Cover created by Earl Moniz

CMH Pub 70–100–1 PIN : 082666–000 
Foreword

This extensive account of U.S. Army Special Operations soldiers and their actions in Afghanistan is an important contribution to understanding how these unique individuals removed 

the Taliban from power and destroyed al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan as 

part of the US global war on terrorism. The originating idea, research, and writing that went 

into it are strictly the product of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and its assigned 

authors.

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is pleased to have been selected to provide the technical editing and production assistance required to produce this novel 

work. The editing section of CSI’s Research and Publication Team has faithfully produced the 

thoughts, ideas, and sentiments of the original authors.

 Lawyn C. Edwards

 Colonel, Aviation

 Director, Combat Studies 
Weapon of Choice

U.S. Army Special Operations Forces

in Afghanistan

Charles H. Briscoe

Richard L. Kiper

James A. Schroder

Kalev I. Sepp

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan / Charles H. Briscoe, Richard 

L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Sepp, authors.

p. cm.

1. Afghanistan—History—2001. 2. United States Army Special Forces—History—21st century. I. 

Briscoe, Charles H. (Charles Harry)

DS371.4.W43 2003

958.104’6—dc22

2003021246

The fi gures that appear in this book are credited as follows:

U.S. government photos: chapter 1, fi gures 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

CIA photos: chapter 1, fi gures 1 and 2; chapter 2, fi gures 4, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 31; chapter 3, 

fi gures 2, 19, and 52; and chapter 5, fi gure 5.

Joint Combat Camera Center: chapter 1, fi gure 6; chapter 2, fi gures 6, 12, 15, 30, and 36; chapter 

3, fi gures 7, 8, 13, 15, 24, 59, 66, and 69.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command History Offi ce: chapter 1, fi gures 4, 5, and 7; chapter 2, 

fi gures 1, 3-5, 7-11, 13, 14, 15-22, 26, 29-35, 39-60; chapter 3, fi gures 1-5, 8-12, 14, 16-18, 20-23, 25-

58, 60-68, 70, 73-75; chapter 4, fi gures 1-34; and chapter 5, fi gures 1-4, 6-31.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The 

views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

A full list of CSI/CGSC Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found 

at <http:www.cgsc.army.mil/csi>.
i

iii

v

Contents

Chapter Page

 USSOCOM Foreword ..................................................................................................................i

 USASOC Foreword ...................................................................................................................iii

 Figures .....................................................................................................................................viii

 Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................xiii 

 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. xv

 1. Prelude to Terror ......................................................................................................................... 1

 2. Awakening the Giant ................................................................................................................. 33

 “Subdue Without Fighting”: JPOTF, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida .................................... 47

 Developing the SOF Campaign at SOCCENT, Tampa, Florida................................................ 50

 Top Draft Choices: 10th SFG, Fort Carson, CO, and 7th SFG, Fort Bragg, NC ...................... 51

 5th SFG = CJSOTF-North, Fort Campbell, Kentucky .............................................................. 52

 Standing Up JSOTFs in Tampa and Fort Campbell .................................................................. 54

 Committed to Middle East Exercises ........................................................................................ 57

 3rd SFG Prepares for the Horn of Africa at Fort Bragg ............................................................ 58

 Thinking Ahead: Senior Liaison Offi cers for Resistance Leaders ............................................ 59

 Civil Affairs to Islamabad, Pakistan .......................................................................................... 60

 Of Vital Importance: PSYOP .................................................................................................... 62

 Site Coordination With the Uzbeks at Karshi Kanabad ............................................................ 64

 Uncorking the Bottled Airlift .................................................................................................... 66

 All Credit Cards Accepted at K2 Gas Station ........................................................................... 68

 Air Campaign and CSAR Go Hand in Hand ............................................................................ 68

 Making Camp Freedom a Fully Operational Base: K2, Uzbekistan ......................................... 70

 Northern Air Campaign CSAR = MH-47Es ............................................................................. 71

 Building Camp Freedom at Double Time ................................................................................. 72

 The Universal Morale Booster at K2—Hot Food ...................................................................... 73

 Special Forces: CSAR Personnel Recovery and UW Preparation ............................................. 74

 Real Estate and Security at K2 .................................................................................................. 74

 Task Force Dagger = JSOTF-North at K2 ................................................................................. 74

 Hot-Wiring the “Snake”: Rearranging JSOTF-North Communications ................................... 75

 Building the JOC Inside the “Snake”: TF Dagger’s JOC ........................................................... 77

 Staff “Battle Captain”: The Combat Operations “Pulse Monitor” ............................................ 78

 Different Intelligence Concerns for Air Planners ...................................................................... 78

 JSOTF-North Growing Pains at K2 ........................................................................................... 79

 We Don’t Fail ............................................................................................................................. 80

 DAPs Set the Stage for UW in Afghanistan .............................................................................. 82

 3. Toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan, 19 October-7 December 2001 ......................................... 93

 Jumping Into the Dark: Seizing Rhino, 19 October 2001 ........................................................ 109

 Tactical PSYOP for Rhino ....................................................................................................... 113

 Showing American Power ........................................................................................................ 115

 “Look, We Have to Get the Special Forces Teams Into Afghanistan!” .................................... 117

 On Horseback With Dostum .................................................................................................... 122

 ODA 595 Begins Bombing Taliban Defenses ......................................................................... 125

 Aerial Resupply From the Receiver ......................................................................................... 127

 Aerial Resupply by SOCEUR .................................................................................................. 129

 A “Bump” and Missiles in the Abyss ...................................................................................... 132
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 Chapter Page

 500 Afghans Can Die, But Not One American Can Be Injured .............................................. 134

 AAA = A Bad Night in the Hindu Kush .................................................................................. 134

 Getting a Handle on the Air Threat .......................................................................................... 138

 Fostering Faith and Providing Solace ....................................................................................... 138

AAA Payback Time ................................................................................................................. 139

Bastogne in Afghanistan .......................................................................................................... 140

“Little Birds” of Prey ............................................................................................................... 141

High Desert Rat Patrol ............................................................................................................. 143

The Great Communications Terminus ..................................................................................... 145

Resupply From 10,000 Feet ..................................................................................................... 146

PSYOP = Hard, Steady Work ................................................................................................... 147

A Supportive Populace ............................................................................................................ 150

Getting PSYOP on the Ground in Afghanistan ........................................................................ 151

Have Tools Will Travel ............................................................................................................. 151

Mr. President ............................................................................................................................ 153

A Signifi cant Meeting With an Unusual Man .......................................................................... 154

The Battle of Tarin Kowt ......................................................................................................... 155

SOCCENT to Mazar-e-Sharif .................................................................................................. 158

Al-Qaeda Uprising—Qala-i-Jangi—24-29 November ............................................................ 158

ODA 583 Meets Gul Agha Sherzai .......................................................................................... 165

The Fight at Tahk-te-pol .......................................................................................................... 167

Fighting at Arghastan Bridge ................................................................................................... 169

Plans Versus Reality ................................................................................................................. 171

The Karzai Way to Kandahar ................................................................................................... 172

Charge to the Airport and Back Again ..................................................................................... 174

Attacking the Arghendab Bridge With Karzai ......................................................................... 175

Who Dares, Wins ..................................................................................................................... 178

Death From Above ................................................................................................................... 179

Another Reaction to Kandahar’s Fall ....................................................................................... 182

CA and Humanitarian Relief ................................................................................................... 183

CA Teams on the Ground ......................................................................................................... 184

Tactical PSYOP to Mazar-e-Sharif .......................................................................................... 185

Emergency Casualty Evacuation at K2 .................................................................................... 187

4. The Campaign in Transition, 8 December 2001-28 February 2002 ......................................... 203

Old Glory Flies Again in Kabul ............................................................................................... 211

Tora Bora .................................................................................................................................. 213

One Army ................................................................................................................................. 216

The Answer is Out There .......................................................................................................... 219

A New Twist on an Old Idea .................................................................................................... 220

Chokepoint ............................................................................................................................... 225

“60 Minutes II” ........................................................................................................................ 227

High-Altitude Rescue of a Marine CH-53 ............................................................................... 229

Taking Down al-Qaeda at the Mir Wais Hospital .................................................................... 232

The Raid at Hazer Qadam ........................................................................................................ 235

SR Eyes on Target .................................................................................................................... 241

From EMT to Special Forces Force Multiplier ........................................................................ 244

Politics, War, and Rapport ........................................................................................................ 248
vii

Chapter Page

GTMO Bound .......................................................................................................................... 250

CA Liaison Work ...................................................................................................................... 251

CJSOTF-West .......................................................................................................................... 253

End of Mission—Aerial Resupply in Afghanistan .................................................................. 253

“We’re Going for Sure This Time” .......................................................................................... 255

Be Prepared for SSE ................................................................................................................ 256

Native Pashto and Dari Speaker Seeking PSYOP Assignment ............................................... 257

Keep on Trucking .................................................................................................................... 260

Rescue at 10,000 Feet .............................................................................................................. 261

Date Drop at Khowst ............................................................................................................... 263

ODA 394: The Next Mission ................................................................................................... 265

5. The New War ............................................................................................................................ 275

Entering the Valley .................................................................................................................. 282

Field Expedient Triage ............................................................................................................ 285

Disaster and Frustration........................................................................................................... 285

Combat Multipliers ................................................................................................................. 287

D-Day ANACONDA From the Viewpoint of Force Multipliers ............................................. 288

ARSOF in Direct Support ....................................................................................................... 292

On Again-Off Again ................................................................................................................ 293

With the Aussies ...................................................................................................................... 295

Forty-Five Seconds Too Long ................................................................................................. 296

Never Leave a Fallen Comrade ................................................................................................ 299

Against All Odds ..................................................................................................................... 302

Joining the Fight on Takur Ghar .............................................................................................. 309

ODA 394 Climbs the “Whale” ................................................................................................ 319

Integrating Civil Affairs .......................................................................................................... 328

Ambush at 80 Knots ................................................................................................................ 330

Trail of Caches ........................................................................................................................ 332

Establishing CJSOTF-Afghanistan.......................................................................................... 335

Communications at Bagram .................................................................................................... 337

High Desert Automation Management .................................................................................... 338

“Good Morrrrning, Afghannnnistan” ...................................................................................... 340

A Disaster Provides a Catalyst ................................................................................................ 342

The Communications Handoff ................................................................................................ 344

Better Communications ........................................................................................................... 344

CJSOTF-Afghanistan and the Joint Air Component ............................................................... 345

CJSOTF-Afghanistan and “Zulu Time” .................................................................................. 345

Command Guidance and VTCs ............................................................................................... 346

Rebuilding the Kabul Military Academy ................................................................................ 347

Another View of the Kabul Military Academy Task ............................................................... 349

“Chiclets” and PSYOP Teams in Kandahar ............................................................................. 350

Their Lucky Day ...................................................................................................................... 353

Dealing With Cryptographic Compromise .............................................................................. 355

Caves and Graves .................................................................................................................... 356

Vietnam-Style A Camp at Orgun-e ......................................................................................... 358

A National Army for Afghanistan ........................................................................................... 358

Observations and Refl ections ........................................................................................................ 369
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Chapter Page

Preparation for War .................................................................................................................. 370

Driving the Taliban From Power: ARSOF in the Supported Role ........................................... 376

Transition and Combat Operations .......................................................................................... 383

The CJSOTF-Afghanistan Era Begins ..................................................................................... 389

Glossary ......................................................................................................................................... 393

About the Contributors .................................................................................................................. 399

Index ......................................................................................................................................... 401

Figures

Chapter 1

1. Regional Map and Selected Cities in the Country ....................................................................... 1

2. Regional Location Map and Neighboring Countries ................................................................... 3

3. Jimmy Carter .............................................................................................................................. 11

4. Soviet Tank Carcass .................................................................................................................... 12

5. Abandoned MiG at Mazar .......................................................................................................... 15

6. Hamad Karzai............................................................................................................................. 18

7. Afghan Children ......................................................................................................................... 20

8. Madeleine Albright..................................................................................................................... 22

9. Bill Richardson........................................................................................................................... 22

10. William Cohen ........................................................................................................................... 24

11. GEN Henry Shelton .................................................................................................................. 24

12. George Tenet............................................................................................................................... 26

Chapter 2

1. Extensive Mountainous Terrain .................................................................................................. 34

2. Pakistan Government Building .................................................................................................. 35

3. Tribal Factions, Regions, and Leaders ....................................................................................... 36

4. Map Depicting the Ethnic and Linguistic Diversity of Afghanistan .......................................... 37

5. BG McClure, COL Volckmann, and COL Bank ........................................................................ 39

6. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Names the Operational Efforts .................................................... 40

7. LTG Bryan D. Brown Encourages Soldiers ............................................................................... 42

8. Helicopter View of Karshi Kanabad (K2) Air Base, Uzbekistan ............................................... 45

9. The 528th Support Battalion Kept the Water Flowing ............................................................... 45

10. The 112th Signal Battalion Established the JSOTF-North Communications Links .................. 45

11. The 528th Support Battalion Soldiers Prepared for Base Camp Construction .......................... 45

12. C-17 Globemaster III Taking Off From K2 to Make Humanitarian Food Drops ....................... 46

13. Commando Solo Airborne Broadcasting Platform .................................................................... 46

14. “Drive Out the Foreign Terrorists” Leafl et Dropped During the Air Campaign ........................ 46

15. 75th Rangers Night Parachute Assault on Objective Rhino ....................................................... 47

16. MH-47E Helicopters Taxi for Prefl ight Checks Before Night Missions .................................... 47

17. 160th SOAR—Loaded and Ready for Night Operations ........................................................... 47

18. Resistance is Futile; Assistance Works Better ............................................................................ 48

19. “Reassurance” Leafl ets in Multiple Languages ......................................................................... 48

20. Leafl et Messages Directed at the Civilian Population ................................................................ 49

21. Leafl et Appealing to Afghan Nationalism .................................................................................. 50

22. 4th POG Printing Presses Regularly Operated Overtime ........................................................... 50

23. SOCCENT Map Dividing Afghanistan Geographically ............................................................ 54
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24. Afghanistan ................................................................................................................................ 55

25. LAN Connectivity to the K2 “Snake” ........................................................................................ 56

26. Amman, Jordan .......................................................................................................................... 58

27. The Central Command’s Horn of Africa Region ........................................................................ 59

28. TF Dagger Commander COL Mulholland Gives GEN Myers (CJCS) an Update at K2 .......... 59

29. U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command Shoulder Patch .................. 60

30. Islamabad in Relation to Afghanistan ........................................................................................ 61

31. PSYOP Themes Centered on Accepting Coalition Assistance ................................................... 63

32. Karshi Kanabad (K2), Uzbekistan............................................................................................. 64

33. K2, Uzbekistan .......................................................................................................................... 65

34. Uzbek Guards—The Bottom of the Bureaucratic Ladder ......................................................... 66

35. K2 Buildup With Backlog of Accumulating Supplies and Equipment ..................................... 67

36. 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) .............................................................. 67

37. Refueling a Soviet Mi-17 at K2 ................................................................................................. 68

38. Night Stalker View of the C-130P Trailing Refuel Lines and Probe Basket ............................. 69

39. Trail Aircraft View of MH-47E Refueling ................................................................................ 69

40. MH-47E Hooked Up for Aerial Refueling ................................................................................ 69

41. 112th Signal Battalion Satellite Antennas ................................................................................. 70

42. K2 Buildup ................................................................................................................................ 70

43. MH-47E Landing at K2 ............................................................................................................. 70

44. MH-60L DAPs .......................................................................................................................... 71

45. Aircraft Maintenance Was a Crucial Factor for Success ........................................................... 71

46. 528th SOSB Initial Logistics Chaos .......................................................................................... 72

47. K2 Cantonment Area ................................................................................................................. 72

48. COL Frank Kisner and COL John Mulholland ......................................................................... 75

49. TF Dagger Logo ........................................................................................................................ 75

50. The Support Battalion Needs Communications to Provide Support ......................................... 76

51. 112th Signal Battalion Unit Insignia and Beret Flash ............................................................... 76

52. Dry for the Moment................................................................................................................... 77

53. JSOTF-North Commander COL Mulholland With Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld ................ 80

54. Antennas, Power, and Cabling Installed First ............................................................................ 81

55. Initial Signal Links to K2 .......................................................................................................... 81

56. MH-60L DAP. Winter Operations in High Mountainous Terrain Posed Major Challenges ...... 82

57. Identifying the Good Guys From the Bad Guys ........................................................................ 84

58. Prefl ight Check Included Attaching Glint Tape to Identify “Friendlies” .................................. 84

Chapter 3

1. LTG Bryan D. Brown, USASOC Commander .......................................................................... 93

2. Kabul, Afghanistan’s National Capital ...................................................................................... 94

3. General Abdul Rashid Dostum .................................................................................................. 95

4. Refueling the MC-130P Tanker Was a Major Task ................................................................... 96

5. View of an Impacting Smart Bomb ........................................................................................... 97

6. General Shariff and Supporters ................................................................................................. 97

7. 75th Rangers Combat Parachute Assault on Objective Rhino .................................................. 98

8. A Soviet-Made Mi-17 Utility Helicopter Flown by Contract Pilots ......................................... 99

9. An MH-47E Deploying Defensive Measures .......................................................................... 100

10. Ismail Khan ............................................................................................................................. 100

11. Special Forces Teams Use Satellite Links for Communications ............................................. 101
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12. A Special Forces Soldier Employing a Laser Designator to Mark Targets ............................. 101

13. Lethal AH-6 “Little Bird” Conducts a Night Raid .................................................................. 103

14. Loading Nonstandard Tactical Vehicles Aboard an MH-47E .................................................. 104

15. U.S. Air Force AC-130 Spectre Gunship Firing at Night ........................................................ 105

16. D Company, 109th Maintenance Battalion, ARNG, Reinforces the 160th SOAR .................. 106

17. Hamad Karzai Poses With Special Forces Soldiers ................................................................. 106

18. Masirah Island Off the Coast of Oman ................................................................................... 108

19. Masirah Airfi eld ....................................................................................................................... 108

20. Shoulder Scroll of the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment .................................................. 110

21. Receiving Mission Orders Before Departure .......................................................................... 110

22. 75th Rangers Prepare for an Airborne Assault ........................................................................ 110

23. Rangers Preparing to Seize Objective Rhino ........................................................................... 111

24. Parachute Assault on Objective Rhino ..................................................................................... 112

25. Rangers Clearing Objective Cobalt ......................................................................................... 112

26. 75th Ranger Calling Card ........................................................................................................ 114

27. U.S. Navy P-3C Orion Aircraft ................................................................................................ 116

28. 75th Rangers Rehearsing a Fast Rope Infi ltration from a 160th SOAR MH-60K ................... 118

29. Patriotism Abounds at All Hours ............................................................................................. 119

30. High Mountain Terrain Obstructed the Route ......................................................................... 119

31. MH-47E Clearing the “Bear” at Night .................................................................................... 120

32. Dostum Travels in a More Traditional Way ............................................................................. 123

33. Pack Mules and Rucksacks—A Good Combination for ODA 595 ......................................... 124

34. Mobility Issues Were Overcome by an Old-Fashioned Solution ............................................. 124

35. ODA 595’s Second Echelon Moves to Link Up With Dostum’s Main Body of Fighters ........ 124

36. An American Special Forces Soldier on His Afghan Horse .................................................... 125

37. A Middle-Aged Afghan Man ................................................................................................... 126

38. JDAM Strikes Were a Morale Booster for Dostum ................................................................. 127

39. Western Versus Cordura Saddles ............................................................................................. 129

40. GEN Holland and BG Fuller With COL Mulholland .............................................................. 129

41. Units Worked Very Long Hours to Support Resupply Demands ............................................. 130

42. Bodyguards for the Special Forces Team ................................................................................. 134

43. General Dostum Sharing a Meal With Special Forces Personnel ............................................ 134

44. An MH-47E Deploying Flares During a AAA Threat ............................................................. 136

45. Night Stalker Crew Chief ........................................................................................................ 137

46. 75th Rangers Conducting Long-Range Armed Reconnaissance ............................................. 140

47. 75th Rangers Awaiting MC-130s ............................................................................................. 141

48. An AH-6 “Little Bird” Armed for Night Raids ....................................................................... 142

49. 75th Ranger Hide Site .............................................................................................................. 144

50. 75th Ranger Night Movement Under NVGs ........................................................................... 144

51. Unexpected, But Welcome, Resupply Bundles ........................................................................ 147

52. The Modular Print System (MPS) at Bagram Air Base ........................................................... 147

53. Reward Leafl et ......................................................................................................................... 148

54. CA Personnel Give Transistor Radios to Afghans ................................................................... 149

55. 4th POG Leafl et With Radio Broadcast Frequencies ............................................................... 149

56. Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean............................................................................................ 150

57. The 109th Aviation Maintenance Battalion (AVIM) Provided Quality Support ...................... 152

58. Hamad Karzai .......................................................................................................................... 153
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59. Afghan Leader With a PSYOP Leafl et ..................................................................................... 154

60. Preparations Under Way to Reestablish Control Over the Prison ............................................ 160

61. AC-130 20mm Gatling Guns (Vulcan) .................................................................................... 164

62. Gul Agha Sherzai ..................................................................................................................... 165

63. Location and Importance ......................................................................................................... 168

64. Deploying Forces ..................................................................................................................... 168

65. Battle of the Arghastan Bridge................................................................................................. 170

66. One of the Major Objectives of the Southern Offensive ......................................................... 171

67. Training New Karzai “Recruits” for Combat .......................................................................... 173

68. A U.S. Air Force A-10 Warthog CAS Aircraft ......................................................................... 174

69. Actions at the Arghendab Bridge ............................................................................................. 176

70. The Kandahar Welcoming Committee ..................................................................................... 179

71. A Mission-Ready JDAM ......................................................................................................... 180

72. JDAM Components ................................................................................................................. 181

73. President George W. Bush ....................................................................................................... 181

74. President Bush and Hamid Karzai ........................................................................................... 182

75. Inventory and Accountability Were a Constant Part of Humanitarian Aid .............................. 184

76. CA Collar Insignia and the USACAPOC Shoulder Patch ....................................................... 185

77. A Casualty Evacuation Kit on an MH-47 Chinook ................................................................. 188

78 CA Always Fostering Goodwill and Demonstrating Compassion ........................................... 188

Chapter 4

1. American Colors Unfurled at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul ....................................................... 203

2. Preparing for al-Qaeda ............................................................................................................ 204

3. Under New Management ......................................................................................................... 205

4. Sand Table for DA SSE Raid Preparations .............................................................................. 205

5. Afghan Children ...................................................................................................................... 207

6. The Camp Abel Motor Pool in Bagram ................................................................................... 208

7. Post-Mission Discussions Among ARSOF Personnel ............................................................. 210

8. Kabul Sprawl and Majestic Mountains .................................................................................... 212

9. U.S. Embassy Cornerstone and a Solemn Ceremony .............................................................. 212

10. Two Northern Afghan Leaders ................................................................................................. 213

11. Cave Searches Locate Weapons and Munitions Caches .......................................................... 214

12. Mobile Cave Operations .......................................................................................................... 214

13. The 19th SFG Beret Flash With Special Forces Crest ............................................................. 217

14. A 5/19th SFG Soldier Establishing Communications in Afghanistan ..................................... 217

15. The 112th Signal Battalion Successfully Improvised at Kandahar Air Base ........................... 220

16. Bamian Buddha Site After the Taliban Destroyed it on 11 March 2001 ................................ 221

17. Autoclaves Inside Herat Hospital ............................................................................................ 222

18. A Typical Classroom in a Bamian School ............................................................................... 223

19. CA Teams Examine the Condition of a Community Well ....................................................... 223

20. Impromptu “Contract Negotiations” With Village Leaders ..................................................... 224

21. Salang Tunnel and Road Conditions ........................................................................................ 224

22. Friendship Bridge .................................................................................................................... 225

23. Making Friends and Infl uencing People .................................................................................. 225

24. Ground Mobility Vehicles (GMVs) Ready for Action ............................................................. 236

25. A/1/5 SFG Uses an “Up” Armored HMMWV GMV ............................................................. 237
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26. Elements of the Kelly Force Aboard a Marine Corps CH-53 .................................................. 238

27. Weapons Captured During a Hazer Qadam Raid .................................................................... 240

28. ODA 514 Conducts SR in Mountains of Southern Afghanistan ............................................. 242

29. PSYOP Leafl et Warning About Unexploded Ordnance ........................................................... 245

30. PSYOP Loudspeaker HMMWVs Traveling in Pairs ............................................................... 246

31. Broadcasting Music Outside an Afghan Village ...................................................................... 246

32. People Long Remember the Good Others Do for Them and Their Children .......................... 247

33. Airdropped Bundles Created Logistics Challenges for the Teams .......................................... 254

34. MC-130Ps Fly a “Racetrack” to Remain Available for Refueling ........................................... 262

35. Recruiting “Runway Maintenance Specialists” From the Local Population ........................... 265

Chapter 5

1. Marching Was the “First Step” in Building a National Army .................................................. 275

2. Equipment Issue is the First, and Sometimes Last, Offi cial Act for Some Army Recruits ...... 276

3. ANA Offi cers Course Begins at Kabul Military Academy ...................................................... 279

4. Terrain Models for Offi cer Tactical Training ........................................................................... 280

5. Focused View of Paktia Province ............................................................................................. 280

6. Bagram Air Base Becomes the “Center of the Universe” ........................................................ 281

7. Coalition View of Operation ANACONDA ............................................................................. 284

8. Objective Remington in the Shah-i-Khot Valley ...................................................................... 291

9. Babulkhel Damage Assessment ............................................................................................... 291

10. Serkhankhal Aftermath ............................................................................................................ 291

11. Millions of 4th POG Leafl ets Emphasized Hopelessness and Encouraged Surrender ............ 293

12. AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter ............................................................................................ 294

13. Two-Wheeled LZs Became Routine for 160th SOAR MH-47E Pilots .................................... 296

14. The Impossible Becomes Inevitable ......................................................................................... 300

15. The Unlikely Becomes Fact ..................................................................................................... 300

16. The Harsh Terrain of Takur Ghar ............................................................................................. 310

17. Mountains and “Whales” ......................................................................................................... 316

18. Typical Special Forces Base Camp Area in Afghanistan ......................................................... 320

19. General Haidar at Rest ............................................................................................................. 323

20. General Haidar on the Move .................................................................................................... 323

21. Humanitarian Aid Arrives ........................................................................................................ 328

22. Good Wells are Vital to Life in Afghanistan ............................................................................ 329

23. Destroyed DshK Antiaircraft Weapon System in the Shah-i-Khot Valley ............................... 333

24. Cave Caches Produced a Surprising Variety of Items .............................................................. 334

25. Cave Caches Were Commonly Uncovered in Sweeps of Shah-i-Khot Valley .......................... 335

26. SOMS-B Broadcasts the News ................................................................................................ 340

27. The “Scope of Work” Was Immense ........................................................................................ 348

28. Local Leaders Help Decide What Comes Next ....................................................................... 350

29. One of America’s Favorite Pastimes Appeals to Others as Well ............................................... 351

30. Deliveries Were Always a Signifi cant Priority ......................................................................... 352

31. Special Forces Medics Conduct Triage of Afghan Wounded ................................................... 354

32. Special Forces Medics Stabilize the Wounded ......................................................................... 355
xiii

Acknowledgments

Weapon of Choice is a history of the Army special operations forces in Afghanistan from 

11 September 2001 to 15 May 2002, during America’s global war on terrorism (GWOT). Lieutenant General R. Doug Brown, commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), directed and personally sponsored this initial effort “to capture the current operations 

history of the Army special operations soldiers as they fought the war in Afghanistan.” Writing 

an unclassifi ed, well-documented history of current operations was a fi rst for the command and 

staff of USASOC as well as for the supported headquarters, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); Joint Special Operations Command 

(JSOC); and Special Operations Command, CENTCOM (SOCCENT). The “learning curve” 

was steep for all parties, but the fi nal results—a special edition of Special Warfare magazine, 

“ARSOF in Afghanistan,” and this book, Weapon of Choice—demonstrate what can be accomplished.

Appropriate thanks are due a myriad of people whose encouragement, assistance “above 

and beyond,” and constant support made this timely history possible. Within the USASOC 

history community are Dr. Cherilyn Walley, USASOC historian, and Dr. Kenn Finlayson, U.S. 

Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) historian, who read, commented on, and edited Weapon of Choice and who proofread the fi nal manuscript; Mr. Earl J. 

Moniz, resident “computer wizard,” who physically organized and compiled all of the written 

material into a manuscript, scanned photographs and leafl ets into the text, and designed the 

cover for Weapon of Choice; LTC Robert Jones, a mobilized U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) historian, who “commanded” and tended to the administrative needs of the 126th and 45th Military History Detachments (MHDs), facilitating the 126th’s overseas deployment and personally 

coordinating their activities in Afghanistan; Ms. Monet McKinzie, archives technician, who 

performed innumerable administrative tasks to assist the historians; Ms. Cyn Hayden, USASOC archivist, who helped the contract historians; and Mr. Erdie Picart, archives technician, 

who ensured the physical security of classifi ed material; the 126th MHD, Army National Guard 

(ARNG), Boston, Massachusetts—MAJ Paul Landry, SFC Daniel Moriarty, SSG Patrick Jennings, and SGT Landon Mavrelis—for covering civil affairs (CA) activities during Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Afghanistan; and the USAR 45th MHD, Atlanta, Georgia, for 

covering psychological operations (PSYOP) in OEF at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

There are many on the USASOC, U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC), U.S. 

Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), and SWCS staffs 

who deserve special mention. From USASOC: COLs Ives Fontaine and Charles Cleveland, 

Chiefs of Staff, the major proponents of the project; Mr. Charles Pimble, Secretary of the 

General Staff; Ms. Connie Wicker; Ms. Jane Sutherlin and Ms. Karen Glass, Acquisition and 

Contracting; COL Steve Schrum, Mr. John Green, Ms. Sally Hurt, Mr. Dan Brand, Mr. John 

Watkins, Mr. Ed Nelson, and Ms. Sarah Fields, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence; COL 

Philip McGhee, LTC Christopher White, Ms. Susan Ritter, Ms. Rose Reid, and Ms. Robin 

Jones, Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management; Mr. Dorsey Mellott, MSG Charles 

Koonce, and Ms. Shelley Marné, Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management; COL 

Randy Cochran, Deputy Chief of Staff, Special Operations Aviation; Mr. Randall Wilkie of 
xiv

the Army Compartmented Element; LTC Jack Ziegler, MAJ Robert Cairns (manuscript reader), MAJ Andrew Nichols, and Ms. Sally Smith, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 

(DCSOPS); MAJ John T. Corley and MAJ Eric Patterson, TDY to DCSOPS for Project Insight; 

and Major Robert Hardy, SFC T. Dennis, and SSG J. Simon, HHC, USASOC. From USASFC: 

COL Manny Diemer, Deputy Commander; COL John Knie, Chief of Staff; Mr. James Hargraves (manuscript reader) and Mr. Chris Crain of the G3; and MAJ Jim Rosenberry and MSG 

Charles Hopkins of the G1. From USACAPOC: LTC Christopher Leyda, G3, and MAJ David 

Fox and SFC G. Doles, CENTCOM desk. From SWCS: COL Richard Helfer, Chief of Staff; 

MAJ Brian Banks, Staff Judge Advocate (manuscript reader); COL Andy Anderson; Major 

David Beech; CW3 William Bryant; and Mr. Jerry Steelman, editor, Special Warfare magazine, 

Department of Training and Doctrine. To all the soldiers and airmen of USASOC who contributed their time, personal photos, and records to the USASOC history team, thanks for being 

true professionals.

Within the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Tampa, Florida, thanks go 

to Mr. Kirk Moeller for the practicalities of “how to get contract personnel into the theater of 

operations” and points of contact in Afghanistan. In the USSOCOM History Offi ce, Dr. John 

Partin, Command Historian; Ms. Gaea Levy, archivist; and the USSOCOM historians who 

worked in Afghanistan—COL Richard Stewart, LTC Thomas Searle, and MAJ Matt Dawson, 

CJSOTF-Afghanistan—for meeting the USASOC team in Qatar and getting it to Bagram to begin work. At JSOC, COL Andrew Milani, Mr. Steve Cage, and Mr. James Kelliher (manuscript 

readers); Mr. Mario Forestier; and Mr. D.J. Friederichs. At SOCCENT headquarters in Tampa 

and overseas in Qatar, we appreciate the help from the J3 section that arranged the USASOC 

trip to Afghanistan.

Special thanks go to Carol Rippey and Tad Sifeis, Armed Forces Information Service, Alexandria, Virginia, for providing electronic copies of the Early Bird covering September 2001-

May 2002. These proved invaluable to the history writers.

Thank you to Mark Boyatt of SYTEX, Inc., Fayetteville, North Carolina, for providing 

three outstanding retired Army special operations personnel with advanced academic credentials and the requisite experience to serve as contract historians for this project.

Finally, accolades are due for Dr. W. Glenn Robertson, Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, and editors Patricia H. Whitten who edited and laid the book out and 

Robin D. Kern who assisted with layout and worked on the covers, Research and Publication 

Team, CSI, for producing a quality Weapon of Choice.

While all authors sincerely appreciate the help rendered by everyone mentioned above, 

errors of fact and identifi cation, and the nonattributable observations and refl ections section in 

Weapon of Choice are my responsibility as senior writer and editor.—Dr. Chuck Briscoe
xv

Introduction

The purpose of this book is to share Army special operations soldier stories with the general 

American public to show them what various elements accomplished during the war to drive the 

Taliban from power and to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan as part of 

the global war on terrorism. The purpose of the book is not to resolve Army special operations 

doctrinal issues, to clarify or update military defi nitions, or to be the “defi nitive” history of the 

continuing unconventional war in Afghanistan. The purpose is to demonstrate how the war to 

drive the Taliban from power, help the Afghan people, and assist the Afghan Interim Authority 

(AIA) rebuild the country afterward was successfully accomplished by majors, captains, warrant offi cers, and sergeants on tactical teams and aircrews at the lowest levels. If Army special 

operations forces (ARSOF) operations and the operational employment of teams in Afghanistan by various Joint Special Operaions Task Forces (JSOTFs) create doctrinal debate, the appropriate venue within which to resolve those issues is at the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center 

and School. Combat operations in Afghanistan remain classifi ed by the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM). This is a carefully “sanitized” rendering of selected combat operations, and used 

pseudonyms for military personnel in the grade of lieutenant colonel and below (unless the 

individuals had received so much media exposure that this simple security measure would be 

meaningless). Likewise, the “eyes” of ARSOF personnel below the grade of colonel have been 

“blacked-out” in the photos for operational security (OPSEC) reasons. Chapter introductions 

and the vignettes have been written so that individuals with little previous knowledge of the 

military can understand and appreciate the contributions of the small Army special operations 

units that succeeded in driving the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.

The selected historical vignettes tell the ARSOF story. Many of these soldier stories demonstrate the capabilities of special operations forces (SOF)-unique equipment, while others 

point out the skills and bravery of the soldiers and aviators. The strength of ARSOF resides in 

its highly trained, very motivated soldiers. While technology plays a part in ARSOF, the soldiers 

make the difference. There has been a conscious effort to ensure that the stories of all ARSOF 

elements are presented. Thus, to provide a fair representative sampling of different activities 

within the security constraints, not all interviews became vignettes. One hundred-percent 

coverage of all participating teams was impossible. The examples selected were the best of 

those available to demonstrate a capability, illustrate an activity, or clarify a combat mission. 

The sensitive classifi ed parts have been sanitized based on specifi c security rules, hence special 

forces elements do not always mean special forces teams, and pseudonyms are used predominantly. A limited-access U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) classifi ed annex of sources will contain true names and specify documents and briefi ngs to corroborate the 

material included. The controlled classifi ed annex will not be available to researchers who do 

not have the appropriate security clearances and a clear “need to know.”

This historical project is not intended to be the defi nitive study of the war in Afghanistan. 

It is a “snapshot” of the war from 11 September 2001 until the middle of May 2002. Since the 

published word promotes analysis and provokes discussion, the fi rst offi cial account of this 

successful unconventional war should come from Army Special Operations because they spearheaded the ground campaign that forced the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. The vignettes 
xvi

are based primarily on recorded interviews, after-action reports, personal notes of participants, 

and tactical operations center (TOC) logs. Open secondary sources were also used, but for this 

operations history, the recorded interviews of soldiers from tactical teams to various JSOTF 

and Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) staff personnel proved to be the most 

valuable. Where minor differences were found between accounts by a tactical team and headquarters records and cross-referencing corroborated data provided by the “team on the ground,” 

that was adopted. In the interest of producing a timely product while the war was still “fresh,” 

discrepancies that could not be resolved satisfactorily were handled by the project director who 

evaluated importance, relevance, and whether they contributed to or confused the issue.

This is a current history of war. The decision to have professional historians with ARSOF 

experience capture the history of current operations in Afghanistan is proof that the book is 

not intended to be a public relations piece. War and combat have never been “all sunshine and 

roses.” Just as campaign plans and units orders tend to “go to the winds” once the fi ghting 

starts, reluctant and ill-prepared leaders are replaced, confusion and incomplete information 

are relegated to the “fog of war,” and recollections from the headquarters afterward as to what 

really happened on the ground tend to dominate after-the-battle reports. The writing team—

composed of retired ARSOF veterans—understood those “given” elements. When everything 

goes according to plan, professional soldiers consider it an anomaly. Thus, to reach 95-percent 

objectivity, the writing team veterans kept the following sports adage in mind: “It’s easy to fool 

the fans, but you can’t fool the players.” While observations and refl ections are included, complete analysis can be done only when the ARSOF mission in Afghanistan is concluded.
1

Chapter 1

Prelude to Terror

Oh, East is East, and West is West,

and never the two shall meet,

Till Earth and Sky stand presently at

God’s great Judgment Seat;

But there is neither East nor West,

Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,

When two strong men stand face to face,

tho’ they come from the ends of the earth.1

On 11 September 2001, two strong men from the ends of the earth stood face to face—

President of the United States George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden, leader of the al-Qaeda

terrorist network. Although they had never met, both stood at the epicenter of one of the most 

cataclysmic events ever to strike the United States. These two men embodied the clash between Western liberalism and eastern Islamic fundamentalism. One culture valued freedom, 

equal rights, and religious tolerance. The other culture epitomized hatred—especially for the 

United States and Israel—suppression of women, demonization of any religion other than Islam, and strict adherence to a radical form of Islam that embraced terrorism and equated death 

in the jihad (holy war) against perceived enemies as glorious martyrdom. Although Americans 

had encountered Muslim fanaticism in 1993 with the bombing at the World Trade Center and 

again in 1998 when bin Laden terrorists attacked U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, most 

failed to understand the vicious nature of a man who viewed “hostility towards America [as] a 

religious duty.”2

 On that September morning, the extent of that hostility was brought home to 

millions of Americans in a fl aming shower of glass, metal, and death.

Figure 1. Regional map and selected cities in the country.
2

 

Even after the events of 1993 and 1998, Afghanistan had little relevance to most Americans as they went about their daily lives. What was unfolding there, however, suddenly would 

dominate the news, the stock market, the airlines, and the very security of the United States. 

Only soldiers, diplomats, historians, and oil pipeline executives expressed any interest in or 

knowledge of that far-away Third-World country. Few Americans understood why the United 

States would be drawn into a confl ict with religious overtones that seemed so distant and so 

confusing. While the United States was not at war with Afghanistan and had no interest in attacking, occupying, or intervening in that country, al-Qaeda, with the support of the Taliban, 

saw the world differently.

To better understand this most recent war in Afghanistan, a summarized history of the 

region is provided. What should become very apparent are three constants: perpetual internal 

fi ghting between tribal ethnic groups, the dominance of Islam in society, and intervention by 

external actors using this discord to achieve infl uence in the country. Afghan leaders, in turn, 

have sought to take advantage of power plays, whether they were made by regional actors or 

international superpowers engaged in Cold War or more powerful warlords. To Westerners, 

internal alliances seem to “shift with the wind.” The limited number of large cities makes them 

critical control points in the country. The dominant ethnic group has controlled the population 

centers. Thus, the signifi cance of their capture or control in 2001 can be related to past wars 

and internal tribal fi ghting. Mountains, among the highest in the world, have always dictated 

the natural fl ow of traffi c in and out of this landlocked country. Throughout this story, historical references will be made to show links between the present war and past confl icts.

Foreign invasion is an integral part of Afghanistan’s history. Alexander the Great invaded 

the region between 330 and 327 A.D. In the seventh century, Arab Muslims, after conquering 

Iran, moved east and reached Kandahar around 700 A.D. By 715, Mohammad Bin Oasim had 

overrun the entire area and begun to convert the populace to Sunni Islam. From the Ghaznavid capital at Ghazni, Yamin ad-Dawlah Mahmud, of Turkish descent, led his military forces 

through Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of India during the fi rst half of the 10th century. His 

conquests assured the domination of Sunni Islam throughout the region. Various Turkish rulers 

would rule Afghanistan until 1221 when, from the North, Genghis Khan crossed into presentday Afghanistan and destroyed the city of Balkh. Fifty years later Marco Polo would comment on 

the ruins of the town. Although his Mongol horde was halted just north of Kabul, Genghis Khan 

quickly regrouped and proceeded to devastate the area. The destruction was so complete that 

one historian has referred to Genghis Khan as “the atom bomb of his day.”3

 But what the Mongols could not destroy was Islam, and by 1295, the descendants of Genghis Khan were Muslim.4

In the late 1300s, the warrior Tamerlane (Timur the Lame) moved south from his home 

near Samarkand in present-day Uzbekistan to incorporate Afghanistan into his Timurid Empire. Tamerlane’s interest in conquest rather than administration prompted the empire’s dissolution after his death in 1405. Although his immediate successors established Herat as a 

cultural center, they were unable to control the competition for power. For the next three centuries, turmoil characterized what would become Afghanistan. Babur (Zahiruddin Muhammad), 

a descendant of Tamerlane and Genghis Khan, founded the Moghul Dynasty that captured 

Kabul in 1504 and extended his rule throughout India. Simultaneously, the Persian Safavid 

Empire seized territory around Kandahar, and Uzbeks attempted to gain control over Herat. 
3

Native Pashtun tribes attacked what they perceived to be foreign invaders, but disunity precluded large gains. Competition, lack of unity, and weakness were ingredients that enabled the 

Persian, Nadir Shar, to control the region with military might.5

Seeking to overthrow the weak Persian ruler and eliminate the Turks from Persia, Nadir 

embarked on a successful campaign that not only recovered land lost to Turkey but also dealt 

with his Pashtun enemies at Herat, Farah, and Kandahar. Because Nadir admired the Pashtun 

fi ghting skills, he relocated them in the southwestern part of Afghanistan, the center of their 

power to this day. His suspicion of those closest led many to be executed, and his son was 

blinded before Nadir was assassinated in 1747.6

Nadir had incorporated into his army a body of cavalry commanded by Ahmad Shah, a 

Pashtun. After Nadir’s death, Ahmad and his men fl ed the Persian camp, stealing the treasury 

that Nadir had used to bribe potential enemies. They arrived at Kandahar where a loya jirga

(council) convened to select a tribal leader. Undoubtedly, Ahmad Shah’s powerful cavalry 

force infl uenced the loya jirga’s decision. Ahmad Shah, as the leader of the most powerful 

Pashtun tribe, became Ahmad Shah Durrani (Pearl of Pearls) and quickly seized Ghazni and 

Kabul. After military expeditions into India, Ahmad returned to quell revolts in Herat and 

southwest Pakistan. Then, a diffi culty that would plague Afghanistan into the 21st century 

surfaced. “No Pashtun likes to be ruled by another,” observed historian Louis Dupree, “particularly someone from another tribe, subtribe, or section.”7

 By 1752, Ahmad had subdued the 

northern regions surrounding Konduz, Khanabad, Balkh, and Bamian to bring the Turkmen, 

Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara tribesmen under his control. While he had succeeded in uniting the 

numerous regional tribes, their loyalty “was not transferred from their own leaders and kin to 

the concept of nation.” Nevertheless, after his death in 1773, Ahmad Shah Durrani was called 

Ahmad Shah Baba, the father of Afghanistan, Baba being “father.” By 1800, however, tribal 

rivalries had plunged the once-united country into civil war, and with civil war came foreign 

intervention.8

Figure 2. Regional location map and neighboring countries.
4

The 19th century was the great period of empire for England, France, and Russia when 

all competed in what Rudyard Kipling described as “the Great Game” in his epic, Kim. With 

imperialism and power expansion as the guiding principles, each empire sought to dominate 

and infl uence the Indian subcontinent. Since the 1600s, England and France had competed for 

India’s lucrative commerce. That competition quickly turned political. By 1763, British infl uence was dominant. While Napoleon Bonaparte’s dreams of using Persia to counter British 

and Russian infl uence in East Asia died at Waterloo in 1815, the czarist dream of a warm-water 

port found new life. The Russian defeat of a Persian army in 1807 prompted a defense treaty 

between the British and Shah Shuja Mirza, the Afghan ruler in Kabul, in 1809 and with the 

Persians in 1814. Suspicious of Afghan intentions toward India, the British later stationed a 

sizable force in northwest India.9

Following the overthrow of Shah Shuja in 1809 and his successor in 1818, Afghanistan 

disintegrated into tribal warfare. Different factions controlled the population centers of Kabul, 

Kandahar, and Herat as well as the Kashmir and Peshawar regions. Dost Mohammad Khan 

eventually achieved a measure of dominance in 1826 in the areas of Kabul and Ghazni. Balkh 

was lost to northern invaders, and Shuja, even with British assistance, failed to regain Kandahar in 1833. In the meantime, the Russians had been exerting infl uence on the Persians. In 

1837, a Persian army with Russian offi cers accompanying it advanced on Herat. The Persian 

advance and the presence of a Russian commercial agent in Kabul caused Great Britain to demand that Dost Mohammad renounce contacts with Persia and Russia, expel the Russian agent 

from Kabul, and recognize the Indian Sikh conquest of Peshawar. When a strongly worded 

British note made the capture of Herat into a threat to India, the Persian army was withdrawn 

and the Russian agent recalled. The Governor General of India, Lord Auckland, was determined that Shuja, whom he believed he could control, should rule in Kabul and Kandahar. The 

“Great Game” overshadowed the diplomatic and military maneuvering between Russia and 

Britain where Afghanistan was the playing fi eld.10

On 26 April 1839, an invading British army occupied Kandahar, took Ghazni on 22 July, 

and reached Kabul on 6 August. When Dost Mohammad fl ed, the British installed Shuja on 

the throne. British soldiers moved to garrisoned Bamian, Jalalabad, and Charikar. An uneasy 

peace settled upon a region ruled by an unpopular Afghan puppet supported by English bayonets. The remainder of the country was controlled by tribal leaders, mostly Pashtun.11

British envoy William Macnaghten unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate with the other 

Afghan leaders to form alliances with Shah Shuja who remained in power only while the 

British occupied the country. Macnaghten’s murder by Dost Mohammad’s son, coupled with 

successful Afghan attacks against the British garrison and the diplomatic residency in Kabul, 

led to the fi nal abandonment of the city in January 1842. Of 16,500 British soldiers, families, 

Sepoy infantry and cavalry, and camp followers who left together from Kabul, there were only 

123 Europeans and about 2,000 Sepoys who survived the Afghan attacks and the harsh winter 

trek. On 5 April, Shah Shuja was assassinated. The British garrison at Ghazni surrendered, 

but those at Kandahar and Qalat withdrew safely. Tribal anarchy plagued Afghanistan until 

Dost Mohammad returned in 1843 to fi ght 20 years to wrest control of the eastern region from 

rival warlords.12
5

The Persians took advantage of the chaotic conditions to occupy Herat in October 1856. 

When the British declared war, the Persians withdrew. It would not be until Herat was captured by Dost Mohammad in 1863 that most of present-day Afghanistan would be consolidated under his control. In the meantime, concerned that British intervention in Afghanistan 

threatened their interests, the Russians steadily pushed southward, reaching the Amu Darya 

River in 1869, the present-day border between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Four years later, 

in 1873, an Anglo-Russian Convention established the Amu Darya as the boundary between 

Afghanistan and Russia.13

Following the cycle of Afghan strongmen, warfare erupted throughout the country when 

Dost Mohammad died in 1863. For six years his sons fought a fratricidal war until Sher Ali 

Khan succeeded in becoming ruler in Kabul. Again, the Persians took advantage of the family 

discord to occupy southeastern Afghanistan. Great Britain had long been concerned about any 

Russian expansion toward the Mediterranean. While the Crimean War of 1853 led to limits 

being placed on Russian expansion into Europe and Turkey, the British became alarmed by 

subsequent Russo-Turkish wars and Russian intentions. The Treaty of San Stefano that ended 

the war was viewed so unfavorably by Great Britain that Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli 

threatened Russia with war if it were not revised. Fortunately, the 1878 Congress of Berlin alleviated British tension, but suspicions of Russian expansion remained strong.

Unfortunately for Afghanistan, the Russians sent an uninvited diplomatic mission in summer 1878 to Kabul. When they were slow to withdraw after formal protest, the British sent 

forces into Afghanistan in November 1878 to precipitate what is called the Second AngloAfghan War. Sher Ali Khan unsuccessfully solicited Russian assistance and died in Mazar-eSharif.14

The inability of the Afghan tribes to unite against the British and Sher Ali’s death led to 

the Treaty of Gandamak on 26 May 1879. A disturbing aspect of the fi ghting had been that the 

British were unable to distinguish friendly Afghans from enemy tribesmen. Although they had 

been defeated and the treaty had, in reality, imposed British rule of Afghanistan from Kabul 

and control of foreign affairs, the Afghan tribes could not be controlled. Native troops from 

Herat revolted. The British garrison fought desperately in Kabul, and another British force was 

defeated near Kandahar. British retaliation left more than 1,000 Afghans dead.

This combination of calamities culminated in another British withdrawal, and Abdur Rahman Khan became ruler in Kabul. He ruthlessly put down numerous tribal revolts, forcibly 

relocated the dissident Pashtuns from the south to the north, relieved tax burdens on non-Pashtuns, named provincial governors without regard to tribal affi liation, and raised an army 

that would be loyal to him. During his reign, Sir Mortimer Durand crafted the Durand Line 

to serve as either an international boundary or a demarcation line between Indian and Afghan 

infl uence, depending on the views of those nations at any specifi c time in history. Rather than 

settling differences, the line became the stimulus for future fi ghting between Afghanistan and 

British-controlled India and later between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The British also delineated the Afghan borders with India and China in the extreme northeast part of the country, 

although the Chinese did not offi cially recognize the demarcation until 1964. After Abdur 

Rahman’s death in 1901, Afghanistan enjoyed the fi rst peaceful transfer of power in history. 
6

The country was united as never before, and a geographic area to serve as a buffer between 

Russia and British India had been defi ned. During the reign of Abdur Rahman’s son, Habibullah, at the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, Russia conceded that Afghanistan was outside its 

sphere of infl uence. Habibullah Khan did not agree to the convention, but the Russians and 

British imposed it anyway.15

As World War I engulfed Europe, the Turks and Germans pressured Habibullah to join them 

in an attack on British India. Habibullah’s response was to approach the British with an offer. 

If Great Britain would relinquish control of Afghan foreign policy, he would stall the Central 

Powers in the region. The threat relieved, British control over Afghan foreign policy continued. Then, Habibullah was mysteriously assassinated—by whom has never been determined.16

Although several of Habibullah’s sons and his brother claimed succession, his third son, 

Amanullah, who controlled the treasury and the army, gained most Afghan tribes’ loyalty. His 

reign as emir brought signifi cant change to Afghanistan. As British troops withdrew to fi ght 

in the Great War, the Afghan tribes began launching small raids against British border posts. 

Sensing weakness, in May 1918, Amanullah used his army in several attacks. This precipitated 

the Third Anglo-Afghan War. After the initial setbacks, the British rallied and countered with 

air attacks against Kabul and Jalalabad. After a month of fi ghting, negotiations were sought. 

The Treaty of Rawalpindi, signed 8 August 1919, ended Great Britain’s 40-year control of Afghan foreign policy but did not stop tribal attacks on British border posts.17

After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Reds had brutally oppressed Muslims during their 

consolidation of power in the southern regions. Amanullah wanted to stabilize the situation 

on his northern frontier and to play off his northern neighbor against the British to his east. 

In 1921, Russia and Afghanistan signed a Treaty of Friendship—the fi rst treaty signed by the 

Afghans since regaining control of their foreign policy. The Soviets considered the treaty a 

diplomatic strike against a European power that opposed the rise of a communist state. The 

treaty provided the Kabul government with money, airplanes, and technicians. Telephone lines 

were established between Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif as well as between Herat and Kandahar. 

Despite the treaty, Soviet troops occupied an island in the Amu Darya River in 1925, forcing 

Afghan forces to withdraw. The issue was settled peacefully by a Pact of Neutrality and Nonaggression, recognizing the borders as previously established, affi rming nonaggression, and 

resolving that neither would become involved in the internal affairs of the other. The “Great 

Game” continued as the British responded with an ambiguous treaty with Afghanistan that 

failed to resolve the disputes over the status of Pashtun people sitting astride the AfghanIndian border. However, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs declared that Afghanistan was “within the British sphere of political infl uence.”18

Emir Amanullah kept a wary eye on the Soviets while twisting the British lion’s tail with 

his anti-Great Britain speeches at public events that English diplomats attended. While walking the diplomatic tightrope between the two regional powers, Amanullah also dealt with the 

Afghan tribal leaders who saw their power being eroded. Revolts continued to be a common 

response as Pashtun leaders near Khowst rebelled against his reforms. The British and the 

Afghans blamed each other for stirring rebellion, but as Afghan historian Louis Dupree observed, “In the frontier areas trouble does not need to be stirred up; it is constantly whirling in 

the air waiting to light.”19
7

Further alienating the traditional tribesmen were Amanullah’s social reforms. Intent on 

bringing the country into the modern era, he sought to impose education for women, to abolish 

the requirement for women to be veiled, to eliminate government subsidies for tribal chiefs, 

and to reform the army. Religious leaders declared many of his reform ideas to be anti-Islamic 

and pointed to photographs of Amanullah’s wife, regarded as Afghanistan’s queen, taken during their European tour, unveiled and with bare shoulders. As the reforms posed threats to both 

religious leaders and tribal chiefs, revolt became widespread. In January 1929, Amanullah 

abdicated. Following another period of tribal warfare, a loya jirga (grand council) proclaimed 

one who advocated reasonable reforms to be emir. Nevertheless, he was assassinated in 1933.

Muhammad Zahir Shah became king in 1933 and reigned until 1973. Afghanistan joined 

the League of Nations and received offi cial diplomatic recognition from the United States in 

1934.20 Being very aware of the “Great Game” and distrustful of Russia and Great Britain, 

Zahir Shah turned to Germany for technical and economic assistance. Lufthansa scheduled 

regular fl ights between Kabul and Berlin. The United States acquired oil exploration rights in 

Afghanistan but relinquished them as Europe became embroiled in World War II. Except for 

some minor frontier skirmishes, Afghanistan, which declared its neutrality on 17 August 1940, 

remained relatively at peace while much of the world was engulfed in war. Two signifi cant regional postwar political changes that impacted Afghanistan heavily were Indian independence 

and the separation of Muslim Pakistan from Hindu India. Vastly separated into an eastern and 

a western Pakistan, the newly created country refused to adjust the Durand Line of 1893. Thus, 

the Pashtun region was divided between West Pakistan and its northern Muslim neighbor. In 

retaliation for cross-border attacks, the Pakistanis cut off oil shipments to Afghanistan in 1950. 

With the British Empire in the process of collapsing, testy Pakistani relations, and western 

infl uence prevailing in Iran, the Soviets seized the opportunity to reestablish friendly relations 

with Afghanistan.21

In need of oil and anxious to obtain money for internal improvements, Zahir Shah looked 

north. The Soviets gladly provided both. One of the more impressive engineering achievements 

was a highway with a 2-mile-long tunnel through the Salang Pass about 60 miles northwest of 

Kabul. Diplomatically, the two nations renewed the 1931 Pact of Neutrality and Nonaggression and signed a major trade agreement in 1956. As Cold War tensions heightened, the United 

States sought to improve relations throughout the region to counter perceived Soviet expansion. U.S. foreign aid funded an airport in Kandahar and a major irrigation project along the 

Helmand River in southern Afghanistan; however, military aid was not forthcoming. While 

Pakistan was invited to join the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955, Pakistan-Afghanistan differences over the Pashtun region and the level of Soviet aid made membership in the regional defense organization moot. The Soviets were quite willing to provide 

the desired military aid.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) concluded that “Afghanistan is of little or no strategic 

importance to the United States” and that “it would be desirable for Afghanistan to remain 

neutral.” The National Security Council adopted a similar position. Offi cially, then, Afghanistan remained neutral as the United States became more active in the “Great Game.”22

Reminiscent of Amanullah’s unsuccessful social reforms to modernize Afghani society 

were the bold efforts of Prime Minister Daoud Khan to end the isolation of women. In 1959, 
8

the wives and daughters of government offi cials were allowed on a reviewing stand with their 

faces uncovered. This supposedly violated two Muslim religious traditions—women wearing 

a veil and women remaining apart from men in public. Before this episode, the Zahir Shah 

government had sanctioned working without a veil for the stewardesses on Ariana Afghan 

Airlines because it was impractical. Females were also permitted to work as radio announcers, 

and young women could work in a pottery factory. These exceptions were nothing compared 

to the upheaval caused by the women’s public appearance on the reviewing stand.

Mullahs, many of whom were illiterate, protested vehemently, but when challenged to cite 

specifi c passages from the Koran to support their position, they could not. While those who 

spoke openly against the government were arrested, they were soon released. Some recanted 

their positions; others did not.23 Two explanations can be given for the mullahs’ views. Some 

mullahs sincerely believed an Islamic woman played a very minor role in society, which Westerners would consider sexual discrimination. Additionally, any social measure that touched on 

religion diminished the power of the mullah. Education could lead to serious questioning by 

the people, and the people might question mullahs who could neither read nor reason.

Politically, the period from 1953 to 1973 was one of tension between liberalism and fundamentalism, nationalism and tribalism, and monarchy and democracy. Islam established by 

Mohammad Bin Oasim and interpreted by the mullahs had been an inherent part of Afghan 

society since 715. Daoud’s attempts to wrench Afghanistan from its feudal state into modernity 

produced mixed results. Although some women obtained liberties not previously available, 

they were freedoms generally limited to women in large cities. Modernized infrastructure 

came only by accepting aid from a nation that had once been a threat. Taxation to support the 

efforts of a central government caused antigovernment riots in Kandahar. Because Afghanistan had been a country created geographically with little regard for cultural lines, it was constantly plagued with confl icts along its southern border with Pakistan over the artifi cial boundary that split Pashtuns who considered the dividing line irrelevant. Border crossing closures 

prompted clashes between nomads seeking to move animals back and forth between grazing 

areas as they had for centuries and Pakistani border guards who considered such movements 

to threaten national stability. The Pakistani actions compelled the Afghans to seek economic 

relief from Russia.

This new development prompted the National Security Council to reassess its position. 

The decision was made to adopt a more active role in the region: “The United States should 

try to resolve the Afghan dispute with Pakistan and encourage Afghanistan to minimize its 

reliance upon the Communist bloc . . . and to look to the United States . . . for military training 

and assistance.”24 U.S. government efforts, however, proved to be too little, too late.

In 1963, Prime Minister Daoud, whom many Afghans blamed for Pakistan’s problems, 

stepped down in a surprise move. Two weeks later, the new prime minister, Muhammad Yousuf, formed a committee to draft a new constitution and sought to resolve differences with 

Pakistan. Instigated by the Shah of Iran, envoys from Pakistan and Afghanistan met in Tehran, 

and on 29 May 1963, diplomatic relations were reestablished.

Demonstrating its neutral, nonaligned status, Afghanistan did not seek advice for drafting 

its new constitution from the United States but instead, sought guidance from France, which 
9

had 15 constitutions since 1789. After the document was drafted, the king called for a loya 

jirga to convene in September 1964 to review it. Elected delegates countrywide attended. This 

was no small feat since the literacy rate was about 5 percent. Election details were disseminated primarily by radio. After deliberations, the loya jirga submitted the 128-article constitution 

to the king. On 1 October 1963, Muhammad Zahir Shah approved the document. It declared 

Afghanistan to be “a constitutional monarchy” having an elected bicameral parliament and 

that “Islam is the sacred religion.” With no tradition of democracy, only approximately 16 

percent of the eligible voters turned out for the fi rst election. Still, four women were elected to 

the parliament.25

For the next decade, Afghanistan vacillated between monarchy and democracy. Political 

parties were forbidden. Newspapers were allowed but were closely controlled. Parliament was 

ineffective. The four female members were defeated in the 1969 elections. Drought and famine 

brought misery to the population. During King Zahir’s visit to Europe in 1973, former Prime 

Minister Daoud initiated a coup and abolished the monarchy. Within two years, he approved 

a new constitution that created a one-party government overseen by a president. In an attempt 

to reduce Soviet infl uence, President Daoud sought aid from India, Iran, and the United States 

and removed Russian military advisers from many units. He also improved relations with Pakistan. Daoud’s actions infuriated Communists in Afghanistan. On 27 April 1978, the reactions 

turned violent as Afghan armored units and MiG-21s attacked the presidential palace. The next 

day Daoud was killed. Nur Mohammed Taraki became president, and the People’s Democratic 

Party of Afghanistan—the Communist Party—took control of the country.26

President Taraki’s programs included cleansing Islam of “bad traditions, superstition, 

and erroneous belief.” He redesigned the Afghan fl ag, eliminating the color green (the color 

of Islam), and made the dominant color red to resemble the fl ag of the Soviet Union. Loan 

payments, gender equality, female education opportunities, and land reform were dictated 

by government decrees. The rural villagers considered these Taraki reforms to be anathema 

because they overturned the traditional ways of social life. Faced by numerous antigovernment uprisings and increased desertions from the army, the president responded by signing 

a Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness with the Soviet Union and invited Russian 

military advisers to help suppress the rebels. In February 1979, U.S. Ambassador Adolph 

Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul, presumably by a Maoist extremist group, and killed during 

the rescue attempt.

The U.S. government, absorbed by the Shah of Iran’s overthrow and the return of Ayatollah Khomeini, considered Afghanistan a lower priority. In Herat in March 1979, after rebels 

killed nearly 100 Soviet advisers and their families, more than 5,000 Afghans died when government forces, equipped with substantial quantities of new Russian weapons and armored vehicles, recaptured the city. Traditional Afghan factional infi ghting erupted in the Communist 

Party. President Taraki was murdered on 14 September 1979 by his Prime Minister Hafi zullah 

Amin, who seized power.27

Infi ghting quickly fl ared into full-scale civil war. Amid a growing apprehension that Russian communists were dominating Afghanistan, the intelligentsia and well to do fl ed the country. The Afghan armed forces, whose offi cers had been trained in the Soviet Union, fell apart. 
10

Soviet newspaper, Pravda, announced that the Soviet leadership could not “remain indifferent” to a civil war “in direct proximity to us.” The Russians responded by sending an infusion 

of advisers to shore up the collapsing ground forces and experienced pilots to fl y combat missions against the antigovernment rebels. In October 1979, Soviet-advised forces moved into 

Paktia Province. Rebel forces retreated, but when government troops withdrew, they returned. 

Shortly afterward, U.S. intelligence reported heightened Soviet military activity as reservists 

were called up, bridging equipment was centralized, and an army headquarters was established 

near the Amu Darya River. In early December, a reinforced airborne regiment sent to Bagram 

earlier quickly moved to secure the Salang Tunnel and Kabul International Airport.28

On the night of 27 December 1979, Soviet troops assaulted Darulaman Palace in Kabul 

and killed President Amin. Soviet leaders attempted to explain their actions using the pretext 

that “We are responding to an appeal from the Afghan leadership to repel outside aggression.” General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev had invoked Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) 

charter that guaranteed “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed 

attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Afghan communists claimed that 

Soviet assistance was necessary to defend themselves against attacks by the United States, 

Pakistan, and China. Then, in a clumsy attempt to justify their actions, the Soviets proffered 

former deputy premier Babrak Karmal as the new president. Karmal broadcast a message to 

the Afghan people on the Radio Kabul frequency that “the torture machine of Amin . . . has 

been broken” and to declare a jihad “for true democratic justice, as respect for the holy Islamic 

religion.” The newly touted president did not mention that he was actually broadcasting from 

Termez, Uzbekistan. During another broadcast, Karmal claimed that he had requested military 

assistance from the Soviets.

Careful scrutiny of the invasion timetable of events revealed how inept the Soviets were 

in their attempts to legitimize the heavy-handed actions. The individuals whom the Soviets 

claimed had elected Karmal were in prison during the supposed election; announcements that 

fi rst Amin and then later, Karmal had requested intervention contradicted each other; the propaganda apparatus did not explain why Amin—if he had requested military intervention—was 

killed and replaced by Karmal; and there were no explanations as to why Karmal did not appear in public in Kabul until 1 January 1980. Efforts to portray Amin as a Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA) agent had no credence based on his supposed request for a massive Soviet invasion.29

Russian scholar Robert Baumann writes, “The motives for a large-scale Soviet military 

intervention were the subject of exhaustive comment and speculation.” Documents released 

in the 1990s prove that Taraki and Amin did ask for military intervention at least 16 times 

between 14 April and 17 December 1979. Soviet military advisers in Kabul, however, had 

advised against such intervention. Although the real reasons for the Soviet intervention may 

never be known, a 31 December 1979 article in Pravda provided as good an explanation as 

any to date. The article spoke of holes in the “strategic arc.” The perception that there were 

holes in Afghanistan that needed to be plugged may explain why the Soviet army’s nightmare 

began.30

Reaction in the U.S. government was outrage. President Jimmy Carter blocked sales of 

grain and high-technology equipment to Russia and boycotted American participation in the 
11

1980 summer Olympics in Moscow. More ominously, he declined to 

submit the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) to Congress 

for ratifi cation. Signed in Vienna on 18 June 1979, SALT II would 

have limited U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear offensive weapons. 

In his State of the Union Address of 21 January 1980, the president 

enunciated a sweeping foreign policy declaration that became labeled 

the “Carter Doctrine.” Specifi cally alluding to the Soviet invasion, 

Carter made clear that “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the 

vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault 

will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”31

International reaction was decidedly unfavorable as well. The UN General Assembly voted 

104 to 18 to “deplore the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan” and called for the “immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.” Although voting with the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro was concerned about the implications that the invasion 

had for Cuba’s future sovereignty. Would Cuba be the next object of Soviet military intervention? Iran was pointedly critical of the invasion of its Islamic neighbor.

A history of tensions with Pakistan concerned U.S. government offi cials. Remembering 

the 1959 cooperative security agreement, President Carter’s initiative to establish a “regional 

security framework” that involved Pakistan, the provision of a $400-million aid package that 

was substantially greater than previous years, and a visit by Deputy Secretary of State Warren 

Christopher and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski all raised the level of Soviet 

hostility toward Afghanistan’s southern neighbor. Concurrent overfl ights, cross-border incursions, and threats raised concerns about stronger Soviet military action.32

The Soviets did not withdraw and soon learned that the Afghans were willing to ignore 

most ethnic and tribal differences temporarily and unite against a foreign invader. The mullahs’ (religious teachers) call for jihad against the Soviets was presented as a spiritual obligation to the 99-percent Muslim population. To fi ght and even die in a holy war against 

Communist kafi rs (infi dels) was a duty that rallied support, not to support an Afghan central 

government but to oppose an invading army. The freedom fi ghters came to be known as the 

mujahideen—the soldiers of God.

Although united by a military objective, the mujahideen fi ghting groups could not agree 

on a common political objective. The Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, an 

alliance of six parties created in January 1980, began to fall apart in March. Led by Gulbuddin 

Hekmatyar, the anti-Western Party of Islam gained prominence in the Kandahar area. Mullah 

Omar soon joined Hekmatyar, but rather than seeking the company of other factions, the Party 

of Islam seemed to be more intent on establishing an Islamic theocratic state than in removing 

the foreign invaders. The Islamic Alliance wanted a country ruled by a loya jirga but with a 

very clear Islamic focus. By the mid-1980s, the Party of Islam, with a primarily Pashtun membership, had spread its infl uence into the provinces near Kabul. Although the Party of Islam 

cooperated with other mujahideen groups, a RAND study’s conclusion was not encouraging: 

“Many of the political parties seem to be expending most of their energy bickering and fi ghting each other and are rife with corruption and nepotism. In the opinion of many mujahideen 

Figure 3. Jimmy Carter.
12

fi eld commanders, the political factions at present represent more of an obstacle to effective 

resistance than an asset.”33

Afghan military forces in Kandahar, Kabul, and Herat had initially opposed the invading 

40th Soviet Army, but three battalions in Jalalabad had deserted en masse. By summer 1980, 

only one-third of the old Afghan army supported the Soviets and their puppet government. 

Karmal pleaded for an end to “factionalism,” affi rming his government’s support of Islam. 

But he also made it clear that “eternal friendship and solidarity with the Leninist Communist 

Party of the USSR” was a key tenet of his regime. Factionalism in the Afghan army units was 

so severe that occasionally elements fi red on each other. Defections, desertions, and sabotage 

destroyed Soviet trust. Somewhat more effective than the army were government militia units 

created in the tribal areas. By paying off tribal leaders, the government sought to secure a 

region against rival mujahideen tribes. Occasionally, these efforts backfi red when “loyalists” 

switched sides and took the government-supplied equipment with them.34

In January 1980, Soviet forces occupied Farah and Herat to guard against incursions from 

Iran. A motorized rifl e division moved into Mazar-e-Sharif. In March 1980, another motorized 

rifl e division secured control of Konar Province, north of Jalalabad. In June, however, disaster 

struck when the mujahideen ambushed and annihilated a motorized rifl e battalion on the road 

between Gardez and Khowst. With only a few helicopters in Afghanistan, the Soviet supply 

convoys were extremely vulnerable. This also meant that attacking or pursuing the mujahideen

in mountainous areas was diffi cult. By mid-1981, the number of helicopters had increased 

fi vefold—from 60 to 300—and by the end of the year, 130 jet fi ghters were in Afghanistan. 

Realizing that tanks were largely ineffective in what had become a guerrilla war, Soviet tanks 

were reduced from nearly 1,000 to 300 that same year.

Figure 4. Soviet tank carcass.

With few exceptions, conventional division- and brigade-size offensive operations were 

the norm. Many of these were directed at guarding supply routes. Exceptions occurred toward the end of 1980 when heliborne troops conducted raids in the Panjshir Valley north of 

Kabul and in Lowgar Province south of the capital. Still, the Soviets were unable to dominate any region permanently. In the Panjshir, their limited success was due in no small measure to mujahideen leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, “the Lion of the Panjshir,” who organized 

his troops into defense, mobile strike, and reaction forces. In the vicinity of Herat, resistance 

units of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, commanded by Ismail Khan, enjoyed some suc-
13

cess. By February 1982, however, Soviet forces had infl icted signifi cant casualties on these 

guerrilla forces.35

Mujahideen leaders, having recognized that their elements could not stand toe to toe with 

Russian military forces, focused on attacking Soviet residential areas and assassinating offi cials in Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. The Soviets often retaliated with brutal effi ciency to 

cleanse the cities and nearby villages of rebel forces and sympathizers. A successful attack on 

Bagram Air Base in April 1982 that destroyed 23 aircraft prompted a major Soviet offensive 

into the Panjshir Valley. The mujahideen captured nine tanks and killed 300 to 400 Russian 

soldiers in this engagement, but the guerrilla and civilian casualties were twice that number. 

The “Lion of Panjshir,” Ahmad Shah Massoud (war leader of another Party of Islam), withdrew into the mountains. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet military left the valley in a wake of destruction, razing villages, burning crops, and blowing up irrigation systems. Guerrillas in the 

south, supplied from Pakistan, attacked Soviet garrisons in Khowst and surrounding villages. 

In the north, kidnapping Soviet technicians in Mazar-e-Sharif triggered large-scale Soviet and 

Afghan army operations in the region.36

Soviet conventional forces faced a major counterinsurgency situation for which they were 

doctrinally unprepared. The mujahideen did not mass to facilitate destruction by Soviet artillery. The Russians established control in specifi c areas only as long as large formations maintained an active presence. Once they withdrew, the area reverted to guerrilla control. In essence, the Soviets faced many of the problems that the British had faced previously. Unlike the 

British, however, the Soviets gained the upper hand with air power. They quickly learned that, 

although the guerrillas could choose the time and place to ambush convoys, helicopters could 

put ground forces on the high ground along convoy routes. If the convoys were attacked, the 

massive fi repower of tactical aircraft could be called on the attacking forces. Although limited 

by terrain, weather, and aircraft performance limits, helicopters were able to deliver supplies 

to remote garrisons, thus avoiding defi les that channeled ground convoys for ground ambush. 

In 1983, the Soviet garrisons in Bamian, Ghazni, Gardez, and Khowst were resupplied entirely 

by airdrops and helicopters. The mujahideen resorted to using conventional ground weapons, 

like the ZPU-1 and 12.7 millimeter (mm) DshK machine gun, to shoot down 20 helicopters a 

year. In 1983, the mujahideen fi rst acquired SA-7 (surface-to-air) missiles from Pakistani arms 

dealers. Three years later they began to receive British Blowpipe antiaircraft missiles.37

In 1986, several Congressmen recommended funds to supply the mujahideen with U.S. 

Stinger antiaircraft missiles. Exactly when the American shipments commenced remains 

cloudy; they possibly began as early as July 1985 but not later than September 1986. The CIA 

shipped 300 in 1986 and 700 in 1987. According to CIA offi cer Vincent Cannistraro, “The 

Stingers neutralized Soviet air power and marked a strategic turning point in the war.” Soviet 

aircraft losses averaged one a day for the initial 90 days when Stingers were fi rst employed. In 

1987, 270 aircraft were shot down.38

The rigidity of Soviet military leaders delayed tactical and systemic changes that could 

have reduced aircraft and crew member losses. A system that discouraged initiative or deviation from established procedure caused casualties. Initially, pilots stuck to the fl ight route, 

even if it meant fl ying through confi rmed enemy air defense zones. All training emphasized a 

doctrinal approach to fl ight operations with no room for innovation if situations changed. As 
14

one analyst noted, “The learning curve seems to have been quite lengthy.” Rather than gathering the tactical lessons learned in Afghanistan and disseminating them to all units, changes 

were made based on individual pilot or unit recommendations. Pilots adapted to survive. They 

fl ew higher, did more night operations, dropped fl ares during takeoff and before landing, and 

learned the value of false helicopter insertions. They also began dropping bombs from higher 

altitudes, which signifi cantly reduced accuracy. With the greater air defense threat, especially 

from Stingers and other antiaircraft missiles, Soviet air operations became less frequent and 

less effective.39

In 1983, ground tactical operations shrank to battalion- and regimental-size efforts instead 

of the previous division-size operations. Part of the rationale behind the smaller-scale operations was a cease-fi re in the Panjshir Valley arranged by Massoud. Although this initiative 

infuriated Hekmatyar (the leader of the original Party of Islam centered about Kandahar), 

who regarded Massoud’s act as a betrayal, it gave the “Lion of Panjshir” time to rebuild his 

depleted forces and to reestablish a supply network in the valley. At the same time, the Soviets 

shifted their forces and gained free use of the highway between Kabul and Konduz. Another 

part of the rationale was the Soviets’ desire to get more Afghan army units into the battle. 

This started in fall 1983. Afghan army brigades started fi ghting the mujahideen in Paktia and 

Paktia Province. The Russians wanted a strong national Afghan army to provide stability to 

the country when their forces withdrew. Although the operations in Paktia and Paktia Province showed improvement in effectiveness, the Afghan army could not match the mujahideen

on the battlefi eld.40

Mujahideen ground and rocket attacks against Kabul caused renewed Soviet large-scale 

offensives into the Panjshir and Konar valleys. Over the next several years, bold guerrilla 

attacks against Soviet and Afghan forces in Khowst, fi erce fi ghting with mujahideen in Kandahar and Herat and the surrounding areas, and the destruction of 20 MiG-21s at Shindand 

Air Base convinced the Soviets and the Karmal government that a short war with a decisive 

victory over the guerrillas was not possible. Despite success in several regions, the mujahideen

were unable to achieve decisive long-term results either, for several reasons: their inability 

and/or unwillingness to coordinate activities and operations among themelves; their inability 

to capitalize on war supply sources in Pakistan; or their inability to get the most from modern 

technology because of the high illiteracy rate among the Afghans.

The warfare was extremely brutal: both sides killed prisoners, Afghan offi cials were assassinated, civilians died in terrorist attacks, villages were destroyed, populations were displaced 

in reprisal, and mines were airdropped by the thousands. At least 5 million Afghans fl ed to 

Iran and Pakistan, most settling in refugee camps. Karmal and the Soviets realized that something had to be done quickly to break the developing stalemate in the war.41

On 29 March 1985, President Babrak Karmal called for “major socio-political work among 

the people and the need to raise the social awareness of the masses.” To foster this effort, 

Babrak wanted the loya jirgas to elect local councils. After the broadcast, the mujahideen

threatened to kill anyone who attended a meeting. Having discovered that an imposed military 

solution had not worked, the Soviets recognized that they needed a different approach—one 

that would garner support for the government and reduce guerrilla support. Incorporating 

key religious tenets from the 1964 constitution, the Afghan Revolutionary Council adopted a 
15

provisional constitution that guaranteed “respect, observance, and preservation of Islam as a 

sacred religion.” Seizing on the importance of Islam in Afghanistan, the Soviets and Karmal 

agreed to establish religious schools and to improve conditions for women. The Afghan president also tried to gain support from the mullahs by providing them with extra food allowances 

and money to repair existing mosques and to build new ones.

The Russians managed to “retool” this idea by sending 16,000 to 20,000 Afghan children 

to schools in Warsaw Pact countries to be educated. This blatant effort to indoctrinate Afghan 

youth caused international outrage. Destroying the bases of support for the mujahideen posed 

the classic dilemma—identifying the insurgents and isolating them from the general population. The Soviet solution was to drive everyone from the villages, destroy the crops and irrigation systems, and mine the farmland. Although these tactics separated the guerrillas from their 

support system and deprived the mujahideen of local intelligence, the refugee numbers in the 

cities greatly increased, as did the insurgents in the urban areas, and resolve in the anti-Soviet 

factions was strengthened.

Militarily, the Soviet strategy was to employ large garrisons to control the cities and infrastructure, to man series of outposts at critical points along supply routes, and to launch combat 

operations against the mujahideen from well-protected base camps. Paratrooper, heliborne assault, and Spetsnaz (special operations) units concentrated on securing the high ground along 

major transportation routes and ambushing mujahideen forces at water points, the favored 

routes through defi les, and along well-traveled paths or roads. Although successful initially, 

the guerrillas countered these efforts by doing more reconnaissance. Using local intelligence, 

they often were able to ambush the ambushers. Over time, the effectiveness of the military 

counterinsurgency effort diminished considerably.42

Figure 5. Abandoned MiG at Mazar.
16

On 11 March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party 

in the Soviet Union. During the Communist Party congress in 1986, the new General Secretary characterized Afghanistan as Russia’s “bleeding wound.” Although Communist leaders 

like Fidel Castro were invited to the congress, President Karmal was conspicuously absent. At 

a Politburo meeting on 13 November 1986, Gorbachev made it clear that he was dissatisfi ed 

with the military situation in Afghanistan, that he had little faith in Karmal, and that the war 

had to be ended “in the course of one year—at maximum two years.” The military situation 

could not be fi xed quickly, but Karmal was replaceable. After the Central Committee of the 

People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan met on 4 May 1987, “the resignation of comrade 

Babrak Karmal on health grounds” was announced. Mohammad Najibullah, head of the secret 

police, was named as Karmal’s successor. Gorbachev’s determination to staunch the “bleeding 

wound” became quite evident when he directed a limited withdrawal of Soviet military forces 

from Afghanistan on 28 July 1987.

Mujahideen ambushes of convoys, patrols, and outposts and ground and rocket attacks 

against Soviet garrisons and airfi elds, however, continued. Fighting was particularly heavy 

in and around Kandahar. Thousands of mines were laid, the city was devastated, and nearby 

villages were destroyed. In 1987, the State Department cited Kandahar as “the scene of . . . 

the heaviest concentration of combat of the war.” When Soviet forces withdrew, the Afghan 

population was one-eighth of what it had been in 1979.43

In a dramatic reversal of the expansionist policy promulgated by his three predecessors—

Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantine Chernenko—Gorbachev announced on 8 

February 1988 that beginning 15 May, all Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan 

in 10 months. On 14 April, in a ceremony in Geneva, Soviet, Afghan, Pakistani, and U.S. representatives signed fi ve accords associated with the Soviet troop withdrawals to be completed 

by 15 February 1989. The United States and the Soviet Union pledged not to interfere in the 

internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Noticeably absent was representation from the 

mujahideen.

44

While some Soviet military advisers remained behind, the 40th Army completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan as prescribed on 15 February 1989. It left behind at least 13,833 dead 

Soviets. A journalist writing in Izvestiia summed up the diffi culties the Soviets had faced in 

Afghanistan: “The foreign intervention stirred patriotism, and the appearance of ‘infi dels’ 

spawned religious intolerance. On such a fi eld, even a tie would have been miraculous.”45

Although the infi dels had been expelled, peace did not come to Afghanistan. While President Najibullah was attempting to establish a government in Kabul, the two largest ethnic 

factions turned on each other. Massoud led the Tajiks and their party, the Jamait-i-Islami

(Islamic Society). Abdul Haq led the Pashtun Hizb-i-Islami (Party of Islam). Massoud’s 

battleground had been the Panjshir Valley, while Haq’s had been Kabul. (Although this Party 

of Islam had the same name as that of Hekmatyar, the two parties were different.) Pakistan’s 

president had other concerns.

From relative safety across the border, President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan had long opposed 

the growing Soviet presence to his north. Zia was concerned about the large number of Pashtun 

refugees that fl ed into Pakistan’s frontier provinces. In 1984, he had condoned the creation of 
17

the seven-party Islamic Unity of Afghan mujahideen in Peshawar. This multiple-party group 

included factions led by Hekmatyar, Massoud, and Haq. President Zia and Hekmatyar shared 

the same fundamentalist Islamic dream of imposing Islamic theocratic governments in the 

region. With the announced withdrawal of Russian troops, a group of anti-Soviet Afghans who 

were friendly with Zia formed an Afghan Interim Government (AIG) headed by Sibghatollah 

Mojadeddi to take control when the Soviet puppet government fell. Even after Zia’s death in 

a suspicious plane crash 17 August 1988, the U.S. government supported Hekmatyar because 

he was considered the best alternative to the communist-controlled Najibullah government in 

Kabul.

The political situation in Afghanistan was very unstable during the Soviet withdrawal. Najibullah had to mediate for tribal factions who were killing each other. Haq was sneaking into 

Kabul regularly to meet with dissidents he had met during the height of the Soviet occupation. 

He covered his covert meetings with rocket attacks on the city. In 1989, Pakistan cut all aid to 

Haq and diverted the resources to Massoud who had a more audacious plan for seizing Kabul. 

The city, however, would not fall until 1992.46

Mujahideen commanded by Abdul Qadir, Haq’s brother, attempted to seize Jalalabad in 

March 1988. The Soviets left behind tanks, artillery, and ammunition for the Afghan army; left 

more than 200 aircraft; and supplied $300 million monthly in aid to Najibullah’s government. 

Infi ghting among the mujahideen leaders led to uncoordinated attacks, and a combination of 

tactical ineptness and superior fi repower cost the guerrillas more than 3,000 fi ghters at Jalalabad. That military disaster split the AIG alliance apart. In July, Hekmatyar’s men ambushed 

a group of Massoud’s fi ghters. Massoud retaliated, capturing Hekmatyar’s responsible commander and hanging him. This caused Hekmatyar to withdraw from the alliance. While the 

United States was preparing for war against Iraq, the Soviet Union was disintegrating. The 

mujahideen forces successfully attacked Afghan government troops at Kandahar, Khowst, and 

Herat, but they suffered heavy casualties in a direct assault on Kabul. Khowst fell in 1990.47

In northern Afghanistan, Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum, who had previously led proSoviet forces, united with Najibullah’s Afghan army to fi ght the mujahideen when the Russians 

withdrew. However, in February 1992, Dostum changed sides and aligned with Massoud, and 

their combined forces captured Mazar-e-Sharif. In April 1992, the two forces reached Bagram. 

Fearing the imminent collapse of his government, Najibullah sought refuge in a UN compound 

in Kabul where he remained in asylum until September 1996. When Najibullah abandoned the 

government, the Afghan army disintegrated. Former Afghan army soldiers joined the advance 

of Dostum and Massoud toward Kabul from the north. Hekmatyar raced toward the capital 

from the south to beat his rivals to the prize. Although Hekmatyar’s lead elements got into 

Kabul, the better-organized northern forces forced Hekmatyar’s men from the city and seized 

control of the government buildings.

Sibghatollah Mojadeddi assumed the presidency, but Burhannudin Rabbani replaced him 

in June 1992. Rabbani was Tajik, as were Massoud and Ismail Khan who had fought the Russians near Herat. Suddenly, the minority Tajiks, supported by the Uzbek, Dostum, controlled 

the government and Kabul. Pashtun leader Hekmatyar, after surrounding the city, responded 

by rocketing the capital. Estimates of Afghans killed in 1993 varied from 2,000 to 30,000.48
18

The expression “you can’t tell the players without a scorecard” aptly fi t the alliance shifts 

among the ethnic groups in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Pashtuns controlled Kandahar, Dostum 

controlled Bagram, and Dostum and Massoud fought for control of Konduz. Ismail Khan, with 

support from Iran, controlled Herat. In 1994, Dostum, who had been ignored in all government 

decisions (possibly because he was Uzbek), aligned with the Pashtun, Hekmatyar, to attack the 

Tajik Rabbani government. Massoud had an opportunity and seized Konduz. Then he swung 

about and forced the Dostum-Hekmatyar alliance away from Kabul. As ethnic infi ghting intensifi ed among the mujahideen warlords, a new group was added to the Afghan scorecard.49

In spring 1994, local mujahideen kidnapped and raped two girls near Kandahar. From 

that brutal crime would spring a popular movement that was directly involved in the events of 

11 September 2001 and against whom U.S. and coalition forces would fi ght in Afghanistan. 

Mohammad Omar, a talib (religious student) and former member of the Soviet resistance in 

Kandahar, gathered 30 fellow Taliban (religious students) to free the girls. The rescue was 

successful, the mujahideen commander was hanged, and the Taliban movement was born. 

The Taliban goal, based on a 1996 interview with Omar, was to protect women and the poor 

and to punish those who were guilty of crimes. “We are fi ghting against Muslims who have 

gone wrong,” Omar declared. Hamad Karzai, who was named president of Afghanistan in 

December 2001, initially believed that “the Taliban are good honest people . . . and were my 

friends from the jihad against the Soviets.” Karzai willingly provided support. The Taliban

grew in strength as many young men who had been educated in the refugee madrasas (Islamic 

schools) of Pakistan joined the cause.50

Pakistan was willing to supply more than just men who were educated in Islamic fundamentalism. President Benazir Bhutto, who had become president after Zia’s death, had two 

major objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan. One objective was to fi nd a regime that was friendly 

Figure 6. Hamad Karzai.
19

to Pakistan—support for Hekmatyar. The other was to establish a secure trade route through 

Afghanistan to the former Soviet republics. Fighting around Kabul had closed the eastern 

route north from Peshawar. Bhutto quickly focused on the western route north from Quetta. 

Pakistani envoys initiated discussions with Ismail Khan and Dostum to allow convoys to use 

the western highway. But Spin Boldak, a critical border town, was garrisoned by Hekmatyar’s 

forces. On 12 October 1994, 200 Taliban fi ghters with Pakistani support defeated the garrison 

and captured 18,000 rifl es and artillery pieces and a large quantity of ammunition. On 29 

October, a Pakistani convoy bound for Turkmenistan departed Quetta. Near Kandahar, three 

local commanders halted the convoy and demanded a cut of the goods. The Pakistanis asked 

the Taliban to help. On 3 November, Taliban soldiers rescued the convoy, killing one of the local commanders. The Taliban force immediately moved to capture Kandahar. On 5 November 

1994, the city was taken, along with tanks, artillery, six MiG-21s, and six helicopters. It was 

rumored that Pakistani advisers had been involved in the fi ghting. Many of the Taliban soldiers 

had been refugees in Pakistan and had been taught a strict interpretation of Islam that required 

total acceptance of the Koran and advocated eliminating the corrupting infl uence of the West. 

By December 1994, Taliban ranks in Kandahar had swollen to 12,000 as the populace embraced the fl edgling movement as a better alternative to the corrupt regime. In the midst of 

these activities, President Bhutto denied any involvement with the Taliban.

51

Historian Ahmed Rashid, who has studied Afghanistan extensively, described the young 

men who comprised the Taliban.

These boys were a world apart from the Mujaheddin whom I had got to 

know during the 1980s—men who could recount their tribal and clan 

lineages, remembered their abandoned farms and valleys with nostalgia, and recounted legends and stories from Afghan history. These 

boys were from a generation who had never seen their country at peace. 

They had no memories of their tribes, their elders, or their neighborhoods. . . . They admired war because it was the only occupation they 

could possibly adapt to. Their simple belief in a messianic, puritan 

Islam drummed into them by simple village mullahs was the only 

prop they could hold on to and which gave their lives some meaning.52

These young men had lived in segregated refugee camps, having no contact with women. 

Fundamentalist mullahs taught them that women would distract them from their service to 

Allah. Adopting a strict interpretation of the Koran, they locked away the women, forbidding 

them to participate in normal society. To the Taliban, television, motion pictures, cameras, and 

music were corruptions that Islamic law forbade. Within days after the Taliban seized Kandahar, the women had disappeared from the streets, and the physical signs of Western infl uence 

had been eradicated.53

By January 1995, the Taliban had established control of the three provinces that bordered 

Kandahar and Kandahar Province—Helmand, Zabol, and Oruzgan provinces—through bribery or military power. In a series of lightning moves, the Taliban seized Ghazni and were 

within 35 miles of Kabul by 2 February. Hekmatyar’s forces around the capital, facing the 

two armies of Rabbani and Massoud coming from the north, fl ed east toward Jalalabad when 

Taliban forces appeared from the south.54
20

Massoud also had a problem in Kabul. The Shi’a Moslem Hazaras—the minority Shi’a 

represented 15 percent of the population—held the southern part of the capital and resisted 

Massoud’s dominance. In March 1995, the “Lion of Panjshir” had launched a large-scale attack 

against the Hazaras. The commander, Abdul Mazari, sought help from the Taliban. Shortly 

afterward, he mysteriously was found dead—the possibility that the Taliban pushed Mazari 

from a helicopter remains unconfi rmed. Mazari’s demise angered the Hazaras (19 percent of 

Afghanistan’s population) and the Shi’a Iran communities. Undeterred, Massoud and his 

better-trained troops ejected both the Hazaras and Taliban from Kabul by mid-March.55

In the meantime, the Taliban seized the western provinces of Nimroz and Farah. At Shindand, they encountered not only Ismail Khan’s forces but also Tajiks airlifted from Kabul by 

Massoud and Afghan government tactical aircraft. The Taliban lost 3,000 fi ghters there, and 

by the end of May, they had been driven back almost to their Kandahar stronghold. Then, 

from Pakistan, 25,000 new volunteers were sent forward. The Taliban counterattacked; Khan’s 

army disintegrated; and on 5 September 1995, the Taliban entered Herat. Ismail Khan fl ed to 

Iran.56

Mullah Omar became head of the Taliban offi cially on 3 April 1996 when the Kandahar 

leaders proclaimed him “Commander of the Faithful.” The next day, Mullah Omar appeared in 

the city wearing Mohammad’s cloak. This act signifi ed that Omar believed that he was not just 

the leader of the Taliban but of all Muslims as well.57

Figure 7. Afghan children.
21

By late spring 1996, the Taliban had regrouped and was showering rockets into Kabul. 

