General Surgical Branch, 297

Hospital Division, 35

Integration Section, 506

Office of the Surgeon General—Continued

subordinate elements of—continued

Medical Consultants Division, 296

Medical Practice Division. 28

Military Personnel Division, 22, 27, 28,

32. 191, 228, 229, 230, 250, 270, 272,

280, 284, 323, 469

Neuropsychiatry Consultants Division,

296

Nursing Division, 23, 84, 222, 224. 229,

296

Operations Service, 36, 84

Personnel Division, 84, 111, 149, 500, 506

Personnel Planning and Placement

Branch, 315

Personnel Service, 75, 86, 171, 221, 228,

250, 279, 283, 291, 294, 324, 493-494,

501, 503-504

Physical Standards Division, 1(57

Preventive Medicine Service, 28, 296

Procurement Separation and Reserve

Branch, 506

Professional Service Division, 23

Reconditioning Consultants Division,

296

Reserve Subdivision, 143

Resources Analysis Division, 35, 36, 37

Sanitary Engineering Division, 281, 320

Strategic and Logistics Planning Unit,

87

Supply Service, 455

Surgical Consultants Division, 296, 297

TrainingDivision, 500, 501

Veterinary Division, 23, 28, 197, 200,

204, 296

Officer candidate schools:

for Medical Administrative Corps, 126, 212

in Zone of Interior, 217-219

Negro graduates of, 321

oversea theaters, 219, 220

“Officer Civilian Classification,” Army Regulations No. 605-95—270

Officer components, of Medical Department,

1,3,5

“Officer Military Classification and Job

Specifications,” Army Regulations No.

60.5-95—270

Officer procurement, during demobilization,

496-499

effects of, 497-499

Officer Procurement Service, 179, ISO, 181-

185, 212, 270

establishment of, 181
536 INDEX

Officer Procurement Service—Continued

in procurement of

dietitians and physical therapists, 231

nurses, 224

technologists,243

procedures for, 181-182

Officer replacement pools, 292

Officer strength, overseas, 414, 415

Officers:

classification of:

code number system in, 271

consultants in, 272

directive on, 270

during 1939-41—267-270

during 1941-43—270-274

Office of The Surgeon General in, 271-

272

role of field commands in, 272-274

sources of information for, 273

within Air Forces, 273-274

male, appointment of, in Army Nurse

Corps,

of Medical Department. See Army Nurse

Corps; Dental Corps; Hospital Dietitians Medical Administrative Corps;

Medical Corps; Pharmacy Corps; Physical Therapists; Sanitary Corps; Veterinary Corps,

of Regular Army, quotas for, 53

pay increase for,

Officers’ Reserve Corps, 130, 136, 137, 141,

166

changes in strength of, 112

commissions in Medical Department Reserve corps of, 112

procurement objective for sections of, 55

suspension of appointments to, 56

Okinawa, 180

OperationTORCH, 68

Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 317

Operations Service, Office of The Surgeon

General, 34, 35, 84

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Opticians, 286

Optometrists, 156, 242

Ordnance Department, 234

Organization:

for personnel matters, 21-52

changes in.

in theaters of operations,47-52

in Zone of Interior, 4, 21-46

of Procurement and Assignment Service,

169-170

Organized Reserves, 111, 144

See also Reserves.

Orthopedic mechanics, 165, 242, 286

Orthopedic technicians, 492

Osteopaths, 156

Oversea duty, extra compensation for, 462

Oversea service, as criteria for release, 488

Oversea strength:

in major commands, 398-404

regional, 382-397

variation in, 380

Oversea theaters:

authorization for direct commissioning in.

215

distribution of Medical Department personnel in, 339-404

by corps and groups, 371-382

Medical Department installations in:

civilianemployees for, 253-266

enlisted men in, 239-242

enlisted women for, 245-246

local labor utilized in, 255-266

non-Medical Department personnel for,

419-420

prisoners of war utilized in, 325-329

morale problems, 330-337

officer candidate schools in, 219, 220

sources of replacement personnel:

casuals from Zone of Interior, 303-305

personnel made available by administrative actions, 301-303

personnel released from hospitals, 298-

300

temporary personnel. 306-307

tahle-of-organization strength of attached

medical personnel and divisional medical battalions, 385

Oversea units, factors in requirement of:

additional tahle-of-organization units, 104

losses, 102-103

non-table-of-organizatiou allotments, 103-

104

reorganized tahle-of-organization units,

104

shortages, 105-109

Owen Stanley Mountains, 256

Pacific islands, 254

Pacific Ocean Areas, 382

general hospitals shipped to, 317

Pacific theaters, 284, 487

Paden, Col. Paul A.. 41, 83, 111, 162

Panama Canal Department, 266, 384

Parasitologists, 212

Paris, 52
INDEX 537

Patterson, Robert P., Under Secretary of

War. 140

Pay, 451-485

adjustments in,

during emergencyperiod, 451-453

of nurses, 453

of officers, 451-453

in early war years, 454—464

of dietitians, 464

of nurses, 462-463

of officers, 454-456

of physical therapists, 464

increase in, 462, 463

later war years, 464-470 ofofficers, 464-467

morale factor of, 451

resignation for insufficiency of, 451

Pay Readjustment Act of 1942—163

Peacetime selective service act. See Selective Training and Service Act.

