United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) CO., LTD.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee,

AND

AMERICAN FURNITURE MANUFACTURERS 

COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL TRADE AND VAUGHANBASSETT FURNITURE COMPANY, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

______________________ 

2013-1156

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 12-CV-0100, Senior Judge Nicholas Tsoucalas.

______________________ 

Decided: March 11, 2014

______________________ 

JOHN M. PETERSON, Neville Peterson LLP, of New 

York, New York, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him 

on the brief was RICHARD F. O’NEILL. 
2 MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) v. US

CLAUDIA BURKE, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendantappellee United States. On the brief were STUART F.

DELERY, Acting Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E.

DAVIDSON, Director, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, Assistant 

Director, and CARRIE A. DUNSMORE, Trial Attorney. Of 

counsel on the brief was SHANA HOFSTETTER, Attorney, 

Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, 

United States Department of Commerce, of Washington, 

DC. 

JAMES MICHAEL TAYLOR, King & Spalding, LLP, of 

Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees American Furniture Manufacturers Committee for Legal Trade, 

et al. With him on the brief were JOSEPH W. DORN and P.

LEE SMITH. Of counsel was DANIEL SCHNEIDERMAN. 

______________________ 

Before RADER, Chief Judge, PROST, and REYNA, Circuit 

Judges.

REYNA, Circuit Judge. 

Marvin Furniture (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. (“Marvin”) appeals a final decision of the Court of International Trade 

sustaining a rescission by the Department of Commerce 

(“Commerce”) of Marvin’s new shipper review in connection with an antidumping order on wooden bedroom 

furniture from the People’s Republic of China. Marvin 

Furniture (Shanghai) Co., v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 

2d 1302 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012). For the reasons below, we 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In 2005, Commerce issued an antidumping duty order 

on wooden bedroom furniture from the People’s Republic 

of China. See Wooden Bedroom Furniture from the People’s Republic of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 329 (Dep’t of Com-
MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) v. US 3

merce Jan. 4, 2005) (“the antidumping order”). Pursuant 

to the antidumping order, importers of subject merchandise who were not individually investigated and assigned 

an individual rate by Commerce are required to post a 

cash deposit at a country-wide rate of 216.01%. 

Marvin is a Chinese producer and exporter of juvenile 

furniture. Marvin did not participate in the investigation

resulting in the antidumping order and did not export

subject merchandise to the United States during the 

period of investigation. On July 30, 2011, Marvin requested a new shipper review in order to obtain an individual antidumping duty rate and avoid the 216.01% 

country-wide rate. In its request, Marvin indicated that it 

had not exported subject merchandise into the United 

States prior to June 20, 2011.

Based on U.S. Customs and Border Protection data, 

Commerce determined that exports of subject merchandise manufactured by Marvin had entered the United 

States on September 8 and September 22, 2010. Commerce requested additional information from Marvin, and 

Marvin submitted a letter explaining that both entries 

contained only non-subject merchandise samples for a 

trade show and that no sales or offers for sale were made. 

Commerce accepted Marvin’s explanation and on August 

25, 2011, initiated a new shipper review covering 

Marvin’s exports of subject merchandise entered during 

the period from January 1 through June 30, 2011. Notice 

of the initiation of the new shipper review was published 

six days later in the Federal Register. See Wooden Bedroom Furniture from the People’s Republic of China, 76 

Fed. Reg. 54,208 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 31, 2011).

On August 26, 2011, Marvin submitted additional information to Commerce regarding the September 2010 

entries. Marvin explained that the imported goods consisted “primarily” of non-subject merchandise and included some subject merchandise. Marvin continued to 
4 MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) v. US

maintain that the goods were samples not entered for 

consumption or sale. On August 31, 2011, Marvin notified Commerce that it had discovered that the September 

2010 imports were in fact entered for consumption. Thus, 

contrary to what Marvin indicated in its initial request1

for a new shipper review, Marvin’s first entries of subject 

goods were made prior to June 20, 2011. Marvin nonetheless maintained that the error in its request was harmless 

because the request was still timely, as it was made 

within one year of the first entry of subject merchandise. 

On January 10, 2012, Commerce preliminarily rescinded Marvin’s new shipper review. Wooden Bedroom 

Furniture from the People’s Republic of China, 77 Fed. 

Reg. 1456 (Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 10, 2012). Commerce 

determined that, because Marvin’s request for a new 

shipper review did not report the September 2010 entries, 

Marvin failed to submit a request based on the date and 

volume of its first entry of subject merchandise. Commerce therefore concluded that Marvin’s request “did not 

satisfy the regulatory requirements” of 19 C.F.R. 

§§ 351.214(b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B) and that Marvin was thus 

not entitled to a new shipper review. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 

1458.

In its response to the preliminary determination, 

Marvin argued that the rescission was improper because 

it was based on a harmless and unintentional error that 

did not affect its eligibility for a new shipper review. 