Massoud, Dostum, and Hekmatyar belatedly joined forces. The Taliban took Jalalabad on 5 

September, captured Bagram shortly thereafter, and entered Kabul on 27 September 1996. 

Rabbani and the three warlords fl ed. Hekmatyar escaped to Iran. Taliban fi ghters took Najibullah from the UN compound and tortured and killed him. They hung his body from a light 

pole for all to see. As they had done in Kandahar and Herat, the Taliban forced women off the 

streets, eliminated them from the workplace, and imposed the wearing of the burqa. Particularly destructive was banning women from the educational and medical professions. Television, music, movies, games, and kites were prohibited. Men without beards were arrested. 

Theocratic totalitarianism, under the guise of Islam, was being imposed.58

The Taliban pursued Dostum and Massoud as they withdrew. Dostum managed to thwart 

the Taliban by blocking the Salang Tunnel. On 18 October, Massoud retook Bagram, but by the 

end of January 1997, a Taliban counterattack recaptured the air base. Then the Taliban shifted 

focus, and major elements were launched north from Kabul and Herat. General Abdul Malik, 

one of Dostum’s commanders, defected to the Taliban with 4,000 men and marched toward 

Mazar-e-Sharif. As Dostum fl ed to Termez on the Uzbekistan border, Taliban forces took Mazar on 24 May 1997. That proved suffi cient for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 

Emirates to recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan.

The residents of Mazar-e-Sharif, however, did not recognize the Taliban, and on 28 May, 

they revolted. Six hundred Taliban were killed, another 1,000 were captured, and the 10 top 

leaders were killed or captured. Malik switched sides again and took control of four northern provinces, killing thousands more Taliban. Massoud, with Russian logistics backing, also 

counterattacked and, by the end of July 1997, had infl icted heavy losses—about 6,600 Taliban

killed, wounded, or captured as well as 250 killed and 550 captured Pakistani fi ghters. In the 

aftermath of the success, Rabbani and others formed a United Islamic and National Front for 

the Salvation of Afghanistan, later to be called the Northern Alliance. Infi ghting severely limited its effectiveness.59

Massoud’s counteroffensive recaptured Bagram. As they retreated toward Kabul, Taliban

forces poisoned wells and destroyed crops. In September, the Taliban in Konduz attacked 

toward Mazar. Fighting erupted between Malik’s troops and those still loyal to Dostum. As 

Malik fl ed to Turkmenistan, Dostum returned from Turkey to drive back the Taliban threat. 

As Dostum forced the Taliban back toward Konduz, entire villages were destroyed, and their 

inhabitants were murdered as they withdrew. UN investigators examined the mass graves but 

in an atmosphere of mutual recriminations could not determine responsibility. The Taliban

ordered the UN out of the country, directed the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) doing 

humanitarian assistance to desist providing aid to women, and arrested journalists for taking 

photographs of women. This brought humanitarian assistance to the people in Afghanistan to 

a virtual standstill.60

The offi cial U.S. position on the civil war initially was neutral. Economically, a peace held 

promise for the American-built gas pipeline across Afghanistan to connect Turkmenistan to 

Pakistan. Despite its antipathy toward Iran, the U.S. government was reluctant to support the 

anti-Iranian Taliban. Increased evidence of Taliban atrocities led Secretary of State Madeleine 
22

Albright to declare in November 1997: “We are opposed to the Taliban because of the opposition to human rights and their despicable treatment of women and children and great lack of respect for human dignity.” U.S. Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson traveled to Afghanistan 

in April 1998 to arrange a meeting between the Taliban and UN offi cials to discuss the plight 

of women. After Richardson left the country, Omar withdrew his pledge.61 Within months, 

diplomacy was shelved as internal fi ghting fl ared up again in Afghanistan, and the U.S. government redirected its attention on international terrorism in Africa.

While Western diplomats argued over courses of action, the anti-Taliban Uzbeks and Hazaras battled each other. The Taliban monitored the progress while further tightening down 

their reign of oppression. Windows had to be blackened so that women could not be seen 

from outside. Newborn children could only have names from an approved list. Public executions and open amputations for criminal activity became commonplace. The Taliban closed all 

NGO offi ces on 28 July 1998. Then, with fi nancial support from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, 

the Taliban launched a major offensive north from Herat, capturing Mazar-e-Sharif in August 

and forcing Dostum to fl ee the country after 1,400 soldiers were killed. Afterward, the Taliban

engaged in a “killing frenzy” resulting in at least 6,000 people dead. Thousands more were 

imprisoned in the Mazar-e-Sharif fortress and in Sheberghan. Prisoners were delivered to the 

two sites in packed overseas shipping containers. In the midst of the frenzy, Taliban soldiers 

also killed 13 Iranian diplomats, almost causing a war with Iran. On 13 September, Bamian fell 

to the Taliban. Five days later, Taliban gunners desecrated the 2,000-year-old Buddha statues 

carved in the nearby rock cliffs by using them for target practice. (In March 2001, the 36- and 

53-meter-tall Buddhas would be totally destroyed to the distress of the world community.) 

In September 1998, Saudi Arabia withdrew its fi nancial support after Mullah Omar insulted 

the king’s nephew with regard to Osama bin Laden. The UN Security Council castigated the 

Taliban on 8 December for their actions (Resolution 1214). Only Pakistan abstained on the 

resolution.62 In the meantime, Washington was responding to more terrorist attacks on U.S. 

government posts and its military serving overseas.

It had taken a string of terrorist bombings in 1998, 1999, and 2000 to promulgate a “fullcourt press” by U.S. intelligence agencies to uncover those responsible. The dust had long since 

settled on the truck bomb that exploded beneath the World Trade Center in New York City at 

midday, 26 February 1993, killing six and injuring another 1,000 at a cost of $300 million. 

Then, the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were destroyed 

Figure 8. Madeleine Albright. Figure 9. Bill Richardson.
23

by terrorist bombs on 7 August 1998. The following year, 19 military servicemen died when 

another explosive-fi lled truck was detonated alongside the Khobar Towers housing complex in 

Saudi Arabia. In December 1999, a plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport was foiled. 

Less than a year later, on 12 October 2000, a bomb-laden terrorist speedboat attacked the USS 

Cole in Yemen’s harbor, killing 17 American sailors and wounding 39. Intelligence agencies 

linked Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist network to the incidents. In February 1998, 

before the Khobar Towers bombing, bin Laden had declared: “To kill the Americans and their 

allies—civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim.”63 Few were familiar 

with Osama bin Laden at the time, and those who were tracking him did not realize at the time 

that his rhetoric had already been transformed into reality.

Bin Laden was born in 1955 or 1957 to a Yemeni father and Saudi Arabian mother. At 

King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, he pursued both business administration and Islamic studies. Having inherited tremendous wealth, Osama bin Laden began in the 

early 1980s to fi nance construction projects for the mujahideen in Afghanistan. He quickly 

branched into supporting military operations against the Soviets using troops, approximately 

half of whom were Saudis, who were trained in his camps. After returning to Saudi Arabia, 

bin Laden was expelled in 1994 for statements against the regime. Bin Laden was next tracked 

to Khartoum, Sudan, when the Sudanese government asked him to leave in 1996. He settled in 

Jalalabad until the Taliban threatened the city. Sometime after relocating to Kandahar, Osama 

bin Laden met Mullah Omar.

From Kandahar on 23 August 1996, bin Laden issued his Declaration of War Against the 

Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places. Angered that Saudi Arabia let the 

United States launch attacks against Iraq in 1990, he condemned them for permitting U.S. 

military forces to be stationed on the Arab peninsula where the holy sites of Mecca and Medina are located, attacked Israel for its “occupation of Palestine,” and declared war against 

the United States as an occupier of Muslim lands. In 1998, Osama bin Laden formed the 

al-Qaeda and created an umbrella organization for Islamic extremists called the International Islamic Front for Holy War Against Jews and Crusaders. During an interview with 

ABC News in December 1998, bin Laden made clear his anti-America views. “Hostility toward America is a religious duty,” he declared, “and we hope to be rewarded for it by God.”64

The response to the 7 August 1998 embassy bombings came less than two weeks later 

when U.S. cruise missiles slammed into terrorist training sites near Khowst and in Sudan on 

20 August 1998. Afterward, President Bill Clinton, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and 

Secretary Albright all emphasized that the United States was not fi ghting Islam but warned 

that international terrorists could not “escape the long arm of justice.” Two days later, President 

Clinton revised Executive Order 12947, issued in 1995, to add Osama bin Laden to a list of terrorists whose assets in the United States would be frozen. The Taliban’s funds had been frozen 

by Executive Order 13129 on 4 July 1999. Clinton further allowed intelligence agents to use 

lethal force for self-defense, to preempt possible terrorist attacks, and to focus on bin Laden’s 

associates. Secretary Cohen ordered two submarines armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles 

to the Persian Gulf. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and Secretary Albright queried 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General (GEN) Henry Shelton about using small Special Forces ground teams to attack bin Laden. News reports said that Shelton thought the idea 
24

was naïve. The State Department’s Counterterrorism Reward Program raised the reward for 

information leading to bin Laden’s arrest to $5 million.65

American actions did not intimidate or deter the Taliban or bin Laden. As the Taliban

recruited and rearmed, Massoud recaptured Bamian in April 1999. Three weeks later, the 

Taliban drove Massoud’s forces from the city. Having garnered 250 opposition leaders and their 

families, the Taliban fi ghters herded the captives into houses and set them afi re, killing all of 

them. On the diplomatic front, the Taliban offered to exchange bin Laden for U.S. recognition 

of their regime. State Department offi cials spoke directly with Mullah Omar and established 

a February 1999 deadline to deliver bin Laden to U.S. authorities. Omar refused after declaring bin Laden to be his guest. Shortly afterward, bin Laden departed Kandahar amid reports 

of growing dissension between him and the Taliban. Albright warned the Pakistanis that their 

country was becoming more and more isolated in the region because of their refusal to act decisively against the Taliban. The growing isolation was true because the murder of the Iranian 

diplomats in Mazar in August 1998 had so infuriated Iran against the Taliban and Pakistan 

that relations between Iran and the United States had begun to improve.66 Another major issue 

was the Taliban’s attitude about the drug trade, a blatant contradiction of Muslim theocracy.

While Afghans died in civil war, opium dealers thrived. The U.S. State Department had 

labeled Afghanistan an international conduit for drugs as early as 1996. Although drugs are 

not permitted under Islamic law, growing poppies to convert into opium was permitted freely. 

“Opium is permissible because it is consumed by kafi rs in the West and not by Muslims or 

Afghans,” argued the Taliban’s antidrug force commander.67 The reality was that opium consumption helped fi nance the fi ghting necessary for the Taliban to gain control of the country. 

From 1995 to 1997, during much of the fi ghting to consolidate power (gaining control of the 

Afghan cities), opium production increased 25 percent. The UN attempted to negotiate with 

the Taliban, promising aid to grow substitute crops if they would eliminate the drug trade. 

That effort ended when the Taliban ordered the UN to leave Afghanistan in 1998. Government 

customs revenues and agricultural taxes for poppy propagation went directly into the Taliban

treasury—a box kept under Mullah Omar’s bed. Afghan opium accounted for 72 percent of the 

world’s supply in 2000.68

When the elusive bin Laden was discovered residing south of Jalalabad on 4 July 1999, 

ABC News had just reported that Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf businessmen were fi nancing his terrorist activities. The Saudis arrested one banker on charges of funneling $2 million 

Figure 10. William Cohen. Figure 11. GEN Henry Shelton.
25

to bin Laden. This prompted President Clinton to issue Executive Order 13129. On 9 July, the 

Taliban acknowledged that bin Laden was in Afghanistan.69

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was meeting with President Clinton when Afghanistan admitted that bin Laden was living there. Although the president angrily addressed 

the lack of Pakistani cooperation in apprehending bin Laden and pointedly told Sharif that he 

would send a communiqué outlining Pakistan’s suggested role, that topic was not a part of the 

message. Sharif did agree to withdraw Pakistani military forces from Kashmir—at the time 

the critical concern to the United States because India and Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons.70 The internecine war in Afghanistan and bin Laden were overshadowed by the threat of 

regional nuclear war.

Although there was fi ghting in the fi rst half of 1999, it was sporadic. A major three-prong 

offensive that Taliban forces launched from Kabul signaled the resumption of full-blown combat on 28 July. For the fi rst time this major Taliban effort combined tanks, artillery, and organized infantry. Bagram fell on 31 July, and other cities quickly followed, including a key point 

along Massoud’s supply line to Tajikistan. From the Shomali plain north of Kabul the Taliban

drove the refugees—numbers varied from 55,000 to 250,000—toward the capital. In their 

wake was devastation—burned villages, destroyed crops, slaughtered livestock, and uncounted numbers of dead villagers. Massoud struck back, killing more than 1,000 Taliban fi ghters, 

including Arabs and Pakistanis. When he quickly closed on Kabul and Bagram, Mullah Omar 

sought help from Pakistan; 2,000 more madrassa students volunteered. On 24 August, Omar 

survived an assassination attempt by unknown persons when a fuel truck was detonated near 

his house in Kandahar. Those responsible never sought recognition.71 With Afghan assistance 

to capture bin Laden seemingly out of the question, the U.S. government sought alternate approaches.

Having prevented nuclear war between India and Pakistan, Washington redirected its priorities toward capturing bin Laden. Having concluded that Pakistan offered the best avenue 

to that end, President Clinton lifted some trade sanctions in September. The following month 

Prime Minister Sharif’s brother met with several Persian Gulf states’ envoys to apprise them 

of Pakistan’s intent to demand bin Laden’s extradition from Afghanistan. The Pakistan army 

chief of intelligence met with Mullah Omar to insist that the Taliban stop training Pakistanis 

who he considered threats to his nation’s stability. A few days later Omar made an offi cial 

statement denouncing terrorism.72

To complicate matters, on 12 October 1999, Pakistan army General Pervez Musharraf 

orchestrated a military coup that overthrew the democratically elected Sharif. Musharraf, supported by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, pledged to reduce tensions along the Indian 

border while warning India not to take advantage of the situation in Pakistan. As for Afghanistan, Musharraf vowed to “continue our efforts to achieve a just and peaceful solution. . . .” The 

U.S. government was disappointed that the general did not set a date to return to democracy.

During his visit to Pakistan in March 2000, President Clinton reiterated that the United 

States supported “an orderly restoration of democratic civilian rule” and was adamantly opposed to regional terrorism. Musharraf promised to work with the Taliban to resolve the problem of bin Laden. The following month, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering warned 
26

the Pakistani chief of intelligence not “to put [his country] in the position” of supporting people 

“that are our enemies.” In May, Pickering reiterated that same message to the Taliban deputy 

foreign minister. Mullah Omar responded that the change in leadership was an internal Pakistani matter.73

The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan once again became a 

discussion topic in the UN Security Council. On 22 October 1999, the 

Council belatedly condemned the Taliban for the 1999 summer offensive; called for the extradiction of bin Laden, an end to drug traffi cking, and the restoration of human rights; and castigated the leaders for 

the Iranian diplomats killed in 1998. CIA Director George Tenet told a 

Senate Select Committee in February 2000 that bin Laden “is still the 

foremost among these terrorists” and that “he wants to strike further 

blows against America.” The Taliban, following the typical summer 

campaign cycle, launched another offensive in July 2000 that concentrated on Massoud’s headquarters in Taloqan. On 5 September, 

the city fell. Massoud was pushed back into the Panjshir valley from 

where he made an unsuccessful attempt to retake Taloqan. While Massoud and Dostum had 

met in March 1999 in Termez allegedly to plan joint operations, the “Lion of Panjshir” appeared 

to be battling the Taliban alone, despite Dostum’s assertion on 1 October to the contrary.

By early 2001, with Massoud controlling only portions of the two northeastern provinces, Badakhshan and Takhar, neighboring countries began giving recognition of the dominant Taliban

regime and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov stated that Russian troops would 

not be allowed into his country to move against the Taliban. He also made it clear that Uzbekistan 

would avoid any border confrontations with the Taliban. In October 2000, Karimov, who previously declared the Taliban to be the “main source of fanaticism and extremism in the region,” stated a 

willingness to accept it as the government of Afghanistan if “the people of Afghanistan trust it.”

What the change refl ected was the growing infl uence of the terrorist Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan (IMU). Trained in bin Laden’s camps, IMU leaders made the creation of an Islamic 

state within Uzbekistan a major goal. Improved relations with the Taliban would potentially 

allow the Uzbeks to focus on destroying the IMU as well as eliminating an excuse for Russian 

intervention.74

In January 2001, the trial of four men accused of bombing the U.S. Embassies in Kenya 

and Tanzania began in New York. Among 22 suspects, also indicted was Osama bin Laden, in 

absentia. On 18 May 2001, a jury convicted the four and sentenced them on 18 October 2001 to 

life imprisonment without parole. Thirteen of the men indicted, including bin Laden, remained 

at large. In Afghanistan, the Taliban continued to consolidate its repressive hold on most of 

the country. On 9 September 2001, two assassins, posing as journalists fi lming a documentary, struck Afghan resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. They detonated a video camera 

packed with explosives. One assassin was killed in the explosion, and bodyguards killed the 

other. The “Lion of Panjshir” died en route to the hospital. Shortly after the act, bin Laden released a video interview to the world press in which he stated, “It’s time to penetrate America 

and Israel and hit them where it hurts the most.”75

Figure 12. George Tenet.
27

Two days later, the people of the United States were painfully aware that Osama bin Laden’s threat had been a promise.
28

Notes

 1. Rudyard, Kipling, The Works of Rudyard Kipling (Roslyn, NY: Black’s Readers Service Co., nd), 85.

 2. Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Wrath of God,” Time (11 January 1999), <www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/1999/990111/osama1.html>.

 3. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 316.

 4. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale 

Nota Bene, 2001), 9; “Political History of Afghanistan,” <www.afghan-info.com/Afghistory.htm>, 2; “Arab Rule of 

Pakistan,” <www.geocities.com/pak_history/arab/html>.

 5. “The Islamic World to 1600: The Mongol Invasions (The Timurid Empire),” www.ucalgary.ca/applied_

history/tutor/islam/Mongols/timurid.html; “Babur,” http://encarta.msn.com/index/conciseindex/51/051a1000.htm.

 6. Dupree, 329-32.

 7. Ibid., 332, 35.

 8. “Nadir Shah,” <www.encyclopedia.com/html/n/nadirs1ha.asp>; Afghanistan: A Country Study, Richard F. 

Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, eds. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1986), 19.

 9. Dupree, 363-64. In 1935, Persia would be renamed Iran.

10. Ibid., 365, 369-76; Afghanistan: A Country Study, 23-27.

11. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (New 

York: DeCapo Press, 2002), 143; Dupree, 379.

12. Ibid., 389, 394, 405; Tanner, 201.

13. Ibid.; Afghanistan: A Country Study, 30.

14. The fi ghting of 1839-42 is considered to be the First Anglo-Afghan War. See Dupree, 406; Tanner, 203; 

“Berlin, Congress of,” “Crimean War,” “Eastern Question,” “Russo-Turkish Wars,” “San Stefano, Treaty of,” The 

Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001, <www.bartleby.com>.

15. “Abdur Rahman Khan, amir of Afghanistan,” <www.avsands.com/abdur-armir-av.htm>; Dupree, 417-29, 

433; Tanner, 215-19. The convention also divided Persia into two areas of infl uence—the Russians in the north and 

the British in the south. This division was the “legal” justifi cation for the Russian and British occupation of Iran after 

World War II.

16. Dupree, 434-35.

17. Tanner, 218-19; “Third Anglo-Afghan War, 1919,” <www.regiments.org/milhist/wars/20thcent/19afghan. 

htm>; Dupree, 444.

18. Afghanistan: A Country Study, 43-44; Dupree, 446; Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A 

Diplomatic History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), 163; “History,” <http://crick.fmed.uniba.

sk/~zahin/hist.html>.

19. Dupree, 449.

20. Afghanistan: A Country Study, 44-50.

21. Dupree, 478-80; Tanner, 225; “Iran,” <www.encyclopedia.com/html/section/iran_history.asp>.

22. Tanner, 225-27; Afghanistan: A Country Study, 56, 59; Index of Declassifi ed Documents, No. 33A (1979), 

No. 377A (1978).

23. Dupree, 532-33.

24. Declassifi ed Documents Quarterly Catalog, 5, No. 1 (1979), No. 448.

25. Ibid., 565-66, 594; Articles 1 and 2, “Constitution of Afghanistan,” as quoted in Ibid., 574; Afghanistan: 

A Country Study, 62-64.

26. Ibid., 69-73.

27. Ibid., 231-33; Tanner, 232; “Adolph Dubs,” <http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/duane-dudkin.html>, #RLIOM57AK; Afghanistan: A Country Study, 234, 239; Afghanistan Online: “Biography (Noor Mohammad Taraki),” 

<www.afghan-web.com/bios/yest/taraki.html>. Various sources will give different dates for Taraki’s death. Another 

date mentioned is 10 October. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan 

(London: Brassey’s, 1991), 27.

28. Anthony Hyman, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-1983 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), 

101, 111, 115; Pravda, 1 June 1979, 5; Joseph C. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of 

Force in Soviet Foreign Policy (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1986), 69; McMichael, 5.

29. Ibid., 78-79; U.S. Department of State, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1, as quoted in Collins, 78, 101; Afghanistan: A Country Study, 242; “Charter of the United Nations,” <www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/chapter7. html>; 

Douglas A. Borer, Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 133.
29

30. Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, 

Leavenworth Paper Number 20 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 132-133; Pravda, 31 December 1979, 4. The article credits National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski with coining the term “strategic 

arc.” Brzezinski actually used the term “arc of crisis.” See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of 

the National Security Adviser, 1977-81 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 446.

31. Ibid., 431-34; “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” <www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-1.html>; “State of 

the Union Address,” 21 January 1980, <www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml>.

32. The New York Times, 15 January 1980, 8; Robert Rand, “Cuba Continues to Take an Ambiguous Stand 

on Soviet Actions in Afghanistan,” Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, RL 56-80 (6 February 1980), np; Collins, 92; 

Brzezinski, 448; “Pakistan: The United States Alliance,” <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@fi eld 

(DOCID+pk0149)>.

33. Rashid, 19; Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 59; Afghanistan: A 

Country Study, 336; McMichael, 26; Alexander Alexiev, Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 1988).

34. Tanner, 243-44; The New York Times, 19 August 1981, 3; McMichael, 45-47, 49-50. The Afghan army 

numbered approximately 90,000 when the Soviets invaded. It would fl uctuate between 25,000 and 40,000 during the 

Soviet occupation.

35. Urban, 60-61,67-68, 70, 72, 96; McMichael, 15. Massoud was assassinated on 9 September 2001 by proTaliban Arabs who wounded three other Northern Alliance offi cials in the same attack.

36. Urban, 80-81, 101-105, 116; Tanner, 252.

37. Baumann, 153; McMichael, 85.

38. “Afghanistan: Lessons From the Last War,” <www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB57/essay. 

html>; “Cold War Postscript: Legacy of Afghanistan Haunts Both Cold War Superpowers,” CNN, 7 March 1999, 

<www.clw.org/atop/media/cnn030799.html>; Ken Silverstein, “Stingers, Stingers, Who’s Got the Stingers?” Slate, 

2 October 2001, <www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2001/011002-attack03.htm>; McMichael, 90; Tanner, 267. It 

must be noted that exact losses are impossible to obtain. One study by Aaron Karp in Armed Forces Journal notes 

that aircraft losses after 1986 were from 438 to 547.

39. McMichael, 91, 93-95.

40. Tanner, 258-59; Urban, 134; Mohammad Yahya Nawroz and Lester Grau, The Soviet War in Afghanistan: 

History and Harbinger of Future War? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Offi ce, 1995), <http://call.

army.mil/fmso/FMSOPUBS/issues/waraf.htm>.

41. Afghanistan: A Country Study, 316-323; Urban, 138, 157.

42. Kabul Radio, 20 March 1985, as quoted in Urban, 165-67; Baumann, 171; McMichael, 66, 71; Afghanistan: A Country Study, 265.

43. CPSU CC Politburo Transcript (excerpt), “Meeting of CC CPSU Politburo,” 13 November 1986, 

<http://cwihp.si.edu/cwihplib.nsf>; Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Speech to the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Central Party of the Soviet Union, 6 March 1986; Kabul Radio, 4 May 1986, as quoted in Urban, 196, 200; Robert D. 

Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 

186-87.

44. The Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan, Amin Saikal and William Maley, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 16; “Afghanistan,” <www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380/htm>.

45. McMichael, 145f. This is an offi cial fi gure. Anecdotal reports are that the fi gure is much higher. A. Bovin, 

“A Diffi cult Decade,” Izvestiia, 23 December 1988, as quoted in Baumann, 177.

46. Kaplan, 41, 168, 170, 173, 176; Urban, 16; Michael Griffi n, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 131; “Herbert Marion Wassom,” Arlington National Cemetery 

Website, <www.arlingtoncemetery.com/hnwassom.htm>. Also killed in the crash were U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan 

Arnold Raphel and Brigadier General Herbert Wassom, chief, U.S. Military Group, Pakistan. The Taliban killed 

Abdul Haq following a battle on 26 October 2001.

47. Tanner, 271-75.

48. “Inside the Taliban: Rashid Dostum,” <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/taliban_profi les. html>; Griffi n, 24-25; Tanner, 277-78.

49. Ibid.; Griffi n, 28.

50. Ibid., 35; John F. Burns and Steve LeVine, “How Afghans’ Stern Rulers Took Hold,” New York Times International, 31 December 1996, A1; Kaplan, 234-35.
30

51. Rashid, 27-29; Tanner, 279-80; Kaplan, 236; The Nation, 18 February 1995, and Dawn (Pakistan), 18 

March 1995, as quoted in Rashid, 29.

52. Rashid, 32-33.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., 33; Griffi n, 42.

55. The Hazaras, the majority of whom are Shi’a, had close ties to Iran, which is 89 percent Shi’a. See “Iran,” 

<www.countrywatch.com>; “Afghanistan,” <www.countrywatch.com>; Rashid, 35.

56. Ibid., 39-40.

57. Ibid., 42. Omar’s title has not been accepted by Muslims outside of Afghanistan. Robert Marquand, “The 

Reclusive Ruler Who Runs the Taliban,” <www.csmonitor.com/2001/1010/p1s4-wosc.html>.

58. Ibid., 49-51. On 26 September 2002, the Associated Press reported that Hekmatyar and Taliban fugitives 

had formed the Islamic Martyrs Brigade specifi cally to attack Americans. The report also stated that Hekmatyar was 

receiving aid from Iran. “Former U.S. Ally Declares War on American Troops in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, 26 

September 2002.

59. Griffi n, 52-53, 96-97, 111; Rashid, 53, 58, 61.

60. Ibid., 62-65.

61. Ibid., 45-46, 71; Reuters, 18 November 1997, as quoted in Rashid, 65. The antagonism between the two 

nations was twofold. The Iranians regarded the Taliban’s view of Islam as un-Islamic. Much of that view is because 

the Taliban is primarily Sunni Muslim and the Iranians are Shi’a Muslims. Furthermore, the Hazaras in Afghanistan 

are mostly Shi’a, while the rival Pashtun, who comprise most of the Taliban, are Sunni. See “Politics-Iran/Afghanistan: Tehran Stares Down the Taliban,” <www.oneworld.org/ips2/aug98/03_58_008.html> and “Taliban Threatens 

Retaliation if Iran Strikes,” <http://europe.cnn.com/WORLD/MEAST/9809/15/iran.afghan.tensions.02/>.

62. Rashid, 70, 72, 78; Michael Winchester, “Inside Story: Afghanistan,” Asiaweek (6 November 1998), 

<www.pathfi nder.com/asiaweek/98/1106/nat_7-2_ismazar.html>; Griffi n, 192-93, 138-39; “Photos Document Destruction of Afghan Buddhas,” 12 March 2001, <www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/03/12/afghan.buddha. 02/index.html>.

63. “Terrorist Attacks on Americans” <www.infoplease.com/spot/terrorism6.html>; “Strike One—Khobar 

Towers, Strike Two—TWA 800, Strike Three . . . ,” <http://members.aol.com/bardonia2/towers.htm>; “Text of 

Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans,” Al-Quds al-`Arabi, 23 February 1998, <www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.

htm>.

64. Rashid, 131-33; “Al-Qa`ida (The Base),” <www.intellnet.org/documents/ 200/060/269.html>; “Osama 

bin Laden,” <www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_1.asp>; “Terror Suspect: An Interview With Osama bin Laden,” 

22 December 1998, <www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/transcript_binladen1_981228.html>; “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Holy Places,” <www.outpost-of-freedom.com/

opf980830a.htm>.

65. “U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan,” 21 August 1988, <www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/

us.strikes.02/>; “Executive Order, 22 August 1998,” <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo-980822.htm>; Bob Woodward 

and Vernon Loeb, “CIA’s Covert War on Bin Laden,” <www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28094-2001Sep13

?language=printer>; Barton Gellman, “Broad Effort Launched After ’98 Attacks,” <www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/

wp-dyn?A6725-2001Dec18?language=printer>; U.S. Department of State, “Reward Offer: Osama bin Laden and 

Mohammad Atef,” <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/98110401.htm>; Presidential Documents, “Blocking 

Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Taliban, Executive Order 13129 of July 4, 1999,” Federal Register 

64, Number 129, 7 July 1999.

66. Griffi n, 221, 215; Rashid, 78, 140, 180, 205.

67. Robin Raphel, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, 

11 May 1996; Rashid, 118.

68. Ibid., 119, 123-124; Bureau of South Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “The Taliban and the Afghan Drug Trade,” <www.state.gov/www/regions/sa/facts_taliban_drugs.html>.

69. David Phinney, “Bankrolled for New Terrorist Attack,” <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/ binladen990707.html>; Reuters, 9 July 1999, cited in Griffi n, 224.

70. Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Center for the Advanced Study of India Policy Paper Series 2002, <www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm>.

71. Griffi n, 227-29.

72. Ibid., 232-33; “Army Chief: Pakistan Coup Launched ‘as Last Resort,’” 13 October 1999, <www.cnn.

com/ ASIANOW/south/9910/12/pakistan.06>.
31

73. “General Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” 17 October 1999, <www.fas.Org/news/Pakistan/1999/991017-mushraf_speech.htm>; “World Reacts Cautiously to Pakistan Coup Leader’s Speech,” 19 October 1999, <http://europe.cnn.com/ASIANOW/South/9910/18/Pakistan.reax/>; Frontier Post (Peshawar, Pakistan), 

13 October 1999, as cited in Griffi n, 237; “Background Press Briefi ng by a Senior Administration Offi cial on the 

President’s Meetings in Pakistan,” The White House Offi ce of the Press Secretary, 25 March 2000, <http://usembassy.state.gov/islamabad/wwwhp077.html>; Gellman, “Broad Efforts Launched After ’98 Attacks.”

74. “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” UN, 22 October 1999, <http://srch0.un.org/plwebi/fastweb?state_id=1031234529&view=scdocs&docrank>; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Current 

and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, 106th Congress, 2d Session, 2 February 2000, 12; 

Griffi n, 248-49; Justin Burke, “Tashkent Interested in Settlement in Afghanistan Regardless of Political Leadership—Uzbek President,” Uzbekistan Daily Digest, 13 October 2000, <www.eurasianet.net/resource/uzbekistan/hypermail/200010/0021.htm>; U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 15 September 

2000, <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/00091511.htm>; Pauline Jones Luong, “A Dangerous Balancing 

Act: Karimov, Putin, and the Taliban,” Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo 166, November 2000, <www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>; “Uzbekistan to Recognize Taliban Control,” Associated Press, 

13 October 2000, <www.bangla2000.com/News/Archive/International/10-14-2000/news_detail12.shtm>; “Moscow 

Prepared to Consider Military Means to Stop Taliban,” Uzbekistan in the News, 23 March 2000, <www.cu-online.

com/~k_a/uzbekistan/news.htm>; Abraham Rein, “Dostum Denies Helping Uzbek Authorities Crack Down on Islamic Militants,” Uzbekistan Daily Digest, 3 October 2000, <www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/hypermail/ 

200010/0004.html>.

75. “Embassy Bombing Trial Under Way in New York,” 3 January 2001, <www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/01/03/

embassy. bombings>; “Four Embassy Bombers Get Life,” 21 October 2001, <www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/10/19/embassy.bombings/index.html>; “The Murder of Massoud,” <http://members.aol.com/_ht_a/mbeve10258/Assassination. html?mtbrand=AOL_US>; “Osama bin Laden: Profi le,” <www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_1.asp>.

33

Chapter 2

Awakening the Giant

War is not merely an act of policy but a true political

instrument, a continuation of political intercourse,

carried on with other means. The political object

is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means

can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.1

Taliban, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. As the rays of the early morning sun refl ected from 

the twin towers of the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 (9/11), few Americans had 

heard those names. Within hours, however, few Americans would not recognize those names. 

Not since 1941 had a foreign power directly attacked the United States. Just as one generation 

of Americans can recall where it was on 7 December 1941 when Pearl Harbor was bombed and 

another remembers 22 November 1963—the day President John F. Kennedy was assassinated—so, too, will another generation of Americans recall where it was on the morning of 9/11.

President George W. Bush characterized the 9/11 attacks as “acts of mass murder” and 

pledged “to fi nd those responsible and bring them to justice.” Unequivocally, he declared that 

the attacks were “acts of war.” Within 24 hours, intelligence reports had linked bin Laden to 

the attacks, and congressmen and military offi cials were calling for retaliation.2

 While Secretary of State Colin Powell mounted a diplomatic offensive to garner support for U.S. offensive 

action, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld prepared an order to mobilize reservists and 

members of the National Guard. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced that 

the military was “entering into a campaign against terrorism.”3 On 14 September 2001, the U.S. 

Congress approved a joint resolution that authorized “the use of United States armed forces 

against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.”4 Islamic 

extremist Osama bin Laden had become America’s “public enemy number 1” and the focus of 

an unprecedented worldwide manhunt with Afghanistan the center of attention.5

Having been regarded as a “backwater” country by U.S. government departments and agencies, designating Afghanistan as a top priority after 9/11 did not yield instant gratifi cation, even 

with America’s vast information resources and technology. The geography and demography 

posed signifi cant challenges to operations in Afghanistan. Mountains that rise to almost 17,000 

feet cover two-thirds of the country, and high desert plateau dominates the rest. Only 15 percent 

of the land can support agriculture.There are three major languages and 30 minor languages 

spoken. Religious divisions between the majority Sunni Muslims and minority Shi’a Muslims 

are further complicated by different tribal cultures and historic rivalries. Centuries of oppression, 80-percent illiteracy, famine conditions as a result of seven years of drought, and general 

lack of infrastructure would hamper diplomatic and military options designed to destroy the 

al-Qaeda terrorists and drive the Taliban from power.6

 Of no small import were the millions of 

unmarked land mines strewn all over the country during the 10-year Soviet occupation.
34

History also had made Afghanistan a diffi cult battleground. Whether it was involved in 

the “Great Game” played by Russia and Great Britain or a newer regional power version that 

involved the Russians, Iranians, and Americans, Afghanistan had been a geopolitical pawn 

for more than a century. Its neighbor, nuclear-armed Pakistan, could not be ignored nor could 

that nation’s nuclear-armed rival to the east, India. Within Afghanistan, perpetual ethnic infi ghting, tension between the extreme fundamentalists and the more moderate branches of Islam, primary loyalty to ethnic regional warlords rather than to a nation, a common willingness to sell military service to the highest bidder, and a tradition of violent overthrows of any 

“national” governments were legacies that U.S. diplomats and soldiers could not disregard.

“We will rally the world,” declared the president, and Powell immediately launched a diplomatic offensive to garner the support of the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO). “We’re building a strong coalition to go after these perpetrators,” Powell told reporters. Within days, U.S.government offi cials had received words of support from Russia, China, 

NATO, and the European Union. The tangible evidence was the commitment of British, Australian, and New Zealand military forces to join America in the fi ght against terrorism. Iran’s 

position was questionable, but British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw obtained a pledge that the 

Persians would not interfere with the coalition’s efforts. On 22 September 2001, the United 

Arab Emirates severed all diplomatic ties with the Taliban, and three days later, Saudi Arabia 

followed suit. Pakistan refused to break diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime.7

 Coalition support of the war on international terrorism proved invaluable.

American relations with Pakistan had always been and would continue to be extremely 

delicate. Although the United States had a long history with Pakistan that included surrogate 

support of the mujahideen, the Pakistanis provided recruits and equipment and recognized the 

Taliban government. President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a leading fi gure 

among the leaders of the growing coalition, knew that Pakistani cooperation would be critical. The day after the attacks on the United States, President Musharraf had pledged his “unstinted cooperation.” Powell provided Musharraf with a list of exactly what support the United 

Figure 1. Extensive mountainous terrain.
35

States wanted. The sometimes violent internal reactions to Musarraf’s commitment indicated 

how tenuous his power was, especially after the Taliban had threatened invasion if the United 

States was permitted to launch attacks against Afghanistan from Pakistan. A strong diplomatic 

push from State Department offi cials convinced Pakistan to send envoys to meet with Mullah 

Omar to urge him to turn bin Laden over to the United States. A similar demand from the UN 

followed. On 21 September, the Taliban rejected the UN demand and a week later informed 

Pakistan that it would not surrender bin Laden. As the only country maintaining diplomatic 

relations with the Taliban, Musharraf did not want Pakistan to become an international pariah. 

At the same time, U.S. government offi cials needed to exploit that link to convey messages to 

the Taliban and quietly urged the Pakistanis to maintain ties. The United States prevailed until 

the war was well on its way. On 22 November 2001, Pakistan ordered all Taliban diplomats out 

of the country, and the embassy closed.8

Equally as important as creating a coalition of nations to fi ght the al-Qaeda and drive the 

Taliban from power was creating an alliance among the anti-Taliban factions in Afghanistan. 

Former Soviet Army Lieutenant Igor Lisinenko, a wounded Afghanistan veteran, warned, “the 

Afghans will stop fi ghting each other and join together to fi ght you.” American diplomats, 

mindful of the Soviet experience, began weaving their way through the maze of tribal, subtribal, 

factional, and religious relationships that had characterized Afghanistan for centuries. In 

Washington, a representative of the Northern Alliance living in exile met with U.S. offi cials 

who recognized the importance of building a strong relationship. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 

understood that the Northern Alliance could “be useful in a variety of ways.” To avoid offending 

Pashtuns who were not well represented in the Northern Alliance, Rumsfeld reminded offi cials 

that ties had to be forged with “tribes in the south.” An alliance that included all Afghan tribes 

was critical to dispelling the appearance of favoritism, that a foreign power was supporting one 

group, or that another foreign army was invading Afghanistan. In the forefront of every major 

military decision was the political goal of providing the Afghans with the environment and 

Figure 2. Pakistan government building.
36

opportunity to establish a stable government after the Taliban was forced from power. Powell 

made that clear in a late September 2001 pronouncement: “We are interested in a multiethnic 

Afghanistan.”9

Ironically, just as Leonid Brezhnev had done in 1980 to justify the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Secretary Powell invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter—“the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense”—to establish secure footing for additional coalition support.10 The difference in September 2001 was that the community of nations saw through the 

Soviet chimera of foreign invasion while the rubble of the World Trade Center towers provided 

glaring evidence to UN diplomats in New York. Calmly, systematically, and methodically, U.S. 

government leaders were “dotting the i’s” and “crossing the t’s.”

“Dead or Alive” was the order issued at the Pentagon on 17 September 2001. That was how 

badly the president wanted bin Laden brought to justice.11 This was no idle threat. Two days 

earlier at Camp David, President Bush met with his national security team to review options 

for responding to the terrorist attacks. CIA Director George Tenet proposed a plan to capitalize 

on the Northern Alliance’s opposition to the Taliban. U.S. ground forces would link up with 

those fi ghters to attack terrorist supporters in and around cities of northern Afghanistan. According to the president, Rumsfeld “understood the utility of having the CIA involved” and 

“quickly grasped” the essence of the plan “to mate up our assets with the Northern Alliance 

troops.” Then the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), GEN Henry Shelton presented three 

military options. The fi rst two consisted of cruise missile and manned bomber attacks; the third 

combined cruise missile and manned bomber attacks with placing American “boots on the 

ground”—inserting Army Special Forces troops.12

Figure 3. Tribal factions, regions, and leaders.

Hamad Karzla
37

President Bush ordered development of Shelton’s third option. According to National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice afterward, “Probably the most important conclusion that he 

[Bush] came to was that this military action . . . had to look different from what the United 

States had been doing over the past ten years or so. It could not just be an air campaign. It 

could not just be a cruise missile campaign. There had to be boots on the ground. We had 

to have a ground presence to demonstrate our seriousness. Probably that insight governed 

more of what we did than anything else.”13 As the American news media bandied about on 

courses of action, Russian veterans of Afghanistan shared their experience and opinions.

Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz lectured statesmen and commanders that 

“the most far-reaching act of judgment” that they “have to make is to establish . . . the kind 

Figure 4. Map depicting the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Afghanistan.
38

of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” Russian military analyst Aleksandr Golts, who studied Soviet 

involvement in Afghanistan, concluded that Soviet leaders failed to heed Clausewitz’s warning: 

“Our armed forces came prepared for the Cold War, for general battle, and they were completely ineffective.” Lieutenant General (LTG) Boris Gromov, who had commanded the Soviet 

40th Army, agreed with Golts: “For the Americans, introducing land forces would not lead 

to anything good,” he predicted. Other Soviet offi cers speculated on the value of committing 

American ground forces to fi ght in Afghanistan and what they would encounter. A ground war 

would be “useless” warned General Makmut Goryeev. Former infantry battalion commander Ruslan Auslev predicted, “The American army will meet with fanatical resistance.” GEN 

Tommy Franks, who commanded the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), knew full well the 

history of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and made it clear that he did not intend to repeat 

those mistakes. “The Soviets introduced 650,000 troops,” he said. “We took that as instructive, 

as a way not to do it.”14

It would not be done that way. On 15 September 2001, when President Bush, as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, told “everybody who wears the uniform to get ready,” 

Washington Post reporters had already speculated that Special Forces were “certain to be at the 

center of the action.”15 Rumsfeld acknowledged that when the war against terrorism began, “a 

lot of the effort . . . will be special operations.” Army Secretary Thomas White seconded that 

acknowledgment. He warned America’s adversaries “to watch carefully, for you are about to 

see our fi nest hour.”16 At a joint session of Congress on 20 September, Bush spoke passionately 

about grief, anger, resolution, and justice. “The Taliban is committing murder,” he declared, 

and as “heirs of the murderous ideologies of the 20th century . . . they will follow that path all 

the way to where it ends in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.”17 U.S. Army Special 

Operations Forces (ARSOF) would push the Taliban into that grave.

Some background history is necessary to better understand who and what constitutes 

the ARSOF today. ARSOF traces its heritage to the very foundations of America. During the 

French and Indian wars in the 1750s, Major (MAJ) Robert Rogers led his rangers on daring 

raids deep into French territory. Brigadier General (BG) Francis Marion, the “Swamp Fox,” attacked unsuspecting British troops in the Southern colonies during the Revolution using unconventional tactics far different from those that European armies experienced. Union and Confederate raiders, on land and at sea, harassed rear areas, destroyed rail lines, cut telegraph lines, 

and disrupted sea commerce during the Civil War. During World War II, the U.S.-Canada 1st 

Special Service Force, “Darby’s Rangers,” and “Merrill’s Marauders” achieved results far out 

of proportion to their numbers in North Africa, Italy, France, and Burma. Having realized the 

need to gather intelligence and conduct operations behind enemy lines, Major General (MG) 

William J. Donovan created the Offi ce of Strategic Services (OSS) to conduct raids and train 

partisans for guerrilla operations in Europe and Asia. In 1952, the dedicated efforts of Colonel 

(COL) Aaron Bank, BG Robert McClure, and COL Russell Volckmann resulted in the formation of the Army Special Forces and the transformation of the Army’s Psychological Warfare 

School into the Special Warfare Center. Training concentrated on infi ltration techniques, foreign languages, small-unit tactics, intelligence collection, and counterinsurgency operations. In 

September 1961, the Special Forces adopted the Green Beret as their offi cial headgear. From 
39

1956 until 1971, Army Special Forces served in the Republic of Vietnam and earned a heroic 

reputation in American military history.

In 1980, less than a year after the debacle of Desert One in Iran, Army Chief of Staff 

GEN Edward Meyer directed the enhancement of the ARSOF’s capabilities. Two years later, the 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was activated to coordinate the training, equipping, and organizing of the Army’s SFGs, Ranger battalions, Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB), and Psychological Operations Group (POG). This was the beginning of a 

major Army effort to broaden special operations capabilities—an effort that resulted in a 

third Ranger battalion and a regimental headquarters, the 3rd SFG, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), and the 528th Special Operations Support and 112th 

Special Operations Signal Battalions. In 1989, the U.S. Army consolidated 1st SOCOM, the 

U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS), and the Reserve 

Special Operations Command under a major command—the U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command (USASOC). USASOC became the Army component of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) that was activated in 1987.18 As one would expect, ARSOF 

trains and conducts operations worldwide year-round, having done so since its inception.

Thus, USASOC forces were conducting scheduled training exercises in the United States 

and overseas when America came under attack on 9/11. Small elements from the Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) headquarters and the signal and support battalions 

were in the Middle East for Exercise EARLY VICTOR, supporting the 5th SFG and preparing 

for Exercise FOAL EAGLE in Korea. The 5th SFG was also preparing for Exercise DESERT SPRING in the Persian Gulf region. One battalion of the 3rd SFG was training in Africa. 

Ranger companies were conducting small-unit training, including standard parachute assaults. 

Unit staff offi cers were planning for the cycle of spring 2002 exercises. The commander of the 

9th PSYOP Battalion was at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Arkansas, and other 

PSYOP soldiers were preparing to deploy to the Middle East for the annual BRIGHT STAR 

exercise. Aircraft from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) were supporting in the Persian Gulf region and at JRTC, and staff planners were attending an exercise 

conference in New Mexico. The headquarters staffs at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were going 

about their daily routine. For ARSOF soldiers, it was just another day.

Within hours of the 3,052 Americans being murdered at the World Trade Center in New 

York; at the Pentagon in Washington, DC; and in a Pennsylvania fi eld, the posture of the U.S. 

military changed to full alert, and preparations for war began—threat and defense conditions 

Figure 5. BG McClure, COL Volckmann, and COL Bank.
40

had been raised to the highest levels based on the multiple terrorist attacks. CENTCOM, whose 

area of responsibility (AOR) spanned the Middle East and Eurasia, cancelled all offi cial travel 

in the region, and the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) cancelled all regional exercises. U.S. 

intelligence agencies focused maximum effort on identifying the perpetrators of the attacks and 

heading off follow-up assaults. Federal buildings and U.S. defense installations quickly instituted stringent access procedures to inspect vehicles and to verify the identity of all personnel 

seeking entrance. The thorough implementation of these increased security measures initially 

resulted in lengthy waits at entry checkpoints and traffi c backups that affected both the installations and the surrounding civilian communities. Within a 10-mile radius of Fort Bragg, there 

were major traffi c delays. USASOC soldiers were issued weapons and ammunition and joined 

other Fort Bragg soldiers to close access roads, install traffi c barriers, stretch concertina wire, 

and guard family housing areas and headquarters. Although all soldiers receive some basic infantry skills training, many found themselves on guard duty, having never performed that role. 

In several support units, noncommissioned offi cers (NCOs) with previous infantry experience 

taught their troops how to walk a guard post, to challenge anyone who approached them, and 

what to do when faced by a perceived threat. “Force Protection” had real meaning, and unit 

commanders scrutinized security measures to protect soldiers and their families, units, and installations. Shortages of critical equipment were sent directly to Department of the Army. The 

“lock down” at Fort Bragg, home of USASOC and the 82nd Airborne Division, “America’s 

Guard of Honor,” pulled national media reporters like a magnet.

The Washington Post had speculated on 15 September that Special Forces would be at the 

center of America’s response. While individual National Guardsmen and Army reservists were 

being mobilized openly and tight security measures were being followed at U.S. military installations nationwide, CENTCOM and its regional special operations headquarters—the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT)—were summoning operations and logistics 

planners to Tampa, Florida, from USASOC to develop plans to retaliate against the terrorists. 

Less than a week after 9/11, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld gave the battle against terrorism a 

name—Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).19 By 5 October, commanders had decided 

on possible courses of action. Staffs worked to prepare documents necessary to implement 

any of the courses of action being considered so that when the JCS made decisions, the implementing commands of CENTCOM, SOCCENT, and USSOCOM could issue warning orders, 

operation orders, supporting plans, and overseas deployment orders. As it turned out, Rumsfeld 

personally set the date to begin infi ltrations into Afghanistan.

 Figure 6. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld names the operational efforts.
41

The JCS designated CENTCOM as the supported combatant command. CENTCOM was 

to “fi ght the war,” and Franks was in charge. All other defense commands would furnish what 

CENTCOM requested. That headquarters implemented the guidance of President Bush. SOCCENT rapidly became the focus for military operations. Franks’ mission was to destroy the 

al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its infrastructure and then to provide military support to 

humanitarian operations. To accomplish these tasks, the CENTCOM combatant commander 

had to build a force that allowed for credible military options, conduct initial combat operations 

and establish the conditions for follow-on operations, build coalition military support and execute decisive combat operations, prevent the reemergence of terrorism, and provide support to 

humanitarian relief efforts. The SOCCENT commander, Rear Admiral (RADM) Bert Calland, 

recognized that his command had to get SOF with their unique capabilities into Afghanistan to 

destroy al-Qaeda.

SOF across the spectrum would be needed. Since unconventional warfare (UW) would be 

a major part, Army Special Forces, those with the most training and experience, would be supported by Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) elements. Since PSYOP 

would support all aspects of the CENTCOM war campaign, Franks established a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) to coordinate PSYOP efforts. With winter approaching, 

the Afghan people’s needs had to be considered. Humanitarian assistance would be a major 

undertaking. That meant Army CA would have a major role. As during the war against Iraq 

(Operation DESERT STORM), U.S. air power would play a major role in combat operations.

With the potential of aircraft being shot down during the air campaign, Calland established 

the Joint Special Operations Task Force–North (JSOTF-North) to recover downed aircrews. 

Anticipating that ground operations, humanitarian assistance, and UW would follow initial air 

attacks, the 5th SFG was tasked to serve as the JSOTF-North. Since an SFG doctrinally would 

direct only the ARSOF assigned to a joint task force (JTF), the 5th SFG had not trained for this 

expanded role and did not have the personnel and equipment necessary to perform as a joint 

fi eld headquarters. Considerable augmentation from the other military services was required, 

more equipment was needed to accommodate different requirements of the other services, and 

a “cram course” on joint staff functions facilitated the rapid transition to a JSOTF headquarters. In late December 2001, Calland established JSOTF-South to integrate coalition forces 

with American SOF conducting direct action (DA) and special reconnaissance (SR) missions 

in southern Afghanistan. This JTF was built around the headquarters of Naval Special Warfare 

Group One (NSWG-1). Together, these two JTFs would maintain pressure on al-Qaeda and 

Taliban forces throughout Afghanistan. Rather than deploy his SOCCENT headquarters to a 

staging base near Afghanistan, Calland established his base in a Persian Gulf country to maintain theaterwide situational awareness. “My job is AOR wide,” the rear admiral said.20

As the supported combatant command, many headquarters assisted CENTCOM. The U.S. 

European Command (EUCOM) and its Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) 

immediately began planning the logistics support required for any military operation in 

Afghanistan. The Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) 

sent training teams to the 3rd and 5th SFGs to help staffs identify other service augmentees, to 

coach JTF operations procedures, and to provide experienced joint staff offi cers to facilitate the 

necessary rapid standup of the JSOTF headquarters. In addition to the military, numerous U.S. 
42

government departments and activities were called on to support the war, and soldiers were 

called on to coordinate with those staff elements.21

The primary USASOC mission was to provide ARSOF to fi ght and support the war 

effort. COL Phillip McGhee, the USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management 

(DCSRM), met daily with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development 

and Integration (DCSFDI) under the direction of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to brainstorm 

requirements and funding; to provide additional equipment and vehicles to deploying ARSOF 

units; to identify the training, instructors, and facilities needed to produce more ARSOF soldiers 

faster; to increase fl ying hours for the 160th SOAR; and to identify internal sources of funding 

for immediate needs while the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) was appropriated 

to fund the war in Afghanistan.

The DCSRM staff, major subordinate commands (MSCs), and major subordinate units 

(MSUs) began daily meetings on 9 October 2001 to discuss plans to fi nance the war, what 

requirements had funding priority, reporting systems, and the approved use of DERF funds 

from USSOCOM. LTG Bryan D. Brown’s guidance on DERF funds for Operations NOBLE 

EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM was very specifi c: “Along with this funding comes the 

responsibility to comply with guidelines related to spending and accounting for expenditure of 

these dollars. . . . My guidance to you is succinct—Do What’s Right! I will personally review 

selected DERF expenditures on a weekly basis.” Needless to say, the $69 million DERF appropriation did not expire on 30 September 2001, but the fi scal year (FY) end close for FY 01 

was a success.22

Figure 7. LTG Bryan D. Brown encourages soldiers.
43

Training soldiers to fi ll the ARSOF ranks is the primary mission of the U.S. Army John F. 

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). Without war pending, this is a diffi cult 

task. Two sobering realities are that units scheduled for deployment are fi lled to full strength, 

and during war, casualties have to be replaced. Thus, reconstituting SF detachments would severely impact the SF training cadres.

With the prospect of a lengthy special operations campaign, manpower was critical. Special operations soldiers cannot be mass-produced quickly. Enlisted soldiers who volunteer for 

SF duty, on average, have been in the Army for four years. Offi cers must have three and onehalf years of service. The individual training necessary to produce an SF soldier requires approximately six months. All SF-qualifi ed soldiers then undergo four to six months of language 

training. Many then attend advanced training in underwater operations or military freefall parachuting. Special operations aviators must have three to four years’ fl ying experience before 

volunteering for the 160th SOAR. The pilots and air crewmen undergo six months of intensive 

training to attain basic mission qualifi cation status. Then they must have one and one-half to 

two years of SOF fl ight operations experience before they are considered fully mission qualifi ed 

to fl y all special operations missions. On 2 December 2001, the U.S. Army directed all soldiers 

with military occupational specialties (MOSs) of SF, special operations aviation, and other 

aviation specialties to be retained on active duty involuntarily. This directive resulted in one 

offi cer, 13 warrant offi cers, and 983 enlisted soldiers being retained on active duty beyond the 

date they otherwise would be eligible to retire, resign, or be released from their enlistments.23

While Department of the Army instituted “stop loss” to freeze retirements, resignations, 

and end-of-enlistment releases of SF-qualifi ed personnel and ARSOF aviators, SWCS developed a plan to continue training SF-qualifi ed personnel with a reduced military cadre. SWCS 

mobilized U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) augmentees; prepared to hire contractors as instructors; evaluated the impact of shortened courses of instruction; and made contingency plans for additional housing, classrooms, and transportation for an 

increased student load. The plan, fortunately, did not have to be implemented fully. Several CA 

offi cers’ courses were conducted to meet critical needs in the Army Reserve units. Because of a 

shortage of SF soldiers, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command increased its efforts and initiated 

a program to recruit for SF “off the street,” just as they do for Army Rangers.

Mobilizing Army reservists, National Guardsmen, ARNG SFGs and aviation maintenance 

units, and USAR PSYOP and CA units was a major task for USASOC and its subordinate 

commands, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC); the U.S. Army Civil Affairs 

and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC); and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy 

Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). The SWCS accelerated initial training programs 

for ARNG SF soldiers and increased refresher training class sizes. USASOC used USAR training battalions to qualify approximately 300 CA soldiers in their MOSs. In addition, USASOC 

exercised an approved contingency plan to activate 36 USAR CA instructors. That decision 

enabled SWCS to double the number of CA and PSYOP enlisted soldiers the school could train. 

The quality of training that Army special operations soldiers received had prepared them well 

for the rigors and dangers of combat.24

ARSOF staff and unit training with conventional Army forces had to be reduced during 

the war buildup. Normally, ARSOF train at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort 
44

Polk, Louisiana, and the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. The special 

operations group and battalion staffs are rotated regularly through the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. These realistic training experiences give 

commanders and staffs the opportunity to “fi ght” their units in a variety of environments, getting performance feedback that will enable the leaders to capitalize on the experience and 

improve their capabilities under combat conditions. Overseas deployment orders caused the 

rescheduling of one JRTC exercise and the cancellation of another. Three BCTP exercises were 

cancelled; one was conducted but with reduced numbers. No exercises were scheduled for the 

NTC.25

In addition to fi eld exercises in the United States, the ARSOF regularly trains with foreign 

militaries. Thirteen JCS-scheduled annual overseas exercises to increase military-to-military 

contact and train at unit level were cancelled because of the terrorist attacks. The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program differs from the JCS overseas training exercises in 

that its purpose is to familiarize American SOF with how their counterparts in other countries 

operate. According to former Department of Defense (DOD) spokesman Ken Bacon, JCETs 

allow American SOF “to build up relationships with the military in other nations.” Twenty-one 

exchanges were cancelled because of the attacks.26 While these invaluable foreign exchanges 

could not be supported, responsibilities and obligations associated with mobilizing USAR and 

ARNG units fi lled those voids.

USASOC, as do most other Army commands, has a mobilization table of distribution and 

allowances (TDA) that allows the headquarters in wartime to augment its staff with USAR and 

ARNG offi cers, warrant offi cers, and NCOs. On 14 September 2001, President Bush authorized the activation of 10,000 USAR and ARNG personnel. From those numbers and based on 

the TDA, six personnel reported to serve on the USASOC and subordinate command staffs 

on 23 September, and another 98 arrived over the next few months. USASOC also mobilized 

the two ARNG SFGs, one PSYOP company, one CAB, one aviation maintenance company, 

a transportation company, a quartermaster company, an ordnance company (attached to the 

528th Special Operations Support Battalion [SOSB]), and two military history detachments 

from September 2001 through April 2002. The mobilization had some problems. Some individuals were mobilized before the USAR units that were to in-process the soldiers had been 

mobilized. Highly motivated USAR and ARNG soldiers reported to USASOC headquarters, 

but they could not be put to work until they had been offi cially brought onto active duty. There 

were staff issues concerning responsibilities and standing operating procedures (SOPs) to administer the individual and unit federal service activations. These problems were resolved as 

the command settled into a war posture.27 All that became reality within three weeks of 9/11.

On 8 October 2001, President Bush announced to the American people in a nationally 

televised address that during the previous night U.S.-led airstrikes struck targets near Kabul 

and Kandahar.28 However, to wage a military campaign effectively in the remoteness of Afghanistan, the use of regional bases was critical. Secretary of State Powell, the CJCS during 

Operation DESERT STORM, clearly recognized that need and, in particular, the critical value 

of Uzbekistan: “Uzbekistan was [the country] of greatest interest to us . . . because it was a 

direct line of supply down into the area of the Northern Alliance.” Powell’s focused diplomatic 

efforts paid off when the Uzbeks granted airspace clearance and permitted coalition support 
45

and search-and-rescue forces to be based at 

Karshi Kanabad. With permission granted, 

U.S. Air Force cargo planes began to shuttle ARSOF nonstop into Karshi Kanabad 

(later known as K2) from European bases. 

Elements of the 528th SOSB, 112th Signal Battalion, and 160th SOAR preceded 

the advance parties of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), the 96th 

CAB, and the 5th SFG. The 5th SFG was 

the nucleus of JSOTF-North that initially 

provided command and control for combat 

search and air rescue operations in northern 

Afghanistan.29

Critical to conducting any military operations is establishing a command and control center, communications network, and logistics base. While the 528th SOSB valiantly labored to 

convert half of a former Soviet airfi eld into a usable American facility, the 112th Signal Battalion established critical communications.

Figure 9. The 528th Support Battalion kept the water fl owing.

Figure 11. The 528th Support Battalion soldiers

prepared for base camp construction.

 

Figure 10. The 112th Signal Battalion established 

the JSOTF-North communications links.

Figure 8. Helicopter view of Karshi Kanabad (K2) Air 

Base, Uzbekistan.
46

 Within JSOTF-North headquarters, 

the 160th SOAR staff coordinated combat 

search and air rescue missions with Joint 

Special Operations Air Component Command (JSOACC) planners and with 5th 

SFG for future combat missions. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said 

that envoys were in contact “with the whole 

gamut of Afghan factions, including the 

Northern Alliance,” and Defense Secretary 

Rumsfeld had stated on “Meet the Press” 

that the United States was attempting to 

fi nd ways to assist antiterrorist forces.30

CA detachments prepared plans to provide 

blankets and food to displaced persons within Afghanistan as soon as the tactical situation stabilized. Concerned that winter would exacerbate survival problems for Afghan villagers who 

had already faced seven years of famine, U.S. Air Force C-17s began airdropping food on 7 

October.

Two days later, EC-130 Commando 

Solo aircraft broadcast radio messages that 

emphasized an international mission to free 

the Afghan people from oppressive, fundamental Islamic, Taliban rule. Some messages the Product Development Company 

(8th Psychological Operations Battalion), 

JPOTF, prepared were pointed directly 

at the Afghan populace, urging them to 

“Drive out the Foreign Terrorists.”31 These 

ARSOF precombat activities and the air 

campaign were preparing the way for ground combat operations.

Figure 12. C-17 Globemaster III taking off

from K2 to make humanitarian food drops.

Figure 13. Commando Solo

airborne broadcasting platform.

Figure 14. “Drive Out the Foreign Terrorists” leafl et dropped during the air campaign.
47

During the night of 19 October 2001, the 

ground war began when nearly 200 Rangers parachute assaulted into Afghanistan from MC-130s, 

and two operational detachment As (ODAs) from 

the 5th SFG were inserted into the mountains of 

northern Afghanistan by 160th SOAR MH-47E 

helicopters. Those well-orchestrated multiple 

night combat operations put American “boots 

on the ground” to launch the ground campaign 

to root out and destroy the al-Qaeda and Taliban

and establish a viable multiethnic government in 

Afghanistan. War as an instrument of U.S. policy 

had begun.

Since it was the efforts of individual ARSOF soldiers and detachments on the ground 

that made the ground campaign to drive the Taliban from power and successfully provide an 

environment in which a multiethnic government could be established, the story of the war can 

be presented most interestingly in a chronological series of “soldier stories.” The fi rst group 

describes initial preparations for war in the United States by PSYOP and SF staff personnel 

and two SFGs—the 5th at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 3rd at Fort Bragg—with support 

from the Special Operations Command of the Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia. These 

stories are based primarily on recorded interviews with participants.

“Subdue Without Fighting”: JPOTF, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue 

the enemy without fi ghting is the acme of skill.”32 So spoke ancient Chinese philosopher Sun 

Tzu around 500 B.C. Rare is the war in which no fi ghting occurs, but many are the wars in 

which PSYOP is employed to minimize the degree of fi ghting. The war in Afghanistan was but 

the latest war in which PSYOP was used to convince the Taliban, the al-Qaeda, and its people 

Figure 17. 160th SOAR—loaded

and ready for night operations.

Figure 15. 75th Rangers night parachute 

assault on Objective Rhino.

Figure 16. MH-47E helicopters taxi for

prefl ight checks before night missions.
48

that resistance to coalition forces was not only futile but also detrimental to the future welfare 

of the nation. Coordinating that PSYOP effort was the Joint Psychological Operations Task 

Force (JPOTF) located at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, 

Florida. The JPOTF commander was Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Sam Halstedt (pseudonym), 

commander of the 8th Psychological Operations Battalion (POB), 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).

Few soldiers outside the PSYOP military specialty had heard of a JPOTF. A unifi ed combatant command can create such a task force “as a separate functional component of the combatant commander.” When established, the JPOTF normally is under the theater commander’s 

operational control. Tactical PSYOP units are then attached to ground maneuver commanders. 

The mission of a JPOTF is to provide “PSYOP support to the overall joint or combined operation at the operational and tactical levels.” To do that, it coordinates requirements with the defense service components based on mission requirements. The command becomes joint when 

members of several services form the organization.33

Following doctrinal guidelines, in September 2001, CENTCOM, the combatant command, 

established a JPOTF, the nucleus of which was the 8th POB staff. The JPOTF mission was to 

Figure 18. Resistance is futile; assistance works better.

Figure 19. “Reassurance” leafl ets in multiple languages.
49

conduct operational and tactical PSYOP to isolate terrorists from their support systems and to 

strengthen resolve between the allies and the people of Afghanistan to eliminate those terrorists. The 8th POB formed the nucleus of the JPOTF because of its war trace alignment with 

CENTCOM, just as other PSYOP battalions are aligned with other regional combatant commanders.34

Halstedt was an experienced soldier. During Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, he commanded a Special Forces ODA and served in the 75th Ranger Regiment. He knew how to plan 

and how to get things done, and he also knew that because PSYOP attracted great interest at 

DOD level, everything the JPOTF did would be subject to media scrutiny. But Halstedt had a 

mission, and defi ning the scope of that mission was his fi rst task. He knew that PSYOP must 

support the overall war campaign plan. The more the JPOTF and the PSYOP soldiers on the 

ground could infl uence enemy soldiers to surrender, the less fi ghting Special Forces and conventional soldiers would have to face. Halstedt also knew that support from the populace was 

key. His plan, therefore, had to include the people.

On 14 September 2001, Halstedt and a staff of four reported to CENTCOM headquarters. 

Based on careful examination of the region and the culture, the JPOTF cadre, military planners, 

and civilian experts developed several themes. The fi rst objective was to produce anti-Taliban

and anti-al-Qaeda material that would persuade the Afghan people to reject their legitimacy. 

Simultaneously, the planners proposed themes to demonstrate that the coalition forces were 

there to assist the people in overthrowing their oppressors and to provide humanitarian aid. The 

group also knew that at some point in the ground campaign the coalition forces would sponsor 

reconstruction efforts and that some form of legitimate government would need to be created. 

It was critical for the Afghan people to understand that the government would be of their choosing, not the United States’ or any other members of the coalition.

With these themes and objectives in mind and having coordinated their plan with the overall campaign plan, Halstedt forwarded the proposed CENTCOM PSYOP plan to the Pentagon 

for approval. Military offi cials in the Offi ce of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) reviewed it and 

then sent it to the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). At OSD, the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Confl ict (ASD-SO/LIC) and the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P) reviewed and approved the draft. OJCS then gave 

Figure 20. Leafl et messages directed at the civilian population.
50

CENTCOM approval to implement the plan. As the war in Afghanistan progressed, the approval process for PSYOP products would be modifi ed. During the fi rst month of the war, all 

PSYOP products were approved at OSD, but beginning in November 2001, Franks, as combatant commander, CENTCOM, assumed that authority.

While the approval process was under 

way, the JPOTF began to fi ll its staff. From 

the initial 120 from 8th POB, it grew to 

313 personnel. About one-third of the staff 

was reservists activated for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). The JPOTF 

coordinated with Air Force personnel who 

advised on using the EC-130 Commando 

Solo aircraft. One U.S. Navy offi cer coordinated PSYOP support for maritime 

operations. Because the preponderance of 

PSYOP assets was Army, the staff was predominantly Army personnel. Two coalition 

liaison offi cers coordinated PSYOP support to military forces from other nations.

Although SOCCENT tactically controls SOF for the CENTCOM commander and PSYOP 

units are SOF, the combatant command, CENTCOM, directly controlled the JPOTF. The 

JPOTF commanded all PSYOP forces, but JSOTF-North would eventually tactically control 

them. While the leaders understood these organizational lines, the funding for the PSYOP units 

was unclear. The issue of whether USSOCOM funded the sustainment costs of deployed SOF 

had to be resolved. Funding issues, like foreign repairs of printing presses, were overcome.

Developing the SOF Campaign at SOCCENT, Tampa, Florida

Designated the “supported” headquarters for the war against Afghanistan, CENTCOM asked 

MG Geoffrey Lambert, USASFC, to provide several staff offi cers to prepare the SOF campaign. 

Figure 22. 4th POG printing presses regularly 

operated overtime.

Figure 21. Leafl et appealing to Afghan nationalism. 
51

Lambert chose two offi cers and two NCOs to assist SOCCENT in developing its regional 

counterterrorist plan. This plan was intended to “look beyond” the near-term deployment of 

SOF to the region for action in Afghanistan to formulate concepts for subsequent activities. 

COL Manuel “Manny” Diemer, Lambert’s chief of staff and the team leader, was accompanied 

by CPT Paul Colter (pseudonym), a former 3rd SFG offi cer who had worked in the CENTCOM AOR.35

When the SF command team arrived at SOCCENT headquarters in Tampa, Diemer was 

surprised to fi nd his colleague, COL Mike Findlay, at work there also. Findlay, the special operations commander from the Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia, had a task much like 

his. “I’m here to give staff guidance and training to the SOCCENT staff,” Findlay told him. 

Diemer soon discovered why they needed additional support. COL Eric Stanhagen, deputy 

commander, SOCCENT, told Diemer in their fi rst meeting that “We’ve put all our J5 (the regional contingency planners) guys into our J3”—that is, the planning cell was disbanded and 

the personnel moved into the current operations section. The headquarters had become focused 

on “the tactical war in Afghanistan,” Diemer relayed to MG Lambert; “There is no special ops 

strategy for the whole region.” Lambert directed Diemer to help the SOCCENT staff expand its 

efforts into a long-range theaterwide plan.36

Twenty-four hours later, Diemer and his team produced a doctrinally correct “classic sevenphase unconventional warfare plan” outlined on yellow legal pads.37 In particular, the plan 

included Lambert’s concept of “operationalized engagement” to ensure that the noncombat 

exercises in the region were integrated into CENTCOM’s counterterrorist and counternarcotics 

campaigns. Shortly afterward, LTC Darrin Matteson (pseudonym), from the SOCCENT Special Plans Offi ce, presented the new plan to Franks, the warfi ghting general of the theater, and 

his principal staff in a formal briefi ng. Matteson explained how this proposed UW plan was 

“synchronized with the CENTCOM four-phase plan” to remove the Taliban government from 

power in Afghanistan. Diemer remembered that Franks did not ask a single question during the 

briefi ng, which he later learned was “a fi rst” for the CENTCOM commander. At the end of the 

presentation, Franks said to Matteson, “I understand everything you said . . . I understand all 

the acronyms . . . your plan is approved.” Diemer fl ew back to Fort Bragg the next day to “gear 

up” USASFC’s resources to make the SOCCENT campaign plan into reality.

Top Draft Choices: 10th SFG, Fort Carson, CO, and 7th SFG, Fort Bragg, NC

COL John Mulholland knew his group needed augmentation to be able to function as the 

JSOTF directing UW operations across northern Afghanistan, and one Special Forces company 

especially needed select personnel to get it to full strength before deployment. When he asked for 

help from USASFC, COL Diemer recommended two 10th SFG offi cers that he had served with in 

the Balkans. For the position of JSOTF-North operations offi cer, Diemer chose LTC Matt Rhinehart (pseudonym).38 Rhinehart was deputy commander, 10th SFG, based at Fort Carson. While he 

had not yet been a battalion commander, Rhinehart was “well known and well respected” in the 

SOF community for his performance as commander of the 10th SFG support company in Bosnia 

during the NATO intervention. Diemer felt he was “the right guy” for the J3 position.39

At Fort Bragg, LTC Marcus Steinmann (pseudonym) was working temporarily in the 

SWCS Battle Lab, waiting to begin his study at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 
52

Pennsylvania, in summer 2002. The former special warfare training battalion commander was 

Diemer’s pick to lead the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF) of JSOTF-North. 

Steinmann had impressed Diemer when he was the J3 operations offi cer for the Combined Joint 

Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF)-Bosnia, and Diemer knew he could readily command 

all of the Army special operations troops in Afghanistan as a part of the larger JTF.40 As it turned 

out, both 10th SFG offi cers served admirably on Mulholland’s JSOTF-North staff. Their experience in Bosnia proved most helpful in preparing for the land campaign in Afghanistan.41

On the morning of 11 September 2001 Chief Warrant Offi cer (CWO) Vincent “Vince” 

Garvey (pseudonym) was receiving his parachute at Green Ramp, one of the runway accesses 

at Pope Air Force Base, directly adjacent to Fort Bragg.42 As a member of the 7th SFG that is 

focused on Latin America, his company was preparing to board an Air Force transport plane to 

make a training jump on Fort Bragg.43 One of the company’s master sergeants asked the jumpers if they had heard the news about New York City. Garvey ran to his parked pickup, pulled 

the truck alongside the parachute-laden soldiers, and turned up the volume on his radio. The 

Special Forces troopers listened in stunned silence to the news broadcasts. The jump was cancelled, and Garvey and the rest of the company went back to their barracks anticipating orders 

to fi ght somewhere in the world.44 Orders came soon but only for a few 7th SFG soldiers on 28 

September. CWO Will Sherman (pseudonym), the operations offi cer for B Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th SFG, told Garvey that he had been handpicked—“by-name selected,” in the reverseorder jargon of the military—to join A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, that was scheduled to 

leave for CENTCOM’s theater of operations. Three other sergeants from 7th SFG accompanied 

Garvey but for other assignments. The desired qualifi cations set for those three sergeants were 

exceptional: school-trained Special Forces sniper or close-quarter battle specialists or former 

service in one of several select special operations units. Garvey was the only member from the 

7th SFG augmentee group who met all of the prerequisites.45

5th SFG = CJSOTF-North, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

As COL Mulholland watched the televised reports of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, he realized his 5th SFG “would be players” in whatever retaliatory action the United States undertook. Based at Fort Campbell, the 5th SFG was trained and equipped to fi ght in the deserts of 

the Middle East and Southwest Asia. They had done fi eld exercises in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, 

and around the Persian Gulf region. When Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization 

emerged as the 9/11 culprits and their connection to the Taliban government was established, 

Mulholland felt “it was apparent we’d be going into Afghanistan.” His immediate problem was 

what he considered an “information defi cit.” Before 9/11, neither his unit nor SOCCENT in 

Tampa had any operational interest in Afghanistan.46 SOCCENT was responsible for planning 

and conducting all special operations in the CENTCOM theater of operations. Mulholland was 

certain that his boss, MG Lambert at USASFC, would soon place the 5th SFG at the disposal 

of RADM Bert Calland, the SOCCENT commander, as part of the “expedition to Afghanistan,” 

as it was initially called.47

By 14 September 2001, the organization of the Afghanistan expedition SOF had not been 

established. Doctrinally, in wartime, SOCCENT was to turn its headquarters into a JSOTF 

headquarters to direct the attached SOF units from the Army, Navy, and Air Force in combat. 

The 5th SFG would become a subordinate component of the JSOTF, called the Army Special 
53

Operations Task Force (ARSOTF), managing the Army elements of the task force.48 “Initially, 

the JSOTF in the north (eventually Karshi Kanabad, or K2, in Uzbekistan) was to be sourced 

and structured for combat search and rescue (CSAR). Thus, an Air Force offi cer was to be in 

charge. However, since K2 was to be converted into a base that would also support UW operations, the differences in Army combat service support and structure or “size, weight, and cube” 

had to be factored, otherwise disruptions to the air movement schedules could have delayed 

combat operations for weeks or months. LTG Brown, the USASOC commander, agreed that 

K2 should be built not only for current CSAR operations but also to support a fl uid transition 

to follow-on combat operations. Brown convinced the SOCCENT planners that Mulholland 

should be put in charge, said MG Lambert.49

Despite COL Mulholland telling the SOCCENT staff that his unit lacked the staff and 

equipment to perform all of the doctrinal duties expected of a theater-level JSOTF, it became 

moot with LTG Brown’s recommendation. In Tampa, RADM Calland regarded his command 

responsibilities as “AOR-wide,” meaning SOCCENT had to oversee special operations not only 

in Afghanistan but also throughout the CENTCOM theater AOR that covered all the Middle 

East and Central and Southwest Asia. “What made sense,” Calland recalled, “was multiple 

JSOTFs.” He directed the creation of several subordinate task forces to prosecute the coming 

campaign.50 That afternoon, U.S. Navy Captain (Capt) Randy Goodman, SOCCENT’s J3 operations offi cer, responded to Mulholland’s query about the JSOTF by simply saying, “You’re 

it.” The 5th SFG headquarters had been “tagged” to command all SOF that would fi ght inside 

Afghanistan—at least for the time being.51

For the help he now needed for his unique mission, Mulholland turned to COL Mike Findlay, Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM), Norfolk. Findlay immediately dispatched a joint training team to Fort Campbell to train the group staff on 

how to function as a JSOTF and provided computer hardware on loan to install a secure local 

area network (LAN). Having taken command only two months earlier and with no experience 

in setting up a JSOTF base, Mulholland welcomed the JFCOM help.52

In the absence of planning guidance from SOCCENT, Mulholland put four A detachments 

(ODAs) into the 5th SFG’s isolation facility (ISOFAC). While the Special Forces A teams did 

not know what their missions might be, inside the closely guarded ISOFAC, they could openly 

study the available classifi ed data to learn more about the geography, the population, the culture, their enemies, and their possible allies in Afghanistan—the Taliban resistance elements.53

The teams quickly discovered that there were no maps of Afghanistan available in normal U.S. 

Army stocks. Being resourceful, they called various defense organizations, including the Land 

Information Warfare Activity, from which they obtained old Soviet-era military maps they could 

use for tactical planning.54 After his Pentagon briefi ng, MG Lambert, the Army Special Forces 

commander, told LTC Carl Hooper (pseudonym) at the 5th SFG ISOFAC to “Climb on the tanks 

and trucks and hang on when the dam breaks and the Northern Alliance sweeps into Kabul.”55

To prepare for future operations, the 5th SFG staff analyzed the ethnic and geographic 

makeup of Afghanistan and divided the Texas-sized country into fi ve major sectors. It later 

reduced this number to three and, fi nally, to two. The northern sector included the vast Hindu 

Kush mountain range, itself the size of Kentucky, and all lands to the north and northwest. The 

southern sector was the area south of the Kush, which also had formidable chains of mountains 
54

as well as arid high deserts. When Mulholland proposed this north-south division during a 

telephone call to the SOCCENT J3 (operations offi cer), Navy Capt Goodman told him that his 

command was now designated JSOTF-North. Mulholland was to focus solely on the northern 

half of Afghanistan, above the east-west highway between Herat and Kabul, which ran roughly 

along the 34th parallel. When Mulholland asked who was going to run special operations in 

the other half of the country, he was told that SOCCENT intended to form a second task force, 

JSOTF-South, from the headquarters of NSWG-1, San Diego, California. Eventually, elements 

of U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams would be assigned to that JSOTF to work with antiTaliban resistance forces in southern Afghanistan. Mulholland knew that the Navy SEALs, 

while adept at lightning-fast raids, were not trained to advise local resistance forces in conducting UW that might last months or even years. He predicted then that the 5th SFG was going to 

“end up doing UW across the country.”56

Standing Up JSOTFs in Tampa and Fort Campbell

LTC Warren Richards (pseudonym), SOCJFCOM operations offi cer, was on a training exercise in Hungary when the United States was attacked. Subsequent erratic fl ight schedules delayed 

his return to Norfolk for two weeks. While Richards was stuck in Hungary, Mulholland, 5th SFG 

commander, learned that he had to form a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to control 

Figure 23. SOCCENT map dividing Afghanistan geographically.
55

SOF operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in northern Afghanistan. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) had never directed an SFG to be prepared to assume that mission.

While SOCJFCOM’s mission had been to “facilitate joint integration . . . to enhance SOF 

effectiveness” and to be “prepared to form a JSOTF to conduct special operations,” it had an 

inherent task to train prospective commanders and staffs of new JSOTFs.57 Shortly after reaching Norfolk, Richards and four soldiers left for USASOC headquarters, Fort Bragg, to assist 

that staff in meeting the 5th SFG’s mission requirements as a JSOTF. From his experience as a 

Special Forces offi cer and as a SOCJFCOM trainer, Richards knew that the 5th SFG headquarters would need help in three areas.

One of the problems it would encounter was the lack of local area network (LAN) equipment it would need to function as a JSOTF. Thus, identifying the specifi c requirements and 

requisitioning the necessary equipment became a top priority. Richards, the USASOC information management staff, and experts from the 112th Signal Battalion identifi ed and resourced 

equipment for the LAN for $500,000.

A second shortcoming was personnel. To function as a JSOTF, an SFG headquarters staff 

would require an additional 120 people. Those people can come from a variety of sources, but 

unless the “drafted” soldiers have trained with that particular JSOTF, basic issues such as SOPs 

and familiarity with the staff principals would delay actions. The unit staff also had to integrate 

the new augmentees into its everyday functions. Joint staff training, therefore, was the third 

problem that faced the group.58

While Richards’ team was at Fort Bragg, retired Special Forces COL Dave Rasmussen 

and eight SOCJFCOM soldiers were working with SOCCENT headquarters in Tampa. RADM 

Figure 24. Afghanistan.
56

Calland had called COL Findlay earlier, asking for assistance in converting his headquarters 

from a peacetime to a wartime footing. Rasmussen ascertained that “they had a problem” in 

that key SOCCENT staff positions were predominantly fi lled by Navy SEALs who had little 

experience with other service operations and staff procedures. Since Calland’s guidance from 

CENTCOM was contained in a PowerPoint briefi ng, his staff struggled to develop a plan to 

employ SOF troops. Rasmussen was concerned that the SOCCENT staff was more focused 

on getting into the theater than in preparing plans or requesting additional personnel to meet 

their staffi ng requirements. The best Rasmussen and his trainers could do was to develop a 

phased implementation plan that supported CENTCOM guidance before accompanying the 

staff into the theater. The former Special Forces colonel and 12 trainers from SOCJFCOM 

departed the Persian Gulf staging base in early December, quite frustrated with the situation.59

It was a different story for a third SOCJFCOM group at Fort Campbell. For two weeks, 

LTC Jack Walters (pseudonym), chief observer trainer, and 11 other staff members conducted 

seminars to educate the 5th SFG staff on the intricacies of JSOTF functioning. Walters used 

his considerable Special Forces experience as a commander and staff offi cer to advise the staff 

on the additional functions a joint headquarters would require. The staff quickly realized that, 

in addition to performing the wartime functions of a group headquarters it would also be the 

communications hub for the attached joint subordinate units, arrange the logistics support for 

the other service units, and coordinate all planning for joint operations.

Communications were a major problem because most of the message traffi c had to be 

conducted over a classifi ed LAN, and there were insuffi cient terminals in the 5th SFG’s staff 

sections for adequate coordination. More hardware quickly resolved this problem. Findlay and 

his offi cers emphasized to Mulholland that internal staff communications were only part of 

the problem he faced. While an SFG commander controls his own communications, a JSOTF 

commander does not. Findlay stressed that external communications requirements could overwhelm the 5th SFG’s signal staff. One problem was video teleconferences (VTCs) because 

higher-level commanders and staffs commonly use them, but VTCs are a practice that could be 

virtually unknown to an SFG commander.

Figure 25. LAN connectivity to the K2 “Snake.”
57

The staff was also responsible for long-range planning, but that function often became 

secondary because of the press of the new day-to-day operational business. Still, Mulholland 

would have to focus on ARSOF tactical operations and, as the JSOTF commander, develop and 

execute the special operations campaign. COL Findlay was especially concerned about longrange planning. The commander “cannot be the guy to do the coordination between current and 

future operations,” he warned. To do both required a J3 staff with more personnel than those 

authorized in the SFG S3 section. Unfortunately, SOCCENT used all 120 augmentees to fi ll its 

battle staff. None were available for the 5th SFG or NSWG-1.

Another outstanding problem was security classifi cations on potential operations in Afghanistan. Soldiers in ODAs have Secret clearances, but they were not authorized access to 

Focal Point information. Operations in Afghanistan were classifi ed under the focal point system. Special Forces soldiers who had to conduct those operations were not authorized to have 

the vital information they needed for planning. A similar problem was the level of security 

classifi cation on messages from higher headquarters to COL Mulholland. Most messages 

were classifi ed Top Secret. This time, it was the limited number of personnel with Top Secret 

clearances in the Special Forces battalions that severely limited access to information. Again, 

this meant that the soldiers in the ODAs were not authorized the necessary information. With 

no solution coming from higher headquarters, Mulholland determined that the restrictions 

the classifi cation process imposed were unrealistic and would endanger his soldiers’ safety. 

He decided that the ODAs had a “need to know” and directed that they receive all necessary 

information.60

Richards, Walters, and Findlay realized that “Mulholland was way over-tasked.” In response, Findlay recommended to RADM Calland that he designate the 5th SFG the Army 

Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF) and that SOCCENT either be the JSOTF or that he 

establish a JSOTF from other assets. The SOCCENT commander elected to continue with the 

5th SFG as a JSOTF. While the designation ensured that the 5th SFG would receive special 

operations air assets and improve its position in the joint environment, both Mulholland and 

Richards knew that the 5th SFG could not, because it had never been a long-term JSOTF, function as such without experienced joint staff help.61

That experienced help came in the form of Richards, Walters, and 13 others from SOCJFCOM. Richards deployed to Afghanistan with the 5th SFG advance party in early October to 

help establish the JSOTF. The other SOCJFCOM soldiers arrived with the main body. COL 

Mulholland used the SOCJFCOM personnel as his J2, J3, J4, assistant J6, and chief of the joint 

planning group. They also assisted the rest of the nascent JSOTF-North staff with its functional 

areas. Without standing up a separate ARSOTF, the JSOTF staff was responsible for isolating 

all Special Forces detachments to be inserted, for resupplying those detachments, for controlling subordinate unit communications, and for tracking the movements and tactical operations 

of those detachments in the combat zone 24 hours a day.

Committed to Middle East Exercises

For the 2nd Battalion, 5th SFG, the 9/11 attacks prompted an immediate cancellation of its scheduled Middle East exercise. However, within 24 hours, the cancel order was rescinded, and the exercise was “back on.” Thus, on 16 September, the initial elements of the 2nd Battalion, less one Special 
58

Forces company, departed Fort Campbell for a regional air base to participate in Exercise BRIGHT 

STAR. At its forward operating base (FOB), the 2nd Battalion headquarters staff organized a small 

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) to support the U.S. (joint) and allied (combined) units. LTC Don Forsythe (pseudonym) was in charge, and his executive offi cer, MAJ Jeffrey 

Solis (pseudonym), directed FOB operations and commanded the Army units in the task force.62

For Exercise EARLY VICTOR, Forsythe’s CJSOTF directed the operations of two Special 

Forces companies, a Navy SEAL platoon, an element of Air Force special operations transport 

aircraft, a 160th SOAR Army helicopter unit, and a company of Army Rangers.63 The allied 

elements in the task force were Jordanian ranger and special forces companies and observer 

teams from Yemen, Egypt, and Kuwait. Forsythe’s mission was to conduct combined special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA) missions—violent, rapidly executed raids. Practicing 

combined SR and DA missions in a Middle East environment proved prescient in late October 

when reports of 5th SFG’s ODAs being inserted in Afghanistan after the initial air campaign 

were received. By the time EARLY VICTOR ended on 26 October, LTC Forsythe and MAJ Solis felt that the 2nd Battalion staff, with its Special Forces Operational Detachments B (ODBs) 

and ODAs, was combat ready. They were anxious to join the 5th SFG’s fi ght in Afghanistan.64

The next stop for the “2nd of the 5th” was 

Al-Jafr Air Base in southern Jordan to await 

further orders from the SOCCENT forward element in Qatar. LTC Forsythe was told to be 

ready for several possible missions. His battalion might be sent to Masirah Island, near Oman, 

or to Yemen or Qatar to be the CENTCOM theater crisis response element (CRE) or to serve 

as the headquarters for other units serving as 

a theater CRE. Solis was convinced that they 

would be moved to a base in Pakistan and from 

there into Afghanistan. As trained and most recently practiced in EARLY VICTOR, Forsythe 

and his staff planned to commit the 15 Special 

Forces ODAs fi rst and then the three Special 

Forces company headquarters (ODBs) for regional command and control while the battalion base (FOB) initially remained outside the 

“denied area.” The battalion intelligence staff 

provided daily updates from the war zone and 

distributed information on Afghan culture; the 

country’s terrain, weather, infrastructure, and 

politics; and some history on British and Soviet 

interventions while they waited for orders.65

3rd SFG Prepares for the Horn of Africa at Fort Bragg

In the wake of 9/11, COL Mark Phelan, commander, 3rd SFG, Fort Bragg, fl ew to Special 

Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) headquarters in Tampa to receive planning 

Figure 26. Amman, Jordan.
59

guidance for future operations. He anticipated that the coming 

war would eventually expand to attack terrorist bases outside of 

Afghanistan, and his 3rd SFG would be assigned to SOCCENT 

to deal with those in eastern Africa. U.S. Navy Capt Randy Goodman, the SOCCENT J3 operations offi cer, told Phelan that intelligence reports indicated that some of the al-Qaeda were leaving 

Afghanistan for Somalia and some of the neighboring countries. 

Since there were no war plans on the shelf for counterterrorist action in that region, Goodman granted Phelan “mission planning 

authority” to support deployment to the Horn of Africa. Phelan 

briefed his initial concept for this mission to the principal staff 

offi cers at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and received their approval. He intended to 

rotate his 1st and 2nd battalions in the theater every 30 days. CENTCOM directed the 3rd 

Battalion to complete Exercise FOCUS RELIEF in Nigeria. When that battalion returned in 

December to Fort Bragg, it would recover and then backfi ll shortages in the other two battalions 

moving in and out of the Horn of Africa.66

While the 3rd SFG staff refi ned this plan to carry Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

(OEF) to eastern Africa in fall 2001, COL Phelan alternated his 1st and 2nd battalions to Camp 

Pickett, Virginia, where they rehearsed the daily tasks they would need to perform as forward 

perating bases (FOBs) once they arrived in the war zone. In particular, they practiced roundthe-clock communications with isolated units dispersed over a wide area. The 3rd Battalion 

in Nigeria was already operating as an FOB and would have two months’ experience when it 

returned in December.67

Thinking Ahead: Senior Liaison Offi cers for Resistance Leaders

The 5th SFG had identifi ed only two key resistance leaders in northern Afghanistan and 

none in the south based on initial intelligence briefi ngs. It had learned little more than the 

names—Fahim Khan of the Northern Alliance and Rashid Dostum. These were the highestranking military commanders, and it was assumed that each had considerable political 

infl uence. In the UN, a delegate from Fahim Khan’s faction had been accepted offi cially as the 

political representative for Afghanistan. Detailed personal information about Fahim Khan and 

Rashid Dostum—ethnicity and education; 

personalities and backgrounds; the 

size of their forces; and the tactical 

state of their soldiers, weapons, and 

equipment—was not yet fully available.68

Despite that limitation, COL Mulholland chose to build his UW campaign 

around those two Afghan leaders. He believed that “it was going to be important 

to put a senior level of leadership” with 

Dostum and Fahim Khan “to help infl uence the political battlefi eld as well as the 

military.” He felt that he could accomplish 

Figure 27. The Central Command’s Horn of Africa region.