Pearl Harbor, 2, 16, 47, 67, 73, 126, 130, 139,

146, 160, 167, 168, 199, 208, 210, 221, 254,

270, 290, 339, 380, 384, 452, 453, 476, 500

Percy Jones General Hospital, Mich., 101

Permanent losses, 420—449

influences affecting rate of, 420-432

types of, 432-449

Persian Gulf Command, 383

ratio of civilian hospital workers to military medical personnel in, 259

Personal hygiene, measures for, as function

of Medical Department,

Personnel Control Branch, Personnel Service, Office of The Surgeon General, 37

Personnel Division:

Office of the Air Surgeon, 38, 223

Office of the Chief Surgeon, European

theater, 52

Office of The Surgeon General, 84, 111,

149, 500, 506

Surgeons’ Office, Southwest Pacific Area,

52

Personal Service, Office of The Surgeon

General, 86, 171

chief (s) of, 27, 30, 75, 501

organization of, 27

Personnel Control Branch of, 37

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Personnel Subsection, Medical Division,

Office of the Chief of Air Corps, 26

Pharmacists, 17, 242, 286

appointment of, in Medical Administrative Corps,

Pharmacy Corps, 1, 7, 17-18, 53, 78, 213-214 abolishment of, 508

creation of, 3, 213-214

discharge rate in, 438

establishment of, 18

strength of, 214

overseas, 371-373

Pharmacy technicians, 165

Philippine Department, 384

Philippine employees, in general and station

hospitals overseas, 257

Philippines, 245, 254, 257

Physical disability:

discharge for, 438

for return to civilian life, 437

Physical Standards Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 167

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Physical therapists, 1, 55, 84, 88-90. 271, 304

civilian status of, 29, 42

creation of component of,

for affiliated units, 207

grade distribution for, 462

in World War I, 16

military status, 154

officer status for, 9-17

pay of, 464

procurement for, 231-232

objective, 232

Officer Procurement Service in, 231

rank of, 17

ratio of, to hospital beds, 88

requirements for, 90

separation of:

age for, 489

point score for, 489

strength of, 90, 232

overseas, 371, 373

superintendent of, 16, 88

training programs for, 232

Women’s Army Corps members commissioned as, 232

Physicians, 497

alien, requirements of, for commission in

Army of the United States, 152

in British Army, ratio of. to troop

strength, 68

naturalized, requirements of, for commission in Army of the United States,

152

Physiotherapy aides, 165, 252, 254
538 INDEX

Planning:

for personneladministration, 31-37

on demobilization, 487

postwar, 505-510

PM, New York newspaper, 154

Podiatrists, 156

Policy for personnel, changes in,

Position categories, in classification of Medical Corps officers, 268

Postwar developments, in Medical Department,

Postwar planning, 505-510

integrationprogram, 505-510

Powell, Lt. Col. Bolling R., Jr., 494

Preventive Medicine Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 28

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Preventive program, of Medical Department, 1-2

Prisoner of War General Hospital No. 2,

Camp Forrest, Tenn., 324

Prisoners of war. 2, 48, 261. 420

category of, 324

detail of, to Medical Department,

employed in Medical Department activities, 499

German, 326-329

Italian, 326

utilization of;

in oversea theaters, 260, 325-329

in Zone of Interior, 32-H325

saving of military personnel effected

by, 255

Problems, of Medical Department,

Procurement,

act of April 1939 in, 122-124

at beginning of mobilization, 124-126

change from voluntary to involuntary

service, 124-125

congressional action in, 133

contributions of organized medicine and

nursing to, 156-164

deferment of professional students in

198-206

during emergency period, 111-166

emergency measures, 124

early Reserve measures for, 112-124

effect of selective service legislation on,

131-134

establishment of rosters for Reserve officers in,129

extension of reservists’ tour of duty in.

129-130

for affiliated units, 206-210

Procurement—Continued

for Army Nurse Corps, 134—135, 221-222

for Dental Corps, 195-11)6

for dietitians, 231-232

for Medical Administrative Corps, 126,

214-220

for Medical Corps, 168-195

forPharmacy Corps, 213-214

for physical therapists, 231-232

for Reserve units, 141-148

for Sanitary Corps, 126, 211-213

for Veterinary Corps, 196-198

in 1941-45—167-210,211-246

legislation for, 167

limiting factor in,

objective of, in 1939—55

for sections of Officers’ Reserve Corps,

55

of civilian personnel, 247-266

in Zone of Interior, 247-253

of enlisted men, 164-166, 233-246

preemergencyprocedures for, 111-112

restrictions on,

students in professional schools in, 136-

140

War Department action in, 133-134

Procurement and Assignment Service, 73-

74. 152, 168, 173. 174, 175, 178, 179, 180,

181, 182, 183, 184. 185, 186, 190, 211, 228,

229, 230, 273. 447

civilian dentists declared available by,

195

Committee on Allocation of Medical Personnel of, 73

creation of, 134

criteria for recruitment of professional

personnel established by, 173

Directing Board of. 69. 150. 227

establishment of, 73, 74, 169

functions of, 162. 170-173

Negro doctors declared available by, 324

nurses declared available by, 228

NursingDivision of, 226-227

on medical branches of the Armed Forces,

297

organization of, 169-170

origin of, 161-163

ratio of dentists to civilians determined

by, 76

ratio of physicians to civilian population

recommended by, 74

reaction of, to Medical Officer Recruiting

Boards, 176-177

relocation of civilian doctors by, 74
INDEX 539

Procurement and Assignment Service—Con.