Commerce disagreed and made the rescission final on 

April 10, 2012. See Wooden Bedroom Furniture from the 

People’s Republic of China, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,536 (Dep’t of 

1 Although not dispositive to the question of the sufficiency of an initial new shipper review request, it is 

noteworthy that, after making its initial request, Marvin 

twice submitted erroneous information concerning the 

nature of its first shipment. 

 
MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) v. US 5

Commerce Apr. 10, 2012). Commerce reaffirmed that 

Marvin’s request did not meet the requirements of 

19 C.F.R. §§ 351.214(b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B) because it did not 

include data establishing the date and volume of its first 

entry of subject merchandise. 77 Fed. Reg. at 21,537-

21,538. 

Marvin filed suit in the Court of International Trade

(“Trade Court”), seeking to overturn Commerce’s final 

rescission. The court affirmed Commerce’s determination, 

finding that Marvin’s failure to satisfy the regulatory 

requirements for a new shipper review rendered its 

request “facially infirm” under 19 C.F.R. 

§§ 351.214(b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B). Marvin Furniture, 867 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1308. Noting that Marvin was not challenging the legality of any part of § 351.214, the court concluded that Commerce’s interpretation of § 351.214 was

reasonable, supported by substantial evidence, and in 

accordance with law. See id. Finally, the court also held 

that 19 U.S.C. § 1677m, which allows a party to correct

prior filings, was inapplicable because Marvin’s request 

for a new shipper review was not filed in “response to a 

request for information” as contemplated under the 

statute. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d). 

Marvin timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

DISCUSSION

We review decisions of the Trade Court without deference, applying the same standard of review that it 

applies in its review of Commerce’s determinations. Mid 

Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 725 F.3d 1295, 

1300 (Fed. Cir. 2013). When reviewing Commerce’s 

determinations in an antidumping duty investigation, the 

Trade Court examines whether the determinations are 

“unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). We review the Trade Court’s factual 
6 MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) v. US

findings for clear error. Arko Foods Int’l, Inc. v. United 

States, 654 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

The antidumping duty trade statutes authorize 

Commerce to impose duties on imported goods that are 

sold in the United States at less than fair value. See 19 

U.S.C. § 1673. Once an antidumping duty order covering 

the goods subject to investigation is in place, Commerce 

may conduct an administrative review for “new” exporters 

or producers who did not export the subject merchandise 

during the period of investigation. See 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1675(a)(2)(B). These “new shipper reviews” give exporters or producers whose sales have not been previously 

examined by Commerce an opportunity to obtain their 

own individual antidumping duty rates. 

Commerce has promulgated regulations that set out 

the procedures governing new shipper reviews. Pursuant 

to these regulations, an exporter or producer seeking a 

new shipper review must include in its initial request 

documentation establishing:

(A) The date on which subject merchandise of the 

exporter or producer making the request was first 

entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption, or, if the exporter or producer cannot 

establish the date of first entry, the date on which 

the exporter or producer first shipped the subject 

merchandise for export to the United States;

(B) The volume of that and subsequent shipments; and

(C) The date of the first sale to an unaffiliated 

customer in the United States.

19 C.F.R. § 351.214(b)(2)(iv).

Marvin argues that Commerce acted unlawfully when 

it determined that Marvin was ineligible for a new shipper review on the basis that its initial request listed an 
MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) v. US 7

erroneous date of first entry. According to Marvin, notwithstanding any deficiencies in its initial request, it 

satisfied the statutory and regulatory requirements 

because it did not export subject merchandise during the 

period of investigation and it made its request for a new 

shipper review within the one-year regulatory period. 

Marvin thus contends that it was “eligible” for a new 

shipper review and that Commerce’s determination to the 

contrary was neither in accordance with law nor supported by substantial evidence.

We disagree that Marvin was “eligible” for a new 

shipper review. The relevant regulations clearly provide 

that a new shipper initial request must, among other 

things, establish the date and volume of the first entry. 

See 19 C.F.R. § 351.214(b)(2)(iv). It is undisputed that 

Marvin’s initial request did not contain this information 

because it failed to disclose the September 2010 entries

and asserted that a later date (June 20, 2011) was the 

date of first entry. Although Marvin ultimately provided 

correct information to Commerce, it did so after Commerce had instituted the new shipper review. Hence, the 

late information did not operate to make Marvin “eligible” 

for a new shipper review because a review had already 

been initiated, for a period not covering the September 

2010 entries, based on the defective initial request. 

Accordingly, Commerce’s determination that Marvin was 

not eligible for new shipper review is supported by substantial evidence and not contrary to law. 