Figure 28. TF Dagger Commander COL Mulholland 

gives GEN Myers (CJCS) an update at K2.
60

this by using two of his three lieutenant colonel battalion commanders as liaison offi cers to the 

two Afghan warlords. Mulholland recounted that battalion commanders provided a more senior 

presence with these signifi cant Afghan leaders. In addition, they were to establish sectors of responsibility.69 He contended that this arrangement would provide the Afghan generals “with an 

extra level of experience and expertise” and “disseminate the command and control dilemma.”70

As the campaign progressed, the planning staffs anticipated that a Pashtun counterpart 

to Dostum and Fahim Khan would emerge to rally resistance in the south. If that happened, 

Mulholland would have a third battalion commander to send to that leader. While this concept 

fragmented the three battalion staffs and gave initial command and control of nine Special 

Forces companies and their ODAs directly to him, Mulholland considered it to be necessary to 

accomplish the assigned mission. It also allowed him to fi ll JSOTF-North staff vacancies.71

Civil Affairs to Islamabad, Pakistan

In his remarks to the State Department on 4 October 2001, President Bush declared that 

“we are friends of the Afghan people,” pledging $320 million for humanitarian aid. He emphasized that the United States was not alone in this effort: “We will work with the UN agencies 

such as the World Food Program and work with private volunteer organizations to make sure 

this assistance gets to the people.”72 Three nights later, the commander of the 96th Civil Affairs 

Battalion (CAB) knocked on MAJ Matt DiJurnigan’s (pseudonym) door and told him, “Pack 

your bags.” This former marine and Army enlisted soldier, and DESERT STORM infantry 

company commander suddenly found himself a “fi rst responder” to the president’s pledge.73

On 9 October, DiJurnigan was in Tampa at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) as 

the 96th CAB liaison offi cer in the civil-military operations cell in the J5 section. As the liaison offi cer to CENTCOM, he was familiar with the headquarters, the civil-military operations 

staff, and his normal duties. What he had not expected was his assignment on 12 October to the 

CENTCOM liaison cell at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. DiJurnigan’s mission was 

to determine whether there was a need to establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC) 

in Pakistan to implement the president’s desires.

A CMOC serves as the primary interface between the U.S. 

Armed Forces and the local population, humanitarian organizations, 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, 

the UN, multinational forces, and other U.S. government agencies. 

Basically, the CMOC can help prioritize humanitarian support and 

ensure that civilian organizations do not attempt to begin relief efforts 

in areas where there is active combat.74 To accurately assess whether 

a CMOC was required, DiJurnigan met fi rst with the Department 

for International Development in London to determine the level 

of assistance for CA that Great Britain would provide. Then, in 

Islamabad, DiJurnigan met with BG Ronald Sams, the chief of the 

CENTCOM liaison cell; the director of the UN Offi ce for Coordination 

of Humanitarian Affairs–Afghanistan; the UN Joint Logistics Cell; 

United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) representatives; the head of the UN Mine Committee, and the fi ve UN regional

Figure 29. U.S. 

Army Civil Affairs 

and Psychological 

Operations Command 

shoulder patch.
61

coordinators created for Afghanistan. After meeting with these offi cials and representatives 

from numerous NGOs, DiJurnigan concluded that a CMOC was not necessary and recommended against its establishment. In his view, the humanitarian relief effort was “mature,” and 

military coordination of the effort was unnecessary. He recommended, instead, that a military 

CA cell be collocated with the UN Joint Logistics Cell that channeled all humanitarian assistance into Afghanistan. Ideally, all aid organizations would coordinate their efforts through 

the international cell that could balance requests for support and information with available 

resources and receive early notice of potential new donors. Unfortunately, many NGOs elected 

to operate independently, thus minimizing the advantages of the UN cell.

In late October 2001, DiJurnigan was the only American CA offi cer working on humanitarian assistance issues with the help of three British soldiers. This severely limited his ability to 

coordinate with the multitude of NGOs arriving in theater. DiJurnigan realized that his initial 

recommendation against a CMOC might have been premature and requested a civil affairs 

team (CAT) from his battalion. On Thanksgiving Day 2001, Captain (CPT) Marty Cavanaugh 

(pseudonym), with three members of CAT-A46, arrived in Islamabad from D Company, 96th 

CAB.75 The team quickly began developing new contacts and exploiting those contacts that 

DiJurnigan had made. Their “full court press” to meet with as many NGOs as possible opened 

signifi cant lines of communication that later paid great benefi ts.

Figure 30. Islamabad in relation to Afghanistan.
62

Of Vital Importance: PSYOP

In 1951, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace wrote, “The psychological warfare program” 

is of “vital importance to national security and defense.”76 The level of importance was quite 

evident as the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) began planning for PSYOP missions 

in Afghanistan shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The group was to provide operationaland tactical-level PSYOP to undermine the terrorists and to separate them from their support 

systems. While the 4th POG had teams constantly deployed in the CENTCOM region, none 

had been focused on Afghanistan. That changed overnight, and within weeks of the September 

attacks, PSYOP teams were ready to move into the region in support of Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM (OEF).

The 8th PSYOP Battalion had already established a Joint Psychological Operations Task 

Force (JPOTF) for all PSYOP within the CENTCOM area of operations. But elements of the 4th 

POG, as well as mobilized Reserve units, provided tactical PSYOP forces to augment special 

operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces worldwide in support of OEF. These PSYOP 

forces initially deployed not only to forward staging bases to support ground operations in Afghanistan but also to Guantanamo Bay to help debrief captured terrorists and to the Philippines 

to support OEF-Philippines and the U.S. Embassy.

As stated before, all PSYOP plans and programs required policy-level approval from the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Confl ict (ASD-SO/

LIC) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P). Once the overarching plans 

and programs had been approved, a prototype of every individual PSYOP product went to the 

CENTCOM commander for approval. Then, the specifi c product was sent to ASD-SO/LIC for 

policy review for fi nal approval before being released for dissemination.77 In the case of radio 

programs, the product was sent into theater by satellite communications for local broadcast. 

When printed products received fi nal approval, they could be printed at Fort Bragg or transmitted digitally via satellite to a forward-deployed print facility for production. Because of the immense size of the PSYOP requirement for OEF, approximately 136 USAR soldiers—printing 

specialists, staff augmentees, and a tactical PSYOP company—were mobilized.

Critical to PSYOP planning was analysis of the target audience by civilian analysts in the 

regionally oriented Strategic Studies Detachments in the Research and Analysis Division of the 

4th POG staff. These sociocultural experts, most of whom had Ph.D.s, had extensive research 

resources and contact networks to help them develop themes and a specifi c focus within the 

target audience. For example, dedicated al-Qaeda or Taliban members might not be affected 

by a PSYOP campaign, whereas villagers who had suffered at the hands of a repressive regime 

were viable targets. Included in the supporting PSYOP plan that the JPOTF developed were a 

number of themes—encourage support for the Partnership of Nations forces, undermine the 

Taliban/al-Qaeda, emphasize the inevitability of Taliban/al-Qaeda defeat, rally support for the 

Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), promote the capture of Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda

leaders by offering rewards, and strengthen Afghan-U.S. friendship. Once the plan and themes 

had been completed and approved, specifi c products were developed. The entire process drew 

heavily on the knowledge, analytical acuity, and cultural empathy of Ph.D.-level area experts 

as well as military PSYOP specialists.
63

Within two weeks after 9/11, two PSYOP liaison offi cers were sent to the 5th SFG at Fort 

Campbell. They were soon followed by tactical PSYOP elements, a deployable print production 

center (DPPC), and a satellite downlink for radio programs. And the 8th PSYOP Battalion had 

established a “bare bones” JPOTF command element at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa.

DOD PSYOP resources were limited, and the Army had the only comprehensive military 

PSYOP capability, so it naturally got “the lion’s share” of the work involved in executing a 

PSYOP plan. An adequate supply of native linguists was a constant challenge, given the tactical requirements overseas. To keep the huge volume of translation as well as broadcasting work 

manageable, contract linguists were hired to augment those Pashto and Dari speakers in the 

4th POG. Air Force capabilities were limited but included important EC-130 aircraft broadcast 

platforms (Commando Solo) and the means to deliver leafl ets on target. The Navy had but one 

shipboard and one land-based system, neither of which were available for OEF.78 Still, in the 

fi rst months of the war, more than 75 million leafl ets were dropped from B-52 bombers and 

C-130 transport aircraft. Commando Solo Air Force EC-130 PSYOP aircraft broadcast more 

than 3,000 hours of radio programs.79

The preceding historical vignettes revealed how the special operations commands, ARSOF units, commanders, staff personnel, and soldiers responded and prepared for America’s 

global war on terrorism, beginning in Afghanistan. The reader should have gotten a sense of 

how enormous the mission of combating terrorism worldwide was, the impact of that enormity 

on the various headquarters and subsequent overseas JSOTFs, the complexity of the problems 

in Afghanistan, the limited information that was initially available to military planners, the 

administrative burden, and the frustrations the fi eld commanders and fi ghting elements faced. 

Equally signifi cant were the proactive, “can-do” stances of ARSOF leaders at all levels; the 

resourcefulness, fl exibility, and adaptability that were common denominators among all SOF 

soldiers; and the ARSOF community’s commitment to ensuring that those elements deploying 

overseas got the highest priority for resources and training.

Figure 31. PSYOP themes centered on accepting coalition assistance.
64

The following stories address the next phase of the operation—the overseas deployment of 

ARSOF forces into Karshi Kanabad (K2) Air Base and the establishment of the JSOTF-North 

headquarters and the American operating base called Stronghold Freedom.

Site Coordination With the Uzbeks at Karshi Kanabad

Before the fi rst meal had been cooked, the fi rst tent erected, or the fi rst aircraft launched, an 

advance echelon (ADVON) had preceded the main body of troops. This ADVON of specifi cally 

chosen personnel normally arrives early to establish rapport with foreign government offi cials 

and local inhabitants. This small element makes necessary arrangements to effi ciently receive 

the main body of soldiers and equipment, usually arriving by aircraft for a military operation. 

The initial ADVON to K2 Air Base, a former Soviet installation in Uzbekistan, consisted of a 

three-man team from Fort Campbell and an 11-person SOCCENT element from Tampa. It was 

to evaluate what eventually became Stronghold Freedom, most commonly referred to as “K2.” 

Its mission was to assess the logistics and operational facilities of the base and to coordinate 

with local offi cials to build an infrastructure that would support approximately 3,500 people.

According to Staff Sergeant (SSG) James Willet (pseudonym), the 2nd Battalion, 160th 

SOAR logistics NCO, an “old hand” with ADVON duty, the Uzbek air base commander at K2 

was not really happy to have Americans on his base.80 He was worried about their personal 

safety and about possible retribution from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a militant terrorist group based across the border in Afghanistan. Willet said, “It was weird and kind 

of eerie being one of only ten Americans, and constantly watched by Uzbek soldiers. When I 

left high school it [Uzbekistan] was still Russia, and I had never heard of Uzbekistan.”81

Once settled, SSG Willet made initial contact with the air base commander, an Uzbek Air 

Force lieutenant colonel, through an interpreter and quickly developed positive rapport, despite 

the wide disparity in ranks. Willet explained that the ADVON traveled light and that he needed 

to buy supplies and rent equipment. Concerned about their good relationship, the Americans 

Figure 32. Karshi Karnabad (K2), Uzbekistan.
65

did not want to exploit the Uzbek commander’s generosity. It took some convincing before he 

was granted permission and escorted by an Uzbek pilot. Willet and his interpreter were driven 

to the open-air market in the village. Dressed in khaki trousers and a sports shirt, and carrying 

an M-9 automatic, the 6-foot, blonde-haired, blue-eyed American was “head and shoulders” 

above everyone in the Asian crowd as he moved among the vendors’ stalls. Feeling very conspicuous and surrounded, Willet was glad that the Uzbek colonel had insisted on the escort. 

After making his purchases in soms, the local currency, the trio returned without incident. Until 

the evening, that is, when Willet realized his visit to the market had made him a television celebrity on the local news. The Americans had truly arrived.

Over the course of the next few days, Lieutenant Commander (Lt Cdr) Millender (pseudonym) from SOCCENT met with the military commander and other local Uzbek offi cials, negotiating as much space as possible for the incoming American forces. However, it was the 

Uzbek commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Kasymov, who ultimately decided the 

boundaries. Kasymov marched to the western edge of an unused taxiway, stopped, and decreed, 

“From this point that way is yours; nothing more!”82 This, as the Americans quickly discovered, 

was how everything was accomplished in Uzbekistan. Operating in a slow, bureaucratic manner, 

all offi cials had to call their superiors for fi nal approval. It was only after Uzbekistan President 

Islam Karimov had personally given Defense Secretary Rumsfeld permission to use the air base 

for search-and-rescue missions that the main body of U.S. forces was allowed to arrive.83 Colonels became primary action offi cers for getting things done in this former Soviet republic.

While diplomatic negotiations continued, the rest of the ADVON began setting up the tactical operations center (TOC) in the only building allotted, an old Soviet-era structure with paint 

peeling off the walls and broken windows. While the building had only a few separate rooms and 

was poorly ventilated, it became the central resourcing point for the ADVON party. U.S. Air Force 

CPT Paul West (pseudonym) conducted a survey of the taxiways and runway to accommodate 

Figure 33. K2, Uzbekistan.
66

the arrival, unloading, refueling, and departure of C-17 jet transport aircraft.84 He also reviewed 

U.S. military air traffi c control procedures with the Uzbek air traffi c control offi cials to ensure 

that they fully understood the differences. MAJ Kyle Killinger (pseudonym), a contracting offi -

cer from SOCCENT, arranged for fuel deliveries (aircraft and heating), building materials, supplies, and laborers with local businesses and government offi cials.85 The future economic benefi t was not lost on any of the Uzbek hierarchy or the local population; these visitors would help 

the local economy. SSG Willet’s rapport with the air base commander enabled him to wrangle 

seven aircraft bunkers for incoming helicopters and airplanes to better divide the available real 

estate. A force protection assessment evaluated the airfi eld’s security and prioritized needed 

improvements, especially to the old earthen berm around the aircraft bunkers. The daily coordination meeting between Millender and the Uzbek colonel in charge of base logistics mandated 

nightly progress reports from the entire ADVON. On 2 October 2001, the worst sandstorm in 50 

years hammered K2. With more storms predicted, acquiring temporary troop shelters escalated 

to the top priority. The Uzbeks provided 19 general purpose burlap tents.

Uncorking the Bottled Airlift

Meanwhile, the delay in obtaining diplomatic country overfl ight clearances and basing 

rights caused a bottleneck in the strategic airfl ow of troops, equipment, and supplies into the 

theater of operations. Transport aircraft packed airfi eld aprons and taxiways at Morone, Spain; 

Sigonella, Sicily; and Incirlik, Turkey. To complicate the air movement, the U.S. Air Force 

C-17 Globemaster III was the only heavy-lift jet aircraft permitted to use K2 Air Base. This 

meant that loads carried by the largest Air Force jet transport, the C-5B Galaxy, had to be 

“downloaded” and split up to fi t the much smaller C-17s. Caught in the bottleneck was an Air 

Force theater airlift control element (TALCE) at Morone, Spain. When that 50-person detachment arrived with none of its aircraft unloading equipment late on 3 October, it was unprepared 

for the gush of backed-up airplanes.

Figure 34. Uzbeck guards—the bottom of the bureaucratic ladder.
67

When Secretary Rumsfeld was granted permission to use K2 for “search-and-rescue operations” fi nally on 5 October, the physical effect on the airplanes backed up from Spain to Turkey 

was like uncorking a champagne bottle.86 Limited ramp and taxiway parking space turned an 

orderly, carefully prioritized, and orchestrated fl ow of airplanes into a hodgepodge. In an effort 

to free clogged European air bases for follow-on traffi c, airplanes were launched as quickly as 

possible, merely shifting the traffi c jam to the unprepared K2 Air Base and overwhelming its 

air traffi c control capabilities. This was made worse by the limited cargo offl oading equipment 

available. With a C-17 arriving every 2 hours by 6 October, the base population exploded from 

100 personnel to more than 2,000 in a week. The resulting command and control situation 

could only be described as “utter chaos”!87

Figure 35. K2 buildup with backlog of accumulating supplies and equipment.

Figure 36. 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR).
68

All Credit Cards Accepted at K2 Gas Station

The early arrival of the forward arming and refueling point (FARP) section of the 2nd 

Battalion, 160th SOAR, alleviated the long delays associated with the Uzbeks refueling all 

U.S. aircraft. In addition to seven fuel handlers and an ammunition handler, the FARP had 

three heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT, pronounced “hemmit” by the soldiers) 

tankers, each capable of carrying 2,550 gallons of fuel. The FARP team leader, Sergeant First 

Class (SFC) Douglas Steverson, seeing how long it took the Uzbeks to refuel the C-130P air 

tankers, started refueling all aircraft with his HEMTTs.88 The FARP team tirelessly pumped 

fuel to all U.S. and coalition aircraft that landed at K2—120,000 gallons of fuel the fi rst month. 

When the Americans began to exceed the contract for 30,000 gallons of fuel a day, Uzbek offi cials at the fuel farm became alarmed about their reserves. These fears were alleviated when 

C-17s began fl ying fuel stocks into K2 to support the UW campaign. Then the 528th SOSB 

set up a contingency fuel point of six 10,000-gallon bladders to support the refueling operation. The Uzbek hosts were happy, and the JSOTF-North staff moved on to other problems.

Air Campaign and CSAR Go Hand in Hand

COL Frank Kisner, with the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) staff, arrived aboard two MC-130P tanker aircraft from the 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) 

shortly before the fi rst C-17s began landing. Kisner directed his pure Air Force staff from the 

16th Special Operations Wing (SOW) to establish a JSOTF headquarters and to begin planning for the personnel recovery mission—recovering downed aircrews in Afghanistan. The 

16th SOW colonel took command of the JSOTF and became the senior American envoy to the 

Uzbek government offi cials. Kisner controlled everything at K2 and named the base “Camp 

Freedom.” His top priority was to conduct full mission profi le rehearsals of aerial refueling 

before the CENTCOM air campaign began.

Figure 37. Refueling a Soviet Mi-17 at K2.
69

Figure 38. Night Stalker view of the C-130P trailing refuel lines and probe basket.

Figure 39. Trail aircraft view of MH-47E refueling.

Figure 40. MH-47E hooked up for aerial refueling.
70

Making Camp Freedom a Fully Operational Base: K2, Uzbekistan

The key to command, control, and operations is communications. Thirty-fi ve soldiers from A Company, 112th Signal Battalion, were quite surprised when they arrived 

shortly after dark on 6 October. Because 

their C-17 aircrew had warned them to be 

prepared for a hostile environment, they 

donned full combat gear and stood with 

their weapons at the ready, expecting the 

worst when the aircraft ramp was dropped. 

Then, instead of a hostile environment, the 

“charged-up,” battle-ready soldiers faced a female Air Force captain, the JSOTF chief of personnel, CPT Childs (pseudonym), and Air Force MAJ Victor Mercado (pseudonym), the chief 

of communications.89 The surprised troops were welcomed to Camp Freedom and then ushered 

to a customs tent for in-processing. This was the standard procedure for most of the early 

chalks. For some unknown reason, neither the C-17 aircrews nor the inbound troops ever received the truth about the real threat at K2.

The personnel who would establish the SOCCENT Joint Special Operations Air Component 

(JSOAC) headquarters, the command element responsible for the 

CSAR mission, followed the signalers. When MAJ Wes McKellar 

(pseudonym), D Company, 2nd 

Battalion, 160th SOAR, arrived, 

he remarked, “You know you’ve 

won the Cold War when you walk 

out the back of a C-17 carrying an 

American fl ag, loaded weapons, 

and have Soviet helicopters fl ying 

CAP [overhead air cover].”90

Figure 42. K2 buildup.

Figure 43. MH-47E landing at K2.

Figure 41. 112th Signal Battalion satellite antennas.
71

LTC James Brinks (pseudonym), commander, 

2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, had been tasked to 

command the JSOAC. Having an Army aviator in 

charge of a JSOAC in combat was a fi rst.91 With no 

experience in the battalion, MAJ Mark Henderson 

(pseudonym), the operations offi cer (S3), had his 

hands full.92 Thus, in the fi rst few days, during the 

simultaneous “standup” of JSOTF-North and the 

JSOAC, the 160th SOAR offi cers and NCOs worked 

for both staffs to support the personnel recovery 

mission that had to be in place to begin the air campaign. Learning curves were steep, but being ready 

to perform the personnel recovery mission drove 

the collective effort. Within days, SOF air assets to 

support the mission included two MC-130P tankers from 9th SOS, a number of special tactics 

squadron (STS) teams from the 23rd STS, a joint Army-Air Force staff, and four MH-47E 

Chinooks and two MH-60L Direct Action Penetrators (DAPs) from 160th SOAR. When the 

strategic bombing campaign was moved up to begin on the evening of 7 October, the urgency 

became acute. The JSOTF and JSOAC had to be ready to support the air campaign despite the 

disorderly airfl ow.

Northern Air Campaign 

CSAR = MH-47Es

The compressed time line 

drove the 160th SOAR “helicopter 

buildup” teams, the D Company 

mechanics, the maintenance test 

pilots, and the B Company crew 

members to attack the aircraft 

like “ants on a Twinkie.” Despite 

the fatigue and jet lag from 

the long journey, the buildup 

crews performed exceptionally 

well. Quality control NCOs 

who certifi ed every completed 

maintenance task found only 

three minor errors during the night 

helicopter buildups. MH-60L 

DAP crewmen and mechanics unloaded their helicopter gunships to prevent damage when it 

became evident that the Air Force TALCE and C-17 loadmasters were unfamiliar with these 

aircraft. Thus, within 24 hours, the JSOAC had an immediate reaction force.

When the rest of the helicopters arrived the next day, the mechanics and aircrews had to 

forego their rest and subsist on short catnaps until all four Chinooks and the two DAPs had 

been built up, test fl own, and made mission ready. Within 48 hours, the entire Army helicopter 

Figure 44. MH-60L DAPs.

Figure 45. Aircraft maintenance was a crucial factor for success.
72

fl eet had been made ready for war. Exhausted maintenance crews fell asleep alongside helicopters on the guano-covered fl oors of concrete bunkers. When they awoke the next day, they were 

covered with dust and debris from a sandstorm.

The 160th SOAR MH-47E Chinook and MH-60L DAP Black Hawk pilots and aircrews 

spent the fi rst week in Uzbekistan rehearsing combat search and rescue (CSAR) scenarios. LTC 

Brinks, the JSOAC commander, believed that it was imperative that his staff, the 160th SOAR 

enlisted planners, and the aircrews could seamlessly exercise their mission responsibilities.93

He knew from experience during Operation DESERT STORM that time was the critical element in successfully recovering a downed pilot or aircrew in northern Afghanistan. His acceptable standard was to launch a rescue within an hour of notifi cation, and it was met.

Building Camp Freedom at Double Time

The Air Force TALCE unloaded C-17 

aircraft as fast as it could, dumping cargo 

pallets anywhere and everywhere. Just 

as the fl ood of arriving personnel and 

equipment threatened to overwhelm the 

infrastructure and resources of the Uzbek base, soldiers from the 528th Special 

Operations Support Battalion (SOSB) 

arrived. COL Kisner’s fi rst words when 

he met MAJ Charles Mahoney (pseudonym), A Company commander, were, 

“Boy, am I glad to see you.94 We have 

some problems.” After receiving a quick 

rundown, Mahoney, remembering the 

capabilities of the Air Force base support packages, did a quick triage of the K2 maelstrom and 

dispatched teams to provide urgent care in the critical areas.

Military theorist Baron Antoine 

Henri de Jomini defi ned logistics as 

“the art of moving armies.”95 Since 

reactivation in 1987, the 528th SOSB 

had become quite skilled in providing 

outstanding logistics support worldwide to special operations soldiers. Although operations security (OPSEC) 

considerations limited details as to 

where they were going, the U.S. Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 

Tampa had tasked them to establish a 

ration point and a warehouse for repair 

parts; to provide offi ce supplies and cold-weather clothing for SOF overseas; and to establish a 

fuel point. Shortly before receiving medical, veterinary, and mortuary services attachments, the 

leaders were told that they were going to K2, Uzbekistan; a small element would go to Oman; 

Figure 47. K2 cantonment area.

Figure 46. 528th SOSB initial logistics chaos.
73

and there would be no conventional support units to assist the 528th SOSB in country.96 The 

number of aircraft determined the fi nal numbers and exactly what equipment would go. The 

battalion staff and company leaders made last-minute adjustments to ensure that all assigned 

missions could be performed. “Though we had little or no guidance, we had lots of experience,” 

remarked First Lieutenant (1LT) Michael Bridgewater (pseudonym).97 Thus, the 528th SOSB 

was prepared when it arrived.

Throughout Camp Freedom, the 528th SOSB’s junior leaders took charge of unspecifi ed 

tasks and, with little or no guidance, restored a semblance of order to the chaos. As cargo was 

dumped on the fl ight line, SSG Celeste Holmes (pseudonym) directed her crew to separate everything into the appropriate logistics classes, from class I to class IX.98 These soldiers were 

used to taking the initiative, thinking on their feet, and taking responsibility for their actions. The 

sergeants decided what was needed, and their decisions enabled the unit to operate independently 

in theater for two weeks without resupply. They understood the importance of their mission to 

the national effort to combat terrorism worldwide. Although the 528th SOSB’s mission was to 

support the Army special operations units, its “can do” attitude and reputation for never turning 

away soldiers who needed support spread rapidly. Instructed by their company commander to 

provide as much support as possible, the supply section had a daunting task. Some Air Force 

elements arrived at K2 without basic subsistence gear like sleeping bags and cold-weather clothing. They had assumed that these items would be issued “in country.” The JSOTF-North and 

JSOAC staffs quickly demolished the offi ce supplies. SSG Holmes said, “We wouldn’t turn away 

a shooter at the warehouse,” except for toilet paper, which became a treasured commodity as the 

camp population rapidly grew.99 The true measure of mission accomplishment was this comment 

by SSG Timothy Matthews (pseudonym), 3rd Battalion, 4th POG: “The 528th is a class act.”100

The Universal Morale Booster at K2—Hot Food

SSG Mark Parsons (pseudonym), a 528th SOSB food service specialist, had been on joint 

exercises and was familiar with what the Air Force brought.101 Parsons found his dining facility 

equipment among the scattered pallets and set to work. Unforeseen problems were the fuel-contaminated soil, trash dumps everywhere, abandoned Soviet equipment relics, and snakes. The 

emergence of a cobra from a temporary latrine area got everyone’s attention. Still, SSG Parsons 

had a mess hall operating in one week instead of the anticipated three weeks. Hot “real” food 

boosted camp morale 100 percent. That single meal per day was the highlight of some very long 

days as well as a welcome relief from the constant diet of meals, ready to eat (MREs).

A combat soldier’s most valuable tools are his weapon and his ammunition. The 528th 

SOSB’s soldiers quickly learned that their most valuable items were the lumber and forklift that 

had accompanied them from Fort Bragg. The foresight of carrying plywood, 2-x-4 lumber, and 

other construction material paid big dividends for A Company. These building materials were 

quickly turned into tent fl oors and walls to enclose latrines. The forklift moved pallets of equipment that arrived daily on U.S. Air Force aircraft, the sea/land containers that became a warehouse, and mountains of abandoned Soviet equipment and trash to clear space to accommodate 

the growing numbers of SOF personnel at Camp Freedom. The forklift operator became one of 

the most sought-after soldiers on the encampment by anyone who needed something moved.
74

Special Forces: CSAR Personnel Recovery and UW Preparation

MAJ Steven Broderick (pseudonym), commander, B Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th SFG, arrived during the night of 7 October with ODB 580. Master Sergeant (MSG) Bowdler (pseudonym) from the 5th SFG advance party met the 18 Special Forces soldiers, got them through 

customs, and got the group bunked down for the night in a few medium-size general purpose 

tents. Their main tasks were to establish an isolation facility (ISOFAC) for the ODAs preparing 

for future combat missions and to provide force protection at K2 and in the local area. Restrictions imposed by the Uzbeks made any force protection measures outside K2 Air Base impossible. The Special Forces soldiers spent several days erecting 18 tents; setting up cots, tables, and 

chairs; and installing fuel oil heaters to create an ISOFAC. Long working hours became the norm 

as more and more ODAs kept arriving at K2. Although Broderick’s ODB had never set up or operated an ISOFAC, the NCOs applied their experience and SOPs to provide a working operation 

in record time.102 SFC Kevin Anderson (pseudonym) coordinated the use of local marksmanship 

ranges with the Uzbek military to assist the ODAs in isolation.103 COL Kisner’s JSOTF staff was 

concentrated on the CSAR mission of the air campaign. Getting the ISOFAC ready to accommodate the additional ODAs involved in the UW campaign was a subsequent Army Special Forces 

mission, and MAJ Broderick’s ODB 580 was expected to “carry that ball” alone.104

Broderick and his ODB 580 isolated the fi rst 11 Special Forces teams (ODAs) going into 

Afghanistan. Missions and insertion times differed between ODAs, and there were constant 

adjustments based on contact with Northern Alliance combat leaders, weather, and intelligence 

factors. MAJ Broderick and his operations sergeant, Sergeant Major (SGM) Manuel Victoro 

(pseudonym), kept the teams attuned to the constant mission changes by attending briefi ngs in 

the JSOTF and JSOAC.105 They restricted access to the ISOFAC to reduce rumors and divert uncoordinated confl icting information from the teams. Broderick discovered COL Mulholland’s 

key concerns during the JSOTF commander’s premission back briefs for each ODA. Sharing 

these insights with the ODA commanders reduced mission assignment turbulence that accompanied unsatisfactory premission briefs to the commander and focused planning better.106

Real Estate and Security at K2

As more personnel arrived daily and tried to get established, confl icting priorities caused 

considerable friction between services and units. The responsibility for real estate management changed hands several times in the fi rst week, eventually settling on the JSOTF-North 

logistics offi cer (J4), U.S. Air Force LTC Richard Shaw (pseudonym).107 Despite demands for 

more space and prime locations, General Kasymov had set limits—end of Uzbek discussion. 

Air Force COL Richard Parker, a civil engineer, stepped forward to address base design and the 

necessary infrastructure to support 3,500 troops.

Base security was solved when the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, 

landed. The infantrymen quickly built checkpoints and fi ghting positions using the earth berm 

that encircled the camp. A few weeks afterward, the Uzbeks agreed to expand the security zone, 

and a second berm was built to provide more force protection.

Task Force Dagger = JSOTF-North at K2

Command relationships were initially “sketchy” until the 5th SFG headquarters and main 

body arrived on 10 October. The confusion about JSOTF command was cleared up. The rela-
75

tionships were clarifi ed, and the Army and Air Force staffs were united as a JSOTF-North team 

when COL Kisner, at the initial joint staff meeting, turned to COL Mulholland and said, “Boss, 

what are your orders?” Thus, in this most professional and gentlemanly manner, Mulholland 

assumed command, and Kisner became his deputy. JSOTF-North became Task Force (TF) Dagger, and with Kisner’s concurrence, the K2 base was renamed “Stronghold Freedom,” the initials “S” and “F” connecting it to Special Forces. With command and control established, Army 

LTC Warren Richards, SOCJFCOM, shifted his focus from base security and force protection 

to making the operations staff more effective.108 This prompted collocation of the JSOTF and 

JSOAC command centers into a long series of interconnected tents across the taxiway from 

the ISOFAC. The resulting “Snake” turned the established communications lines upside down.

Figure 48. COL Frank Kisner

and COL Mulholland.

Figure 49. TF Dagger logo.

Hot-Wiring the “Snake”: Rearranging JSOTF-North Communications

The 112th signalers, 5th SFG, and Air Force communications personnel scrambled fast to 

accommodate the rearrangement while supporting the CSAR mission and anticipating the UW 

campaign. MSG Don Sullivan (pseudonym), the 5th SFG communications chief, and MAJ Derrick Jacobi (pseudonym), the 5th SFG signal offi cer, accompanied COL Mulholland from Fort 

Campbell.109 Their initial mission was to provide communications for the two SF ODAs that were 

on “strip alert” at K2, ready to take off by helicopter at a moment’s notice to search for and rescue 

any U.S. Air Force aircrews that had bailed out of their aircraft during the air campaign while 

bombing targets, dispersing propaganda leafl ets, or dropping humanitarian relief in Afghanistan.

MAJ Jacobi had been made the JSOTF-North communications and electronics staff offi cer (J6) responsible for continuous and reliable telecommunications. His principal assistant 

was MSG Sullivan, a former chef and top-notch tennis player with an undergraduate degree in 

medieval history and Islamic studies. Why the entire 5th SFG staff was going to Uzbekistan to 

set up a base for two ODAs was a mystery to Sullivan, despite having the same security clearances as the principal commanders and staff offi cers and having helped design the networks 
76

for the operation. His “need to know” did not extend beyond the initial planning for CSAR.110

Whatever the reason, Sullivan focused on his key task—ensuring that the 5th SFG commander 

always “got the information he needed to do his job.”111

That meant rapidly integrating the established Air 

Force and 112th Signal Battalion communications 

array to best support the JSOTF-North headquarters 

without losing voice and digital message connectivity 

because the JSOAC was already coordinating fl ights 

of MC-130P tankers and 160th SOAR helicopters to 

perform the CSAR mission. The 5th SFG soldiers 

built their “tent city” operations center fi rst, setting 

up work tables, desks, and chairs and hanging wall 

charts and maps in the principal staff areas. The 5th 

SFG’s communications section then shifted half of the 

Air Force network setup from its principal location in 

several abandoned buildings on the opposite end of 

the runway.

Then MAJ Jacobi’s communications section established the network systems and tactical communications links and brought them 

operationally “on-line.” Having completed this, they took the Air 

Force communications “off-line” and walked together with them, 

helping to carry wiring harnesses, equipment, and other connectors 

down the runway to new workstations in the Snake. Next, they were 

“logged back in” through the digital network “cloud.” The other half 

of the network then followed, with all its hardware and cables being incorporated in the eight-section “temper tent” that was the joint 

operations center (JOC) for the JSOTF headquarters.112 Thus, operational communications were never lost, despite the rapid relocation of 

equipment and personnel. With the 112th Signalers and the Air Force 

communications element helping, the joint base station was completed in less than 48 hours. 

“We went from dirt to a functional J6 in thirty-six hours—bottom line—it worked,” reported 

MAJ Jacobi.113

Shortly after COL Mulholland arrived at K2, CPT Steve Marks (pseudonym), commander, 

A Company, 112th Signal Battalion, was tasked to be fully mission capable to support future 

missions by 13 October. Marks, having successfully led his unit during Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARDIAN, was determined not to be the weak link in supporting those 

missions. The 112th Signalers met the challenge and established a secure video teleconferencing 

(VTC) link from the theater back to the United States. At the height of combat operations, A 

Company was conducting 10 to 14 VTCs a day.114 These conferences enabled the TF Dagger and 

JSOAC commanders to provide real-time reports, to recommend future operations, and to receive guidance directly from CENTCOM’s leaders in Tampa. First Sergeant (1SG) Martin Masterson (pseudonym) summed up the unit’s performance: “We don’t fail; we just don’t fail.”115

Figure 50. The support battalion needs 

communications to provide support.

Figure 51. 112th

Signal Battalion

unit insignia and

beret fl ash.
77

Building the JOC Inside the “Snake”: TF Dagger’s JOC

After three false starts, CPT Carlos Hernandez (pseudonym) had been told that the 5th SFG 

intelligence section would leave for Central Asia on 8 October.116 This time it did, and Hernandez and the intelligence staff landed at K2 in the predawn darkness of 10 October. The staff had 

been cramming on Afghanistan since 9/11. Before then, the former 82nd Airborne Division 

infantry platoon leader only knew that it was “a mountainous country with lots of snow in the 

winter” in the CENTCOM region. Since then, his section had been searching classifi ed and 

public data bases for information on Afghanistan and had talked with analysts at the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, seeking background material on several Afghan warlords in the Northern 

Alliance; namely, Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Atta, Fahim Khan, Ishmail Khan, and others. To 

their dismay, there were no personality data bases available or any information about any subordinate leaders. Copies of The Bear Went Over the Mountain and The Other Side of the Mountain, 

books on the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, were circulated among the staff.117

Along with the intelligence he needed to collect and analyze, CPT Hernandez was also focused on setting up his S2 

“shop” in the JSOTF headquarters. En 

route to Uzbekistan, he chanced to meet 

MSG Jason Bennington (pseudonym), 

a 5th SFG staff NCO during a refueling 

stop at Sigonella, Sicily. Bennington was 

returning from the site survey of the former Soviet air base at K2.118 Elements of 

the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and the 528th SOSB 

were already there, Bennington reported. 

Air Force aircraft and Army helicopters 

were at the airfi eld, ready to conduct 

search-and-rescue missions in support 

of the bombing campaign that had begun on 7 October. On a hand-drawn sketch of the airfi eld, 

Bennington pointed to a spot next to the runway and said, “Here’s the space for the JSOTF.” The 

Uzbeks had granted the Americans use of abandoned parts of the active air base. Since the Air 

Force had already occupied the only building, the 5th SFG staff would have to create their task 

force headquarters with tents.119

The “space for the JSOTF” that Bennington had pointed out turned out to be a narrow 

strip of land about 200 feet long and 100 feet wide between a taxiway and several old concrete 

aircraft bunkers. Twenty large tents were assembled and then erected in a row, mostly end to 

end, creating what became known as the “Snake.” Shortly after the tents were set up, a heavy 

rain began to fall, and the downpour lasted for 10 days. That was when Hernandez remembered one of the “lessons learned” from the Kosovo deployments: “Never set up tents next to 

a runway or the adjacent taxiways because they are designed to allow water to drain naturally 

off their surfaces into adjacent fi elds.” To make matters worse at K2, the dirt security berms 

Figure 52. Dry for the moment.
78

that surrounded the base prevented natural runoff. There was no other location big enough (and 

more importantly available) to go. Within days the water was ankle deep in the JOC. Computer 

servers, cables, and electrical wiring soon fi lled the folding tables used as desks. Throughout 

the rainstorm, Special Forces engineers continued to elevate the wooden fl ooring in the Snake. 

Although the temperatures were surprisingly mild, the rain threatened to shut down the JSOTF 

headquarters just as the UW campaign was ready to “kick off.”120

The JSOAC was charged with the CSAR mission. On 12 October, Mulholland told LTC 

Brinks, the JSOAC commander, that six Special Forces ODAs would be infi ltrated into Afghanistan within 48 hours.

Staff “Battle Captain”: The Combat Operations “Pulse Monitor”

While the J3, LTC Warren Richards, an augmentee from the Special Operations Command, 

U.S. Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM), Norfolk, directed daily operations and activities in 

the JOC, the staff “battle captains” were responsible for maintaining constant situational awareness. CPT Mason Arquette (pseudonym) learned his new duties as he performed them.121 The 

most important task for the tall, lean West Pointer was to keep COL Mulholland and the J3 up 

to date on “everything of note” that the task force was doing. It was the “everything of note” 

that kept Arquette scrambling because that grew each day as the UW campaign evolved. At the 

regularly scheduled morning and evening briefi ngs, “Battle Captain” Arquette formally presented this information, including the availability of transport and combat aircraft (Air Force 

and Army); the exact number of personnel assigned to CJSOTF-North, where they were, and 

what they were doing; summaries of all classifi ed message traffi c in and out of the JSOTF; and 

a myriad of other issues facing a tactical commander in wartime who had also served as the 

senior American military offi cer in Uzbekistan and as Stronghold Freedom commander.122

For most of the 5th SFG staff offi cers and their commander (COL Mulholland took command of the 5th SFG two months before 9/11), serving as the nucleus of a special operations 

task force that was evolving into a joint headquarters JSOTF was “a challenge a minute.” Integrating staff from the other services and USAR and ARNG augmentees was a constant process, 

especially when some services rotated personnel after 45 to 90 days in country. Despite not 

having had the opportunity to practice group-level operations in the fi eld or having participated 

in a large-scale UW exercise since Mulholland’s arrival, the 5th SFG staff under the tutelage of 

several experienced JFCOM offi cers fought the war well.123

The daily pace in the JOC was relentless. Arquette, a parachute infantry offi cer before joining the Special Forces, worked 18- to 20-hour days the fi rst week. With the arrival of another 

staff captain, his duties were pared to just the “Day Battle Captain.” This reduced the work shift 

to only 14 to 15 hours a day—12 hours on duty and an hour of transition with the “Night Battle 

Captain” before and after each shift change. There were no days off for Arquette or for anyone 

serving on the CJSOTF-North staff, which is typical during war.124 On 13 October, just three 

days after arriving at K2, JSOTF-North issued the mission order to the Special Forces ODA that 

would initiate the UW campaign in Afghanistan.125

Different Intelligence Concerns for Air Planners

Night helicopter infi ltrations in the high mountains of northern Afghanistan in winter posed 

major challenges for the JSOAC, both for air rescue (personnel recovery) during the air cam-
79

paign and for inserting Special Forces for the anticipated UW campaign. Density altitude had 

reduced helicopter loads, and the fi rst barrier was the 12,000-foot altitude of the best crossing 

points in the 18,000-foot mountains between K2 and Afghanistan. Helicopter aerial refuels 

from MC-130P tankers were required for missions from the north. The issues were maximum 

loads and getting through the 12,000-foot passes. MH-47Es would dump fuel to increase lift 

as they climbed for the crossing points on the “Bear.” Of concern was the number of refuels 

per mission as the escorting MH-60L Black Hawk DAPs needed to refuel more often than the 

MH-47E Chinooks. The enemy antiaircraft threat was another matter.

Getting a complete threat picture from CENTCOM had been LTC Brinks’ biggest problem. Intelligence had been provided in generalities, detailing the different types of “triple A”—antiaircraft 

artillery, or AAA—but without locations. The biggest fear was surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). 

CPT Jason Mills (pseudonym), the 2nd Battalion intelligence offi cer, and SFC Brandon Carr 

(pseudonym), his intelligence analyst, had collected everything available from the 160th SOAR 

headquarters before departing Fort Campbell.126 Mills also got CWO Erick Jefferson (pseudonym), 

the 160th SOAR intelligence technician, attached to his section.127 Based on what they had brought, 

Mills, Jefferson, and Carr prepared an intelligence picture of the battlefi eld. Current photo imagery, 

critical to selecting helicopter landing zones (LZs) and selecting routes, was unavailable. Secure 

data retrieval from the states was delayed when SCAMPI, the “nickname” for a portable secure 

compartmented information facility, was down, but once operational, Jefferson and Carr collated 

reams of raw data, analyzed it, and developed a comprehensive enemy order of battle picture.128

JSOTF-North Growing Pains at K2

Another problem 5th SFG faced as the JSOTF was the infl ux of units ordered into theater 

without their corresponding headquarters. For example, both CA and PSYOP units arrived and 

reported to the JSOTF. By doctrine, however, a joint civil-military operations task force would 

normally command CA units, and a joint PSYOP task force would command PSYOP units. A 

JTF usually would command both. However, none of these commands had been established 

in the Afghanistan theater. Although those units were invaluable in conducting the campaign, 

directing them placed an additional burden on an already overburdened staff.129

Within the JSOTF, COL Mulholland soon recognized that he was short the expertise to 

coordinate fi re support and to plan aviation operations. LTC Richards borrowed a captain and 

staff sergeant from the 10th Mountain Division to plan fi re support. He implored the Air Force 

16th Special Operations Wing (SOW) to provide someone to assist in planning fi xed-wing aviation missions and a planner from the 160th SOAR for rotary-wing operations. The problem of 

liaison and planning was solved when the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) 

collocated with the JSOTF.

The staff was also saddled with base operations functions—sanitation, billeting, feeding, and 

security. Eventually, about 40 individuals were added to the 5th SFG staff to assist in accomplishing all its assigned missions. Many of those soldiers came from the 20th SFG—an ARNG group.

LTC Walters departed the JSOTF headquarters in mid-November, and LTC Richards left in 

December. Because of the professionalism and dedication of the 5th SFG soldiers and the assistance of the SOCJFCOM training team, by then, the JSOTF was performing its assigned responsibilities admirably. This is due in no small measure to the professionalism of all involved. 
80

Nevertheless, there were areas identifi ed that needed to be resolved. Among those areas was 

determining whether SFGs should be prepared to become JSOTFs. Second, all levels of command must understand that a JSOTF is not a Special Forces operating base with a “J” for “joint” 

inserted in front of it. The SFG must be trained, equipped, and organized to perform the mission. The higher headquarters must ensure that the additional personnel required for the group 

to perform that mission are not only identifi ed but also that those personnel are integrated into 

training exercises. The group staff must be prepared to accept the additional burdens of functioning as a joint headquarters with all the added responsibilities. Finally, the group must have 

the equipment—particularly communications equipment—essential to facilitating its increased 

span of control.130 These are lessons that would not die after the SOCJFCOM staff left the theater. 

The same soldiers would soon fi nd themselves providing the same training and advice to other 

SFGs as they prepared to deploy to Afghanistan to accept the JSOTF mission from 5th SFG.

We Don’t Fail

On 21 September 2001, 10 days after the terrorist attacks on the United States, A Company, 

112th Signal Battalion, received a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) deployment order to 

provide communications support to the JSOTF being established at K2, Uzbekistan, in support 

of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.131 On 4 October, 37 soldiers deployed to the theater. 

They arrived on 6 October and reported to the JSOTF J6.132

The 112th Signal Battalion was capable of deploying rapidly to establish the long-haul 

links to communicate from deployed special operations forces (SOF) to headquarters in Europe 

Figure 53. JSOTF-North commander COL Mulholland

with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.
81

and the continental United States and to embassies in neighboring countries. Although this was 

a combat mission, it was a typical mission practiced numerous times on exercises both in the 

continental United States and abroad. Those exercises also led the company to develop standard 

communications deployment packages that minimized last-minute predeployment planning.

An initial diffi culty at K2 was determining where to set up. This was a critical decision 

because a guiding principle is that once communications have been established, the equipment 

should not be moved. There were only about 100 people on the ground when the company arrived in theater, and there was little knowledge of what other units would arrive or when. Additionally, available real estate was littered with trash and discarded Russian equipment, and the 

soil was contaminated with oil. Some diffi culties developed among the communicators from 

different headquarters, and real estate allocators as units began to move into the base. A critical concern was that systems that processed Top Secret information be located near the Secure 

Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). Not having the facility established early on led to 

equipment being moved and communications interrupted contrary to standard procedures.

The company deployed with one superhigh-frequency satellite hub, a tactical telephone 

switch, a data services team, one SCAMPI node to provide secure and nonsecure networking 

plus data services and secure telephones, equipment for secure video teleconferencing (VTC), 

and three Special Operations Communication Assemblage (SOCA) teams to provide tactical 

satellite (TACSAT) communications. They also took about 200 personal computers. Within 48 

hours, the company had installed communications to support the Joint Special Operations Air 

Component (JSOAC) that had already been established. Real estate allocation diffi culties that 

required some equipment to be moved and minor technical problems resulted in the SCAMPI 

not being reestablished for about four days. Normally, some of these problems are resolved in 

a predeployment communications exercise. Under the given conditions, however, being able to 

troubleshoot problems before hand was not possible.133 The company also deployed two SOCA 

teams to embassies and one team to provide communications between a Special Forces detachment at Mazar-e Sharif and its headquarters.

Figure 54. Antennas, power, and cabling installed fi rst. Figure 55. Initial signal links to K2.
82

After approximately 100 days, A Company at K2 was replaced by a conventional Army 

signal battalion. That, though, did not end the unit’s involvement in the war against terrorism. 

In March 2002, the second platoon of B Company deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan, to 

provide communications to the JSOTF being established at that location. Second Lieutenant 

(2LT) Tom Washington (pseudonym), a former enlisted Special Forces soldier, and his platoon 

immediately appropriated space in a dirt fi eld near the perimeter and went to work. Within 48 

hours, as did A Company, Washington completed the links between the JSOTF and the higher 

headquarters. In his words, “that was possible only because incredible guys are running these 

systems.” The next month, soldiers from fi rst platoon, B Company, established communications 

in Kabul between 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG, and the JSOTF. The platoon also deployed three 

SOCA teams to support forward operating bases (FOBs) in Khowst, Kandahar, and Shkin.134

DAPs Set the Stage for UW in Afghanistan

LTC Brinks, the JSOAC commander, had been told on 12 October to begin planning air infi ltrations into Afghanistan.135 This order expanded his mission from CSAR support to inserting 

Special Forces teams into Afghanistan to advise and assist anti-Taliban leaders in conducting 

UW. Coordinated through diplomatic and military channels, the fi rst ARSOF aviation mission 

was to insert an eight-man pilot team at night south of Mazar-e-Sharif to establish contact with 

General Dostum.

CWO Roger Charles (pseudonym), the MH-60L Direct Action Penetrator (DAP) fl ight leader, received the mission. Originally deployed to Uzbekistan to provide armed escorts to MH47Es performing air rescue of downed aircrews in northern Afghanistan for the air campaign, 

the DAP would demonstrate what it was designed to do—conduct independent long-range 

penetrations into hostile environments to insert special reconnaissance (SR) teams. Although 

the DAP had weapon systems and the 160th SOAR relied heavily on the cover of darkness for 

protection, CWO Charles’ main concern was the incomplete antiaircraft artillery (AAA) threat 

picture in Afghanistan.136 Overhead cover of the helicopter mission by Air Force combat air patrol fi ghters was not an option. Thus, in an abandoned Soviet concrete building, the JSOAC staff 

worked feverishly to collect data from alternate sources because the SCAMPI system (secure 

intelligence reachback) was temporarily down and access was restricted to national intelligence 

sources.

CWO Charles’ second concern was 

weather that potentially was an even greater 

threat than the enemy. Poor visibility masked 

terrain, and a 10,000-plus-foot mountain 

range controlled access to Afghanistan from 

K2. Sand or dust storms constantly obscured 

the high desert plains beyond them. Visibility routinely dropped to less than one-eighth 

of a mile in the plains region. When the dust 

storms slammed into the mountains, visibility limitations reached as high as 10,000 feet, 

and the associated air turbulence was lethal. Figure 56. MH-60L DAP. Winter operations in high

mountainous terrain posed major challenges.
83

Adhering to Night Stalker tradition, “Alone and unafraid,” the 160th DAP pilots prepared 

their insertion plan with the information available and what the pilot team could tell them. On 

14 October, Charles did the mission brief in an old Soviet aircraft bunker where the crews slept 

because there was more room than in the JSOAC building. The two DAP crews, the Chinook 

crew carrying emergency contingency fuel, the MC-130P tanker crew providing primary fuel 

by aerial refuel, and the JSOAC staff principals received the mission briefi ng huddled in a 

small circle around a map of the area of operations. The fl ight route was long, requiring two 

aerial refuels. The plan was simple but had several key elements for success; fuel and weather 

headed the list. Barring poor weather, the mission could be executed the next night. However, 

CENTCOM bumped the mission several days for diplomatic considerations, weather, and reservations. Finally, on the night of 16 October, the execute order was given.137

Under the cover of darkness, a fl ight of DAPs, confi gured more like Black Hawk assault 

helicopters with their armor stripped off, and an MH-47E Chinook took off from K2 headed to 

the south and Afghanistan. The two DAPs rendezvoused with an Air Force MC-130P Hercules 

tanker orbiting above southeastern Uzbekistan to refuel. After the DAPs had refueled from the 

tanker, the MH-47E Chinook helicopter returned to K2. It would meet the returning DAPs at 

the scheduled border-crossing time in the morning darkness. They were carrying an internal 

fuel bladder to refuel the DAPs on the ground if needed.

Shortly after the DAP fl ight crossed the border just east of Termiz, Uzbekistan, around midnight, it hit an unforecasted sandstorm in the northern plains where earlier satellite imagery had 

shown clear weather. Undeterred, CWO Charles led his fl ight onward as visibility shrank to less 

than one-half mile. While the pilots could see stars above through their night vision goggles 

(NVG), providing the illusion of a possible escape, the sandstorm rose to 10,000 feet. The 

helicopter’s forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) helped the pilots maintain proper obstacle 

clearance altitude, especially as the fl ight reentered mountainous terrain to the south of Mazare-Sharif. Relying on instruments, the pilots adroitly fl ew their helicopters “nap of the earth” 

(NOE), following the terrain down steep valleys and then climbing the rugged terrain before 

they broke out of the sandstorm at approximately 8,000 feet mean sea level (MSL). When the 

weather cleared, the moonless night challenged even the latest-generation NVG as the pilots 

fl ew into the central mountain region. They were looking for landing zone (LZ) Albatross, a 

cleared plateau in the bottom of a canyon, close to General Dostum’s headquarters.138

After fl ying for two and one-half hours, the DAPs neared their objective. Expecting the 

LZ to be marked with some lights, CWO Charles was slightly taken aback when he discovered 

the landing area surrounded by more than 100 armed Afghans carrying AK-47s and rocketpropelled grenade (RPG) launchers. Just before takeoff, SSG Michael Stark (pseudonym), the 

crew chief on the lead DAP, had put an infrared chemical light on the right shoulders of the 

pilot team to track the ground force once they disembarked the helicopters.139 This was to help 

identify the U.S. personnel among the Northern Alliance forces in the event something went 

wrong on the ground. En route to the LZ, the pilot team had radioed Dostum’s forces and had 

been assured that everything was looking good. Still, prudence dictated caution.

Thus, CWO Charles in the lead DAP landed fi rst in the dusty LZ, while the second DAP 

circled overhead maintaining visual contact with the other aircraft. After circling the area twice, 

the second DAP landed behind the fi rst. Once both helicopters were on the ground, the pilot 
84

team pulled their equipment off the aircraft, gave the aircrews a “thumbs up,” and disappeared 

into the crowd of Northern Alliance troops. While the DAP crew chiefs manned miniguns on 

each side of the helicopter, a young Afghan boy fi lmed the whole activity with an 8-millimeter 

(mm) movie camera. The threat of being shot down had been greatest when the helicopters 

fl ared on short fi nal approach to the LZ. It seemed unlikely that they would have been attacked 

on the ground in a group of people. Confi dent that the team had found its contacts, Charles gave 

the order for the DAPs to depart.

Tactics dictated that the DAPs return on a different route, but the sandstorm dominating the 

northern plains had not abated and visibility had deteriorated even more as the pilots fl ew to 

their 0400 refuel rendezvous point. A unique phenomena associated with fl ying in a sandstorm 

is the ability to see lights below clearly. Thus, DAP aircrew members reported seeing obvious 

lights going on near populated areas to mark their fl ight path as they fl ew over. It seemed that 

people on the ground were signaling or tracking their advance in the middle of the night. This 

Figure 57. Identifying the good guys from the bad guys.

Figure 58. Prefl ight check included attaching glint

tape to identify friendlies on the night battlefi eld.
85

primitive tactic was later discovered to have been developed by the mujahideen to track Soviet 

helicopters. Like clockwork, the DAP fl ight crossed the border and hit the 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) MC-130P tanker on schedule. Once refueled, the Chinook with emergency fuel joined the two Black Hawks for the return fl ight to K2 as the tanker sped away. The 

9th SOS tanker crews quickly established a reputation with the 160th SOAR for always being 

at the right place at the right time to refuel the ARSOF helicopters.

Unbeknown to many, this mission paved the way for the UW campaign in Afghanistan. It 

was a historic night. Army special operations aviation had achieved Night Stalker standards—

time on target, plus or minus 30 seconds at night—under extreme weather conditions with 

aerial refuels and penetrated some of the highest and most rugged mountains in the world to 

deliver a team, on time and on target.

COL Kisner, deputy JSOTF commander, asked CWO Charles to carry an American fl ag on 

this fi rst combat mission into Afghanistan. Charles said that “he would be honored.” What he 

did not know was that Kisner planned to present the fl ag to the president. Afterward, Charles 

wrote a letter to accompany the fl ag, assuring the Commander in Chief that his orders had been 

executed with honor and dedicated to the nation. So it was with great pride that TF Dagger 

and the Night Stalkers sent President Bush the fl ag and letter as tokens of appreciation for his 

leadership.140

Organizing two joint special operations tactical headquarters—JSOTF-North or TF Dagger and the JSOAC—in the midst of establishing a joint FOB in Uzbekistan was a signifi cant 

accomplishment. More important, these fl edgling joint tactical staffs met the CENTCOM mission for CSAR in northern Afghanistan before the air campaign date was moved forward and 

conducted a successful long-range helicopter penetration deep into Afghanistan to insert a team 

responsible for coordinating the UW campaign with anti-Taliban war leaders. This was all done 

in less than two weeks.

Success must be attributed to the junior special operations leaders and soldiers who accepted responsibility for the myriad tasks that needed to be accomplished. They often learned as 

they did and persevered in the face of obstacles. Another critical element was the maturity and 

fl exibility of the SOF leaders who responded professionally to new command arrangements, 

who took mission changes in stride, and who had confi dence in their subordinates’ ability to get 

the job done well and on time, regardless of the diffi culty.

The preceding stories describe some of the preparations for the war on terrorism by ARSOF stationed throughout the United States; the movement of troops overseas into combat; 

standing up Stronghold Freedom at K2, Uzbekistan; and initial combat missions. These should 

have conveyed the quality of the soldiers in ARSOF, the wide spectrum of ARSOF capabilities, 

the different components of ARSOF—Special Forces, PSYOP, CA, aviation, Rangers, signal, 

and support—the importance of USAR and ARNG units and individual augmentees to ARSOF, 

and what is involved in training Army soldiers for SOF assignments.

Having set the stage for the UW campaign in Afghanistan with the fi nal story about the 

DAP long-range penetration to General Dostum’s mountain redoubt near Mazar-e-Sharif, the 

soldier stories in the next chapter will chronologically cover the war that leads to the Taliban

government’s collapse in late November 2001.
86

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1976), 87.

2. Rowan Scarborough, “Military Offi cers Seek Swift, Deadly Response,” Washington Times, 12 September 

2001, 1; Dan Eggen and Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Intelligence Points to Bin Laden Network,” Washington Post, 12 

September 2001, 1; eMedilMillWorks Inc., “President Bush’s Remarks,” Washington Post, 12 September 2001, 2; 

Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, “‘We Will Rally the World,’” Washington Post, 28 January 2002, A01.

3. Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Rumsfeld Asks Call-Up of Reserves, as Many as 50,000,” New York 

Times, 14 September 2001; Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Plans War on Terrorists, Not Infrastructure,” Washington 

Times, 14 September 2001, 13.

4. David Von Drehle, “Senate Approves Use of Forces; Military Patrols Cities and Ports,” Washington Post, 

15 September 2001, 1; Associated Press, “Text of Joint Resolution,” Washington Post, 15 September 2001, 4.

5. Eggen and Loeb, 1.

6. “Afghanistan Online,” <www.afghan-web.org>; “Country Watch—Afghanistan,” <www.countrywatch. 

com>.

7. “A New World Order,” Christian Science Monitor (14 September 2001), 1; President Bush’s address to 

the nation, 12 September 2001; FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror: Chronology,” <www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/

frontline/shows/ campaign/etc/cron.html>; “British Join in Anti-Terror War,” Editorial Number 0-09464; “Coalition 

Support Grows,” Editorial Number 0-09474; and “Australia Helps Fight Terrorists,” Editorial Number 0-09480, 

The United States Government’s International Broadcasting Bureau, <www.voa.gov>; FRONTLINE, “Campaign 

Against Terror.”

8. Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, “A Day to Speak of Anger and Grief,” Washington Post, 30 January 2002, 

A01; Ben Barber, “Taliban Threatens to Invade Pakistan,” Washington Times, 16 September 2001, 1; Molly Moore 

and Pamela Constable, “Taliban Asks Clerics to Rule on Surrender of Bin Laden,” Washington Post, 18 September 

2001, 1; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Taliban Rejects U.S. Demand, Vows a ‘Showdown of Might,’” Washington Post, 

22 September 2001, 1; Susan B. Glasser and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan Closes Taliban’s Last Embassy,” Washington 

Post, 23 November 2001, 33; “Interview with Richard Armitage,” FRONTLINE, <www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/

frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/armitage.html>; FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

9. Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Groups Could Help Find Bin Laden and Assist American Attacks,” 

New York Times, 24 September 2001, 1; Maura Reynolds, “Soviet Vets Warn U.S. of Perils in Afghanistan,” Los 

Angeles Times, 19 September 2001, 1; FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

10. Nicholas Kralev, “U.S. Can Strike Without U.N. Nod,” Washington Times, 27 September 2001, 17; “Charter 

of the United Nations,” <www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/chapter 7.html>.

11. Dan Balz, “Bush Warns of Casualties of War,” Washington Post, 18 September 2001, 1.

12. Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, “At Camp David, Advise and Consent,” Washington Post, 31 January 2002, 

A01.

13. FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

14. Clausewitz, 88; Susan Glasser, “Soviet Generals War of ‘Sea of Bloodshed,’” Washington Post, 19 

September 2001, 13; FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

15. Elaine Sciolino, “Bush Tells the Military to ‘Get Ready’; Broader Spy Powers Gaining Support,” New York 

Times, 16 September 2001, 1; Dana Priest, “Special Forces May Play Key Role,” Washington Post, 15 September 

2001, 5.

16. Michael R. Gordon, Eric Schmitt, and Thom Shanker, “Scarcity of Afghan Targets Leads U.S. to Revise 

Strategy,” New York Times, 19 September 2001; Rowan Scarborough, “Pentagon Prepares Variety of Responses,” 

Washington Times, 21 September 2001, 1; Anne Plummer, “Army Secretary Vows U.S. Adversaries About to See 

‘Our Finest Hour,’” Inside the Army, 17 September 2001, 1.

17. “Transcript of President Bush’s Address,” <www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>.

18. U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Sine Pari: The Story of Army Special Operations, 

Historical Monograph #1 (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC, 1997), 2-8; USASOC, Standing Up the MACOM: The U.S. 

Army Special Operations Command, 1987-92, Historical Monograph #8 (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC, 1996), 11-

13.

19. Elizabeth Becker, “Renaming an Operation to Fit the Mood,” New York Times, 26 September 2001. Initially, 

the operation was named INFINITE JUSTICE. Muslim countries, however, objected to the name because, in their 

opinion, only Allah could dispense infi nite justice.
87

20. RADM Bert Calland, Commander, Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command, interview 

with Kalev Sepp, 3 May 2002, As Sayliyah, Qatar, transcript, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina.

21. BG Les Fuller, Special Operations Command, Europe, interview with Richard Kiper, 15 April 2002, Fort 

Bragg, notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; CPT James Saxon (pseudonym), 5th Special Forces Group, 

interview with Richard Kiper, 10 July 2002, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg; “Front-Row Seat,” The Joint Journal (March/April 2002), 3.

22. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), USASOC, CG letter, Subject: Defense Emergency 

Response Fund (DERF) Guidance, 22 October 2001.

23. HQDA, DAPE-MPE, message, Subject: Suspension of Voluntary Separation of Offi cers and Enlisted 

Soldiers From the Active Army (Stop Loss) in Selected Specialties, 021635Z Dec 2001; USASOC Military 

Personnel Division, Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, e-mail, 3 October 2002, 1217 and 1534 

(hours), USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Memorandum for Record, Richard Kiper and U.S. Army John F. 

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS), Directorate of Training and Doctrine and Special Operations 

Proponency Offi ce, 10 October 2002, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

24. LTC Ralph Washington (pseudonym), SWCS, interview with Richard Kiper, 20 August 2002, Fort Bragg, 

transcript, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; COL Scott Faught, Deputy Assistant Commandant for Reserve 

Affairs, SWCS, interview with Richard Kiper, 27 September 2002, Fort Bragg, notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, 

Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Faught interview.

25. USASOC Unit Training Division, Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, e-mail, Subject: SOF 

in OEF History Project, 30 September 2002, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

26. “Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT),” <www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/

soccent.htm>; “Special Operations Forces,” JCET, <www.ciponline.org/facts/sof.htm>; HQ, USASOC, message, 

29 October 2002, Subject: JCS/JCET.

27. CPT Geoff Morris (pseudonym), Offi ce of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, USASOC, interview 

with Richard Kiper, 27 September 2002, Fort Bragg, notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Faught 

interview; Steve Vogel and Matthew Mosk, “Area Reserve Forces Wait Anxiously to Be Called Up,” Washington 

Post, 15 September 2001, 5.

28. Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. and Britain Strike Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps; Bush Warns 

‘Taliban Will Pay a Price,’” New York Times, 8 October 2001, 1; Peter Baker, “Kabul and Kandahar Hit in Attacks 

Through Night,” Washington Post, 8 October 2001, 1.

29. C.J. Chivers, “2d Wave of Troops Arrives in Uzbekistan,” New York Times, 8 October 2001; U.S. Army 

Special Operations Command Crisis Response Cell briefi ng, 092000Z Oct 2001; “The Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan,” Editorial Number 0-09473, The United States Government’s International Broadcasting Bureau, 

<www.ibb.gov>; FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

30. Rowan Scarborough, “Northern Alliance Gets Help From U.S.,” Washington Times, 28 September 2001, 

1; Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, “Bush Approves Covert Aid for Taliban Forces,” New York Times, 1 

October 2001, 1.

31. U.S. Army Center for Military History, “Afghan War Chronology,” 25 April 2002; Andrea Stone, “USA’s 

Airborne Message: Taliban, ‘You Are Condemned,’” USA Today, 17 October 2001, 10; MAJ Larry Paulson 

(pseudonym), 4th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group, interview with Richard Kiper, 3 April 2002, Fort 

Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. The back of the leafl et had a picture of 

a man whipping a woman. The message read: “Is this the future you want for your women and children?”

32. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffi th, trans. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.

33. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.30, Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Offi ce [GPO], 2000), 5-1 and 5-2.

34. LTC Sam Halstedt (pseudonym), 8th PSYOP Battalion, interview with Richard Kiper, 1 November 2002, 

Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

35. Paul Colter and Darrin Matteson are pseudonyms. Manuel A. Diemer, 28 May 2002, Fort Bragg, interview 

with Kalev Sepp, transcripts at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Diemer interview.

36. Ibid.

37. Copies are stored in the classifi ed section, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

38. Marcus Steinmann and Matt Rhinehart are pseudonyms.

39. Diemer interview.
88

40. Diemer interview. MG Geoffrey Lambert had the authority to send Rhinehart to join Mulholland’s 5th 

SFG since Rhinehart was serving in his command. As per regulations, Lambert had to formally ask MG Jerry 

Boykin, commander, SWCS, to provide Steinmann to 5th SFG. Boykin gladly granted the request. 

41. Diemer interview.

42. Vincent Garvey, Will Sherman, Jon West, and Harry Sims are pseudonyms.

43. Vincent Garvey (pseudonym), interview with Kalev Sepp, 20 September 2002, tape recordings, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. SOCCENT is pronounced “SOCK-cent.”

47. COL John F. Mulholland, 12 July 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Charles Briscoe, transcripts and 

tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Mulholland interview.

48. JSOTF is pronounced “juh-SO-tiff,” and ARSOTF is pronounced “ARE-so-tiff.”

49. MG Geoffrey C. Lambert, 29 April 2003, Fort Bragg, e-mail note to Charles Briscoe, USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

50. RADM Bert Calland, 3 May 2002, As Sayliyah, Qatar, interview with Matthew Dawson, tapes at 

USSOCOM Command Historian’s Archives, MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Florida.

51. The rank of U.S. Navy captain is equivalent to a U.S. Army colonel. Mulholland interview.

52. Concurrently, COL Mulholland prepared a joint manning document (JMD) for SOCCENT’s approval to 

support his request for additional personnel to augment his headquarters and combat units, and to meet the additional 

responsibilities of serving as a JSOTF. SOCCENT rejected his JMD “fi ve or six times,” without providing him the 

planning guidance he needed to properly prepare the document. “It was absolute agony,” remembered Mulholland. 

Mulholland interview.

53. ISOFAC is pronounced “EYE-so-fak.”

54. Mulholland credited MSG Morton Chase (pseudonym) with eventually obtaining the high-quality, 

1:100,000-scale topographic maps used by all the 5th SFG teams that entered Afghanistan. Mulholland interview.

55. MG Geoffrey C. Lambert, 29 April 2003, Fort Bragg, note to Charles Briscoe, USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

56. Mulholland interview.

57. “Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM),” <www.globalsecurity.org/

military/agency/dod/ socjfcom.htm>.

58. LTC Warren Richards (pseudonym), SOCJFCOM, interview with Kalev Sepp and Richard Kiper, 29 May 

2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Richards 

interview.

59. Retired COL Dave Rasmussen (pseudonym), SOCJFCOM, interview with Kalev Sepp, 19 July 2002, 

Norfolk, Virginia, notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Rasmussen interview.

60. COL Mike Findlay, SOCJFCOM, interview with Charles Briscoe, 19 July 2002, Norfolk, tape recording 

and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Rasmussen interview.

61. LTC Jack Walters (pseudonym), SOCJFCOM, interview with Richard Kiper, 19 July 2002, Norfolk, tape 

recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Walters interview; LTC Warren 

Richards (pseudonym), SOCJFCOM, briefi ng to Charles Briscoe, Richard Kiper, Kalev Sepp, and James Schroder, 

19 July 2002, Norfolk, notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

62. Jeffrey Solis and Don Forsythe are pseudonyms.

63. The participating units were the Air Force 6th Special Operations Squadron, the Army 3rd Battalion, 160th 

Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), and A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Infantry Regiment. 

MAJ Jeffrey Solis (pseudonym), interview with Kalev Sepp, 24 April 2002, Fort Campbell, transcripts and tapes, 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Solis interview.

64. Solis interview.

65. Ibid.

66. COL Mark Phelan, 18 July 2002, Fort Bragg, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

67. Ibid.

68. Mulholland interview.

69. COL Mulholland informed his battalion commanders of his concept for their employment at separate 

times. LTC Carl Hooper (pseudonym) called Mulholland from SOCCENT headquarters in Tampa, Florida, on 26 
89

September 2001 and recommended that a liaison offi cer from 5th SFG be sent to the Northern Alliance. Mulholland concurred. LTC Marc Bell (pseudonym), after leaving Fort Campbell on 4 October 2001, was informed of this 

concept at the JSOTF-North base at Karshi Kanabad (K2) in mid-October. LTC Don Forsythe (pseudonym), who left 

for Jordan with his battalion on 16 September 2001, learned of the concept from a JSOTF-North staff offi cer in midNovember, two days after arriving at K2. LTC Carl Hooper, 10 December 2002, Fort Campbell; Bell, 6 December 

2002, MacDill AFB; and LTC Don Forsythe, 6 December 2002, Fort Polk, Louisiana, telephonic interviews with 

Kalev Sepp; Mulholland interview.

70. COL John F. Mulholland, “Commanders’ Conference Presentation,” May 2002, Fort Bragg, videotape, 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. COL Mulholland also indicated that he felt the lieutenant colonels were 

not necessary to help him and his task force staff direct the A detachments in Afghanistan, asking rhetorically, “did 

they [the A detachments] need a battalion commander be put on top of them?” Battalion headquarters were recreated in late November, although each of them was assigned a mix of A and B detachments from all three battalions. 

Mulholland interview.

71. Ibid.

72. “Transcript: Bush Says U.S. Giving Millions More in Food Aid to Afghan People,” U.S. Department 

of State International Information Programs, 4 October 2001, <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/

text20011004bush.htm>.

73. MAJ Matt DiJurnigan (pseudonym), C Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, interview with Richard 

Kiper, 4 November 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

74. FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000), H-1 - H-3.

75. Marty Cavanaugh is a pseudonym.

76. DA, Offi ce of the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Importance of Army-Wide Support of the Psychological 

Warfare Programs, 2 February 1951, Record Group 319, National Archives.

77. Dr. Darren Curtis (pseudonym), Strategic Studies Detachment, 4th Psychological Operations Group, 

interview by Richard Kiper, 15 April 2002, Fort Bragg, transcript, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

78. Andrea Stone, “Soldiers Deploy on Mental Terrain,” USA Today, 3 October 2001, 7.

79. Keith B. Richburg and William Branigin, “U.S. Bombs Aid Rebels in North; Propaganda Campaign 

Intensifi es,” Washington Post, 8 November 2001, 13. Totals as of 17 October 2002 were 84,215,894 leafl ets 

disseminated, 6,873:39 hours broadcast by SOMS-B and Commando Solo, 538 different radio scripts, and 7,670 

radios distributed.

80. SSG James Willet (pseudonym), HHC, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 25 

March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

81. Ibid.

82. “Secretary Rumsfeld Press Conference With President of Uzbekistan,” News Transcript, <http://www. 

defenselink.mil/news/Oct2001/t10082001_t1005uz.html>, hereafter cited as “Rumsfeld Press Conference.

83. Ibid.

84. Paul West is a pseudonym.

85. Kyle Killinger is a pseudonym.

86. Rumsfeld Press Conference.

87. Harkin interview.

88. SFC Douglas Steverson (pseudonym), HHC, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with Charles Briscoe, 

25 March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

89. Childs and Victor Mercado are pseudonyms.

90. MAJ Wes McKellar (pseudonym), Commander, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with 

Charles Briscoe, 24 April 02, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

91. LTC James Brinks (pseudonym), Commander, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 

27 March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

92. Mark Henderson is a pseudonym.

93. James Brinks is a pseudonym.

94. MAJ Charles Mahoney (pseudonym), Commander, A Company, 528th Special Operations Support 

Battalion (SOSB), interview by Richard Kiper, Kalev Sepp, and James Schroder, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, 

hereafter cited as Mahoney interview.

95. Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), 69.

96. “After Action Review for Operation Enduring Freedom” (Fort Bragg, NC: Alpha Forward Support 

Company, 528th Support Battalion, 13 March 2002), 1.
90

97. 1LT Michael Bridgewater (pseudonym), A Company, 528th SOSB, interview with Richard Kiper, 6 March 

2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Bridgewater 

interview.

98. SSG Celeste Holmes (pseudonym), Headquarters (HQ) and Main Support Company, 528th SOSB, 

interview with Richard Kiper, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, 

Fort Bragg.

99. Ibid.

100. SSG Timothy Matthews (pseudonym), HQ and Service Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, interview with Richard Kiper, 4 April 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg.

101. Mark Parsons is a pseudonym.

102. MAJ Steven Broderick (pseudonym), Commander, B Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group 

(Airborne), interview with Kalev Sepp, 21 March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Broderick interview.

103. Kevin Anderson is a pseudonym.

104. Broderick interview.

105. Manuel Victoro is a pseudonym.

106. Broderick interview.

107. Richard Shaw is a pseudonym; Mahoney interview.

108. Warren Richards is a pseudonym; SOCJFCOM facilitates the joint integration of SOF elements and trains 

special operations commanders and their staffs to function as a theater joint special operations task force.

109. Don Sullivan and Derrick Jacobi are pseudonyms.

110. Sullivan was not notifi ed that A detachments had moved into the 5th SFG’s isolation facility (ISOFAC) at 

Fort Campbell on 19 September 2001, even though it was his duty to provide those teams with critical information 

for their communications plans such as what radios, frequencies, codes, and call signs they would use. He discovered 

this the day after the teams’ isolation began, when he was contacted to provide the data. Don Sullivan (pseudonym), 

24 April 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg, hereafter cited as Sullivan interview.

111. Sullivan interview.

112. “Temper tent” was slang for temperature-controlled tent, a modular internally framed wall tent that could 

accept larger vinyl tubes that carried either heated or cooled air from blowers into the tent’s interior.

113. Sullivan interview.

114. 1SG Martin Masterson (pseudonym), A Company, 112th Signal Battalion, interview with Richard Kiper, 

19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

115. Ibid.

116. Carlos Hernandez and Jason Bennington are pseudonyms.

117. CPT Carlos Hernandez, 24 April 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes, 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Hernandez interview.

118. MSG Jason Bennington was the brother of MAJ Del Bennington, also serving in 5th SFG.

119. Hernandez interview.

120. Ibid.

121. Mason Arquette is a pseudonym.

122. CPT Mason Arquette, 26 April 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes, 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Sullivan interview.

126. CPT Jason Mills (pseudonym), HHC, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 26 

April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

127. CWO Erick Jefferson (pseudonym), HHC, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 12 July 2002, 

Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

128. SCAMPI includes deployable systems and tactical gateways that allow SOF organizations to obtain voice, 

data, and video teleconferencing (VTC) of all classifi cation levels while deployed anywhere in the world to support 

SOF missions. See <http://www.sotech-kmi.com/printarticle.cfm?DocID=119> accessed 2 Jan 04.
91

129. FM 3-05.30, 5-1 and 5-2; FM 41-10, 4-5.

130. Richards interview; Walters interview; “Joint Special Operations Insights,” Special Operations Forces 

Joint Training Team, June 2002.

131. U.S. Central Command Deployment Order, 19 September 2001.

132. Briefi ng by CPT Sam Mitchell (pseudonym), January 2002, USASOC, Fort Bragg.

133. CPT Steve Marks (pseudonym), A Company, 112th Signal Battalion, interview with Richard Kiper, 19 

March 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

134. 2LT Tom Washington (pseudonym), 2nd Platoon, B Company, 112th Signal Battalion, interview with 

Richard Kiper, 6 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg.

135. Brinks is a pseudonym.

136. Roger Charles (pseudonym), DAP Flight Lead, D Company, 1st Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with 

James Schroder 22 April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, 

hereafter cited as Charles interview.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

139. Michael Stark is a pseudonym.

140. Charles interview.

93

Chapter 3

Toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan

19 October - 7 December 2001

War should be carried on like a monsoon;

one changeless determination of every particle

towards the one unalterable aim.1

When the war in Afghanistan accelerated ahead of the estimates the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) staff prepared, it was not a surprise to Army special operations commanders. 

After GEN Charles R. Holland, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) combatant commander, and others in the Pentagon had been briefed on the seven classic phases of unconventional warfare (UW), MG Geoffrey Lambert, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command 

(USASFC) commander, cautioned that each faction in the Northern Alliance had distinct capabilities and strengths, which meant that they would not progress into the fi ght in linear fashion. 

LTG Bryan D. Brown, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) commander, 

included a slide in the briefi ng that explained that the Northern Alliance factions were in different phases of development and that a slow phase-by-phase model for buildup did not really fi t 

reality on the ground. Lambert felt strongly that the war would have a “velocity and momentum 

of its own.” GEN Holland agreed to explain to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) the 

unknown velocity and momentum of the Northern Alliance forces.2

Figure 1. LTG Bryan D. Brown, USASOC commander.
94

The initial concept called for reconnaissance units and Army Special Forces teams to fl y into 

Afghanistan in October and November 2001.3 The supposedly beleaguered Afghan Northern 

Alliance forces would weather the winter much like a “Valley Forge” experience. The CENTCOM planners envisioned that Special Forces ODAs would spend those cold, snowy months 

in the high valleys of the rugged Hindu Kush drilling a loose collection of warrior bands into a 

well-trained, battle-ready, well-equipped army.

If there were bands of resistance fi ghters ready and anxious to do battle, the Special Forces 

soldiers would assist them in attacks against the Taliban army as soon as practicable. To these 

ends, the Special Operations Command of CENTCOM had directed COL John Mulholland to 

use his 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) staff as the nucleus of the JSOTF-North headquarters 

and to carry out this effort with his operational Special Forces detachments. Mulholland hoped 

that one, possibly two, northern towns might be taken from the enemy before the cold weather 

brought the traditional winter hiatus from military operations.4

Around April or May 2002, this new, Special Forces-trained, anti-Taliban army was to begin 

a spring offensive to secure the northern tier of Afghan cities. It was also to open roads into Pakistan and Uzbekistan to receive supplies, particularly humanitarian aid, and possibly to facilitate 

U.S. combat divisions’ entrance into Afghanistan. Then, perhaps later that year, a general offensive toward Kabul could be launched. Operations in the southern region around Kandahar were 

thought to be problematic. Strong anti-Taliban leaders had not yet been identifi ed among the 

Figure 2. Kabul, Afghanistan’s national capital.
95

ethnic Pashtuns who constituted the majority of the Afghan population south of Kabul. However, events would soon move faster than the initial time line estimations by the CENTCOM staff.5

By the middle of September 2001, the 5th SFG staff learned that intelligence sources had 

identifi ed two key leaders of the anti-Taliban resistance forces.6 One was Mohammed Fahim 

Khan, the military successor to assassinated senior resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, the “Lion of Panjshir,” who operated in the northeast corner of Afghanistan. Before his 

murder, Massoud led a confederation of primarily Panjshir Valley Afghan Tajiks called the 

Northern Alliance.7

 Several other groups, formed and defi ned by ethnicity and sometimes by 

tribe, were aligned with Massoud and then with Fahim Khan. While Pashtun Afghans make up 

most of the population in the southern half of Afghanistan, they constitute less than 10 percent 

of the inhabitants north of Kabul. Massoud had been recognized as an exceptionally capable, 

charismatic leader and was the only resistance leader with wide popular support. His death, just 

two days before the 9/11 attacks in the United States, left the viability of the Northern Alliance 

in doubt in the minds of American leaders.

The other leader, General Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek who led the Junbush-e-Millie, 

the largest single military corps in the north, was of particular concern to COL Mulholland 

because he planned to send a Special Forces ODA to live with and advise him and his Afghan 

fi ghters through the winter. His loosely associated amalgam of resistance elements of Uzbek, 

Tajik, and Hazara Afghans was thought to number between 10,000 and 15,000 fi ghters. Their 

opponents, the Taliban armed forces, were thought to number as many as 40,000. Dostum was 

based in the Dari-a-Souf Valley in the mountains south of Mazar-e-Sharif.

General Dostum had served in the Red Army before joining the Afghan armed forces of 

the Soviet puppet regime that strongman Mohammed Najibullah led.8

 He then changed sides 

to fi ght with the anti-Soviet mujahideen against Najibullah, who was ousted by rebel forces. 

Najibullah was later taken from the UN compound where he had sought refuge and executed by 

the Taliban. During the continuing civil

war, Dostum was reported to have initially 

supported the Taliban and then opposed 

them. In reprisal for a 1997 Taliban attack 

against Mazar-e-Sharif, the center of his 

political and military power in northern 

Afghanistan, Dostum allegedly ordered 

the execution of captured Taliban. When 

the Taliban drove Dostum and his army 

out of Mazar-e-Sharif the following year, 

reprisals were taken in return against 

those captured fi ghters from Dostum’s 

forces.9

 Although many of the allegations 

were never substantiated, a Special Forces 

captain remarked, “No one [the Afghan 

leaders] here is clean.”10 COL Mulholland 

told his detachments to be prepared for 

the worst.11 Figure 3. General Abdul Rashid Dostum.
96

After two days of waiting for the weather to clear, the fi rst two SF detachments were inserted into Afghanistan on the night of 19 October 2001 by specially confi gured MH-47E Chinook 

helicopters. The 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) aircrews 

fl ew the teams through steep walled valleys choked with dust storms that rose 2 miles into the 

night sky, over mountain ranges higher than any the Night Stalkers had ever fl own, and did 

aerial refueling from Air Force MC-130P tankers en route. The 160th SOAR pilots pushed 

their helicopters to the limits of aircraft design performance. The weather conditions were so 

bad that the two MH-60L Black Hawk DAP helicopters fl ying armed escort for the MH-47E 

Chinook fl ight were forced to turn back to Karshi Kanabad (K2). Relying almost exclusively on 

the advanced multimode radar systems to avoid the rugged mountainous terrain, the Chinook 

pilots pressed on through the blinding dust to deliver the two Special Forces teams to landing 

zones (LZs) deep in Afghanistan.

The 12 men of Special Forces ODA 595 (Five-Nine-Five) stepped off the back ramp of 

their Chinook helicopter at 0200 on 20 October into a tiny cultivated plot in the mountainwalled Dari-a-Souf Valley about 50 miles south of Mazar-e-Sharif. Guides had appeared 

from the darkness to take them to one of General Dostum’s camps. The SF team met the 

Afghan leader at sunrise. Within hours of that meeting, half the team, to its complete surprise, was riding on horseback to Dostum’s command post. The next day, ODA 595 started 

guiding “smart” bombs dropped from a B-52 Stratofortress bomber circling overhead on 

the Taliban front-line positions.

Figure 4. Refueling the MC-130P tanker was a major task.

In northeast Afghanistan, in the mountains above the Panjshir Valley, the Special Forces 

ODA 555 (the “Triple Nickel”) had also landed in the darkness of 20 October and been taken 

by guides to meet General Shariff, one of Fahim Khan’s fi eld commanders.12 Like Five-NineFive, within 24 hours, the Special Forces soldiers traveled to the long-stalemated front lines 

and were directing the aerial bombardment of Taliban defensive fi ghting bunkers and trenches 

around the abandoned Soviet air base at Bagram. For the past three years, these entrenchments 

between the imposing mountain ranges guarded the northern end of the broad Shomali Plain 

that runs between them, thus serving as the fi rst line of protection for the Afghan capital city of 

Kabul only 25 miles away.
97

Figure 5.

View of an impacting smart bomb.

Figure 6. General Shariff and supporters.

At exactly the same time the Special Forces teams were being surreptitiously fl own into 

northern Afghanistan, almost 200 Army Rangers parachute assaulted on a landing strip in the 

southern Afghan desert to publicly demonstrate that the American military could put “boots on 

the ground” deep inside enemy territory at will. The airfi eld, code-named Objective Rhino, was 

fi rst blasted by Air Force AC-130 gunships and then overwhelmed in minutes by several platoons 

of Rangers from the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. Two Rangers were injured in the night 

parachute assault, and one Taliban guard at the site was killed.13 Army photographers with nightvision cameras videotaped the parachute assault and the extraction of the Ranger force by MC-
98

130 aircraft. Within hours of the successful night combat 

operation, a combat camera team had done a fi rst edit of 

the raw footage of the raid and electronically delivered the 

reduced footage to a product development team of the 3rd 

Psychological Operations Battalion (POB) at Fort Bragg. 

This team edited and transmitted a fi nished video clip to 

the Pentagon in time for Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld to show it the following day during his noon 

press conference and in time for it to be integrated into 

the American “news cycle.”14 Concurrently, another night 

raid took place to the north of Objective Rhino, which was 

not fi lmed.15 That same night, after a second successful 

parachute assault to seize an airfi eld, two Rangers died in 

an accidental helicopter crash in Pakistan during supporting operations. These soldiers were 

the fi rst ARSOF casualties in the U.S. military campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan.16

More Special Forces ODAs were inserted into northern Afghanistan as the JSOTF-North 

headquarters learned of more anti-Taliban resistance groups that were capable of taking the 

offensive. Contentious relationships among the various resistance chiefs, especially Dostum 

and Fahim Khan, required the JSOTF to “balance” teams between the factions to preclude the 

perception by the ethnic groups that any were “more favored” by the Americans. To assuage 

Fahim Khan’s displeasure when he learned that his old rival Dostum had U.S. advisers, COL 

Mulholland dispatched Special Forces teams to bolster two of Khan’s allies. On 23 October, 

Special Forces ODA 585 was inserted by MH-47E Chinooks into the Callocutta region near 

Konduz to support Burillah Khan. Weather delayed ODA 534 until 4 November when it was 

also inserted by MH-47E helicopters into the Dari-a-Balkh Valley to work with Afghan Tajik 

General Atta Mohammed, the head of the Jaamat-e-Islami militia who was at times a confederate and other times a rival of Dostum.17

With the belief that, politically, more senior, experienced Special Forces offi cers were necessary to advise the most important Afghan resistance leaders, COL Mulholland planned to use 

his battalion commanders in that role. During the night of 24 October, he dispatched a Special 

Forces lieutenant colonel and several staff members to the Bagram area to advise and assist 

General Bismullah Khan, the senior Northern Alliance military commander operating in the 

Shomali Plains region. A week later, on 2 November, another Special Forces battalion commander was provided to Dostum as a senior adviser as well to help coordinate his offensive with 

Atta as they marched north toward Mazar-e-Sharif.18

Despite constant aerial bombardment, the Taliban army remained a potent military force, 

and it moved to counter the resistance forces’ advances. The 26 October attempt by long-time 

anti-Taliban leader Abdul Haq to infi ltrate overland into Afghanistan to help the fi ghting ended 

in Taliban soldiers capturing him and immediately executing him by decapitation.19 About the 

same time, a “jihad brigade” of 5,000 to 10,000 Pakistanis, incited by mullahs calling for a 

crusade against the invading American “infi dels,” reportedly entered Afghanistan.20 In the north 

and center of Afghanistan, some anti-Taliban warlords continued to mobilize fi ghters and mass 

Figure 7. 75th Rangers combat 

parachute assault on Objective Rhino.
99

those troops for a general offensive. Others pressed their attacks against the Taliban, aided by 

Special Forces soldiers directing airstrikes onto the enemy positions.21

More Special Forces teams made the 

harrowing long night fl ights into the mountains of the Hindu Kush. Flying in normal 

conditions near sea level, the 160th SOAR 

MH-47E Chinooks could easily carry 40 

or more American soldiers loaded with 

packs, ammunition, and weapons. But to 

fl y over the 2-mile-high mountains of Afghanistan, the Night Stalkers had to send 

two “stripped” medium cargo helicopters 

to deliver a single detachment. The 10 men 

of Special Forces ODA 553 slated to go to Yakawlang, near Bamian in the center of the country, 

were split between two Chinooks to reduce the helicopter loads in the low-density altitude conditions. On 8 November, ODA 586 and ODA 594 fl ew together on MH-47Es to a way station 

near the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border. At daybreak the next morning, the Special Forces soldiers of Five-Eight-Six were fl own to Konduz aboard a Russian-made Mi-17 helicopter fl own 

by contract pilots to join General Daoud Khan at Farkhar. Mi-17s also shuttled ODA 594 into 

the Panjshir Valley to reinforce the Triple Nickel (ODA 555) as its anti-Taliban forces prepared 

for an offensive against Bagram and Kabul. While the powerful, rugged, old Russian helicopters could fl y higher altitudes than the American rotary-wing aircraft, they could only fl y during 

daylight in good weather, and the fl ight oxygen systems were primitive and barely adequate.22

Even the cover of darkness did not fully protect the aircrews of the 2nd Battalion, 160th 

SOAR, as they transported the Special Forces ODAs into Afghanistan. Taliban soldiers and alQaeda fi ghters frequently fi red at the black Chinooks as they fl ew nap of the earth (NOE), hugging the terrain as they fl ew down the mountain valleys and skimmed the ridges and mountain 

crests. The ambushers positioned themselves in the mountain valleys where they suspected the 

Americans would fl y and waited for the sound of the helicopter rotor blades. The MH-47 Chinook, larger than a Greyhound bus, offered a big target to gunners on the ground. Often, during 

a night sortie—a round trip from K2 into Afghanistan and back—the MH-47E Chinook pilots 

would weave through barrages of bullets and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and dodge 

shoulder-fi red antiaircraft missiles.