role of, in procurement, for

Army Nurse Corps, 225-231

Medical Corps, 169-173

Subcommittee on Negro Health of, 324

Procurement of female technicians for medical installations, program of Women’s

Army Corps, 242-243

Professional civilian personnel, Medical Department, in oversea theaters, 253-254

Professional quality, of Medical Department

personnel, oversea, 416-419

Professional retraining, 500-505

Professional schools, students in, 136-140

Professional Service Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 23

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Professional students, deferment of, 198-206

early methods, 198-201

Professional Training Committee, 504

Professional Training Program, 509

Proficiency rating, of Medical Corps officers,

274

Proficiency symbol, in category classification. 268,269

Promotion, 451-485

Army’s system of, 292

as reward for exceptional service, 337

authority for recommendation for, 454

decentralization of, 483

during emergency period, 451-453

of nurses, 453

of officers, 451-453

for orthopedic mechanics, 492

in Army of the United States, 454

in early war years, 454-464

of nurses, 462

of officers, 454—456

inequalities in system of, 464

later war years, 464-470

of nurses, 467-468

of officers, 464—467

morale factor of, 451

overseas, 471-485

enlisted personnel, 483-485

officers, 471-483

temporary, 476-477

through vacancies, 477

“Protected” personnel, category of prisoner

of war, 324, 325

See also Prisoners of war.

Protective-Mobilization Plan, 56, 57, 62, 141-

142, 143

Provost Marshal, 152

Provost Marshal General’s Department, 154

Psychiatric social workers, 101

Public Health Committee, Directing Board,

Procurement and Assignment Service, 170

Public Law 828, December 1042, authority

for field grades in Army Nurse Corps, 462

Public opinion, on concessions to officers in

lower ranks, 125

Publicity campaigns, for recruitment of—-

doctors, 191

nurses, 135, 191, 223

Puerto Rican Department, 384

Qualifications, for appointment to—

Army Nurse Corps, 8-9

medical service of Regular Army, 111

Sanitary Corps Reserve,

Quality, professional, of—

Dental Corps, 418

enlisted personnel, 418

Medical Corps, 416-417

Quartermaster Corps, 234

Questionnaires:

for classification of officers, 268, 273, 275,

281

See also “Classification Questionnaire of

Medical Department Officers.”

Quinacrine hydrochloride, 500

Quota, for civilian nurses’ aides, 251

Rank, 451-485

adjustments in,

during emergency period, 451—453

of nurses, 453

of officers, 451—453

in early war years, 454—464

of dietitians, 564

of nurses, 462—463

of officers, 454-456

of physical therapists, 464

later war years, 464—470

of nurses, 467—468

of officers, 464—467

morale factor of, 451

of Medical Department officers overseas,

470-471

of reservists, 452

of The Surgeon General,

Ratings, for female medical technicians, 244

Ratio, of medical troops, to total oversea

troop strength, 339, 341-345

Ration, of labor, in Great Britain, 261

Readjustment regulations, War Department,

490

Reassignments, in effective utilization of

personnel, 331, 332
540 INDEX

Recall to active duty, legislation provided

for, 167

Reception centers, 285, 293

enlisted men assigned to Medical Department from, 295

enlisted personnel classified at, 166

recruits classified at, 286, 287

Reconditioning program, 239

Records, of officers, for uniformity of classification, 278

Recreation, in effective utilization of personnel, 331

Recruiting:

for Army Nurse Corps, 221

for female technicians for medical installations, 242-243

in procurement for Medical Corps, 190-191

of medical reservists for active duty, 122

Recruiting campaigns, for nurses, 228

Recruits, classification of, at reception centers, 166

Red Cross, 5, 19, 55, 69, 102, 112, 122, 135,

163, 164, 223, 224, 227, 228

civilian nurses’ aides trained by, 251

First Reserve of, 222, 223

in procurement for Army Nurse Corps,

222, 224

Nursing Service of, 134

publicity campaign of, for recruitment of

nurses, 135

Registry of Medical Technologists of, 165

staff workers of, in Army hospitals, 252

technicians registered with, 233

Red Cross Reserve, 207

Red Cross workers:

for the Medical Department, 19

in Army hospitals, 419-420

Redeployment, 4, 487-510

during period of partial demobilization,

487-491

factor of, in personnel planning, 36

problems of, 490-491

Redistribution, of Medical Department

officers, 315-316

Reduction;

in Medical Corps strength, protests

against, 72, 73

of criteria for demobilization, of officers,

493-495

Reed, Senator Clyde M.,

Regimental Combat Team, 442d—153

Regional hospitals, in Zone of Interior, 312

Registration of nurses, for military service,

230

Registry of Medical Technologists, 165

Regular Army, 5, 9,17, 111

authorization for nurses of, 54

authorization of Medical Department

officers of, 53

commissioned status of women in, 154

integration of Medical Department corps,

505-508

Medical Department officer corps in,

professional retraining for Medical Corps

officers of, 502-505

qualifications for appointment to Medical

Department corps of, 111

quota of personnel for, 53

strength of, 72

increase in, 58, 61, 505, 506

statutory, 54

worldwide and overseas, 404

Regular Army Medical Corps, appointment

of women doctors in,

Regulations,Army;

on classification system, 270

pertaining to candidates for Medical

Corps Reserve, 148

See also specific Army Regulations.