Marvin argues in the alternative that “eligibility” for 

a new shipper review depends solely on meeting the 

conditions provided in the statute: not having exported 

the subject merchandise during the investigation period 

or being affiliated with someone who did. See 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1675(a)(2)(B)(i)(I)-(II). According to Marvin, Commerce’s regulation imposing additional eligibility requirements improperly limits Marvin’s statutory right to 

obtain a new shipper review. In other words, we are faced 
8 MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) v. US

with the question of whether Commerce’s rescission of 

Marvin’s new shipper review on the basis that the initial 

request did not include the date and volume of the first 

consumption entry was a proper interpretation of the 

statute under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 

Under the Chevron framework, we first must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. Here, 

the “precise question at issue” is whether Commerce may 

rescind the initiation of a new shipper review on grounds 

that the initial review request failed to establish the 

correct date and volume of the first entry of subject merchandise. Our review of Section 1675 indicates that 

Section 1675 does not address this precise issue. Therefore, our next question is “whether the agency’s answer is 

based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 

843. If Commerce’s interpretation is reasonable, Chevron 

requires us to accept the agency’s construction, “even if 

the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes 

is the best statutory interpretation.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 

(2005). As discussed below, we hold that Commerce’s 

interpretation of the statute is reasonable.

Congress left it to Commerce to establish the procedures necessary to conduct new shipper reviews. The 

statute mandates that Commerce “shall” establish, within 

the prescribed amount of time, an individual duty rate for 

an exporter or producer who has demonstrated that it did 

not export subject merchandise during the period of 

investigation or was affiliated with someone who did. See 

19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). The only procedural 

requirement imposed by the statute is that Commerce 

make its preliminary and final determinations within the 

time limits of § 1675(a)(2)(B)(iv). To fulfill its mandate, 

Commerce exercised appropriate authority to promulgate 

the procedural requirement that the request for a new 
MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) v. US 9

shipper review establish the date on which the goods 

covered under the outstanding antidumping duty order 

first entered the U.S. market for consumption. See Nat’l 

Cable, 545 U.S. at 982 (“Chevron’s premise is that it is for 

agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.”).

Here, given that Commerce must conduct a new shipper review within a determined amount of time, it is 

reasonable for Commerce to require data on a new shipper’s first entry of subject merchandise as a prerequisite 

for initiation of a new shipper review. As the Trade Court 

noted, the required information “provides the basis upon 

which Commerce can undertake the review and calculate 

an individual dumping rate.” Marvin Furniture, 867 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1308. Requiring that such fundamental 

information be included in the initial request not only 

assists Commerce in fulfilling its statutory obligation to 

conduct a review in a timely manner, it also ensures that 

a new shipper review is initiated, and that an individual 

rate is accurately determined, on the basis of all relevant 

entries. 

The one-year regulatory period also ensures that new 

shipper reviews are granted to exporters and producers 

that are entering the U.S. market for the first time. 

These are the only exporters and producers that are 

entitled to receive the statutory benefit of being able to 

post a bond and avoid paying cash deposits during the 

course of a review. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(iii). 

Accordingly, we see no reason why this Court should 

revise Commerce’s requirements for instituting new 

shipper reviews. Commerce’s treatment of the documentation required under 19 C.F.R. § 351.214(b)(2)(iv) as an 

eligibility requirement is reasonable, and its rescission of 

Marvin’s new shipper request is not contrary to law. 

Marvin argues that its failure to comply with the regulation was harmless error because the only purpose of 

requiring documentation is to determine compliance with 
10 MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) v. US

the one-year requirement, which Marvin argues it still 

met even considering the September 2010 entries. We 

disagree. The error was not harmless because it led 

Commerce to institute the new shipper review for a period 

from January 1 through June 30, 2011. The September 

2010 entries could not have been investigated because 

they were outside the period of review. Regardless of 

whether the error was unintentional or not, the result 

was the institution of a new shipper review covering less 

than all relevant entries necessary to determine an accurate individual rate. We agree with the Trade Court that 

Commerce did not err in applying the express provisions 

of the regulation and determining that a “facially infirm” 

request is proper grounds for rescinding a new shipper 

review. 

Finally, we affirm the Trade Court’s determination 

that 19 U.S.C. § 1677m is inapplicable because Marvin’s 

request for a new shipper review was not filed in “response to a request for information.” See 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677m(d) (providing that Commerce shall provide an 

opportunity to remedy deficient submissions if “a response 

to a request for information . . . does not comply with the 

request”). Marvin’s defective initial request was filed of 

its own accord.

CONCLUSION

We hold that Commerce’s rescission of a new shipper 

review based on a failure to establish in the initial request for the review the correct date and volume of first 

entry of subject merchandise is a reasonable interpretation of the statute and its regulations, and a proper exercise of Commerce’s regulatory authority. The Trade 

Court’s decision affirming Commerce’s rescission of 

Marvin’s new shipper review is

AFFIRMED
MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) v. US 11

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.