On 2 November, ODA Five-Five-Three landed in freezing darkness to support General 

Kareem Kahlili, the 65-year-old senior Hazara military commander in the Bamian region. The 

Shiite Muslim Hazaras had been viciously persecuted by the Taliban, and they were eager for 

retribution. Like all ODAs across Afghanistan, the Special Forces team at Bamian made it 

clear to their new allies that Americans would not tolerate reprisals for past killings, particularly murdering prisoners. This was a big concern for the Special Forces troops who worked 

alongside pro-Iranian General Mohammed Mohaqqeq. Mohaqqeq, leader of 3,000 Hazara 

Hezb-e-Wahadat fi ghters, had volunteered his troops to hunt down the fl eeing Taliban mercenaries. He also wanted to negotiate with Dostum and Atta for a fair share of the post-Taliban

Figure 8. A Soviet-made Mi-17 utility

 helicopter fl own by contract pilots.
100

Figure 9. An MH-47E deploying defensive measures.

political power in northern Afghanistan.23 There would be no such 

contest in the far west of the country, as ODA 554 discovered when 

it joined General Ismail Khan during his offensive to seize Herat 

from the Taliban on 11 November. Ismail Khan was the single most 

powerful military and political fi gure in that vast region along the 

Iranian border, and thus, he was key to ODA Five-Five-Four’s mission to establish a humanitarian relief base at the Herat airfi eld.24

Augmented by the combination of American guided aerial 

bombing, humanitarian aid, and other assistance that included airdropped weapons and ammunition, the anti-Taliban forces began to 

gain the initiative.25 Some warlords like Dostum were independent 

and aggressive while others responded slowly, despite prompting by 

their new American Special Forces advisers. While 160th SOAR’s Chinooks continued to be 

the only viable means of infi ltrating SOF soldiers into Afghanistan, the supplies and equipment 

that the SF teams advising the anti-Taliban forces needed could be delivered by U.S. Air Force 

MC-130 Combat Talon transports controlled by the Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR).26 BG Les Fuller, commander, SOCEUR, directed the procurement and packing of supplies and equipment in Germany and their shipment by Air Force cargo jets to Incirlik Air Base, 

Turkey. There, parachute bundles—packed with items as diverse as satellite radios, horse feed, 

and saddles to fi t the larger American Special Forces soldiers—were loaded on the dull grey, 

four-engine, turboprop Combat Talons. The Air Force special operations aircrews then fl ew the 

14-hour round trip down into mountainous valleys to drop their cargo by parachute in the middle 

of the night onto drop zones as small as a football fi eld.27 The MC-130s made these supply and 

equipment airdrops to the isolated Special Forces teams and continued to deliver humanitarian 

food rations all over Afghanistan. At Bamian, ODA Five-Five-Three witnessed the largest single 

night drop of rations of the Afghan war when Air Force C-17 Globemaster III jet transports 

Figure 10. Ismail Khan.
101

scattered 110 tons of yellow-wrapped vegetarian meals over the airfi eld from 10,000 feet above 

ground level (AGL).28

The Special Forces teams and their Afghan militia-type forces each developed distinctive 

“battle rhythms” to keep continuous pressure on the Taliban armies. The Special Forces ODAs, 

many of which had been augmented with Air Force special tactics airmen who were specially 

trained to direct tactical airstrikes and guide smart bombs, split apart into several three- and 

four-man teams. This permitted the ODAs to cover more of the mountainous battlefi elds in 

their regions and to use their close-air-support (CAS) teams in shifts to keep bombs falling and 

airstrikes on the Taliban around the clock.29 Each of the smaller CAS teams carried a targeting 

laser and satellite-linked global positioning devices to guide smart bombs precisely to their 

targets.

Dividing the ODAs to capitalize on the CAS capability proved to be a major combat multiplier for the small SOF teams. Against the Bagram Airfi eld defenses, the Triple Nickel directed 

B-52 heavy bomber fl ights to drop swaths of 500-pound bombs onto the Taliban trench lines, a 

technique referred to during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 as “carpet bombing” because 

of the breadth of devastation that resulted. In the Dari-a-Souf and Balkh valleys, SF ODAs 595 

and 534 blasted Taliban bunkers, artillery emplacements, and tanks with airstrikes while their 

Afghan allies prepared for an early afternoon ground attack. Using this modus operandi, they 

attacked and if they were successful in forcing the Taliban to retreat, there normally would not 

be suffi cient daylight remaining for the Taliban to mount an effective counterattack. In this way, 

they fought their way through successive Taliban defensive lines. On 9 November, the forces 

of Dostum and Atta broke out of the Balkh Valley and, via the Tangi Pass, swept down into the 

city of Mazar-e-Sharif. On the outskirts of the city, several hundred defi ant Pakistani Taliban

fi ghters barricaded themselves in a former girls’ school and swore to “fi ght to the death.” When 

the Pakistanis gunned down a party of mullahs seeking to negotiate a surrender, anti-Taliban

troops prepared to assault the school compound. ODA 595 guided smart bombs directly into 

Figure 11. Special Forces teams use 

satellite links for communications in 

northern Afghanistan.

Figure 12. A Special Forces soldier 

employing a laser designator to mark 

targets for close air support.
102

the barricaded building, eliminating all of the fanatical defenders.30 Shortly afterward, another 

3,000 Taliban soldiers surrendered.31

On 10 November, as the victor of the battle of Balkh Valley, General Rashid Dostum made 

Mazar-e-Sharif the fi rst major Afghan city liberated from the Taliban.

32 When a struggle for 

political control of the city arose, the Army Special Forces advisers brokered a transitional power-sharing agreement between Dostum, Atta, and Mohaqqeq. Having negotiated deals 

among contesting factions in Bosnia, the Special Forces offi cers brokered an accord based on 

dividing municipal functions and responsibilities instead of city sections. CENTCOM commander GEN Tommy Franks sent RADM Bert Calland, a U.S. Navy SEAL, and the senior 

special operations offi cer in SOCCENT to monitor the implementation of the accord and to 

oversee the humanitarian relief effort.

Considerable infrastructure repair had to be done to support expanded humanitarian aid 

and reconstruction. Outside the city, the Special Forces engineers arranged and supervised the 

local repair of the bomb-cratered runway at the airport. They showed local Afghan workers 

how to fi ll the bomb craters and artillery shell holes with a mix of riverbed gravel and tar accumulated from burning old tires. To foster stable conditions in Mazar-e-Sharif, JSOTF-North 

sent a four-man civil affairs team (CAT) from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB) from K2. 

CAT-A33 made fi eld assessments to identify those projects that merited immediate funding 

to support the “reconstruction of a civic fabric.”33 CAT-A32 was attached to a Special Forces 

ODA in the vicinity of Bagram. CAT-A33 and CAT-A32 coordinated their relief efforts with 

the international volunteer organizations struggling to deliver private assistance and foreign 

government aid to needy Afghans.34 Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT) 922 used its loudspeakers to 

play music and broadcast anti-Taliban messages to the largely illiterate population throughout 

the city. It also passed out information leafl ets to the Afghan populace and posted handbills in 

central locations.35

On 10 November 2001, the date of the fi rst major victory at Mazar-e-Sharif, CENTCOM 

had more than 50,000 American servicemen and women in its theater of operations, one that 

extended from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.36 Of those personnel, approximately half were 

aboard U.S. naval vessels in the Arabian Sea, 3,000-plus were in Oman, and almost 2,000 were 

in Uzbekistan at Stronghold Freedom on K2 Air Base. In the skies over the CENTCOM area 

of responsibility (AOR), there were 400 Air Force and Navy combat aircraft, including those 

patrolling “no-fl y” zones over Iraq, fl ying sorties almost every day. In the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Yemen, and Jordan, 5th SFG units conducted maneuvers and trained the special 

operations forces of those countries. These military exercises, planned and coordinated more 

than one year before the 9/11 attacks, were considered essential to shore up the counterterrorist 

capabilities of friendly countries in the region. The American Special Forces teams were eager 

to “get in the Afghan fi ght” and were prepared to move to Uzbekistan as soon as they fi nished 

their training obligations. In Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld only admitted that an 

unspecifi ed number of U.S. troops were at “four locations” somewhere in a vast area the size 

of Texas.37 On the ground, the UW campaign to topple the Taliban regime was being directed 

by about 130 U.S. Army Special Forces, CA, and PSYOP soldiers and a handful of Air Force 

special tactics airstrike controllers.38
103

With the 10 November fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, the second largest city in Afghanistan, others 

fell in rapid succession to the growing anti-Taliban forces. The towns of Bamian in the central region, Taloquan in the north, and Herat in the west surrendered within days, and Konduz 

was besieged.39 Then, on 12 and 13 November, Northern Alliance forces, most of which rode 

standing, jam-packed in large Ginga (brand name) cargo trucks, literally drove from the trench 

lines at Bagram into the hastily abandoned capital of Kabul in less than 24 hours.40 The following day, 14 November, Jalalabad fell, essentially closing the Khyber Pass access route to the 

Taliban and their Pakistani supporters.41 Just before Thanksgiving, the Taliban forces at Konduz capitulated after being threatened with annihilation by “angels of death”—the devastating 

AC-130 Spectre gunships that had rained down carpets of explosive shells without warning in 

the night—and the “death rays”—the target lasers—Army Special Forces used to guide smart 

bombs to their targets. Broadcasts in the local dialects accelerated surrender.42

In the midst of the constant aerial bombardment, hundreds of thousands of propaganda leaflets were dropped in special air-delivery bombs. Thus, when the U.S. warplanes came, Taliban

fi ghters did not know whether they were going to be bombed or showered with paper. PSYOP 

units had designed the leafl ets and printed them on their own massive presses at Fort Bragg for 

overseas shipment and distribution by “leafl et bombs” over Afghanistan. The PSYOP cells also 

produced radio programs with popular Dari and Pashto music—Afghan “greatest hits,” as the 

PSYOP teams referred to them—intermixed with anti-Taliban and anti-al-Qaeda messages. 

They recorded these programs on mini discs, which were transmitted to Afghan listeners by 

airborne radio broadcast stations inside Air Force special operations EC-130 Commando Solo 

aircraft orbiting over the population centers in regular circuits over the country.43

As the offensive continued to gain momentum, coalition forces joined the U.S. effort in 

Afghanistan. One hundred British Royal Marines were met by U.S. Special Forces and other 

British troops when they landed at Bagram airfi eld on 15 November.44 Pakistan, the only country to maintain diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, closed the Afghan Embassy in 

Islamabad on 22 November.45 Deft U.S. diplomatic negotiations had garnered forward bases 

for American and coalition forces in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and later Tajikistan while simultaneously isolating the Taliban from its outside sources of money, personnel, and aid.46

MH-60L Direct Action Penetrator (DAP) helicopters from the 160th 

SOAR, when not providing armed escort to the MH-47Es inserting Special 

Forces ODAs, prowled Afghanistan 

hunting for, and then attacking, Taliban

antiaircraft gun positions and truckmounted systems that shifted about trying to ambush and shoot down the lumbering Chinooks. To extend the helicopters’ range without aerial refueling and to 

expand area coverage by these roving helicopter prowlers, Army Rangers and Air Figure 13. Lethal AH-6 “Little Bird” conducts a night raid.
104

Force special tactics airmen did a “mini Rhino-like” night parachute assault on 13 November 

to seize another desert airfi eld. Conducting a low-altitude combat parachute jump in total darkness directly on the airstrip, code-named Bastogne, the Rangers cleared the area for four small 

AH-6 helicopters called “Little Birds” by the 160th SOAR aviators. These Little Birds quickly 

fl ew off to attack a Taliban compound with rockets and machine gun fi re, then returned to the 

airstrip to rearm and refuel for a second raid against another target. Before sunrise, the Army 

Rangers and the 160th SOAR’s Little Birds were long gone from Bastogne. Within days, more 

Little Bird attack helicopter raids followed. To break the pattern, Air Force special operations 

MC-130s airlanded Army Rangers in heavily armed 4-x-4 trucks to drive cross-country nightly 

to seize different airstrips to support the Little Bird raids.

Even as Taliban resistance crumbled across 

the country, some enemy forces remained dangerous. One of the largest battles of the Afghanistan campaign was an al-Qaeda prisoner uprising 

that began on 25 November and lasted four days. 

Three to four hundred of the more fanatic enemy 

fi ghters that surrendered near the Mazar-e-Sharif 

airfi eld had been interned in the prison area of 

the 18th-century fortress of Qala-i-Jangi, which 

had also served as Dostum’s headquarters. While 

the Uzbek leader was away directing the siege of 

Konduz, the prisoners turned on their guards in 

a violent uprising. The prisoners seized a large 

arsenal of weapons and ammunition that included 

mortars and RPG launchers.47 In the melee that 

followed, the prisoners attacked two CIA offi cers inside the fortress. One escaped and radioed 

for help.48 Nearby, the staff of the headquarters section, 3rd Battalion, 5th SFG, and a squad 

of British troops hastily formed an ad hoc rescue force. While local militia struggled to keep 

the fanatical prisoners inside the fortress, the Army Special Forces and British troops fought 

for the next three days to fi nd the missing American. Special Forces ODA 533 and an infantry 

rifl e platoon from the 10th Mountain Division were rushed by MH-47E helicopters from K2 to 

reinforce the 3rd Battalion staff.49 While the rescue force directed airstrikes against the heavily 

armed prisoners on 26 November, an errant 2,000-pound American bomb hit near U.S. forward 

positions.50 The awesome explosive blast destroyed an Afghan tank and its crew and wounded 

four British and fi ve Americans soldiers. The explosion also caused a large breach in the fortress wall that almost turned the battle in favor of the al-Qaeda.

51

The fortuitous arrival of Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunships the next night salvaged a 

very desperate situation. After another day of tough combat, the body of missing intelligence 

offi cer Michael Spann was recovered.52 The last of the surviving prisoners gave up a day later 

when their underground bunker was fl ooded with water.53 John Walker Lindh, a 19-year-old 

American citizen who had fought with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, was discovered among the 

twice-surrendered prisoners. U.S. Special Forces soldiers, alerted by a journalist, found Walker 

at the Sherbergan prison the following day. The 3rd Battalion, 5th SFG surgeon, with the help 

Figure 14. Loading nonstandard tactical 

vehicles aboard an MH-47E.
105

of several Special Forces medics, saved Walker from dying of hypothermia.54 The prisoner uprising at Qala-i-Jangi quelled, the focus of the JSOTF-North staff shifted back to operations in 

southern Afghanistan.55

At K2 Air Base, the JSOTF-North headquarters operated around the clock. Stronghold 

Freedom had been established in three weeks. The effort required 60 C-17 Globemaster III jet 

transport sorties to move hundreds of soldiers and more than 2,200 tons of equipment to the 

former Soviet fi ghter base.56 Many of the staff offi cers had been detailed from other commands 

and services to augment the 5th SFG staff nucleus suffi ciently to function as a major JTF 

headquarters responsible for fi ghting the war in Afghanistan. Reorganized by COL Mulholland 

for missions dictated by constantly evolving events, Task Force (TF) Dagger’s staff managed 

the daily operations, fi eld requirements, and base support normally distributed among three 

subordinate battalion headquarters and nine Special Forces company ODB teams. Stronghold 

Freedom was a newly created tent city that was much like a Gold Rush “boom town” in the 

middle of nowhere. But this modern military base had a major airport, fi eld hospital, warehouse 

complex, staging area, ammunition dump, barracks, isolation facility, and worldwide communications center.

While directing Special Forces detachments in combat in Afghanistan, the staff also dealt 

with pressing local matters, ranging from vehicle accidents to VIP visits and USO entertainers 

to cleaning up toxic waste dating back to the Soviet era. While daily routine tasks became 

automatic, JSOTF-North was simultaneously making history. The long-range night helicopter 

insertions of Special Forces teams deep into Afghanistan and the airstrikes and refueling 

fl ights launched from K2 were the fi rst U.S. combat operations ever staged from a former 

Soviet republic. Both at K2 in Uzbekistan and at their home bases in the United States, the 

160th SOAR maintenance crews kept the critical MH-47E Chinooks fl ying. Activated for the 

fi rst time in 30 years, Army National Guard (ARNG) D Company, 109th Aviation Battalion, 

Figure 15. U.S. Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunship fi ring at night.
106

provided midlevel maintenance to sustain operational Night Stalker helicopters worldwide. 

This became critical when Operation ENDURING FREEDOM spread to the Philippines and 

160th SOAR Chinooks were required to support antiterrorist missions there.57

In southern Afghanistan, two 

anti-Taliban Pashtun leaders fi nally 

emerged—Hamad Karzai and Gul Agha 

Sherzai. Advised and assisted by Special 

Forces teams, the two led their forces toward Kandahar, the “spiritual capital of 

the Taliban movement.” Karzai, a Pashtun, spoke perfect English. On 8 October, Karzai returned to Afghanistan from 

Pakistan where he had been living in exile. The anti-Taliban political leader and 

two companions shared two motorcycles 

during the ride into Oruzgan Province 

north of Kandahar.58 When Karzai returned to Pakistan a few weeks later, he 

talked with several American special operations offi cers, imparting the latest intelligence gathered on the southern provinces and suggested themes and specifi c products for PSYOP programs.

Special Forces ODA 574 followed Karzai to Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan, on 14 November 

aboard four MH-60K Black Hawk helicopters from the 160th SOAR, which could operate better at the lower elevations 70 miles north of Kandahar. Although Karzai had only a few dozen 

fi ghters, his unexpected presence in Tarin Kowt so alarmed the Taliban leaders in Kandahar 

that they sent about 1,000 fi ghters in a 100-truck convoy to retake the town. At dawn on 17 

November, from a ridge above the valley, ODA 574 directed fl ight after fl ight of Air Force and 

Navy jet fi ghters against the approaching Taliban convoy. The smart bombs produced devastating results on the line of trucks. But to their surprise, in the midst of destroying the entire 

Taliban convoy, the Special Forces team had to abandon its overwatch position to rally Karzai’s 

Pashtun fi ghters who fl ed at the sight of the large Taliban force. Despite this unexpected problem, ODA 574 still managed to destroy some 30 trucks loaded with enemy fi ghters, which 

prompted an enemy retreat to the south.59 The arrival of the fi rst American conventional ground 

Figure 16. D Company, 109th Maintenance Battalion, ARNG, reinforces the 160th SOAR.

Figure 17. Hamad Karzai poses 

with Special Forces soldiers.
107

forces in Afghanistan further raised the pressure on the Taliban in Kandahar. On Thanksgiving 

Day, two U.S. Marine Corps infantry battalions were helicoptered into Objective Rhino, the 

undefended compound and dirt airstrip in the desert 50 miles southwest of Kandahar. On the 

night of 19 October, an Army Ranger task force had conducted a parachute assault on Objective 

Rhino to support attack helicopter raids against al-Qaeda targets.60 The reconnaissance element 

for the U.S. Marine operation was a three-man U.S. Navy SEAL element.61

As the scale of the victory at Tarin Kowt became apparent to the local populace, Karzai’s 

tiny coterie of supporters grew to more than 100 fi ghters in two weeks.62 This victory, which 

gained more followers, prompted COL Mulholland to send a Special Forces lieutenant colonel 

as his senior military adviser just before Karzai’s movement south toward Kandahar to begin 

negotiations for the city’s surrender.63 In their movement south, Karzai’s Pashtun fi ghters and 

the Special Forces soldiers turned back a second major Taliban attack on 4 December at the 

Sayd-Alim-Kalay bridge, 40 miles north of the provincial capital. The same day, the Americans 

heard by radio that Karzai was the leading candidate to become prime minister of the Afghan 

Interim Authority (AIA).64

Karzai almost did not accept the nomination. The next morning, 5 December, a misguided 

2,000-pound bomb struck the hilltop where the Special Forces team had gathered around the 

Pashtun leader. The Air Force airstrike controller inadvertently sent incorrect target map coordinates to a B-52 bomber orbiting overhead. The bomb wiped out ODA 574, killing three 

and wounding the other nine team members. At least 23 Pashtun soldiers died instantly. Several other Americans and numerous Afghans were wounded as well, some from being hurled 

through the air by the force of the blast. Karzai was injured but refused to be evacuated for 

medical treatment.65 As U.S. Marine Corps helicopters at Camp Rhino (the name given to the 

compound on Objective Rhino) and Air Force special operations MH-53 Pave Low helicopters 

and MC-130 Combat Talons at Jacobabad, Pakistan, rushed in surgical teams to care for and 

evacuate the wounded, JSOTF-North dispatched ODB 570 and replacements for ODA 574 to 

the scene. That same day, the U.S. Air Force fl ew the most seriously wounded Americans to 

military hospitals in Germany, and the U.S. Marines ferried the Afghans to U.S. Navy ships for 

treatment.66

As Hamad Karzai, indifferent to his wounds, parlayed with Mullah Naqib to peacefully 

surrender Kandahar, Gul Agha Sherzai captured the Taliban capital. In early November, 

Sherzai had crossed the mountains from Pakistan into the Shin Narai Valley, southeast of 

Kandahar. Special Forces ODA 583 was inserted by 160th SOAR MH-47Es to join him on 

the night of 19 November. In a series of battles, CAS teams from ODA 583 directed the aerial 

bombardment of Taliban forces day and night. This enabled Sherzai’s Pashtuns to seize the 

highway from Kandahar to Spin Boldak, thereby cutting off the primary Taliban supply line 

from Pakistan. These Pashtuns attacked up the southern avenue of approach to Kandahar. By 

3 December, while Karzai’s troops attacked the bridge at Sayd-Alim-Kalay 40 miles from 

Kandahar, Sherzai’s 2,000-man force was probing the airport defenses just south of the city. As 

Sherzai returned in triumph to Kandahar, the streets were crowded with thousands of cheering 

Afghans who threw marigolds at the American pickup trucks and shouted “Thank you!” in 

English to the Special Forces soldiers accompanying the Pashtun leader. Sherzai, the provincial 

political leader before the Taliban forced him into exile, reoccupied his former offi ce in the 
108

governor’s palace at midday on 7 December. This rekindled the struggle for control with 

Karzai’s supporter, Mullah Naqueebullah, but every major Afghan city and town had now been 

liberated from Taliban control.67

The U.S. Marines at Camp Rhino relocated a week later to the Kandahar airport, guided 

through the city to their new base by Pashtun and U.S. Special Forces troops. The U.S. Marine force preceded the headquarters of the recently constituted Joint Special Operations Task 

Force–South (JSOTF-South) (Task Force Kabar), commanded by U.S. Navy Commodore Bob 

Harward. Based on orders from the commander, SOCCENT, RADM Calland, Harward had 

formed JSOTF-South around the nucleus of his Naval Special Warfare Group One (NSWG-1) 

staff based in San Diego, California.68 Unlike the 5th SFG that provided the core of the JSOTFNorth headquarters and most of its combat forces, Harward’s training command had no assigned 

combat units. SOCCENT assigned A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, to Harward. A-1-5 was 

specially trained and equipped as a mobile strike force. It was suited to conducting direct action 

(DA) missions in Afghanistan. The 81 Special Forces soldiers of A-1-5 and the 19 other service 

attachments fi nished training in Kuwait and joined their new task force on Masirah Island off the 

coast of Oman. There, they prepared for the special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA) 

operations that were expected to start with the New Year.69

While the prisoner uprising at Qala-i-Jangi was being quelled and the Pashtun armies of 

Karzai and Sherzai were advancing on Kandahar from the north and south, allied aircraft began 

bombing the Tora Bora region 45 miles southwest of Jalalabad.70 The Afghan resistance leaders claimed that Tora Bora contained the “last and strongest camp” of the Taliban army and 

al-Qaeda fi ghters.71 Their estimates were that up to 1,200 enemy fi ghters from various parts of 

Figure 18. Masirah Island off the coast of Oman.

Figure 19. Masirah Airfi eld.
109

the country had congregated in the caves and tunnels there to rearm and regroup. CENTCOM 

headquarters directed COL Mulholland at JSOTF-North to send one Special Forces ODA to 

direct airstrikes for the Afghan militia units led by Commanders Hajji Mohammed Zaman 

and Hazrat Ali that would attack into that mountainous region.72 SF ODA 572 was assigned 

that mission. After the aerial bombardment and Afghan militia ground battles in Tora Bora, 

other Special Forces teams climbed the rugged cliffs and escarpments searching for suspected 

cave openings spotted in aerial photographs. Afghan, British, and American Special Forces 

teams worked their way upward along narrow mountain trails to elevations as high as 15,000 

feet above sea level where the air was thin and frostbite was a constant danger.73 The allied air 

bombing and the ground searches continued through December into January.

American and allied Afghan forces managed to topple the Taliban government and most 

of its army in Afghanistan in two months.74 In late September 2001, CENTCOM headquarters 

anticipated that the ground campaign would take two years.75 By December, the nature of the 

UW campaign to destroy al-Qaeda and their Taliban sympathizers had changed.76 CENTCOM 

and its anti-Taliban Afghan allies waged the initial phase of the war against enemy forces organized as conventional military units practicing orthodox tactics despite not having air superiority. This made them extremely vulnerable to conventional air attacks. The confl ict took on the 

character of a true guerrilla war in December, as the surviving Taliban and al-Qaeda fi ghters 

scattered to distant mountain strongholds and cross-border sanctuaries and blended back into 

their neighborhoods in cities and towns across Afghanistan.77

The following soldier stories explain the ARSOF combat missions and duties in the early 

days of the UW campaign in Afghanistan. The essentially fi rsthand accounts are presented 

chronologically, adhering to the introductory presentation. These are the most representative 

stories that illustrate what was happening on the ground and in the air, and they have been 

cross-referenced for accuracy and completeness with headquarters records. They are intended 

to allow the reader to feel the danger, high stress, and determination of the young ARSOF soldiers as they endeavored to make everything work in combat as well as the vagaries associated 

with all warfare. One cannot help but be impressed by the élan and top-notch fl ying skills of 

the 160th SOAR pilots and the courage and bravery of the Rangers and Special Forces soldiers 

who strove to accomplish their missions against great odds.

Jumping Into the Dark: Seizing Rhino, 19 October 2001

At 1845Z (Zulu), 19 October 2001, Task Force 3/75 Ranger, with a regimental command 

and control element, conducted a night combat parachute assault to seize a remote desert landing 

strip (DLS) to destroy Taliban forces; gather intelligence; provide a casualty transload site for 

other simultaneous combat operations; establish a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) 

for rotary-wing aircraft; and assess the capabilities of the airstrip for future operations. Four 

Air Force special operations MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft dropped 199 Army Rangers at 800 

feet above ground level (AGL) under zero illumination conditions to seize Objective Rhino.78

This was the fi rst Ranger combat parachute assault since Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama.

Objective Rhino, located southwest of Kandahar, Afghanistan, contained four separate objectives—Tin, Iron, Copper, and Cobalt. Air Force B-52 Stealth bombers had dropped 2,000-pound,
110

 Figure 22. 75th Rangers prepare for an airborne assault.

Figure 20. Shoulder scroll of the 3rd Battalion, 

75th Ranger Regiment.

Figure 21. Receiving mission orders before departure.
111

global positioning system (GPS)-guided bombs on Objective Tin before AC-130 Spectre gunships raked the target with heavy fi re. Initial reports were that 11 enemy had been killed and 

nine were seen running away. The AC-130 aircrews had identifi ed no targets on Iron. While 

they were unable to positively identify Copper from the air, they did fi re on the buildings inside 

and the guard towers on the walls of Objective Cobalt.

A Company (-), 3rd Battalion, 75th Rangers, with an attached sniper team, had the mission 

to secure Objectives Tin and Iron and prevent enemy interdiction of Objective Cobalt and the 

landing strip. Specialist Four (SPC) Martin Pasquez (pseudonym) sensed how low the Combat 

Talon was fl ying when dust blew inside as the jump doors were lifted open. As the parachutists 

fl oated down in the darkness, SFC Ron Searcey (pseudonym) and his platoon used the fi res on 

Objective Tin to orient themselves. Because airplanes and helicopters would be using the DLS, 

the Rangers had to bag their chutes and drop them clear of the strip. The Ranger task force was 

prepared for resistance, but only one enemy fi ghter appeared out of the darkness. Several Rangers of C Company swiftly shot him. Prior rehearsals paid off. The Rangers assembled quickly 

after the night drop, cleared Objective Iron, and established preplanned blocking positions to repel possible counterattacks.79 The mission for the C Company platoons was to clear Objective Cobalt, the walled compound on Rhino. Although Spectre gunships had put devastating fi re on the 

compound, damage was minimal. The thick concrete walls and building roofs (later discovered to 

be reinforced with rebar) had either absorbed the blasts or the cannon shells had punched through 

the roofs and ceilings leaving only holes. The guard towers were in the same condition. As the 

Rangers moved toward the walled compound, a loudspeaker team from the 9th POB broadcast 

tapes in three languages to encourage any remaining enemy fi ghters to surrender. Unbeknown 

to the Rangers, there was no one in the compound. Preassault fi re had breached one wall, and 

that gap became the Ranger assault entry point into the compound. Well-rehearsed Ranger teams 

quickly moved to clear their assigned buildings and guard towers. Clearing the interiors of buildings proved diffi cult and took longer than anticipated. A number of rooms inside had locked steel 

doors that could be opened only with multiple shotgun blasts or explosive charges.80

 Figure 23. Rangers preparing to seize Objective Rhino.
112

Fourteen minutes after C Company began clearing the compound, a Combat Talon landed 

with a medical team to treat those Rangers who had been injured on the jump. Six minutes 

later, the fi rst fl ight of helicopters supporting another combat operation in the area fl ew in to 

be rearmed and refueled. Air Force special tactics squadron (STS) airmen were surveying the 

DLS to determine its capability to handle larger aircraft. As these activities were done, orbiting 

AC-130 Spectre gunships destroyed several enemy vehicles moving toward the airstrip and a 

group of people approaching on foot.

Figure 24. Parachute assault on Objective Rhino.

Figure 25. Rangers clearing Objective Cobalt.
113

Refueled and rearmed, the helicopters fl ew off as the Rangers who cleared Cobalt moved to 

board the MC-130s that had refueled the helicopters. TF 3/75 Ranger systematically drew in its 

combat elements, maintaining all-round security, to reload arriving MC-130 aircraft. After the 

fi nal Combat Talon landed, the infrared airstrip markers were picked up, and TF 3/75 Ranger 

left Rhino 5 hours and 24 minutes after its parachute assault.81

Simultaneously with the parachute assault on Rhino, 26 Rangers from B Company, 3rd 

Battalion, 75th Rangers, and two Air Force STS airmen parachuted or airlanded on another 

airstrip, Objective Honda, to establish a support site for contingency operations related to Objective Rhino. As the second MH-60K helicopter fl ared on landing, the resulting “brownout” 

obscured the landing area, and the helicopter hit hard and tilted over on its side. Several soldiers 

aboard the aircraft were pinned under the Black Hawk wreckage. The mission quickly changed 

from supporting Rhino to rescuing the trapped soldiers and evacuating the friendly casualties. 

Unfortunately, two of the Rangers, Specialist Jonn Edmunds and Private First Class (PFC) 

Kristofor Stonesifer, were killed in the accident.82

True to their motto, “Rangers Lead the Way,” the 3rd Battalion Rangers led the way in 

Afghanistan. Aboard MC-130s en route to Objectives Rhino and Honda, the Rangers, wearing 

their parachutes and loaded down with weapons and equipment, had recited the inspiring words 

of their creed. “Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fi ght on to the Ranger 

objective and complete the mission.”83 Not only did they accomplish the mission but the Army 

Rangers also demonstrated that American military forces could strike swiftly, silently, and with 

deadly force day or night. They had shown the Taliban and al-Qaeda that there were no safe 

havens and that America could project its military power at will. CENTCOM commander GEN 

Franks said that the mission was an unequivocal success. “The objective was to prove . . . we 

will go anywhere we choose to go.”84 The Taliban and al-Qaeda learned that lesson on the 

night of 19 October. On 25 November, U.S. Marines occupied the site of the Ranger assault and 

designated their new facility Camp Rhino.85

Tactical PSYOP for Rhino

On 12 September 2001, Tactical PSYOP Detachment (TPD) 940, B Company, 9th POB, 

began target audience analysis for Afghanistan, specifi cally the Taliban regime, the Afghan 

populace, and the al-Qaeda network. Research continued until TPD 940 was sent to the 75th 

Ranger Regiment on 18 September, carrying its loudspeaker scripts that introduced forces, 

covered surrender appeals, and issued civilian noninterference warnings. After being briefed on 

Objective Rhino, TPD 940 decided to narrow its messages down to four. After several rehearsals with the Rangers, it departed for an initial staging base in the Middle East on 12 October, 

arriving there on the 14th.

For fi ve days, TPD 940 conducted fi nal planning, underwent several inspections, and participated in detailed rehearsals of actions on the objective. Inspections included personnel, weapons, ammunition, and combat equipment as well as the PSYOP product scripts and minidisc 

copies of the scripts in Urdu, Pashtun, and Arabic that would be used during the operation. The 9th 

POB Product Development Detachment (PDD) had also prepared leafl ets that were to be left on the 

objective. They were to communicate America’s resolve to stop terrorism and to let the enemy 

know that it had been there. Four of the most experienced PSYOP soldiers from TPD 940 
114

were selected to make the parachute assault with the Ranger task force: SSG Jack Thomas, SGT 

Mario Perez, SGT Gene Ball, and Corporal (CPL) John MacGinnis (pseudonyms).86

On 19 October, the Ranger task force prepared for the parachute assault operation that 

night. Just before donning their parachutes, the Ranger commanders and sergeants major gave 

last-minute words of encouragement, and the 75th Ranger Regimental Chaplain invoked a 

blessing on the force. Everyone, wearing parachutes and full equipment, was packed aboard 

the MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft. Seated on the fl oor, the 4-hour fl ight was long, cold, and 

uneventful except for the occasional fl are punctuating the darkness outside the paratroop doors. 

As TPD 940 fl ew to the objective, the soldiers’ minds raced with possible scenarios of once they 

landed: “Would the drop zone be mined?” “How would they react to enemy contact?” What 

would they do if one of the team were wounded or killed?”

SSG Thomas described his recollections after jumping out of the MC-130 at 800 feet above 

the ground:

It was completely black outside. . . . I could see one of the secondary objectives burning furiously from a bomb hit. . . . I heard sporadic fi re coming from Rhino. . . . As I was descending, 

the last of the aircraft fl ew overhead, dropping its load of Rangers. Just as it passed over, fl ares 

started popping out of it, illuminating the night sky and the airfi eld below just in time to orient myself on the horizon and prepare to land. I hit the ground like a rock and promptly found 

myself entangled in parachute suspension lines and 1⁄4-inch cotton webbing. I cut myself free, 

chambered a round in my weapon, activated my [night vision goggles] NVG, and scanned the 

immediate area for the enemy. Convinced that I was in no immediate danger, I gathered my 

chute and stuffed it into my kit bag, found a Ranger buddy, and moved to the assembly area.

As we waited in the assembly area, my element leader spotted an unidentifi ed person coming 

toward us from the vicinity of the compound. Several of us quickly acquired him and lased 

him with our PEQ-2s. Fire control was incredible as we watched and waited with lasers dancing all over the target until one found the glint tape arm band identifying him as a friendly 

Ranger. Once assembled, we moved toward our primary objective. [Tactical PSYOP Team] 

Figure 26. 75th Ranger calling card.
115

TPT 943 (SGT Perez and CPL MacGinnis) was leading with TPT 941 (myself and SGT 

Ball) in trail. While moving toward the objective, gunfi re erupted to our right rear fl ank. 

Our immediate response was to get down. Since we did not have a clear fi eld of fi re, we just 

stayed put. A lone Taliban had stumbled into a squad of Rangers guarding our right fl ank.

It was decided that another airstrike on the compound was necessary to ensure that no other enemy 

would walk into our formation by chance. Word was passed that an airstrike was imminent, so 

we lay fl at on the ground, pulled security, and waited. The AC-130 Spectre gunship strike can 

only be described as impressive. I was awestruck because 500 meters from my location highexplosive shells were impacting on the compound. Once the strike was over, we moved to our 

initial broadcast position.

As the lead Ranger element moved toward the objective, SGT Ball and I set up our loudspeaker and began to broadcast our fi rst message. It told anyone in the area that U.S. forces were present and that they needed to exit the buildings, stay away from the airfi eld, drop 

any weapons, and get down on the ground if they wanted to survive. We played the message 

for about 5 minutes. The broadcast resounded across the valley fl oor into the compound. 

There was no doubt that anyone in the area had fair warning. This done, we bounded forward 

to join the rest of the Ranger element at building #1, secured a room, and awaited orders.

We were told to assist in searching the building for any intelligence and weapons, and to 

be watchful for booby traps. We found a Soviet RPK machine gun with a belt of ammo in 

the feed tray, expended shell casings, belt links on the ground, a [rocket-propelled grenade] 

(RPG) launcher with 10 to 12 rounds nearby, and two AK-47 assault rifl es. The rooms had 

articles of clothing strewn about, mattresses and bedding, and other personal effects. After collecting the weapons, we distributed about 400 leafl ets in and around the building.

As we lifted off from the airfi eld to return to base, I proudly showed the machine gun on my back 

to those around me. We were all elated to have participated in and survived America’s fi rst ground 

strike against terrorism at Objective Rhino. I then got comfortable on the fl oor and went to sleep.87

The PSYOP broadcast team proved to be a combat multiplier for the Ranger task force deep in 

Afghanistan.

Showing American Power

“Good afternoon. Yesterday, U.S. military forces conducted ground operations in addition 

to our air operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Under the direction of the 

President, . . . Special Operations Forces, including U.S. Army Rangers, deployed to Afghanistan. I have several video clips of yesterday’s action to show you. You’ll see troops exiting the 

C-130 aircraft and jumping onto the objective.” These were the words of GEN Richard B. Myers, CJCS, at a press conference on 20 October 2001.88 The events he referred to and the clips 

he showed were TF 3/75 Rangers parachuting onto a desert airstrip near Kandahar.

Seemingly unrelated to that press conference MAJ Walter Barstow (pseudonym) was ordered to report to a special operations command headquarters on 19 September. Although his 

primary specialty was military police, among his contemporaries, Barstow had several unique 

qualifi cations. This Nichols State University political science major was a master parachutist 

who had worked with the Rangers. With an alternate specialty of PSYOP, Barstow was waiting 

to assume command of C Company, 9th POB. Within a matter of hours, however, he and 14 

members of the PDD were preparing for a new mission.89

Barstow had been briefed that his mission was to plan for PSYOP, to develop and produce 
116

PSYOP products, and to distribute them throughout Afghanistan. To accomplish this, he reorganized the PDD around a core of PSYOP specialists from A Company and had two technicians, broadcasters, and their Digital Audio Production System from 3rd POB. Presciently, he 

brought computers capable of editing digital video. These assets gave him the ability to produce 

loudspeaker disks, a limited ability to print leafl ets, and the ability to produce radio scripts for 

the Air Force EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft systems. Barstow was aboard an airplane bound 

for Masirah Island, Oman, on 10 October, knowing that the rest of the PDD would follow him 

two days later.

Like most Americans, Barstow and his team were immediately struck by the heat and humidity of Oman. Although they were personally uncomfortable living in those conditions, their 

greater concern was for their delicate, weather-sensitive equipment. The computers and printers 

had to be operated in an environmentally controlled work space. Once the PDD found a suitable 

place, installed and connected the environmental control unit, and tested its equipment, it could 

begin producing leafl ets.

Within a week of arrival, the PDD team received a mission that was more sensitive than 

developing and printing PSYOP leafl ets. Elements of 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, 

were to parachute onto a desert landing strip (DLS) near Kandahar to destroy Taliban forces 

and gather intelligence about the possible use of the strip for future operations. The media was 

constantly querying President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and the CJCS about when 

American military ground forces would be committed in Afghanistan. The 3/75 Ranger raid 

became a golden opportunity not only to seize a military objective but also to demonstrate U.S. 

determination to root out and destroy Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. Barstow and the PDD were 

suddenly key players in that initiative.

Barstow learned what assets were available to fi lm the Rangers on their objective. He found 

out that he would have the gun camera fi lms from the AC-130 Spectres, Ranger combat cameramen, and videotapes from a Navy P-3C Orion command and control aircraft. The latter was 

of great interest because that aircraft had enhanced surveillance capability and could transmit 

real-time video imagery. This enabled Barstow and his PDD to capture the imagery and surveillance recordings and begin editing information immediately.90

Figure 27. U.S. Navy P-3C Orion aircraft.
117

 Time was of the essence. Guidance from LTC Kim Battles (pseudonym), the special operations liaison offi cer in the Pentagon, was that the Secretary of Defense wanted fi lm of the raid to 

be available for the major news networks to show during the Saturday news cycle on 20 October—the day after the planned Ranger raid. Because of the 91⁄2-hour difference in time between 

Afghanistan and the east coast of the United States, Barstow knew he would have only a few 

hours to edit the videos and send a clip by satellite to the Pentagon for review. The edited version 

then had to be forwarded to the major networks to be incorporated into their broadcasts.91

As the video began to come in, Barstow realized he had about six hours of raw footage 

that had to be reduced to a 3-minute clip. He knew the Pentagon would then select segments to 

provide to the networks. The edited version had to clearly demonstrate American “boots on the 

ground” and to prove conclusively that those combat boots were on the ground in Afghanistan. 

Using their computer video editing capability, a combat cameraman and technicians from the 

PDD completed the task. Then, the communication section assigned it the highest dispatch priority and sent it to the Pentagon. LTC Battles received the video clip and rushed it to the Offi ce 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) where it was carefully reviewed. On Saturday, 20 October, 

during his 12:10 p.m. news conference, CJCS GEN Myers showed the world what the U.S. 

Armed Forces had done the previous night in Afghanistan. The video soon was played on every 

major network and news channel across America.

The United States had sent a message to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Myers told the assembled 

reporters: “One of the messages should be that we are capable of, at a time of our choosing, conducting the kind of operations we want to conduct.” As MAJ Barstow and the soldiers of the 9th and 

3rd POBs watched Myers’ news conference, they had the satisfaction of knowing they had made a 

signifi cant contribution in getting that message to the world. The United States was striking back.

“Look, We Have to Get the Special Forces Teams Into Afghanistan!”

After a week of aerial bombardment, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld ordered the next phase 

of the campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan to begin. He wanted military 

forces on the ground in Afghanistan to collaborate with the Northern Alliance warlords and 

with those forces that were friendly to the coalition. It was imperative that Army Special Forces 

ODAs link up with allied Afghan forces to make the plan work. The primary means of infi ltrating the ODAs was Army special operations helicopters fl own by the airmen of the 160th SOAR. 

The Night Stalkers had trained to penetrate any environment in the world and in any weather 

to reach an objective on time to the standard of plus or minus 30 seconds. The rugged Hindu 

Kush Mountains in northeastern and central Afghanistan tested the endurance and mettle of the 

aircrews and the performance and capability limits of the aircraft.92

The precipitous granite-faced high-altitude mountain ranges created rapidly changing 

weather systems that were very diffi cult to forecast based on conventional computer models. 

There were times when the weather changed signifi cantly by the hour. The terrain outside K2 

rapidly soared from 6,000 feet to more than 16,000 feet mean sea level (MSL). Narrow mountainous valleys intensifi ed and channelized the weather. Obscurations caused by precipitation 

and severe sandstorms that rose to more than 10,000 feet MSL forced helicopter pilots to fl y in 

zero-visibility conditions for long hours.
118

The MH-47E Chinook could penetrate the obscured mountain ranges at these high altitudes. The MH-47E multimode radar (MMR) system permits pilots to fl y in adverse weather 

with reduced visibility using its terrain following/terrain avoidance technology. The system 

cues the pilot to climb, descend, or turn to avoid obstacles and enables aviators to closely fl y 

over and around rugged terrain approximately 300 feet above the ground using nap-of-the-earth 

(NOE) techniques, thereby evading enemy detection.

Imagine sitting very still in a chair with all four of your limbs fi xed on a set of controls 

watching a 9-inch-square television screen 18 inches from your face. The pilot, often wearing 

NVG, is required to follow computer-generated directions that tell when to pull up on the controls, when to push down, and when to turn left or right. This procedure for terrain following 

requires continuous coordination between the pilot fl ying in response to computer cues and 

the second pilot, without NVG, who is navigating, announcing obstacles, and confi rming the 

mission data via intercom. Then add simultaneously monitoring another small screen for forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) that provides the pilots with limited situational awareness 

in obscured weather. This is not “seat-of-the-pants” fl ying.

The MH-60L Black Hawk Direct Action Penetrator (DAP) was designed to support the 

insertion of Army special operations teams deep in enemy territory to conduct SR and DA 

missions. Capable of providing armed escort as well as delivering a variety of ordnance, it has 

a sophisticated armament system, an integrated avionics suite that allows precise navigation, 

and a FLIR system that is superior to the MH-47E and enables the pilots to “see” through light 

obscurations. The DAP is not equipped with an MMR and must rely on tactical instrument 

fl ight to avoid mountainous terrain, essentially fl ying set altitudes above the highest terrain. 

Both aircraft can be refueled in the air. Knowing a little about the different capabilities of the 

two ARSOF aircraft and what was required to fl y in zero visibility will help readers appreciate 

the fl ight demands on today’s Night Stalkers.

Exact enemy locations were uncertain on the night of 19 October, but all knew that the 

antiaircraft artillery (AAA) threat was high. Without access to the bomb damage assessments 

from the air campaign, the 160th SOAR crews had little idea what percentage of the Taliban’s 

Figure 28. 75th Rangers rehearsing a fast

rope infi ltration from a 160th SOAR MH-60K.
119

AAA had been destroyed during the fi rst week of bombing. The attempt to infi ltrate a Special 

Forces ODA into the Panjshir Valley on the night of 17 October had been unsuccessful because 

mountain obscurations had forced the two MH-47Es to turn around when they could not break 

out of the clouds at 10,000 feet MSL along the planned ingress course. Thus, the air mission for 

19 October was to simultaneously infi ltrate one ODA into Landing Zone (LZ) Elspeth to link 

up with Fahim Kahn and one ODA into LZ Albatross to link up with General Dostum. Politically, both warlords had to receive their Special Forces teams at the same time. On the night of 

19 October, the infi ltration missions of the two teams had to succeed according to the pressure 

being applied from senior leaders.93

With a timed separation, three consecutive fl ights of 160th SOAR helicopters lifted off 

from K2, Uzbekistan, in the darkness. The fi rst sortie was a pair of MH-47Es followed by one 

MH-47E with two MH-60L DAPs, and the fi nal sortie was a lone MH-47E carrying emergency 

fuel (the “fat cow”) to serve as a forward arming and refueling point (FARP). Each fl ight of aircraft negotiated the obscured mountains of southeastern Uzbekistan. The Chinooks used their 

MMR, while the DAPs executed coordinated letdowns according to known terrain altitudes on 

their planned route that were cross-checked with the lead Chinook. Once each fl ight descended 

below the cloud layer, the aircraft rendezvoused with an Air Force special operations MC-130P 

tanker to refuel at approximately 3,000 feet MSL or 500 feet above the ground before crossing the Uzbekistan border. The single Chinook carrying the emergency fuel then broke off and 

fl ew to the southern border of Uzbekistan where it landed and waited for the other two fl ights 

to return.94

After refueling, the LZ Elspeth fl ight headed east and entered Afghanistan through Tajikistan. The visibility steadily decreased to near zero the farther south they fl ew because of a severe 

sandstorm in the high plains of northern Afghanistan. With Special Forces teams counting on 

them to get them to their LZ, the MH-47E helicopters separated and immediately began using 

the MMR to negotiate the terrain. Flying much the same route that had been unsuccessfully attempted two nights before, the fl ight of two climbed as it approached the mountain range and 

continued through the solid cloud layer. At 10,000 feet, the aircrews used the helicopter oxygen 

system to prevent hypoxia, a physiological condition resulting from a lack of oxygen in the blood 

that causes blackouts and, in extreme cases, death. Realizing the importance of the mission, 

Figure 29. Patriotism abounds at all hours. Figure 30. High-mountain terrain obstructed the route.
120

CPT John Gates (pseudonym), the air 

mission commander (AMC), said “Look, 

we have to get them in.” CWO Arthur Solanis (pseudonym), the fl ight lead pilot, 

directed the aircraft to press onward. The 

rest of the ingress route was obscured in a 

blanket of clouds, and the crews relied on 

the helicopter’s terrain-following radar.95

The route was planned to take advantage of narrow mountain passes. However, 

because clouds hid many of the mountain 

passes, the fl ight often had to estimate deviations to the course by relying on a paper map to 

locate alternate passes and avoid higher terrain. The fl ight of two MH-47Es had to climb to 

16,500 feet, an unnerving altitude for any helicopter, to traverse the fi nal ridgeline before entering the Panjshir Valley that was controlled by Northern Alliance forces. Once in the valley, 

the fl ight conducted a terrain-following letdown, relying solely on the aircrafts’ computerized 

systems and radar to descend into clearer conditions.

When the MH-47Es hit the intended LZ, they had expected fl ashlights or fi res marking the 

landing area but saw nothing. The two Chinooks cautiously landed and dropped off the ODA at 

0300. Having seen a small group of Afghans approaching the Special Forces team, Solanis kept 

his crew chiefs on their miniguns and monitored his radios for an emergency evacuation call as 

they lifted off. None came as they orbited the landing area. Satisfi ed that the Special Forces had 

met their greeting party, Solanis turned the fl ight to its planned egress route.96

Again, they encountered the same conditions: marginal weather, mountain passes obscured, 

and poor visibility at even higher altitudes. At one point, the two helicopters fl ew up a narrow 

valley only to discover that they could not clear an obscured pass that approached 20,000 feet. 

Then, at that extreme high altitude where lift is severely reduced and winds are turbulent, the 

pilots of both aircraft had to execute a 180-degree hovering turn before retracing their entry 

path. The aviators faced a real predicament; they could look up and see the stars or down and 

barely see the ground, but they were unable to see anything directly in front of the aircraft. Solanis instructed the fl ight to revert to the original ingress route to negotiate the obscured mountain 

range. Predictably, the deviations caused the MH-47Es to burn more fuel than the pilots had 

planned. Then, to further complicate matters, while descending from the mountains, the fl ight 

again ran into dust storms in the fl ats of northern Afghanistan. Thus, by the time the two Chinooks crossed the border they were critically low on fuel, but the MC-130P tankers from the 9th 

Special Operations Squadron (SOS), true to their word, were waiting on station, and the fl ight 

refueled. Relying on the MMR a fi nal time to negotiate the mountain range south of K2, the 

Night Stalker MH-47Es fi nally landed at the airfi eld after the more than eight grueling hours of 

fl ight—six hours of which was spent fl ying zero visibility in the clouds.97

The LZ Albatross fl ight of one MH-47E and two DAPs had a similar experience. After 

aerial refueling, CWO Alfred Mann (pseudonym), the fl ight lead in the Chinook, led the fl ight 

Figure 31. MH-47E clearing the “Bear” at night.
121

carefully around the populous town of Termiz, Uzbekistan, to fl y southeast toward Tajikistan. 

Just beyond the Amu Darya River, the northern boundary between Uzbekistan and its neighbors, was potentially a high AAA threat area. Mann chose to avoid the area by deviating far to 

the east and then backtracking toward Mazar-e-Sharif to reach LZ Albatross undetected. But 

soon after penetrating Afghanistan, the fl ight of three encountered a severe sandstorm. The 

MH-47E crew began using its terrain-following radar to avoid obstacles.98 The pair of MH-60L 

DAPs closed in on the lead Chinook, using the glow of its engine tail cones as reference points. 

The DAP pilots knew that as long as they stayed above the engine tail cones they would not fl y 

into anything. Their main concern at this point was avoiding a collision with the other DAP.99

The fl ight pressed on. The pilots aboard the Chinook and the DAPs “white-knuckled” the 

fl ight controls and stayed intensely focused on the instrument panel and the little outside visibility that was available. The aircrew members and Special Forces team riding in the back of 

the MH-47E knew they were just along for the ride; their lives were in the hands of the pilots 

up front. The FLIR initially provided some comfort to the DAP pilots because it could “see” 

through the dust storm, but as the fl ight climbed to negotiate the mountains, the dust cloud was 

transformed into a solid white cloud. About 11⁄2 hours into the fl ight, the DAPs, lacking a terrainfollowing radar capability, inadvertently lost sight of each other and the lead Chinook in the cloud 

blanket. The pilots on both DAPs executed their planned avoidance procedures and were able to 

climb clear and, with their aircraft infrared position lights illuminated, to regroup. The DAP 

pilots had pushed their aircraft capabilities to the extreme; the time had come to abort the escort 

mission and return to base. CWO Roger Charles (pseudonym), the DAP fl ight lead, explained 

his concerns to CPT Brian Jefferson (pseudonym), the AMC.100 Both agreed that for safety reasons the two DAPs should break off. The formation separated; Charles led his fl ight on a return 

course as tactically as possible in limited visibility; Mann continued alone to insert the ODA.

The Chinook crew traversed Taliban-controlled areas around Mazar-e-Sharif and negotiated terrain in excess of 10,000 feet using the MMR. When they hit the valley that contained LZ 

Albatross, the pilots did a terrain-following radar letdown, breaking out of the clouds at about 

500 feet above the ground. Despite the AAA threat, bad weather, and braving two hours of fl ying through enemy territory as a lone eagle, the Night Stalker MH-47E arrived at LZ Albatross 

on time. While the aircrew had been briefed to expect an LZ of loose gravel, the fl aring of the 

big aircraft turned reality—4 inches of lightly packed dirt—into a brownout where a thick dust 

cloud enveloped the helicopter and prevented the pilots from seeing the ground. With Mann 

backing him up on the controls, CPT Jefferson continued the approach, relying on the hover 

symbology on the advanced avionics to land the helicopter at 0200. When the dust cleared, the 

MH-47E crew saw a group of Afghans approaching the helicopter carrying AK-47s and RPGs. 

They turned out to be Dostum’s soldiers who had been guarding the LZ. The Special Forces 

team disembarked, gave the aircrew a “thumbs up” sign, and disappeared into the crowd.101

Mann adjusted his fl ight plan in the helicopter computer to egress and, confi dent that the 

Special Forces were secure, departed. The return route was almost a repeat of the entry—poor 

weather conditions, high terrain, and sandstorms. Without the burden of maintaining contact 

with the DAPs, the Chinook pilots returned at the best airspeed the aircraft could sustain, given 

the high altitudes. After crossing the Uzbekistan border, Mann met the MC-130P tanker at the 
122

right place and time, “hit the basket,” and refueled for the fi nal MMR leg to clear the mountain 

range southeast of K2. It had been a 51⁄2-hour mission with 31⁄2 grueling hours of fl ying blind 

in the clouds.102

Earlier, the DAP fl ight had crossed the border without incident, refueled, and returned to 

the airfi eld. The FARP Chinook lifted off from its location after all fl ights had crossed back into 

Uzbekistan and successfully refueled from the MC-130P tankers.

The Joint Special Operations Air Component–North (JSOAC-North) used the full spectrum of its air assets to complete the mission. The insertion of the two Special Forces ODAs 

deep into Afghanistan while TF 3/75 Rangers were parachute assaulting Objective Rhino had 

been accomplished by the highly trained, dedicated aircrews of the 160th SOAR and the 9th 

SOS. According to the Night Stalkers, the 9th SOS provided the best tanker support in theater. 

It was also a night of fi rsts for ARSOF aviation: MH-47Es served as the primary high-altitude, 

long-range insertion aircraft for the Special Forces teams going into combat; never before had 

Army helicopters fl own in combat in zero-visibility conditions in obscured mountains that exceeded 16,000 feet in altitude for such long durations; and never before in Army rotary-wing 

aircraft history had an aircrew fl own in combat more than two hours under oxygen. These 160th 

SOAR aircrews lived up to their motto, “Night Stalkers Don’t Quit.”

On Horseback With Dostum

Just after sunrise on 19 October 2001, in the Dari-a-Souf Valley in northern Afghanistan, 

CPT Mike Nash (pseudonym) waited for the man described in intelligence reports as a “ruthless warlord,” who would likely be unreceptive to Americans, and who might even attempt 

to kill him at their fi rst meeting.103 General Rashid Dostum, commander of the largest armed 

faction in northern Afghanistan, was an ethnic Uzbek and former Soviet tank offi cer who had 

been fi ghting the Taliban in the canyons of the “valley of the river of caves” for years. Little else 

about him was known for certain.104

Nash and the 11 men of his Army Special Forces detachment, ODA 595, had arrived in the 

Dari-a-Souf Valley several hours earlier in the darkness, fl own in aboard an MH-47E from the 

160th SOAR. Relying on their MMR, the Night Stalker pilots fl ew the Special Forces soldiers 

over mountains higher than the Rockies through a night sandstorm that had forced the two 

MH-60L DAP escorts to abort and required an air refuel while fl ying at 110 knots just 300 feet 

above the ground. After two hours of NOE fl ying, weaving through narrow mountain valleys 

on a moonless night, the Chinook arrived at LZ Albatross, a small plowed fi eld, at 0200, precisely on schedule. As arranged, a guide accompanied by his Afghan security guards awaited 

the team on the LZ. Emerging from the thick cloud of dust raised by the helicopter’s downwash, 

the heavily robed Afghans appeared to one American like the “Sand People” from the movie 

“Star Wars.” The guide led the Special Forces team into the darkness to a small mud-walled 

compound. There, the Special Forces soldiers formed a security perimeter with the Afghans 

around their new base.105

Then, Nash; his second in command, CWO Bill Phipps (pseudonym); and the team’s senior 

NCO, MSG Pat Earnhardt (pseudonym) received a 3-hour intelligence update from the guide 

party. The sketchy personality profi le of Dostum that Nash received in Uzbekistan was fl eshed 
123

out by the guides who described the Uzbek warlord as a smart, pragmatic man who was eager 

for American Special Forces support. The meeting with Dostum had been set for 0800, but 

there was no sign of the Afghan general. At 0900, an advance guard of 30 Afghan horsemen 

galloped into the American base camp “armed to the teeth”—carrying AK-47 assault rifl es, PK 

machine guns, and RPGs—and “looking pretty rough.” Dostum and 20 more heavily armed 

riders trailed the security party. Halting by the Americans, Dostum jumped off his horse, strode 

up to the Special Forces soldiers, and welcomed each with a fi rm handshake.106

Dostum, Nash, Phipps, and two of the guides, one of whom spoke Dari and served as 

translator, sat on a mound of carpets inside the walled compound. They drank a cup of hot 

shai—Afghan tea—before the general spread out his map and explained his long-term strategy 

and immediate campaign plan.107 Nash sized up the Uzbek general. In the isolation facility 

(ISOFAC) tents at K2, the JSOTF-North staff had described Dostum to the Special Forces team 

as “frail,” “crippled,” and weak from diabetes. “This guy’s healthy as an ox,” thought Nash, 

“and much bigger than the average Afghan, maybe six foot one or two inches tall, about two 

hundred and thirty pounds, and defi nitely the man in charge.” With close-cropped gray hair 

and a short beard, the deep-voiced Dostum looked Nash in the eye when he spoke. He shook 

hands frequently, in a confi dent, friendly way. Then, abruptly, the meeting was over. Dostum 

jumped up and announced that he wanted CPT Nash and three other Americans to accompany 

him on horseback to his command post several hours’ ride to the west. They were to leave in 15 

minutes. Their rucksacks would be delivered by mules later, he assured the Americans. Nash 

asked that two more Special Forces sergeants accompany the party, and the general relented. 

Nash quickly chose the men for his “split team” element. He took fi ve NCOs: his intelligence 

specialist, a medic, two communications specialists, and a weapons sergeant—Al Mix, Barry 

Ball, Vinsong Ming, Paul Wannamaker, and Sol Kitts (pseudonyms). They hurriedly repacked 

their rucksacks so they would fi t aboard their three donkeys. CWO Phipps and team sergeant, 

Earnhardt, stayed behind with the other half of the detachment—Sam Bagby, Wes Snow, Mark 

Exley, and Carey James (pseudonyms). They were to establish their base camp; organize the 

logistics of the Afghan-American force with Satar Hahn, Dostum’s supply offi cer; and receive 

the resupply bundles being airdropped on the LZ that night. Then Dostum rode off toward Dehi, 

leaving behind 10 of his security guards to lead the Americans to his command post.108

Figure 32. Dostum travels in a more traditional way.
124

It was a pure coincidence that the Special Forces captain chosen to ride with Dostum 

was the best horseman in 5th SFG. The lean, sandy-haired Nash was raised in north central 

Kansas on his parents’ cattle ranch and had competed in collegiate rodeo while he earned 

his degree in biology at Kansas State University. Initially, ODA 595 had been sent to Uzbekistan to accompany Army helicopters performing combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) operations in northern Afghanistan. Air Force special tactics personnel had arrived a week before the Army detachment, though, and were already on the job. Nash’s original mission was 

Figure 35. ODA 595’s second echelon moves

to link up with Dostum’s main body of fi ghters.

Figure 34. Mobility issues were overcome by an old-fashioned solution.

Figure 33. Pack mules and rucksacks— 

a good combination for ODA 595.
125

subsequently cancelled, and his men went to work putting up tents for the JSOTF-North headquarters. The team was without a mission until, by chance, it was selected to support General 

Dostum’s anti-Taliban force. The intelligence staffs had not discovered that Dostum’s 2,000 

troops were horse-mounted cavalrymen nor that Nash grew up as a cowboy.109

As the combined entourage moved up a narrow, rocky trail, Nash took measure of his 

team’s mounts. They were “tough little mountain ponies,” he noted, “like American mustangs 

from out West.” The Afghan horses were all stallions that pushed, bumped, and bit each other 

if they got close. The primitive saddles were too small for the American soldiers, and the stirrups were too short and nonadjustable. This forced the Special Forces soldiers to ride with 

their knees bent uncomfortably. The brass stirrups were also small and narrow; fi ne for the 

Afghans, but American combat boots stuck in them. The real danger, Nash realized, would be 

if anyone fell from his horse on the narrow mountain trails. He then issued the fi rst of several 

“Horse SOPs” to the men: “Keep your feet 

light in the stirrups,” he ordered. “If anyone is thrown by his mount and has a foot 

caught in the stirrup and the horse doesn’t 

stop immediately, the nearest man has to 

shoot the horse dead.” “You’ll be killed if 

you’re dragged on this rocky ground,” he 

warned his team. The SOPs were closely 

heeded. Although not as accomplished as 

Nash, Wannamaker had learned to ride as 

a boy in South Dakota. The other sergeants 

were all novices; several were fi rst timers 

on horseback.110

ODA 595 Begins Bombing Taliban Defenses

The horseback ride to Dostum’s command post was a journey back in time. When the 

Special Forces soldiers passed through the village of Dehi, CPT Nash felt like he was “riding 

through Biblical Jerusalem.”111 There were steep, barren brown mountains, the dirt trail, the 

mud huts, and not a single sign of modernity, save the muzzles of the Kalashnikov assault rifl es 

poking out from underneath the bearded men’s blanket-like robes. General Dostum had rallied 

some 300 fi ghters near Dehi, all rough-looking and well-armed mujahideen warriors. Their 

guides warned them about the village and its “hair-trigger reputation,” advising them, “Don’t 

hang out in Dehi.” As they rode slowly down the street through the crowd of glaring onlookers, Nash told his team to assume the Special Forces version of a politician’s “grip and grin.” 

“Smile and wave with one hand,” said the captain, “and grip your weapon tight with the other, 

ready to fi re.”112

On the ride to Dostum’s mountain redoubt, Nash concluded that communicating with his 

new Afghan allies would not be easy. While Dostum profi ciently spoke several dialects and 

languages, including Uzbek, Dari, Pashto, and Russian, Five-Nine-Five was lacking in that key 

Figure 36. An American Special Forces

soldier on his Afghan horse.
126

area. The team had long prepared for operations in the Middle East; thus, most team members 

were schooled in Arabic and French. Nash knew enough Russian to converse at the “caveman 

level,” and he was worried that he would not be able to talk with the Uzbek general that he was 

to support. The problem was alleviated in the afternoon when a middle-aged Afghan named 

Maqdoom came to the Dehi camp and introduced himself to Nash.113 Maqdoom could speak 

passable English. He became the translator for Nash in the leaders’ meetings.114

On 21 October, General Dostum led the Special Forces from his mountain command post 

to the front lines where Nash proposed to direct the aerial bombardment of the Taliban forces. 

Oddly, Nash observed, Dostum seemed very protective of him and his teammates. In addition 

to surrounding them with his personal bodyguards, Dostum would not allow the American soldiers any closer than 8 kilometers (km) from the Taliban front lines on a distant ridge. Nash’s 

team used the global positioning satellite receiver to confi rm their position, and then through 

the brownish haze plotted an azimuth and calculated the distance to a far-off enemy bunker. 

With this data, they plotted the map grid coordinates of the targeted bunker and radioed the 

coordinate numbers to a B-52 bomber high above.115

Figure 37. A middle-aged Afghan man.

The single B-52 bomber was fl ying 20-minute racetrack circuits in the sky 20,000 feet 

overhead, dropping a single smart bomb on each pass. The fi rst two bombs impacted a mile 

west of the target. That was when Nash observed almost 100 Taliban fi ghters climb out of their 

trenches to watch the bomber as it left thin white oblong circles of contrail vapor overhead, ap-
127

parently oblivious to the danger. The third bomb came the closest, hitting only 200 yards from 

the bunker. Nash radioed adjustments to the B-52, but the next three bombs struck more than 

2 miles farther away, in a different direction each time. Frustrated, Nash watched the Taliban

troops disdainfully gather around the closest bomb crater. Disappointed with the results, Nash 

cancelled the B-52 bombing after the sixth pass.

General Dostum, however, was buoyant. Maqdoom, the translator, explained, “You made 

an aircraft appear and drop bombs. General Dostum is very happy.”116 Physical damage to the 

Taliban defenses was not as important to Dostum as the psychological impact the massive 

bombs had on the Taliban soldiers, the translator told Nash. Dostum’s communications chief 

was able to tune in to the Taliban’s radio frequencies and, by listening to the chatter, gather intelligence. As the B-52 fl ew away, General Dostum picked up a walkie-talkie set to the enemy’s 

frequency and announced to the Taliban commander across the gorge, “This is General Dostum 

speaking. I am here, and I have brought the Americans with me.”117

Dostum was constantly on his satellite telephone. Riding at his side, CPT Nash heard him 

answer calls from journalists, national political leaders from Russia and Pakistan, and a U.S. 

Congressman. According to Maqdoom, the journalists repeatedly asked the general if American commandos had joined him. “No,” he would reply, “the only foreigners in his camp were 

some aid workers assisting his own soldiers.” This became an “in-house” joke between Dostum 

and ODA 595, with the general referring to the Special Forces soldiers as “humanitarian aid 

workers who were in Afghanistan to distribute ‘lead’ to the Taliban.”118

Aerial Resupply From the Receiver

While in isolation at K2 preparing for its mission, ODA 595 had planned for a year-long 

stay in the Dari-a-Souf Valley.119 All it would be able to carry with it on the helicopter into 

Figure 38. JDAM strikes were a morale booster for Dostum.
128

Afghanistan was what it could carry in pockets and rucksacks. The other supplies the team 

would need to survive the winter, as well as organize and train the anti-Taliban resistance force 

with whom it would work, were packed in bundles for later parachute airdrops. These resupply 

bundles would be dropped, one or two at a time, from Air Force special operations MC-130 

Combat Talon four-engine turboprop transports. The Air Force aircrews who were to deliver 

the resupply bundles had told Team ODA 595 in the ISOFAC, “All we need is a center point 

on your drop zone, and we’ll drop the bundle within 100 meters.” The drop altitude, they said, 

would only be 300 to 400 feet above the ground to ensure surface winds would not blow the 

parachute-supported bundle far from the center point. This was how the aircrews trained, and 

during joint exercises in the United States and the Middle East, the Special Forces detachment 

had witnessed bundle drops made with bulls-eye accuracy.120

The diffi culty of fl ying through the deep valleys of the Hindu Kush at night dramatically 

altered these plans. On ODA 595’s fi rst full night inside Afghanistan, a medical bundle was to be 

delivered. As CWO Phipps waited on the drop zone, he noted that the Combat Talon made its approach at almost 1,500 feet above the valley fl oor. Needless to say, the bundle landed 1⁄2 mile away. 

Each subsequent night, Phipps watched the lumbering MC-130 transport fl y the approach lower 

and lower, until the aircraft fi nally got down to an altitude of 800 feet, dropping that night’s resupply bundles directly on the small riverbed drop zone. As they rapidly gained experience fl ying at 

night in the harrowing conditions common to Afghanistan, the Air Force Talons made “nothin’ but 

net” parachute drops of resupply bundles onto drop zones no bigger than a tennis court.

After having to spend most of their initial days in Afghanistan on horseback, Nash wanted 

better saddles for the American team. He knew exactly what was needed—either the McClellan 

or the Australian saddle. These types were both lightweight, essential to prevent overloading 

the small Afghan stallions already burdened with about 75 pounds of blanket, saddle, feed, and 

bridles. The saddles that Nash wanted had adjustable stirrups. He specifi ed that the McClellans 

must have saddle horns for the rider to hold onto to maintain balance while traversing the steep, 

winding trails. The canvas Australian saddle had a curved aluminum bar in front as part of its 

frame to serve that purpose. When Nash radioed his request by digital transmission, he also 

emphasized that he did not want the Western trail saddle. That saddle was fi ne for big American 

quarterhorses, but it was too large and heavy for the Afghan mountain ponies.121 Three weeks 

later in mid-November, after ODA 595 had fought its way out of the Balkh Valley and into Mazar-e-Sharif, the team received two bundles with saddles by parachute drop. One set of saddles 

came from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, their home base, that the 5th SFG comptroller purchased. 

They were cordura nylon versions of the canvas Australian saddle, called “endurance riding 

saddles,” and were quite adequate for the task Nash had in mind.122

The second set came from the 21st Theater Army Support Command in Germany, purchased from a local Western store.123 “They were exactly what I said I didn’t want,” said Nash 

when he saw the heavy leather imitation Western trail saddles, well-ornamented with rows of 

nickel studs. At this point, it no longer mattered. Having defeated the Taliban and broken out 

onto the northern Afghanistan plain, the team had returned their horses and were now riding in 

small pickup trucks. Before leaving for Konduz, they turned the saddles over to the staff of the 

newly established Special Forces Forward Operating Base (FOB) 53.
129

Aerial Resupply by SOCEUR

Aerial resupply might appear simple to a casual observer, but combat experience from 

World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and even the humanitarian relief efforts of today have revealed 

how diffi cult the task can be. Weather and terrain do signifi cantly impact aerial resupply because aircraft carry the loads, and most are delivered by parachute. Supporting the war efforts 

in Afghanistan by air from faraway supply bases several hours distant complicated the task for 

logisticians doing their best to meet the needs of the combat forces. The next vignette will discuss aerial resupply from the provider’s perspective.

BG Les Fuller and his 

Special Operations Command, 

Europe (SOCEUR) managed 

aerial resupply for the Army 

Special Forces on the ground 

inside Afghanistan. When the 

9/11 attacks occurred, Fuller 

and his staff were two weeks 

into a combined fi eld exercise 

that had to be truncated so that 

participating American units 

could return to their bases in 

the United States. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) 

ordered another operation in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina starting 

Figure 39. 40-pound Western leather saddle (left)

instead of requested 15-pound Cordura saddle (right).

Figure 40. GEN Holland and BG Fuller with COL Mulholland.
130

on 25 September to proceed. Thus, American special operations forces (SOF) deployed to Sarajevo under Fuller’s direction where they helped police locate and arrest several terrorists, 

including suspected al-Qaeda members. The war on terrorism had begun for SOCEUR.124

 When BG Fuller and his contingent returned to Stuttgart, he received orders to provide 

aerial resupply to SOF in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. CENTCOM had tasked EUCOM to carry out this mission. SOCEUR got the mission and the authority to use $64 million of Title 10 funds to purchase the supplies that the Special Forces teams standing ready 

to enter Afghanistan would need. By 20 October, the day after the fi rst Special Forces ODAs 

were infi ltrated into Afghanistan, Fuller established a SOCEUR forward echelon at Incirlik 

Air Base, Turkey. This element soon grew to 250 personnel. Manpower for Incirlik came from 

the SOCEUR staff, including the J4 staff logistics offi cer, Air Force personnel from the 16th 

and 352nd Special Operations Wings (SOWs), the 5th SFG, and communications specialists 

from the SOCEUR signal detachment.125 Fuller’s deputy commander and chief of staff, both 

colonels, rotated the responsibility of commanding the SOCEUR element in Turkey monthly. 

To help with the logistics and aircraft coordination, Fuller sent two sergeants from C Company, 

1st Battalion, 10th SFG, Stuttgart, to the CJSOTF-North base at K2, Uzbekistan.126 The 21st 

Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM), U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), later sent part 

of the support battalion and parachute riggers from the 5th Quartermaster (QM) Company to 

Kaiserslautern, Germany, to assist with the steadily growing workload at Incirlik.127

The demand for aerial resupply grew every day. CENTCOM gave Fuller the JSOTF-Northgenerated list of 256 preplanned supply bundles that had to be assembled and prepared for parachute delivery at various dates over the next six months.128 Fuller’s number one priority, however, 

was to acquire and deliver red wheat and blankets to help America’s new Afghan allies survive the 

coming winter in their mountain retreats. In Texas and Montana, Fuller’s staff found the special 

red wheat that met CENTCOM’s stipulated requirements and had the grain expeditiously fl own to 

Ramstein, Germany, and then to Incirlik on scheduled C-5B Galaxy and C-17 Globemaster III jet 

transports.129 In Turkey, the wheat and blankets were transloaded onto C-130 Hercules turboprop 

transports for the fi nal leg to Afghanistan.130 The red wheat and blanket drops 

went on for two weeks and stopped when 

Afghan Northern Alliance forces began 

a general offensive against the Taliban. 

However, the line of supply remained the 

same: items the Special Forces teams in 

Afghanistan requested were collected and 

packed at Kaiserslautern and Ramstein, 

fl own by jet to Incirlik, then carried by 

tactical transports to their destinations. 

German parachute riggers helped the 5th 

QM Company (Air Delivery) [QM (AD)] 

and the USAR 421st QM (AD) Company 

from Fort Valley, Georgia, pack the nonlethal aid bundles.131

Figure 41. Units worked very long

hours to support resupply demands.
131

Four U.S. Air Force MC-130 Combat Talon transports from the 16th SOW fl ew the fi rst 

aerial resupply mission into Afghanistan on 22 October 2001. They took off from Incirlik at 

about 1500, local time, to arrive over their drop zones in darkness. The 14-hour round trip required two in-fl ight refuels. A Space Command representative at Incirlik provided digital maps 

to the pilots of the Combat Talons to help them program “way points” along their fl ight route. 

The drop altitude, the altitude at which the cargo was to be dropped by parachute, was typically 

1,000 feet above the drop zone or lower for these aircrews. Visual contact or communications 

with someone on the ground was the requisite for all lethal aid drops.

SOCEUR did not conduct the high-altitude drops of the yellow-plastic-wrapped humanitarian rations (later blue wrapped) that were scattered for miles and that received considerable 

coverage in the international news. Conventional Air Force C-17 transport crews dropped their 

humanitarian rations 29,000 feet above the ground, beyond the range of any antiaircraft missile 

that the Taliban was thought to possess. Humanitarian aid could also be dropped without having communications with anyone on the ground.132

Problems arose constantly. Fuller, the senior Green Beret in Europe, was frustrated by Special Forces ODAs in Afghanistan sending urgent resupply requests without specifi cs. On any 

given morning, SOCEUR could receive messages demanding the impossible—delivery that 

same evening. The time just to transload cargo at Incirlik made these requests moot. Despite 

computer technology, all e-mail logistics requests had to be logged in to track the action until it 

was delivered and to provide strict accountability for those items purchased with Title 10 funds. 

SOCEUR also received pressing requests for special operations radios and night vision goggles 

(NVG), but none of those items were stocked in Europe and had to be ordered and transported 

from depots or stripped from units in the United States. This delayed fulfi lling requests that 

Fuller knew from experience would be taken by the teams inside Afghanistan as “unresponsiveness” on the part of his command. He also felt that the Special Forces teams sometimes 

promised items to their Afghan allies that fell into the category of “unreasonable requests.” In 

one instance that Fuller recalled, a team requested four all-terrain vehicles to be airdropped 

to them in Afghanistan in 18 hours. “These items were not available in Wal-Mart, let alone in 

Germany,” said Fuller. “It’s hard to get special ops items.”133

Correspondingly, there were a number of problems on BG Fuller’s end of the resupply 

pipeline. He had to call other general offi cers in Europe to get permission to include tobacco 

items and candy bars in resupply bundles. Fuller reminded them that EUCOM had turned 

down SOF requests from Somalia for tanks and AC-130 Spectre gunships before the debacle 

at Mogadishu. “Who are we to second-guess the requests from the soldiers on the ground?” 

asked BG Fuller. After initiating nightly video teleconferences (VTCs) with SOCCENT in 

Tampa, Fuller cancelled them after a month because they provided “nothing useful.” That 

ended the direct coordination with SOCCENT. An early attempt to use high-velocity parachutes to drop critical gasoline and NVG padded with blankets and wheat was a total failure. 

All of the airdropped equipment and supplies “thundered in,” and what was not destroyed was 

scattered everywhere. It also took some time before the 421st QM (AD) parachute riggers who 

assembled the bundles of supplies learned to make them “man-portable” from the drop zone. 

They repacked cold-weather clothing in duffel bags with handles and shoulder straps. Before 

the 21st TASCOM sent additional riggers to Germany and Turkey, SOCEUR was so short on 
132

manpower that Fuller observed “colonels and lieutenant colonels building pallets and packing 

ammunition bundles . . . it was truly a pick-up game.” To Fuller, this demonstrated the “can-do” 

attitude prevalent in his command.134

A “Bump” and Missiles in the Abyss

The severe weather and high mountain terrain of northern Afghanistan tested the fl ying 

capabilities of the 160th SOAR pilots and the limitations of MH-47E Chinook helicopters during a critical resupply mission on the night of 23 October. A vast stationary front had settled 

along the Afghan-Uzbek border that thoroughly obscured the northeastern mountain ranges. 

The weather was horrible, and the terrain was extremely hazardous, which made the margin 

for fl ying errors miniscule, but the Special Forces team on the ground required special equipment, and “Night Stalkers Don’t Quit.” The detailed premission planning indicated that the 

potential for a mission abort existed at some time during the six-hour fl ight. But the 160th 

SOAR aircrews were mentally prepared for the long fl ight in the clouds at night in poor weather 

because they had been fl ying in these tough conditions for the past two weeks.

The fl ight of two MH-47E Chinooks lifted off in darkness from K2 Air Base without their 

MH-60L DAP escorts because the weather conditions in Afghanistan obscured the 8,000-foot 

“Bear,” a steep mountain ridge just beyond K2. As they crossed into Afghanistan, the Chinooks once again encountered a sandstorm in the northern plains. Separated by several miles 

to avoid collision, the MH-47E pilots used their terrain-following radar along the same route 

toward the next mountain range. CW3 Arthur Solanis, the fl ight lead, noticed an image appear, 

disappear, and reappear on his radar screen before he determined that it was nonrefl ecting sand 

dunes—not a good sign.135 As the fl ight began traversing the perilous mountain ridges, they 

relied solely on the aircraft systems as the “friendly” clouds masked them from enemy observation and potential antiaircraft fi re.

The two Chinook crews had been fl ying in zero visibility for three hours when the lead 

aircraft reached the planned turnaround checkpoint. Solanis, the fl ight lead pilot, discussed the 

situation with CPT Gates (pseudonym), the air mission commander (AMC), and suggested that 

they proceed to LZ Albatross.136 They had battled the environment to get this far, and the equipment aboard was said to be vital to the Special Forces ODA mission. Gates agreed, and Solanis 

radioed the trail Chinook, CW3 Derrick Donalds (pseudonym), of their decision to press on.137

As the fl ight continued toward LZ Albatross, the weather was slightly better than it had 

been earlier, but a dusty fog blanketed the valley containing the LZ. CW3 Donalds and his crew 

were able to visually close on the lead Chinook using their NVG and the FLIR since the fog was 

less dense at that altitude. The aircrew spotted the fl ashing infrared strobe that marked the LZ. 

As the lead Chinook made its approach to LZ Albatross, visibility was approaching a quarter 

of a mile. The lead MH-47E was to land while the second Chinook orbited overhead. Donalds 

slowed down and climbed a little above the lead Chinook to allow him space to maneuver in the 

narrow valley. Solanis told CW5 Brian Emerson (pseudonym), who was fl ying the cues generated by the radar, to overfl y the objective so he could survey the area.138 It was a tough LZ at the 

base of a horseshoe-shaped draw with steep terrain on all sides.

Solanis could see a strobe through his NVG when he took the controls to begin the 
133

approach. He maintained sight with the ground, banking the helicopter to the right since he was 

in the right seat. As Solanis maneuvered in this attitude, the crew members in the back could 

distinguish the contrast colors of the terrain only by looking straight down. SSG Lee Clauden 

(pseudonym) shouted on the intercom to Solanis, “Hold your descent, sir!”139 and immediately 

issued directives to climb “Up, up, up” as the distance between the Chinook and the “rising” 

terrain quickly evaporated. All four landing gear impacted simultaneously against the ground 

in a big bump!! Then the large helicopter “trampolined” off the sloping wall back into the mist. 

The Chinook attitude proved to be at exactly parallel to the terrain when it bounced off the 

ground. From above, CW3 Donalds saw both sets of helicopter rotor blades fl ex down, and a 

dust cloud puffed out from behind the Chinook. He knew they had just touched the ground.

Although startled, the pilots, with cool precision, held the lifting aircraft’s attitude while 

quickly scanning multifunctional cockpit displays to gain situational awareness. The pilots confi rmed that they were climbing and that the aircraft was clear of obstacles. The FLIR was still 

working but was locked in its last position, aimed at the LZ. Emerson quickly cycled the FLIR 

control and recovered full functions. The crew members in the back hung outside to confi rm 

that all landing gear was still intact. No one had been injured during the bump and recovery. 

Once their beating hearts had slowed, CPT Gates and CWO Solanis decided that landing was 

too hazardous in these conditions. Solanis told Donalds that the fl ight was headed home. The 

two Chinooks reversed course, acquired separation, and headed into the obscured Hindu Kush 

Mountains, fl ying nap of the earth (NOE).

As the second helicopter had just cleared the fi nal ridge at the edge of the northern plains 

and descended below the cloud layer at approximately 800 feet and while Solanis was focused 

on “a new city of lights” in the distance near the border, the crew in the back suddenly saw fl ashes in the clouds behind the trail Chinook. Donalds’ aircrew also saw fl ashes, but they thought 

Air Force bombing was probably the reason. Later, Special Forces teams on the ground would 

report the fl ashes as antiaircraft artillery (AAA) fi re. Then, as the two MH-47Es approached the 

border, Donalds reported a surface-to-air missile (SAM) launch at his 3 o’clock position. First 

he saw the booster motor fl ash and then the fl ight motor fl ash, but it exploded away from the 

helicopter. His right gunner also saw the fl ash. The automatic fl are dispenser did not discharge 

because the missile never got close. But just seconds later, two volleys of fl ares were launched 

from Donalds’ aircraft. The crews on both aircraft watched as the missiles exploded safely away 

from the Chinook. For the crews, it was a tense moment, but all were relieved when the fl ares 

worked as advertised. The fl ight crossed into Uzbekistan minutes later and returned to K2 Air 

Base without further incident.140

The Night Stalker pilots battled the environment for hours to arrive at their objective on 

time. Weather conditions compounded the landing risks posed by extreme terrain hazards that 

surrounded the LZ on three sides. Still, they persevered. The “icy cool” recovery from the bump 

experience demonstrated how good the 160th SOAR pilots were, but the “envelope had been 

pushed to the extreme” and further risk to the crew and aircraft was out of the question. It was not 

“life or limb” on the ground, and the air mission was only half over. They still had to deal with the 

terrain and weather systems, in reverse order, and the threat of AAA required constant vigilance 

by every crewman if they were to survive to fl y tomorrow’s SOF missions.
134

500 Afghans Can Die, But Not One American Can Be Injured

Rapport between General Dostum and his commanders and Special Forces ODA 595 improved with 

each bomb that was directed on the Taliban. Yet, CPT 

Nash had to improve the effectiveness of the bombing, and that meant getting closer to the enemy. Although he repeatedly insisted, the Uzbek general objected.141 “Five hundred of my men can die,” Dostum 

told Nash, “but not one American can even be injured or you will leave.” Dostum was convinced that 

if any U.S. soldier was killed, the U.S. government 

would withdraw all Americans from Afghanistan. 

Nash knew that Dostum had assigned his own bodyguards to protect the Special Forces troops 

but did not discover until later that the bodyguards were threatened with death should anything 

happen to the Ameriki. By continually pressing the matter at every meeting of commanders for 

two days, the general relented, having seen Nash under fi re and been assured that the United 

States would not renege on its commitment to support him with soldiers.142

AAA = A Bad Night in the Hindu Kush

As the number of Special Forces ODAs being inserted in Afghanistan increased, the 160th 

SOAR aviators knew the enemy was becoming familiar with fl ight routes and how the helicopters operated. There were only so many avenues of approach through the mountain ranges, 

and these shrank considerably when the weather turned particularly bad. Enemy agents were 

known to be present along the borders, and the Taliban was known to have links with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Intelligence resources identifi ed a pattern of increased 

activity along the border at the planned penetration points and times. To protect themselves, 

the Night Stalkers varied ingress routes across the border since they were never confi dent of 

the true threat picture. The intelligence section (S2) provided the best analysis based on the 

amount of data available. The weather remained as much a threat as the Taliban and al-Qaeda

Figure 42. Bodyguards for the

Special Forces team.

Figure 43. General Dostum sharing a meal with 

Special Forces personnel.
135

in October, but Special Forces ODAs had to be infi ltrated and, once on the ground, resupplied. 

The adverse weather proved to be both a blessing and a curse.

The mission on the night of 28 October was to insert a two-man Air Force special tactics 

squadron (STS) team into LZ Albatross and to resupply the ODA operating in the area. The air 

mission required four aircraft: a pair of MH-60L DAPs to provide armed escort and a pair of 

MH-47E Chinooks to carry the personnel and cargo. While all aircrews were confi dent they 

could reach the border, anticipated weather in the Afghan northern plains posed a problem for 

the DAPs, which did not have terrain-following radar. The intelligence offi cer had reported no 

new AAA threats along the fl ight route.

The fl ight of four helicopters lifted off from K2 in typical fashion, gained separation to 

cross the “Bear” (the high mountain just outside of K2), and descended to refuel with the 

MC-130P tankers before crossing the border. As anticipated, the now familiar sandstorms in the 

northern Afghan plains were waiting for the helicopter fl ight. About halfway across the plains, 

or fl ats as the pilots referred to them, visibility dropped to almost zero/zero conditions, forcing the DAPs to turn back. CW4 Roger Charles (pseudonym), the DAP fl ight lead, told CW3 

Solanis, the Chinook fl ight lead, that they would meet them on the egress route if the weather 

improved.143 CPT Gates, the AMC, concurred.144 CW3 Donalds, in the trailing Chinook, automatically picked up separation as they fl ew toward the Hindu Kush Mountains.145 As the two 

approached the Hindu Kush, they passed in and out of scattered clouds, all the way up the 

mountainside. At 9,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) visibility cleared. The moon was full, and 

illumination was near 100 percent as they cleared the mountain ridge.

As Donalds descended below the clouds on the other side, the crew could see the lead 

Chinook about 11⁄2 miles ahead. The fl ight of two fl ew parallel to a ridge on the right, and occasionally, the Chinook’s refl ection could be seen moving across the ground below. Suddenly, the 

crew chief manning a side minigun spotted a fl ashlight being switched on and off from a cave 

embedded in the mountainside. Farther down the ridge another fl ashlight switched on and off 

from another cave, with the beam shining down to the valley fl oor. The signifi cance of the fl ashing lights had not registered with Donalds and his copilot, CW3 Jerry Tucker (pseudonym), 

until missiles streaked upward from the valley fl oor.146 Tucker, fl ying in the left seat, reacted to 

the sight of antimissile fl ares being “popped” by the lead Chinook by releasing his fl ares. Then 

crew members in both helicopters saw two missiles explode between them. The pilots in each 

Chinook began executing radical evasive maneuvers, banked hard right, and climbed over a 

parallel ridgeline to escape the AAA threat. In the melee, Donalds and Tucker lost sight of the 

lead, which had a third missile fi red at it before the helicopter cleared the danger area. As the 

two MH-47Es crossed into a big valley, the weather cleared, and the two helicopters linked up 

before landing at LZ Albatross.

CW5 Emerson, fl ying lead with Solanis, landed on the LZ. The STS team disembarked 

and was met by the Special Forces team that took the resupply bundle. Meanwhile, Donalds 

and Tucker, circling above, had two vital aircraft systems fail simultaneously—his multimode 

radar (MMR) and forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR). Reminded by the clouds hovering 

above the ridgeline that he had to fl y through the same weather system to get home, Donalds 

explained his problems and improvised a plan. He would climb to an altitude that cleared the 
136

terrain, and Solanis, in the lead, would relay pertinent information en route, verifying clearance 

altitudes and updating weather conditions, much as the Chinooks had done for the DAPs. The 

lead lifted off LZ Albatross and headed toward the ridgeline with the trail helicopter picking up 

separation as the two Chinooks approached rising terrain and the cloud layer. Within minutes, 

the pilots of the second MH-47E were fl ying strictly with their instruments, deviating only 

when cued by the lead.

Solanis updated Donalds on his position and weather conditions. After several minutes, 

the two helicopters reached a clear space between a layer of scattered clouds above and broken 

below, several miles and terrain features offset from their ingress route. When Donalds, in the 

trail aircraft, was abeam the area of the missile shots, he jokingly remarked, “Well guys, if it 

makes you feel any better, we are in good guy land now and should have no more problems 

getting home.” After descending below the clouds into a big valley illuminated by a full moon, 

Donalds saw muzzle fl ashes in the valley ahead near Solanis’ helicopter.

Simultaneously, SSG Clauden, the fl ight engineer in the lead helicopter, saw fl ashes and 

yelled, “Triple A, Triple A, Break right, Break right!” into the intercom.147 As the missile exploded behind the lead, the automatic countermeasures system instantly deployed fl ares. Instinctively, Clauden also manually launched additional fl ares, inadvertently silhouetting the 

second Chinook. Antiaircraft shells exploded all around his helicopter. Emerson and Solanis 

ordered the crew chiefs manning the two M-134 miniguns to “Return fi re!” They did so, but 

the radical, abrupt turns Emerson executed to break contact rendered the fi re very ineffective. 

The gunners were either looking up at the stars or the ground and most of the time were just 

hanging on for the ride. Emerson told Donalds that they were taking fi re and were heading into 

the clouds for protection. As Emerson climbed, Clauden saw fl ashlights being illuminated, sequentially marking their fl ight path. Fortuitously, a saddle in the ridgeline appeared that enabled 

Emerson to accelerate out of the ambush valley into another that appeared to be uninhabited. In 

their frantic effort to break out of the AAA ambush zone, the pilots in the lead Chinook aircraft 

lost radio contact with Donalds in the trailing MH-47E.

Figure 44. MH-47E deploying fl ares during a AAA threat.

Within moments after Emerson was fi red on, the trail Chinook began receiving fi re. SSG 

Tom Dugan (pseudonym), the fl ight engineer, yelled, “Turn left, Turn left, Triple A, Triple A!” 
137

into the intercom.148 On the opposite side of the beleaguered Chinook, SSG Michael Bartley 

(pseudonym) yelled, “Hold your left! Hold your left! We’re right next to a cliff!”149 Donalds, a 

former AH-1 attack helicopter pilot, took the fl ight controls and began using his “Cobra fl ying 

skills,” as the crew would later say, “bank-rocking” the helicopter hard in opposite directions to 

snake his way though the AAA ambush as his crew members called out the directions of the incoming rounds. The AAA rounds exploded in big fl ashes around the Chinook, causing the night 

vision goggles (NVG) to temporarily shut down. Realizing that he was caught in a cross-fi re 

between a machine gun and AAA on opposing ridges, Donalds dove for the valley fl oor 2,000 

feet below. As he pushed the yoke forward, he remembered that Soviet helicopter pilots tried the 

same tactic only to fi nd the real ambush near the bottom of the valley. Soviet aircraft lacked the 

power to climb over the terrain while evading. But there were no other options because AAA 

and red tracers were encircling the aircraft.