Release of officers, criteria for, during partial demobilization, 487-489

Relocation of civilian doctors, by Procurement and Assignment Service, 174

Reorganization, of—

Office of The Surgeon General, 27, 30

War Department, 40-43

Replacement system:

in utilization of personnel, 297-317

organizationalchanges in, 306-307

procedural changes in, 306-307

temporary personnel in, 306-307

Replacement training center(s), medical,

165, 217, 235, 292, 320. 454

Replacements:

factors in, in oversea units, 102-103

sources of, in oversea theaters, 298-305

Report, subcommittee of Senate Committee

on Education and Labor, on procurement

of doctors for armed services, 194

Requirements:

additional oversea units, 102

Army Nurse Corps,

civilians, 66,100-102

Dental Corps, 75-76

dietitians, 88-90

enlisted men, 91-98

enlisted personnel, 60-65

enlisted women, 99
INDEX 541

Requirements—Continued

factors affecting determination of, 58-66

in 1939-41—53-66

in 1941-45—67-109

Medical Administrative Corps, 78-84

Medical Corps, 67-74

Medical Department officer shortages in,

58-59

Pharmacy Corps, 78

physical therapists, 88-90

Reserve shortages in, 59-60

Sanitary Corps, 77

Veterinary Corps, 76-77

Requisitions, processing of, 305

Research, as function of Medical Department,

Reserve Corps, Medical. See Medical Corps

Reserve.

Reserve nurses:

authorized for assignment to active duty,

134

call to active duty of. 55

Reserve Officers Training Corps, 5, 57, 122,

124,136, 137, 200-201

Reserve shortages, 59-60

Reserve Subdivision, Military Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General, 22,

27

Reserves, 5, 9, 290

call to active duty of physicians in, 168

classification of officers of, 1940—268-270

assistance of civilian agencies in, 268-

070 compulsory service for, 123

Medical Administrative Corps section of,

MedicalDepartment officer coips in.

of Medical Department,

officers and nurses of, for medical service

of active forces, 112

Sanitary Corps section of,

strength of, worldwide and overseas, 404

Reservists:

adequacy of. 112

allotment of, to Medical Department, 55

compulsory active duty for, 129

deferment of service for, 127-129

extension of tour of duty of, 129-130

extension by interpretation, 129-130

Service Extension Act, 1941—130

geographicrestriction on use of, 125

legislation pertaining to, 122,124. 129

of Medical Department,

rosters of, 128-129

Residencies, 192

Residents, 139

effect of selective service on military

status of, 137

military obligations of, 137

Resources Analysis Division, Office of The

Surgeon General, 35, 30. 37

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Responsibilities, of Medical Department,

Restrictions:

geographic, on use of

National Guard, 54, 125

reservists, 125

in legislation pertaining to reservists, 124-

125

Retention, of trained noncommissioned officers, in Medical Department, 160

Retirement, 443

age for, 445

Retraining, 487—491

during period of partial demobilization,

487-491

professional, 500-505

Return, to civilian life. 437

Reynolds, Maj. Gen. Charles R., 57, 60,

141, 142

See also Surgeon General, The.

Reynolds, Brig. Gen. Edward, 455

Reynolds plan, in procurement for Medical

Corps, 184—185

Roberts Field, Liberia, 259

Rome, 254

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 18, 54, 61, 67,

69, 112, 124, 161, 187, 193, 229, 230

approves establishment of Procurement

and Assignment Agency, 162

authorized to—-

commission officers in the Army of the

United States, 130

defer draftees by age group, 167

extend tours of active duty for Reserve

officers, 130

empowered to calf Medical Department

Reserve officers to active duty, 122

personal physician of, 205

questions ratio of doctors to military

strength, 68

state of the Union message of Jan.

1945—229

Rotation:

drawbacks of. 335

in utilization of personnel. 332-336

influence of, 336

system of, 290
542 INDEX

Royal Army Medical Corps, 154

Sanitary companies, 320-321, 396

purpose for, 411

Sanitary Corps 1, 5, 7, 56, 59, 77, 79, 124,

166,462

abolishment of, 508

classification of officers of, 280-281

commissions in:

direct, 212

directive pertaining to, 212

discontinued, 77

discharge rate in, 438

misassignment of officers to, 213

Negro personnel in, 318

procurement for, 126, 211-213

promotion in, 469

reservists of, as substitutes for Medical

Corps reservists, 60

strength of, 213

overseas, 371,373

Sanitary Engineering Committee, DirectingBoard, Procurement and Assignment Service, 170

Sanitary engineers, 169, 211, 212, 381

improper classification as, 280-281

Sanitary technician, 286

Sanitation of messes, as function of Medical

Department,

Schools, medical, unapproved American,

graduates of, 150-152

Scott, Dr. Norman M., 210

Sea duty, extra compensation for, 462

Secretary of Defense,

Secretary of the Navy, 187,188

Secretary of War, 3, 17, 21, 53, 102, 111, 122,

128, 129, 130, 153, 154, 155, 175, ISO, 183,

184, 187, 188, 189, 194, 199, 205, 214, 224,

237, 322, 324, 452, 453, 469, 490, 493-494,

507

Assistant Civilian Aide to, 323

civilian consultants to, 250

favors draft of nurses, 229

Secretary of War’s Personnel Board, 179,

180,181, 506

Seeley, Col. Sam F., 162

Seine Base Section, European theater, 255

261

Selective Service Act. See Selective Trainingand Service Act.