The aircrew in the back had been thrown to the fl oor and could not return fi re with the aircraft miniguns. The smell of burnt cordite fi lled the helicopter. When Solanis radioed from the 

lead, Donalds ignored the call as he responded to the instructions from the crewmen and continued evasive maneuvers. The Taliban forces easily shifted fi re. It was obvious that they could 

see the big Chinook. Suddenly, a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) shot straight up from the far 

ridge where they were headed. It missed and did not explode. As the ground raced toward them, 

Donalds eased his descent and slipped into the dark shadows of the terrain for cover, fl ying 20 

to 30 feet off the ground. The enemy fl ashlights sequentially tracked the Chinook about a mile 

down the valley. Then, seeing the same saddle in the ridgeline by which Emerson had escaped, 

Donalds broke contact and escaped. The Taliban had the Chinook in their grasp for a full minute and a half before the big bird broke free. Afterward, one crew member remarked, “I didn’t 

think a Chinook could fl y like that!”

Figure 45. Night Stalker crew chief.

Solanis had just started turning back when Donalds radioed that he had made it through. 

Relieved, Solanis returned to the planned egress route, traversing the remaining mountains 

with Donalds following several minutes behind. As the two Chinooks raced over the northern 
138

fl ats, CPT Gates told the DAP fl ight lead, Charles, to turn around because they were fl ying as 

fast as possible and the MH-60Ls would not be able to keep pace laden with weapons. Eventually, the Chinooks passed the DAPs and “hit” the refuel MC-130P. All aircraft returned to K2 

without any further problems.

The mission debrief was short. The crew handed the intelligence offi cer the FLIR tapes, 

and Clauden announced, “We’re going to bed.” Some just went off by themselves to refl ect 

on the recent events, while others simply laughed; all had cheated death again. CW3 Donalds 

stated simply, “It was a bad night.” The next day, the S2 told the Chinook crews that they had 

fl own over a Taliban division headquarters that had relocated after fi ghting Northern Alliance 

forces. Amazingly, the current intelligence assessment of the battlefi eld was simply, no new 

threats. Regardless, the close calls under fi re on 28 October strengthened crew cohesion and 

instilled greater confi dence among the Night Stalkers.

Getting a Handle on the Air Threat

Once the Special Forces ODAs were on the ground, there was enough human intelligence 

(HUMINT) that CWO Jefferson’s intelligence staff, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, and the Joint 

Special Operations Air Component–North (JSOAC-North) could develop the Taliban order of 

battle down to company-level elements. This was critical to the Night Stalker aircrews. CENTCOM analysts had only identifi ed brigade-level units. With the mobility of the Taliban AAA, 

it could split up elements rapidly to cover the limited air routes in and out of Afghanistan. The 

2/160 SOAR order of battle assessment proved to be so well developed that the JSOTF-North, 

the Combined Air Operations Center, the Combined Force Air Component Command, SOCCENT, and CENTCOM used it. This order of battle later contributed to the success of the 

bombing campaign.150 Additionally, the JSOAC intelligence staff functioned as the targeting 

cell until the JSOTF received an Air Force F-16 targeting offi cer. When everything was enemy 

or “red” in Afghanistan, there were few concerns, but once friendly or “blue” forces were on 

the ground, the targeting became more diffi cult.

Fostering Faith and Providing Solace

Some ARSOF warriors carried state-of-the-art weapon systems into battle, some fl ew sophisticated helicopters great distances in terrible weather, but for a small group of soldiers, the 

power of prayer was their weapon. CPT Mark Knapp (pseudonym) was the chaplain of 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, at K2. The Southern Baptist chaplain was everywhere—at air mission briefings, in the maintenance area during fl ight preparations, on the fl ight line for departures, at the 

fl ight line when the Night Stalkers returned, and he was available when the crews awakened.151

Before leaving Campbell Army Airfi eld, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, Knapp had prayed for 

the soldiers’ protection aboard the C-17 Globemaster III and C-5 Galaxy transports and en 

route. At K2, he started building a ministerial team, locating fi rst, Air Force Chaplain Daniel 

Cook (pseudonym) and a few days later, Chaplain (LTC) Mark Bojune (pseudonym), 5th SFG 

chaplain with whom he shared a chapel back at Fort Campbell.152 The three chaplains acquired 

a 50-person tent and, with footlockers of Bibles, the Koran, a Jewish Prayer Book, Jewish 

scriptures, Spanish Bibles, and dehydrated grape juice, they began to offer religious services at 

Stronghold Freedom. Quickly, it became standing room only for most services.153
139

In the manly, chest-thumping world of special operations, with its competitiveness, 

aggressiveness, and sense of urgency, a dichotomy existed between the operational world 

and the spiritual world, and the two did not necessarily mix. The special operations soldiers 

conducted intense, precise planning and detailed mission rehearsals; missing the slightest detail 

could cost lives. According to Chaplain Knapp, “We told the operational world what God was 

doing as a result of time spent in prayer.” The Special Forces teams and 160th SOAR aircrews 

survived the challenges of severe weather; rough, high-altitude mountainous terrain; and AAA 

nightly, and helicopter maintenance was nearly perfect.154 The SOF commanders recognized 

their chaplains’ important roles. An invocation opened each daily staff update. Knapp was added 

to the air mission briefi ng agenda to ensure that those seeking solace had an opportunity to pray. 

On the fl ight line, he rendered a departing prayer for protection and success, and afterward, he 

was available for those who wanted to give thanks, especially after the most harrowing fl ights. 

B Company’s 1SG Dan Garrison (pseudonym) made it a point to know where Knapp was 

during the day to direct personnel.155

AAA Payback Time

By mid-November, the weather had improved slightly, enabling the MH-60L DAPs to perform their armed escort of the MH-47E Chinooks. No longer hindered by sandstorms, CW4 

Charles, the fl ight lead, knew the DAPs posed a formidable threat to Taliban forces hiding in 

the darkness. These Night Stalkers could get up close and personal.156 However, not all Taliban

and al-Qaeda forces were dissuaded by the presence of the armed escorts and took shots at 

passing helicopter fl ights. Although the city of Mazar-e-Sharif fell to Northern Alliance forces 

on 9 November, sizable pockets of “hard-core” Chechen al-Qaeda fi ghters continued to resist. Taliban heavy weapons changed hands, sometimes daily, as Commander Usted Atta and 

General Dostum maneuvered to control the second largest city in Afghanistan. Caught in the 

middle by this jostling were the Special Forces ODAs assigned to each leader and the 160th 

SOAR DAP crews with a strong desire to destroy enemy targets, especially the Taliban AAA 

assets. The rules of engagement (ROE) were clear when heavy weapons belonged exclusively 

to Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. The problem was the forces of rival warlords using “captured” 

equipment to “fi re up” American helicopters to cause trouble.

On the night of 13 November, while escorting a pair of MH-47E Chinooks to Deh Dadi 

airfi eld, the DAPs received antiaircraft fi re and had a missile fi red at them from the vicinity of 

a school compound on the outskirts of Mazar-e-Sharif. The pilots executed evasive maneuvers 

as the automatic countermeasure systems launched fl ares. Unable to positively identify the site 

from which the missile came, neither DAP returned fi re. CW4 Charles diverted CWO Alfred 

Mann, the Chinook fl ight lead, away from the suspected danger area.157 After completing the 

mission and returning to K2, the pilots, during their debrief, were told that Chechen fi ghters 

were suspected to be operating out of a school in Mazar-e-Sharif.

Three nights later, on another armed escort mission to Deh Dadi airfi eld, Charles alerted 

CWO Walter McCracken (pseudonym), in the other DAP, that he had spotted a group of vehicles along the east-west road leading into Mazar-e-Sharif.158 The two MH-60Ls maneuvered 

for a closer look, weapons at the ready. As they drew near, the gun crews identifi ed a halted, 

strungout convoy composed of armored personnel carriers, a few tanks, and about 15 people 
140

standing about in the vicinity of Chemtal, a small village 15 km west of the city. Since Mazare-Sharif had fallen, the ROE had become more restrictive. The DAPs could not engage threats 

unless fi red on without the air mission commander’s (AMC’s) approval. The request was denied 

because ownership of the military equipment could not be determined. The DAPs simply diverted the Chinooks around the cluster of vehicles.159

As the fl ight closed on Chemtal, Charles spotted two Soviet ZPUs with quad-mounted 

14.5mm machine guns used for air defense. They were in the open with people 500 meters away. 

This time, approval to engage was granted because the ZPUs posed a threat to aircraft; they fell 

within the ROE. The people 500 meters away made them “free game.” Charles and McCracken 

coordinated their attack runs and destroyed the ZPUs with 2.75-inch rockets and 30mm chain 

guns—rapid-fi re cannon capable of shooting 625 rounds of high-explosive 30mm ammunition 

per minute. The people scattered for cover when they heard the DAPs roaring in on the ZPUs. A 

fi nal pass confi rmed that the two ZPUs were ruined. Charles relayed the information to the Chinooks and to TF Dagger. The DAP aircrews felt that they had accomplished what they were sent 

to Afghanistan to do. After two months of frustration, the Night Stalkers had killed something. 

The rest of the mission was uneventful, but when the crews returned to K2, morale was very high.

Bastogne in Afghanistan

Students of American military history readily will recognize the name “Bastogne” as the 

site of the epic World War II battle where BG Tony McAuliffe and the 101st Airborne Division 

stood their ground against repeated German assaults during the Battle of the Bulge. In November 

2001, B Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Rangers, made the second combat parachute assault during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Like their airborne predecessors, these Army Rangers 

made a daring night jump to do what those “Screaming Eagles” would not have imagined—to 

seize a desert landing strip (DLS) to support forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations to facilitate attack helicopter raids on Taliban and al-Qaeda objectives in Afghanistan.

Figure 46. 75th Rangers conducting long-range armed reconnaissance.

At 1800Z, 13 November 2001, with less than 24 hours’ notice, one MC-130 Combat 

Talon dropped 32 Rangers and an eight-man Air Force special tactics squadron (STS) element 

led by CPT David Watson (pseudonym) onto DLS Bastogne southwest of Kandahar. The 

combat jump at 800 feet was made in pitch black darkness into an area without markings and 

without distinguishable landmarks. As soon as it landed, the Ranger assault unit bagged up its 

parachutes to preclude damage to arriving aircraft, assembled, and established security. Night 
141

combat jumps during World War II were characterized by paratroopers being scattered across 

the landscape. Assembling units, and sometimes just groups, of paratroopers was extremely slow. 

Technology, though, has progressed far beyond the “cricket” tin noisemakers 82nd and 101st 

Airborne Division soldiers used on D-day at Normandy. Using hand-held global positioning 

devices (about one per fi re team of four to fi ve soldiers), Rangers punched in the coordinates of 

the assembly area, and that single technological advancement enabled the troops to assemble, 

with parachutes, in about 45 minutes. The Air Force STS team verifi ed that the strip was suitable 

for C-130 four-engine turboprop transports before placing the infrared landing lights down its 

length.

At 1915Z, the fi rst MC-130 landed to quickly unload two helicopters and a mobile FARP. 

Fifteen minutes later, the second MC-130 landed and unloaded two more helicopters and 

another FARP. Less than 15 minutes after the second MC-130 landed, the four helicopters were 

airborne en route to their raid objectives. With the helicopters clear, the two MC-130s took 

off for an aerial refueling rendezvous. At 2100Z, the helicopters returned to rearm and refuel 

before departing on another raid. At 2222Z, the MC-130s began landing at DLS Bastogne to 

reload the FARPs and await the returning attack helicopters. After conducting their raids, the 

helicopters returned to Bastogne, were loaded onto awaiting airplanes, and the entire force, 

including the Rangers, was airborne by 2334Z.160

The parachute assault on Objective Bastogne demonstrated that airdropped Rangers could 

secure an airfi eld deep in enemy territory to support a FARP for attack helicopter raids. This capability provided American SOF commanders with another way to attack high-priority targets 

in areas where enemy forces might feel secure. The capacity to project surgical power anywhere 

and anytime the U.S. government decides is essential to America’s global war on terrorism.

“Little Birds” of Prey

As part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), the attack helicopter pilots 

and crews of B Company, 1st Battalion, 160th SOAR, were anxious to engage the Taliban and 

al-Qaeda forces on behalf of their nation. Their opportunity fi nally came early on the morning 

of 13 November. It was short notice, but the attack element was ready. CWO Joseph Morris 

Figure 47. 75th Rangers awaiting MC-130s.
142

(pseudonym), an AH-6 attack helicopter fl ight lead pilot, was told that the “Little Birds” would 

soon be part of the fi ght in Afghanistan.161 About 0100, targets were identifi ed, and the attack 

team went into action; the pilots and crew members developed courses of action, planned fuel 

and armament, and established fl ight requirements. Morris briefed their plan fi ve hours later at 

0600. With an approved plan, the “Little Bird” crews spent the next fi ve hours coordinating fi nal 

arrangements and preparing equipment, helicopters, and personal gear before bedding down.162

By 1730, four AH-6 attack helicopters and crews, two mobile FARPs, and the armament and 

refuel personnel were cross-loaded on two MC-130E Combat Talon transports. The four-engine 

turboprop engine aircraft is equipped to infi ltrate, exfi ltrate, and resupply SOF and equipment 

in hostile or denied territory.163 The two MC-130Es departed at 1945 for a DLS that would be 

secured by Rangers. At 2345, the fi rst Combat Talon landed and unloaded its cargo and was 

guided off the runway. Exactly 15 minutes later, the second MC-130E landed and was unloaded. By 0015, four heavily armed AH-6 “Little Birds” were en route to Objective Wolverine.

The zero-illumination condition stretched the limits of the night vision goggles (NVG) the 

special operations aviators routinely wore. The high desert vegetation provided little contrast. 

These fl ight conditions demanded precise navigation and intense concentration by the pilots 

under NVG to avoid fl ying into the ground. Despite these factors, Morris pressed his fl ight 

of four toward the target, a compound that resembled a vehicle maintenance park with stored 

equipment, vehicles, and some radar pieces. Morris located the target, and the two-ship attack teams made several runs, destroying the compound with rockets. Satisfi ed that the target 

was destroyed, Morris led the fl ight back to the DLS. At 0130, each attack team of two AH-6 

helicopters landed at a separate rearm and refuel point operated by aircrew, fuel handlers, and 

armament specialists. Each pilot located the infrared chemlight that marked his landing point 

and landed in a heavy dust cloud. According to Morris, the pilots were happy to see that their 

helicopters were still upright when the dust cleared. Within 10 minutes, the four AH-6s departed with full loads of ammunition and fuel to raid Objective Raptor.

Again, the fl ight of “Little Birds” traversed the barren terrain in total darkness to fi nd its 

prey, another walled compound containing vehicles and equipment. The two-ship attack teams 

repeated the assault scenario, making several runs to destroy the objective. This time the rockFigure 48. An AH-6 “Little Bird” armed for night raids.
143

ets hit a fuel dump, and the compound was ablaze as the helicopters slipped away into the night. 

The four AH-6s arrived back at the DLS at 0315, and each team landed near its designated MC130E. The “Little Bird” pilots shut down and, with the crew members, pushed their helicopters 

onto the Combat Talons. By 0400, both MC-130Es were airborne, en route to their staging base.

The Night Stalkers had demonstrated their ability to respond quickly and effectively, destroying enemy facilities hundreds of miles away at night in extremely tough fl ying conditions. 

Despite thousands of hours of combined fl ight experience, the Night Stalker attack pilots had 

to admit that it was extremely diffi cult under NVG to discern contrast on that barren high desert 

landscape in zero-illumination darkness. But these “Little Birds” of prey demonstrated another 

powerful long-range surgical strike capability unique to ARSOF.

High Desert Rat Patrol

“The Rat Patrol” was a popular television series that fi ctionalized the exploits of the LongRange Desert Group (LRDG) fi ghting the Germans and Italians in North Africa during World 

War II. During Operation RELENTLESS STRIKE, A Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Rangers, 

turned those fi ctionalized accounts into reality but with a new twist that the LRDG could never 

have imagined. The ARSOF are capable of striking suddenly in the most hostile environments 

after coming from the most unexpected locations. RELENTLESS STRIKE combined the lethal 

fi repower of Army special operations attack helicopters with the desert mobility of Ranger 

forces. This joint mission required intense planning, close coordination and cooperation among 

several SOF elements, adaptability to a very harsh environment in winter, modifi cation of 

established modus operandi to new combat situations, and great confi dence in one another.

The mission of the attack helicopters was to strike critical targets within range of a desert 

landing strip (DLS) that had a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) to support further 

operations. Critical to the continuing mission was determining whether proposed landing strips 

would support the landing of MC-130 transports carrying the helicopters, FARP system, and 

personnel and securing the DLS areas during landings and takeoffs and while FARP operations were conducted. Reconnaissance revealed that the initial DLS (Anzio) would support the 

weight of the fully loaded MC-130, and the operation began.

On the nights of 16 and 17 November, MC-130s inserted six desert mobility vehicles (DMVs) and 48 Rangers and Air Force STS personnel led by CPT Chuck Seims 

(pseudonym) on DLS Anzio to provide security for the forthcoming attack helicopters and 

FARP.164 After spending several hours carefully patrolling the area to ensure that their arrival had not prompted enemy responses, the Ranger force moved to the predetermined location for DLS Bulge to determine its suitability. Employing standard Ranger procedures, 

such as listening halts, bounding overwatch with the DMVs, and leader recons, the Rangers confi rmed the second DLS. While Lieutenant Carter and SFC Bondurant (pseudonym) 

positioned the DMVs for all-around security on the proposed airstrip, the Air Force STS element assessed the area, verifying the dimensions; noting potential hazards and obstacles; 

and taking core samples of the “runway” area and determined that it was also suitable for 

MC-130 landings. Bondurant checked out the proposed “hide site,” doing an on-the-ground 

reconnaissance. He found that their choice not only concealed the vehicles but also over- 
144

looked DLS Bulge. The DMVs were moved into the hide site, and the Rangers proceeded to their 

tactical priorities—putting out local security, brushing away tire tracks, making radio contacts, 

setting up camoufl age nets, and reviewing immediate action drills—before settling in for the night.

On 18 November, the Ranger task force was alerted to secure DLS Bulge for helicopter operations that night. After dark, the Rangers moved to the DLS to establish security around the strip 

while the STS, guarded by CPT Seims and 1SG Karl Maxey (pseudonym) in DMVs, set out the 

infrared landing lights along the length of the runway. At 1600Z, the MC-130s landed with their 

cargo of helicopters, the FARP, and a resupply bundle for the Rangers. The well-rehearsed helicopter crews quickly unloaded the helicopters, and the pilots took off minutes after the MC-130s 

landed. When the attack helicopters returned, they, like the Rangers, reported seeing heavy rocket 

fi re in the distance. (The next day both groups were informed that they had witnessed a meteor 

shower.) After a second strike mission, the MC-130s returned to load the FARP and helicopters, 

and departed. The Rangers helped the STS retrieve the landing lights, swept the area of evidence, 

and returned to their hide site. Dismounted patrols maintained the security of the task force.165

The mission scenario was repeated the following night after ground patrols verifi ed the absence 

of enemy forces in the area. Since it was to be a repeat operation from the same DLS, the Rangers 

established observation posts (OPs) farther out on higher ground to provide better early warning. 

According to CPT Seims, the Rangers were confi dent that “nothing could sneak up [on them].”166

Again, STS laid out the landing lights, and the MC-130s with the helicopters and FARP aboard 

soon landed. The helicopters conducted their raid, returned to refuel and rearm, and conducted a 

second raid. These raids marked the end of Operation RELENTLESS STRIKE because the entire 

force was extracted that night. At 2045Z, 19 November 2001, MC-130s started landing. First the 

FARP and helicopters were taken out and then the Ranger task force with its DMVs. By 2221Z, 19 

November, DLS Bulge was just another high desert area in the hinterlands of Afghanistan.167

While Special Forces teams, Army Rangers, and 160th SOAR helicopters, supported by 

Air Force special operations MC-130E Combat Talons, AC-130 Spectre gunships, MC-130P 

refuelers, and tactical teams were fi ghting Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, JSOTFNorth in Uzbekistan was directing operations and inserting other ARSOF units as combat multipliers on the battlefi eld. In the United States, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command 

Figure 49. 75th Ranger hide site.

Figure 50. 75th Ranger night movement 

under NVG.
145

(USASOC), Fort Bragg, was mobilizing USAR and NG units to augment forces at home and 

overseas. In neighboring Pakistan, discussions were under way with Hamad Karzai, a Pashtun 

leader, to open a southern front against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. These vignettes demonstrate 

that the global war on terrorism was an ARSOF team effort.

The Great Communications Terminus

One of the staff elements most affected by the unique 5th SFG command and control arrangement was the communications section, which operated the signal base station for JSOTFNorth. COL Mulholland anticipated that the task force would initially be supporting the forces 

of two major Afghan resistance leaders, expecting that a third leader would emerge later. Within 

weeks, however, more Special Forces ODAs had been committed to a variety of tribal chieftains and missions, without either a Special Forces company or Special Forces battalion as an 

intermediate headquarters, to share the responsibilities of “commanding and controlling” the 

Special Forces teams. MSG Don Sullivan (pseudonym), the 5th SFG communications chief in 

charge of the joint base station, only had four radio operators to communicate with one higher 

headquarters and three lower headquarters, as authorized by his table of organization and equipment.168 By Special Forces doctrine, these three “out stations” normally would be the command 

posts of the 5th SFG’s three battalions. Each of the battalion base stations, using its authorized 

number of radios, could talk to each of the three Special Forces company headquarters, led by 

majors and their staffs called Special Forces B Teams, in turn, would send and receive messages 

to and from the fi ve or six Special Forces ODAs.169

Instead, by late November, Sullivan and his small section at the JSOTF-North terminus 

were receiving and transmitting to 47 different fi eld stations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 

Without the normal hierarchical arrangement of headquarters to distribute responsibilities, the 

joint base station at K2 communicated with three lieutenant colonels (battalion commanders 

designated as “ODC team” leaders), six ODB elements, and 25 ODA SF teams. Many of them 

were subdivided into “split teams” to cover more territory and to operate in shifts to direct 

airstrikes around the clock. There were also Special Forces intelligence teams and CA and 

PSYOP units spread across Afghanistan that reported directly to JSOTF-North. Since this was 

12 times as much communications support as MSG Sullivan’s joint base station was manned 

and equipped to handle, the stress level “red-lined” in that element.170

For years, the signal community had postulated that in today’s “information age” a “fl at” 

command and control organization was possible. Digitized message traffi c would eliminate 

the need for traditional three-layer communications. It also promised a faster, unfi ltered fl ow 

of data between a senior leader and the elements of his command. Operations in Afghanistan, 

however, made this diffi cult. First, 5th SFG communications planning had been shared with 

the battalion and company communications sections. This complex and exacting task now fell 

solely to the offi cer and NCOIC of the 5th SFG signal center, which also served as the base station for JSTOF-North. Second, due to the unexpectedly rapid and fl uid nature of the war with 

Special Forces teams and their Afghan allies almost constantly moving, JSOTF-North and its 

units had to rely almost solely on satellite radios for communications. The assigned satellite 

channels were the single point of convergence for all voice and data over-the-horizon radio 

traffi c that was being transmitted on the 152 tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios in the 5th SFG. 
146

Overhead, two U.S. military telecommunications satellites carried 54 channels of traffi c, but 

almost all of them were already apportioned.171 The President of the United States; the National 

Command Authorities; the JCS; and the various regional combatant commanders, intelligence 

services, and other national-level “customers” dominated most of the available channels. Even 

though Special Forces ODAs were in combat, MAJ Jacobi (pseudonym), the 5th SFG signal 

offi cer, and MSG Sullivan had to “vie for access” to the satellites.172

The four high-frequency (HF) satellite bands available to JSOTF-North permitted suffi cient 

voice and data transmission if they were carefully administered. The task force J6 was usually 

allocated one wide-band channel, two narrow bands—one of those “on loan” from the U.S. Air 

Force—and a portion of the Demand-Assigned Multiple-Access (DAMA) band that digitally 

separated transmissions to permit simultaneous communication between stations. Still, Sullivan was very aware that the technology did not allow multiple messages to be “pushed” through 

one satellite channel (“pipe”) at the same time, in parallel. He had to arrange for their transmission one after another, in series. Because of the enormous volume of satellite radio traffi c, both 

the outgoing and incoming messages were backlogged. Sometimes as many as 200 digital messages sat in the electronic queue, waiting for a base station operator to record and forward the 

message to its addressee. The delays had the most serious impact on aerial resupply, especially 

on delivery times, drop zone locations, and supplies.173

Combine the communications backlog with the challenges and frustrations of SOCEUR 

and the comments from Special Forces ODAs in the fi eld, and it should become evident that 

aerial resupply is not just a logistics function for ARSOF. It is a complicated process that involves other services, and there are distinct responsibilities at all levels, from the Special Forces 

teams, to the JSOTF commander, to the supporting theater commander. Fortunately, while air 

resupply has become the standard provisioning method for SOF since mid-World War II, the 

allies have enjoyed air superiority and not had to fi ght an enemy as well supplied with SAMs as 

the mujahideen were against the Soviets.

Resupply From 10,000 Feet

Inside shallow caves above the Balkh Valley just south of Boi-Becha, CPT Nash and 

Special Forces ODA 595, supporting General Dostum, were roused from sleep by the thunderous crashing of munitions bundles rolling down the mountainside around them.174 At 

0200, the night before the “big push” toward Mazar-e-Sharif, without notice to the Special 

Forces team, C-17 jet transports began dropping 32 parachute bundles of arms and ammunition onto the steep slopes surrounding the valley fl oor from 10,000 feet above ground level 

(AGL).

After the rain of bundles came an avalanche of broken bundles and crates, rocks, and boulders. When that stopped, the shouts of Afghan soldiers fi lled the night as they scurried about 

“collecting treasure.” At dawn, ODA 595 surveyed the scene. More than two dozen bundles, each 

weighing 300 to 400 pounds, lay scattered among the rocks with parachutes draped on the valley 

slopes. Some of the ammunition bundles had burst, strewing mortar shells and hand grenades all 

over the ground. Across the narrow valley, SGT Bagby (pseudonym) saw three parachutes caught 

on high jagged outcroppings “like coat hooks,” with their heavy bundles dangling in the air.
147

CPT Nash realized that any major effort to collect the resupply arms and munitions would 

delay the offensive scheduled to begin in a few hours. For now, they would have to do without 

it, leaving troops behind to protect the site from scavenging locals. Later, General Dostum sent 

recovery parties back to collect the supplies that were strewn across the mountainside drop 

zone in time to support the fi ght through the Tangi Pass on 9 November.175

PSYOP = Hard, Steady Work

A year after graduating from high school in Seminary, Mississippi, SSG Logan Donovan 

(pseudonym), inspired by his older brother, an Army infantryman, joined the Army National 

Guard (ARNG). Mobilized as an electrician during Operation JUST CAUSE, Donovan repaired 

damaged buildings in Panama. His overseas duty convinced him to transfer to the Regular Army 

and acquire an entirely different skill—photo layout specialist. After serving in Germany and England, Donovan was assigned to the 3rd Psychological Operations Battalion (POB) at Fort Bragg.

In September 2001, SSG Donovan was in charge of a fi ve-man squad that printed PSYOP 

leafl ets. Within days of the 9/11 attacks, his team was alerted that it would be printing leafl ets 

for distribution in Afghanistan. The battalion Heidelberg presses were soon running off thousands of leafl ets. As each sheet of 12 leafl ets rolled off the press, Logan’s print squad transferred the sheets to a paper cutter that cut the sheets into individual leafl ets. Then the squad 

boxed the leafl ets for delivery. Many of these initial products advertised a $25 million reward 

for the capture of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

Because the Heidelberg presses were large 

and permanently installed, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), the parent 

headquarters of 3rd POB, had portable systems developed for rapid overseas movement 

to give fi eld commanders an immediate print 

capability. The Modular Print System (MPS) 

consists of two smaller Heidelberg presses, a 

paper cutter, and two edit stations. Soldiers who 

Figure 51. Unexpected, but welcome, resupply bundles.

Figure 52. The Modular Print System (MPS)

at Bagram Air Base.
148

perform the edit function can process fi lm as well as edit by computer. As the requirement for 

fi lm processing has decreased, these soldiers generally use the computers to create an image 

that is fed to a pressmate printer. From the printer emerges a negative that can be transferred to 

an aluminum plate that is then affi xed to the presses to print leafl ets. The self-contained MPS 

has proven invaluable to overseas commanders for promulgating a PSYOP campaign.

Thus, SSG Donovan was not surprised when told in late October that his squad would 

deploy to Kuwait with the MPS to produce PSYOP leafl ets to support Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM. He knew his equipment was in top-notch shape because he made sure that his 

printer repair people (the “J6s”) were available to deal with any press malfunctions.

On 12 November, Donovan and his squad joined the other four squads of 2nd Platoon, A 

Company, 3rd POB, aboard a C-17 Globemaster III for the fl ight to Kuwait. After two refueling stops, they arrived at Kuwait City International Airport. Awaiting buses took them to Camp 

Doha where they bedded down for the night.

The next morning, Donovan’s squad opened the MPS shelters, inventoried the contents, and 

ran operational checks on all equipment so there would be no delay when the print missions 

became reality. Afterward, the soldiers explored their new home. They were impressed. It was 

not luxurious but certainly better than some places they had been. Latrines were in trailers that 

also had hot showers with running water. The food was good. The recreation center had a pool 

table and more than 200 VCR movies that they could check out. The movie theater on base had 

fi rst-run movies, and other facilities had fast food. “All in all, not a bad place,” said Donovan.

1LT Carol Clewell (pseudonym) organized her platoon into two shifts to conduct 24-

hour operations. Two print squads worked a day shift of 12 hours—one squad per press—and 

two squads worked the 12-hour night shift. Periodically, the squads rotated shifts. The troops 

worked four days on and one day off because the work pace was steady. When radio broadcasts 

by the Air Force EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft became possible, Donovan’s squad printed 

Figure 53. Reward leafl et.
149

handbills that ground units could distribute to villages. The handbills depicted a radio tower and 

had various frequencies for music and news. In conjunction, other PSYOP units working in the 

fi eld distributed small transistor radios countrywide because the Taliban had made it a crime 

to possess a radio and few were available. There was only one maintenance problem. When the 

blade on the paper cutter broke, Donovan took it to Kuwait City and had a local machine shop 

fabricate a replacement.

In the rare periods when work slowed, 1LT Clewell encouraged her soldiers to visit Kuwait 

City. Very few had ever been in the Middle East, and she wanted to give them an opportunity to 

become familiar with the culture. After visiting other U.S. military bases in Kuwait, the troops 

unanimously agreed that the 2nd Platoon had the best facilities.

Even living in a good facility, the routine can sometimes get boring. Once printed and cut by 

the 2nd Platoon, the leafl ets were packed, put on pallets, and fl own to Diego Garcia. There, other 

3rd Battalion soldiers would pack the leafl ets into M129 leafl et bombs that B-52 Stratofortress 

bombers carried aloft and dropped over Afghanistan. At a preset altitude the two halves of the 

leafl et bomb separated, and the wind scattered the contents across the countryside. To ensure the 

pallets were not offl oaded before reaching Diego Garcia, a 2nd Platoon soldier would go along as a 

“pallet rider.” The fi rst stop was always Bahrain where the soldier could stay in a hotel instead of a 

warehouse and experience a degree of Western culture. The soldier and pallet would then continue 

to Diego Garcia. SSG Donovan never had a problem getting volunteers to be “pallet riders.”

While not as glamorous or exciting as other special operations missions, printing the 

PSYOP leafl ets was critical to the air and ground campaign to topple the Taliban government 

and destroy the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Whether it was a leafl et offering a monetary reward, 

providing a radio listening frequency, extolling the new government, or warning about land 

mines, the 30 million leafl ets 2nd Platoon, A Company, 3rd POB, printed were a signifi cant 

contribution to the global war on terrorism. “It was hard, steady work,” Donovan concluded, 

and then added proudly, “and we produced top-quality leafl ets.”176

Figure 54. CA personnel give

transistor radios to Afghans. Figure 55. 4th POG leafl et with

radio broadcast frequencies.
150

A Supportive Populace

Less than two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Fort Bragg soldiers, MAJ Jim McLemore 

(pseudonym) and SGT Charles Walters (pseudonym), were at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, attached to 5th SFG. Among the factors to be considered in planning military responses to the 

terrorist attacks was the human suffering of the long-oppressed Afghan people. McLemore 

and Walters, C Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB), were to be on the forefront of 

American action to establish a positive climate among a population that had been brutalized 

for years. Their actions, and those of other CA soldiers, could have a lasting impact not only on 

future American military activities but also on the future of a reconstituted democratic Afghan 

government. On 8 October, they were at K2 in support of JSOTF-North.

As the one active Army CA company regionally oriented toward the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility (AOR), the soldiers of C Company had no doubt that they would join Walters 

and McLemore overseas. That expectation was realized when Civil Affairs Team (CAT)-A32 

deployed to K2 on 16 October, followed by CAT-A33 and CAT-B30 on 12 November and CATA34 and CAT-A36 on Christmas Eve.177

On 15 November, the Army component command of CENTCOM, ARCENT, directed 

JSOTF-North to send a CAT-A to Mazar-e-Sharif to establish a coalition humanitarian liaison 

cell (CHLC). Five days later, the newly created Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task 

Force (CJCMOTF) was given tactical control of C Company, 96th CAB. With that authority, 

the CJCMOTF directed that another CAT-A be sent to Bagram to establish a CHLC. Recognizing the importance of the two missions, MAJ John Bowman (pseudonym) split his company 

headquarters staff between the locations but left a CA liaison element at JSOTF-North. During 

the next months, the CA liaison team coordinated the delivery of 700 tons of red wheat as well 

as winter clothes and toys for children.178

Mazar-e-Sharif was critical to the fl ow of humanitarian aid. The airfi eld was the focal point 

for supplies coming into Afghanistan and the transload site to villages in need of aid. The city 

was also the road terminus for truck-transported supplies from Uzbekistan—a major objective 

Figure 56. Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
151

that Secretary of State Colin Powell set. Bowman told CAT-A33 to make an area assessment 

to determine what support the people required and to determine how to facilitate the fl ow of 

humanitarian aid by nongovernment organizations (NGOs). CAT-A33 reached Mazar-e-Sharif 

on 27 November and, in the midst of its assessment, helped the Jordanians establish a major 

hospital. This hospital would provide free medical care to more than 8,000 people before the 

team left the city.179

Getting PSYOP on the Ground in Afghanistan

On the fi rst of November, the 9th POB commander told SSG Jim O’Reilly (pseudonym) to 

get ready to go to Afghanistan to support the 5th SFG.180 Twelve days later the Tennessee native 

and Tactical PSYOP Detachment (TPD) 930 were aboard a C-17 on the way to K2, Uzbekistan. 

As TPD 930 stepped off the airplane at K2 at about midnight on 14 November, the temperature 

was 45 degrees. CPT Mark Puller and SGT Harold Aspen (pseudonyms), the liaison offi cer and 

NCO from the JPOTF, bedded them down in the wood-fl oored chapel tent that fi rst night.181

O’Reilly and his team leader, CPT Rick Harrison (pseudonym), were responsible not only for 

the 13-man TPD 930 but also for a nine-man PSYOP support element from the 3rd POB.182 They 

were to operate the Deployable Print Production Center (DPPC) that could produce PSYOP products quickly at a forward base. Because neither PSYOP team had worked with 5th SFG before, 

O’Reilly and Harrison gave the JSOTF-North staff a briefi ng on the capabilities of their TPD and 

the DPPC. When Mazar-e-Sharif, the second largest city in Afghanistan, fell to Northern Alliance 

forces on 10 November, the PSYOP soldiers knew they would be going “in country” shortly.183

Have Tools Will Travel

The initial success of the war on terrorism depended heavily on the availability of ARSOF 

helicopters to infi ltrate SOF deep into Afghanistan. Helicopter maintenance was key to operationally ready aircraft, and for that reason, the Army special operations aviation staff at the U.S. 

Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) sought assistance from the ARNG. D Company, 109th Aviation Battalion, was an aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) company 

that could provide maintenance expertise for various types and models of helicopters that were 

organic to the 160th SOAR. This unit seemed ideal to augment the Night Stalker maintenance 

team.

The AVIM company, predominantly fi lled by soldiers and airmen from Nebraska and Iowa, 

was commanded by MAJ Martin Jackson (pseudonym), a former Marine Corps CH-46 pilot 

and veteran of the Gulf war.184 To preclude a delay in receiving the experienced mechanics that 

were urgently needed, the 160th SOAR assumed responsibility for all administrative requirements associated with activating the ARNG unit. With the support of Fort Campbell and the 

USAR mobilization command on post, the unit’s required mobilization training was scheduled 

as time permitted. MAJ Jackson and LTC Edward Simpson (pseudonym), the 160th SOAR executive offi cer, worked closely to develop a plan that would capitalize on the backgrounds and 

experience of the factory-trained mechanics who normally worked on CH-47 Chinooks, UH-60 

Black Hawks, and OH-58 Kiowas.185 Although doctrine suggests that an AVIM company operate separately from its supported unit, Jackson and Simpson divided D Company’s personnel into four maintenance contact teams that were assigned to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions 
152

and to the regiment’s training company. This was a pioneering aviation maintenance concept.

All of the 109th contact teams quickly assimilated to the normal fast pace of the 160th 

SOAR’s maintenance sections. Although each required some familiarization and training on 

the special operations helicopters, the 109th teams were fi lled with talent and years of experience—former contract mechanics from Lockheed Martin, Sikorsky, and Duncan Aviation—and 

quickly contributed to the maintenance effort. They promptly established credibility. Within a 

month, the 109th mechanics were working long hours and multiple shifts side by side with 

their 160th SOAR contemporaries. This teamwork enabled the 160th and 109th to complete 

helicopter phase maintenance in as little as 28 days, a remarkable feat. Both the ARNG and the 

160th SOAR benefi ted from the relationship. The experienced ARNG mechanics shared their 

extensive knowledge with the regiment’s younger mechanics, and the SOAR personnel, in turn, 

trained the 109th on the unique equipment common to ARSOF aircraft.

D Company personnel were also integrated into Green Platoon, the 160th SOAR’s training 

and selection course. More than 60 soldiers from the unit completed the course during the fi rst 

six months of activation. Successful completion of Green Platoon added to the ARNG members’ credibility because it is a 160th SOAR requirement for deployment overseas. More than 

27 mechanics from the 109th AVIM deployed overseas to Afghanistan, Korea, and the Philippines with the Night Stalkers. One outstanding graduate with a law enforcement background 

was selected to be a Green Platoon martial arts instructor.

This close working association with the 109th was unique in another respect. The ARNG 

unit brought 14 female mechanics to work with the 160th SOAR “maintainers.” By regulation, 

women are precluded from being assigned to active duty special operations aviation units as 

mechanics or crew members. These 109th female helicopter mechanics enjoyed a wartime service experience beyond the reach of their active duty contemporaries.

The mutually benefi cial assignment signifi cantly contributed to the high operational readiness of the critically needed ARSOF helicopters in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Korea. 

Success can be attributed to innovative organizational ideas; highly trained, competent professionals; specialized training; and a commitment to the highest standards of helicopter maintenance. While it was a groundbreaking effort, the 160th SOAR-D Company, 109th Aviation Battalion (ARNG), relationship was a “keeper” because it set the standard for future associations.

With PSYOP and CA units at K2 preparing to be coalition force multipliers in Afghanistan 

and an ARNG AVIM company working with the 160th SOAR to keep the ARSOF helicopters 

operationally ready, the JSOTF-North communications logjam was overlooked. More pressing 

Figure 57. The 109th Aviation Maintenance Battalion (AVIM) provided quality support.
153

issues faced TF Dagger. One major task was getting a Pashtun leader to open a second front in 

the south with an offensive.

Mr. President

MAJ Walter Barstow, C Company, 9th Psychological Operations 

Battalion (POB), knew he was to meet with an Afghan leader who had 

considerable infl uence on 12 November in Jacobabad, Pakistan. The 

PSYOP major was introduced to a fatherly looking man of medium 

build. Within seconds, Hamad Karzai, with his fi ngertips together, almost prayer-like, began articulating his views on the present state and 

future of Afghanistan in a clipped British accent. Then, the Pashtun 

Afghan switched to the American military PSYOP campaign to propagate anti-Taliban sentiment in his country. Karzai spoke passionately 

about the Afghan culture and the history of foreign invasion, periodically pausing for effect. Barstow listened attentively. After 30 minutes, the Pashtun ended his oratory, and the one-sided interview was 

over. At the time, Barstow had no idea that he had just met the man who would be named to 

head the interim government for Afghanistan in about a month.186

Karzai, who spoke six languages including English, was well aware of the power the media 

possessed. Barstow was unaware that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Voice 

of America (VOA) had already interviewed Karzai several times. With a high illiteracy rate in 

Afghanistan, the Pashtun leader knew that radio broadcasts in various dialects would have a 

greater effect than leafl ets. He had listened to the programs broadcast by the Air Force EC-130 

Commando Solo aircraft and told MAJ Barstow that the music was very effective, but the BBC 

and VOA had better-quality programs. Karzai urged Barstow to make the messages more forceful. The people needed to be told what they should do about the Taliban and al-Qaeda who 

were still in their midst.

Karzai did not totally discount the value of leafl ets and advised Barstow to keep them 

simple. He suggested using the national fl ag before the Taliban came to power as a symbol of 

traditional Afghanistan. He further told Barstow to stress themes that promoted a free country 

and the role of the people in its establishment. Education was critical to Afghanistan’s future. 

In this regard, Karzai wanted something that stressed better education opportunities for all Afghans, including women, because it would have a positive appeal.

Karzai’s insights into the various Afghan peoples were invaluable to Barstow. Writing furiously as the future leader “lectured,” Barstow tried to capture every word. With the knowledge 

that the Afghan villagers were unhappy because American bombs sometimes killed innocent 

civilians, Karzai recommended that the information campaign stress that innocents were being killed only because the Taliban hid behind them. The broadcasts and leafl ets ought to say, 

“Drive out the Taliban and the people will not be hurt,” Karzai said. “Stress that the Americans 

have been invited and are not in Afghanistan as occupiers,” he remarked and then added, “The 

people must be able to understand the distinction between the United States that is sending 

forces to help the country and the Soviets who sent forces to conquer the country.”187

As Barstow fl ew back to Masirah Island, Oman, to implement the guidance, he pondered 

Figure 58. Hamad Karzai.
154

what Karzai had told him. His notes were turned into recommendations. Much of what Karzai 

espoused was transformed into leafl ets and broadcasts.188

A Signifi cant Meeting With an Unusual Man

Assisting with establishing JSOTF-North in Uzbekistan was just one of several major tasks 

for LTC Warren Richards. In late October 2001, COL Mike Findlay, commander, Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM), had told COL Mulholland that 

the “borrowed staff help” from SOCJFCOM was needed to support other overseas missions. 

The JSOTF-North commander asked, “Can I keep Richards for one more thing?” Findlay acquiesced. A few days later, Richards fl ew to Jacobabad, Pakistan, to meet a well-educated, 

articulate Afghan leader who wanted the Taliban out of his country.189

Hamad Karzai had been a diplomat for the mujahideen during the Russian occupation. 

Although he welcomed and supported the Taliban initially, Karzai quickly realized they had 

become “a proxy for a foreign power” and that “Osama bin Laden had embedded himself in 

the movement.” After the Taliban murdered his father, Karzai emerged as a key Pashtun leader. 

According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the CIA identifi ed Karzai as “the 

most promising leader in the south.”190

On 8 October 2001, Karzai, “armed only with a satellite phone,” had entered Afghanistan 

on the back of a motorcycle from his refuge in Pakistan. His goal was to persuade fellow Pashtuns to rise up against the Taliban. When the Taliban surrounded him and his small group, 

Karzai put the phone to good use. The United States rushed in weapons, ammunition, and 

supplies. After collecting the airdropped equipment, Karzai and his 150 heavily armed fi ghters 

successfully escaped the Taliban. Wolfowitz made it clear that the United States would back his 

efforts to launch a front against the Taliban from the south and that he would have the backing 

of the American military. “When he [Karzai] goes back in,” Wolfowitz said, “let’s make sure he 

has the kind of support the Northern Alliance has with our Special Forces.”191

By late October, the main American effort was still in the northern part of Afghanistan. 

Several Special Forces ODAs had been inserted and were supporting Northern Alliance leaders. Most of those leaders were Tajik, Uzbek, or Hazara. Karzai was a Pashtun from southern 

Afghanistan. Special Forces support to him would accomplish several goals. First, it would 

Figure 59. Afghan leader with a PSYOP leafl et.
155

demonstrate that the United States was backing all Afghan tribes. This was in keeping with the 

ultimate goal of establishing an ethnically diverse national government. Second, Karzai and his 

forces could open another front against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the south. Pressure on the 

enemy from several directions would hopefully hasten the collapse of armed resistance.192

Two Special Forces detachment commanders accompanied Richards. Their mission was to 

ascertain whether Karzai, an untested leader at this point in the war, was capable of assembling 

a military force and was willing to start offensive operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 

Affi rmation of these key factors would warrant inserting a Special Forces ODA to assist him 

and his forces. Six lieutenants accompanied Karzai to the meeting. Richards, the ODA team 

leaders, and representatives of other U.S. government elements talked with Karzai and his lieutenants for two days. Richards was also trying to determine the number of fi ghters that Karzai 

could rally and employ so he could recommend how many ODAs should be dedicated and 

whether a senior command element should work with Karzai. It became readily apparent, based 

on the number of fi ghters Karzai could promise, that only one Special Forces ODA would be 

necessary. Richards recommended that ODA 574, led by CPT Jason Amerine, be sent. On 14 

November, ODA 574 was inserted near Tarin Kowt to support Karzai and his anti-Taliban force.

Interestingly, one of Karzai’s lieutenants was a former mujahideen and Taliban soldier. 

As Richards was preparing to leave, the Pashtun, with a slight smile, turned to him and said 

(through an interpreter), “I have been fi ghting for almost 22 years in Afghanistan. I would have 

enjoyed meeting you on the battlefi eld.” Richards looked him straight in the eye and calmly replied, “You would have lost.” The Pashtun fi ghter laughed heartily and then presented Richards 

with an Afghan hat. The two soldiers parted, never having had to face one another in combat.193

The Battle of Tarin Kowt

“That was the turning point”—so spoke President of Afghanistan Hamad Karzai regarding 

the battle of Tarin Kowt.194 Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz postulated that war is the 

continuation of policy by other means.195 That proved to be the case after the battle of Tarin Kowt.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz made it clear that when Karzai returned to Afghanistan, he would have the same level of Special Forces support that the United States was 

providing to the Northern Alliance leaders. After LTC Richards met with Karzai in late October 

2001, he had recommended that ODA 574, commanded by CPT Amerine, be the Special Forces 

detachment that provided that support.196

When Amerine graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, in 1993, 

he wanted to be a Special Forces offi cer. Since Army regulations precluded initial entry into 

Special Forces, he was an infantryman until he satisfi ed the prerequisites. After service in Panama; at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and in Korea, Amerine was accepted for Special Forces training 

and earned his Green Beret. The 5th SFG was his fi rst assignment, and after a year on staff, he 

took command of ODA 574.197

ODA 574 was on a training mission in Kazakhstan on 9/11. A week later when the team 

returned to Fort Campbell, COL Mulholland told the detachment to get ready to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) operations with Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan. After 

ODA 574 reached K2, the 5th SFG commander specifi ed the mission: ODA 574 was to “link 
156

up with Hamad Karzai and his Pashtun fi ghters, and advise and assist his forces to destabilize 

and eliminate the Taliban regime” in the south. On the night of 14 November, four MH-60K 

helicopters inserted Amerine and his team into southern Afghanistan.198

As postulated by Clausewitz in On War, plans were interrupted by the friction of combat. 

Three of the helicopters landed at the correct landing zone (LZ) in Oruzgan Province, but the 

fourth was unable to set down because of insuffi cient space. Those Special Forces soldiers were 

landed about 2 miles from the rest of the team. Karzai and about 30 of his men met Amerine. 

“We knew we were among friends, but I was wondering what happened to the men on the fourth 

helicopter,” Amerine said. After about an hour, the Pashtun tribesmen with Karzai had located 

them, loaded their gear on mules, and brought the soldiers to rejoin the ODA.199

Although Amerine, who had accompanied LTC Richards to Jacobabad, had met the Pashtun leader, there had been no time to build the rapport that would be critical to conducting a 

successful UW campaign. As Amerine put it, “We had to build trust, then go to war. I drank a 

lot of green tea with Hamad Karzai during late nights.”

Drinking tea was not the only thing the Special Forces soldiers were doing. Karzai considered Tarin Kowt the “heart” of the Taliban movement because Mullah Omar and several key 

leaders lived in and around the city. Karzai believed that capturing Tarin Kowt would cause the 

Pashtuns in the region to align with him. As the Afghans made plans to attack the city, it quickly 

became apparent to ODA 574 that victory could be assured only if they blocked the southern 

approaches from Kandahar. The Taliban garrisons in Kandahar could easily overwhelm the 

Americans and the 200 Pashtuns with Karzai unless the Special Forces could block and repel 

a counterattack. The United States furnished arms and ammunition, and ODA 574 provided 

rudimentary tactical training while Karzai kept up a steady phone dialogue with other Pashtun 

leaders. When the citizens of Tarin Kowt revolted against the Taliban on 16 November, Karzai 

told Amerine that they needed to move into the city immediately.

Suddenly CPT Amerine was faced with a decision that might prove crucial to the outcome 

of the war. He quickly weighed the known and unknown factors. Karzai had a small, poorly 

trained Pashtun force. There were sizable Taliban garrisons nearby. The Pashtun leader wanted 

to move immediately. The Air Force and Navy could be called on to provide aerial fi re support 

if the situation turned ugly. The unknown element was what kind of reception awaited them in 

Tarin Kowt. Amerine concluded that “We had to go in there and try to do what we could.”

Assembling a convoy of pickup trucks, fl atbed trucks, and any other vehicle that could 

move, the motley force of Pashtuns and Americans raced toward Tarin Kowt, arriving early in 

the evening on 16 November. The force was greeted with the news that about 80 to 100 vehicles with 500 to 1,000 Taliban were on the way from Kandahar to regain control of the city. 

Although Amerine was anxious to establish a defense, the Afghans, who had called for a council when Karzai arrived, were in no hurry. Despite his concern about the approaching Taliban

force, Amerine politely ate beef stew, raisins, and bread before excusing himself to prepare for 

the coming fi ght.

After a quick survey of the terrain south of the city, ODA 574 and 30 to 50 Pashtun fi ghters 

assumed defensive positions on a ridge overlooking the main road from Kandahar. Their ridge 
157

position looked down into a valley with a pass at the far southern end. The Taliban would have 

to clear that chokepoint to reach the American-Pashtun defenses. “You could not have asked for 

better terrain,” said Amerine. The Air Force tactical air controller radioed his headquarters that 

there was a strong possibility of a major battle and alerted them that both Air Force and Navy 

aircraft should be available based on the size of the Taliban force.

Shortly after dawn on 17 November, the lead Taliban trucks cleared the pass. Based on 

Amerine’s order, “Well, smoke ’em,” the close air support (CAS) team fi xed the laser beam of 

the target designator on the lead vehicle, and the F-18’s bomb unerringly followed the track to 

“kill” the fi rst truck. The blast was deafening, even from a distance. The convoy stopped long 

enough to fi gure out how to bypass the wreck and continued onward as more bombs rained 

down on them. More trucks and Taliban soldiers were obliterated. Despite the awesome success being achieved, the Pashtun fi ghters panicked, abandoned their positions, ran down the 

backside of the ridge, jumped in their trucks, and took off toward Tarin Kowt, leaving the 

Americans alone. With the choice of defending the ridge by themselves or following the escaping Pashtuns, the American Special Forces team chose the latter. To ODA 574 “it felt like we 

were grabbing defeat from the jaws of victory.”

Back in Tarin Kowt, CPT Amerine hurriedly explained the situation to Karzai, urging him 

to rally his men. The airborne command post reported that the Taliban convoy had reached Amerine’s original position. Now he would have to fi nd another site that was defensible; provide a 

measure of protection for the team and whatever Pashtuns accompanied it; and most important, 

offer good observation of the Taliban column. The Americans located another position south of 

town that was not as good as the previous site but was suitable, and it was the best they could fi nd 

in the time available. Karzai got some of the Pashtun fi ghters moving, but it was a motley group. 

Old men with rifl es came running to the position, as did curious children to see what was going 

on. While the CAS team was directing airstrikes, the kids were trying to pilfer their rucksacks.

Finally, the Americans got control of the situation and were able to concentrate on destroying the Taliban from the air. When a small enemy force managed to fl ank their position, the Afghans succeeded in driving them off. By 1030, the battle was over. Remnants of 30 trucks and 

about 300 dead Taliban littered the valley fl oor. The rest of the force withdrew to Kandahar.

That evening, local mullahs met with Karzai. They were respected as church leaders and 

for their literacy. Because of the infl uence they had in the area, their views would be crucial 

to ridding the country of the Taliban. If these mullahs expressed anti-American sentiments, it 

would have made Karzai’s task even more diffi cult. What they did say was, “If the Americans 

had not been here, we all would have been killed.” The Taliban would not have treated kindly 

those who had risen up against the regime and killed the mayor.

Not only was the battle to protect Tarin Kowt a decisive military success, it was also an 

overwhelming psychological and political victory. Had Karzai been defeated, the hopes that 

the U.S. government had for him as a southern Afghanistan war leader and future president 

would have been dashed. Instead, his stature increased immeasurably. His credibility among the 

regional leaders, with the leaders of the Northern Alliance, and with the U.S. government had 

been ensured. As Amerine said, “After the battle of Tarin Kowt, Hamad Karzai was a leader to 

be reckoned with [in Afghanistan].”
158

In the meantime, RADM Bert Calland, SOCCENT, had been dispatched to Mazar-e-Sharif 

following a summit meeting with CENTCOM commander GEN Tommy Franks, Fahim Khan, 

and COL Mulholland in Tajikistan. While the victor of Mazar-e-Sharif, General Rashid Dostum, concentrated on Konduz, one of the major battles of the war erupted at Qala-i-Jangi.

SOCCENT to Mazar-e-Sharif

GEN Franks, CENTCOM commander, called a summit meeting of his commanders with 

Fahim Khan in Tajikistan in early November. RADM Calland, SOCCENT, fl ew from his forward command post in Qatar, while COL Mulholland, JSOTF-North commander, fl ew from K2 

on a Russian-built Mi-17 helicopter. With Dostum already on the offensive, they were meeting 

with Northern Alliance chief, Fahim Khan, to get him energized to start offensive operations 

with his forces. GEN Franks’ priorities at Mazar-e-Sharif, as Calland recalled them, were to 

open the land bridge to Termez; get an airfi eld operational; and “Keep Dostum, Mohaqqeq, and 

Atta from killing each other.”200

Taloqan was the key objective according to Fahim Khan who declared, “When Taloqan 

falls, all else will follow”—meaning Bagram and then Mazar-e-Sharif, in that order. Engineer 

Arath, Fahim Khan’s primary aide and chief negotiator, wanted more airstrikes and other specifi c support in return for their promise to begin advancing on Bagram and Kabul by Thanksgiving.201 After the discussions ended, RADM Calland ordered COL Mulholland to “send in 

three or four more ODAs to support Fahim Khan” while he, as directed by GEN Franks, assessed the situation in Afghanistan.202

Calland was fl own into the old Soviet dirt airstrip at Deh Dadi aboard an MH-47E helicopter at night on 13 November. LTC Marc Bell (pseudonym) and some staff offi cers at Forward 

Operating Base (FOB) 53 met the admiral and took him to General Dostum’s headquarters in 

the recently liberated Qala-i-Jangi fortress.203 Calland missed Dostum and spent the night on 

a mattress on the fl oor, remembering that the departed Taliban troops had left piles of feces 

in rooms adjacent to his. The next day, Calland departed on an 81⁄2-hour drive toward Konduz 

where Dostum was laying siege to the city and its Taliban defenders.204

Al-Qaeda Uprising—Qala-i-Jangi—24-29 November

When 300 al-Qaeda fi ghters surrendered just outside Mazar-e-Sharif on 24 November 

2001, neither the anti-Taliban chiefs nor their American advisers anticipated an uprising that 

would become a major battle of the war in Afghanistan.205 The mass surrender of the al-Qaeda

seemed to be more good news for the two dozen U.S. Special Forces soldiers who staffed FOB 

53.206 They had established themselves in the fi ve-story Turkish school that had been vacant for 

the past 4 years. Only the caretaker and a few instructors remained. While FOB 53 coordinated 

the consolidation of the newly liberated city among the supporters of Dostum, Mohaqqeq, and 

Atta, the general had led most of his troops against Konduz, the last Taliban stronghold in upper 

Afghanistan.207 LTC Bell, FOB 53 commander, left with General Dostum on the morning of 

24 November to monitor the encirclement of Konduz, a full day’s drive to the east on a rough, 

rutted road across broken terrain. Dostum positioned his forces on the high ground overlooking 

the city and called for the capitulation of the disintegrating Taliban forces.208
159

Negotiating the surrender of the more than 300 al-Qaeda fi ghters near the Mazar-e-Sharif 

airfi eld the day before Dostum left for Konduz had been lengthy, violent, and tense. The spokesmen for the al-Qaeda at fi rst tried to get safe passage to Kandahar in return for their submission.209 At one point during the talks, a suicide bomber armed with a grenade killed himself 

and Dostum’s chief of security, and wounded several of the anti-Taliban forces. Despite this 

incident, the warring parties reached an agreement by late afternoon, 23 November, and the alQaeda boarded trucks—most of which were their own, driven by their people—to be convoyed 

to a detention facility. On the way to the 18th-century fortress at Qala-i-Jangi, the convoy with 

the more than 300 al-Qaeda prisoners stopped in Mazar-e-Sharif, in front of a former Taliban

militia barracks, opposite the Turkish school and FOB 53. Northern Alliance troops at the barracks looked over the al-Qaeda fi ghters for 10 minutes, and then the convoy continued to the 

old fortress, some 7 miles west of the city.210 Non-Afghan prisoners were interned in the south 

compound of the fort and guarded by 100 local troops that Commander Fahkir led. Despite the 

al-Qaeda suicide attack to kill Dostum earlier, the guards conducted only occasional and cursory searches of the more than 300 al-Qaeda prisoners inside the fortress.211

Built of adobe-style mud bricks, Qala-i-Jangi was built on a 17th-century French design, 

and it dominated the landscape for miles in all directions.212 More than 300 yards in diameter, 

the fortress was complete with moats, ramparts, scarps and counterscarps, parapets, and hundreds of fi ring ports atop walls that were 30 feet high and 45 feet thick. In the 20th century, the 

fortress had housed the Royal Afghan Army, the Soviet Red Army, anti-Taliban resistance, and 

the Taliban. General Dostum reclaimed it for use as his military headquarters once again on 

10 November 2001, after having been driven out by the Taliban in 1997. The Taliban had left 

Qala-i-Jangi intact, abandoning huge stores of arms and munitions. Thus, rooms all over the 

fortress were piled high with World War I-era French rifl es; World War II Russian submachine 

guns (called “burp guns”); and modern artillery rockets, mortars, and very effective rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs). Using the simple optical sight on an RPG, a person could shoot a 

powerful football-size explosive grenade at targets up to 300 meters with excellent accuracy. 

The Special Forces soldiers of FOB 53, essentially the headquarters staff of 3rd Battalion, 5th 

SFG, and CPT Mike Nash’s ODA-595 briefl y stayed inside the fortress before relocating to the 

cleaner, more spacious Turkish school on 21 November.213 There, the Special Forces were less 

than a 10-minute drive from the Mazar-e Sharif airfi eld, which gave them access to a paved 

runway instead of the dusty airstrip at Deh Dadi south of the fortress.214

Trouble at the prison began to mushroom during the night of 24 November. FOB 53 received a report from Qala-i-Jangi that an al-Qaeda prisoner had killed himself and two guards 

with a concealed hand grenade. The next morning, the FOB learned of a second grenade suicide that killed three prisoners. At 1345, 25 November, the JSOTF-North at K2 radioed FOB 

53 that an American had been killed at Qala-i-Jangi. The K2 message said that an American was wounded and another was trapped in the fortress by the prisoners. As the Special 

Forces soldiers soon discovered, the report was not completely accurate. The two Americans 

were identifi ed later by CIA Director George Tenet as intelligence offi cers.215 They were inside 

Qala-i-Jangi to interrogate the al-Qaeda prisoners.216 At the Turkish school, a senior adviser to 

General Dostum arrived and “frantically pleaded” for immediate Special Forces assistance at 

the fortress. About the same time, RADM Calland returned to the FOB from Kodi Bar where 
160

he had watched humanitarian aid supplies being delivered to a hospital. Calland remarked that 

he had heard explosions and gunfi re coming from the direction of the huge fortress.217

Hiding inside the fortress headquarters in the north wall, one of the intelligence offi cers 

radioed to his chief that the al-Qaeda prisoners had exploded some sort of bomb, overpowered 

their guards, and seized control of the entire fortress (this was incorrect; they were only in the 

southern half, which was separated from the northern half by a 20-foot-high wall). The intelligence offi cer added that he last saw Mike Spann fi ghting hand to hand in a mob of al-Qaeda

prisoners and did not believe that he was still alive. This alarming information was passed 

rapidly through channels, by secure telephone and radio, to FOB 53 at the Turkish school.218 A 

German ARD-TV team fi lmed and recorded the intelligence offi cer’s escape from the revolting 

prisoners and his satellite telephone reports to his superiors.219

The two senior Special Forces offi cers in FOB 53 knew that they had to rescue the Americans 

at Qala-i-Jangi. MAJ Kevin Sault (pseudonym), the executive offi cer, and MAJ Mario Magione 

(pseudonym), the operations offi cer, did a quick head count of available personnel. All of their 

Special Forces ODAs were a day’s drive away at Konduz with LTC Bell and several members 

of the staff. FOB 53 also had to protect RADM Calland while he was in Afghanistan. The two 

offi cers decided that Sault would remain at the Turkish school to coordinate their efforts, and 

Magione would lead what soldiers he could assemble to the fortress to assess the situation 

there. The core of the rescue force became a vehicle-mounted squad of British troops with an 

attached U.S. Navy seaman who had been operating around Mazar-e-Sharif. Two Air Force 

intelligence offi cers, the Special Forces battalion surgeon, two Special Forces sergeants, the 

Afghan interpreter, and another American rounded out Magione’s ad hoc force. Until the other 

scattered Special Forces personnel from the FOB returned to base, these men would serve as 

the medics, radiomen, and translators for the rescue attempt.220

The rescue force raced to the main gate of the Qala-i-Jangi fortress while steady gunfi re 

and explosions fi lled the air. The 300 al-Qaeda prisoners had ransacked a large armory in the 

Figure 60. Preparations under way to reestablish control over the prison.
161

southern compound and were as well, if not better, armed than the outnumbered anti-Taliban

militia troops trying to contain them inside the fortress. The British detachment scaled the ramparts on the northeast corner, carrying two machine guns and ammunition, and began to pour 

fi re into the mobs of armed al-Qaeda fi ghters in the south compound. Magione and a four-man 

team of Americans positioned themselves on the parapets to direct close air support (CAS) 

and aerial bombs against the buildings where the enemy was hiding. Inside the fortress, the 

militia troops struggled to contain the al-Qaeda in the southern compound. SFC Pete Bender 

(pseudonym) called the overhead Air Force airborne command post that controlled the fi ghters 

and bombers operating in Afghanistan. The command aircraft radioed Bender that the bombers 

sent to support FOB 53 were approaching at 20,000 feet. Because his troops and the Afghans 

were so close to the enemy, Magione demanded that the jets fl y lower so they could actually see 

their targets rather than just drop their bombs toward a map coordinate. Twenty minutes later, 

a pair of F-18 fi ghters dropped down to 12,000 feet and in rapid succession dropped six 1,000-

pound satellite-guided bombs into the south compound. Despite the blasts of the powerful joint 

direct-attack munitions (JDAMs), al-Qaeda fi ghters kept fi ring their captured assault rifl es and 

launching rocket grenades into the north compound.221

The crew of a B-52 bomber orbiting overhead told SFC Bender it could not see the fortress 

that was now marked by a plume of thick black smoke from fi res started by the last airstrikes. 

Magione waved off the bomber. Another pair of F-18s arrived, and Magione relayed a description 

of the target to the pilots through Bender. When the fi rst bomb impacted in a fi eld almost a mile 

north of the fortress, Magione put the airstrikes on hold so he could organize a search party to 

look for the missing Americans before the sun went down. As darkness gathered, Magione was 

worried about a possible attempt to break out at night when it would be impossible to distinguish 

Afghans from al-Qaeda and when the enemy could easily overwhelm their small rescue force. 

While the search party was stripping its equipment down to pistols and carbines, Magione decided to chance dropping another bomb. As the search party climbed over the the fortress wall, 

Magione heard the thundering explosion and saw the fi reball of the bomb detonating on target. 

During the search of the marble-columned commander’s residence, the rescue party found several Afghans hiding who described the escape of several Westerners. Magione assumed that this 

group of escapees included the American that he was seeking. What he did not know was that the 

one surviving American intelligence offi cer and the German fi lm crew had escaped earlier over 

the roof of the headquarters, hailed a passing taxi van, and were riding to Mazar-e-Sharif when 

the American and British soldiers were driving to the fortress. The limited search complete, 

Magione assembled the entire rescue force by the main gate and ordered it to withdraw to the 

Turkish school to plan the next day’s operations. Although the shooting subsided with the coming darkness, FOB 53 heard gunfi re and explosions from the fortress throughout the night.222

On the morning of 26 November, RADM Calland granted permission to FOB 53 to continue its attempt to rescue the missing American. Reinforced by an infantry platoon from the 10th 

Mountain Division at K2 and additional Special Forces soldiers, Magione led the group back 

to the Qala-i-Jangi fortress to continue aerial bombardment in support of an Afghan ground 

assault.223 Hundreds of Afghan militiamen, alerted to the prison uprising, were walking along 

roads toward Qala-i-Jangi. Some had captured small bands of al-Qaeda who had slipped out 

of the fortress in the night. The fugitive Arabs, Pakistanis, and Chechens proved easy to hunt 

down. The Afghan militia readily discerned them as “foreigners.” Inside the fortress, al-Qaeda
162

had set up 82mm mortars and were lobbing shells toward the ramparts as the American and 

British troops took up covered positions along the walls. As the volume and intensity of enemy 

fi re steadily increased, Magione and a communications detachment led by CPT Pat Schroeder 

(pseudonym) prepared to guide in the fi rst bomb run of the day.224

Magione and Schroeder selected the reinforced concrete “pink house” close to the center 

of the south compound as the fi rst target and double-checked the coordinates from their Etrex 

Venture global positioning system (GPS) to fi x their position and pinpoint the building. As an 

added safety measure, the rescue force laid out orange VS-17 marker panels to delineate its 

location to the aircraft. As he had done the day before, SFC Bender carefully described the 

targeted pink house to the F-18 pilot making the bomb run. The pilot replied, “Roger, I have a 

visual on the target,” and confi rmed his visual by reporting that he also saw the tall scarred trees 

next to the structure. Schroeder ordered the attack.

At 1051, the 2,000-pound bomb impacted. Magione stood up to spot the exact bomb strike 

in case corrections were required to bring the next bomb closer to the target. He discovered that 

the dust cloud from the blast was rising from the north side of the fortress, not the south compound. The JDAM missed its target by almost 200 yards and literally pulverized a section of the 

massive fortress wall. The blast had thrown a 35-ton battle tank that had climbed atop the wall 

into the air, tearing its gun turret completely off and killing the four Afghans inside. The explosive shock wave also blew down a lower wall on top of a 10th Mountain infantry squad that was 

hunkered down 50 feet from the point of impact. It pushed out from under the crumbled adobe 

wall like sand crabs coated in a powdery brown dust. Squad members were slightly injured, all 

having bloodshot eyes because their capillaries had been ruptured by the concussion.225

Two likewise injured British soldiers realized that American CPT Karl Latimer (pseudonym) had been blown over the wall by the blast. Despite their injuries, the two British soldiers 

ran through enemy gunfi re to drag the unconscious captain back inside the fortress to cover. 

The other members of the rescue force, with the battalion surgeon, CPT Charles Moss (pseudonym), rallied to treat the fi ve American and four British casualties. Based on “Doc” Moss’ assessment of the seriousness of the injuries, Magione directed their immediate evacuation with 

the rest of the force heading back to the Turkish school. Latimer was so badly injured that MAJ 

Sault called JSOTF-North for a helicopter to get Latimer to a medical facility. An MH-47E was 

dispatched with a medical team to take him to K2. There, Latimer was put aboard a transport 

jet and fl own to a U.S. military hospital in Europe.226

Repeated assaults by the Afghan militiamen on 26 November failed to break the al-Qaeda

uprising. Commander Fahkir estimated that 50 of his troops had been killed and as many as 250 

wounded in the fi ghting. When JSOTF-North told MAJ Sault that AC-130 Spectre gunships 

were available for aerial fi re support that night, he said he wanted them to hit Qala-i-Jangi.227

Magione, satisfi ed that his wounded men were in stable condition, organized another CAS team 

to return to the fortress. The major, four Special Forces sergeants, and an Air Force tactical 

air controller would direct the Spectre gunships at Qala-i-Jangi. They were accompanied by a 

heavily armed, mounted quick reaction force (QRF) of fi ve Special Forces sergeants from ODA 

534 and eight 10th Mountain infantrymen. The force arrived at Qala-i-Jangi just after sunset. 

After posting the QRF 1 km away, the CAS team went to meet Fahkir at the gaping breach in 
163

the north wall. When it got to the meeting site, Magione was alarmed to discover that because 

of the anticipated airstrikes that evening, all but a handful of the Afghan militia had left the 

fortress. Until the AC-130 arrived, his fi ve-man team was the only thing between the al-Qaeda

fi ghters in the south compound and the front gate. Air Force SGT Bobby Chesterfi eld (pseudonym) made a quick call to the inbound turboprop gunship on his tactical satellite (TACSAT) 

radio and learned that it was on schedule but was still two hours away. For an hour that seemed 

like an eternity, Magione and his team waited in the dark with mortar rounds exploding around 

them for the al-Qaeda breakout that never came.

To their great relief, the AC-130, Grim 12, arrived overhead an hour early, a little past 2200. 

Chesterfi eld described friendly and enemy positions to the AC-130’s fi re control offi cer and 

established targeting priorities. After the CAS team on the ground confi rmed its exact location 

to the sensor operators on the Spectre gunship with special markers, Magione fi red a hand-held 

parachute fl are into the night sky to signal the remaining Afghan militia to leave the fortress. 

Five minutes later, Grim 12 began a punishing hour-long cannonade of the south compound, 

raining down hundreds of 40mm and 105mm high-explosive shells to create a carpet of yellow 

fi re that enveloped the buildings and interior cells in which the al-Qaeda sought cover. An hour 

later, when Grim 12 ran out of ammunition, its sister gunship, Grim 11, arrived to orbit over the 

fortress and rake the al-Qaeda hideouts with cannon fi re. At midnight, when Grim 11 reported 

that it was down to only four rounds of 105mm artillery, Chesterfi eld gave the gunship a new 

target—a long building just inside the wall that separated the south from the north compound 

where he suspected an al-Qaeda mortar was hidden. As the Spectre sequentially punched four 

105mm rounds through the roof of the long shed, the third detonated a hidden munitions dump. 

Giant fi reballs briefl y blinded the low-light television camera on the gunship as a thunderous 

series of explosions followed, each more intense than the last. The blasts shook the entire fortress, hurling 100-pound artillery shells over the walls, and burning rockets shot off in all directions. With mud bricks, large dirt clods, rocks, and exploding ammunition showering down 

on top of them, Magione and his team ran from the fortress. They linked up with the QRF and 

drove back to Mazar-e-Sharif, wondering if any al-Qaeda had survived the Spectre assaults and 

exploding ammunition storage site. From the roof of the Turkish school nearly 10 miles away, 

FOB 53 watched the ammunition dump blaze fi ercely all night.228

The FOB 53 troops on the roof of the Turkish school were joined by CPT Bill Gregg (pseudonym), commander, ODA 592. Five-Nine-Two had been alerted to go to Afghanistan just after 

news of the fratricidal bombing at Qala-i-Jangi reached JSOTF-North. Gregg was to command 

the QRF, and his Special Forces team would organize the 23 10th Mountain Division infantrymen and the guards at the Turkish school—27 Hazaran fi ghters with a Dari-speaking translator—into an effective fi ghting force. The FOB staff briefed Gregg on the situation at the fortress, 

the internal building layout, the terrain features, medical evacuation procedures, and various 

routes the QRF could use to and from Qala-i-Jangi. Afterward, when he had watched the AC-130 

gunship detonate the ammunition dump and felt the explosive shock waves rumble through the 

building where he was standing, Gregg assumed his job was essentially over. No one inside the 

fortress, he thought, could have survived two hours of AC-130 gunfi re and that fi nal blast.229

On 27 November, day 3 of the uprising, additional reinforcements from Atta and Mohaqqeq arrived. The Afghan troops fought their way into the southern compound supported by 
164

tank cannon fi re and rapid-fi re antiaircraft guns mounted on armored cars. Once inside, it was 

intense room-to-room fi ghting where the combatants were only yards apart. Their close proximity precluded the use of airstrikes. Clearing the southern compound was slow going.

On the morning of day 4, there were still a few pockets of die-hard al-Qaeda that, barricaded into rooms, were holding out. When an al-Qaeda fi ghter emerged from a doorway and 

approached the militia, seemingly to surrender, he killed himself using concealed hand grenades, wounding fi ve Afghan soldiers. As the fi ghting continued, a squad of Afghans found the 

second American intelligence offi cer’s body and carried it to the American-led rescue force in 

the northern compound. Mike Spann’s remains would be fl own to K2 that evening.

As the rotors of the MH-47E helicopter turned, 5th SFG Chaplain LTC Mark Bojune conducted a brief, solemn service.230 After the American and British soldiers rendered honors to 

their fallen comrade, FOB 53 SGM Marvin Vandiver (pseudonym) produced an American fl ag 

that he had carried into Iraq during the Gulf war. Unable to drape it over the coffi n because of 

the swirling rotor downwash, Vandiver asked the two escort offi cers to give the fl ag to Spann’s 

family.231

The next day, 29 November, the last al-Qaeda fi ghters in Qala-i-Jangi surrendered. The day 

before, this group had retreated into the basement of the pink house. The reinforced concrete 

roof installed by Soviet army engineers proved too formidable for the AC-130 Spectre 105mm 

cannon to penetrate, and the building managed to escape any direct hit from the powerful 

JDAM bombs. The Afghan soldiers fi rst tried to drive the al-Qaeda out by dropping grenades 

Figure 61. AC-130 20mm Gatling guns (Vulcan).
165

down the entry way, then by pouring burning diesel fuel inside. When these attempts did not 

prompt surrender, an ingenious fellow suggested pumping water from the fortress well down 

the stairs leading underground. This fl ooded the basement, forcing the al-Qaeda below to stand 

in several feet of freezing-cold water on a frosty November night. Hypothermia accomplished 

what explosions and fi re could not, and the last holdouts, stupefi ed and numbed to impotence 

by the cold, gave up. These 86 were the only survivors of the more than 300 al-Qaeda who 

entered the fortress six days before.232 Intelligence reports later revealed that the surrender may 

have been intended as a ploy to get the al-Qaeda fi ghters inside Mazar-e-Sharif to retake the 

district capital. If so, the al-Qaeda failed to anticipate their incarceration outside the city in the 

18th-century fortress or that Afghan militia men, supported by American and British troops and 

airstrikes, would be able to contain and then break the prisoner revolt at Qala-i-Jangi.233

With the quelling of the al-Qaeda uprising at Qala-i-Jangi fortress, JSOTF-North shifted 

its focus back to General Dostum outside Konduz in the north and to the southern offensive 

where Hamad Karzai was working toward Kandahar from the north while Gul Agha Sherzai 

approached from the south. The question was who would get into the city fi rst.

ODA 583 Meets Gul Agha Sherzai

Over the roar of the MC-130’s turboprop engines, CPT Harry Sims (pseudonym) received his 

fi nal mission guidance on the apron of the K2 runway in Uzbekistan on the night of 18 November 

2001.234 He and his team, ODA 583, were to fl y to an airbase near Jacobabad, Pakistan, where he 

and two of his men would board a helicopter that would carry them into southern Afghanistan. 

During this leader reconnaissance, the rest of ODA 583 would wait in Jacobabad. “You might be 

on the ground in Afghanistan for only two or three days,” said LTC Marcus Steinmann (pseudonym), the JSOTF-North Army forces commander. Sims was being inserted to meet Gul Agha 

Sherzai, the anti-Taliban Pashtun leader, and to evaluate his potential to rally suffi cient following to begin offensive operations in southern Afghanistan. Sims had been told that Sherzai was 

a minor Pashtun fi gure with a few followers. Steinmann and LTC Matt Rhinehart (pseudonym), 

JSOTF-North operations offi cer, allowed 

that Sims and some of his ODA members 

might possibly stay longer “just to keep an 

eye on Sherzai.”235

Sims was uncertain as to how his 

mission would unfold. Despite intense 

intelligence community efforts, personal backgrounds on Afghan leaders 

remained sketchy and sometimes contradictory. It was common that Hamad 

Karzai was confused with Gul Agha 

Sherzai in reports. Because the situation 

inside Afghanistan changed rapidly, the 

mission for ODA 583 changed several 

times. But CPT Sims was patient and 

determined that he would make his own Figure 62. Gul Agha Sherzai.
166

opportunities once the Special Forces team was in the area of operations.236

At the intermediate staging base at Jacobabad, Sims met the four-man “pilot team” that 

would accompany him and SFCs Elias Sage and Stan Boyd (pseudonyms) aboard the Air Force 

MH-53 Pave Low helicopter into the Shin Narai Valley in southern Afghanistan, just across the 

border from Pakistan.237 Both Sage, the intelligence sergeant, and Boyd, the communications 

sergeant, carried operational funds for mission needs. These needs could range from locally 

prepared meals to fuel for vehicles and electrical generators to construction material for bunkers 

or renting pack animals to carrying equipment in the mountainous terrain. One NCO was the 

class A agent who made purchases, and the other was the contracting offi cer who accounted 

for the funds used. Shortly after the MH-53 Pave Low helicopter lifted off, Sims fell asleep 

on the metal fl oor, awakening only after the aircraft touched down in Afghanistan just before 

midnight.238

Sherzai, accompanied by 20 fi ghters, personally met the Special Forces team on the landing 

zone (LZ). The Pashtun soldiers were surprised and seemed dismayed when the helicopter 

suddenly took off, leaving just three Special Forces soldiers and some other Americans behind. 

Lighting the way with his bright fl ashlight, Sherzai led the Americans to his base camp to meet 

his subcommanders. The news that Mazar-e-Sharif had fallen to the Northern Alliance had 

reached them, and Sims’ pilot team was greeted warmly. Inside the command post, a mudwalled hut with a parachute for a roof, Sherzai politely asked for weapons, ammunition, food, 

and medicine for his Pashtun force.

At fi rst light on 19 November, Sims and the pilot team fanned out through the valley to 

determine how large Sherzai’s force might be. They counted at least 650 fi ghters and estimated 

there could be as many as 800. Sherzai claimed that he could call on another 400 to 600 from 

other locations. During a briefi ng at the JSOTF-North at K2, Sims had been told that there 

should be at least 500 anti-Taliban fi ghters in the Shin Narai for his entire ODA to be committed. 

He immediately radioed to have the rest of his men sent in.239

That evening, Sims reviewed the tenets of his assigned mission. As ordered, he had been 

infi ltrated into Afghanistan and had linked up with Sherzai. Now he was supposed to “deny 

the area to Taliban and al-Qaeda forces by any means possible.” Repeating “by any means 

possible” as he studied his aviator’s map of the province, Sims reasoned that the best way to 

drive the enemy out of his area of operations was to seize the Taliban capital city of Kandahar. 

His terrain study, using the map, told the rest of the story, it seemed—the key to the city was 

the Kandahar Airport. His conclusion took only a few minutes. Sims explained his idea to Sage 

and Boyd, and to the other American advisers. “Let’s see how much trouble we can cause,” Sims 

said smiling. Everyone enthusiastically endorsed his plan.240

The next afternoon, on 20 November, Sherzai held a war council of his subcommanders. 

Earlier, Sims and an American adviser who had known Sherzai for several years rehearsed their 

proposed speech. At the council, the discussion moved one by one around the circle of a dozen 

Afghan chieftains seated on rugs in the mud hut headquarters. Then it was Sims’ turn to talk to 

the leaders. Pausing regularly to allow the interpreter to translate his English into Pashto, Sims 

recounted that the Taliban had been defeated in northern Afghanistan and driven from Bagram, 

south of Kabul. He reminded Sherzai and his subcommanders that Karzai was fi ghting toward 
167

Kandahar from the north and concluded by challenging Sherzai: “Do you want to sit here in the 

Shin Narai,” asked Sims, “or do you want to be in Kandahar where you once were governor?”241

This proposition got the Pashtun leader very excited.

Sims then spoke for 45 minutes without interruption. He detailed the phases of his bold 

plan that, sequentially accomplished, would lead Sherzai’s forces to Kandahar. First, they would 

drive west from the Shan Narai Valley to Tahk-te-pol to block Highway 4 that linked Kandahar 

with Pakistan. Then they would advance north to the Arghastan Wadi to seize the bridge over 

the mile-wide dry riverbed. From there, they would attack and seize Kandahar Airport and the 

al-Qaeda training base at Tarnak Farms. Then, with Highway 4 blocked and the airport controlled by Sherzai, the city of Kandahar would fall. Sherzai listened intently and altered only 

one part of Sims’ proposed plan—to approach the intermediate objective of Tahk-te-pol from 

the north, using a nearby mountain range for cover, rather than from the south. Sherzai then 

turned to his commanders and gave the order to march on the provincial capital.242

A day later, on 21 November, after JSOTF-North had cross-checked Sherzai’s troop strength 

using other intelligence channels, the rest of ODA 583 was released to join Sims in Afghanistan. 

Eight members of Special Forces ODA 583 and an Air Force special tactics squadron (STS) were 

dispatched that night on an Air Force MH-53 helicopter. After an emergency landing at Quetta 

for engine trouble, the team was switched to another helicopter that dropped it in the darkness at 

the wrong LZ. By the time ODA 583 linked up with CPT Sims the next morning, Sherzai was 

already preparing to put his force in motion. Sims “split” the Special Forces A detachment into 

three close air support (CAS) teams of four men each to travel with the several troop columns. 

Then, they were off!

On the morning of 22 November, some 800 Pashtun warriors and Sims, with his 11 special 

operations soldiers, began the drive out of the Shin Narai Valley. Mounted in 100 vehicles—

small Toyota pickups, large multiple-axle Ginga transport trucks, and farm tractors pulling 

trailers—the polyglot convoy slowly made its way west, bound for Kandahar.243

The Fight at Tahk-te-pol

The fi rst objective in the Sims/Sherzai plan was to deny the Taliban the use of Highway 

4.244 The Taliban in Kandahar received most of its military supplies by truck convoy from Pakistan via Highway 4. The highway runs north through the mountains from Chaman, Pakistan, 

and crosses the Afghan border at Spin Boldak. From there, the single-lane paved road continues 

north, climbing to Tahk-te-pol, then climbs up again across more high desert before descending to the broad Arghastan wadi. There, the mile-long concrete bridge over the fl at, shallow 

riverbed, which is dry except for occasional fl ooding in the rainy season, leads to the Kandahar 

Airport near the Tarnac Farms and then into Kandahar city. After two and one-half days of 

uncontested movement from the Shin Narai Valley, the 100 vehicles reached a bowl-shaped 

depression 5 miles east of the Taliban garrison at Tahk-te-pol late on 23 November.245

Sherzai, after consulting with Sims and his other advisers, decided to attempt to negotiate a Taliban surrender in the town. To provide some security for his delegation, Sherzai sent 

half of his 800 fi ghters to take up positions behind a low ridgeline 2 miles east of Tahk-te-pol. 

Sims went along, anticipating a fi ght. He brought seven of his team with him, split into two 
168

four-man CAS teams to accompany each of the Pashtun subcommanders who were leading 

the advance forces. The subcommanders shared the same name, so the Americans called them 

“Gulalai One” and “Gulalai Two.” CPT Sims and Technical Sergeant (TSGT) Alan Kellogg 

(pseudonym), his Air Force airstrike controller, and SSGs Kim Joes and Stef Holman (pseudonyms) went with Gulalai One. SFC Sage followed Gulalai Two, with SFC Boyd and SSG 

Wally Czyrnyck and SSG Cory Loomis (pseudonyms). Sherzai remained behind in the bowlshaped depression with the rest of his troops, the ODA 583 team sergeant, MSG Neal Nutting 

(pseudonym), and the remaining three Special Forces NCOs—SFC Chuck Fan, SSG Bobby 

Santiago, and SGT Gus Cornell (pseudonyms). Night fell. While the negotiations proceeded, 

the two Galalais noticed that Taliban elements were slipping out of Tahk-te-pol in pickup trucks, 

maneuvering around the Pashtun positions to surround them. The Pashtuns quickly moved to 

the top of the ridgeline for better observation. Sims told Kellogg to call for combat aircraft. At 

Figure 63. Location and importance.

Figure 64. Deploying forces.
169

the same time, Sims received the report that additional Taliban troops had driven around and 

beyond the Gulalais’ covering elements and all but surrounded Sherzai and his men.246

At 2000, the Taliban negotiators rejected Sherzai’s suggestion to surrender, and Sherzai’s 

delegation fl ed from Tahk-te-pol. Almost simultaneously, Taliban soldiers attacked the Gulalais 

from the high ground to their north and south, and from Tahk-te-pol. Sims and Kellogg, who 

had moved to a better vantage point, began to call in airstrikes from the AC-130 gunship against 

targets they were able to spot in the darkness. Two air attacks silenced Taliban gunfi re from the 

northern high ground, permitting the Pashtun negotiators to gain the protection of the Gulalais’ 

position. The 400 Pashtun fi ghters and the two American CAS teams then withdrew to rejoin 

Sherzai in the bowl-shaped valley. Despite all the shooting in the two-hour gun battle, only six 

members of the Gulalais’ advance force were slightly wounded.247

During the fi ght outside Tahk-te-pol, Taliban patrols had probed the defensive perimeter 

of Sherzai’s main force. Firefi ghts broke out in several locations, marked by tracers streaking 

through the dark in all directions. When the Gulalais’ advance forces rejoined the main body 

at 2200, Sims sent his men to “circle the wagons” of Sherzai into a strong defensive perimeter. 

While the Special Forces sergeants set about doing this, CPT Sims and TSGT Kellogg, guarded 

by six Pashtuns, climbed to the highest ground on the north side facing Tahk-te-pol.

Shortly after getting in position, Sims and Kellogg spotted three groups of Taliban vehicles 

moving through the broken terrain to attack. In rapid succession, the Spectre gunship 105mm 

cannon blasted six enemy trucks, one of which was an ammunition carrier that exploded and 

burned brightly for 45 minutes like a huge bonfi re in the night. The Taliban appeared to pull 

back about midnight, but Sherzai was sure that another wave of attacks would come just before 

dawn, so the Pashtuns and American Special Forces troops remained on full alert. At 0200, with 

the Spectre reporting no evidence of further enemy movement in the area, Sims and Kellogg 

left the observation post (OP) to return to Sherzai’s headquarters. There, they found the ODA 

making plans for airstrikes to support a morning attack to seize Tahk-te-pol.248

Once the sun was fully up on 24 November, about 0900, Sherzai’s troops began a threepronged advance toward Tahk-te-pol. SFC Sage’s CAS team advanced with the 350-man main 

assault force, only to discover that the Taliban had abandoned the town during the night, leaving 

the high desert cluttered with abandoned trucks and rapid-fi re cannons. By 1300, the town had 

been completely occupied by Sherzai’s Pashtuns and Highway 4, the key Taliban and al-Qaeda

supply route between Pakistan and Kandahar, was blocked to traffi c. Sims and ODA 583 had 

already begun to plan the next step to Kandahar—taking the bridge over the Arghastan wadi.

Fighting at Arghastan Bridge

Once Sherzai had occupied Tahk-te-pol on 24 November, CPT Sims and his Special Forces 

sergeants encouraged him and his subcommanders several times during the afternoon to take 

advantage of their success by continuing the offensive.249 Late in the afternoon, Sims fi nally 

convinced Sherzai to send out strong security elements to establish vehicle checkpoints along 

Highway 4 to provide early warning of approaching threats and to interdict any Taliban vehicles heading to or from Kandahar. The Pashtuns drove 5 miles north from Tahk-te-pol to the 

Arghastan wadi and 5 miles south toward Spin Boldak to set up strongpoint roadblocks. Almost 
170

immediately, they captured a truck carrying Arab al-Qaeda fi ghters who had not heard about 

the previous day’s battle.

The following day, however, the Taliban bombarded the northern security checkpoint at 

the Arghastan wadi with rocket artillery from the Kandahar Airport, seemingly in preparation 

for a counterattack.250 Sims emphasized the danger to his thinly held forward line to Sherzai, 

and Sherzai sent 100 fi ghters to man defensive positions along a ridgeline several miles north 

of Tahk-te-pol. From that prominent position, Sherzai’s 100 troops and a CAS team from ODA 

583 overlooked the Arghastan wadi and could see, in the distance beyond, the Kandahar Airport. For the next seven days, the Special Forces CAS teams took turns directing a continuous 

stream of Air Force and Navy fi ghters and bombers against Taliban troops, vehicles, artillery, 

and Soviet tanks. Working 24-hour shifts, the CAS teams clobbered Taliban defenses around 

the airport to “soften them up” before Sherzai began his next attack.251

When the CAS team spotted the counterattacking Taliban forces seeking protection under 

the Arghastan Bridge from the airstrikes, the Special Forces spotters fi gured the enemy was 

thinking that the Americans would not destroy the bridge because they might need it. Thus, 

many sought protection from the concrete roadway. Aware that the Spectre’s 105mm cannon 

could not destroy or drop the bridge, the CAS team directed the highly accurate AC-130’s 

40mm and 105mm fi re into the wadi along the sides of the bridge span. Thousands of metal 

splinters from the high-explosive shells sprayed those sheltered underneath from both sides. 

The lethal fragments only chipped the concrete but killed the Taliban soldiers hiding between 

the abutments.252

The Taliban responded to the constant air attacks with volleys of shoulder-fi red surface-toair missiles (SAMs). The white smoke trails from the heat-seeking missiles reached up thousands of feet into the sky over Kandahar Airport and Tarnak Farms. Despite volleys of shoulder-fi red SAMs and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) barrages from rapid-fi re cannon and machine 

guns, no attacking U.S. aircraft were shot down.253

Figure 65. Battle of the Arghastan Bridge.
171

Now, with Sherzai’s Pashtun forces threatening Kandahar Airport from the south, the progress of Karzai’s Kandahar offensive from the north needs presentation. The size and composition of the two forces differed considerably, as did the aggressive spirit of their leaders. A 

Special Forces advisory team, headed by a 5th SFG battalion commander, was dispatched to 

support Karzai. Because capturing the Taliban capital, Kandahar, was the focus of both Pashtun 

leaders, the Special Forces teams had their hands full. Since a lot happened in a short time, the 

reader will be shifted back and forth between Karzai and Sherzai with the vignettes. Tenuous 

southern front conditions raised stress levels in JSOTF-North. Helicopter support for that region was coming primarily from Pakistan. This was a signifi cant change.

Plans Versus Reality

On his laptop computer screen, MAJ Del Bennington (pseudonym), 2nd Battalion, 5th 

SFG, operations offi cer, at a Jordanian air base, read the order deploying his unit to Afghanistan in two weeks.254 Transmitted on the secure Internet channel for classifi ed message traffi c, 

the order also specifi ed that an advance headquarters element would go to K2, Uzbekistan, to 

plan the battalion movement to Bagram Airfi eld, Afghanistan, for combat operations. LTC Don 

Forsythe selected 14 of his staff to accompany him. They were Bennington and several others 

from operations, an intelligence team, Air Force meteorologists, and a communications section. 

MAJ Jeffrey Solis (pseudonym), the battalion executive offi cer, would remain behind with the 

battalion’s main body to bring it forward when the JSOTF-North directed.255

The advance echelon (ADVON) fl ew to Uzbekistan on a commercial airline fl ight on 14 

November in civilian clothes with their belongings and equipment in military backpacks and 

duffel bags. After arriving at the Tashkent Airport, they were bussed to K2. MAJ Stan Messinger (pseudonym), acting Army forces commander, JSOTF-North, met Forsythe and Bennington 

to explain a change in plans. The ADVON had been designated Special Operations Command 

and Control Element (SOCCE) 52.256 Forsythe and SOCCE 52 were to be helicoptered into 

Figure 66. One of the major objectives of the southern offensive.
172

the Tarin Kowt region of southern Afghanistan where they would serve as an advisory staff for 

Pashtun resistance leader Hamad Karzai. CPT Amerine and ODA 574 from the 3rd Battalion 

were about to leave Pakistan to join Karzai, about 70 miles north of Kandahar.257

An Air Force MC-130 Combat Talon transported the newly formed SOCCE 52 to Jacobabad, Pakistan. LTC Dan Herndon (pseudonym), deputy commander, Joint Special Operations Air Component Command–South (JSOAC-South), briefed Forsythe and his staff that they 

would enter enemy territory aboard MH-53 Pave Low helicopters. Before Herndon joined the 

Air Force and became a transport pilot, he had been an Army enlisted soldier and served in 

both Special Forces and Ranger units. Bennington thought that the SOCCE had a particularly 

strong collection of offi cers and sergeants. His primary assistant, CPT Douglas Bain (pseudonym), was a former A-team leader and was considered to be one of the best commanders in 

the battalion. The most experienced plans offi cer was CWO Tim Roswell (pseudonym). CPT 

Jack Loach and SSG Cody Prosser (pseudonyms) anchored the intelligence section. Two Army 

communicators, a meteorologist, and two tactical air control parties (TACPs) from the Air 

Force 19th SOS rounded out SOCCE 52.258 They were also fortunate because they had several 

linguists on the team: SGM Rich Ryder (pseudonym) spoke Pashto (one of the few speakers in 

the 5th SFG); SSG “Charlie” Fazal (pseudonym) was a native Persian Farsi speaker; and SSG 

Nick Sands (pseudonym), a recent Special Forces school graduate, had been fi rst in his modern 

Arabic language class.259

SOCCE 52 did not arrive in Afghanistan together. After meeting Hamad Karzai near Tarin 

Khot, CPT Amerine radioed back to Pakistan that “only three” more Americans would be welcome. Thus, Forsythe, Bennington, and Sands, who was a trained radio operator, made the cold 

three-hour fl ight by MH-53 Pave Low into Oruzgan Province. At 0300, 24 November, the MH53 made a “controlled crash” on the landing zone (LZ). When the MH-53 helicopters hovered 

over the high desert LZs, the downwash from their rotors raised thick, blinding clouds of 

dust that enveloped the aircraft, creating a brownout condition. For the last several feet of the 

landing, the pilots could not see the ground—or anything else outside the cockpit—and could 

only maintain a steady rate of level descent until the helicopter landing gear bumped heavily 

onto the earth. Safely in Afghanistan, the three members of SOCCE 52 joined CPT Amerine 

and ODA 574. Over the next 10 days, they followed them and the slowly growing army of antiTaliban Pashtuns marching toward Kandahar.260 Forsythe and Bennington became the military 

advisers to Karzai. They also directed the operations of ODA 574 and ODA 583 with Sherzai 

south of Kandahar. Bennington focused on planning the details and coordinating the schemes 

of maneuver and air support for the two forces to prevent the converging militia armies from 

inadvertently attacking each other or having airstrikes directed against them.261

The Karzai Way to Kandahar

In late November 2001, Kandahar suddenly became the focus of attention. As the city that 

gave birth to the Taliban movement, it was most signifi cant to those who supported the repressive regime and those who sought to free Afghanistan from these oppressors. The fall of Kandahar would have a tremendous psychological and political impact on the entire campaign. When 

LTC Forsythe, commander, 2nd Battalion, 5th SFG, arrived at K2 in mid-November, the chief 

operations offi cer (J3) of JSOTF-North, LTC Matt Rhinehart, directed him toward supporting 

Karzai near Tarin Kowt.262
173

Figure 67. Training new Karzai “recruits” for combat.

While CPT Amerine and ODA 574 were defeating the Taliban at the battle of Tarin Kowt 

north of Kandahar, CPT Harry Sims and ODA 583 were advancing on the city from the south. 

Forsythe sought to link up with Amerine and Karzai and assist in the move south. On 29 November at 0200, Forsythe and three members of his staff landed at Tarin Kowt where Amerine 

introduced him to Karzai. His “army” consisted of “25 to 30 well-meaning friends, farmers, 

shopkeepers. There was no army to speak of,” said Forsythe.

Establishing rapport with a guerrilla leader is critical to advising an unconventional force. 

The Tarin Kowt region is known for its pomegranates, and there were thousands of trees about 

the camp. Forsythe told Karzai that his grandfather had a pomegranate tree in his backyard. 

They talked about their experiences as children climbing pomegranate trees and tasting the 

fruit. According to Forsythe, “That seemed to be the thing that broke the ice.” Forsythe, Karzai, 

and Amerine then began to plan the advance on Kandahar in conjunction with Sherzai from 

the south. In the meantime, ODA 574 directed airstrikes against small groups of Taliban moving against them from Kandahar and coordinated airdrops of weapons, munitions, food, and 

humanitarian aid for the neighboring Afghan people.

To prepare for the move, Karzai sent four men to a village about halfway to Kandahar to 

reconnoiter the area. They reported no Taliban. On 30 November, the column of Pashtun trucks 

moved out but only went a short distance before Forsythe was called to the head of the column. 

The vehicles had stopped at a local gas station to refuel, and the attendant would not fi ll the 

vehicles because no one had any money. Finally, Karzai came forward and introduced himself 

and promised that he would come back to pay him if he would refuel the vehicles. That worked, 

and the convoy was on its way again.

There has been no U.S. military fi eld manual written to describe the “tactical convoy” that 

the Afghans were conducting. Forsythe described it as something like “a cross between the 

Baja, California, off-road races and scenes from the movie, ‘Mad Max.’” There was no order 

or semblance of security as local Afghans in Subaru and Toyota trucks joined the advance. All 

wanted to see Karzai. The trucks would race alongside the line of vehicles until they spotted 

him, pull alongside, wave, and shout a greeting. That would be replaced by another truck full of 

people racing alongside the future president of Afghanistan. The fact that no one wrecked was 

a miracle. Fortunately, the Taliban never threatened, but the Air Force was on call just in case. 

After about 30 miles, the convoy stopped for several days.
174

The new recruits had to be armed and fed. That meant an aerial resupply. Afterward, ODA 

574 provided rudimentary training to the new volunteers who had never fi red a weapon before. 

The training was simply how to load ammunition in a magazine, how to get a bullet in the 

chamber, where the trigger was, and that each knew “which end of the rifl e the bullet came out 

of.” The entire force, counting the Americans, numbered about 200. Having become increasingly concerned about the possibility of encountering enemy forces, Forsythe convinced Karzai 

to establish some control over the mob as they planned the next phase of the advance—attacking Sayd Alim Kalay, 15 miles north of Kandahar.

Returning to Sherzai and his Pastun forces south of the Arghastan Bridge, they were preparing 

to continue the offensive. Sherzai would attack the Kandahar Airport in the fi rst days of December.

Charge to the Airport and Back Again

Facing only occasional rocket and artillery fi re from the vicinity of the airport, about 100 

of Sherzai’s troops moved across the Arghastan Bridge on 2 December. CPT Sims stood alongside Sherzai on the bridge as he directed his fi ghters to take up defensive positions. As evening 

approached, Air Force aircraft spotted Taliban troops massing in the wadi to the west of the 

bridge. Their advance through a maze of canals had concealed them from Sherzai’s forces but 

not hidden them from “overhead intelligence” satellites and aircraft that kept the battlefi elds 

under constant surveillance, reporting enemy movement. Hence, at nightfall, when the Taliban

began a series of small counterattacks to recapture the Arghastan Bridge, Sherzai’s Pashtuns 

were able to hold them off with the assistance of airstrikes directed by MSG Nutting’s CAS 

team, observing from a ridgeline above the wadi.263

The next morning, 3 December, Sherzai and Sims talked about the day’s operations to 

secure the bridge area to the entrances of the canal system, 1⁄2 mile away, by extending his 

defensive perimeter. At 0900, the security forces encountered al-Qaeda fi ghters guarding the 

canals, and a series of sharp fi refi ghts ensued. Sherzai quickly committed about 400 reinforcements to the attack, and this large force overran the al-Qaeda defenders so quickly that they 

captured heavy mortars in their fi ring positions. Special Forces medics Cory Loomis and Kim 

Joes treated the seriously wounded Afghans in the cover of the bridge.264 Encouraged by this 

early success against the canal system, Sherzai pressed his advantage. At 1400, he sent 200 

Figure 68. A U.S. Air Force A-10 

Warthog CAS aircraft.
175

men up Highway 4 to seize the main entrance to Kandahar Airport that was a little over 2 miles 

away. CPT Sims dispatched SFC Sage and his CAS team with the assault force to keep him 

abreast of their progress and to direct airstrikes if needed. They were vitally needed when the 

Pashtun force was stopped by heavy machine gun and cannon fi re just a few hundred yards 

from the airport main gate. More signifi cantly, in their haste to reach the airport, the Pashtun 

commander had driven right past Taliban and al-Qaeda troops positioned near the highway 

who moved to surround the assault force. Under crackling fi re, Sage and his CAS team made 

their way to the foremost line of Pashtuns. They started guiding airstrikes so that the bombs 

would impact directly in front of them to enable the Pashtuns to break contact with the dug-in 

enemy and withdraw south before they were trapped. The CAS team held the Taliban at bay 

with continuous airstrikes as the assault force retreated south.

By late afternoon, all of Sherzai’s troops had reassembled back at the Arghastan Bridge. 

Sherzai, furious with the assault force commander, replaced him. ODA 574 knew that zealous 

haste almost cost Sherzai one-fourth of his Pashtun force and that Sage’s CAS team had saved 

them. Nonetheless, the air attacks and heavy bombing had mauled the Taliban, which put the 

Arghastan Bridge fi rmly under Sherzai’s control. The next attack on Kandahar Airport, Sims 

hoped, would be better planned and executed.265

While the back-and-forth fi ght across the Arghastan Wadi went on, Taliban forces moved 

up Highway 4 from Spin Boldak on the Pakistan border. They took cover in another wadi about 

3 miles from Sherzai’s security checkpoints south of Tahk-te-pol. On the day after the battle for 

the Arghastan Bridge ended, 5 December, the Taliban from Spin Boldak started bombarding 

the southern outposts with rockets and mortar fi re. Sims sent Sage, SSG Czyrnyck, SFC Boyd, 

and a medic, SSG Loomis, by pickup truck to help the Pashtuns hold the line and to protect 

Sherzai’s back while his troops recovered from the setback at the airport. They went into action as soon as they arrived. Sage’s CAS team directed bombs on Taliban mortar positions 

and artillery pieces hidden in the wadi, achieving a direct hit on an antiaircraft gun. Sage then 

asked for permission to attack the bridge over the riverbed, reasoning that this would block the 

enemy from simply driving up Highway 4 to attack Sherzai from behind. The CAS team spotted 

Taliban soldiers and vehicles seeking cover under the bridge as they had at Arghastan. When 

Sims gave the OK, the bombs that blew down the span over the wadi also destroyed a mobile 

rocket launcher parked underneath and detonated a hidden ammunition truck. The fi erce aerial 

bombardment shattered the Taliban counterattack force, and the CAS team watched the survivors retreat south toward Spin Boldak. With their southern fl ank secure, Sage and his CAS team 

returned to Arghastan to prepare for the assault on Kandahar.266

Attacking the Arghendab Bridge With Karzai

After the battles at Tarin Kowt and Patowek, Hamad Karzai’s “Opposition Group,” as CENTCOM referred to the anti-Taliban forces, advanced on Sayd-Alim-Kalay and the Arghendab 

Bridge. By 2 December, Karzai’s Pashtun fi ghters had occupied the town, but they met sharp resistance when they tried to cross the bridge the following day. On 3 December, CPT Amerine and 

three other Special Forces soldiers from ODA 574 moved with the 60 Pashtuns in the advance 

force followed by the main body. Just after crossing the Arghendab Bridge, the advance came 

under fi re from the village on the opposite side of the dry riverbed. When the Afghans began to 
176

retreat, Amerine ran forward and yelled for them to follow him. At the top of a slight ridge, 

he saw Taliban soldiers fi ring from buildings in the town. The American soldiers returned fi re, 

killing several Taliban before joining the retreating Pashtuns on the other side of the bridge. If 

the advance were to continue, the bridge had to be seized. The soldiers quickly organized the 

Pashtuns into a defensive line for the night.

Shortly after dark, most of the Afghans suddenly jumped in their trucks and drove away, 

leaving only LTC Forsythe, ODA 574, and about 30 Afghans to defend the north side of the 

bridge. Then, approximately 100 Taliban counterattacked across the dry riverbed. Using the 

fi repower and night vision capability of the AC-130 Spectre gunships to keep them alert for 

new threats, the Special Forces soldiers and Pashtuns drove back the attackers.

The next morning, 4 December, when Karzai brought the rest of his force to the forward 

position, Forsythe convinced him that they had to seize the bridge. MAJ Bennington “felt 

the pressure of time” because indications from the Bonn Conference were that Karzai would 

likely be named prime minister of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) and would be expected 

in Kabul in about two weeks. Amerine and half of his team with about 100 Pashtuns were the 

advance element in “the ruins,” a crumbling set of mud walls 250 yards north of the bridge. 

Now very profi cient at guiding bombs and directing close air support (CAS), Amerine’s team 

used well-aimed aerial bombs to prevent enemy counterattacks across the two-lane concrete Arghendab Bridge. LTC Forsythe oversaw the fi ght from a knoll 200 yards behind the ruins with 

MSG Jefferson Davis, Five-Seven-Four team sergeant, and the rest of the Special Forces team 

and about 50 Pashtun fi ghters in the support position. Bennington and SSG Sands stayed at the 

“command post,” a one-time Soviet mortar battery position on a prominent hilltop a little more 

than 1⁄4 mile to the east of Forsythe. With them were their guides and a reserve force of about 70 

Pashtuns positioned to move to wherever Karzai’s lines were threatened by an enemy attack.267

During the back-and-forth fi ghting near Sayd-Alim-Kalay, a Taliban soldier had defected, 

bringing a hand-held radio with him. The defector was taken back to the command post where 

Figure 69. Actions at the Arghendab Bridge.
177

Bennington and Sands heard the excited chatter on the radio still tuned to the Taliban frequency. 

They recognized that the crackling voices directing the enemy were speaking Arabic, not some 

Afghan dialect. “We’re fi ghting al-Qaeda,” realized Bennington, whose Arabic was rusty, but 

Sands, fresh from language school, clearly understood the orders being issued on the radio. 

“They’re going to fl ank us on our left using the apple orchard for cover,” announced Sands. 

Bennington radioed LTC Forsythe at the support position and recommended a plan to counter 

the enemy attack. He looked down toward the east side of the bridge above the wadi and saw 

the apple orchard the Taliban leader had described as the approach route that his soldiers should 

use to sneak down to the riverbed. “I’m going to take some guys down from my position,” said 

Bennington, waving forward a quick-reaction squad of Karzai’s Pashtuns, “and see what I can 

see.”268

Bennington signaled for 12 Pashtun fi ghters to follow him, and with three guides, the group 

ran several hundred yards downhill toward the wadi. Long practiced in infantry tactics, Bennington quickly placed the rifl emen and the machine gunner along the crest of the bank opposite the orchard by pointing out exactly where he wanted each to lie down. Moments later, 

about 30 Taliban soldiers emerged from the grove of leafl ess gray apple trees, slipped down 

into the dry riverbed, and started across. Taking careful aim at the approaching Taliban with 

his M-4 carbine, Bennington “triggered” the ambush by fi ring fi rst. Instantly, his entire squad 

joined in, spraying the riverbed with bullets. The loud staccato of returning Russian-model PK 

machine gun fi re and the “whoosh” and crash of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) could be 

heard over the Pashtun machine gun and rifl e fi re. With at least 10 of the enemy force wounded 

and down in the dry riverbed, the others turned and fl ed back to the cover of the apple orchard. 

The Pashtuns cheered out loud about their success. Bennington directed the senior Pashtun, a 

veteran fi ghter who the Americans had respectfully nicknamed “Sergeant Major,” to keep the 

squad ready for another enemy attack. Then he ran back to Forsythe’s location to report that the 

enemy assault had been repulsed. Forsythe realized that the Taliban might try a similar fl anking 

maneuver on their right and dispatched American Special Forces soldiers with another band of 

50 Pashtuns to the west side of the bridge. Both groups watched and waited for another attack, 

but the Taliban was content to harass them with small-arms fi re for the rest of that day.269

Karzai’s troops and the Special Forces soldiers were now fi rmly established on the north 

side of the wadi, controlling the approaches to the bridge with a glowing sense of having beaten 

the Taliban in the most intense close-in fi ghting of the offensive. During the battle, SSG Walter 

Madison (pseudonym), defending at the ruins, was shot through the shoulder.270 Bennington 

reported their situation to JSOTF-North and that Madison had been wounded. The radio operator in the joint operations center responded with an order from “Marshal Eight-Five,” COL 

Mulholland, the JTF commander. LTC Forsythe was to pull all of his men back 1⁄2 mile to the 

town of Sayd-Alim-Kalay.

Confused by the order to give up the position they had fought so hard to take and hold, MAJ 

Bennington asked for the message to be repeated a second, and then a third, time so that Sands 

and the guides could hear it as well. When Bennington delivered the order to Forsythe, he said, 

“I want verifi cation,” but, unaccountably, radio contact with the U.S. base at K2 had been lost. 

For the next 31⁄2 hours, SOCCE 52 and ODA 574 were literally incommunicado. Unable to get 

the verifi cation he wanted, Forsythe had no choice but to obey the last orders he had received. 
178

He directed the American soldiers to abandon the positions by the bridge and pull back into the 

town to await the helicopters due that night with supplies, mail, and 12 more men, the rest of 

SOCCE 52. “We still have the initiative,” said Forsythe. “We’ll make plans for their next step in 

the morning.”271 That evening, Karzai was told on his cellular telephone that the next day the delegates of Afghan factions meeting in Bonn, Germany, would name him the interim leader of the 

new government of Afghanistan.272 While the Karzai attack from the north was stalled at the Arghendab Bridge, Gul Agha Sherzai was determined to win the “race to Kandahar” from the south.

Who Dares, Wins

With Kandahar within striking distance, CPT Sims favored sending a large portion of Sherzai’s growing force of Pashtuns away from the airport on a wide arc around the Tarnak Farms 

to approach the city from the west.273 On 4 December, JSOTF-North radioed tactical guidance 

to Sims: “Don’t go west. That course of action will stretch you too thin.” His response was, 

“Well, let’s get the marines in the fi ght.” JSOTF-North replied that the marines were not at 

Objective Rhino for “direct combat.” Sims was baffl ed. “Why were hundreds of Marines in the 

desert 80 miles from Kandahar if not to join in the fi ght?” he wondered. The operations center 

also expressed serious concerns about Sherzai and ODA 583 actually entering Kandahar and 

suggested that a better plan would be to surround the city. With Karzai and ODA 574 about 40 

miles north of the last Taliban-held city in Afghanistan and pushing southward, JSOTF-North’s 

fi nal instructions to Sims were “Continue to develop the situation.”274

Sherzai pushed his scout elements—small groups of pickup trucks carrying around 10 

men each—around the outskirts of Kandahar. Then, Pashta, the older of Sherzai’s two younger 

brothers, made a sizable reconnaissance in force with 10 trucks carrying 200 Pashtun troops 

toward the city. On the morning of 7 December, Sims was standing near the gate of Kandahar 

Airport with Sherzai when Pashta called him on his satellite telephone. Excitedly, the younger 

Pashta reported that he had entered the city meeting no Taliban resistance and was at the governor’s palace. Sherzai turned to Sims and said (through the interpreter, Engineer Yosif), “I’m 

going to the palace, come with me!” Sims deliberately hesitated, knowing entry into the city 

was contrary to JSOTF-North directions, and said that he would have to get permission from 

his commander, LTC Forsythe. As Sims was trying to raise “Rambo 85” (Forsythe) by satellite radio for instructions, COL Mulholland came on the air and ordered Sims, “Don’t go into 

Kandahar. We have reports that Sherzai’s troops are looting the city, and the various factions are 

fi ghting each other. It’s not safe.” Impatient to return to his former seat of government, Sherzai 

did not wait for Sims to fi nish the radio conversation. He quickly gathered about 500 of his 

troops who mounted their trucks and sped away into the city with Sherzai in the lead vehicle. 

Four British soldiers in a four-wheel-drive truck followed the Afghans.275

Engineer Yosif drove back and found Sims 45 minutes later. “Sherzai invites you to his 

palace,” implored the translator, “He asks why you’re not there with him.” As Yosif waited, 

Sims weighed the consequences of accepting Sherzai’s invitation with COL Mulholland’s reaction. Thinking quickly, he rationalized that the presence of U.S. Special Forces troops might 

deter interfactional fi ghting. The task force commander did not know that Sherzai was already 

in the governor’s palace in Kandahar. Sims did not think that Mulholland or any of his staff in 

Uzbekistan knew the situation as well as he did, and so far, no one at JSOTF-North had sec-
179

ond-guessed him on his decisions. Yosif said it was safe, and what was to be gained from joining 

Sherzai now was worth taking the risk. Sims had another motivation: he wanted his team, ODA 

583, to be the fi rst American soldiers into Kandahar. It took only a few moments before he yelled 

to Yosif, “Hell, yeah, we’re coming!” Sims told four of his men to secure their base. As the rest of 

his team jumped into two sport utility vehicles, someone asked, “What did COL Mulholland say?” 

“That’s not important now,” answered Sims. “The situation is changing too rapidly.”276

When they entered the former Taliban capital, Sims thought to himself, “So this is what 

it’s like to liberate a city.” As the Special Forces detachment drove its vehicles along dusty 

streets crowded with thousands of Afghans, the people were cheering, waving, and throwing 

marigolds at them. Sims heard occasional shouts of “Welcome!” and “Thank you!” in broken 

English coming from the crowd. Sims glanced at his watch and saw that it was nearly 1400. 

Then it struck him. The date was 7 December—Pearl Harbor 

Day. That had been a surprise attack like 9/11, he thought, and 

thus, it seemed quite appropriate to ride into the enemy’s capital in tribute to that “day of infamy” for Americans. When ODA 

583 reached the governor’s palace, Sims typed a message into his 

digital encrypting device to transmit to JSOTF-North: “We are in 

the governor’s palace with Sherzai.” It was 1500.277

Sims picked up his satellite radio and called JSOTFNorth to make the same report, but personally, to the task force commander. LTC Mike Roberts 

(pseudonym), the JSOTF-North operations offi cer, answered for Mulholland.278 “I’m in Kandahar,” reported Sims. “Tell me why you went into the city,” replied Roberts, calmly. In short, 

clipped phrases, Sims recounted the reasons that had run through his mind when Yosif presented 

Sherzai’s invitation to him. He then described the buoyant crowds inside Kandahar, celebrating 

the fall of the Taliban. “Okay, sounds good,” Roberts responded. To his relief, there had been 

no challenge to the decision. As he stood looking about the governor’s palace, he recalled his 

original orders at the task force base in Uzbekistan three weeks before, telling him what he was 

to accomplish in Kandahar province: “Deny the area to Taliban and al-Qaeda forces by any 

means possible.” A sense of satisfaction came over him. “I felt like I accomplished my mission,” 

said Sims. Nineteen days after landing in the Shin Narai Valley, ODA 583 and Sherzai’s Pashtun 

warriors had fought their way across high deserts and over mountains through thousands of enemy fi ghters to seize Kandahar, their objective, “by any means possible.” This victory effectively 

ended the battle for Afghanistan.279

While ODA 583 and Sherzai’s Pashtuns were fi ghting the Taliban on the southern outskirts 

of Kandahar, tragedy was about to strike the other Pashtun force converging on the city from 

the north. The news that Karzai had been selected to lead the AIA would be temporarily forgotten in the wake of a fratricide incident.

Death From Above

5 December 2001 was a day no member of ODA 574 would ever forget. Team members were 

busy sharing the contents of “care packages” from home that came with the resupply items on 

the helicopters that delivered the rest of SOCCE 52 to Sayd-Alim-Kalay the night before. In the 

Figure 70. The Kandahar

welcoming committee.
180

midst of this activity, the Special Forces soldiers had spotted several Taliban fi ghters on a ridge 

and around a cave nearby. The CAS team had already directed Air Force F-18s carrying bombs 

on the target while the tactical air control party (TACP) attached to ODA 574 talked to circling 

B-52 bombers. Suddenly, at 0930, “All hell broke loose.”A joint direct-attack munition (JDAM) 

dropped from a B-52 impacted directly on a friendly position. In a split second, two Americans—

MSG Davis, the ODA 583 team sergeant, and SFC Daniel Petithory—and at least six Afghans 

were dead; eight other Americans and perhaps 40 Afghans were wounded; and one American, 

SSG Prosser (pseudonym), was seriously wounded. CPT Amerine realized at once what had happened: “We were hit by our own bomb.” Both of Amerine’s eardrums had burst, and he was hit 

in the thigh by a bomb fragment. Karzai was injured by the shattered glass of a nearby window. 

Moments before, Davis had been sharing Rice Krispie treats from his wife’s care package.280

The highly trained Special Forces soldiers reacted instinctively. The survivors hurriedly 

reconstituted a defense and applied fi rst aid to the casualties. Luckily, the team had two medics 

and another soldier who was a former medic. Although one of the medics was injured, the trio 

did a quick triage of both American and Afghan casualties. They were all allies; they were all 

fi ghting for the same cause; they would have done the same. The intravenous kits all Special 

Forces soldiers carry were soon all in use. All Special Forces soldiers receive combat lifesaving 

training, and that basic skill ensured the survival of numerous wounded personnel.

Forsythe notifi ed COL Mulholland of the disaster, and Mulholland alerted a quick-reaction force (QRF) in case the Taliban took advantage of the situation. Both Mulholland and 

Forsythe called for aerial medical evacuation. The nearest helicopters were at the U.S. Marine 

base at Camp Rhino, more than 100 miles southwest of Kandahar. U.S. Navy CH-53s in Pakistan responded the fastest. As medics on the ground sorted the casualties, the number kept rising. There was no question that the two helicopters would be loaded to capacity. After taking 

on the dead and wounded, the Navy helicopters lifted off for Rhino. Short of fuel, an Air 

Force CH-130P tanker met the fl ight and refueled them en route. Escorted by AH-1 Cobra 

gunships, two U.S. Marine CH-53 helicopters carrying ODB 570 and ODA 524 (dispatched 

from JSOTF-North) and SOCCE 540 personnel (with TF 58 at Rhino) arrived with doctors 

and Air Force pararescue medics. The U.S. Marine helicopters evacuated the wounded Afghans 

Figure 71. A mission-ready JDAM.
181

to Rhino. Using the airstrip at Camp Rhino, an emergency surgical team treated the critically 

wounded Americans as they were fl own to hospitals in the region. Some continued on to Germany and eventually to the United States.281

What went wrong? Initial indications revealed that the bomber received the wrong coordinates for the enemy position. A technological quirk in the global positioning system (GPS) 

the Air Force TACP was using required that the system be recalibrated after the batteries were 

changed. Otherwise, the GPS automatically displayed the map coordinates where the device 

was located. If the operator neglected to reenter the coordinates of the enemy position after changing batteries, he could inadvertently transmit his position as the target to the B-52 

bomber circling overhead at 10,000 feet. Then ODA 574’s location would automatically be 

entered in the JDAM homing mechanism, and the bomb would travel directly to where it was 

programmed—in this case, at friendly forces.282

Unfortunately, casualties from friendly fi re (fratricide) are a fact of war. In World War II, 

GEN Lesley J. McNair was inadvertently killed by American bombs shortly before the breakout from Normandy. Almost a platoon of paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, heavily engaged fi ghting the North Vietnamese 

at Dak To, were killed by American CAS 

when an errant bomb struck a command 

post. Like the JDAM bomb strike on ODA 

574, such incidents are very diffi cult to accept. Despite the losses, the Taliban was defeated, the city of Kandahar was captured, 

and Karzai survived to become the interim 

president of a war-torn nation. President 

Bush spoke of the deaths and the soldiers’ 

contributions: “And I want the families to 

know that they died for a noble and just 

cause, that the fi ght against terror is noble 

and just. And they defended freedom. And 

for that we are grateful.”283

Figure 72. JDAM components.

Figure 73. President George W. Bush.
182

Less than 48 hours after the fratricide incident at Sayd-Alim-Kalay involving Karzai’s forces, ODA 574, SOCCE 52, Sherzai’s Pashtuns, and ODA 583 entered the abandoned Taliban

capital, Kandahar. The American plan for seizing the city in a coordinated assault involving the 

two Pashtun forces did not consider Afghan rivalry for power.

Another Reaction to Kandahar’s Fall

Shortly before the JDAM struck ODA 574 as the U.S. soldiers were reading their mail 

and opening packages from home, Karzai was talking to a Taliban delegation in Kandahar on 

his telephone. For almost two weeks, Sherzai, advised by CPT Sims and ODA 583, had been 

steadily advancing on Kandahar from the south. From the north, Karzai had been moving toward the same city. As the birthplace of the Taliban movement, its fall would be signifi cant in 

the war to establish a stable Afghanistan. As the two forces approached the city, it appeared 

imminent that resistance would soon collapse and a new era would begin. In CPT Amerine’s 

opinion, “Taking Kandahar, as I saw it, was probably going to be the end of the war.”284

After talking to the Taliban delegation by satellite phone, Karzai told reporters that he started 

“serious negotiations beginning this morning,” and he hoped that the situation would be “resolved 

soon.”285 While Karzai was on the phone negotiating, LTC Forsythe was planning to coordinate 

the moves from south and north to “squeeze the Taliban between us.”286 His fi rst move was to reoccupy the terrain approximately 700 meters from where the JDAM had struck. On 6 December, 

American Special Forces and Pashtun forces accomplished this without incident.

Karzai’s efforts culminated in his agreement to meet with the Taliban delegation near SaydAlim-Kalay on 7 December. Concerned about the AIA president’s safety, Forsythe advised 

Karzai to limit the Taliban delegation to a single vehicle. Karzai concurred. According to the 

Pashtun leader, the American presence was so intimidating to the Taliban delegates that they 

immediately surrendered. The terms of that surrender were somewhat unclear, however.287

“The Taliban have decided to surrender Kandahar, Helmand, 

and Zabul (provinces) to me, and in exchange, we have offered them amnesty,” reported Karzai. This sweeping gesture, 

however, proved unacceptable to President Bush. According 

to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, any mutual agreement that 

granted amnesty to Taliban leader Mullah Omar would not be 

accepted. Furthermore, there were still Taliban and al-Qaeda

dug in around the city. Sherzai and Sims faced a strong force 

and were about 2 miles from the city at the airport. Shortly 

after Karzai’s meeting on 7 December, Sherzai entered Kandahar and occupied his old offi ce in the governor’s mansion.288

When Karzai found out, he was furious. Mullah Naqueebullah, a senior Taliban military 

leader in Kandahar, had been negotiating his becoming the Kandahar governor in exchange for 

surrendering the Taliban military to Karzai. The mullah’s issue was that Sherzai already occupied the mansion. LTC Forsythe convinced Karzai that a civil war over Kandahar was not in his 

or the country’s best interest. The compromise with Naqueebullah was that Karzai would allow 

him to retain his title of mullah and his house in the city if he agreed to sever all political and 

military ties. Karzai, Forsythe, and the Special Forces soldiers of SOCCE 52 entered the city 

Figure 74. President Bush and 

Hamad Karzai.
183

on 8 December. Three days later, Karzai agreed that Sherzai should be designated provincial 

governor, and Naqueebullah agreed to the compromise conditions.

Forsythe, Sims, and the rest of the Special Forces soldiers were still nervous about the arrangements. Consistent with Afghan tradition, many former Taliban suddenly were loyal to 

Karzai. Switching sides carried no stigma to these fi ghters. To the Americans, though, it was 

disconcerting. “One minute you’re shooting at them, and the next minute they’re your allies and 

friends,” Forsythe remarked. An unanswered question was, where had all the Taliban leaders 

gone? Mullah Omar had disappeared from the city. The Americans had to conclude that during 

the negotiations the important Taliban leaders had fl ed. A few days later, Karzai offi ciated at the 

formal ceremony installing Sherzai as governor and then departed for Kabul to become interim 

president of Afghanistan.289

Amerine’s prediction that the fall of Kandahar marked the end of the war proved wrong. 

Fighting continued. Nevertheless, two Afghan Pashtun forces with small advisory contingents 

of American Special Forces troops had liberated a major portion of their country. The Americans had accomplished the task without creating the impression that they were another foreign 

force bent on occupying the country. Taliban propaganda comparing the United States’ actions 

with those of Great Britain or the Soviet Union would carry little weight. Coupled with the 

capture of Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Bagram, and Kabul in early November, the fall of Kandahar 

in December was a decisive victory in the war against terrorism.

As Northern Alliance forces, supported by the Special Forces ODAs, captured towns and cities in northern and central Afghanistan, Army civil affairs teams (CATs) followed close behind. 

These teams coordinated humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts, working closely 

with tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs). These “on-the-ground” tactical teams complemented the 

Air Force EC-130 Commando Solo airborne radio broadcasts and added emphasis to PSYOP 

messages being distributed in massive leafl et drops throughout the country. JSOTF-North directed all these efforts as part of the overarching unconventional warfare (UW) campaign.

CA and Humanitarian Relief

During its effort to rejuvenate old connections and establish new links to recent NGO 

arrivals, CPT Marty Cavanaugh (pseudonym) and CAT-A46, D Company, 96th Civil Affairs 

Battalion (CAB) learned that UNICEF had an inoculation campaign set up to begin in the 

area southeast of Herat in late November.290 Concerned that the UNICEF inoculation teams 

would get caught up in Ismail Khan’s offensive against the Taliban near Herat, MAJ DiJurnigan, chief, civil-military operations center (CMOC), Islamabad, after contacting Special Forces 

ODA 554, diplomatically suggested that the inoculation campaign be postponed. In another 

instance, when he received a call from an aircraft carrying humanitarian aid from Iran to Herat, 

DiJurnigan coordinated the landing instructions with ODA 554.

CAT-A46 spent most of its time recording, updating, and disseminating the multitude of 

humanitarian aid and assistance activity inside Afghanistan. Over time, more and more of the 

NGOs recognized and realized the benefi ts of coordinating with DiJurnigan and the CA team. 

However, many NGOs and private organizations were reluctant to work or cooperate with any 

organization that was overtly military like the CMOC. DiJurnigan, therefore, coined the title 

coalition humanitarian liaison cell (CHLC) to eliminate the word “military” from civil-military 
184

operations center. The nondoctrinal CHLC, as well as its popular nickname, “Chiclet,” became 

part of the CA legacy during the war in Afghanistan.

In October and November, while DiJurnigan coordinated humanitarian operations from Islamabad, elements of C Company, 96th CAB, deployed to Uzbekistan where they established

CMOC-North at K2. With CAT-A46 capable of handling the requirements in Islamabad, DiJurnigan fl ew to Kabul in early December to imbed himself in the newly created Combined 

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) to assist CMOC-North and CMOCSouth with their information requests and serve as a voice for the 96th CAB teams in Afghanistan. Since many of the NGO personnel in Kabul had migrated there from Islamabad, this 

enhanced his value to the new headquarters. DiJurnigan was realistic about the CA role in the 

war: “The biggest issue was where do we [CA] fi t into this particular confl ict? That was always 

our biggest challenge—to fi nd out where we could most effectively ‘plug into’ a longstanding 

humanitarian infrastructure.” Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld commented on the role of the CA 

soldiers: “[They made] remarkable contributions. By demonstrating our concern for the welfare of the Afghan people through the delivery of humanitarian relief from the fi rst days of the 

war, we showed the Afghan people that we were coming as a force of liberation, not a force of 

occupation.”291 And it all started in Pakistan.

CA Teams on the Ground

Decades of fi ghting had disrupted the Afghan economy, and the Taliban government 

institutions had not been functioning for some time. The Army CA teams were introduced as part 

of a massive effort to provide for the welfare of the people. At Mazar-e-Sharif, CAT-A33 helped a 

Jordanian medical team establish a hospital that provided care for about 8,000 people in 60 days.292

Education was among the top civic-action priorities. The team assessed 15 schools in and around 

the city and submitted repair projects to CJCMOTF for funding. The CA soldiers helped deliver 

textbooks to local hospitals and a medical school. Because Mazar-e-Sharif was the second largest 

city in the country, it was to be a main food distribution center. CAT-A33 personnel arranged 

the construction of a large food storage warehouse at the airfi eld by the World Food Program.

The second critical site for the humanitarian relief effort was the airfi eld at Bagram. When 

it arrived on 23 November, CAT-A32’s mission was to establish a distribution center to ship aid 

Figure 75. Inventory and accountability were a 

constant part of humanitarian aid.
185

throughout Afghanistan. Thus, part of the headquarters staff of a CAT-B accompanied CAT-A32 

to Bagram.293 In the interim, MAJ Steve Small (pseudonym) and CAT-A32 arranged for the repair of two hangars that had been stripped of wiring. Four Soviet aircraft stored in one had to be 

man-handled out to make room for the rapidly arriving aid. They worked with several NGOs, 

including a European organization, to transport 40 injured children to Germany for treatment. 

SFC Charles Rogers (pseudonym), a former Special Forces medic on CAT-A32, described the 

scene of the wounded children as “heartbreaking.” “I’ve got children of my own, and that’s all 

I could think of when I was holding these kids,” said Rogers. On 7 December, the fi rst aircraft 

loaded with 945 bags of red wheat and 1,440 blankets arrived and was unloaded. Danger was 

ever present, and on 18 December, a U.S. soldier from another unit stepped on a mine near a 

hangar. Rogers administered fi rst aid immediately and helped to stabilize the injured soldier 

until an ambulance with doctors arrived. That evening, CAT-A32 departed Bagram for K2 and 

was replaced by CAT-A41 from D Company, 96th CAB.294

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, defi nes civil-military operations as “the activities that . . . establish, maintain, infl uence, or exploit relations between 

military forces . . . and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations 

in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives.” ARSOF 

soldiers, in general, and CA soldiers, in particular, were often the fi rst Americans that the Afghan people, especially in the cities, met as the Taliban regime collapsed. CA soldiers know 

that fi rst impressions can determine whether the populace supports American military operations or views them as an invading, occupying army. The 96th CAB soldiers quickly won the 

Afghan people’s support by appreciating their plight, meeting their basic needs, and shedding 

tears over their injured children. As one soldier said, “This is just an easy thing to do.”295

Tactical PSYOP to Mazar-e-Sharif

Three weeks after Mazar-e-Sharif fell to General Rashid Dostum and a week after the alQaeda prisoner uprising at Qala-e-Jangi fortress, SSG Carl Dawkins (pseudonym) of Team 

922, A Company, 9th POB, was the fi rst PSYOP soldier to reach the town. After arriving by 

MH-47E, Dawkins unloaded his loudspeaker and Pashto and Dari tapes. He then met with the 

commander, Special Forces ODA 595, to determine what PSYOP would be most effective in 

the area. While becoming familiar with the city, Dawkins met an Afghan woman who had one 

Figure 76. CA collar insignia and the USACAPOC shoulder patch.
186

of the airdropped American transistor radios. She told him that it was the fi rst radio she had 

heard in seven years. Dawkins made it a point to request the delivery of more transistor radios. 

Five days later, SGT Charles Vargas (pseudonym) arrived with more batteries to power the 

portable loudspeaker. Finally, on 21 December, the third member of the team, PFC Paul Davis 

(pseudonym), joined Dawkins and Vargas at Mazar.

Although SSG O’Reilly (pseudonym), the detachment sergeant, could talk to his team by 

radio from K2, he had a responsibility to visit his soldiers in the fi eld. Riding a resupply helicopter seemed to be the answer. When he did that the day after Christmas, the enemy threat at 

Mazar-e-Sharif was such that the helicopter did not shut down while the cargo was unloaded. 

On 5 January, O’Reilly tried again to deliver mail and Copenhagen tobacco to the team. This 

time, it turned into a night-long adventure when the aircraft commander suddenly told him that 

there was a change of mission—he and his team, with equipment, had to get on the helicopter. 

Four hours later they were in Kandahar for an “on-call” PSYOP loudspeaker mission. After 

sitting on the airfi eld with its engines running for several hours, the helicopter fl ew to Bagram 

with O’Reilly and TPT 922 aboard. By daylight, O’Reilly, TPT 922, and soldiers from the 19th 

SFG, who boarded in Bagram, were back at K2.296

While at Mazar-e-Sharif, SSG Dawkins had worked closely with ODA 595 and CAT-A33. 

The detachment sergeant, SSG O’Reilly, was most proud of that ARSOF integration at Mazar. 

The experience the Special Forces soldiers brought, together with that of the PSYOP soldiers, 

was not simply the sum of two parts. It had a synergistic effect. Together, they could tailor 

PSYOP products to assure the local populace that the United States was there to eliminate the 

Taliban and make their lives better. MAJ Barstow, commander, C Company, proudly commended his soldiers on that point: “The ability of attached forces to support the maneuver 

commander, to tailor psychological operations products that are as instantaneous as we can 

make them . . . is the beauty of what 9th PSYOP Battalion does.” The humanitarian impact of 

providing food and information also paid great dividends. Particularly gratifying to O’Reilly 

was the work the PSYOP soldiers did to make the people aware of mines. Identifi ed minefi eld 

boundaries were marked by rocks painted red on the side facing the minefi eld and white on 

the “safe” side. Barstow, O’Reilly, and the Special Forces commander focused their efforts on 

more prominently identifying minefi elds and distributing leafl ets to warn the Afghan people 

about their presence. After returning to the United States, O’Reilly commented on his time in 

Afghanistan and the contributions of TPT 922. “It was a great thing,” he concluded.297

Broadcast media proved very effective during the PSYOP campaign. More than 7,500 

small battery-powered transistor radios were distributed both by airdrop and by TPTs with 

Special Forces ODAs. Simple leafl ets told the Afghan people which numbered channels to tune 

to for American PSYOP-produced programs.298 Initially, the EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft 

broadcast only 10 hours a day, but as soon as the Special Operations Media Systems–Broadcast 

(SOMS-B) radio stations were set up in Afghanistan, programs could be broadcast 24 hours a 

day. The Afghans queried said they liked the radio programs because they broadcast music, and 

for almost everyone, it was the fi rst time they had been permitted to listen to music in six years. 

Changes to the selected music were made based on feedback provided by the PSYOP teams 

working with the Special Forces ODAs. Intelligence sources reported that the PSYOP campaign was a key factor in the surrender of Konduz. Other feedback indicated that the PSYOP 
187

leafl ets and radio broadcasts were important contributors to the Afghan population withdrawing its support from the Taliban, especially from al-Qaeda.

299

MAJ Henry Blackaby (pseudonym), commander of a psychological development company, 

8th POB, recognized that leafl ets and radio broadcasts were critical to Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM; however, “The real heroes are the young troops who develop the products.”300

After World War II, GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower said, “The exact contribution of psychological 

warfare toward the fi nal victory cannot, of course, be measured. . . , however, I am convinced 

that the expenditure of men and money in wielding the spoken and written word was an important contributing factor in undermining the enemy’s will to resist.”301 There is no reason to 

believe that Eisenhower’s assessment will be any less valid when the fi nal history of Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM is written.

Emergency Casualty Evacuation at K2

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) operated with a concentrated focus during combat missions in central Asia. Garrison uniform and grooming standards were not mission-essential tasks. The ARSOF commanders established policies based on the missions being conducted 

and fully expected their soldiers to comply. Historically, when conventional forces collocate 

with special operations forces (SOF), an age-old clash of cultures occurs. Stronghold Freedom 

was no exception to this, but attitudes changed on 3 December.302

Base commander COL Albert Love left the K2 Air Base with fi ve personnel—his driver, 

another soldier, two interpreters, and a DOD contractor—to attend a meeting with Uzbek offi cials. Not far from the compound, an Uzbek driving a dump truck inadvertently crossed the 

center lane and collided head on with the base commander’s rented sport utility vehicle. Love 

received a severe head injury, lacerating most of his scalp, and the other fi ve passengers had a 

variety of injuries, some critical.

Meanwhile, CWO Walter Striker (pseudonym), a 160th SOAR maintenance test pilot, had 

just returned from a midday test fl ight with a three-man crew.303 They were the “day crew” that 

primarily did postmaintenance test fl ights and daily inspections on the helicopters. This procedure allowed night-mission crews to get up later in the day and make fi nal preparations before 

the evening launches, thereby maximizing crew endurance and daylight maintenance time. As 

the crew was completing its postfl ight tasks, a soldier ran up and said, “Hey, we’ve got an accident out here. It’s COL Love in his truck.” Immediately, SGT Philip Svitak, the fl ight engineer, 

and Striker reacted, grabbed a crewman, and sent the runner for medical support. A doctor and 

several medics from the 274th Forward Surgical Team came running to the fl ight line with their 

emergency medical equipment. Company Commander CPT John Gates got an Air Force STS 

team for security and climbed into the copilot seat.304 By then Striker had the MH-47E rotors 

turning.

Once everyone was aboard, Striker lifted off and found the accident site within 10 minutes. Careful not to create more problems with the downwash of the Chinook’s rotors, Striker 

landed adjacent to the highway and dropped the ramp. Gates, the 274th medical team, and the 

Air Force STS team ran to the accident scene. Gates took charge of the accident site using the 

STS team to cordon off the area while the medical team administered fi rst aid. The question 
188

of what to do with the injured Uzbeks from the dump truck was solved when another vehicle 

arrived to transport them to a local hospital. Since off-base security was always a concern, 

everyone worked quickly and remained vigilant. Soon, all the injured were carried or walked 

to the Chinook. They were back at the airfi eld 20 minutes after leaving. SSG Landon Falkerie 

(pseudonym), a 160th medic, met the Chinook and transported Love to the American fi eld 

hospital.305

The Night Stalker maintenance crew displayed its ability to respond to any task. With limited information, it quickly gathered the medical and security personnel needed and raced to 

the rescue. COL Love underwent extensive surgery and fully recovered. After he presented Certifi cates of Appreciation to those involved in the emergency casualty evacuation, the ARSOF 

aviators noticed a change in the atmosphere around Stronghold Freedom.

Thus, the ARSOF preparation for combat and the war to topple the Taliban regime in 

Afghanistan was concluded. But the JSOTF unconventional warfare (UW) campaign was just 

beginning. The previous vignettes chronologically trace combat operations on the ground and 

in the air, primarily dominated by the 5th SFG ODAs supporting the anti-Taliban leaders in 

the north, northeast, and south; 160th SOAR aircrews inserting Special Forces teams, guardFigure 78. CA always fostering goodwill and 

demonstrating compassion.

Figure 77. A casualty evacuation kit on an MH-47 Chinook.
189

ing insertions, and conducting surgical air raids requiring multiple aerial and ground refuels in 

extremely bad weather; and 75th Rangers assaulting airstrips to support follow-on operations. 

Throughout, PSYOP teams prepared leafl ets, broadcasts, and a boots-on-the-ground video presented nationwide, and CA teams coordinated humanitarian relief to the Afghan populace. As 

the cities fell to anti-Taliban forces, tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) and CA teams were attached 

to the Special Forces ODAs and a Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Command in Kabul. 

JSOTF-North at K2, Uzbekistan, commanded by a Special Forces colonel, developed the UW 

campaign plan, daily directed offensives in a constantly evolving operation, orchestrated Army 

and Air Force SOF assets into combat multipliers, and successfully fought the war to overthrow 

the Taliban in less than two months. Given the time involved, errors were made because combat 

priorities were constantly being triaged, but none proved to be mission stoppers.

Chapter 4 addresses ARSOF activities during the “transition period” between the fall of the 

Taliban regime in mid-December 2001 and Operation ANACONDA in February 2002. During 

this period, a second JSOTF for southern Afghanistan was established with control over coalition forces; the CJCMOTF expanded its role; an Army conventional brigade replaced the U.S. 

Marine force at Kandahar; the JSOAC-North headquarters relocated to a Persian Gulf base, 

taking the Air Force SOF elements with it; 19th SFG (ARNG) elements were committed in Afghanistan; the 3rd SFG was alerted to replace the 5th SFG; the 20th SFG (ARNG) was alerted 

for overseas movement; the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB) was replaced 

by the 507th Corps Support Group from Europe; USAR CA and PSYOP units were alerted 

to replace 96th CAB and 4th POG units in theater; and the 160th SOAR rotated its Chinook 

helicopters to accomplish annual maintenance checks and introduced MH-60K Black Hawks 

to support ARSOF missions. The turbulence associated with transition was further complicated 

by the continuing mission to destroy Taliban and al-Qaeda forces and to support the Afghan 

Interim Authority (AIA) government.
190

Notes

 1. Herman Melville (1819-1891) and Israel Potter (1855), The Writings of Herman Melville, Vol. 8, Harrison 

Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle, eds. (1982), chapter 10.

 2. Geoffrey C. Lambert note to Charles Briscoe, 29 April 2003, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, at U.S. Army 

Special Operations Command (USASOC) Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hererafter cited as Lambert note to 

Briscoe.

 3. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Press Release, 11 April 2002. Jim Pavitt, Deputy Director of Operations, “Address to Duke University Law School Conference, 11 April 2002.” “Teams of my paramilitary operations 

offi cers . . . were among the fi rst on the ground in Afghanistan. . . . In those few days that it took us to get there after 

that terrible, terrible attack, my offi cers stood on Afghan soil, side by side with Afghan friends that we had developed 

over a long period of time. . . . We were there well before the 11th of September.” <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/pavitt_04262002.html>.

 4. John F. Mulholland, 12 July 2002, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, interview with Charles Briscoe, transcripts 

and tapes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Mulholland interview.

 5. LTC Warren Richards (pseudonym), 29 May 2002, Fort Bragg, interview with Richard Kiper et al., 

transcripts and tapes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as W. Richards interview.

 6. Mulholland interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

 7. The term “Northern Alliance” was in widespread use at the time and appears in U.S. government publications that predate the 9/11 attacks. For example, see U.S. State Department, “Country Reports on Human Rights 

Practices 2000,” 23 February 2001, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/sa/721.htm>.

8. Najibullah was of Pashtun ethnicity. See Mark Fineman, “Afghan Leader Najibullah Forced to Resign by 

Rebels,” Los Angeles Times, 17 April 1992, 2.

9. “The Battle for Mazar-e-Sharif,” Information Paper, Department of the Army (DA), U.S. Army Center of 

Military History (CMH), 28 April 2002. See also Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 

2000).

10. FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror,” 8 September 2002, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/Frontline 

/shows/campaign/interviews/595.html>.

11. For reports on the cycle of massacres and reprisals in Afghanistan, see Ian Cobain, “Taliban’s Child Victims 

Found in City of Blood,” London Times, 13 November 2001, and David Rohde, “Executions of P.O.W.’s Cast Doubts 

on Alliance,” New York Times, 13 November 2001. COL Mulholland ordered his Special Forces detachments to take 

what actions they could to prevent atrocities by their new Afghan allies and to report any atrocities they discovered. 

Mulholland letter to Kalev Sepp, 5 December 2002, Fort Campbell, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

12. CIA Press Release, 2 June 2002, A.B. Krongard, Executive Director of the CIA, “Remarks at the Conference on the 60th Anniversary of OSS, 7 June 2002.” “[I]n an Afghan valley, a Special Forces team—among the fi rst 

into the country and itself a proud successor to OSS—ran into a party of mysterious fi gures. From one of those fi gures, through darkness broken only by a fl ashlight, came the roar of an American voice: ‘Hi! I’m Hal! Damn glad to 

meet you.’ He was from CIA’s Special Activities Division and had been scouting the ground, gathering information.” 

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/ ossconference_06022002.html>.

13. Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon Loeb, “Special Forces Open Ground Campaign,” Washington Post, 19 

October 2001, 1; Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Offensive in Afghanistan Enters Riskier Phase of Commando Raids,” Wall Street 

Journal, 22 October 2001, 1; Brad Knickerbocker, “US Strategy Moves to the Ground,” Christian Science Monitor, 

22 October 2001, 1; John Barry and Arian Campo-Flores, “The Warriors of the Night,” Newsweek, 29 October 2001, 

22; and Romesh Ratnesar, “The Ground War: Into the Fray,” Time, 29 October 2001.

14. Thom Shanker and Steven Lee Myers, “Rumsfeld Says Attacks Seek to Help Rebels Advance,” New York 

Times, 23 October 2001, 1.

15. Michael Smith, “US Special Forces Beat Retreat as Enemy ‘Fought Back Like Maniacs,’” London Daily 

Telegraph, 26 October 2001.

16. Michael Janofsky, “2 Soldiers Remembered for Their Focus and Patriotism,” New York Times, 23 October 

2001.

17. Donatella Lorch, “The Green Berets Up Close,” Newsweek, 14 January 2002. In this article, the author 

records that during ODA 534’s preparations for its operations inside Afghanistan, the team requested a personality 

profi le on General Atta Mohammed, the warlord it was to meet. Instead, it received a dossier on Mohammed Atta, 

one of the terrorist skyjackers who killed himself during the 9/11 suicide attack in New York. See also U.S. Army, 

“Narrative Justifi cation for Award of the Presidential Unit Citation,” Headquarters (HQ), 5th Special Forces Group 
191

(SFG), Fort Campbell, n.d., and “The Battle for Mazar-e-Sharif,” Information Paper, CMH, 28 April 2002.

18. The lieutenant colonels were the commanders of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 5th SFG (at Bagram with Bismullah Khan and at Mazar-e-Sharif with General Rashid Dostum, respectively). U.S. Army, “Narrative Justifi cation 

for Award of the Presidential Unit Citation,” HQ, 5th SFG, Fort Campbell, n.d.

19. For one version of the story of Abdul Haq’s death, see Robert D. Novak, “Abdul Haq’s Last Hours,” 

Washington Post, 1 November 2001, 35.

20. “Afghan War Chronology,” Information Paper, CMH, 25 April 2002.

21. Carl Hooper (pseudonym), letter to Kalev Sepp, 5 December 2002, Fort Campbell, USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

22. The Mi-17 and its earlier version, the Mi-8, are also known by the NATO reporting name “Hip.” See 

Barbara Hall, “ODA 586, Northern Warriors,” The Drop (Summer 2002), 15-17.

23. “The Battle for Mazar-e-Sharif,” Information Paper, CMH, 28 April 2002.

24. “In the West, Gen. Ismail Khan, an alliance commander, has regained control of the city of Herat, and is 

again in position to be Iran’s proxy.” See David Rohde, “Warlords are Vying to Fill Vacuum Left by the Taliban,” 

New York Times, 16 November 2001.

25. “During the fi rst part of the Afghanistan campaign, the [21st Theater Army Support Command] was the 

sole supplier for U.S. military special operations teams and CIA special operating groups in Afghanistan, catering to 

every need and want made by military special operators or CIA agents in the fi eld. They located and bought . . . specialized batteries, nonmilitary tactical gear, civilian camping gear, mountaineering clothing and special food. . . . 

By the time the conventional supply system took over, the [21st TASCOM] had bought and shipped nearly 2 million pounds of wheat and 93,000 blankets for humanitarian relief, along with the tons of equipment and supplies 

to keep the military operation going.” See Dennis Steele, “Unconventional Logistics,” Army (November 2002), 

8-10; also, U.S. Central Command, Transcripts, “Informal Press Opportunity With Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, 30 

October 2001.” “We’re providing weapons and ammunition to a variety of opposition groups in a variety of ways.” 

<http://www.centcom.mil/news/transcripts/20011030.html>. For descriptions of some parachute supply drops, and 

misdrops, made to the CIA teams, see Evan Thomas, “A Street Fight,” Newsweek (29 April 2002).

26. SOCEUR is pronounced “SOCK-yur.”

27. Hamad Karzai, who later became the prime minister of the post-Taliban Interim Afghan Authority (AIA), 

described an early parachute drop: “[S]uddenly somebody rushed and said, ‘There are planes.’ So we came out and 

we saw the planes and they dropped parachutes. Half of them were exactly on the spot. The other half went just one 

mountain beyond.” FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

28. The color of the plastic wrapping of the food packets was soon changed from yellow to blue to avoid the 

chance of civilians confusing the food packets with yellow-painted explosive bomblets. See Steven Mufson, “U.S. 

Changing Color of Airdropped Food Packs,” Washington Post, 2 November 2001, 21; Deborah Zabarenko, “U.S. 

Lesson: How to Tell Cluster Bombs From Food,” Washington Post, 30 October 2001, 14.

29. Carla Anne Robbins and Neil King, Jr., “Powell Sees No Halt in Afghan Campaign During Muslim Holy 

Month of Ramadan,” Wall Street Journal, 1 November 2001.

30. “The Battle for Mazar-e-Sharif,” Information Paper, CMH, 28 April 2002.

31. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld describes his meeting at Karshi Kanabad (K2) with 5th SFG 

soldiers who had fought the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif in his essay, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs, 

May/June 2002, 20-21. For more details about the three-week-long battle, see “The Liberation of Mazar-e-Sharif: 

5th SFG Conducts UW in Afghanistan,” Special Warfare (June 2002), 34-41. 

32. Previously, there had been doubt that the Northern Alliance could achieve such success. For example, 

see Michael O’Hanlon, “At the Pace of the Offensive, the Taliban Will Survive the Winter,” Los Angeles Times, 26 

October 2002.

33. Civil Affairs Team Alpha 32 (CAT-A32) arrived in Bagram on 23 November 2001, and CAT-A33 arrived 

in Mazar-e-Sharif on 27 November 2001. “Operational Summary of Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell–Bagram 

(CHLC-B), Operation Enduring Freedom, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan,” 4 January 2002, C Company (-), 96th 

Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), 1; “Operational Summary of C Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion Deployment in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom (24 September 2001-31 March 2002),” 4 April 2002, C Company, 

96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), 2, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. See also Meg Laughlin, “The 

Army of Hope,” Herald-Leader, 14 January 2002, and William Patterson, “Army Civil Affairs Builds Trust in Afghanistan,” Paraglide, 3 January 2002.

34. U.S. Army, “Narrative Justifi cation for Award of the Presidential Unit Citation,” Headquarters, 5th SFG, 

Fort Campbell, Kentucky, n.d.
192

35. Thom Shanker, “The Stripes Are on Their Sleeves, Not Their Pants,” New York Times, 13 January 2002.

36. Before the 9/11 attacks, CENTCOM normally oversaw 20,000-25,000 U.S. military personnel inside its 

geographic area of responsibility. See “Afghan War Chronology,” Information Paper, CMH, 25 April 2002.

37. Scott Peterson, “Rebels Attempting First Big Gains,” Christian Science Monitor, 9 November 2001, 1.

38. The U.S. Air Force title for airstrike controllers was tactical air control party (TACP). The Air Force sergeants in these units were called ETACs, for enlisted terminal attack controllers. However, Air Force special tactics 

airmen from other Air Force special operations units directed airstrikes as well. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/tacp.htm>.

39. Susan B. Glasser and Molly Moore, “Rebel Forces Claim Key City of Herat, Seize Road to Kabul,” Washington Post, 13 November 2001. “After missing the story of the fall of Mazar-e Sharif . . . reporters in the north were 

baffl ed to learn that the city of Herat had also quickly fallen. ‘One day it was said to be a Taliban stronghold, and the 

next day Northern Alliance commander Ismail Khan was in power.’” Robert G. Kaiser, “Already, Too Many Pieces 

Are Missing,” Washington Post, 23 December 2001, B1.

40. Keith B. Richburg and Molly Moore, “Taliban Flees Afghan Capital,” Washington Post, 13 November 

2001, 1.

41. Afghan Pashtun leader Haji Abdul Qadir occupied Jalalabad after the Taliban abandoned the town of 

60,000 people. See Paul Wiseman, “Southern Tribes Help Fight Taliban,” USA Today, 15 November 2001, 6, and 

Pamela Constable, “Two Rebel Groups Vie for Control of Key City,” Washington Post, 16 November 2001, 26.

42. According to a sergeant from Special Forces A Detachment 595, during surrender negotiations, Dostum 

used a radio to allow the Taliban chieftain in Konduz, Mullah Fazl, to hear the voice of an American female weapons 

offi cer on board an AC-130 Spectre gunship. Dostum told his enemy counterpart that it was the voice of the “angel 

of death” who would come in the night and kill all the Taliban who did not surrender. FRONTLINE, “Campaign 

Against Terror.”

43. “EC-130 ‘Commando Solo’ psychological operations aircraft broadcast instructions to civilians to follow 

when U.S. troops arrive: ‘Attention! People of Afghanistan, United States forces will be moving through your area,’ 

according to transcripts released by the Pentagon. We are here for Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and those who protect 

them! Please, for your own safety, stay off bridges and roadways, and do not interfere with our troops or military 

operations. If you do this, you will not be harmed.’” Ricks and Loeb, 1. See also David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, 

“U.S. Stalks Taliban With New Air Scheme,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (15 October 2001), and Michael 

R. Gordon and Steven Lee Myers, “Taliban’s Troops Hit as Allies Plan for Commando Raids,” New York Times, 11 

October 2001, 1.

44. Michael R. Gordon, “Afghans Block Britain’s Plan for Big Force,” New York Times, 20 November 2001; 

Michael R. Gordon, “Securing Base, U.S. Makes its Brawn Blend In,” New York Times, 3 December 2001; Mulholland interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

45. According to Ambassador Richard Armitage, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Pakistan maintained its 

diplomatic ties to the Taliban only while the foreign aid workers inside Afghanistan remained in Taliban custody. 

FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.” 

46. Douglas Frantz, “Pakistan Ended Aid to Taliban Only Hesitantly,” New York Times, 8 December 2001, 1; 

Vernon Loeb, “Pentagon Eyes Use of Tajikistan Air Base,” Washington Post, 13 November 2001, 24.

47. Keith B. Richburg, “Taliban Prisoners Revolt,” Washington Post, 26 November 2001, 1.

48. CIA Press Release, 28 November 2001. George J. Tenet, Director, CIA, “On the Death of a CIA Offi cer in 

Afghanistan.” “[O]ne of our offi cers at the Central Intelligence Agency has died in the line of duty in Afghanistan. 

Johnny Micheal [correct spelling] ‘Mike’ Spann, who worked in the Directorate of Operations, was where he wanted 

to be: on the front lines serving his country. . . . Mike was in the fortress of Mazar-e Sharif where Taliban prisoners 

were being held. . . . Their prison uprising—which had murder as its goal—claimed many lives, among them that 

of a very brave American, whose body was recovered just hours ago.” <http://www.cia.gov/public_affairs/press_release/archives/2001/prl11282001.html>. See also James Risen, “C.I.A. Names Agent Killed in Fortress,” New York 

Times, 29 November 2001. Carlotta Gall, “An American is Said to be Killed During a Failed Prison Uprising,” New 

York Times, 26 November 2001.

49. The rifl e platoon was part of C Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division.

50. Bay Fang, “Eyewitness: American ‘Friendly Fire’ Casualties,” USNews.com, 26 November 2001.

51. Carlotta Gall, “Fight With Prisoners Rages at Northern Afghan Fort,” New York Times, 27 November 2001, 

1.

52. CIA, Press Release, 28 November 2001, 1, and “CIA Offi cer’s Body Brought Home to Family,” Washington Post, 3 December 2001, 13.
193

53. Carlotta Gall, “In Tunnels Full of Bodies, One of Them Keeps Firing,” New York Times, 30 November 2001.

54. Christopher Marquis, “Before He Died, C.I.A. Man Interrogated U.S. Captive,” New York Times, 7 December 2001; Jeff Gerth, “U.S. Detainee is Questioned, but His Fate is Still Unclear,” New York Times, 10 December 

2001; Daniel Klaidman and Michael Isikoff, “Walker’s Brush With Bin Laden,” Newsweek, 31 December 2001/7 

January 2002; Mike Nash (pseudonym), Memorandum, “ODA 595, Operation Enduring Freedom,” 19 March 2002, 

Fort Campbell; Mike Nash (pseudonym), 26 March 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcript and 

tapes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Nash interview. See also FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

55. Bradley Graham and Vernon Loeb, “Rebels’ Gains Shift U.S. Focus to the South,” Washington Post, 13 

November 2001, 1.

56. U.S. Army, “Narrative Justifi cation for Award of the Presidential Unit Citation,” Headquarters, 5th SFG, 

Fort Campbell, n.d.

57. Mark Landler, “Philippines Offers U.S its Troops and Bases,” New York Times, 3 October 2001; Richard C. 

Paddock, “U.S. Use of Bases in Philippines Renewed,” Los Angeles Times, 18 December 2001.

58. FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

59. Peter Finn, “Wounded Army Captain Details Teamwork Against Taliban,” n.d., USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

60. Thomas E. Ricks and Bob Woodward, “Marines Enter South Afghanistan,” Washington Post, 26 November 2001, 1.

61. The SEAL reconnaissance element at Rhino came under attack by U.S. Marine Corps AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters leading the transport helicopters. The SEALs reported the attack on their surveillance position by 

the Cobras back to the JSOTF-South command post on Masirah Island, which relayed the “cease-fi re” call through 

command channels to the Cobra helicopter crews. The SEALs did not suffer any casualties. Donald W. Richardson, 

19 July 2002, Norfolk, Virginia, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, 

Fort Bragg. For a partial description of the reconnaissance mission, which incorrectly reports the SEALs as “the only 

U.S. force in . . . southwest Afghanistan” (Army Special Forces A Detachments 574 and 583 were already there), see 

James W. Crawley, “Navy’s Silent Warriors Operated Alone, Deep in the Afghan Desert,” San Diego Union-Tribune, 

21 December 2001, p 1.

62. Willis Witter, “Afghan Leader Will Give Taliban a Chance to Flee,” Washington Times, 4 December 2001, 1.

63. “Troops Inch Closer to Driving the Taliban From Kandahar,” USA Today, 5 December 2001, 8.

64. Hamad Karzai’s role in the future Afghan government was being debated at the Bonn conference. 

FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

65. Norimitsu Onishi, “Interim Afghan Leader Discusses Kandahar’s Surrender With Taliban,” New York 

Times, 6 December 2001; John Pomfret, “For Incoming Chief, One More Close Call,” Washington Post, 6 December 

2001, 31; Vernon Loeb, “‘Friendly Fire’ Deaths Traced to Dead Battery,” Washington Post, 24 March 2002, 21.

66. Tony Perry, “Marine Outpost Key Player in Treatment of Wounded Soldiers,” Los Angeles Times, 7 

December 2001.

67. U.S. Central Command, Transcripts, “GEN Franks’ Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, 

27 February 2002.” GEN Tommy Franks, Commander, CENTCOM: “Combining the resources and capabilities of 

the Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies of the Federal government has produced 

results [in Afghanistan] no single entity could have achieved.” <http://www.centcom.mil/news/transcripts/20020227.

htm>.

68. A temporary combat designation for an offi cer in the U.S. Navy ranking above captain and below rear 

admiral. Thus, Commodore Bob Harward outranked COL John Mulholland in Afghanistan.

69. U.S. Army, “A-1/5th SFG(A) Operation Enduring Freedom Roll-Up, 15 December 01–15 February 02,” A 

Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, Fort Campbell, slide presentation, 8 July 2002, copy in classifi ed fi les, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

70. Tora Bora means “black dust” in the local dialect.

71. Tim Weiner, “Afghan Says Fighters Are Ready to Attack Cave Complex,” New York Times, 4 December 2001.

72. “The Course of Operation Enduring Freedom in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan,” Information Paper, 

CMH, 26 April 2002; FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

73. Michael Evans, “British Special Forces to Join Cave Assault,” London Times, 3 December 2001.

74. For analytical overviews of the battle for Afghanistan, see Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of 

Confl ict: Implications for Army and Defense Policy,” paper, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2002/afghan/afghan.pdf>; Michael O’Hanlon, “A 
194

Flawed Masterpiece: Assessing the Afghan Campaign,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2002), 47-63; Anthony Cordesman, “The Lessons of Afghanistan: A First Analysis,” paper, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 August 2002, <http://www.csis.org/burke/sa/ lessonsofafghan.pdf>; Rebecca Grant, “An Air War Like No Other,” Air 

Force Magazine (November 2002), <http://www.afa.org/magazine/Nov2002/1102airwar.asp>.

75. “[S]trategic analysts remain puzzled. Writing in the Wall Street Journal this week, Sir John Keegan, the 

British military historian, had this to say: ‘The success of the bombers is nevertheless a surprise, even if not a wholly 

unpredictable one. What had been unpredictable is the resurgence of the Northern Alliance. Their ability to achieve 

practical superiority, against an enemy superior in numbers who had held them at bay for fi ve years, could not have 

been foreseen and defi es explanation. It is not due to superior weapons—there must have been a collapse of Taliban

morale.’” R.W. Apple, Jr., “Pondering the Mystery of the Taliban’s Collapse,” New York Times, 30 November 2001.

76. Michael R. Gordon, “Shifting Fronts, Rising Danger: The Afghanistan War Evolves,” New York Times, 10 

December 2001.

77. For a thorough analysis of the initial campaign, focusing on the combination of special operations forces, 

indigenous fi ghters, and precision-guided aerial bombing, see Biddle.

78. “Combat Operations Summary of Ranger Actions on OBJ Rhino, Southern Afghanistan on 19 October 

2001” (Masirah Island, Oman: 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, 25 October 2001), 1; “The 75th Ranger Regiment: Combat Operations in Southern Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom,” briefi ng prepared 

by 75th Ranger Regiment, n.d., USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

79. 1LT Kenneth Brown (pseudonym), SP4 Martin Pasquez (pseudonym), SFC Ron Searcey (pseudonym), 

SGT Thomas Evans (pseudonym), C Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, interview with Richard Kiper, 

28 March 2002, Fort Benning, Georgia, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

80. SSG James Turner (pseudonym), B Company, 9th Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 

Group, interview with Richard Kiper, 3 April 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg; SFC Ron Searcey (pseudonym) and CPT Stanley Davis (pseudonym), C Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, interview with Richard Kiper, 28 March 2002, Fort Benning, tape recording and notes, 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

81. “Combat Operations Summary of Ranger Actions on OBJ Rhino,” 1.

82. Janofsky.

83. CPT Sam Crevald (pseudonym), HHC, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, interview with Richard 

Kiper, 28 March 2002, Fort Benning, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Ranger 

Creed, <www.benning.army.mil/rtb/ranger/rgrcreed.htm>.

84. FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

85. Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Grabs Airstrip Near Kandahar, Gains Fixed Base Inside Afghanistan,” 

Washington Times, 27 November 2001, 1.

86. Jack Thomas, Mario Perez, Gene Ball, and John MacGinnis (pseudonyms), Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM “Objective Rhino, the PSYOP Perspective,” TPD 940, B Company, 9th PSYOP Battalion, n.d., USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

87. Ibid.

88. “DoD News Briefi ng—GEN Myers,” Defense Link, <www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2001/t10202001_

t1020jcs.html>.

89. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, “Objective Rhino, the PSYOP Perspective,” TPD 940, B Company, 

9th POB, n.d., USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

90. “Admiral (Rear Admiral Anthony Winns) Touts Role of Navy’s P-3 Recon Aircraft in Afghanistan War,” 

P3 News, <www.centerseat.net/p3news.htm>.

91. Kim Battles is a pseudonym.

92. James Brinks (pseudonym), commander, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 27 

March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

93. Alfred Mann (pseudonym), HHC, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 25 March 

2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Mann 

interview.

94. Ibid.

95. John Gates (pseudonym) and Arthur Solanis (pseudonym) (hereafter cited as Solanis interview), 

B Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 25 March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape 

recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

96. Ibid.
195

97. Ibid.

98. Mann interview.

99. Roger Charles (pseudonym), D Company, 1st Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 18 

April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as 

Charles interview.

100. Ibid.

101. Mann interview.

102. Ibid.

103. Dari-a-Souf, also spelled Darya-Suf, is pronounced “DAH-ree-ah SOOF.” Mike Nash, Bill Phipps, Pat 

Earnhardt, Al Mix, Barry Ball, Vinsong Ming, Paul Wannamaker, Sol Kitts, Sam Bagby, Wes Snow, Mark Exley, and 

Carey James are pseudonyms.

104. Nash memorandum and Nash interview. See also FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. Pronounced “shy.”

108. Nash memorandum and Nash interview. See also FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Nash memorandum and Nash interview. See also FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

113. Maqdoom is pronounced “mack-DOOM.”

114. Nash memorandum and Nash interview. See also FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Nash memorandum and Nash interview.

119. Ibid.

120. Nash memorandum and Nash interview. See also FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

121. Ibid.

122. According to MSG Pat Earnhardt (pseudonym), the detachment operations sergeant, the endurance riding 

saddles cost $300 each, compared to the top-of-the-line Australian saddles that went for $1,000 each. Nash memorandum and Nash interview. See also FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

123. Dennis Steele, “Unconventional Logistics,” Army (November 2002), 58.

124. Leslie L. Fuller, 15 April 2002, Fort Bragg, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Fuller interview.

125. SOCEUR was authorized 84 personnel, but with individual mobilization augmentees and reservists called 

to active duty from both the Army and Air Force, Fuller’s headquarters numbered 120 personnel by the New Year. 

Fuller interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. These resupply bundles are referred to inside Special Forces by their unclassifi ed code name, “Marge 

Bundles,” and are normally prepared for detachments in anticipation of long-term operations inside hostile territory.

129. Aircraft that travel on these routinely scheduled routes are called “channel fl ights.” Later, the 16th Special 

Operations Wing moved several of its Talon I and II model aircraft to the former Soviet airfi eld at K2 where CJSOTFNorth was headquartered. Fuller interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

130. Fuller interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. Solanis interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid. Gates and Donalds are pseudonyms.
196

138. Ibid. Emerson is a pseudonym.

139. Ibid. Clauden is a pseudonym.

140. Derrick Donalds (pseudonym), B Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with Kalev Sepp, 17 

April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as 

Donalds interview.

141. Mike Nash is a pseudonym.

142. Nash memorandum and Nash interview. See also FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

143. Solanis interview.

144. Ibid.

145. Donalds interview.

146. Tucker is a pseudonym.

147. Lee Clauden (pseudonym), B Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 27 

March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

148. Tom Dugan (pseudonym), B Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 26 

March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

149. Michael Bartley (pseudonym), B Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 

27 March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

150. Mills interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

151. Mark Knapp (pseudonym), chaplain, HHC, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 

26 April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited 

as Knapp interview.

152. Pseudonyms.

153. Knapp interview.

154. Ibid.

155. Knapp interview; Garrison is a pseudonym. 

156. Charles interview.

157. Ibid.; Mannis a pseudonym.

158. Charles interview; McCracken is a pseudonym.

159. Charles interview.

160. Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, memorandum for record, Subject: Combat Operations 

Summary of Ranger Actions on OBJ BASTOGNE, Southern Afghanistan on 13 November 2001, 17 November 

2001, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

161. Morris is a pseudonym.

162. Joseph Morris (pseudonym), B Company, 1st Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with Charles Briscoe, 18 

April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

163. <http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/MC_130E_H_Combat_Talon_I_II.html>.

164. CPT Chuck Seims (pseudonym), A Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, interview with 

Richard Kiper, Fort Benning, 27 March 2002, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

165. CPT Chuck Seims, “Battle Summary for Relentless Strike 05,” n.d., USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg.

166. Headquarters, 75th Ranger Regiment, memorandum, Subject: Debrief Report A/3-75 Ranger Mission to 

Objectives ANZIO and BULGE, 21 November 2001, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

167. Seims, “Battle Summary.”

168. Don Sullivan and Derrick Jacobi are pseudonyms.

169. Don Sullivan (pseudonym), 24 April 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and 

tapes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Sullivan interview.

170. Ibid.

171. The two satellites are each 20 years old and were designed to carry 30 channels each. Time and exposure 

have degraded their capacity from 60 to 54 channels. Sullivan interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

172. Sullivan interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

173. Ibid.

174. Boi-Becha is pronounced “BOY-buh-SHAY.”

175. Nash memorandum and Nash interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. See 

also FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”
197

176. SSG Logan Donovan (pseudonym), A Company, 3rd PSYOP Battalion, interview with Kalev Sepp, 4 

April 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Carol Clewell is a 

pseudonym.

177. “Operational Summary of C Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion Deployment in Support of Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM (24 September 2001–31 March 2002),” 4 April 2002, C Company, 96th Civil Affairs 

Battalion (Airborne), 2, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

178. MAJ John Bowman is a pseudonym. “C Co, 96th CA BN (A) CAT-A & B Activity Summary in Support of OEF,” n.d., USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. CHLC is not a doctrinal term. It originated in the 

Afghanistan–Pakistan area as a term that does not use the word “military.” The CHLC performs the functions of a 

civil-military operations center to interface between military civil affairs units, nongovernmental organizations, and 

international organizations. Although all of these organizations provide humanitarian assistance, several civilian organizations were uncomfortable coordinating the effort with military organizations. The term “CHLC” was created 

to address those sensibilities.

179. Ibid., 4; FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror”; Gerry J. Gilmore, “Rumsfeld Praises Civil Affairs’ 

Work in Afghanistan,” American Forces Information Service, 20 August 2002. Mike Russell is a pseudonym.

180. SSG James O’Reilly (pseudonym), C Company, 9th PSYOP Battalion, interview with Kalev Sepp, 3 April 

2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as O’Reilly 

interview. Mark Puller, Rick Harrison, Carl Dawkins, and Charles Vargas are pseudonyms.

181. O’Reilly interview.

182. Ibid.; Harrison is a pseudonym.

183. Ibid.

184. MAJ Martin Jackson (pseudonym), commander, D Company, 109th Aviation Battalion, interview with 

James Schroder and Charles Briscoe, 24 April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

185. LTC Edward Simpson is a pseudonym.

186. Major Walter Barstow (pseudonym), C Company, 9th PSYOP Battalion, interview with Kalev Sepp, 3 and 

4 April 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

187. Major Walter Barstow, “PSYOP Assessment—Mr. Hamad Karzai,” 12 November 2001, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

188. Pamela Constable, “Assembly Elects Hamad Karzai as Transitional Head of State,” Washington Post, 14 

June 2002.

189. W. Richards interview.

190. Ahmed Rashid, “Hamad Karzai Moves From Lightweight to Heavyweight in Afghan Politics,” Eurasia 

Insight, 12 December 2001, <www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav121001.shtml>; FRONTLINE, 

“Campaign Against Terror.”

191. Ibid.

192. Lieutenant Colonel Jack Walters (pseudonym), U.S. Joint Forces Command, interview with Richard Kiper, 

19 July 2002, Norfolk, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

193. W. Richards interview.

194. FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

195. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and trans. (Princeton,NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1976), 87.

196. W. Richards interview.

197. Tom Carhart, “In Afghanistan With CPT Jason Amerine ‘93,” Assembly (March/April 2002), 54-55.

198. FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror”; Hall.

199. Clausewitz, 580; Finn.

200. RADM Bert Calland, 3 May 2002, As Sayliyah, Qatar, interview with Matthew Dawson, tapes at 

USSOCOM Classifi ed Archives, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, hereafter cited as Calland interview.

201. Mulholland interview; “The Campaign Against Kandahar and Subsequent Events,” information paper, 

CMH, 30 April 2002; “Engineer” is a form of address in Afghanistan, indicating the person’s academic credentials 

in the same way “doctor” or “professor” is used. 

202. Mulholland interview.

203. Marc Bell is a pseudonym; Calland interview,tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

204. Calland interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

205. Pronounced “MAH-zar-ee-shar-EEF.” Mario Magione, Kevin Sault, Marc Bell, Pete Bender, Pat Schroeder, 
198

Karl Latimer, Bobby Chesterfi eld, Charles Moss, Bill Gregg, and Marvin Vandiver are pseudonyms. Mario Magione 

and Kevin Sault, 22-23 March 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Magione and Sault interview.

206. Ibid.

207. Ibid. Initial reports indicated that there were 500 to 600 al-Qaeda fi ghters in this band, but at the time, no 

one took an accurate count. After the uprising, the sum of the number of surrendered fi ghters, counted precisely by 

American troops, and an approximate tally of al-Qaeda losses in the fortress totaled closer to 300. 

208. Pronounced “KAHN-dooz.”

209. The Taliban forces at Konduz included hundreds of Pakistanis urged by their mullahs to travel to 

Afghanistan to wage a jihad against the American “infi dels” (non-Muslims) who the mullahs said had invaded 

Muslim territory. Magione and Sault interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

210. Ibid.

211. LTC Bell told Calland that when he advised GEN Dostum at Konduz to order a thorough search of the 

prisoners, he refused. Calland felt Dostum’s outlook was in accordance with the Afghan and Islamic traditions of 

hospitality and the granting of sanctuary, even for one’s enemies. Calland interview, tapes and notes in USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

212. Pronounced “KAHLA-ee-JAHN-guee.” The fortress of Qala-i-Jangi had most recently been the headquarters of the Taliban’s 18th Division, which was defeated in the battles in the Bahlk Valley. Magione and Sault 

interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

213. The Turkish school was also cleaner and better ventilated than the cell-like chambers inside the walls 

of Qala-i-Jangi. The arriving Americans discovered the fl oors of the fortress rooms covered with human feces the 

Taliban occupants left. The Special Forces medics told their commanders that as long as they stayed in the airless 

vaults, they were at risk for respiratory infections from fecal dust. Magione and Sault interview, tapes and notes in 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

214. Ibid.

215. CIA Press Release, 28 November 2001.

216. CIA Press Release, 11 April 2002.

217. Calland interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Magione and Sault 

interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

218. Ibid.

219. Cable News Network, “CNN Presents: House of War: The Uprising at Mazar-e-Sharif,” air date 3 August 

2002, videotape, <http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/presents/index.house.of.war.html>.

220. Magione and Sault interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

221. JDAM is pronounced “JAY-dam.” For details on the joint direct-attack munition (JDAM), GBU 31/31 

1,000-pound (lb) and 2,000-lb bombs, see the U.S. Air Force fact sheet, <http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/JDAM. 

html>. Magione and Sault interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

222. Ibid.

223. The unit was 1st Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division. Magione and 

Sault interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

224. Ibid.

225. Ibid.

226. Calland interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

227. Magione and Sault interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

228. The AC-130 gunship is described at <http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/AC_130H_U_Gunship.html>.

229. Magione and Sault interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; H.B.G., 

memorandum, “ODA 592, Operation Enduring Freedom,” 6 March 2002, Fort Campbell, and 18 November 2002, 

Fort Campbell, telephonic interview with Kalev Sepp, memorandum and transcript, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, 

Fort Bragg.

230. Mark Bojune (pseudonym), “The Beginning: Answered Prayers and Miracles,” after-action notes, HHC, 

5th SFG (Airborne), Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

231. Magione and Sault interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

232. Ibid.

233. The American, John Walker Lindh, was in this group of recaptured prisoners, but he did not identify 

himself until a day later when he was interred at Shebergan Prison, west of Mazar-e-Sharif; Magione and Sault inter-
199

view, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

234. Harry Sims, Marcus Steinmann, Matt Rhinehart, Stan Boyd, and Elias Sage are pseudonyms.

235. Harry Sims (pseudonym), 27 March 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcript and 

tapes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Sims interview.

236. Ibid.

237. Pronounced “SHIN-nah-RYE”; Ibid.

238. Sims interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

239. Ibid.

240. Ibid.

241. Ibid.

242. Ibid.

243. Ibid.

244. Ibid.

245. Ibid.

246. Ibid.

247. Ibid.

248. Ibid.

249. Ibid.

250. Harry Sims, Neal Nutting, Elias Sage, Stan Boyd, Chuck Fan, Wally Czyrnyck, Stef Holman, Cory Loomis, Kim Joes, Bobby Santiago, Gus Cornell, and Alan Kellogg are pseudonyms; Ibid.

251. Harry Sims, memorandum, “ODA 583, Operation Enduring Freedom,” 19 March 2002, Fort Campbell, 

hereafter cited as Sims memorandum; Sims interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

252. Ibid.

253. Ibid.

254. MAJ Del Bennington, 25 March 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes, 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Bennington interview.

255. Del Bennington, Don Forsythe, Nick Sands, Dan Herndon, Douglas Bain, Tim Roswell, Jack Loach, Rich 

Ryder, Charlie Fazal, Stan Messinger, Jeffrey Solis, and Walter Madison are pseudonyms. 

256. Ibid.

257. SOCCE is pronounced “sock-SEE.” Bennington recognized at the time that this organization and approach to unconventional warfare operations was not in accordance with established doctrine, which held that a 

Special Forces company headquarters, led by a major, was to perform this sort of mission. However, the staff began 

planning for its infi ltration and follow-on operations immediately. Bennington interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

258. Douglas Bain, 25 March 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. TACP is pronounced “tack-PEA.” The letters stand for tactical air control party, “A 

subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison to land forces and 

for the control of aircraft,” <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/natoterm/t/01065.html>.

259. Bennington interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

260. Ibid.

261. Del Bennington, letter to Kalev Sepp, 2 December 2002, Washington, DC, copy at USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Bennington letter.

262. LTC Don Forsythe (pseudonym), 2nd Battalion, 5th SFG, interview with Richard Kiper, 25 April 2002, 

Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Forsythe 

interview. Matt Rhinehart is a pseudonym.

263. Sims memorandum and Sims interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

264. Ibid.

265. Ibid.

266. The U.S. Air Force 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing delivered most of the bombs in support of U.S. Army 

Special Forces operations in southern Afghanistan. The wing included B-52 bombers and F-15E and F-16 fi ghter 

bombers. The 391st Fighter Squadron (“Bold Tigers”), equipped with F-15E Strike Eagles, was part of the 332nd Air 

Wing during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. One of the 391st’s pilots, MAJ Jim Sisler, was the son of Medal of 

Honor recipient 1LT George K. Sisler, a 5th SFG offi cer during the Vietnam war. George Sisler received the Medal 

of Honor posthumously for heroism while directing airstrikes against enemy forces on 7 February 1967, when his 
200

patrol was surrounded inside enemy territory in Laos. His son Jim painted the Special Forces regimental insignia 

on the nose of his F-15E fi ghter jet. Bennington letter, Sims memorandum, and Sims interview, tapes and notes in 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

267. Bennington letter, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

268. Bennington interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

269. Ibid.

270. SSG Walter Madison was evacuated by helicopter at 2230 that night from a pickup zone about 3 miles 

away. Bennington interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

271. The 12 remaining members of Forsythe’s battalion headquarters staff arrived by helicopter in the predawn 

darkness at 0430 on 5 December 2001. Later, Bennington heard that a satellite failure had interrupted all radio 

communications in JSOTF-North for more than 3 hours that afternoon and into the evening. Bennington interview, 

tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

272. Ibid.

273. Sims interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

274. Ibid.

275. Ibid. See also ODA 583 (Texas 17), “Monograph, Operation Enduring Freedom, Southern Afghanistan 

Campaign (18 Nov 01 to 6 Feb 02),” n.d., copy at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

276. Sims interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

277. Ibid.

278. Ibid.

279. Ibid.; Forsythe interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

280. Ibid.

281. John Hendren and Maura Reynolds, “Afghanistan: Target Finder’s Error Cost about 28 Lives to ‘Friendly 

Fire,’” Los Angeles Times, 27 March 2002.

282. Michael A. Fletcher, “Victims Were Professional Soldiers,” Washington Post, 6 December 2001, 28.

283. Hendren and Reynolds.

284. Forsythe interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Finn.

285. Norimitsu Onishi, “Interim Afghan Leader Discusses Kandahar’s Surrender With Taliban,” New York 

Times, 6 December 2001; FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

286. Forsythe interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

287. Dallas Bronson (pseudonym), 2nd Battalion, 5th SFG, telephonic interview with Kalev Sepp and Richard 

Kiper, 5 December 2002, Fort Bragg, notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

288. Willis Witter, “Taliban Surrenders Stronghold,” Washington Times, 7 December 2001, 1; Vernon Loeb and 

Bradley Graham, “Rumsfeld Says No Amnesty for Taliban Leader,” Washington Post, 7 December 2001, 34.

289. Forsythe interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; FRONTLINE, “Campaign 

Against Terror”; David Rhode and Eric Schmitt, “Taliban Give Way in Final Province Where They Ruled,” New York 

Times, 10 December 2001, 1.

290. Major Matt DiJurnigan (pseudonym), C Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, interview with Richard 

Kiper, 4 November 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter 

cited as DiJurnigan interview.

291. Gilmore; Senate Armed Services Committee, Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, 

31 July 2002, <http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/pk1/wwwh02080201.html>.

292. DiJurnigan interview, 4; FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror.”

293. “Operational Summary, Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell–Bagram (CHLC-B), Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan,” 4 January 2002, C Company (-), 96th Civil Affairs Battalion 

(Airborne), 1; “Narrative Justifi cation for the Meritorious Unit Citation,” Company D, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion 

(Airborne), n.d., USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

294. Ibid., 2-6; Gordon, “Securing Base, U.S. Makes Its Brawn Blend In”; Jon R. Anderson, “Soldiers Bring 

Joy and Hope to Kids in Afghanistan,” European Stars and Stripes, 19 December 2001; MAJ Steve Small and SFC 

Charles Rogers are pseudonyms.

295. U.S. Army Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Offi ce, February 2000), 1-1; Anderson.

296. O’Reilly interview, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. Mark Puller, Rick 

Harrison, Carl Dawkins, and Charles Vargas are pseudonyms.

297. Ibid.
201

298. Keith B. Richburg and William Branigin, “U.S. Bombs Aid Rebels in North; Propaganda Campaign Intensifi es,” Washington Post, 8 November 2001, 13. Totals as of 17 October 2002 were 84,215,894 leafl ets disseminated; 

6,873:39 hours broadcast by SOMS-B and Commando Solo; 538 different radio scripts; and 7,670 radios distributed.

299. Curtis interview, tapes and notes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

300. MAJ Henry Blackaby (pseudonym), Psychological Development Company, 8th Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group, interview by Richard Kiper, 17 April 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

301. Letter, General Dwight D. Eisenhower in Psychological Warfare Division, “Operations in Western European Campaign,” October 1945, Record Group 319, National Archives, 1.

302. SFC Kevin Easton (pseudonym), B Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, interview with James Schroder, 26 March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

303. Striker is a pseudonym.

304. Gates is a pseudonym.

305. Falkerie is a pseudonym.

203

Chapter 4

The Campaign in Transition

8 December 2001 - 28 February 2002

The art of war is simple enough.

Find out where your enemy is.

Get at him as soon as you can.

Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on.1

Three days after the Taliban defeat at Kandahar on 7 December 2001, 5th SFG soldiers 

conducted a brief ceremony at sunrise in Kabul, raising the American fl ag for the fi rst time in 

12 years at the U.S. Embassy.2

 The unoffi cial observance, which also honored the three Special 

Forces soldiers killed by friendly fi re earlier that week during fi ghting that drove the Taliban out 

of the capital city, symbolized the end of the battle for Afghanistan.