Selective service boards, authority of, for

selection of professional men, 131

Selective Service System, 134, 170, 178. 186,

187. 188, 201,317

Selective Training and Service Act, 125, 132,

138, 184, 187, 331), 402

amended, 167

effect of, on procurement during emergencyperiod, 131-134

passage of, 5, 54,124,131

third- and fourth-year students in Reserve

Officers Training Corps deferred by, 137

Senate Committee on Labor and Education,

68

Senate Military Affairs Committee, 230

Separation:

criteria for Medical Department officers,

487-489

for transfer to Enlisted Reserve Corps, 205

problems of, 490-491

Separation centers, medical officers needed

for, 493

Serologists, 212

Service command commanders, 179

Service command surgeons, 275, 492

restoration of position in responsibility

to service command commanders, 45

Service commands:

Medical Department qualified personnel

transferred by, 294

method of assignment of medical personnel in, 45

Service Extension Act of August 1941—130

Services of Supply, Army Service Forces,

154, 173, 217, 293

allotments to, 72

commanding general of, 320

creation of, 289

Military Personnel Division of, 173, 224

Officer Procurement Service of, 179, 181-

185

See also Army Service Forces.

Seventh U.S. Army, 216, 217

Sheep, Brig. Gen. William L., 23

Shipments, of Medical Department personnel to oversea theaters, 303-304

Signal Corps, 107, 234

Skilled civilian workers, in Medical Department, 253,254

Snyder, Maj. Gen. Howard McC., 85

Solomons, 383

Somervell, Gen. Brehon B., 86, 87, 155,

179. 204

See also Commanding General, Army

Service Forces.

South Atlantic, 266, 383, 386
INDEX 543

South Pacific Area, 257, 382, 383

affiliated units in, 208

classification system in, 284

Southwest Pacific Area, 104, 220, 232, 245,

298, 305, 306, 317. 382, 383, 397

chief surgeon of. 284

civilians employed in, 256

classification system in. 284

organization for personnel administration

in, 52

shortages of Medical Department officers

in, 107

Special Assistant, to the Secretary of War,

229

Special draft of doctors, proposed, 186-193

Specialists:

assignment of, 290

enlisted critically needed, 492

directive pertaining to, 237, 238

in Regular Army Medical Corps, 267-268

promotion of, 4(57

Specialization,in medical profession, 2(57

Specialties, occupational. Medical Department. Sec Occupational specialties, Meddical Department.

Specialty boards, American. See American

specialty boards.

Specialty centers, use of, 312

Staff functions of Medical Corps Officers,

Standard Oil of New Jersey, 30

State committees, of Procurement and Assignment Service. 170

State Governors, 111

assistance of, in recruiting for enlisted

women for Medical Department, 244

Station and Job Assignment Recruiting

Plan,243

Station Hospital, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., 319

Station hospital (s)

closure of, in Zone of Interior, 312

corps area surgeons authorized to employ

civilians for, 248-249

Protective Mobilization Plans for number

of, 62

reorganization of, under T/O 8-560, 28

Oct. 1944—301

.See also Hospitals, station.

Statistical clerks, 165

Statistics, on strength of Medical Department,

Statutory strength, of Regular Army, 54

Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W., 259

Strategic and Logistics Planning Unit,

Office of The Surgeon General, 87

Strength:

active-duty, of Medical Department

groups, by Army components, 112 Army Nurse Corps, 227, 228, 229, 230

civilian nurses’ aides, 251

Dietitians, 232

Medical Administrative Corps, 218, 219

of Corps Area Assignment Group, 30

June 1939—2(5

of Medical Department, 53-54, 339-449

in 1944—1

on Dec. 1941—9

statistics,

Pharmacy Corps, 214

Physical Therapists, 232

Sanitary Corps, 213

“Strength of the Army,” 33

Strohm, Col. J. G.. 144

Student-apprentice program, for dietitians, 232

Students:

in professional schools: commissions for, in Medical Administrative CorpsReserve, 139-140

deferment of, 138-139,198-20(5

of medicine, supply of,

Subcommittee on Medical Education, Health

and Medical Committee, Council of National Defense, 1(51

Subcommittee on Negro Health, Procurement and Assignment Service, 324

Subcommittee on Nursing, Medical and

Health Committee, Office of Defense

Health and Welfare Services, 163-164,

223, 226

Substandard American medical schools,

graduates of, 150-152

Superintendent(s), of —-

Army Nurse Corps, 84, 222, 225, 228. 230. 453, 463

Hospital Dietitians, 16

Physical Therapists, 16

Supply and Distribution Committee, National Nursing Council for War Service, 223

Supply Service, Office of The Surgeon

General:

chief of, 455

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Surgeon, Army GroundForces, 456