Figure 1. American colors unfurled at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.

The focus of the war had shifted to the eastern mountainous regions along the Pakistan border. While thousands of Taliban soldiers simply changed allegiance to the victorious side—a 

long-established Afghan tradition—and thousands more lay dead, there were thousands also 

retreating to redoubts and sanctuaries in eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan.3 In an effort 

to cut the escape routes and suspected safe havens, coalition air forces bombed the caves of 

Tora Bora, Special Forces teams assaulted Taliban leaders’ residences, and Afghan soldiers—

variously called the Anti-Taliban Forces, Opposition Group Forces, and the Afghan Military 

Forces (AMF)—advanced into the mountains to eliminate the enemy.4

The jagged, high mountain ranges of Tora Bora, about 45 miles southwest of Jalalabad 

on the Pakistan border, were reported to contain an elaborate maze of tunnels and caves that 

had been occupied as late as the mujahideen resistance. Intelligence staffs also believed that 

al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and his chief lieutenants 
204

had retreated to this underground complex. American and British special operations units directed airstrikes on the dug-in Taliban fi ghters in support of the slowly advancing Afghan militia forces. Then, Special Forces detachments like ODA 561 began painstakingly methodical 

searches of dozens of possible hiding places in the mountains, earning them the unwanted 

reputation of the “cave experts.”5

 Aerial photographs were used to guide Special Forces teams 

and their Afghan militia guards to suspected tunnel and cave openings in the mountainsides 

and craggy valleys. In most cases, the detachments found only shallow recesses that local goat 

herders used for temporary shelter and rock outcroppings. Occasionally, however, they found 

storage caches of weapons and ammunition, documents, and remains of enemy fi ghters killed 

by aerial bombs. Under pressure from the advancing Afghans and an intense bombing campaign—as many as 125 airstrikes per day—the enemy withdrew into the nearby snow-capped 

White Mountains, closer to Pakistan.6

Figure 2. Preparing for al-Qaeda.

By 17 December, despite numerous attempts by the Afghans to negotiate surrenders, the 

main body, estimated at 1,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda fi ghters, slipped away into the surrounding mountains and across the border.7

 The Special Forces teams did not fi nd bin Laden, but the 

offensive netted some 60 al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners.8 U.S. forces fl ew the captives around 

the world to a newly constructed detention center at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO, pronounced 

Git-mo) on the island of Cuba. DOD referred to the captured enemy as “detainees” and named 

their facility “Camp X-Ray.”9

In addition to the unconventional warfare (UW) missions conducted by COL Mulholland’s 

Uzbekistan-based Task Force (TF) Dagger (JSOTF-North), Commodore Bob Harward’s Joint 

Special Operations Task Force–South (JSOTF-South) carried out special reconnaissance (SR) 

and direct-action (DA) raids and searches from his new headquarters at the Kandahar Airport.10

C Company, 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion (SOSB) installed the elaborate radio 

and satellite communications array the JSOTF-South staff needed to direct the missions as well 

as the connectivity for A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, and the 160th SOAR, relocated 

from K2 to Kandahar.

The 1,300 U.S. Marines and Navy Seabee engineers from the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units [MEUs that included TF 58 and TF 64 (Australians)], moved on 14 December
205

Figure 3. Under new management.

from Camp Rhino in the desert to the airport, making Kandahar the second coalition base inside 

Afghanistan. Bagram had been the fi rst.11 Eventually, the JSOTF-South command grew to more 

than 1,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen and Special Forces units from four allied countries: 

New Zealand, Germany, Denmark, and Norway.12 The task force staff also included a Turkish 

military liaison offi cer. The coalition special forces joined in the manhunt for bin Laden, Mullah Mohammed Omar, and other fugitive al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders.

On Christmas Eve 2001, A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG (A-1-5), a 100-man SR and 

DA assault unit specially trained in urban warfare house-to-house fi ghting and long-range reconnaissance, left Masirah Island, Oman, and moved into Harward’s base camp at Kandahar 

Airport. Over the next month, after extensive surveillance, the Special Forces company raided 

Figure 4. Sand table for DA SSE raid preparations.
206

three suspected enemy hideouts in succession. The force was fl own to its objectives on U.S. 

Air Force and U.S. Marine helicopters. The nighttime raids, called sensitive site exploitations 

(SSEs), netted more detainees as well as arms and munitions, documents, computers and discs, 

and pro-Taliban propaganda posters. At one site, several bags of processed heroin were found. 

Extremely sensitive to local customs and culture, the soldiers of A-1-5 conducted raids with 

such discipline that at one site, they removed their boots before entering a mosque to conduct a 

search. The mullah was so impressed that he told the villagers, “These men respect God.” The 

surprise searches were executed so quickly that in three of four operations, only two shots were 

fi red, both as warnings to prompt the surrender of Afghan sentries.13

Special Forces teams also established bases around the eastern Afghan border town of 

Khowst, in Paktia province, south of Kabul. On 4 January 2002, SFC Nate Chapman became 

the fi rst American soldier killed by enemy fi re in Afghanistan when his Special Forces element 

was ambushed near Khowst.14 The soldiers of C-1-5 named the dirt runway at its camp “Chapman Airfi eld” in his memory. In the coming months, enemy forces assaulted the Special Forces 

camp at the airfi eld twice with rockets, mortar fi re, and infantry. On 20 January, one of the two 

Marine Corps CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters carrying supplies to Chapman Airfi eld crashed 

into a snow-covered mountain near Kabul, killing two crewmen. Night Stalker aircrews from 

2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR at Bagram scrambled to reach the site in less than 90 minutes and 

rescued the fi ve U.S. Marine survivors.15 Two Special Forces detachments from C Company, 

2nd Battalion, 5th SFG, were sent to Zhob and Kohat, Pakistan, to advise and assist Pakistani army units in the search for Taliban and al-Qaeda on their side of the border adjacent to 

Khowst.16 Despite U.S. diplomatic encouragement, the Pakistanis were reluctant to send their 

troops, accompanied by American Special Forces advisers, into the tenuously controlled “Federal Autonomous Tribal Areas” near Afghanistan, and the effort never came to fruition. A civil 

affairs team (CAT) from D Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB), had better success 

inside Pakistan monitoring and coordinating international relief efforts to aid Afghan refugees 

encamped near Islamabad, Quetta, and Peshawar.

The emerging concern of the Western powers was a possible major human disaster in Afghanistan, brought on by the shattered infrastructure, the return of a million refugees, and winter. CA and engineer units were quickly deployed into the theater of war to begin recovery and 

disaster relief operations. Humanitarian aid of every description, promised by the signatories 

of the 14 December 2001 Brussels Accord, had to be airlifted into the country, and with the aid 

came the multifarious agencies wanting to oversee distribution and application. They had to be 

supported and protected whether they wanted to be or not. This effort received additional impetus when the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was formally organized on 22 December and 

Hamad Karzai was sworn in as prime minister. Karzai understood that the relief efforts were 

essential to stabilizing Afghanistan against any Taliban resurgence or a new civil war among 

the ethnic warlords restored to power in various provinces.17

On Christmas Eve 2001, elements of the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task 

Force (CJCMOTF) arrived in Kabul. From a staff of six soldiers, the headquarters of BG David Kratzer grew in two months to more than 150, primarily USAR personnel.18 A week before Kratzer’s arrival, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), consisting of British 

Royal Marines initially in a peacekeeping role, was stood up in Kabul.19 With the last large-
207

scale fi ghting over in early December, the relief effort intensifi ed and expanded throughout the 

country. The same day the Taliban deserted Kandahar, Special Forces engineers supervised and 

assisted the Afghans in completing the fi nal repairs to the bomb-damaged runway at Mazar-eSharif. As soon as Air Force teams verifi ed its suitability, international cargo airplanes began 

landing with humanitarian aid and a group of French engineers. An American Special Forces 

detachment accompanied a Jordanian fi eld hospital and its staff. The Special Forces team had 

helped the Jordanian medical teams prepare for their mission to Afghanistan. This humanitarian aid task force eventually grew to 1,000 American and coalition soldiers and civilians. Only 

days later, the fi rst overland relief convoy delivered supplies from Uzbekistan via the Friendship Bridge into Afghanistan.20

CAT-As, consisting of an offi cer and three Special Forces-qualifi ed sergeants from the 96th 

CAB, managed most of the effort. The international media captured the highly qualifi ed personnel, their positive attitudes, the wide variety of missions, and the unique contributions of the 

CAT-As. The American national press services and news networks focused on human interest 

feature stories as the teams treated children who had been injured by old Soviet-era mines, delivered food to refugee camps, arranged well digging, and began rebuilding schools and medical clinics—critical essentials for the Afghan communities.21 The CATs also labored to fi nd 

and apply the resources to repair the crumbling, war-damaged Afghan infrastructure—roads, 

bridges, and the vital Salang Tunnel through the Hindu Kush connecting northern and southern 

Afghanistan by a two-lane road.22

The number of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan grew from the 130 SOF soldiers who 

waged the battles that defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan to almost 5,000 soldiers. Mechanics 

from the 528th SOSB who were trained to repair and service Army tactical vehicles applied 

their skills with ingenuity to keep the motley conglomeration of civilian Ginga trucks and 

Japanese-built pickups and other vehicles used by Special Forces elements and their Afghan 

allies running.

Figure 5. Afghan children.
208

Figure 6. The Camp Abel motor pool in Bagram.

Special Forces ODAs and ODBs from the ARNG 2nd Battalion, 19th SFG, and the 3rd 

SFG assumed the operational mission from departing 5th SFG teams in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The 2nd Battalion headquarters, 19th SFG, took control of the isolation facility 

(ISOFAC) and other Special Forces sites at Karshi Kanabad (K2). At Fort Bragg, B Company, 

2ndBattalion, 3rd SFG trained for urban combat and long-range reconnaissance to assume the 

SSE mission from A-1-5 at Kandahar. 3rd Battalion, 75th Rangers, after the parachute assault 

on Bastogne in November, rotated its companies in and out of Afghanistan to support continuing operations theaterwide.

Conventional forces were on the move as well. Army infantry battalions from the 101st 

Airborne Division (Air Assault) from Fort Campbell arrived in mid-January 2002 to replace 

the U.S. Marines at Kandahar Airport. The 10th Mountain Division headquarters and a large 

contingent of infantrymen arrived at Bagram Airfi eld from Fort Drum, New York, between 

13 and 21 February. On 22 February, an MH-47D Chinook helicopter company from the 3rd 

Battalion, 160th SOAR, arrived to replace the MH-47E Chinooks from the 2nd Battalion. The 

SOCCENT, RADM Bert Calland, assigned the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG to JSOTF-South at Kandahar. Although Commodore Harward, commander, JSOTF-South, initially planned to break 

up the unit and distribute its personnel to augment his staff sections and other units, Calland 

convinced him otherwise based on the merits of a forward operating base (FOB) and by committing his staff to support the headquarters. Thus, the “Third of the Third” became FOB 33, 

responsible for the command and control of its Special Forces companies and ODAs fi ghting in 

the Khowst region. Together with a group of joint staff offi cers and sergeants transferred from 

JSOTF-North at the end of February 2002, FOB 33 helped the predominantly Navy staff direct 

UW operations in southern Afghanistan.

The hunt for the leaders and supporters of the ousted Taliban government and the al-Qaeda

terrorist organization continued. When A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, raided two enemy 

compounds simultaneously at Hazar Qadam on 23 January, it encountered sharp resistance. 

In the night gun battle that ensued, A Company fought from darkened room to darkened room 

wearing night-vision goggles (NVG) and using laser-sighted weapons, killing 16 enemy fi ghters and capturing 27.23 In the days following the very successful night raid, local Afghans alleged that the defenders of both compounds had switched allegiance from the Taliban to the 

new AIA before the assault.24 The international media, tired of humanitarian relief coverage, 

tried to expand the allegations into an exposé story. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
209

settled the matter when he endorsed the soldiers’ response to hostile fi re—when fi red on, the 

Special Forces soldiers fi red back.25

The month before, a band of diehard al-Qaeda fi ghters barricaded themselves inside the 

Mir Wais Hospital in Kandahar, disrupting medical service to the population. The local women 

were particularly encumbered because the only gynecological facility in the Kandahar area was 

in the wing where the al-Qaeda fi ghters were holed up. A standoff had lasted for several weeks 

because sympathizers on the hospital staff smuggled food, water, and supplies to the diehards. 

With negotiations at a standstill, the commander, A Company, 3rdBattalion, 5th SFG, planned 

to end the deadlock with a DA assault. Just before dawn on 27 January, after training an Afghan 

force for weeks, Special Forces ODA 524 directly supported the hand-picked group of Pashtuns that stormed the hospital wing. After ODA 524 blasted a man-size opening through a wall 

with explosive charges, the Pashtun assault force was stopped by a fusillade of gunfi re from the 

fortifi ed room. A second assault team was hastily formed to attack down the hallway, throwing 

grenades. The six al-Qaeda fanatics who had sworn to “fi ght to the death rather than surrender” 

were killed, and the deadlock ended.26

During another night raid operation on 12 February, an aerial refuel rendezvous between 

two Air Force MC-130P tankers and three MH-47E Chinooks en route to their target ended in a 

miraculous high-mountain rescue mission. While the nighttime aerial refueling was under way, 

one of the two MC-130Ps crashed into the side of a snow-covered mountain almost 2 miles 

above sea level. Developing a rescue plan “on the fl y,” one Chinook landed in the deep snow 

immediately below the crash site while the other two MH-47Es fi nished refueling. Remarkably, 

although the four-turboprop MC-130P tanker plane had broken in half on impact and fuel had 

surrounded the smoking wreckage, all eight crew members survived. In complete darkness on 

a snow-capped peak, the Chinook pilots landed the assault force turned rescuers and took off 

to aerial refuel again, in turn, before fl ying the 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) airmen 

back to the base for medical treatment.27

With U.S. and coalition forces repairing and opening airfi eld runways across Afghanistan 

to supply fl ights, and fi xing roads and replacing bridges for truck traffi c, BG Lesley Fuller 

and the Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR)-based support units began reducing 

parachute resupply drops. In the fi rst 70 days of combat, personnel from SOCEUR units, the 

U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) 21st Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM), and the 

Air Force 16th and 352nd Special Operations Wings (SOWs) packed, parachute-rigged, and 

airdropped 1.8 million pounds of bundles that included most of the supply classes. During 135 

combat air missions, the MC-130 Combat Talons dropped 1,347 containers. In those 70 days, 

only a single Talon could not fl y as scheduled; however, its cargo was quickly transferred to a 

backup MC-130, and the airdrop mission was only 30 minutes behind schedule.28

The 5th SFG staff manning JSOTF-North at K2, Uzbekistan, prepared to transfer its 

missions, responsibilities, and remaining combat forces to JSOTF-South at Kandahar and 

return to the United States. The sequentially orchestrated transfer to maintain the Special Forces 

presence began at the end of February and continued into mid-March. In turn, the JSOTF-South 

headquarters at Kandahar, built around the Naval Special Warfare Group One (NSWG-1) staff, 

was also slated to close down on 30 March. It was to hand off the direction of operations 
210

 Figure 7. Post-mission discussions among ARSOF personnel.

to the arriving 3rd SFG headquarters that was building a new base camp at Bagram Air Base. 

Two hundred soldiers from the 3rd SFG and 100 soldiers from the ARNG 3rd Battalion, 20th 

SFG, were to staff the new Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) headquarters.29 As the 3rd SFG ODAs arrived, they were sent to replace the 5th SFG 

teams dispersed at sites across Afghanistan. As an example of what happened during the ongoing transfer of responsibilities between JSOTFs, the changing character of the confl ict, and 

the focus on supporting the AIA, Special Forces ODA 394 received new orders before it had 

carried out earlier ones, week after week.

Cued initially by intelligence reports from a Special Forces detachment in December 2001, 

the American and coalition military staffs began planning a brigade-size offensive operation 

against Taliban and al-Qaeda fi ghters that had regrouped in the rugged escarpments around the 

isolated Shah-i-Khot Valley.30 Code-named Operation ANACONDA, the offensive sweep was 

intended to fl ush the Taliban and al-Qaeda fi ghters from their hiding places toward ambushes 

and blocking positions that would be established around the valley. Infantry battalions from the 

10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division, and U.S. and coalition SOF would support the main attack being made by several Afghan militia forces with American Special Forces 

advisers. After two weather-driven delays, the planned 48-hour operation started just after daybreak on 2 March. The stubborn, very effective enemy defense of the Shah-i-Khot Valley took 

most American and Afghan commanders by surprise. Operation ANACONDA turned into two 

weeks of heavy bombing and hard fi ghting. U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF suffered the 

most killed-in-action (KIA) casualties—eight men killed by enemy and friendly fi re and two 

MH-47E helicopters shot down in the high mountains.31

The entire character of the Afghanistan campaign continued to evolve, as had been the case 

since the Ranger parachute assault and the fi rst Special Forces team insertions in Afghanistan 

on 19 October 2001. It rapidly became evident to the ARSOF commanders that the UW cam-
211

paign in Afghanistan was not going to evolve neatly into a postconfl ict paradigm where peacekeeping forces oversaw nation-building projects. Rather, combat operations aimed at hunting 

down the surviving Taliban and al-Qaeda fi ghters would continue. Creating and training a new, 

multiethnic Afghan National Army (ANA) to prosecute this phase of the UW campaign fell to 

the 3rd SFG and a unit of French army mountain troops. The primary training site would be the 

bomb-cratered Kabul Military Academy and its grounds.32 The Germans accepted the mission 

to train the national police force in the capital, and the British were to train Afghan national 

guard battalions to provide “internal security” for the new government.33

Once the major Taliban and al-Qaeda forces had been beaten in open combat and with the 

rest of them switching to guerrilla warfare, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) placed a 

conventional Army corps commander (XVIII Airborne Corps) in charge of military operations 

in Afghanistan and sent in more infantry battalions to man the Kandahar and Bagram air bases. 

The CJSOTF-A and its assigned U.S. and coalition SOF were to support the conventional TF 

180. American troop strength in Afghanistan reached 7,000, and the allied troops in the ISAF, 

manned by 18 nations, numbered almost 5,000.34 The loya jirga—the grand national council of 

Afghanistan—was scheduled to convene in June 2002 to choose the new post-Taliban government. As infi ghting among the Afghan warlords grew in scope and intensity, coalition SR units 

reported that reorganized Taliban units had begun to reenter the country from Pakistan. Both 

posed threats to a successful convention of the loya jirga. The campaign to seal the military victory with political, social, and economic stability was a long way from concluding. This meant 

that the work of ARSOF in Afghanistan was far from over as well.

The following vignettes cover ground combat operations that were conducted to eliminate 

the remaining pockets of Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance; the key leaders who escaped during 

the fi nal offensives; and the heavy demand for CA elements with increased emphasis on reconstruction, humanitarian relief, and infrastructure restoration to provide stability for the AIA. 

With units being replaced and joint headquarters being established as others were taken down, 

communications elements were fully employed, responding to constant changes and maintaining critical capabilities throughout. There were a lot of things happening but few as exciting as 

earlier combat segments.

Old Glory Flies Again in Kabul

After the fall of Kandahar, JSOTF-North Commander COL John Mulholland entered Afghanistan for the fi rst time, having orchestrated the war from K2, Uzbekistan. His fi rst task was 

to survey the abandoned U.S. Embassy in Kabul to determine, with State Department offi cials, 

when it could reopen. The survey team, escorted by Special Forces ODAs 550 and 575, drove 

through the city to the old embassy compound. There were bullet holes in the walls of the building, evidently the work of frustrated Taliban, but the interior was surprisingly unmolested. A 

Super Bowl 1979 poster was still tacked to the wall in one offi ce, and copies of the embassy 

phone directories were found in desk drawers. Most amazing, however, was the embassy fl eet 

of 1979 Volkswagen Jettas parked in the basement garage. All but two of them started. “It was 

kind of weird—like stepping into a 12-year time warp,” said one soldier. Apparently, rumors of 

booby traps in the buildings and mines buried on the grounds, spread at the time the embassy 

was evacuated and perpetuated by the caretakers, had discouraged the Taliban from desecrating 
212

Figure 8. Kabul sprawl and majestic mountains.

or plundering the buildings as it typically did when abandoning sites.35

Just before sunrise on Monday, 10 December 2001, Mulholland assembled the survey 

group and the ODAs in the crisp predawn air in front of the embassy for a brief ceremony before the U.S. Marines arrived from Camp Rhino to assume their traditional mission. CPT Mason Arquette (pseudonym), the joint operations center (JOC) link to K2, described the small, 

appropriate ceremony.36 The 5th SFG commander, wearing his green beret and an Afghan tribal 

scarf around his neck, carefully unfolded a 3 x 5-foot Civil War style regimental “battle fl ag.” 

Embroidered on the top red stripe of the American fl ag were “5th SFG (Airborne)” in white 

block letters, a parachutist badge next to the Special Forces shoulder patch, and the 5th SFG 

silver-bordered black fl ash worn on the green beret.37

Figure 9. U.S. Embassy cornerstone and a solemn ceremony.

As Arquette watched the fl ag being raised up the tall metal pole in front of the American 

Embassy, the sun was just breaking the horizon of the nearby mountains, and the white contrails 

of B-52 bombers circling several miles overhead could be seen. COL Mulholland called for a 

moment of silence “for our fallen comrades” who had been memorialized on the back of a map 

case: “In memory of Jefferson Davis, Dan Petithory, and Cody Prosser, ODA 574, killed in action” near Sayd-Alim-Kalay supporting Hamad Karzai three days before.38 Then Mulholland 

spoke again, and the fl ag was lowered so the U.S. Marines could raise the embassy fl ag. Arquette lingered in the courtyard, surprised that he was so moved by the simple ceremony. Moments later, the fallen having been memorialized and America’s presence having been restored 

at the embassy, the Special Forces soldiers silently departed to return to the war.39
213

Tora Bora

In early December 2001, when American and Afghan military operations were focused on 

Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban, intelligence sources began reporting that although signifi cant Taliban and al-Qaeda forces remained near the city the leaders had already fl ed toward 

the White Mountains near the town of Tora Bora. There had been numerous reported sightings 

of Osama bin Laden in the area. Southwest of Jalalabad, the high mountain region offered not 

only excellent defensive terrain, but adjacent to the porous Pakistan border, there were also 

numerous escape routes. It was apparent to commanders at all levels that the Tora Bora region 

was the next logical military search objective.40

Afghan militia leader Hazrat Ali referred to Tora Bora as “the last center of al-Qaida in 

this country. It is the strongest center of al-Qaida, and now we want to take it and make it the 

weakest center of al-Qaida.”41 With its narrow defi les and innumerable natural caves in steep 

terrain topping 15,000 feet, the White Mountains were an ideal hideout for the remnants of the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. Although American air power played a decisive role in the ground 

campaign during October, November, and early December, most of the targets had been in the 

high-altitude plains regions, not in the Hindu Kush. The predominantly mountainous terrain in 

the Tora Bora area limited its effectiveness. Military planners recognized that ground operations were essential to fi nding, then rooting out and destroying the enemy in the region.

Figure 10. Two northern Afghan leaders.

Hazrat Ali, who controlled the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) in the area, was quite anxious to launch an offensive into the mountains. Other American advisers with Ali had pushed 

him to launch an attack into the mountains. In mid-December, there were only limited American combat forces in Afghanistan—the U.S. Marines at Camp Rhino, southwest of Kandahar; 

several Special Forces ODAs scattered around the country supporting prominent AMF war 

leaders; and the SEALs at Kandahar. In June 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told Congress: “We deliberately did not plan an operation in Afghanistan based on putting 

in 100,000 or 150,000 American troops along the model of the Soviets.” Thus, any major offensive into the White Mountains would have to be conducted by the Afghan forces.

This meant assigning a Special Forces team to Ali to advise him and to assist his ground 

operation with close air support (CAS). COL Mulholland, the JSOTF-North commander, was 

very skeptical and concerned about the plan. In his view, “This [was] a fl awed concept. What 

[was being proposed was] a deliberate attack against an entrenched enemy in a mountain 
214

stronghold, [an enemy that we knew was] going to fi ght to the death.” Estimates of the Taliban

and al-Qaeda numbers in the area varied from 500 to 3,000. Subsequent events established 

that they also had tanks. The 5th SFG commander knew that the Afghans did not have enough 

trained soldiers, heavy weapons, or logistics for such a large operation. Nevertheless, he realized that some key Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders might be in the region, and any operation had 

to be executed quickly. Mulholland tapped ODA 572 to support Ali.42

Figure 11. Cave searches locate weapons and munitions caches.

Figure 12. Mobile cave operations.

However, before the Special Forces team could be dispatched, Ali had loaded his forces 

into pickup trucks and moved into the mountains. With no logistics support or the means to 

arrange American air support, the probability of success was slim. Mulholland was concerned 

that Ali would launch a deliberate attack without the requisite preparation. On 4 December, 

CW3 Dwayne Torgelson (pseudonym) and ODA 572 arrived to support Ali. Torgelson divided 

his team into two CAS teams at Jalalabad before their mountain insertion by Air Force MH-53 

helicopters. When the team became engaged in a fi refi ght, an American reconnaissance element called for air support without knowing the location of all the friendly forces. Torgelson 

saw the potential for disaster and called off the airstrike. After ensuring that no friendly forces 

were in danger, both elements withdrew to safe distances, and a B-52 dropped its payload on 

the enemy positions.

When ODA 572 linked up with Hazrat Ali, the Afghan leader insisted that the CAS teams 

accompany his front-line soldiers into battle without understanding the diffi culty of calling in 

airstrikes while under fi re or the necessity to have a safety buffer zone between friendly forces 
215

and the impact area of the bombs. CAS strikes and the B-52 bombing were a part of a sustained 

air campaign that resumed on 1 December in support of the U.S. and Afghan effort to root out 

the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Special Forces teams that were on the ground to direct the air attacks 

made that campaign even more effective.43

Recognizing that there were serious coordination problems, JSOTF-North pulled ODA 572 

back to Jalalabad until the situation could be sorted out between Ali, the American advisers, 

and the task force. Adding to the coordination problems was the fl uid ground situation. Battle 

lines were shifting back and forth continuously, and Ali was concerned about the safety of the 

Special Forces soldiers. On 6 December, ODA 572 returned to Ali’s forward command post 

and convinced him to provide it with a small security element. The next day it reentered the 

mountains and over the next several days occupied a series of advancing positions to provide 

CAS to the Afghan troops who were attacking caves and tunnels that were sites of resistance. 

Several groups of Taliban attempted to negotiate surrender with the Afghans, whose custom 

was to set the enemy free after surrendering. The Americans would not accept this practice because they wanted to ensure that those surrendering were not Taliban or al-Qaeda leaders and 

that they would not pose future threats by reverting back to fi ghting once released. The ODA 

572 team sergeant, MSG Shannon Whitley (pseudonym) made it clear to the Afghans that “It’s 

a complete unconditional surrender, and [they] are processed as prisoners.” The Special Forces 

team was not going to allow al-Qaeda terrorists to escape by feigning surrender. Secretary of 

Defense Rumsfeld had been adamant about the unconditionality of enemy surrender: “This is 

not a drill where we’re making deals.”44

Airstrikes directed by ODA 572 supported the tough ground combat being waged by Ali’s 

forces in the White Mountains. GEN Richard Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 

said the mountainous fi ghting was “very tough.” “The al-Qaida forces that we think are ensconced up there . . . are fi ghting for their lives,” he told a television news reporter.45

On 20 December, SF ODA 561 elements arrived to assist ODA 572 as it searched caves and 

tunnels for intelligence documents, any indication of bin Laden’s presence, and to take DNA 

samples from dead enemy bodies. When the rest of ODA 561 arrived, the two teams expanded 

their search areas to explore more enemy locations. Together, they found quantities of ammunition, heavy machine guns, documents, computer disks, maps, photographs, manuals, and 

videotapes. Unfortunately, local Afghans had already pillaged many of the caves. In most cases, 

the caves that intelligence photo analysts “spotted” proved to be shadows cast by overhanging 

rocks. To add to the frustration and sense of “chasing the proverbial wild goose,” Afghan leaders charged the teams as much as $1,000 for meals and $300 for vehicle use. Despite this “price 

gouging,” the two SF teams kept focused on accomplishing their mission.46

ODA 572 left the region on 17 January, followed by ODA 561 on 22 January. The two Special 

Forces teams returned to K2, Uzbekistan. Estimates of al-Qaeda killed by the Afghan commanders ranged from 200 to as high as 1,000. There were no signs of bin Laden or Mullah Omar. According to GEN Tommy Franks, commander, CENTCOM, we “simply don’t know” where they 

are. SSG Jeremy Parsons (pseudonym) stated that fi nding bin Laden was not ODA 572’s primary 

mission: “Our mission was to support General Ali’s troops in getting rid of the pockets of resistance of al-Qaeda and Taliban and to go start the searches of the caves.” Patently obvious was 
216

that many of these enemy fi ghters had escaped to Pakistan. The border was impossible to seal. 

Ali was not terribly concerned: “We’re happy because we have expelled the foreigners.”47

Despite the heavy coverage, the media treated the Tora Bora operation an “opportunity lost.” 

Franks disagreed: “I look at Tora Bora as a favorable operation.” There was no evidence found 

that proved bin Laden had been killed, but the al-Qaeda delaying operation had been disrupted. 

Many had been killed, and they had been dislocated. Special Forces ODA 572 and ODA 561 did 

exactly as tasked. They accompanied their Afghan allies into a mountainous complex containing well-prepared defenses and managed to dislodge the defenders. As “warrior diplomats,” the 

teams had to balance support of military operations while ensuring that nothing they said or did 

would adversely affect the future of U.S.-Afghan relations. SSG Wallace Seifert (pseudonym) 

saw their mission as typical: “We were just there doing our job; just doing our job.”48

While the Tora Bora operation was under way, the JSOTF-South and 101st Airborne Division’s Rakkasan Brigade established themselves at Kandahar Airport. The 3rd Battalion, 3rd 

SFG, assigned to JSOTF-South would operate from that base. But it was the 5th Battalion, 19th 

SFG from the ARNG that would serve as the special operations liaison to the Combined Forces 

Land Component Command (CFLCC) headquarters at the air base.

One Army

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, neither SSG Karl Kramer nor SSG Sylvester 

Largent (pseudonyms) had any idea that six months later they would be anywhere near Kandahar, Afghanistan.49 Both were Special Forces soldiers in ODA 581, 5th Battalion, 19th SFG, 

ARNG, based in Colorado, and neither could imagine being deployed as part of the DOD 

response. Kramer continued working with the sheriff’s department and Largent as a fi nancial 

manager. Their daily routine suddenly changed on 30 November when their Special Forces 

company was alerted for possible overseas deployment.50

As the size of the active Army decreased, the role of the ARNG and USAR increased 

dramatically. Thousands of soldiers were mobilized for Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, 

and approximately 50,000 guardsmen have been mobilized for the war on terrorism.51 These 

soldiers who train one weekend each month and two weeks in the summer have civilian jobs 

but must be prepared to be mobilized for state or federal missions. The active Army, and this 

is particularly true with its SOF, cannot perform all of its missions without the ARNG and 

USAR. The increased integration of these components has made the U.S. Army into a true 

“One Army.”

Just days after the alert, the soldiers of B Company, 5th Battalion, 19th SFG, had reported 

to Fort Carson, Colorado, to be mobilized. By 5 December, the 5th Battalion personnel had 

joined the headquarters of the 2nd Battalion, 19th SFG, from West Virginia at Fort Knox, Kentucky, where they were mobilized again and then federalized. Deputy Commander, U.S. Army 

Special Forces Command (USASFC), COL David Burford elected to mobilize one Special 

Forces company from each of the three 19th SFG battalions to spread the combat experience 

throughout the ARNG. The 2nd Battalion from West Virginia would provide command and 

control.
217

After a week at Fort Knox, B Company, 5th Battalion, and the 2nd 

Battalion headquarters bussed to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to prepare for 

overseas movement. Two other companies—one from the 1st Battalion 

in Utah and the other from the 2nd Battalion in West Virginia—joined 

them at Fort Campbell. Some of the units had previously trained together, 

while others had not. This further complicated the initial organizational 

decision because 2nd Battalion was unfamiliar with the state of training 

and equipment of the units from the 1st and 5th Battalions. To the dismay 

of everyone, there was only one Special Forces company from 5th SFG 

at Fort Campbell. The others had already deployed overseas, and the one 

left behind could do little to help the 19th SFG units because its equipment was palletized for movement. Although the 5th SFG rear detachment welcomed the guardsmen—even referring to them as the 4th Battalion, 5th SFG—there 

were few personnel available to assist them in preparing for overseas deployment. And no one 

could tell the 19th SFG personnel what their mission in Afghanistan might be.

Nevertheless, the Special Forces ODAs worked to improve their small-unit tactical skills 

as well as their specifi c specialty skills. MSG Adam Fulkerson (pseudonym), 5th SFG signal detachment, recognized that the 19th SFG needed more training on newer-model radios.52

He quickly arranged a hands-on familiarization program that would pay big dividends for the 

ARNG communications specialists.

This time, the ingenuity and innovativeness of the Special Forces soldiers to solicit training from outside sources, like the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School, was 

constrained by 2nd Battalion’s leaders because of memories of being mobilized, having been 

trained to standard by the active SFGs, and then not being deployed for Operation DESERT 

STORM. The priority was getting overseas. Outside assistance might give the impression that 

the ARNG Special Forces units were not operationally ready. They would prove themselves in 

theater. It was a “don’t rock the boat mentality,” said one Special Forces guardsman.

Figure 14. A 5/19th SFG soldier establishing communications in Afghanistan.

Figure 13. The

19th SFG beret

fl ash with Special

Forces crest.
218

A signifi cant problem was the lack of training ammunition to qualify personnel on their 

assigned weapons and refamiliarize them on hand grenades, light antitank weapons, M-203 

grenade launchers, and crew-served weapons—the squad automatic weapon (SAW) and M240 machine gun. Mobilization had happened so fast that there had been no time to forecast 

training ammunition requirements. Active component units that were familiar with installation range and ammunition procedures had forecasted and scheduled resources. The 19th 

SFG settled for “leftovers.” For example, each ODA was allocated three hand grenades for 

familiarization. Despite the frustrations, the 19th SFG soldiers recognized that the 5th SFG 

rear could do little in the way of “sponsorship,” especially when the Christmas holiday period 

descended on the post. In fact, the ARNG Special Forces had only praise for their active duty 

counterparts. “5th Special Forces Group set us up for success,” declared SFC Kip Kupinski 

(pseudonym).

The 19th SFG ODAs began to deploy overseas in January 2002. By 17 February, all of B 

Company, 5th Battalion, had arrived at K2, Uzbekistan. LTC Don Forsythe, commander, 2nd 

Battalion, 5th SFG, told ODA 981 that part of the team would replace ODB 540 as the Special 

Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) for TF Rakkasan (3rd Brigade, 101st 

Airborne Division) headquarters at Kandahar Air Base. The other half of ODA 981 and B 

Company headquarters would go to Kandahar city. The other 19th SFG ODAs were assigned 

to serve as area support teams for 5th SFG ODAs preparing for and conducting combat operations in Afghanistan.53

The mission of the SOCCE at Kandahar Air Base was to coordinate special operations and 

activities with the ground force headquarters that controlled large numbers of conventional 

units operating nearby. The SOCCE also forwarded conventional force requests for assistance 

to the commanders, JSOTF-North and JSOTF-South.54 With two infantry battalions working 

in and around Kandahar Air Base, a small SOCCE was the ideal organization to deconfl ict and 

coordinate the daily activities and long-range plans of conventional forces and SOF.

CPT Daniel Fitzgerald, commander, SF ODA 981, and two detachment members reached 

Kandahar Air Base on 26 February. Their immediate task was to meet with all forces in the area 

(American, coalition, and Afghan Military Force [AMF]) to ensure that everyone knew what 

friendly forces were where, what they were doing, and to prevent confl icts among the various 

simultaneous operations. Fitzgerald began with the 5th SFG liaison offi cer at the air base. SFC 

Kupinski went to the 3rd Brigade “Rakkasans,” 101st Airborne Division tactical operations 

center (TOC), to discuss Special Forces and conventional operations. Because the Rakkasans 

were responsible for providing a quick-reaction force (QRF) to respond to fi eld emergencies 

and medical evacuations—ambulances and helicopters—a close working relationship between 

the 19th SFG ODAs operating in and around Kandahar city, some 30 miles away, and the Rakkasans was imperative. Responsibility to coordinate with coalition forces belonged to SSG 

Jesus Martinez (pseudonym). Initially, the SOCCE had little contact with the AMF in separate 

encampments beyond the American defensive perimeter at the air base. At the air base, the 

SOCCE coordinated base operations and kept the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, apprised of 19th 

SFG operations. Liaison with AMF forces was accomplished primarily by Army tactical CA 

and PSYOP units.55
219

On 1 March, the rest of ODA 981 arrived with the team equipment. Half of the ODA 

went to the city and half stayed at the airport to serve as the SOCCE. ODA 984 deployed to a 

compound owned by Taliban leader Mullah Omar outside of Kandahar city to supervise the destruction of collected arms caches, to coordinate fi ring ranges for coalition forces, and to identify helicopter landing zones (LZs) for future operations. The missions that B Company, 5th 

Battalion, 19th SFG, performed were neither glamorous nor the activities that fi lled adventure 

novels or combat action movies. They were, however, essential to the conduct of training and 

combat operations. In the military in a combat environment, “everyone singing off the same 

sheet of music” could mean the difference between life and death. In its SOCCE role, ODA 

981 was the “maestro” of the military symphony at Kandahar. The fact that ODA 981 was an 

ARNG Special Forces detachment coordinating with conventional infantry battalions, another 

active Special Forces battalion, and the various coalition forces only demonstrated the viability 

of the “One Army” concept.

The Answer is Out There

C Company, 112th Signal Battalion, activated in July 2001 from assets within the battalion, hit the ground running. After several months of signal training exercises, evaluations, and 

unique equipment certifi cations, the company was deemed qualifi ed to perform its wartime 

mission. Initially prepared to support another mission in a different part of the world, when the 

priorities changed, the company had fi ve days to prepare to deploy to Afghanistan.

A nine-man signal advance echelon (ADVON) and its equipment traveled aboard a C-5A to 

Germany and then transloaded to a C-17 Globemaster III for the fi nal leg to Kandahar Air Base, 

Afghanistan. The team was to establish communications between Forward Operating Base 

(FOB) 33, the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, and various higher headquarters. While well trained to 

perform this mission, a myriad of problems impeded immediate success. “Doing what we have 

to do to get the job done” became the mantra for the C Company signal team members.56

Administrative troubles delayed the establishment of satellite communications (SATCOM) 

for four days. In the meantime, the signal team helped build the FOB. They set up tents, tore 

down the tents, and moved them to new locations. Even the simple task of getting their equipment to the desired location presented a challenge. An Air Force shortage of diesel fuel limited 

the use of their forklift to unloading aircraft. Since the SATCOM were “on hold,” SSG Wilfred 

Chandler (pseudonym) traded some of the 85 gallons of diesel fuel for his generator to the Air 

Force forklift operator to get the team equipment from the fl ight line to FOB 33. This soon 

became the modus operandi for getting the mission accomplished.

As the communications bandwidth requirements quickly grew beyond those allocated before deployment, adjustments had to be made. C Company’s mission had been expanded beyond the FOB to include coalition special operations units and the 3rd Battalion, 160th SOAR, 

forces located at the base. New bandwidth was granted, but it proved insuffi cient to satisfy 

the growing demand for secure and nonsecure Internet and telephone access. The number of 

computers threatened to exceed the capabilities of the local area network (LAN). The question 

was how to effectively connect more than 30 computers on the backside (from the router in the 

communications center to the end user) through two lines to the stepside (from the router to the 

communications van and satellite dish) for nonsecure Internet access.
220

Working collectively, the signal team members discovered a solution to this dilemma. SGT 

Dwayne Jackman (pseudonym), the technical control sergeant, said, “It has been a learning experience since we’ve been here.” The team discovered the answer online at the Cisco website. 

Using the protocol instructions downloaded from the site, the team programmed the router to 

break down two Internet Protocol (IP) addresses into more than 50 sub-IP addresses for the 

backside computers, thereby accommodating the demand for nonsecure Internet access. This 

was the fi rst time anyone in the 112th Signal Battalion had attempted this confi guration, and 

it worked. Jackman had attended a Wave Tech Router course, but it in no way prepared him 

to program a router in this confi guration. As he said, “I’m a satellite guy. Normally, a network 

user would receive a line from the local area network administrator to plug into his computer.” 

Ingenuity helped the C Company signalers achieve success in their fi rst wartime mission.

Figure 15. The 112th Signal Battalion successfully improvised at Kandahar Air Base.

SSG Thomas Barrington (pseudonym), the team sergeant, traded for an air-conditioning 

unit to keep the computer equipment and routers cool. Keeping the computer equipment clean 

and dust-free in the dusty environment of Kandahar prevented system failures and prolonged 

the service of the equipment. When materials or parts were either delayed in shipment or unavailable through the normal supply system, bartering with other signal elements and units at 

the airport ensured their communications center remained operational. After a few weeks, the 

team settled into a daily routine of maintaining equipment and solving minor technical problems. They functioned as a cohesive team and proved that they were capable of accomplishing 

anything they set out to do.

A New Twist on an Old Idea

Army CA units are active in peacetime as well as in war. A peacetime mission for the 96th 

Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB) is providing a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) to 

U.S. embassies abroad. The HAST prepares an assessment of humanitarian assistance requirements to the country team. The team has CA soldiers as well as specialists such as veterinarians, preventive medicine experts, and civil engineers.
221

MAJ John Bowman (pseudonym), commander, C Company, 96th CAB, recognized the 

value of the HAST concept in a hostile environment. By including preventive medicine specialists and engineers with skills other than those his soldiers already possessed, his CA teams 

could provide greater capabilities to the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force 

(CJCMOTF) beyond what the CAT-As normally provided. Because the CJCMOTF forwarded 

civil infrastructure reports to the Department of State, Bowman put his concept into action on 

9 December 2001.

Bamian, south of Kabul, and Konduz, east of Mazar-e-Sharif, had just been freed from 

Taliban control. The state of the populace in those cities and the condition of public utilities and 

services were virtually unknown. Bowman sent MAJ Jim McLemore and SFC Charles Walters 

(pseudonyms), who had deployed with 5th SFG, along with several specialists to conduct a 

thorough assessment of Bamian to expand the Special Forces ODAs’ initial work.

Figure 16. Bamian Buddha site after the Taliban destroyed it on 11 March 2001.

Working closely with ODA 553, which had been the area since early November, enabled 

the HAST to expand its assessment to areas outside the city. Having been told that the Taliban

had destroyed almost every village around Bamian as it withdrew, the HAST anticipated the 

worst. The Red Cross provided medical care in Bamian, but the hospital in nearby Yakawlang 

had been looted of its supplies. While some school buildings were generally intact, there was no 

money for teachers. The immediate need in the area was for clothing to survive the approaching 

winter. After completing their assessment and meeting with local offi cials to corroborate their 

fi ndings and prioritize requirements, McLemore and Walters submitted their HAST report to 

CJCMOTF to coordinate expeditious assistance.57

On 19 December, another two-man HAST led by MAJ McLemore met with the Special 

Forces ODA at Taloqan to expand the humanitarian assessment there before going to Konduz. 

At Taloqan, the most critical requirement was to repair a bridge so that supplies could be delivered to the city. Konduz had a very large number of displaced persons living in camps outside 
222

the city and in makeshift shelters outside the camps. The quandary was who needed assistance. 

The camp numbers were relatively easy to estimate, but the team had to rely on local offi cials to 

provide the number of those living in makeshift shelters outside the camps. Since local offi cials 

usually exaggerated numbers, McLemore used his best judgment to estimate the approximate 

numbers—normally, one-fourth of the number provided. School repairs were needed in both 

Taloqan and Konduz. The HAST worked with a nongovernmental organization (NGO) to make 

the necessary repairs and submitted the other data to the CJCMOTF.58

The city of Herat in western Afghanistan was extremely sensitive because of its close proximity to Iran. On 3 January 2002, MAJ Bowman sent CAT-A34 with several attached specialists to Herat based on a report of 200,000 displaced persons in the area. CPT Chuck Allison 

(pseudonym) and CAT-A34 met with two NGOs to coordinate care for and the resettlement of 

the massive number of refugees. As was common in most other locations, the lack of medical 

care was a major concern. Two generators were needed to run the medical equipment at the 

hospital in Herat. Medical Civic Action Program teams were recommended to immunize the 

surrounding villages against disease. Half of the schools in the surrounding provinces needed 

repair and to support the emphasis on education, new facilities would have to be built. Problems 

soon surfaced in other areas.

Figure 17. Autoclaves inside Herat Hospital.
223

Figure 18. A typical classroom in a Bamian school.

Water was the most pressing need for farms near the city of Qal-e-yeh. During Taliban

fi ghting to establish their dominance, the local irrigation canal had deteriorated badly and fi lled 

with silt. As a result, the farmers had no access to water and could not raise crops. On 11 February, local workers started to dredge 20 km of the canal. This initial effort was suffi cient to raise 

interest at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to fi nish the remaining 150 

km. This project had an immediate impact on the people near Herat because it revitalized 400 

hectares of arable land in the district. The rapid start of the project established a direct connection between the arrival of American soldiers and improvement in the Afghan people’s lives.59

Figure 19. CA teams examine the condition of a community well.

After completing its assessment of Bagram, CAT-A32 went to Konduz on 14 January 

2002 to follow up on recommendations McLemore made. The team met with government 

offi cials to solicit their priorities in reestablishing local infrastructure and to advise them how 

to interact with the various humanitarian assistance organizations. Recommending how to 

operate within the confi nes of Afghan laws and culture proved critical to the NGOs. These 

efforts paid off when offi cials representing the NGOs met to coordinate local government projects 
224

with organizations that were willing to do the work. After the ODA left, CAT-A32 provided 

situational awareness on the Konduz area to the commander, JSOTF-North.60

Between Bamian and Konduz, the CAT-As nominated approximately 90 projects for funding by the CJCMOTF. The little appreciated, mostly disregarded aspect of the proposed project process was the paperwork required. To submit projects for consideration and approved 

funding, the CAT-As had to solicit local contractors’ assistance to develop the statements of 

work and cost estimates. Lacking experience in the contract proposal business where numerous 

persons/companies routinely solicit work in the United States and only one of several bidders 

receives the contract, it was easy for the CA teams working overseas in primitive fi eld conditions to become frustrated with the system. In some cases, the teams were able to arrange with 

local NGOs to execute the projects.61

Figure 20. Impromptu “contract negotiations” with village leaders.

The CJCMOTF had been slated to operate from Dushanbe, Tajikistan, but the unexpected 

success of the campaign against the Taliban regime caused its relocation to Kabul. The need 

for a CA liaison cell in Tajikistan was still valid to assess the road system into Afghanistan and 

to coordinate humanitarian aid efforts, including one from Russia. Since the Red army blew 

the bridges over the Amu Darya as it withdrew in 1989, all traffi c across the river had been by 

barge. CAT-A36 examined the three bridge sites and briefed the U.S. Ambassador. In January 

Figure 21. Salang Tunnel and road conditions.
225

Figure 22. Friendship Bridge.

2002, the fi rst land convoy of humanitarian aid crossed by barge at Dushanbe en route to Kabul. 

The convoy, guarded by Afghan forces, traversed the Salang Tunnel.62

The CAT-As of C Company, 96th CAB, provided a positive climate for military and diplomatic objectives in Afghanistan. Every day the CA soldiers dealt with “a multitude of interrelated issues, positions, and interests [that were] associated with the agendas of various groups 

or individuals” as cited in FM 41-10. They negotiated actual minefi elds and ethnic minefi elds 

of ancient tribal rivalries, jealousies, and competing interests. Sorting through that multitude of 

interrelated issues, CA soldiers never lost sight of their primary mission to “provide assistance 

to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population.” Mixing peacetime and wartime 

doctrine with innovation, initiative, expertise, and professionalism as seasoning, 96th CAB 

personnel did exactly what they were charged to do— to provide a positive climate to achieve 

U.S. national objectives.63

Figure 23. Making friends and infl uencing people.

Chokepoint

An essential element for any military operation is transportation. This not only includes 

the means by which soldiers and materiel move but also the routes by which they will travel to 

and from their destination. Since its completion in 1964, the Salang Tunnel, 39 miles north of 
226

Bagram, has controlled north-south road movement in eastern Afghanistan. At 11,000 feet above 

sea level, the tunnel is the highest structure of its kind in the world. As key terrain in that region 

of the country, the Soviets and the mujahideen fought to control the tunnel in the 1980s. In 1997, 

Afghan resistance forces blocked the 1.6-mile-long tunnel to prevent the Taliban from reinforcing and resupplying their military units near Kabul and farther south. The Salang Tunnel was as 

critical in 2001 and 2002 as it had been since 1964.64 The tunnel and the road had to be opened. 

Then tunnel traffi c had to be controlled to support large-scale overland humanitarian relief coming south to Kabul. On 4 January 2002, MAJ Gary Jaffe (pseudonym), commander, D Company, 

96th CAB, assigned CAT-A41 the mission to reconnoiter the tunnel and road leading to it.

All that MAJ Silas Greene (pseudonym) and CAT-A41 knew was that a Russian NGO had 

repaired one ventilation fan in the tunnel and a Scottish organization had cleared land mines 

from one lane inside the tunnel. Because of the bad weather, Greene planned a “top-to-bottom” 

recon, meaning the team would drive as fast as possible to its main objective—the tunnel—then 

turn around and do a detailed assessment of the road on the way back to the base in Bagram. 

The evaluation included damaged and destroyed bridges along the route, washed-out sections 

of road and resultant bypasses, major landslide areas, destroyed or broken culverts, variances 

in road width, major pothole hazards, and the extent of demining on the shoulders. Photographs and exact grid coordinates helped engineers determine what assets, heavy equipment, 

and materials were needed to repair the road and its structures. The fi rst try got 4 km from the 

tunnel before snow and severe weather stopped the convoy. The team simply turned around and 

focused on the road survey back to Bagram.

“It was a horrendous road on the best of days.” There were sections no more than 9 feet 

wide with no shoulder and, in others, a precipitous drop into a river valley far below. The team 

forded two washed-out areas. In several places, destroyed Russian military vehicles from the 

Soviet era had been pushed into large holes and rocks dumped on them to fi ll the gaps. As the 

winter weather became more severe, it became apparent that ground convoys were the only 

reliable way to deliver humanitarian assistance to the areas near Kabul. The necessity to clear 

the tunnel became more urgent. After a second attempt to reach the tunnel later in the month 

also failed, the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) funded the repairs 

on the road.65 In the meantime, a collaborative effort by USAID, the French, the Russians, the 

Scots, and the Afghans opened the tunnel on 14 January to one lane of traffi c, which required 

great care to negotiate.66

Although the priority mission for CAT-A41 was to assess the tunnel, the team pursued 

other tasks in the surrounding villages near Kabul and Bagram. In the village of Qarabagh near 

Bagram, MAJ Greene made a notable impression by participating in buzkahsi (translated “goat 

grabbing”), the national game of Afghanistan. Two teams on horseback fi ght to carry a headless calf across a line for points. It is a very brutal game in which the riders slam their horses 

against their opponents, then whipping and clawing, they try to take the carcass from the opposing team. Greene, a college animal science major who minored in equine management, was 

an expert horseman. While CAT-A41 was in Qarabagh, he played in several games, much to the 

Afghans’ great delight.

Based on a report that an avalanche had trapped a Red Cross convoy in the Salang, the 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) asked CAT-A41 to make a third 
227

attempt on 7 February. Forty-mile-an-hour winds, heavy driving snow, and approaching darkness precluded that effort. The following morning, a British helicopter fl ew SFC Bart Schuyler 

(pseudonym), the Special Forces medic on A41, to the snowed-in tunnel to assess the situation. 

Schuyler found four casualties—Afghans who had been asphyxiated by carbon monoxide poisoning while sleeping in their cars with the motors running. A British land mine-removal organization with heavy equipment eventually reached the tunnel and rescued numerous trapped 

Afghan travelers who had been patiently waiting their turn to use the single lane of traffi c.67

Increasing the fl ow of traffi c grew even more important.

“60 Minutes II”

It was a newsworthy story from Afghanistan, said CBS’s “60 Minutes II” producer Shawn 

Efran. With the military defeat of the main-force Taliban and al-Qaeda units, the diffi cult work 

of helping Afghans rebuild their country fell to small groups of U.S. special operations soldiers 

like CAT-A41.68 These men were professional soldiers of the highest order, but wearing beards 

and local garb provided better access to the people they wanted to help. Their job was “nation 

building.”

As characters in a news story, the four soldiers were “good copy.” MAJ Greene led the team 

with energy and had excellent judgment. His urbane manner and articulate speech belied his 

background as a tank offi cer who had completed parachute and Ranger training. The effectiveness with which Greene led his team derived, in large part, from prior service in the U.S. Army 

96th Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB), a special operations unit based in North Carolina. Greene 

became an expert horseman while pursuing an undergraduate degree in animal science at the 

University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The CA offi cer had just received a master’s degree 

in national security studies at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, and his 

thesis, coincidentally, was “Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia.”69

CAT-A41 moved constantly in and around the town of Bagram to determine where U.S. 

resources could be applied. SFC Roger “Mac” McDonald (pseudonym), the team sergeant who 

had never quite lost his Queens accent, served as “front man” for the team. He made travel 

plans and meeting agendas for the constant sessions with local political and military leaders, 

and developed the security arrangements for each gathering. Everyone on the small team had 

to stay aware of his vulnerability and be constantly mindful of force protection because the 

team worked independently long distances from other American elements. The team expert on 

civil infrastructure was SFC Lyle Canberra (pseudonym), who surveyed and assessed water 

and sewage systems, aqueducts, wells, power grids, roads, and bridges. This Special Forces 

engineer also organized demining operations, as he had on other battlefi elds. SFC Schuyler 

was CAT-A41’s medical specialist and, like McDonald and Canberra, was a veteran of Special 

Forces. He had also honed his skills on the edges of civilization throughout the world.70

CAT-A41 personnel were trained in foreign languages but not for Central Asia; it was regionally oriented toward Europe. MAJ Greene spoke French, McDonald spoke Polish, Schuyler spoke German and Spanish, and Canberra spoke Spanish and Portuguese. The projected 

CA effort in Afghanistan required as many teams as could be deployed. In any event, given the 

variety of Pashto, Dari, and Urdu dialects endemic to the numerous ethnic groups of Afghanistan, local translators were necessary for better communications.71
228

Shawn Efram, the “60 Minutes II” producer, brought his cameraman, Dave, and his sound 

man, Scott, to meet CAT-A41 in mid-January 2002 to do the background research and prepare 

the story. Their correspondent, Scott Pelley, would fl y in later. As with any new team members, 

SFC McDonald and SFC Canberra gave the three “60 Minutes II” personnel some rudimentary 

weapons training and put them through basic security drills—immediate action responses to 

possible threat situations—for their self-defense, so they would not increase the already heavy 

security burden of the four-man CAT-A. SFC Schuyler taught basic fi rst aid procedures for gunshot wounds and related trauma. Dave, the cameraman, was a former 82nd Airborne Division 

paratrooper. Both Dave and Scott, the sound man, fi t in easily.72

When correspondent Scott Pelley joined CAT-A41 and his “60 Minutes II” crew a week 

later, MAJ Greene simply followed the team’s normal busy schedule. On the day of the fi lming, the team was to revisit the Emergency Medical Clinic in Bagram. It was one of 23 clinics 

and a hospital supported by an Italian private volunteer organization. However, the Emergency 

Medical Clinic physician, Doctor Mohammed Atta, had not been paid in eight months. He had 

remained in his hometown, working through the Soviet and Taliban occupations, even when 

Bagram was a center of fi ghting. Dr. Atta was living “hand to mouth” in a bunker near the clinic 

and wanted to plant a garden on its roof.73

Just minutes after CAT-A41 and the “60 Minutes II” crew arrived, a mob of local children 

rushed in a badly injured 16-year-old boy who the doctor recognized. As the boy picked up a 

hand grenade, it detonated in his right hand. The little fi nger and parts of his ring fi nger and 

thumb were gone. The dorsal portion of his hand was degloved to the wrist—the skin was 

peeled back like a banana. He had a grenade fragment visible in his cheek, but most of the 

blood on his face was from his torn-up hand.74

CAT-A41 immediately went into action, forgetting completely the “60 Minutes II” crew 

who recorded the event. McDonald and Canberra took up security positions to hold back the 

gathering crowd of curious Afghans. SFC Schuyler knew he could do “deminimus activities”—

on Greene’s orders—to alleviate the immediate suffering of non-Americans. Schuyler followed 

Dr. Atta’s lead in the treatment, serving as his primary medical assistant. MAJ Greene gathered 

some Afghans to help “push start” the worn-out “ambulance,” a battered old Mitsubishi minivan with its back seats removed. Then, they loaded the boy into the running ambulance, and Dr. 

Atta jumped behind the wheel and headed to the hospital. Schuyler arranged for a U.S. Army 

surgeon to make a follow-up visit at the Italian-run hospital in Kabul and coordinated skin 

grafting and physical therapy. A few days later, Schuyler went to the hospital to check on the 

boy and was pleased to learn that there was no secondary infection. The boy’s hand had been 

saved.75

The incident in the Bagram clinic was over in less than 20 minutes, and the “60 Minutes II” 

team caught all of it on tape. Correspondent Scott Pelley featured it in his story on CAT-A41, 

which was introduced nationwide as “Mission Impossible.” But for Greene, McDonald, Schuyler, and Canberra, who comprised one of the 10 CA Alpha teams operating throughout the 

formerly Taliban nation, it was just another morning of another day trying to give Afghanistan “a good start” toward becoming a nation that would never again provide sanctuary for 

terrorists.76
229

The previous historical vignettes provided the Special Forces team perspectives on the Tora 

Bora operations and showed what the tactical CA teams were doing in the fi rst months after 

the collapse of the Taliban regime. Despite the severe winter weather, helicopters supported 

the Army special operations elements that were spread throughout the country. The hunt for 

Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders continued, and the search fan spread along the Pakistan border 

areas. The next stories detail the hazards of helicopter operations and Special Forces teams conducting direct-action (DA) missions to eliminate al-Qaeda diehards and capture enemy leaders, 

weapons caches, and sensitive equipment.

High-Altitude Rescue of a Marine CH-53

For a downed aircrew or for isolated personnel, there was comfort in knowing that a procedure existed for extricating personnel from risky circumstances. Combat search and rescue 

(CSAR) was an imperative mission for the men of 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR. The 160th was 

well prepared to perform the CSAR mission with its highly skilled fl ight medics, pilots, and 

crew members. The rapid response to a CSAR mission on a cold winter morning saved the lives 

of fi ve marines whose helicopter had crashed in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan.

On 20 January, shortly after departing Bagram Air Base at 0800, one of two Marine Corps 

CH-53 Super Stallion heavy-lift helicopters carrying supplies to ARSOF troops operating in 

the vicinity of Khowst crashed into a remote snow-covered mountain about 40 miles south of 

Bagram.77 The U.S. Marine helicopter pilots had fl own similar routes earlier in the week and 

had received ineffective small-arms fi re near the village of Azrow south of Bagram Air Base. 

This morning, the two Super Stallions were traversing the southern mountainous region approximately 200 feet above the ground. In the few moments when the crew chief in the lead 

helicopter made his interior compartment checks, the trail helicopter disappeared. All he saw to 

the rear was a billowing cloud of smoke rising behind a ridgeline. He passed this information 

to the pilot.78

CPT Alison Thompson (pseudonym), commander of the lead CH-53, quickly reversed 

course and fl ew toward the smoke while trying to contact the trail helicopter on the radio.79 As 

Thompson crested the ridgeline, she saw the helicopter wreckage in the bottom of a valley that 

was surrounded by mountain ridges that soared more than 9,800 feet mean sea level (MSL). As 

CPT Thompson fl ew closer to the crash site, she could see scattered parts of the wreckage burning through the heavy black smoke. After circling several times and observing no movement, 

she assumed that the crew was dead. Thompson made a last effort to contact the aircraft by 

radio but received no reply. The U.S. Marine captain then tried to contact the orbiting Airborne 

Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft on four different radio frequencies. Again, she 

got no response. Uncomfortable with landing at such a high altitude, not knowing whether the 

other helicopter had been shot down, and uncertain of the ground threat, CPT Thompson made 

a fi nal circle and fl ew back to Bagram for help.80

When this happened, Bagram Air Base was still a very immature military environment 

in the throes of expanding from a Special Forces fi eld operating base (FOB) run by a Special 

Forces major, the “Khan of Bagram,” into a conventional military base. Physical security was 

tenuous and the command relationships were still evolving. Virtually all the tactical operations 
230

centers (TOCs) got the word that a U.S. Marine helicopter had crashed and were examining 

courses of action. While the basic questions were being asked—what caused the crash, was 

it mechanical malfunction or due to hostile fi re, were there any survivors—the number and 

variety of headquarters and yet-to-be-defi ned command and control relationships in the midst 

of transitions and relocations created more problems. Forward elements of JSOTF-North (TF 

Dagger), the newly formed JSOTF-South, units of the U.S. special operations task force, coalition special operations forces, and the 10th Mountain Division were all involved. The answers 

to the critical questions of CSAR, such as who had the authority to launch the rescue effort 

and who would provide the security force, were based on assumptions. Everyone wanted to 

do something now. Thus, concomitantly, the Joint Search and Rescue Center in Saudi Arabia 

launched Air Force HH-60 Pave Hawks and MH-53 Pave Lows simultaneously from different 

bases toward the crash site, but these helicopters were several hours away, and it was the height 

of winter in Afghanistan.

CPT Stan Rauch (pseudonym), the TF Dagger (Forward) operations offi cer, was attending a briefi ng at the TF Mountain TOC when he received a radio report that a U.S. Marine 

helicopter had crashed.81 JSOTF-North at K2 had tasked the 160th SOAR to do the CSAR 

mission. Factoring the possible antiaircraft artillery (AAA) threat, the altitude of the crash 

site, and the weather conditions, Rauch debated the best solution to quickly execute the 

search-and-rescue mission. He went straight to “Motel 6”—a bombed-out three-story building at the airfi eld that served as the Night Stalker communal sleeping, eating, and planning 

area. The previous night’s mission aircrews and medics were roused and alerted for the CSAR 

mission. Rauch brought CPT John Gates (pseudonym), the air mission commander (AMC), 

and CWO Christopher Gaines (pseudonym), the MH-47E lead pilot, to the special operations TOC where the staff was monitoring the situation.82 Gates and Rauch provided a quick 

estimate of the situation: the CSAR could require the use of special insertion techniques, a 

potential enemy threat existed, and the circumstances dictated the use of special operations 

troops as a quick-reaction force (QRF) because they were familiar with high-risk recoveries. 

The commander of the special operations force agreed with the assessment and approved using his men as the QRF.83

Meanwhile, the 160th SOAR aircrews and medics had already started their well-established routine in preparation for a short-notice mission. The pilots and aircrew members 

rushed to the flight line to get the two MH-47E Chinook helicopters ready for immediate departure. Aircraft mooring ropes and engine intake covers were removed, the side 

miniguns and light machine guns were loaded, and the flight data was entered into the 

cockpit computer systems. The flight medics carried their emergency medical kits aboard 

and strapped everything down. These medics are intimately familiar with operating in and 

around the helicopters. As graduates of the Special Operations Combat Medic Course, 

they were trained in advanced trauma treatment and provided life-sustaining care to combat-injured personnel as they were transported to higher levels of medical care.

Working together, the medics and aircrew members reconfi gured the helicopter interior 

with stanchion sets to accommodate litters on the left side of the aircraft. A Pro-Paq cardiac 

monitor, essential for monitoring vital signs in a noisy helicopter, and a medical bag with an 
231

assortment of medical supplies was placed immediately forward of the stanchion setup. Other 

medical life-support equipment included an oxygen bag and extra O2

 cylinder, emergency airway equipment and extra blankets, a hypothermia bag, a traction splint, and folded litters. CPT 

Kerry Regent (pseudonym), 2nd Battalion fl ight surgeon, and SFC Charles Lafayette (pseudonym), the senior fl ight medic, conducted fi nal operational checks of their equipment to ensure that everything was functioning properly.84 Forty minutes after being awakened from deep 

sleep, both MH-47Es were rigged, and the aircrews were ready to launch.

After CWO Gaines and CPT Gates discussed the in extremis plan (what to do in a worstcase scenario like an aircraft shoot-down) with the ground force, radio frequencies and call 

signs were confi rmed, and the group headed to the fl ight line. By this time, 10th Mountain 

had sent its infantry QRF down to the fl ight line. The two groups converged at the ramps of 

the Chinooks as the helicopter blades began to rotate. Then a 5th SFG ODA arrived to act as 

the QRF. Neither was aware of the other being tasked to perform the mission. The issue was 

quickly resolved by the TF Bowie commander and CPT Gates. Orders were given to the pilots, 

and the Special Forces QRF boarded the helicopters. Just before liftoff, CPT Thompson, the 

U.S. Marine pilot, ran up to the lead helicopter. Realizing the benefi ts of having her accompany 

the mission, Gates invited her aboard. She quickly provided details and verifi ed the location of 

the crash site on an aerial map.85

At 0950, 90 minutes after being alerted, the two MH-47Es departed the airfi eld. CPT Gates 

initially intended to fl y to the coordinates of the crash site, identify the wreckage, assess the 

enemy situation, grab any survivors, and get out as quickly as possible. After talking with the 

AWACS, CWO Gaines was passed to the fi ghter aircraft en route to the site. Both the helicopters and the jet fi ghters arrived at the site almost simultaneously—for the MH-47Es that 

was just 17 minutes from Bagram. The fi ghter pilots observed no enemy in the area. As the 

Chinooks circled the site, the crew members spotted an SOS stamped out in the snow. Gates 

felt that the helicopter probably crashed because of mechanical problems but remained cautious. Since both helicopters were carrying identical mixes of medics and security forces, Gates 

directed the trail Chinook to land fi rst while his helicopter remained aloft to coordinate with 

the MC-130P tankers, fi ghters, and Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) in Saudi Arabia to 

recall the other CSAR assets.86

CWO Curtis Jameson (pseudonym) landed his helicopter 50 feet to the left of the crash 

site near the wrecked fuselage.87 Manning the miniguns, the Chinook crew quickly scanned 

the wreckage site for any potential threat. The crash was horrible, and the area surrounding it 

looked like a mass casualty training exercise. The valley fl oor was covered with 2 feet of old 

snow. In stark contrast to the snow were grotesque charred and blackened chunks of the cabin. 

The broken rotor blades stuck up from the ground like obscene memorials. About 30 feet beyond was an unidentifi able section of the cockpit that had broken off on impact and had not 

caught on fi re. Nothing of the wreckage was taller than 3 feet high.

The small group of survivors was spotted off to one side of the carnage. Marine CPT Douglas Glasgow (pseudonym) had dragged his copilot and three other crewmen out of the burning 

wreckage. As Glasgow got the living out, he gathered them in a tight circle. One deceased 

crewman was spotted some distance away from the aircraft; another was still wedged in the 

wreckage. Having done this, Glasgow stamped out SOS in the snow.88
232

The QRF rushed to secure the crash site. After a few minutes passed, in which the dazed 

marines stared at the rescue party and the aircrew stared at them, SFC Lafayette grabbed his 

aid bag and ran off to the Chinook to get things moving on the ground. A slightly dazed CPT 

Glasgow walked over to the aircraft and climbed the ramp. Dr. Regent directed him to a seat 

on the right side and began examining him. The four other survivors were brought aboard in 

litters. Each had a variety of injuries: one had a possible hip injury, one had chest injuries, another had a broken femur, and the last had lower back injuries. The “trauma room” aboard the 

MH-47E was put into operation. While the Pro-Paq provided vital signs, oxygen was administered, splints applied, and blankets wrapped about the injured men. Aircrew members stripped 

off some of their outer clothing to warm the patients. With the injured protected in the other 

aircraft, CWO Gaines landed. The QRF disembarked with the “jaws of life” and other tools to 

recover the dead crewman and increased the security around the helicopters.89

With the other Chinook on the ground and the fi ghter aircraft overhead, CWO Jameson 

lifted off to fl y the fi ve marine survivors back to Bagram at full speed. During the fl ight, Dr. 

Regent, Lafayette, and a QRF medic continued treating the injured. At the airfi eld, elements of 

the 244th Forward Surgical Team were standing by to receive the injured on the taxiway. Dr. 

Regent briefed the 244th surgeon on the condition of the patients as the medical response team 

hustled them into fi eld medical emergency rooms and took over medical care.90

Meanwhile, CWO Gaines departed the crash site with the deceased marines. There was no 

joy awaiting his aircraft when it landed, only the mortuary team waiting on the taxiway. As the 

aircrews left the fl ight line, Jameson and Gaines realized that only 3 hours had elapsed since 

they were awakened in “Motel 6.”91

According to a CENTCOM press release on 23 January 2002, FA-18s dropped precisionguided munitions on the remnants of the Marine Corps CH-53 to prevent pilfering and because 

it was unsalvageable. Although chastised by the JSRC in Saudi Arabia for not having the proper 

launch authority, fi ve U.S. Marines were saved by the decisive actions of a valiant few who 

were closest to the crisis, could respond quickly with the right resources, and acted while others 

debated whether they had the authority to act. Those fi ve marines were glad the Night Stalkers rescued them from the Afghan mountains in winter, especially since they had already been 

presumed killed in the crash.

Taking Down al-Qaeda at the Mir Wais Hospital

CPT Mel Pierce (pseudonym), with Special Forces ODA 524 and ODA 570, fl ew from 

K2 to Camp Rhino and boarded Marine Corps CH-53s to fl y into Sayd-Alim-Kalay, north of 

Kandahar, to replace ODA 574. ODA 574 had fallen victim to a fratricidal bombing while supporting Hamad Karzai and his forces.92 Two days later, Gul Agha Sherzai and his Pashtun forces 

drove into the “spiritual capital of the Taliban movement” from the south. Karzai and ODA 

524 soon followed, entering the city from the north and occupying the former palace of Mullah 

Omar, the head of the Taliban, who had escaped.93

Pierce and his detachment executive offi cer, CWO Doug Anton (pseudonym), refl ected on 

the current chain of command. Their 1st Battalion Special Forces ODA reported to an advanced 

operating base (AOB) of the 3rd Battalion, controlled by Forward Operating Base (FOB) 52, 
233

commanded by LTC Don Forsythe of 2nd Battalion. This was not an issue to ODA 524 because 

it was taking in the scope and suddenness of the military victory. The fall of the Taliban regime 

as a viable government had occurred exactly two months after the fi rst U.S. Air Force bombs 

began to fall in Afghanistan. But there were still viable pockets of enemy resistance, and in 

mid-December, LTC Forsythe ordered Pierce and his team to go after the al-Qaeda diehards 

that had holed up inside the Mir Wais Hospital in downtown Kandahar.94

As Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance collapsed in Kandahar, fi rst at the airport and then in 

the city, the leaders of both groups fl ed, and the able-bodied fi ghters abandoned the wounded 

as they withdrew. Local Afghan militia took a number of wounded al-Qaeda and Taliban to the 

Mir Wais Hospital for treatment. Nine of these “prisoners,” thought to be Saudis and Yemenis, 

mutinied and barricaded themselves on the second fl oor of the southeast wing of the huge hospital complex. The medical facility occupied an entire city block and was surrounded by a high 

adobe mud wall. After days of negotiations, one of the al-Qaeda had surrendered and another 

killed himself using a hand greande. That left seven inside the hospital.95

The most compelling reason to remove the terrorists was because their presence prevented 

the Afghan women from gaining access to the obstetrics clinic. The female clinic was located 

on the ground fl oor of the wing where the armed diehards had barricaded themselves. To demonstrate his support for the women of the newly liberated city, Governor Sherzai wanted the 

al-Qaeda out. Forsythe directed CPT Pierce and ODA 524 to advise and train the Pashtun 

troops of Sherzai and Khan Mohammed on how to clear the building. Sherzai specifi ed that the 

American Special Forces soldiers were not to enter the hospital.96

On 20 December, as ODA 524 moved into position to observe from the corners of the walled 

compound, one of the al-Qaeda spotted it and alerted the others. Negotiations proved fruitless. 

About 2000, after dark, a 15-man Pashtun force began fi ring at the windows of the barricaded 

rooms that drew heated counterfi re. The exchange of fi re went on for a quarter hour and then 

ceased. The Pashtuns never entered the hospital. Throughout the exchange, the diehards constantly yelled “Jihad! Jihad!”97 The siege continued. After days of negotiations, two al-Qaeda had 

surrendered, one with a gangrenous leg and another had killed himself with a hand grenade. There 

were still six diehards inside. The American suggestion to “starve them out” failed when Taliban

sympathizers among the hospital staff continued to smuggle food and drink to the holdouts.98

About 20 January 2002, CPT Pierce, CWO Anton, and the members of ODA 524 recruited 

10 likely fi ghters from among Khan Mohammed’s troops without revealing the purpose. Sherzai 

contributed 10 of his better warriors for the undisclosed mission. For more than a week, the team, 

knowing the al-Qaeda in more than 30 days had “bunkered themselves in quite well,” trained 

the Afghans in urban warfare tactics and techniques that culminated in room-to-room fi ghting. 

Staying near Mullah Omar’s palace, they built a mock “shooting house” of bamboo poles and 

target cloth to practice assault and room-clearing skills, repeatedly drilling the Pashtuns to “do 

everything by rote.” “We didn’t tell them what we were training them for because secrecy was 

essential, and besides, we thought they’d run,” said Anton, the team’s executive offi cer.99

On the evening of 27 January 2002, the Americans told the “Joes,” as they had come to 

call the Afghans, that they were going to assault the Mir Wais Hospital in the morning. Shortly 

afterward, four of Khan Mohammed’s men disappeared into the night. “Still, we had enough 
234

fi ghters,” said CPT Pierce, “by taking the remaining six of Khan’s ‘Joes’ and picking the best 

fi ve of Sherzai’s men for the attack.” The ODA would ensure that the Afghan guards along the 

perimeter of the hospital let no one out. An American medical evacuation helicopter was standing by to assist if necessary.100 An Air Force tactical air controller (TAC) and a special tactics 

airman were attached to ODA 524. Additional Special Forces medics and military ambulances 

were staged out of sight several blocks away. At 0505 on 28 January, the assembled force waited 

alertly in the cold, clear, predawn darkness.101

CPT Pierce and his Pashtun assault force climbed silently over the west wall of the hospital 

compound and carefully moved to the hallway connecting the north and south wings of the Hshaped main medical building. At the exterior doorway to the hallway, they clipped off the padlock 

with bolt cutters. Then, Pierce and his senior weapons sergeant, SSG Jim Hall (pseudonym), stealthily led the 11 Pashtun “Joes” into the attack position, a room off the bottom of the stairs that led to 

the southeast wing corridor. Right behind them was the demolition team—two Special Forces engineer sergeants and two explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) specialists—carrying high-explosive 

door-breaching charges. The Special Forces medics, SFC Robert Staunton (pseudonym), and SSG 

Robards (pseudonym) trailed the group. The breaching team and snipers occupied a room opposite 

the Joes at the bottom of the stairs while the medics set up in the fi rst-fl oor lobby area.

At 0555, the American breachers and snipers moved silently upstairs. Trailing the demolition team, CWO Anton and SFC Jack Kittridge (pseudonym), armed with sniper rifl es, turned 

in the opposite direction at the top of the stairs and moved to a room in the northeast wing, opposite the rooms that the six al-Qaeda had barricaded. Anton and Kittridge adjusted the sights 

on their weapons using a laser range fi nder to verify the distance across the open courtyard 

between the wings—65 meters exactly. Meanwhile, outside on the compound south wall, MSG 

Mike Huffman (pseudonym), ODA 524 team sergeant, and the Air Force TAC covered the 

southern side of the target with telescope-equipped M-4 carbines.102

The time had arrived to end the deadlock. The breaching team carefully placed its preshaped 

charges against the door that closed off the corridor to the al-Qaeda rooms. Then, the two Special 

Forces sergeants “tamped” (covered) the explosives with sandbags to protect the assault team. 

This tamping would direct most of the explosive force into the door area.103 On CPT Pierce’s signal, the demolition team detonated the explosive charges. Verifi cation that a successful breach had 

been made delayed the “Joes’” assault through the man-sized hole. The al-Qaeda defenders had 

time to recover before the assaulters charged into the dark corridor. Two hand grenades exploded 

immediately, and then deafening and continuous gunfi re resounded in the darkness. The Pashtun 

assaulters began screaming for the medics. The al-Qaeda, fi ring down the tiled hallway, retreated 

into a single room on the south side of the wing. When the fi ring died down, the American Special 

Forces soldiers dispatched Pashtuns to retrieve the wounded. The assault force retreated downstairs carrying their six wounded. The wounded were triaged, treated, and prepared for evacuation. 

The most seriously wounded were sent to Kandahar Air Base to the fi eld surgical team.

Having abandoned the breach point, the remaining Pashtuns were unwilling to go back 

upstairs to prevent the al-Qaeda from escaping into another area of the hospital. SFC Staunton 

and SSG Robards moved to cover the opening while the ODA leaders sought guidance about 

the next assault. During the 3-hour gap between assaults, CW3 Carl Patterson (pseudonym) 
235

tried to “smoke them out” using a thermite grenade to ignite the bed sheeting scattered in the 

hallway.104 The fi re and acrid smoke spread throughout the enemy-held area, and movement was 

detected by the sniper team outside. When one of the al-Qaeda holdouts leaned out a window 

to gasp for air, MSG Huffman on the south wall killed him with a single shot. The number of 

effectives barricaded inside was reduced to fi ve. CW2 Aaron (pseudonym), an Arabic speaker, 

futilely attempted to negotiate with the remaining holdouts.105

The Special Forces soldiers prepared for a second assault, but the few Pashtuns left showed 

little interest. A contingent of Kandahar police volunteered to clear the rooms after the Americans initiated the assault with a volley of hand grenades. SFC Staunton volunteered to launch 

the grenade assault overwatched by CW3 Mike Fontaine (pseudonym) and two others. CW3 

Patterson got the police into position and orchestrated the attack. Grenades launched, the Afghan police rushed into the fi rst room, discovered the al-Qaeda, and were driven out by a heavy 

volume of small-arms fi re. They immediately exited the area and withdrew down the stairs. No 

amount of coaxing by CW3 Patterson could convince them to go back.

With no other recourse, SFC Staunton, covered by CW3 Fontaine, inched down the smokey corridor to the edge of the doorway where the al-Qaeda were barricaded.106 Staunton’s fi rst 

attempt to get a grenade into the room was caught by an al-Qaeda fi ghter who tossed it back 

outside the room. Staunton and the other two American assaulters managed to reach cover in 

an adjacent room before it detonated. Having run out of grenades, the holdouts threw chunks 

of masonry into the corridor. In the murky area, the Americans initially thought that they were 

grenades and retreated into a room. After that, SFC Staunton allowed his grenades to “cook 

off ” before throwing them low inside the room and through an air vent. After both had detonated, Staunton fi red a 5.56mm magazine into the strongpoint, reloaded, and then charged into 

the room, shooting the remaining al-Qaeda. His two backup men ensured that all were dead.

When the fi ring stopped, the remaining Pashtun fi ghters and Kandahar police stormed into 

the corridor, fi ring their rifl es into all the rooms, but the fi ght was already over. All six terrorists were dead. As they had publicly declared, the six al-Qaeda had fought to the death, the last 

two fi ring from behind the stacked bodies of their dead comrades. None of the Americans were 

injured. Before the combined American-Afghan force could depart the premises, the Mir Wais 

medical staff had already begun assessing what needed to be done to return the facility to full 

operation.107 Almost seven hours after they had started, CPT Pierce reported that the hospital 

was clear of enemy fi ghters. The nearly 50-day siege had been ended by American Special 

Forces soldiers and Afghan militia. By mid-afternoon, U.S. Army CA tactical teams were en 

route to coordinate repairs at the Mir Wais Hospital.108

The Raid at Hazar Qadam

As the hunt for Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda leadership continued through winter 2001-2002, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) directed a discrete intelligence-gathering mission that required the long-range reconnaissance and surveillance and urban warfare 

close-quarters battle skills of A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG (A-1-5).109 This mission was 

referred to as a sensitive site exploitation (SSE), and it called for the focused search and recovery of enemy personnel, documents, manuals, monies, computers, communications equipment, 

explosives, weaponry, and related materials that might be of intelligence value.110
236

Figure 24. Ground mobility vehicles (GMVs) ready for action.

A-1-5, commanded by MAJ Jon West (pseudonym), was specifi cally trained, equipped, and 

organized for this type of mission. It was available to the CENTCOM commander for particularly diffi cult long-range reconnaissance and surveillance and direct-action (DA) missions—raids 

and surgical strikes—most often in urban or builtup areas. All unit members were highly trained 

in close-quarters, room-to-room fi ghting; long-range surveillance; and sniping.111

Since December 2001, A-1-5 had conducted three SSE missions with marked success. 

Surprise was so complete and execution so rapid that only two shots had been fi red in all three 

missions—both as warning shots that prompted immediate surrenders. The company captured 

nine al-Qaeda suspects (detainees); destroyed several tons of weapons and ammunition; and 

made valuable intelligence fi nds, including satellite telephones, tape recordings. and encrypted 

electronic records.112

On 9 January 2002, the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) of U.S. 

CENTCOM issued another SSE order to Commodore Robert Harward, commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force–South (JSOTF-South), then based at Kandahar Airport.113 JSOTFSouth was tasked to conduct an SSE of two suspected al-Qaeda compounds at Hazar Qadam 

near the town of Oruzgan, 166 km northeast of Kandahar in Oruzgan Province. The SSE mission, designated “AQ-048,” was to kill or capture any Taliban or al-Qaeda personnel and collect material for intelligence analysis.114

The intelligence staff at CENTCOM identifi ed the two target sites to the CFLCC. Each 

walled compound contained a collection of various-size buildings. The buildings were surrounded by orchards and farm fi elds, and the two sites were 1.5 km apart. When the photo 

interpreters suggested that there might be women and children in the compounds, a “kinetic 

strike” (aerial bombardment) was ruled out, and ground raids were directed. Because of the size 

and complexity of the two sites, target-designated AQ-048, Harward selected A-1-5 for the SSE 

mission and attached a New Zealand unit.115

West decided he would seize both sites simultaneously and divided his company into two 

assault forces. The New Zealand troops were designated the quick-reaction force (QRF). West 

would lead Special Forces ODAs 512, 513, and 514 in the assault of the western site, named 

Objective Kelly. The eastern compound, named Objective Brigid, would be the target for ODAs 

511 and 516, led by the company operations offi cer, CWO Dwight Ashford (pseudonym). Each 
237

force would have radio operators, explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) experts, interpreters, 

and FBI agents attached. The FBI agents selected those detainees they wanted for questioning 

and assumed “chain of custody” for evidence collected to ensure admissibility in any subsequent legal proceedings. If necessary, they would also serve as government witnesses so that 

A-1-5 soldiers would not be required to return to the United States to testify in court (per posse 

comitatus rules).116

To avoid establishing operational patterns in their SSE missions, MAJ West arranged for 

night helicopters to infi ltrate the assault forces into separate remote landing zones (LZs) that 

were several kilometers away from their objectives. The high mountain valley LZs were hidden from Hazar Qadam by intervening ridges that masked the sound of the helicopters as they 

fl ew nap-of-the-earth (NOE) routes that skimmed along the bottom of valleys and popped 

over passes. After landing, Ashford’s mobile force, wearing night-vision goggles (NVG), would 

drive 6 km on a dirt road to Objective Brigid in two heavily armed high-mobility multipurpose 

wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), or ground mobility vehicles (GMVs).117 West’s three Special 

Forces teams, also wearing NVG, would walk 5 km around a mountain peak to approach their 

target, Objective Kelly.118

The CFLCC wanted surveillance teams to have “eyes on the target” AQ-048 well ahead of 

the raids, in part, to confi rm the presence of noncombatants (women and children) at the two 

sites. But three attempts by Marine Corps CH-46 helicopters to infi ltrate a long-range reconnaissance element failed. The fi rst attempt failed because of aircraft mechanical problems, 

the second failed because of heavy icing on the helicopter, and the third aborted on landing 

when the blowing snow whiteout obscured the LZ. During the 17 January video teleconference 

(VTC), the CENTCOM J3 restated his desire to execute the SSE mission AQ-048, and the 

CFLCC ordered the mission to proceed without preliminary surveillance of the target sites.119

Continuous changes because of helicopter availability and priorities delayed the mission 

until the night of 22 January. The Kelly force launched from Kandahar and landed at its offset 

Figure 25. A/1/5 SFG uses an “up” armored HMMWV GMV.
238

LZ. In the meantime, while fl ying to Kandahar to pick up the Brigid force, the Bagram-based 

helicopter pilots reported marginal weather near Hazar Qadam that was becoming worse. Based 

on their estimate, Commodore Harward, commander, JSOTF-South, decided to postpone the 

AQ-048 mission for 24 hours. Thus, under a bright moon with broken clouds and Fahrenheit 

temperatures in the low teens, the Kelly force marched back to its initial LZ for extraction, and 

the AC-130 Spectre gunship already en route to support the raid returned to Masirah Island, off 

the coast of Oman.120

The next night, the weather was clear, and the mission was launched again. This time, two 

Marine Corps CH-53s carried West’s 45-man dismounted force to its insertion LZ.121 Three 

MH-47Es from the 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, transported Ashford’s mobile force. Two Chinooks carried a GMV and its driver inside while the third ferried the 26 soldiers who would ride 

the trucks to Objective Brigid.122

After a quiet tactical march and slow drive under NVG across terrain 7,000 feet above sea 

level at 17 degrees Fahrenheit, the two assault forces arrived at their preassault positions right 

on schedule. Maintaining close communications, the two forces simultaneously moved their 

security elements into position. A deep irrigation ditch just outside the wall of Brigid forced 

the assaulters to dismount and approach their entry points on foot. The vehicle drivers and gun 

teams aboard began hastily searching for a way to bypass or cross the deep ditch. To execute 

both “hits” simultaneously, CWO Ashford would assault without the backup heavy weapons 

from his GMVs. Understanding the situation, MAJ West proceeded.

Having received an “up” from all elements, signifying their readiness to attack, both assault 

leaders initiated their attacks according to a well-rehearsed sequence of commands: “Stand by 

. . . I have control. Five, four, three, two, one—Execute!” The three breaching charges on the 

three entry points were detonated on “Execute,” and the assault elements positioned to the side 

of each entry point stormed into the compound. Within minutes, the assault teams at Kelly had 

Figure 26. Elements of the Kelly force aboard a Marine Corps CH-53. 
239

physically overpowered two dozen enemy fi ghters in the 10 buildings on the compound. One 

enemy fi ghter, fi ring his weapon from a doorway, wounded SSG Jesse Wilcox (pseudonym) in 

the right foot. As the enemy fi ghter backed out of the building, spraying bullets into the darkness, a security team killed him. An enemy sentry was killed when he fi red on the assaulters 

from outside the compound. These were the only two enemy fatalities at Objective Kelly.123

At Objective Brigid, a guard opened fi re when he spotted Ashford’s assault teams as they 

ran through the main gate of the compound to their breach points. His alarm shots started fi refi ghts as the assaulters fought their way across the courtyard and into the main building. Once 

inside, it was close-quarters combat from room to room, and the resistance was sharp. Having 

initially stunned the enemy fi ghters in the room with fl ash-bang grenades, the assaulters killed 

fi ve enemy fi ghters as two escaped out windows. When MSG Albert Payle and SFC Jon Hsu 

(pseudonyms) burst into another room, an enemy fi ghter ran out right between them. Hsu spun 

about and pursued him, shooting him down before he could escape. Alone and wearing NVG, 

Payle faced three enemy fi ghters surrounding him in the darkened room. He quickly killed two 

of them with his M-4 carbine before the third jumped him from behind, clawing at his eyes. 

Payle, using combat jiu-jitsu, threw the enemy soldier over his shoulder, sharply snapping the 

man’s head to one side. In the darkness, Payle felt the enemy fi ghter, even with a broken neck, 

still grasping at him. Payle drew his 9mm pistol and fi red twice, fi nally fi nishing his opponent. 

As he started to move, Payle realized that his opponent was still hanging on him, his hand 

having been caught in his body armor during their struggle. Not all fought so violently or so 

stubbornly. In the next room, a single enemy fi ghter dropped his rifl e when assaulters charged 

in and was readily subdued and fl ex-cuffed.124

In the courtyard, after killing several defenders, the outside assault team was under heavy 

rifl e and machine gun fi re from more enemy fi ghters hiding in a pile of rubble adjacent to the 

main building. Just as things were getting tense, the two heavily armed HMMWVs wheeled 

into the compound with their M-2 .50-caliber machine gun and MK-19 40mm grenade launcher.125 This heavy fi repower quickly silenced the enemy behind the rubble heap.

But the fi ghting was not over, even after Brigid was thought to have been secured. CWO 

Ashford’s Pashto-speaking interpreter, Marine Corps CPL Colin Bermann (pseudonym), had 

come inside the main building to examine some documents. While Bermann was reading the 

papers with his small penlite, an enemy fi ghter, who was thought to be dead, quietly got up from 

the dirt fl oor and attacked Bermann with his bare hands. The surprised Bermann managed to 

shove his assailant away, and he and an assaulter killed him with their M-4 carbines.126

With the mission complete at Objective Brigid, Ashford sent a survey team to mark the 

nearby LZ before he radioed for the waiting helicopters to extract his force. The team reported 

back that the primary LZ was unusable and suggested the alternate site. However, the walled 

farmhouse next to it had not been checked, cleared, and secured. Ashford told ODA 516 to 

clear the building. The Special Forces team applied an explosive breaching charge to the wall 

and blew an entry way into the small yard. Inside the farmhouse, they found a family huddled 

together, frightened by the gunfi re and explosions. The assaulters moved them into a windowless room for safety and continued to clear the area.

ODA 516’s actions refl ected the professionalism and character of the A-1-5 soldiers. 
240

Minutes before, the detachment was fi ghting close quarters with the enemy in the freezing 

darkness. Then, a helmeted masked assaulter was patiently leading a little girl by her hand to 

her family. The unit’s reputation had preceded it: The farmer’s wife had been hysterical until 

the assaulters identifi ed themselves as Ameriki. With that one word, the woman regained her 

composure and quietly guided her children to the safe area.127

At Objective Kelly, West knew the operation was a success, as defi ned by his orders. They 

had taken 27 detainees; confi rmed 16 dead enemy fi ghters; seized radios and documents; and 

were about to demolish antiaircraft cannons, mortars, and other weapons and munitions.128 The 

AC-130 Spectre gunships overhead that had covered their assault would cannonade the materiel 

the unit could not destroy. The entire operation had been completed in less than two hours, but 

MAJ West had an inkling of trouble.

Figure 27. Weapons captured during a Hazar Qadam raid.