Surgeon,Fifth U.S. Army, 382

Surgeon General, The, 17, 25, 26, 33, 34, 38,

40, 41, 58, 60, 61, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 77,

78, 79, 80, 81, 86, 90, 99, 111, 124, 127,
544 INDEX

Surgeon General, The—Continued

128, 129, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 142, 143,

144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153,

154, 159, 161, 162, 167, 170, 171, 175, 176,

177, 178, 179-180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 188,

191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 203,

204, 207, 208, 210, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217,

222, 225, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 235-236,

237, 242, 243, 244, 248, 250, 251, 267, 269,

274, 275, 277. 278, 279, 292, 296, 312, 313,

316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 438, 451, 453, 454,

455, 456, 469, 483, 492, 493-494, 500, 501,

506

affiliated units allocated by, 142

announces conditions for commissioning

graduates of unapproved medical

schools, 150-151

appointment of,

appoints liaison officer to Procurement and

Assignment Service, 162

argument of, against ceiling figure for

Army Nurse Corps, 84

assignment authority of, 46, 289

authority of, over—-

civilian personnel, 43

recruiting boards, 175

awards certificate of appreciation to unaffiliated unit, 210

comments of, on rejection of special draft

of doctors, 190

disagreement with General Staff on Protective Mobilization Plan, 62

essentiality of Medical Department officers

determined by, 453

estimate of, for

dentists, 76

nurse personnel, 87

estimates ratio of doctors to military

strength, 67

in recruitment of medical reservists for

active duty, 122

institutes “reconsideration program,” 183

instructed to prepare plan for recruiting

boards, 173

instructions of:

on classification of officers, 275, 276 to recruiting boards, 174

jurisdiction of, over affiliated units, 142

lack of authority of. to reassign medical

personnel, 291

medical personnel requirements estimated

by, 56

on promotion of medical officers, 465, 466,

467

Surgeon General, The —Continued

on redeployment of medical personnel,

487-488

orders closing of recruiting boards, 179

plan of;

for MedicalDepartment, 510

for medical service of fully expanded

army, 69

for utilization of Negro personnel, 318

to conduct survey of medical profession,

156,159-161

position categories established by, 268,

270-271

position of, on ratio of physicians for

civilianmedical service, 74

promotions recommended by, 452, 453

proposed ratio of Medical Department

enlisted personnel to total Army

strength, 62

proposed revival of affiliated units, 141-

142

rank of, as provided by Federal statute,

recommendation of, for —■

allotting technicians, 293

appointments in theReserves, 132

calculation of nurse requirements, 55

removal of restrictions in selecting Reserve officers, 123

use of “branch immaterial” officers, 60

recommends

commissions for students in professional

schools in Medical Administrative

CorpsReserve, 139,140

establishment of officer candidate school

for Medical Administrative Corps,

126

special draft of doctors, 184, 186-190

requests—-

cooperation of American Medical Association in recruitment, 156

discontinuance of procurement, 194-195

increase of Medical Department’s enlisted personnel quota, 60

training-centerfacilities, 165

responsibility of, for administration of

personnel affairs, 21

restrictions imposed upon, 42

shift of command authority from, 42

stand of, on reduction of Medical Corps

officers, 68

testimony of, on women doctors, 154-155

Surgeon General’s Office. See Office of The

Surgeon General.
INDEX 545

Surgeon General of the Navy, 74, 161, 162,

189, 206

Surgeon General of U.S. Public Health

Service, 127, 161,162

Surgeon’s Office, Southwest Pacific Area, 52

Surgeons, contract. See Contract surgeons.

Surgery, consultant in, in—

European theater, 282

)ffice of The Surgeon General, 272

Surgical hospitals, 59

See also Field medical units.

Surgical technicians, 243. 244, 286, 306

Surplus, of medical officers, 301

Suspensionof appointments, in Dental Corps

Reserve, 57

Table-of-allotment units, promotion authorized in,455

Table-of-organization units, 303. 39(5

changes in, 381

overstrengths in, 301

promotion authorized in, 455, 456

reduction of enlisted complements in, 255

technicians authorizedby, 293

vacancies in, 305

Tables of organization, 90

for oversea units, 95, 96, 97

for Women’s Army Corps hospital company, 244

for Zone of Interior hospitals, 91

promotion provided by, 455

revision of, for personnel allowances, 313-

314

used as manning guides for Zone of Interior station hospitals, 64-66

Tactical medical units and detachments:

enlisted personnel for, 61

increase in number of, 61

See also Field medical units.

Taft, Senator Rodert A., 231

Teams, for recruiting medical personnel,

190-191

Teasley, Lt. Col. Gerald H.. 270, 283

Technical Information Branch, Army Nurse

Corps, 228

Technical manuals, War Department, onenlisted personnel classification, 285

officer classification, 270, 277

See also specific War Department Technical Manual.

Technicians, procurement of, for Medical Department, 242, 243

Technologists recruitment of, for medical

installations. 242-243

Temporary duty, as alternative to rotation,

in utilization of personnel, 336

Thatcher, Maj. Harold W., 320

Theater chief surgeons, personnel functions

of, 49

organization,49-52

Theaters of operations:

classification system in;

development of, 281-283

uniformity of, 283-284

distribution of Army strength in, 385

fixed hospitals, ratio of

dietitians and physical therapists to

beds in, 89

nurses to beds in, 86

personnel functions of theater commander

in, 47-49

temporary personnel as replacements in,

306-307

types of Medical Department units in, 396

undermanning units in training in, 307-

311

See also specific theater.

Third U.S. Army, 327

organization for personnel administration

in, 52

T/O 8-117, November 1940, sanitary companies established under, 320

T/O 8-550, July 1944, on reorganization of

general hospitals, 301

T/O 8-560, 28 Oct. 1944, on reorganization

of station hospitals, 301

revision of, 104

TOE 8-117, for establishment of Italian

service units, 326

TOE 8-500, 23 Apr. 1944—253

Training:

Army Medical Residence Program, 502

Army Specialized Training Program, 212,

276

civilian nurses’ aides, 251

enlisted men, 165, 293-295

for civilian physicians in military

methods, 168

in dietetics and physical therapy, 232

of medical specialists, 193

of Wacs, for Medical Department work,

243

Training officer, Medical Administrative

Corps officer serving as,

Transfer(s)

loss to Medical Department through,

448-449
546 INDEX

Veterans’ Administration, 127, 128, 1(52, 248

Medical Department officers assigned to,

339

Reserve officers employed as civilians in,

128

transfer of medical officers to, 73

Veterinarians, 76, 77, 169

Army regulations governing, 77

inducted as enlisted men, 133

Veterinary company, 61

Veterinary Corps, 1, 56, 59, 76-77. 112. 203,

292

creation of,

deficits in, 58

field grades in, 456

general officers in, 456

Negro personnel, 318

of Regular Array, integrationgains, 508

procurement for, 196-198

objectives of, 77

sources of, 197

promotions in, 455

separation from: age for, 489

point score for, 489

strength of. 197, 204

authorized, in 1939—53

overseas, 371, 373

Veterinary Corps Reserve, 200

Veterinary Division, Office of The Surgeon

General, 23. 28, 197

chief of, 197, 200

See also Office of The Surgeon General.

Veterinary Medicine Committee, Directing

Board, Procurement and Assignment

Service, 170

Veterinary officers, duties of,

Veterinary phase, of Army Specialized

Training Program, termination of, 204

Veterinary Service, function of, 77

Veterinary students: commissioned in Medical Administrative

Corps, 199-200

deferment of, for occupational reasons, 139

in Army Specialized Training Program:

commissioning of, upon graduation,

202-203

school costs for, 202

with Reserve commissions, transferred to

Medical Administrative Corps Reserve,

137

Veterinary surgical technician, 286

Victory Program. See War Munitions Program.

Transfer(s) —Continued

of qualified personnel from Medical Department, 294

TransportationCorps, 99

Triangular organization, of combat divisions, 313

Tripler General Hospital, 258

Tucker, Katherine, 227

Twelfth Air Force, 305, 330-331, 335

Unaffiliated units:

as source of officer personnel, 210

certificate of appreciation awarded to,

210

Under Secretary of War, 140

Uniforms, of Army Nurse Corps, 221

United Kingdom, 104, 302

United States, entry of, into World War II,

125

See also Zone of Interior.

Units, of Medical Department, operating

strength in oversea areas, 385, 387

University of Minnesota, 73

University of Pennsylvania, 227

University of Rome Medical School, 254

Unskilled workers, civilian, in Medical Department, 253,254

U.S. Army components, 5, 111

See also Army of the United States; National Guard; Regular Army; Reserves.

U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 397

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, 245

U.S. Army Medical Department. See Medical Department.

U.S. Department of State, 152

U.S. Navy, 2, 77, 190

U.S. Public Health Service, 127,157,172, 190,

211, 456

Utilization, 3, 289-338

assignment, 289-297

morale factors in, 329-337

of limited-service personnel, 235-236

of native labor troops, 324-329

of Negro personnel, 317-324

of prisoners of war, 324-329

replacement system in, 297-317

Vatican City, 254

V-E Day, 34, 82, 108, 196, 241, 260, 302, 304,

330, 339, 380, 397. 417, 487, 490, 504

V-.T Day, 245, 325, 493, 494

V-12, Navy College Training Program, 201,

203

Venereal disease, control measures for, as

function of Medical Department,
INDEX 547

Vogel, Maj. Emma E., 16, 88

See also Physical therapists.

Voluntary enlistment, 1(54

Volunteer Directing Board. See Directing

Board, Procurement and Assignment

Service.

WAAC. See Women’s Army Corps.

WAC. See Women’s Army Corps.

Walter Reed General Hospital, 167, 454, 502

War, Secretary of. See Secretary of War.

War Department, 2, 21, 47, 53, 55, 58, 72, 84,

90, 95, 102, 103, 104, 108, 123, 125, 128,

130, 132, 135, 137, 138, 140. 142, 144, 146,

147, 152, 156, 159, 170, 175, 186, 187, 190,

194. 200, 203, 204. 205, 209, 212, 21(5, 217,

228, 239, 251, 275, 27(5, 2851, 297, 304, 307,

312, 324, 336, 396, 445, 462, 487, 490,

505-506

action of, in procurement during emergency

period. 133-134

ceases to press for legislation to draft

nurses, 231

classification questionnaire for officers,

273, 275

curtails Army Specialized Training Program, 203-206

establishes ceiling on Medical Corps

strength, 73

extends tour of Medical Department Officers, 123

ManpowerBoard of, 32

orders classification of Reserve Officers,

268-270

policy of, on—-

assignment of Japanese-American officers, 153

promotion, 453

promotion regulations of, 464

Protective Mobilization Plan of, 56, 57

readjustment regulations of, 488, 490

relaxes physical requirements for duty,

167

reorganization of, 27, 40-43

responsibility of, for Medical Department

personnel, 54-57

terminates activities of Medical Officer RecruitingBoards, 179

War Department CircularNo. 58, on policy of rotation, 332

No. 99, on change in table of organization

of general hospitals, 303

No. 209. guide for authorization of personnel, 314

War Departmentment Circular—Continued

No. 232, on proficiency qualifications of

officers, 277

No. 33, governing commissions in Sanitary

Corps, 212, 213

No. 4(50, on classification procedures for

Medical Department officers, 283

War Department General Staff. 33, 40, 55,

56, 59, 61. 62. 63, 64, 65, 76. 77, SI, 87,

99, 100. 123, 124, 132, 140, 143, 146, 149,

157, 159, 1(50, 176, 194, 197, 207, 237, 268,

312, 314, 384, 438, 451-452, 465

affiliated units approved by, 142

assignment of Reserve nurses to active

duty authorized by, 134

disapproval of, of estimated nurse requirements, 84

War Plans Division of, 67

War Department Manpower Board, estimate

of nurse personnel requirements, 85

War Department Memorandum W615-44,

pertaining to critically needed specialists,

237

War Department Reserve Pool, 127, 128, 140

War Department Technical Manual

12-406, “Officer Classification, Commissioned and Warrant,” 270, 277

12-426, on civilian occupational classification of enlisted personnel, 285

12-427, on military occupational classification of enlisted personnel, 285

War Manpower Commission, 84,170

Bureau (if Placement of, 169, 22(5

Chairman of, 68, 74, 169, 177, 178, 184, 186, 187, 226

Director of, 69, 187,188

Nursing Supply and Distribution Service

of, 226

War Munitions Program, 67 War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, 67

Warrant officers:

legislation increasing pay of, 462

Medical Badge authorized for, 337

Washington Post, newspaper, 229

Waste disposal, as function of Medical Department,

Water supplies, as function of Medical Department,

WD AGO Form No. 178-2. “Classification

Questionnaire of Medical Department Officers,” 273,275

Welsh, Col. Arthur R., 35

Wentworth, Col E. T., 144
548 INDEX

Western Europe, 54

Western Hemisphere, 125, 382

White House, 297

Wolman, Abel, 211

Women doctors, appointment of, in Regular

Army Medical Corps,

Women Physicians Committee, Directing

Board, Procurement and Assignment Service, 170

Women’s Army Corps, 9, 155, 217, 245, 296,

380, 420, 463, 467

assignment of female doctors to, 154

Director of, 244

members of:

as technicians, 99

commissioner as dietitians or physical

therapists, 232

for hospitals, 99

for medical installations, 212

in Medical Department,

physical therapy technician courses for,

232

Negro hospital companies of, 322

organization of hospital companies of,

244-245

program of, for procurement of female

technicians for medical installations,

242-243

World War I, 2, 5, 56, 141, 143, 144, 156,

168, 267, 268, 313

civilian consultants used during, 250

dietitians in, 16

physical therapists in, 16

Red Crosshospitals used in, 222

service of female doctors on contract

basis during, 154

strength of Medical Department during,

53

X-ray technicians, 165, 243, 286, 492

Yale-New Haven Hospital, 227

Yugoslav service troops, for Medical Department activities, 326

Zone of Interior, 1, 64, 65, 104, 214, 215, 275,

282, 283, 203, 295, 297, 301, 304, 305, 334,

451-470

all-Negro hospital established in, 319

changes in hospital system in, 312-313

civilian personnel for Medical Department, 19,247-253

contract surgeons, 250

dietitians and physiotherapyaides, 252

nonprofessional personnel, 252

nursing personnel, 250-251

occupational therapists, 251-252

overall employment, 247-250

procurement of, 247-266

Red Cross workers, 252

commands in, 40

decentralization of personnel administration in,40-45

distribution of Medical Department personnel in,339-404

enlisted men for Medical Department in,

233-239

problem of illiterates, 233-234

enlisted women for Medical Department

in, 242-245

hospitals in

allotment of Medical Administrative

and Medical Corps officers to, 81

closure of station, 312-313

manning guides for, 91

occupational therapists in. 251-252

prisoners of war cared for in,

ratio of dietitians and physical therapists to beds in, 88

ratio of nurses to beds in, 86

officer candidate schools in, 217-219

organization for personnel administration

in,

Air Corps, 26-27

Air Surgeon’sOffice, 38

corps areas, 24-26

Surgeon General’s Office, 21-24

personnel planning, 31-37

utilization of prisoners of war in, 324-325

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING 0FFICE:I963