As the Kelly force consolidated on its objective, an assaulter brought West a fl ag of the new 

Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) that he found during a search of the site. As the shooting died 

down at Objective Brigid, CWO Ashford radioed West that one of his assault force found an 

Afghan national fl ag inside the compound gate. West immediately radioed the JSOTF-South, 

requesting that CENTCOM provide confi rmation that there were no “friendlies” at Hazar Qadam before he ordered the destruction of the captured arms and munitions. The reply was, “No, 

there are no ‘friendlies’ at that site.” As it turned out, this was not quite correct.129
241

The intelligence that indicated Hazar Qadam (AQ-048) was a Taliban or al-Qaeda site 

proved to be dated. It seemed that the Afghan fi ghters at Hazar Qadam had crossed over to the 

new AIA government two weeks before the raid. Afghan offi cials had not reported this. Soon 

afterward, the Washington Post reported, “U.S. Was Misled in Deadly Raid.”130 Controversy 

was further exacerbated when the 24/7 news media published the unsubstantiated “eyewitness 

accounts” of Afghans who claimed to have been present during the attacks. They accused the 

American soldiers of atrocities against “unarmed farmers.” Anti-American elements had easily 

duped the 24/7 international news media. The fabricated stories were all eventually disproved, 

but while the offi cial investigation was still under way, the New York Times headlined the CENTCOM commander’s remarks: “After January Raid, GEN Franks Promises to Do Better.”131

For MAJ West and his men, there was no explanation for the obsolete intelligence at 

CENTCOM that directed the SSE on AQ-048. The fact that the Afghan men at Hazar Qadam 

stood and fought, while during all other A-1-5 SSE missions the men simply surrendered or 

fl ed, was established. And the fact that the women in the compound at Hazar Qadam, without 

being told, instinctively held out their hands to be fl ex-cuffed demonstrated that this group had 

known the American SSE procedure for Taliban and al-Qaeda. MAJ West felt no regrets about 

his company’s actions at AQ-048. The Secretary of Defense personally defended A-1-5 after 

the raid: “It is no mistake at all,” said Donald Rumsfeld, “if you’re fi red on, to fi re back.”132 The 

rest, West knew, was to be expected when a foreign army was fi ghting a war in Afghanistan.133

The following special reconnaissance (SR) story explains the criticality of having “eyes on 

target” before conducting a direct-action (DA) mission. This had been done on all A-1-5 DA 

missions before Hazar Qadam. While diffi cult to accomplish successfully in the sparsely populated areas of Afghanistan, these SR teams showed how important their physical assessment 

was to the DA assault teams.

SR Eyes on Target

The possible sighting of Osama bin Laden at a safehouse near Shkin in early January 2002 

prompted CENTCOM to order a DA mission against the complex. Since DA in Afghanistan 

was a CJSOTF-South mission, the task fell to A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, at Kandahar 

Airport. The confi rmed presence of women and children ruled out a kinetic airstrike against the 

safehouse, an old Russian fort with outbuildings just 5.5 km from the Pakistani border. MAJ 

Jon West was ordered to send in an SR element on 8 January “to confi rm or deny the presence 

of al-Qaeda leadership and facilitate direct action.”134

Three surveillance and observation cells from Special Forces ODA 514 were to be inserted 

by MH-53M Pave Low IIIs that night. Two four-man cells were to be landed to the northwest 

and would move on foot to establish two separate observation posts (OPs). One three-man cell 

would be inserted west of the target and move on foot to set up an overwatch position south of 

the compound. While the Pave Lows inserted the soldiers at two LZs some 10 km north and 

south of the compound, there would be an AC-130 Spectre gunship overhead.

Wearing NVG, the foot movement to the OPs went slowly. Noise discipline was a major 

concern because sounds carried farther on the desolate terrain. The loose rocks made footing 
242

unstable and a stealthy approach diffi cult. The steep terrain reduced the men to crawling on 

their hands and knees at times, and the lack of oxygen at altitude heightened fatigue. It took the 

three groups almost six hours to move the 3 to 4 km to their OPs.

Hide sites were established on the crests of very high, steep ridgelines well above the grass 

line on the edge of inaccessible cliff faces at elevations above 2,500 meters. The Special Forces 

soldiers wanted to be above the “natural lines of drift followed by local goat herders and the 

children that often trailed along behind, playing and exploring.” Individual camoufl age was a 

combination of civilian duck-hunting blinds and “yetti nets” tied to natural vegetation by strips 

of brown burlap with sticks used to break up the outlines. Brown-gray schemes blended well 

with the bushes and rocks.

Figure 28. ODA 514 conducts SR in mountains of southern Afghanistan.
243

Once the early morning fog cleared in the valley, the compiled reports from the SR cells 

provided a remarkable sense of activity in and around the target complex. A well-used road led 

to an excavation where the inhabitants appeared to be mining. There were four tractors, including one with a front loader used to dig irrigation ditches. Children played freely in and around 

the compound. Except for goat herders on the mountain slopes, most civilian activity was 

confi ned to the valleys and lower mountain slopes. Most people lived inside compounds just 

northwest of Shkin. Generally, the locals were asleep with their lights out by 2100. Virtually all 

living areas had dogs that barked at the slightest noise or light source at night. At one point, a 

young girl, following the sheep and goats up the mountain, came within 75 meters of the OP in 

the south, but the team was not compromised.

Despite the benign appearance of the target complex, the OPs witnessed military activity. 

It was the only compound in the area where the occupants carried weapons openly. A three- to 

four-man armed patrol roamed about the area during the day, leaving one armed sentry inside 

the compound. The men all wore similar white Arabic robes in contrast to the herders and 

farmers who wore traditional Afghan clothing with turbans and scarves. Sentries were regularly 

posted and relieved, and there was an actual formation inside the compound one day. One night, 

a four-vehicle convoy from the border patrolled around the compound before stopping for several hours 400 meters to the east. Every night, vehicle traffi c back and forth across the border 

got heavy as soon as it got dark.

On 10 January, a weather front swept through, dumping 11⁄2 inches of snow on the SR teams. 

Although the snow quickly melted, everyone was left wet and cold. After nearly 72 hours on the 

ground with most of their supplies gone, JSOTF-South had to either conduct the DA mission or 

replace the SR teams. CENTCOM believed that it was a likely meeting place for some of the 

key enemy leaders, and it did not want to jeopardize that opportunity by being premature with 

DA. The decision was to change out ODA 514 with ODA 515 the next evening.

The rotation took place at 2030, despite the MH-53M Pave Low III having diffi culty fi nding the southern LZ marked by a chemlite “buzzsaw” until an infrared strobe light was used. 

Special Forces ODA 515 set up two OPs, one 7 km west of the target and the other 3.7 km 

south. It took the two groups almost three hours to reach their positions undetected.

On 12 January, SFC Rocky Salvadorini (pseudonym) had a kidney stone attack. When the 

valium that followed the ibuprofen produced no relief, SFC Slater (pseudonym), the team medic, started morphine to deal with the excruciating pain. This medical emergency threatened to 

compromise the target. MAJ West, company commander; CPT Bill Hall (pseudonym), battalion physician assistant; SFC Slater; and SFC Salvadorini “huddled” on Iridium telephones for 

a medical consultation. Despite the pain, the condition was not “life threatening.” Salvadorini 

wanted to stay put. West agreed to keep him on the target another 24 hours until the DA strike; 

they had invested four days of SR on the target already. The opportunity came the next day.135

On 13 January, CENTCOM misinterpreted an ODA 515 report of 10 to 15 vehicles coming 

and going in the area around the target as a congregation at the target. The belief that this accumulation of vehicles signaled the arrival of a high-value target (HVT) prompted the order for 

a “kinetic” airstrike followed by a DA team to exploit the hit. The JSOTF-South staff scrambled 

to prepare as Commodore Harward looked at the new HVT target proposed by Tampa. It was 
244

the Shkin target. Harward called the chief of operations at CENTCOM to say that he had strong 

reservations about the “kinetic” airstrike because he had surveillance on the target for the past 

four days. No vehicles had congregated there, but there were defi nitely women and children on 

the target. The airstrike was canceled less than 30 minutes before it was to be executed. Having 

averted a near disaster, Harward ordered A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, to execute the DA 

mission. Ten days later, the lack of SR eyes on target on the Hazar Qadam complex caused a 

well-executed DA mission to get international media attention from action-starved correspondents in Afghanistan.

The Shkin compound proved to be an intelligence coup based on the value of seven detainees, the wealth of documents, and arms and munitions. Captured were eight RPGs with 30 

rockets, 12 assault rifl es, a complete 81mm mortar, .51-cal DshK heavy machine gun, Eastern 

bloc NVG, binoculars, bin Laden posters, identity cards and passports, heroin with syringes, 

photos and documents, and 200,000 Pakistani rupees as well as Afghan currency. The explosive 

ordnance demolition (EOD) team used 65 pounds of explosives to destroy the weapons and 

munitions. More important, there were 14 women and 17 children in the target complex that 

the day before had been marked for a “kinetic” airstrike.

Throughout the DA mission, the SR teams from ODA 515 provided overwatch and early 

warning as well as security. SFC Salvadorini was evacuated with the southern OP team when 

the assault teams left. The western OP stayed behind to observe responses to the DA mission. 

When they were compromised by curious villagers the next day, the Special Forces soldiers 

were exfi ltrated to Jacobabad, Pakistan, by a Pave Low III that night. It was a major success for 

the SR teams that, despite a changeover of ODAs to extend the coverage, they were not compromised until after the DA mission had been completed, and their presence had prevented a 

disaster on 13 January.

While not as exciting as a Special Forces DA or SR mission, the experiences of a tactical 

PYSOP team (TPT) in the Kandahar area varied from emergency medical care to serving as 

a combat multiplier on a sensitive mission. TPT 911 was part of Tactical PSYOP Detachment 

(TPD) 910, A Company, 9th POB from Fort Bragg. It performed both of the following missions 

within two weeks of arriving in Afghanistan.

From EMT to Special Forces Force Multiplier

TPD 910 was alerted to deploy to Kandahar Air Base on 10 January 2002. The 8th POB, 

the PSYOP task force (JPOTF), provided an intelligence brief and a cultural and target audience overview as well as packages of PSYOP products on diskettes. TPD 910 (12 personnel), 

plus four augmentees from 3rd POB (a print specialist, electronic maintenance specialist, communications sergeant, and a graphic illustrator), departed Fort Bragg on 20 January. One TPT 

assistant team leader had a family emergency en route and was replaced by the electronic 

maintenance specialist.

When TPD 910 arrived at Kandahar Air Base on 24 January 2002, with its four HMMWVs, 

it was attached to the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. TPT 913 (with driver/gunner = 

three personnel) described the facilities as quite primitive. It would be four weeks before showers were available. Latrines consisted of 55-gallon drums that were burned off daily by detailed 
245

troops. The single fi eld mess served one hot meal a day, and it was just the basics. Meals, ready 

to eat (MREs) suffi ced for the other meals. Bottled water was fl own in. Having made arrangements with the local offi cials to hire interpreters, the TPTs started making rounds in their assigned sectors the second day in Afghanistan to gain support for the coalition forces. The teams 

attracted attention by simply playing Afghan music in the remote villages because most had 

no electricity. Initial broadcast efforts were directed toward mine awareness, support for the 

coalition forces, and keeping the Afghans away from the Kandahar Airport fence and the 101st 

Airborne Division perimeter defensive positions.

Figure 29. PSYOP leafl et warning about unexploded ordnance.

Within days, the local gunfi re outside the camp was reduced. At fi rst, the TPTs went afi eld 

with one vehicle to present the smallest possible “footprint,” as recommended by TPT 930 

that had supported the 5th SFG in November 2001. It distributed more than 100 portable radios 

in the various villages. The 101st Rakkasans created military information support team packages, combining military police, CA, counterintelligence, and PSYOP personnel. The Rakkasans 

envisioned such a support team assisting each battalion. The counterintelligence element was 

later dropped because the personnel proved counterproductive.
246

On Super Bowl Sunday, 4 February 2002, 12 days after TPT 913 arrived at Kandahar, 

SGT Mitchell Dennison, SP4 Dale Stevenson, SP4 Ike Monroe (pseudonyms), and an interpreter were driving to Kowantarkali when they encountered a young boy in the middle of the 

dirt road.136 Dennison thought he should give him a copy of their mine-awareness fl yer. The 

boy handed the fl yer back. He immediately became frantic and spoke rapidly. The interpreter 

said that a man from the nearby village had just stepped on a land mine. Concerned about an 

ambush, Dennison reported the incident to the detachment before investigating. The PSYOP 

sergeant stopped the HMMWV alongside a dry fi eld and carefully got out of the truck (the fi eld 

had obviously been mined) as three Afghans drove the injured man up in a tractor.

The man was mangled, with visible chunks blown out of his thighs, calves, ankles, and 

wrists. He was obviously the victim of a mine. Monroe requested a medical evacuation helicopter, explaining the seriousness of the injury while Dennison began performing fi rst aid, 

Figure 31. Broadcasting music outside an Afghan village.

Figure 30. PSYOP loudspeaker HMMWVs traveling in pairs.
247

applying pressure bandages with fi eld dressings from the combat lifesaver bag. It seemed that 

the Rakkasan medical evacuation helicopter was responding to an AMF soldier who had been 

shot near Kandahar, and the newly arrived aircrews were not familiar with the area.

“It was really, really bad. It was the fi rst time I had ever been around so much blood in my 

life,” said Dennison. Still, the sergeant believed that he could keep the man alive for 30 minutes, 

the time it should take a convoy with an ambulance to get there from the airfi eld. “Every time I 

applied a bandage and stopped the bleeding in one place, the locals would pull back the man’s 

robe and show me a bigger wound to cover. After using all my fi eld dressings, I began cutting 

off the bottom of the local villagers’ robes to use as bandages. All in all, I used about 15 “ties” 

and all the splints on him because he was in bad shape. I tried to give him an IV, but he had bled 

out to the point that when I inserted the needle and missed his vein, he never bled when I pulled 

it out,” Dennison said.

The man had already been waiting for more than half an hour when TPT 913 came along. 

“I couldn’t give him water, so I wet part of my tee shirt to revive him while I worked on him. 

I talked with him and had the locals do the same, encouraging him. Throughout this effort, I 

was unarmed and surrounded by about 20 Afghans watching me work. I managed to stabilize 

him and keep him alive for almost an hour and a half, but it was 1 hour, 45 minutes before the 

convoy called from Shanendour, which was about 3 “clicks” (kilometers) away. Because none 

of the Rakkasans were familiar with the area, SSG Nolan Ward (pseudonym) from TPT 933 

volunteered to lead the convoy into the village.

By the time the convoy with an ambulance and medics arrived, the man had already died. 

The locals said a prayer and took the body to the center of town. TPT 913 followed in its truck. 

“It made me feel really bad that the guy died, despite everyone reminding me that I was not a 

doctor. It was a pretty memorable experience for me, and one I’ll never forget,” said Dennison. 

“We helped the villagers dig the grave because he had to be buried by sundown according to 

custom, and we joined them in fi nal prayers at the burial. All in all, this effort created great 

rapport with the local villagers. Until then, they had had very limited contact with Americans. 

Now, every time we return the people will remember what we did for them that day.”

Figure 32. People long remember the good others do for them and for their children.

Before deploying to Kosovo, SGT, then PFC, Dennison attended the Combat Lifesaver 

Course at Fayetteville Tech as part of the company’s overseas preparation training. A retired 
248

Army Special Forces medic, SGM Jim Messenger, taught combat lifesaving. Basically, the 

course taught soldiers how to keep someone alive on the battlefi eld—the necessary steps to 

treat a casualty encountered in battle. Realizing that he needed more training, Dennison went 

through the course again. SGM Messenger said then, “Dennison, God forbid if you ever have 

to treat a casualty.” Without the pressure of life and death it was easy to make a mistake on a 

dummy. TPT 913’s experience caused TPD 910 to change its operating procedures because it 

showed that “anything could happen out there.” With one man on the vehicle weapon, another 

operating the radio, and the third doing lifesaving, the TPT had been “maxed out.” “There had 

been mines all over the place.” From that day on, the 910 TPTs operated with two vehicles and 

more personnel.

Within days of SGT Dennison’s combat lifesaving experience with an Afghan mine victim 

in a remote village, his TPT was tasked to support a Special Forces team conducting an HVT 

mission. Dennison and SPC Stevenson (pseudonym) rehearsed with the Special Forces team 

and coalition forces and then boarded helicopters for a night assault on a high-mountain target 

in the vicinity of Bagram. There was 11⁄2 feet of snow on the ground when Stevenson began 

his message broadcasts to stop the fi ring in the village. As the helicopters left, they blew snow 

everywhere, creating a virtual snowstorm. The purpose for the mission was explained, and the 

villagers were told to stay inside until the search was complete. At daybreak, the loudspeaker 

script was changed to keep the curious villagers away while the Special Forces personnel accumulated the weapons, munitions, and equipment seized for removal. What could not be lifted 

out was prepared for destruction onsite. The broadcasted warnings ensured the safety of the 

villagers. That night, as the group was extracted, TPT 913 kept the villagers away from the LZ 

and was the last to board the helicopters. Afterward, the team praised the PSYOP soldiers for 

their professionalism and for demonstrating that they were truly force multipliers.

While the fi ght to eliminate the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan continued, ARSOF 

was working with Pakistan. Pakistan had agreed to block its border against fl eeing Taliban and 

al-Qaeda and had captured a quantity of the enemy fi ghters. As a border country, Pakistan had 

become the home of thousands of Afghan refugees. The following stories explain what Army 

Special Forces and CA soldiers were doing in that country to support America’s war on global 

terrorism and the dilemma of military uniforms versus mufti in the combat zones.

Politics, War, and Rapport

Politically sensitive missions are common for Army Special Forces. On 7 December 2001, 

the JSOTF-North commander gave ODB 560 a mission that was extremely politically sensitive. 

Within days, the Detachment B commander, MAJ Mike Ryan (pseudonym), was in Islamabad, 

Pakistan, meeting with the CENTCOM liaison offi cer, BG Ronald Sams; Pakistani army plans 

offi cer MG Farooq Ahmad Khan; and U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy J. Chamberlin.137

ODB 560 arrived at K2, Uzbekistan, in late November. Three of MAJ Ryan’s SF ODAs had 

fl own directly from Jordan, and another had come from Kosovo where it had been engaged in 

other missions. As soon as they arrived, two Special Forces teams were assigned to be a quickreaction force (QRF). Ryan was being briefed on yet another mission. Pakistan was concerned 

that al-Qaeda and Taliban fi ghters were fl eeing across the border and was evaluating where to 
249

best stop the fl ow. President Pervez Musharraf requested U.S. support to assist an interdiction 

effort. Ryan’s mission was to assess the situation: how serious were the Pakistanis about interdiction, what exactly did the Pakistanis want, and what was required to support their objectives? 

The Pakistanis said they intended to deploy Special Service Group forces into the Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) along the northwest border. Potentially, U.S. Army Special 

Forces would serve in a combined QRF to stop the exodus.

The FATA was created by the British to effect control of the region through the tribal 

leaders. Subsequent Pakistani control over the region after 1948 was tenuous at best because 

many of the leaders refused to acknowledge government authority over the tribes. The matter 

was so volatile that Pakistan’s constitution specifi ed that no act of parliament or court ruling 

applied in the FATA unless the president declared it to be and then only after consulting with 

the tribal leaders.138 FATA tribal militia patrolled the northwest border, thus for Musharraf 

to deploy forces into the region would be an exceptionally delicate undertaking. Fortunately, 

Ryan and MSG Aaron Watson (pseudonym), from his team, had worked with the Pakistan 

Special Service Group previously and knew the unit capabilities as well as some of the soldiers. 

This experience proved immensely valuable because initial good rapport would enable the two 

forces to begin working together in harmony. With that potential diffi culty erased, Ryan had to 

ensure that U.S. military actions did not exacerbate the political diffi culties.

During the meeting with Ambassador Chamberlin, BG Sams, and MAJ Ryan, MG Farooq 

reminded the Americans that his government had requested U.S. military support in November 

2001, and nothing had come of that request. Based on that rebuff, the Pakistani chief of military 

operations wanted an immediate commitment. As the discussion developed, it became evident 

to Ryan that what Farooq wanted was U.S. airlift to emplace the QRF as a blocking force. The 

Pakistanis did not have the requisite air support, and U.S. aircraft would cut the QRF’s response 

time by half because the force was to be based at Zhob and Kohat. What Farooq outlined was 

feasible for Special Forces, and MAJ Ryan told this to COL Mulholland. Then, the JSOTFNorth commander and BG Sams had to decide its viability and importance to the overall war 

effort. It was up to Ryan to determine whether the two proposed QRF locations had airfi elds 

and secure facilities for his soldiers.

Several trips to Zhob and Kohat convinced Ryan that the QRF could be based at those 

locations and that there was adequate space for his ODAs to train the Special Service Group. 

An Army helicopter pilot and an Air Force lieutenant colonel agreed that both airplanes and 

helicopters could safely operate from the airfi elds. Until the 160th SOAR’s MH-47 Chinooks 

returned to the theater, Air Force MH-53 Pave Lows at Jacobabad, Pakistan, would be the QRF 

insertion helicopters. The 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB) would refuel at 

the two forward airfi elds.

Shortly before Christmas, two Special Forces ODAs deployed to Pakistan from K2 to support the mission. Ryan and his two teams immediately began a two-week training program for 

the Special Service Group. Training included loading and exiting aircraft, marksmanship, tactics, and using night-vision devices. Only the Pakistanis could order the QRF to be employed. 

Ryan ensured that procedures were established and how launching the QRF would be verifi ed. 

He also worked with the group commanders to select ambush positions in the border region.
250

ODB 560 left Pakistan in early March. Although the QRF mission was never executed, 

this Special Forces detachment made signifi cant contributions. Historically, relations between 

Pakistan and Afghanistan had been strained. As the only regional country to maintain relations 

with the Taliban, Pakistan’s geographical location was important to the war effort. Musharraf’s 

willingness to support the United States and the coalition nations against another Islamic border country posed potentially dire consequences for him, his country, and the war on terrorism. 

The political signifi cance of having two Special Forces ODAs and one ODB in Pakistan, along 

with Army helicopters and Air Force airplanes and helicopters, cannot be minimized. Still, the 

major difference between Army and Air Force special operations is that Special Forces soldiers 

were training Pakistani soldiers in an area that was traditionally off limits to the Pakistani 

army. MAJ Ryan fully understood the issue. “You mess this up and the Pakistanis could tell 

the United States to leave,” he said. The fact that American military forces remain in Pakistan 

is a tribute to the professionalism, diplomatic capabilities, and rapport-building skills that U.S. 

Army Special Forces soldiers brought to the battlefi eld.139

GTMO Bound

Ambassador Chamberlin had the challenging task of ensuring that President Musharraf 

remained committed to the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in neighboring Afghanistan. 

To assist the ambassador with the military aspects of the campaign, CENTCOM sent Air Force 

BG Ronald Sams with a liaison staff of 17 soldiers to Islamabad, one of whom was Army Special Forces LTC James Karnes (pseudonym). Their initial mission was to ensure that the fl ow 

of equipment and supplies from the United States to Pakistan that Musharraf had requested as 

quid pro quo for basing combat search and rescue (CSAR) forces in the country went uninterrupted. Sams and Karnes also coordinated U.S. airlift to support quick-reaction Pakistani military forces to block Taliban and al-Qaeda escaping across the mountainous border.140

However, in mid-December 2001, another sensitive mission became priority. Combat actions in Tora Bora led some 90 al-Qaeda fi ghters to fl ee Afghanistan and seek refuge in Pakistan. 

The al-Qaeda had been rounded up by Pakistani authorities and imprisoned. With the collapse 

of the Taliban regime, Pakistan wanted them out of the country. LTC Karnes got the mission. 

The impetus behind the rapid dispatch of the “political detainees” became suddenly apparent 

on 19 December when al-Qaeda prisoners at Parchinar overpowered their military guards. In 

the ensuing gun battle, several soldiers and some of the al-Qaeda were killed. Both sides had 

wounded personnel. In the ensuing melee, several of the al-Qaeda prisoners escaped. The Pakistani army soon recaptured most of them. Karnes, who had served with the 5th Special Forces 

in Vietnam, called the provost marshal at the Combined Forces Land Component Command 

(CFLCC) and told him a facility for enemy detainees had to be established immediately.141

At a Pentagon briefi ng on 27 December, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced 

that captured al-Qaeda and Taliban fi ghters would be transferred to a long-term facility—Camp 

X-Ray—at the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO, referred to as Git-Mo). 

That same day, two groups of 45 manacled, hooded detainees were loaded aboard MC-130 aircraft at Peshawar, Pakistan, and fl own to a short-term holding facility guarded by marines and 

Army soldiers near Kandahar. LTC Karnes had a dedicated 15-person team that included an 

Army judge advocate, linguists, a military policeman, a Navy medic, and several U.S. Marines. 
251

To establish custody and ensure security, all detainees were fi ngerprinted and photographed, 

and personal possessions were inventoried and bagged individually.

After watching the two MC-130s carrying the fi rst group of detainees take off into the 

night bound for Kandahar, Afghanistan, Karnes fl ew to Kohat where Pakistani military were 

guarding more detainees. Between 31 December and 6 January 2002, Karnes orchestrated the 

secure movement of another 150 detainees to Kandahar. On the night of 5 January, after the 

four-engine turboprop MC-130 carrying 25 “bagged and tagged” (hooded, manacled, and identifi cation tags attached) detainees was taxiing to the runway and the roaring noise of the aircraft 

receded in the distance, Karnes heard small-arms fi re. As he glanced at the control tower, the 

lights inside abruptly went out. As Karnes entered the darkened tower, he heard, “Lieutenant 

Colonel sahib, they are shooting, get down.” When he fl icked his mini Mag Lite toward the 

voice, a Pakistani air force air traffi c controller huddled under a table against the concrete 

wall said, “And please, sahib, turn off the light. They can see us.” Obeying the request, Karnes 

turned and walked out into the darkness. Outside, FBI Special Agent Karen Williams (pseudonym), assisting the effort, asked if the small-arms fi re was “friendly” or “hostile” and what 

caliber weapons were being used. Karnes responded, “When you’re being shot at, it’s hostile 

fi re, and if you’re hit, it doesn’t matter what caliber weapon was used.” When Williams asked if 

they should contact the aircraft, the Special Forces offi cer said, “No. If the aircrew thought they 

had been fi red on, they might not come back, and we have one more detainee transfer mission 

from here and another two from Quetta. We want them to come back. Now, collect everyone up 

and we’ll call it a night.” The next morning, Karnes went to Quetta to arrange for the shipment 

of 15 ambulatory detainees and fi ve on stretchers. They were sent to Kandahar on 8 and 10 

January, accompanied by a medical team. To fi ll an aircraft load, Karnes picked up 16 detainees 

in Bagram and brought them to Kandahar.142

On 10 January 2002, the fi rst group of 20 enemy detainees left Kandahar for Camp XRay. Three days later, another 30 shackled detainees were en route to Camp X-Ray.143 The 

fl ights continued as long as American Special Forces troops scoured the countryside to kill 

or capture those seeking to continue their reign of terror in Afghanistan. For LTC Karnes, 

watching the enemy fi ghters deplane in Cuba on television was a satisfying moment. Although the detainee transfer was not a Special Forces mission, Karnes was proud to be the 

Special Forces soldier who had been given the mission and “made it happen” in Pakistan and 

Afghanistan.

CA Liaison Work

Soon after the attacks of 9/11, the tactical CA teams of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion 

(CAB) began planning for possible missions in Afghanistan. Normally oriented toward Europe, 

CAT-A42, D Company, 96th CAB, knew very little about the country. Anticipating deployment 

to Afghanistan, the team immersed itself in regional studies focusing on the culture, religion, 

geography, politics, and economics of the region. Yet, when it did get alerted to deploy overseas, 

it was not to Afghanistan but to Pakistan. CAT-A42 leader CPT Barry Sanford, team sergeant 

SFC Sol Sorrenson, engineer SFC Forrest Kilbourne, and medic SFC Reggie Holloway (pseudonyms) immediately packed their equipment and, on 21 December 2001, departed for a country 

none of them had ever expected to visit.144
252

The United States had already initiated a massive humanitarian aid effort to help the Afghan people before CAT-A42 arrived in the region. The Air Force had been dropping aid by 

parachute since 7 October, but the ground tactical situation hindered overland distribution. By 

mid-November, as Northern Alliance forces liberated more of the country, aid began to fl ow 

in from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was quite 

emphatic about the need to increase humanitarian aid in the face of the approaching winter. 

“It’s a time to concentrate even more than we do anyway—which is a lot—on things like humanitarian operations.” Two days before Christmas 2001, CAT-A42 arrived in Islamabad to do 

just that.145

In southern Afghanistan, offensive operations by Hamad Karzai, with the assistance of 

Special Forces ODA 574, were only beginning. How to get humanitarian assistance to the 

people in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan was the problem. Although there were 

many U.S. government, UN, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Pakistan with that 

goal, a willingness to coordinate efforts and cooperate for the common good was lacking. During their tenure in Islamabad, CAT-A46, working with MAJ Matt DiJurnigan (pseudonym), 

had made great strides to improve that cooperation, but more was required. CPT Sanford had 

worked CA in Bosnia and knew how critical it was to the overall effort to know exactly what the 

NGOs were doing and planning to do. CAT-A42 embedded itself in the coalition humanitarian 

liaison cell (CHLC) to help fi nd a solution to the problem.

A continuous challenge was keeping abreast of what organizations were in Islamabad because all were looking to get into Afghanistan. The team fi nally obtained an updated list from 

the UN Humanitarian Information Center. That done, the real legwork was talking with every 

organization on the list. Education was a constant given because very few offi cials and representatives had any experience working with military CA units. The CAT-A carried a simple 

briefi ng that explained what capabilities the team possessed and how it could assist with the 

overall humanitarian aid mission. CPT Sanford took his medic, SFC Holloway, when he met 

with the NGOs in Quetta and Peshawar. Information collected during these visits was sent to 

CENTCOM in Tampa to D Company, 96th CAB, and when created, to the Combined Joint 

Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) in Kabul. Thus, situational awareness was 

expanded for the ARSOF commands and units.

These efforts did pay off regularly. An NGO in Peshawar had 12 child victims of land mines 

who needed top-quality medical treatment. The question was whether the military could evacuate them to Germany. Although military aircraft were not available, Sanford and his men used 

their contacts to locate a charter air service that could do it. Within a week, the 12 children were 

on their way to a hospital in Germany and a better future. In another case, the Special Forces 

medic on a CAT-A working in Kandahar needed insulin for an Afghan child. Could CAT-A42 in 

Islamabad help? The team had to scramble because CPT Sanford was in Peshawar with another 

NGO. SFC Sorrenson tracked him down and explained the situation. Sanford bought the insulin 

at a local pharmacy with his own money, called the local Red Cross (Red Crescent) offi ce to 

fi nd an airplane going to Kandahar, delivered the medicine to the aircrew at the airport, and the 

next day, the CAT-A medic was injecting insulin into the child. Why did they do this? Because, 

as Sorrenson said, “We did anything humanitarianly possible for the Afghan people . . . whether 

or not we were supposed to be doing it.”146
253

CJSOTF-West

Dexter “Dex” Yates (pseudonym), a retail broker and Special Forces master sergeant (MSG) 

in C Company, 3rd Battalion, 20th SFG, Florida ARNG, was going to vacation in southern 

Europe for a few weeks before doing a stint of active duty, when the 9/11 attacks interrupted 

his plans.147 Since the president’s declaration of war against global terrorism was made during 

the U.S. government’s fi scal year (FY) changeover, ARNG funding was caught in limbo. Thus, 

without appropriate funding available for annual training, MSG Yates reported for duty with 

Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) in Tampa, working for several weeks for 

“points without pay.” Service points counted toward a National Guardsman’s total time in uniform, whether he received military pay or not.

On 4 January 2002, Yates fi nally received orders for paid active duty in the J3 plans section 

of SOCCENT. By then, SOCCENT had three Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs) 

overseas supporting the campaign in Afghanistan: JSOTF-North at K2, Uzbekistan; CJSOTFSouth in Kandahar, Afghanistan; and the CENTCOM crisis response element (CRE), Al Saliyah, Qatar.148 Yates’ specifi c mission was to help “stand up” a fourth task force for the Horn of 

Africa that would become CJSOTF-West.149

After several weeks of staff planning, coordination, and conferences, the SOCCENT staff 

directors announced that the planned CJSOTF-West was “not going to go”—the 3rd SFG, the 

intended main element of the Horn of Africa task force, had orders to relieve the 5th SFG in 

Afghanistan. Now without a specifi c staff assignment, MSG Yates volunteered to go overseas. 

“Send me to the smallest, most forward overseas element possible,” he requested. Within a 

few weeks, Yates was at Al Saliyah to serve as a “utility infi elder” in the J3 special operations 

section of SOCCENT’s forward headquarters. Like most of his fellow Special Forces National 

Guardsmen, MSG Yates was willing to do whatever had to be done and serve wherever he was 

needed just to be part of the campaign to destroy the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Although Yates did 

not know it then, he would be much closer to the action in Afghanistan in a few months.150

End of Mission—Aerial Resupply in Afghanistan

As the anti-Taliban offensive gained momentum and expanded to the south, BG Lesley 

Fuller, the Special Operations Commander, Europe (SOCEUR) saw that “the action was moving 

faster than the supply cycle.” Fuller considered moving his resupply transload operation from 

Incirlik, Turkey, to Baku, Azerbaijan, on the Caspian Sea to shorten the MC-130 fl ight routes 

and thus improve responsiveness. However, because the Horn of Africa was still a possible mission for the 3rd SFG, Incirlik could better support both theaters than Baku. The effectiveness 

of the resupply operations continued to improve as the three logistics staffs of the SOCEUR 

element in Turkey; JSOTF-North in Uzbekistan; and CENTCOM in Florida coordinated their 

requirements, priorities, and daily activities by routine video teleconferences (VTCs). Unique 

requests still continued to come in from the Special Forces teams in Afghanistan, asking for 

items like 12 Suunto digital watches for mountain climbers, 60 horse saddles and bridles, and 

bleach (“Who ordered the bleach?” Fuller wondered aloud).151

The Air Force MC-130 Combat Talons assigned to SOCEUR usually fl ew two to three 

missions every night, and each of the special operations turboprop transports was assigned to a 
254

single drop zone. Communications and coordination improved to the point that after resupply 

bundles packed by parachute riggers in Germany had been shipped to Turkey, the “customer” 

in the combat zone was called and queried. If events had overtaken the original requirements 

and changes were requested, the bundles could be reconfi gured by the riggers at Incirlik before 

being loaded for parachute delivery in Afghanistan. Then, as the pace of war accelerated, more 

and more requirements were canceled just days after being requested. The unneeded supply and 

equipment bundles began to pile up in the SOCEUR hangars at Incirlik Air Base, bringing the 

resupply that had been overtaken by events to a head. Fuller’s basic concept had been to “push” 

the supplies to the Special Forces units and not to demand perfection in administrative details. 

“Ask for what you think you might need,” he told the teams, “and we can drop it wherever you 

want later.”152

While the accelerated tempo of ground operations began to create problems for the SOCEUR resupply operation, it also ended large-scale fi ghting in Afghanistan early. Once Kabul 

had been taken in mid-November 2001, aerial resupply missions fell to one a night. The need for 

aerial resupply was long over when CENTCOM ordered BG Fuller to cease aerial resupply operations to JSOTF-North on 14 January 2002. SOCEUR dropped bundles to the Army Special 

Forces units and their Afghan allies. While they did not directly support CA and PSYOP teams 

on the ground, they did so indirectly through the Special Forces regional command elements.153

Figure 33. Airdropped bundles created logistics challenges for the teams.

In the fi nal tally, the SOCEUR headquarters, with U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) support 

and the 16th and 352nd Special Operations Wings (SOWs) fl ying MC-130 Combat Talons, delivered 1.8 million pounds of supplies in 70 days. The two SOWs fl ew 135 combat missions and 

dropped 1,347 containers. SOCEUR spent $59 million in supplies, materials, and parachutes to 

support the CENTCOM mission.154 Army warrant offi cer supply specialists purchased and accounted for all the supplies in carefully maintained Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 

mission property books. These records showed that 98 percent of all supplies SOCEUR Combat Talons delivered directly supported Special Forces teams and their missions.155

During those 70 days, only one MC-130 could not fl y as scheduled. That Combat Talon 

had been taxiing to take off when it broke down, but its cargo was quickly transferred to another MC-130 that took off 37 minutes later. For BG Fuller, another resupply highlight came 

at Thanksgiving when turkey dinners with all the trimmings were packed in sealed thermal 

containers and airdropped to most Special Forces units in Afghanistan. The end of the aerial 

resupply mission for Afghanistan did not mean a break in activity for Fuller and his command. 
255

OEF was a global mission that required SOCEUR attention in Europe, the Balkans, and Africa.156

“We’re Going for Sure This Time”

When LTC Jack Sykes (pseudonym) took command of the Florida ARNG’s 3rd Battalion, 

20th SFG on 1 September 2001, he announced his intention to “get the battalion ready for 

war.”157 This was traditional “Hurricane Sykes”—the hard-charging Boynton Beach, Florida, 

policeman who earned his nickname by relentlessly emphasizing high standards of training and 

physical fi tness. Sykes had earned his green beret by passing the same rigorous Special Forces 

assessment, selection, and qualifi cation course that today’s Regular Army soldiers and offi cers 

attend. After the United States was attacked, he knew he had to set aside his preparations to 

become a police chief and threw himself into ensuring that if called to active duty, his Special 

Forces battalion would be ready.158

The “Third of the Twentieth” already had a solid reputation as a competent, capable unit. 

Having shadowed the 3rd SFG during Operation TRADEWINDS in Guyana in 1999, the following year, the 3rd Battalion was the Special Forces component in the annual Latin American 

combined exercise. In August 2001 at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Louisiana, 

the chief evaluator for Special Forces units commended their performance.159 Hence, it was not 

diffi cult for 20th SFG Commander COL Greg Champion to select Sykes’ battalion to send to 

Afghanistan.160

LTC Sykes was directed to take his battalion command post and one Special Forces company to the mobilization center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for further training for eventual movement to the theater of war. His headquarters detachment and support company from 

Florida, a military intelligence detachment from Kentucky, and B Company from Virginia were 

selected because they were almost at full strength in personnel. Sykes still harbored “a burning 

memory” of the 20th SFG’s mobilization for Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 when, after 

having had its operational readiness thoroughly evaluated, “we sat on our butts for months” and 

never deployed overseas. Sykes was determined this would not happen again. When the Third 

of the Twentieth arrived at Fort Bragg on 1 December 2001, they began live-fi re weapons training right away.161

Coordinating personnel issues between three different state Adjutants General and the National Guard Bureau in Washington was an administrative nightmare. Processing security clearances, arranging medical examinations, and even issuing identifi cation cards to soldiers’ family 

members had the staff going crazy. The Kentucky ARNG put several soldiers on active duty and 

sent them to LTC Sykes, not to deploy overseas with his unit but to have the 3rd Battalion use its 

deployment priority to get them into military schools. Overweight and out-of-shape guardsmen 

who had not kept up a strict exercise regime during their off-duty time were transferred to other 

ARNG units. “If it hadn’t been for 9/11,” said SGM Jorgé Bustillo (pseudonym), “we might 

have tried to ‘rehabilitate’ them. But the urgency of the situation required their immediate 

transfer.”162 As was typical for most ARNG Special Forces units, the 3rdBattalion, 20th Special 

Forces was almost last on the priority list for new equipment purchases and issues in Florida. 

Hence, the Special Forces battalion received new body armor but not the new radios or laser 

sights for M-4 carbines to make them compatible with the Regular Army special operations 
256

units. When he discovered that B Company did not have the requisite large shipping containers 

necessary for transporting its unit equipment by air or sea, LTC Sykes had his nonmobilized 

units in Florida empty their containers—technically, the property of the state of Florida—and 

send them to Virginia.163

As Sykes and his staff worked their way through the gamut of problems, he received good 

news. The 3rd Battalion would be part of COL Mark Phelan’s 3rd SFG, which would be the 

nucleus of a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). When the two commanders met, however, Sykes was chagrined to learn that his unit would be used as individual 

staff augmentees in the CJSOTF headquarters. The additional staffi ng needed to operate and 

maintain CJSOTF-Afghanistan exceeded what 3rd SFG had assigned and what the higher headquarters could muster in support. Sykes would not serve as a battalion or forward operating 

base (FOB) commander as he had envisioned but would be the J5 future plans offi cer on the 

CJSOTF staff.

“Hurricane” took it in stride because, unlike 1991, he and his men were not going to be left 

behind while the rest of the Army went to fi ght. And who knew what would happen overseas? 

At the CJSOTF-Afghanistan, Bagram Air Base, one-third of the 300-person headquarters staff 

was ARNG Special Forces soldiers. Sykes was instrumental in rapidly integrating the numerous coalition special operations units into the CJSOTF, facilitating coalition access to information and coordinating combined combat operations throughout Afghanistan. The CJSOTF 

logistics chief strongly endorsed the National Guardsmen: “We couldn’t run this place without 

the ‘Third of the Twentieth.’”164

Be Prepared for SSE

In September 2001, B Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd SFG, received the mission from CENTCOM to prepare to assume the sensitive site exploitation (SSE) from A Company, 1st Battalion, 

5th SFG, by 1 February 2002. Although the date the mission was assigned was close to the date 

of the terrorist attacks on the United States, the timing was purely coincidental. While the SSE 

mission incorporated many of the tasks a Special Forces company would normally perform, 

there were additional essential tasks that required more personnel and specialized equipment 

and training.

B Company commander MAJ Dalton Carlisle (pseudonym) and his company sergeant major, SGM Geoff Beckwith (pseudonym), knew that their task was diffi cult.165 First, they had 

to get more Special Forces soldiers to bring the company up to full strength. The 3rd SFG 

accomplished this by transferring soldiers with the requisite skills from other Special Forces 

companies. After training in basic skills during the SF qualifi cation course, all Special Forces 

soldiers receive language and advanced skills training. The SSE mission required many of the 

advanced skills. Given the limited training time and criticality of the SSE mission, the U.S. 

Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) accommodated an infl ux 

of soldiers from B-2-3 by temporarily shifting more instructors to the required courses. “That 

worked out very well,” Carlisle said.

Next, the unit required mission-specifi c equipment, and to become profi cient with the new 

items, it had to train with them; thus, the company needed them “yesterday.” Acquiring these 
257

specialized items rapidly proved diffi cult. The contract purchasing process was slow. Funds to 

purchase the various items of equipment came from specifi c accounts. Unfamiliar with the complex process, Carlisle and Beckwith were confused and frustrated. The only thing certain was 

“the ball always seemed to roll back to them at the company.” There were internal disconnects 

within the staff between those who validated the need for the equipment and those who procured 

the items. Then, LTC Julian McGinnis (pseudonym), the U.S. Army Special Forces Command 

(USASFC) logistics offi cer, got directly involved. “Although sheer willpower could not solve 

every problem, McGinnis solved most. Buy that man a six-pack,” said SGM Beckwith.

Despite the Herculean efforts of McGinnis, it was just six days before deployment that the 

$753,000 arrived to buy the specialized equipment. In the midst of palletizing their equipment, 

determining aircraft load plans, and taking care of last-minute family issues, they had to focus 

on ordering critical equipment to perform the SSE mission overseas. Since there is no contracting offi cer on the Special Forces group or battalion staffs, the burden of problem resolution 

slid down to the lowest operational level that lacked personnel with the requisite experience or 

expertise.

Fortunately, both Carlisle and Beckwith had served in units with an SSE mission. The Special Forces company moved to Camp Mackall, North Carolina, to concentrate on the different 

mission profi les. The 160th SOAR provided an MH-60K Black Hawk to support the specialized training. Since the Night Stalker aircrew had extensive experience with the missions the 

company would perform, it shared planning skills, discussed tactics and techniques, and demonstrated ways to increase the probability of mission success. After several months of intense 

training, COL Phelan evaluated the company’s operational readiness and declared the unit to 

be mission capable.

Having achieved the standards necessary to perform the SSE mission for CENTCOM, B 

Company fl ew to Qatar on 1 April. There, MAJ Carlisle and SGM Beckwith met with key staff 

from the SOCCENT crisis response element (CRE) and leaders of A Company, 1st Battalion, 

5th SFG. CW3 Dwight Ashford (pseudonym), A-1-5’s executive offi cer, had prepared a “smart 

book” of the most critical information that Carlisle and Beckwith needed to know based on 

his company’s experience. After a week’s overlap with A-1-5’s leaders, Carlisle felt confi dent 

that his company could perform the SSE mission wherever CENTCOM needed its specialized 

skills. From then on, it would train, honing individual and collective skills, to be prepared to 

deploy into combat on short notice.166

Back in the United States, the “heavy lifting” for the PSYOP campaign continued. In the 

midst of high-priority requirements and short-fuse deadlines, an Army reservist had succeeded 

in making his unique talents available to the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), Fort 

Bragg. It took great personal initiative, perseverance, and the endorsement of the USAR command sergeant major to make it happen.

Native Pashto and Dari Speaker Seeking PSYOP Assignment

Akmed Astor (pseudonym) and his family escaped Soviet-occupied Kabul, Afghanistan, 

in 1983, fi rst to Lahore, Pakistan, for about a year and then to Chicago, Illinois.167 Kabul was 

his birthplace. His father, an Uzbek Herati from Heart in the northwest, worked for the British 
258

Consul in Kabul and was the representative of the U.S. Library of Congress in Afghanistan. 

His mother, a Pashtun from Kandahar, had worked at the Bulgarian Embassy and the UN. After graduating from high school in Chicago in 1987, Astor joined the Army and served at Fort 

Campbell, Kentucky, and Grafenwoehr, Germany. He attended Chicago State University for 

two years, studying computer science, before rejoining the Army, again as a personnel records 

specialist. When Astor was levied for Korea in late 1997, he got reclassifi ed as an interrogator; 

was schooled at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and went to the JRTC, Fort Polk, for two years.

In October 2000, SGT Akmed Astor got out of the Army again but joined the USAR as a 

personnel records specialist. This led to the Active Guard Reserve Program and his assignment 

to the 99th Reserve Support Command (RSC), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on Labor Day weekend 

just before the 9/11 attacks. Astor said, “As bad as I wanted to get out of deployments, I really 

wanted to help out in Afghanistan. So I called here [Fort Bragg] to the 8th Psychological Operations Battalion [POB] to fi nd out if they needed help. Specialist (SPC) Mohammed Osterman 

(pseudonym) said that they needed a lot of help, especially with language, and since I had spent 

more time in Afghanistan than he, my knowledge of culture would be more current.”168

SGT Astor talked with 99th RSC’s leaders. They told him, “If you want to go, we’re 100 

percent behind you. We know what the Army needs at this time. We’ll let you go.” First, the 99th 

RSC had Astor attached to the 303rd PSYOP Company, Pittsburgh. By mid-December 2001, 

he was temporary duty (TDY) at 8th POB while the U.S. Army Reserve Command expedited 

his mobilization.

SGT Astor, born and raised in Afghanistan by a well-educated family, spoke Pashto, Dari, 

and Farsi and understood Urdu. He learned English at the French Center and Urdu from watching Hindi movies in Kabul. While the Afghans did not make fi lms, 13 of the 15 theaters in the 

capital showed Indian movies. ARSOF and the PSYOP community were fortunate that Astor 

had been so persistent, especially because SPC Osterman left the service after fulfi lling his 

enlistment in mid-January 2002.

Support for the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), humanitarian reconstruction, and coalition forces seeking to eliminate the Taliban and al-Qaeda threat—the major PSYOP themes 

in December and January—were being heavily promulgated by radio broadcasts based on the 

advice of Hamad Karzai two months earlier in Pakistan. SGT Astor carefully balanced music 

selections between “fast dances” for the younger people and traditional classics that everyone enjoyed and provided introductions. For down south, the Special Operations Media Systems–Broadcast (SOMS-B) wanted more Pashto songs, and up north they wanted more Dari 

music. Then, specifi c requests came in from the SOMS-B. Astor went online to fi nd the music 

and burned compact discs (CDs). One weekend, he copied the collections of his wife and sister—nearly 50 CDs.

The messages between the music had to be correct in both Dari and Pashto, the two major 

languages in Afghanistan. Since a Pashto message takes longer to read than one in Dari, there 

were fewer songs on the Pashto tapes. “It’s a constant juggling match,” said Astor. The messages solicited popular support for the legitimate government—the AIA warned the people to 

avoid interfering with the coalition forces; pushed the need for the loya jirga; gave specifi cs on 

humanitarian aid; and identifi ed, by country, who was providing what to the Afghan people. The 
259

other topics were women’s roles in government, the importance of education, and the reconstruction of girls’ schools. One particularly good piece was a biography of female leader Sima 

Simar, a Hazzara (a minority group), that emphasized her important work in the government 

and stressed that women are as important in Afghan society as men and that they can make 

contributions. Then, they are told how to help. CENTCOM had already approved these scripts 

in English, but the fi nal translations could not be in harsh language or offensive to a particular 

ethnic group. With seven other translators, supervision and careful review became mandatory 

for SGT Astor.

As Astor stated, “It wasn’t that hard to counter the feeble Taliban and al-Qaeda PSYOP efforts.” The Taliban and al-Qaeda psychological warfare consisted primarily of “night letters,” 

a carry-over from the mujahideen anti-Soviet propaganda efforts. These zeroxed hand-written 

leafl ets were delivered to doorsteps and glued on walls during the night. The message was basically, “Just like when the Russians were here, we fought a jihad against them. Now that the 

Americans are here, we have to do the same thing.”169

The success of a special program based on the works of Ahmed Zahir, a popular folksinger 

who mixed modern Western musical instruments with traditional Afghan instruments, demonstrated how successful the 8th POB program was. Zahir, who was “as big as Elvis Presley in 

Afghanistan,” had been killed by the communist regime. The idea for the program came from 

an online magazine article, “Afghan Music,” written by a friend. With the author’s permission 

and CENTCOM’s approval, the 8th POB Product Development Company prepared a 75-minute, seven-part program in both Pashto and Dari. Even the narrated parts had Zahir’s music in 

the background to emphasize the importance of his music contribution to the entire country. 

Feedback from overseas was positive, and CENTCOM wanted more products like the Zahir 

program to be developed. For a passionate admirer like Astor, it was literally “music to his 

ears,” but further recognition was forthcoming.

The Command Sergeant Major of the USAR, CSM Ray Lackey, made a point of visiting 

SGT Astor at his work place when he visited Fort Bragg. Lackey told Astor, “I remember that 

when your paperwork came across my desk, the 8th POB had been asking for a reservist in 

Pittsburgh. I just wanted to meet you and fi nd out what you are doing. I know that you had to 

‘jump through a lot of hoops’ to get here, but I hear that you’re doing a great job.” Lackey then 

presented Astor with his coin.170 This recognition was nice, but Astor was even prouder that his 

father had been selected to participate in the loya jirga in Kabul. Now both would be contributing to the betterment of Afghanistan.

SGT Astor summed it up appropriately: “Every place where the United States has conducted 

some type of military operation in favor of or against a government, you know good things have 

happened. We have seen good things happen, and I believe it will be the same for Afghanistan. 

The more we do for Afghanistan and the Afghan people, the more Americans will get out of it. 

The more you do good in the unstable countries of the Middle East the better. Good ties with Afghanistan and Pakistan will help improve relations with the other Middle Eastern countries.”171

Returning to Afghanistan, the next collection of soldier stories will cover support to the ARSOF combat forces; CA humanitarian, reconstruction, and food distribution efforts; an emergency air rescue mission; and Special Forces gearing up for SSE and Operation ANACONDA.
260

Keep on Trucking

The deployment of a maintenance support team (MST) from B Company, 528th Support 

Battalion, was as unique as some of their tasks while attached to Forward Operating Base 

(FOB) 33. Just getting to Afghanistan proved to be an adventure. The four-man team boarded 

a C-5A Galaxy jumbo cargo aircraft at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, that fl ew west to 

Travis Air Force Base, California. There, the aircraft was refueled, and a fresh aircrew resumed 

the fl ight to Guam. After a 24-hour layover in Guam, the C-5A fl ew to Diego Garcia in the 

Indian Ocean. At Diego Garcia, the four maintenance specialists were transferred to a C-17 

Globemaster III and fi nally arrived at Kandahar just before daylight on a cold day in February.

The MST’s primary mission was to provide vehicle and generator maintenance for the 

3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, at FOB 33 in Kandahar. This initially entailed repairing or replacing 

engines, transmissions, and major assemblies for the unit ground mobility vehicle (GMV), an 

armored version of the HMMWV. Needless to say, with mechanics “in town,” the mission was 

expanded. Since the GMVs were in good shape, the team went to work on the various civilian 

pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles that the Special Forces had captured. Most of the Toyota 

Land Cruisers and small Japanese pickup trucks the ARSOF used throughout the country were 

old and in poor mechanical condition. The MST started doing basic vehicle maintenance—

checking oil levels, fi lling radiators, servicing batteries, and tuning engines.172

SSG Jason Lafayette (pseudonym), the MST team sergeant, believed that since all diesel and gasoline engines work on the same basic principles, his mechanics could get the dilapidated vehicles running again and keep them functioning.173 And they did but not without 

solving some major challenges. All the available reference manuals were written in Japanese, 

and replacement parts were nonexistent. American Toyota parts were incompatible with those 

found on captured Taliban vehicles. By using standard Army mechanic ingenuity, the team 

made a few “controlled substitutions,” an Army maintenance term for cannibalizing, from other 

Taliban vehicles. As the Special Forces teams brought back more captured vehicles, the MST 

switched good parts for broken ones, replacing torn-off radiator shrouds and fans broken by the 

rough terrain conditions. The two major goals were to “make the decrepit vehicles last as long 

as possible and not to fail the guys down range.” SPC Timothy Berdeau (pseudonym) spent four 

weeks at a desolate Special Forces team base keeping several all-terrain vehicles functioning 

with only his tools and a lot of imagination.174

The team’s most signifi cant accomplishment was a tactical modifi cation to the GMV. The 

heavy-duty springs of the modifi ed GMV posed a clearance problem for rapid infi ltration and 

exfi ltration of the truck using the MH-47E Chinook helicopter. SPC Berdeau and SGT Jack 

Felico (pseudonym), a mechanic from the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, modifi ed several GMVs for 

a special mission by adjusting the coil spring on the front end of the vehicle.175 This lowered 

the GMV profi le suffi ciently to facilitate rapid helicopter loading and offl oading, and could 

be readjusted on the ground afterward. The procedure had never been performed in an austere 

tactical environment and required great skill. It worked for the mission, and the truck drivers 

reported no problems with the temporary arrangement.

The 528th MST never failed to meet the demands imposed upon it. It was eager to be part 

of the ARSOF effort to fi nd and destroy the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In the team’s opinion, MSTs 

did not do anything special, but for the Special Forces teams in the fi eld, MSTs were invaluable. 
261

SSG Lafayette summed it up best, “Most of the time, mechanics do a whole lot of something 

with a whole lot of nothing.”

Rescue at 10,000 Feet

Flexibility, dedication to mission, and reliability meant success to all special operations 

forces (SOF) in Afghanistan. The pilots and aircrews of the 9th Special Operations Squadron 

(SOS) demonstrated these traits since they arrived to support the combat search and rescue 

(CSAR) mission of the initial air campaign in northern Afghanistan. The MC-130P aircraft of 

the 9th SOS conducted aerial refueling support for the ARSOF helicopters of the 160th SOAR 

almost daily during the fi rst three months of combat in Afghanistan. Given the high-altitude 

mountain chains along the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border, the treacherous winter weather conditions and frequent sandstorms that reached 10,000 feet routinely, and the reduced lift associated with high altitudes in the region, the “Mother Hen” MC-130P refuelers that provided fuel 

as many as three times a night to the Night Stalker MH-47E and MH-60L helicopter fl ights 

often determined the success or failure of the long-range night infi ltration missions in the near 

“zero-zero” weather conditions.

For a high-profi le mission scheduled for 12 February, pre-mission planning revealed that 

this one, like most, was fuel dependent. This meant the 9th SOS MC-130P tankers were critical 

to executing the operation. For this particular mission, the aerial refueling track would be in the 

high northern mountains of Afghanistan. The MC-130P tankers were to refuel three MH-47E 

Chinooks that were supporting a Special Forces team conducting a direct-action (DA) mission. 

It was a short refuel track based on the location, and there was a 19-minute window allowed for 

refueling. The weather was typically marginal, and illumination was 0 percent; heavy snow had 

recently fallen, blanketing the mountains.

The fl ight of three Chinooks rendezvoused at the “refuel racetrack” that was supported 

by two MC-130P tankers, a primary tanker and a backup. The altitude of the racetrack was 

9,500 feet mean sea level (MSL). Aerial refueling at this altitude was tough for two reasons: air 

turbulence was heavy and winds shifted radically around the high mountains, and the extreme 

altitude reduced aircraft performance for both the MC-130Ps and the MH-47Es, but the Army 

and Air Force aircrews were very experienced. CWO Alfred Mann (pseudonym), the fl ight lead, 

moved in to refuel off the left wing of the tanker, and CWO Jackson Ferrell (pseudonym) in the 

third Chinook crossed over to the right wing to receive gas. Both the fi rst and third helicopters 

refueled without problems and backed off the tanker. Ferrell remained positioned on the right 

wing but was fl ying slightly above the tanker as the last Chinook approached to refuel.176

CWO Curtis Jameson (pseudonym) moved into the refuel approach “slot” after CWO 

Mann in the lead helicopter moved off. Jameson had just connected to the refuel basket as the 

MC-130P reached the end of the track. The 19-minute racetrack limitation required the tanker 

to turn in the direction of the helicopter ingress route. As the fl ight turned in the new direction, 

Jameson’s MH-47E inadvertently disconnected from the tanker but quickly recovered and was 

reconnected after the turn. On the right wing of the MC-130P, Ferrell manipulated the aircraft 

navigation systems and caught a fl eeting glimpse of terrain on his multimode radar screen.177

Suddenly, the tanker abruptly pulled up, causing a sine wave in the refueling hose. The sudden maneuver ripped the refueling basket off the helicopter refuel probe, and the MH-47E rotor 
262

blades severed the gyrating hose, damaging the blades and causing the fl ight controls to vibrate 

slightly. Jameson was pulling the big Chinook upward as the MC-130P impacted on a mountain 

plateau at 9,800 feet MSL. Unbelievably, the skilled Air Force pilot, faced with an impossible 

situation, managed to wrench the MC-130P nose up in suffi cient time to stall the airplane, pancaking the heavy aircraft onto the steep, heavily snow-covered mountain slope at approximately 

80 knots. The MC-130P slid to a stop in the deep snow on an upward slope of a high plateau.

Figure 34. MC-130Ps fl y a “racetrack” to remain available for refueling.

Luckily, the MC-130P struck the mountain at just the right angle and speed. The airplane 

fuselage cracked in half, sparing the lives of the crew aboard. CWO Mann fl ew over the top of 

the crashed tanker and pinpointed its position in his onboard navigation system. As he circled 

overhead, seven of the eight crew members emerged from the wrecked fuselage and signaled to 

him with fl ashlights. Mann acknowledged the signal with a white landing light and then moved 

to land about 200 feet down from the wreck. It was a very cautious, slow landing when he saw 

how deep the snow was. When the Chinook settled in on the 15-degree slope, the refuel probe 

was buried and virtually touched the ground.

The Special Forces soldiers aboard quickly exited the aircraft to begin wading through 

hip-deep snow toward the wrecked aircraft. The Air Force pilots had assembled everyone in 

the crew outside except the trapped fl ight engineer. The Special Forces team helped the airmen 

wade down the slope to their helicopter. The Chinook crew and fl ight medic quickly treated 

the injured and wrapped them in fl ight jackets, blankets, and sleeping bags taken from survival rucksacks—anything to warm the survivors. Having gotten most of the airmen aboard the 

MH-47E, the Special Forces team returned to the wreck to work feverishly to free the pinned 

fl ight engineer. The tanker was burning, hissing, and crackling as if it was about to explode at 

any minute. Aircraft fuel was everywhere inside and all around the broken MC-130P. Despite 

the physiological challenges associated with high-altitude work, the men persevered but were 

hampered by the lack of specialized rescue equipment. They had to be content with providing 

fi rst aid.

Meanwhile, overhead, the aerial refuel mission continued with the backup MC-130P. CWO 

Jameson was low on fuel, and the second tanker quickly pulled into position. LTC James Brinks 

(pseudonym), the air mission commander (AMC), directed Ferrell, fl ying the trail helicopter 

and carrying the emergency refuel package—the “cow”—to return to Bagram Air Base. Because Jameson was carrying the CSAR package, as soon as he fi nished refueling, he was to fl y 

to the mountaintop and land upslope from the wreckage. This would give the Special Forces 
263

team easier access to the wrecked aircraft. The CSAR package included two Air Force pararescue medics, a “jaws of life” mechanical device, and a large medical kit.178

Using the “jaws of life” device, the Special Forces team extracted the seriously injured 

fl ight engineer, loaded him aboard a Sked litter, and dragged him to the Chinook. After examining his injuries, a broken pelvis and probable internal injuries, the senior medic recommended 

an expeditious return to medical facilities. Mann and Brinks decided to abort the original mission and fl y the injured airman back to Bagram as quickly as possible. Having spent so much 

time with engines running on the ground to keep the airman and his aircrew warm in the low 

teen Fahrenheit temperatures at high altitude, Mann had to refuel again from the MC-130P, 

closely monitoring the situation from above.

This rescue operation revealed the great trust and confi dence shared within the SOF community. When the situation turned bad, the SOF team members responded quickly, never forgetting their responsibilities while capitalizing on their unique capabilities and high level of 

training. The lead Chinook immediately landed, the Special Forces team courageously rescued 

everyone from the crashed MC-130P tanker, the backup tanker automatically moved into the 

racetrack to refuel the helicopter with the CSAR package, and the force lived to fi ght again. 

Although altitude, the additional passengers, the condition of the injured airman, and lost hours 

of darkness prevented the fl ight from continuing its assigned mission, the orchestration of the 

recovery exemplifi ed SOF skill, determination, and dedication.

Date Drop at Khowst

Ankle deep in mud, MAJ Silas Greene (pseudonym) stood on the edge of the Khowst 

airfi eld in the dark as a steady drizzle soaked the ground.179 He was listening for the sound of 

three MC-130 transports that were to drop humanitarian aid bundles to his CA team. Greene 

had gotten a radio message earlier in the day, telling him that the CAT-A would receive drops 

of wheat and blankets starting that night and every night thereafter until further notice. The 

Air Force tactical combat controlers (CCTs) had already positioned dim marker lights on the 

drop zone, turned on homing beacons, and were speaking with pilots of the inbound aircraft 

on their high-band radios.180 Because the rain had turned the dirt runway into mud, the CCTs 

requested that the transports drop the aid bundles alongside of the airstrip. When the MC-130s 

roared by overhead, unseen in the darkness, the parachute-delivered huge bundles landed one 

after another in a row, directly down the centerline of the runway. Greene was surprised to hear 

crashing as the bundles slammed into the ground rather than the dull thudding he expected from 

packages having been dropped by parachute.

As MAJ Greene walked the length of the airfi eld with his fl ashlight, he discovered the 

reason for the crashing sounds. All but one of the dozens of bundles exploded open on impact, 

spilling tons of wheat and scattering hundreds of blankets across the rain-soaked dirt strip for 

more than 1,000 yards. He discovered another surprise: tens of thousands of dates, wrapped in 

leafl ets in a language that he did not recognize, had burst out of thin plastic containers, covering the soaking wheat like large pepper fl akes. As Greene splashed through the puddles while 

enduring the drizzle, he saw that the recently repaired runway was now blocked by a half-milelong stretch of canvas and nylon straps, cluttered mounds of broken cardboard boxes, tons of 

spilled wheat, wool blankets, paper leafl ets, and sticky dates. It was a colossal mess.181
264

Having reported the disaster before going to bed, Greene was informed the next morning 

that the aid bundles had been specially packed by parachute riggers in Germany to deliberately 

break open on landing. This packing system had been devised for aerially dropping humanitarian aid into areas where no U.S. military personnel would be present to oversee the distribution 

of the aid to the local Afghans. The Containerized Delivery System used small parachutes 

designed to stabilize the bundles and keep them upright rather than to slow their descent. The 

shock of impact was to be absorbed by layers of honeycomb-shaped cardboard packed in the 

bottom of each bundle. It was obvious to MAJ Greene that no one had tested the bundles with 

these contents beforehand.

The dates caused Greene to recall a story about another “date drop” in November or December to one of the Special Forces ODAs in northern Afghanistan. Someone, somewhere 

in a PSYOP planning cell, probably based on Operation DESERT STORM experience, had 

convinced the “powers that be” that dates were a special treat in Central Asia, particularly on 

certain Muslim holy days. Thus, dates were packaged in small lidded plastic tubes, along with 

leafl ets that read “A gift from the United States.” As it turned out, the Afghans did not appreciate the airdropped dates, nor were they the delicacy that someone “in the rear” imagined them 

to be. At the time, Greene thought bemusedly that “maybe the Afghans were just regular guys.” 

But he did remember—“No dates” for Afghans, at least until this drizzly February night in 

southeastern Afghanistan.182

Since the Khowst runway had been designated as an alternate airfi eld for the upcoming 

Operation ANACONDA that would begin in a few days, MAJ Greene had to get the mess 

cleared off immediately. At dawn the next day, CAT-A41 went to several of the local villages 

and hired 30 laborers at the going rate of 200 rupees a day, about $2.00 in U.S. currency. This 

pay was considered quite generous because almost no one was fully employed in the destitute 

province. In addition to the pay, Greene offered the workers all the wheat, blankets, and dates 

they could carry away. CAT-A41 and the Afghans worked for 14 hours straight, clearing the 

sodden mounds of wheat, blankets, and dates that “trashed” the runway. As the drizzling rain 

turned into a downpour, the trucks Greene used to carry off the debris got stuck in the mud. 

After the trucks were winched out, there were deep ruts criss-crossing the runway—another 

problem to solve when the rain stopped.

The local villagers did carry off a lot of the sodden “aid,” including some of the wheat in 

wheelbarrows, although Greene thought that the rain would have ruined most of it. The villagers also took all the blankets and scrap canvas, but the dates were left behind. None of the local 

Pashtuns could read the leafl ets that were packed with the dates. Greene soon discovered why. 

They were written in Tajik, which is spoken only in northeastern Afghanistan. The cleanup 

crew shoveled the sticky dates off the airstrip into piles. The piles turned into sticky globs in 

the rain. Finally, the “delicacies” ended up in a nearby dump.183

Three days later, when the rain stopped, Greene hired a local farmer to use his grader to make 

the strip usable for aircraft. He fi nished just before Operation ANACONDA kicked off. Afterward, MAJ Karl Jurgens (pseudonym), the 10th Mountain engineer who had helped Greene at the 

Salang Tunnel, brought a platoon of combat engineers to rebuild the airstrip. When MAJ Greene 

was leaving Afghanistan, he heard that wheat was growing alongside the Khowst runway.184
265

ODA 394: The Next Mission

The “fog and friction of war” so often referred to in military history and theory became 

reality for ODA 394 soon after the 12 Special Forces men landed in Afghanistan.185 CPT Jed 

Samuels (pseudonym) received the fi rst mission change from his battalion commander, LTC 

Terry Sanders (pseudonym), at the “Rose Garden,” a former Taliban military training camp 

(Tarnac Farms) near Kandahar airport. ODA 394 deployed on 8 February 2002, with its four 

GMVs—armed HMMWV trucks—to conduct mounted special reconnaissance (SR) and direct-action (DA) missions in the desert.186 As A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, left Afghanistan, C Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, had been assigned sensitive site exploitation (SSE). 

MAJ Mickey Hensen directed SGM Rudy Madden and MSG Gregg Corr (pseudonyms) to start 

training the company in close-quarters battle (CQB) techniques to fi ght in buildings.187

This was not refresher training but entirely new training for the company and its Special 

Forces ODAs that lacked the specialized equipment to perform the mission. Samuels’ team had 

to teach itself how to perform the advanced CQB tasks. CWO Max Gorley and MSG Ty McFadden (pseudonyms) built on to the company’s two-day initial training program and modifi ed 

its weapons, body armor, and personal carrying harnesses to fi ght in the mud-walled houses 

endemic to the villages of Afghanistan. The buildings had low ceilings and small windows. Exterior mud walls commonly surrounded a cluster of buildings. Thus, Americans tended to refer 

to them as compounds, but they were vastly different from compounds found in the Balkans 

and in Latin America. ODA 394 equipped itself with “hooligan tools”—sledge hammers and 

large crowbars to break down doors for entry. After almost two weeks of intense CQB training 

and rehearsals, ODA 394 was alerted for a mission. Instead of a building for which they had rehearsed for weeks, the mission was to search several square kilometers of mountainous terrain. 

Samuels’ team was to be part of a coalition task force that would identify caves for destruction 

by aerial bombing. New Zealand, Canadian, Norwegian, and Danish units would participate 

with them.

But as the mission start time approached, ODA 394 and ODA 391 were designated to be 

the quick-reaction force (QRF) for the coalition. MAJ Hensen and his headquarters would be 

Figure 35. Recruiting “runway maintenance specialists” from the local population.
266

the QRF command element. Leaving its vehicles behind, the QRF fl ew to Bagram Air Base, 

the abandoned Soviet airfi eld north of Kabul. Hensen and his men “froze their butts off ” on the 

cement fl oor of a bombed-out hangar, waiting for orders.188

The next morning, SGM Madden asked the command sergeant major of the 10th Mountain 

Division, CSM Marc Lorenzo (pseudonym), if he could feed the Special Forces teams on QRF 

standby. Although all were unshaven, some sporting full beards, and wearing an assortment of 

jackets and pants, CSM Lorenzo said, “Of course. Come with me,” and led them inside the hangar where he told the servers to give the Special Forces troops all they could eat for breakfast. 

Later, the QRF was stood down, and ODA 394 returned to Kandahar to prepare for a major new 

operation code-named ANACONDA.189

The preceding few stories, while not action-packed combat vignettes, reveal the ability of 

the ARSOF soldiers and airmen to adapt to the environment, adjust to new unfamiliar tasks 

determined to accomplish their missions, and respond with consummate professionalism to calamity. They also refl ect innovative solutions, instinctual piloting reactions that come only with 

extensive experience, and basic humbleness. Although everyone tried to contribute and wanted 

to do the “right thing,” mistakes were made.

In the next chapter, Army and coalition SOF and Afghan militias will be supporting American conventional units in the biggest battle of the war after the collapse of the Taliban regime. 

While Operation ANACONDA may have grown from a special operations concept, the operation was planned as a conventional force mission. Special Forces teams would advise and support the Afghan militia forces in the primary attack. As in any combat situation, events evolve 

and plans go to the winds when the fi rst rounds are fi red. Thus, the ARSOF fi ght on the mountain of Takur Ghar will distract and confuse many about Operation ANACONDA.
267

Notes

 1. Ulysses Simpson Grant (1822-1885), quoted in Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval 

Quotations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1966).

 2. U.S. Marines arrived later that day, taking over guard of the U.S. Embassy from the Special Forces troops. 

The Marines raised an American fl ag at a formal ceremony 10 days later. Kit R. Roane, “For Special Forces, a Time 

to Remember,” U.S. News and World Report (24 December 2001); Barry Bearak, “U.S. Prepares for Reopening 

of Embassy,” New York Times, 11 December 2001; Kirk Spitzer, “U.S. Flag to Signal the Reopening of Mission in 

Kabul,” USA Today, 17 December 2001, 2; Kevin Sullivan, “Embassy in Kabul Reopened by U.S.,” Washington Post, 

18 December 2001, 16.

 3. According to news correspondent John F. Burns, from a single valley in northwest Pakistan, “10,000 to 

15,000 [Pakistani] men marched off to Afghanistan to fi ght America in October, and 2,000 to 3,000 have not returned.” 

John F. Burns, “Jihad’s Lost Battalions Mourned by Pakistani Kin,” New York Times, 10 December 2001, 1.

 4. Greg Jaffe and Michael M. Phillips, “Possible Bin Laden Hiding Places are Hit by Warplanes With Help 

From Commandos,” Wall Street Journal, 4 December 2001; Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz, “U.S. Troops 

Join Bin Laden Search,” Washington Times, 5 December 2001; Susan B. Glasser, “Al Qaeda Base Under Assault,” 

Washington Post, 6 December 2001; Brian Knowlton, “All-Out Hunt for Bin Laden,” International Herald-Tribune, 

10 December 2001; Susan B. Glasser, “U.S. Attacks on Al Qaeda Intensify,” Washington Post, 10 December 2001.

 5. Stephen Farrell and Michael Evans, “SAS Searches ‘Bin Laden’ Cave System,” London Times, 4 December 

2001; Rowan Scarborough, “Caves in Tora Bora Survive,” Washington Times, 19 December 2001, 1.

 6. Susan B. Glasser, “Al Qaeda’s Forces Flee Caves for Mountains,” Washington Post, 11 December 2001; 

U.S. Army Center for Military History (CMH), “The Course of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Southern and 

Eastern Afghanistan,” Information Paper, 26 April 2002.

 7. For a journalistic assessment of the Tora Bora offensive written six months after the action, see Rod 

Nordland, Sami Yousafzai, and Babak Dehghanpisheh, “How Al Qaeda Slipped Away,” Newsweek (19 August 2002). 

Michael O’Hanlon criticizes U.S military leaders’ decisions during the fi ght for Tora Bora in “A Flawed Masterpiece: 

Assessing the Afghan Campaign,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2002), 54-58.

 8. FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror,” air date 8 September 2002, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/

frontline/shows/campaign/etc/cron.html>; Michael R. Gordon with Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Putting Off Plans to Use 

G.I.’s in Afghan Caves,” New York Times, 27 December 2001.

 9. Esther Schrader, “POWs Will Go to Base in Cuba,” Los Angeles Times, 28 December 2001, 1; “U.S. to 

Hold Detainees at Guantanamo Bay,” CNN.com, 28 December 2001, <www.cnn.com/2001/US/12/27/ret.holding.

detainees>; James Dao, “U.S. Begins First Airlift of Prisoners,” New York Times, 11 January 2002, 1; Dave Moniz 

and Tom Squitieri, “U.S. Flies Second Batch of Afghan Prisoners to Cuba,” USA Today, 14 January 2002, 8.

10. Mark Mazzetti, “How Special Ops Forces Are Hunting Al Qaeda,” U.S. News & World Report (25 February 

2002); Seth Hettena, “Navy SEALs Led Covert War Against Al-Qaida,” Ventura County (Calif.) Star, 22 September 

2002.

11. Carol Morello, “Marines Rebuilding Kandahar Airport,” Washington Post, 21 December 2001, 31.

12. U.S. Navy, “TF-KBAR Coalition Conference (13-16 Aug 02) AAR (U),” Naval Special Warfare Group 

One, 26 August 2002, copy in U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina.

13. U.S. Army, “A-1/5th SFG(A) Operation Enduring Freedom Roll-Up, 15 December 01–15 February 02,” A 

Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (SFG), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, slide presentation, 8 July 2002, 

copy in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

14. SFC Nathan R. Chapman was a member of the 1st SFG based at Fort Lewis, Washington, and was on an 

assignment supporting the 5th SFG in Afghanistan. U.S. forces named the runway and its base “Chapman Field” in 

his memory. Gene Johnson, “Green Beret is Laid to Rest,” The Seattle Times, 12 January 2002.

15. The quick-reaction force that fl ew to the crash site on board the MH-47 helicopters included U.S. Army 

Special Forces medics and a radio operator, and U.S. Navy special operations personnel. Steve Vogel and Marc 

Kaufman, “Helicopter Accident Kills 2 Marines in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, 22 January 2002, 8; Tony Perry, 

“Pilots Helped Save Crew, Marines Say,” Los Angeles Times, 23 January 2002.

16. Daniel Pearl and Scott Neuman, “U.S. May Beef Up Pakistan Border Force, Cutting Off Exit Route of 

Taliban Soldiers,” Wall Street Journal, 4 December 2001; John Pomfret, “Fleeing Fighters Meet Some Resistance at 

Porous Border,” Washington Post, 10 December 2001, 1; Willis Witter, “Pakistan Moves to Foil Escapes at Border,” 

Washington Times, 11 December 2001; Douglas Frantz, “Pakistan Sends Troops to Border to Bar Bin Laden’s Escape 
268

From Tora Bora,” New York Times, 12 December 2001; Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Holes Found in Pakistan’s ‘Sealed’ 

Border,” Washington Times, 18 December 2001.

17. Peter Foster, “Face-Saving Mission to Keep the Peace Among Warlords,” London Daily Telegraph, 27 

December 2001; Karen DeYoung, “$9 Billion Afghan Aid Outlined,” Washington Post, 26 December 2001; Carlotta 

Gail, “As Afghans Return Home, Need for Food Intensifi es,” New York Times, 26 December 2001; Marc Kaufman, 

“Massive Food Delivery Averts Afghan Famine,” Washington Post, 31 December 2001.

18. Scott Peterson, “Special Ops Tackle Aid Mission,” Christian Science Monitor, 1 March 2002, 1, <http://

www.csmonitor.com. 2002/0301/p01s03-wosc.html>; Greg Jaffe, “In Afghan Provinces, a Few GIs Struggle to 

Bring Aid and Order,” Wall Street Journal, 28 February 2002, 1; CMH, “Afghan War Chronology,” Information 

Paper, 25 April 2002.

19. Patrick E. Tyler, “Britain Ready to Lead Force for the U.N. After the War,” New York Times, 12 December 

2001; Carola Hoyos, Alexander Nicoll, and Hugh Williamson, “Germany Set to Contribute Up to 1,000 Troops,” 

London Financial Times, 12 December 2001, 8; Betsy Pisik, “U.N. Planning Multinational Afghan Force,” Washington 

Times, 14 December 2001; T.R. Reid, “Britain Pledges Up to 1,500 Peacekeepers for Afghanistan Force,” Washington 

Post, 18 December 2001, 15; Richard Eden, “Britain Flies Out 300 More Soldiers,” London Daily Telegraph, 27 

December 2001.

20. William Patterson, “Civil Affairs Teams Re-Establish Afghan Relief,” ArmyLINK News, 21 December 

2001, <http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Dec2001/a20011221 cateams.html>; CMH, “Afghan War Chronology.”

21. CBS News, “60II: Mission Impossible,” CBSNews.com, 6 February 2002, <http://www.cbsnews.

com/stories/2002/02/06/60II/main328444.shtml>; Carol J. Williams, “Afghan Aid Handed Out, With Charges of 

Favoritism,” Los Angeles Times, 11 December 2001; Liam Pleven, “U.S. Troops Help Restore Services,” Newsday.

com, 11 December 2001, <http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/ny-warmaza112505439 dec11.

story>; David Zucchino, “Civil Affairs Troops Aim to Win Afghan Hearts, Minds,” Los Angeles Times, 11 February 

2002, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-021102civil.story>; Paul Purpura, “N.O. [New Orleans] 

Group Steadies Afghanistan,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, 10 February 2002, 27.

22. “Russians Clear Explosives From Kabul, Afghan Tunnel Used by Soviet Troops,” Wall Street Journal.com, 

26 December 2001; Peter Graff, “For Needy Afghans, Light is Coming to End of Tunnel,” Philadelphia Enquirer, 2 

January 2002; “U.S. Aids Humanitarian Shipments,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 5 December 2001, <http://www.

jsonline.com/news/attack/ap/dec01/ap-afghan-reclaimi 120501.asp>; Meg Laughlin, “The Army of Hope,” HeraldLeader (Lexington, Kentucky), 14 January 2002.

23. Steve Vogel and Bradley Graham, “U.S. Forces Raid Taliban Compounds,” Washington Post, 25 January 

2002, 1; Eric Schmitt with Todd S. Purdum, “U.S. Forces Strike Taliban at Camps Near Kandahar, New York Times, 

25 January 2002; John Hendren, “U.S. Raids Afghan Site, Seizes 27 Taliban Fighters,” Los Angeles Times, 25 January 

2002; Chip Cummins, “U.S. Troops Raid Two Taliban Compounds, Face Continued Resistance in Afghanistan,” Wall 

Street Journal, 25 January 2002; U.S. Army, “A-1/5th SFG (A) Operation Enduring Freedom Roll-Up, 15 December 

01-15 February 02,” A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, Fort Campbell, slide presentation, 8 July 2002, copy in 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

24. “Afghan Villagers Say Raid Claimed Innocent Victims,” Washington Post, 28 January 2002, 13; Ellen 

Knickmeyer, “Afghan Offi cials Seek Release of Detainees Captured in U.S. Raid,” Boston Globe, 29 January 2002, 

<http://www.boston.com/news/daily/29/attacks_afghanistan.htm>; “Afghans Protest Special Forces Raid,” Common 

Dreams, 30 January 2002, <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0130-03.htm>; “Pentagon Probes Whether 

Special Forces Raid Went Awry,” Washington Times, 31 January 2001, 11; John Fullerton, “U.S. Was Mislead in 

Deadly Raid,” Washington Post, 31 January 2001, 19; Vernon Loeb and Bradley Graham, “Rumsfeld Say U.S. Raid 

May Have Killed Allies,” Washington Post, 5 February 2002, 9; Marc Kaufman and Peter Baker, “U.S. Mistakes Cost 

Innocent Lives, Afghan Leader Says,” Washington Post, 6 February 2002, 1.

25. Eric Schmitt, “After January Raid, Gen. Franks Promises to Do Better,” New York Times, 8 February 

2002; Richard T. Cooper, “Rumsfeld Addresses ‘Unfortunate’ Attack,” Los Angeles Times, 22 February 2002; U.S. 

Department of Defense, “DoD New Briefi ng—Secretary Rumsfeld and GEN Myers,” DefenseLINK, 21 February 

2002, <http://defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/ t02212002_t0221sd.html>; Eric Schmitt, “Top General Defends Raid 

in Which 16 Afghans Died,” New York Times, 26 February 2002. For an earlier example of confusion between friend 

and foe, see Amy Waldman, “Debate Over U.S. Raid on Convoy Exposes Fluid Loyalties in Area Shaken by War,” 

New York Times, 28 December 2001.

26. Tyler Marshall, “U.S. Forces Storm Kandahar Hospital,” Los Angeles Times, 28 January 2002, 1; Craig S. 

Smith, “Afghans Kill 6 Who Held Out Inside Hospital,” New York Times, 29 January 2002, 1; Peter Maass, “A Bul-
269

letproof Mind,” The New York Times Magazine, 10 November 2002, 52-57. The ad hoc organization of the 5th SFG 

units in JSOTF-North was evidenced at the Mir Wais Hospital take-down: ODA 524, from the 1st Battalion, took its 

orders from a company commander from the 3rd Battalion, who in turn reported to the lieutenant colonel commanding the 2nd Battalion.

27. Jonathan Ewing, “Accidents Kill One Soldier, Injure Eight Others in Afghanistan,” ArmyTimes.com, 

13 February 2002, Robert Wall, “War Drains U.S. Military’s Aircraft and Munitions,” Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, 18 February 2002, 31; CMH, “Afghan War Chronology.” 

28. Exclusive of SOCEUR’s operations, the U.S. Air Force also air-dropped 2.4 million humanitarian rations 

over Afghanistan between 7 October and 17 December 2001. BG Leslie L. Fuller, 15 April 2002, Fort Bragg, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as 

Fuller interview.

29. During this transition period, JSOTF-South was offi cially redesignated as the “Combined Joint Special 

Operations Task Force-Afghanistan” (CJSOTF-A). The arriving 3rd SFG headquarters assumed the title from the 

departing task force. COL John F. Mulholland, 5th SFG, 5 December 2002, Fort Campbell, letter to Kalev Sepp, at 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

30. COL John F. Mulholland, 12 July 2002, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, interview with C.H. Briscoe, transcripts 

and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Mulholland interview.

31. U.S. Army, “Coalition Joint Task Force Mountain,” Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, 

New York, slide presentation, 5 April 2002, copy in Classifi ed Files, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. A 

well-balanced journalistic overview of the battle is provided by Richard T. Cooper, “Fierce Fight in Afghan Valley 

Tests U.S. Soldiers and Strategy,” Los Angeles Times, 24 March 2002, 1.

32. “U.S. General Advises Afghans on Raising Professional Army,” Washington Times, 19 February 2002, 4; 

Vernon Loeb, “Franks Supports an Afghan Army,” Washington Post, 26 February 2002, 16; Bill Gertz, “U.S. General 

Advocates Afghan Army as Stabilizing Force,” Washington Times, 26 February 2002, 3; Tim Friend and Elliot Blair 

Smith, “U.S. Military to Lead Training for Afghanistan’s New Army,” USA Today, 27 February 2002, 9.

33. Philip Smucker, “Split Over British and US-Trained Armies,” London Daily Telegraph, 26 February 2002; 

Michael Evans, “Germans Agree to Security Mission,” London Times, 27 February 2002.

34. Michael Elliott, “The Battle Over Peacekeeping,” Time, 4 March 2002, 31; Esther Schrader and Greg 

Miller, “Avowals Aside, U.S.’ Afghan Role Has Become That of Peacekeeper,” Los Angeles Times, 25 February 2002, 

1.

35. Mason Arquette (pseudonym), 26 April 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and 

tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Arquette interview.

36. Mason Arquette is a pseudonym.

37. Arquette interview, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

38. Approximately 27 Afghan troops fi ghting alongside ODA 574 were also killed by the bomb blast.

39. Roane; Arquette interview, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

40. Mulholland interview; Glasser, “Al Qaeda Aides Killed in Raids,” Washington Post, 5 December 2001, 1. 

Tora Bora is actually the name of a village in a valley in the White Mountains region. In 1996 while in Jalalabad, bin 

Laden had used the nearby caves on Milawa Mountain. During the fi ghting the press used the term “Tora Bora” to 

defi ne the area of the battle.

41. Glasser, “Reputed Bin Laden Hideout Targeted,” Washington Post, 4 December 2001, 12.

42. Drew Brown, “Opportunity Lost in Tora Bora,” The Kansas City Star, 13 October 2002, 1; Mulholland 

interview.

43. CMH, “The Course of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan”; ODA 

572, “Lessons Learned, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,” 12 March 2002, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg; Mulholland interview. Dwayne Torgelson is a pseudonym.

44. FRONTLINE: “Campaign Against Terror;” John Kifner and Eric Schmitt, “Fierce Al Qaeda Defense Seen 

As A Sign of Terror Leader’s Proximity,” New York Times, 14 December 2001, 1. Shannon Whitley is a pseudonym.

45. Glasser, “U.S. Attacks ON Al Qaeda Intensify,” Washington Post, 10 December 2001, 1.

46. CPT Paul Douglas (pseudonym), ODA 561, 5th SFG, interview with Sepp, 25 April 2002, Fort Campbell, 

tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

47. Molly Moore and Susan B. Glasser, “Remnants of Al Qaeda Flee Toward Pakistan,” Washington Post, 

17 December 2001, 1; Moore and Glasser, “Afghan Militias Claim Victory in Tora Bora,” Washington Post, 18 

December 2001, 1; FRONTLINE: “Campaign Against Terror.” Jeremy Parsons is a pseudonym.
270

48. Brown, “Opportunity Lost in Tora Bora,” 1; FRONTLINE: “Campaign Against Terror.” Wallace Seifert is 

a pseudonym.

49. Karl Kramer (pseudonym) and Sylvester Largent (pseudonym), B Company, 5th Battalion, 19th SFG, 

interview with C.H. Briscoe and David Beech, 9 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, tape recording and notes, 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

50. Ibid.

51. “History,” The Army National Guard, at <www.arng.army.mil/history>.

52. Adam Fulkerson is a pseudonym.

53. Kip Kupinski and Don Forsythe are pseudonyms.

54. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army (DA), 1999), 4-14 and 5-15. 

55. Daniel Fitzgerald, Adam Fulkerson, and Jesus Martinez are pseudonyms. “Rakkasan” is the nickname 

for the 187th Infantry Regiment that comprises the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. During the occupation of 

Japan after World War II, the Japanese gave the regiment the name “Rakkasans” which loosely translates as “falling 

umbrellas.”

56. Thomas Barrington, Wilfred Chandler, and Dwayne Jackman (all pseudonyms), C Company, 112th Signal 

Battalion, Fort Bragg, interview with James Schroder, 10 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

57. “Civil Affairs Humanitarian Assessment of Bamian Region, Hazarajat, Afghanistan, 09-18 Dec 01,” C 

Company, 96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion, 28 December 01, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; John 

Bowman, James McLemore, and Charles Walters are pseudonyms.

58. “Civil Affairs Humanitarian Assessment of Taloqan-Konduz, Afghanistan 19-25 Dec 01,” C Company, 96th 

CA Battalion, 1 January 2002; “Operational Summary of C Company, 96th CA Battalion Deployment in Support of 

ENDURING FREEDOM (24 September 2001-31 March 2002,” C Company, 96th CA Battalion (Airborne), 4 April 

2002, 6, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. 

59. Ibid., 3-4; “Civil Affairs Humanitarian Assessment of Herat Region, Afghanistan 01-12 Jan 02,” Company 

C, 96th CA Battalion, 12 January 2002, 1-2, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. Chuck Allison is a 

pseudonym.

60. “Operational Summary of C Company,” 4, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

61. Ibid., 6.

62. Ibid., 3; SFC Mark Patterson (pseudonym), CAT-A36 Team Sergeant, Company C, 96th CA Battalion, 1 

October 2002, Fort Bragg, notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; LTC John Olanski (pseudonym) and 

LTC Tim Marks (pseudonym), CJCMOTF, 30 September 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. 

63. U.S. Army FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, DA, February 2000), 1-8, 

1-9, 2-2.

64. Patrick Cockburn, “British Charity’s Effort to Clear Tunnel Leads Way for Aid Projects,” at <http://news.

independent.co.uk/world/asia/_china/story.jsp?story=110493>.

65. Silas Greene (pseudonym), CAT-A41, 96th CA Battalion, interview with Sepp, 28 August 2002, Fort 

Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Greene interview. Gray Jaffe is a pseudonym.

66. U.S. Agency for International Development, “Central Asia Region—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #43 

(FY 2002), 14 January 2002; “Central Asia Region—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #16 (FY 2002), 18 January 

2002.

67. Bart Schuyler is a pseudonym. Marc Kaufman, “Hundreds Are Rescued After Afghan Avalanche,” Washington Post, 8 February 2002, 18.

68. Silas Greene, Roger McDonald, Bart Schulyer, and Lyle Canberra are pseudonyms.

69. Greene interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

70. Silas Greene, Roger McDonald, and Bart Schulyer (pseudonyms), 5 April 2002, Fort Bragg, interview 

with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.
271

76. Ibid.

77. CENTCOM update, <http://www.centcom.mil/operations/Enduring_Freedom/Updates/efupdatejan20. htm>.

78. Stan Rauch (pseudonym), HHC, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, interview 

with James Schroder, 25 April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg, hereafter referred to as Rauch interview.

79. Tony Perry, “Soil-Clogged Engines Blamed for Fatal Afghan Helicopter Crash,” The Los Angeles Times, 7 

August 2002.

80. Rauch interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

81. Pseudonym.

82. Pseudonyms.

83. Rauch interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

84. John Gates (pseudonym), Company B, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, interview with James Schroder, 25 March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, 

Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Gates interview.

85. Pseudonym.

86. Charles Lafayette (pseudonym), HHC, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, interview with James 

Schroder, 22 April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

87. Gates interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

88. Ibid.

89. Kerry Regent (pseudonym), HHC, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, interview with Schroder, 

25 April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

90. Gates interview.

91. Ibid.

92. Doug Anton, Mel Pierce, Don Forsyth, Jack Kittridge, Mike Huffman, and Jim Hall are pseudonyms.

93. Doug Anton, 11 July 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Anton interview.

94. Ibid.

95. B Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG After Action Report: Mir Wais Hospital dated 29 January 2002, 

provided by SFC Robert Staunton (pseudonym) in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

96. Anton interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.; Khan Mohammed was the new military commander of Kandahar, serving under Sherzai, the returned 

governor of the city and province.

100. “Medevac” is the abbreviation for medical evacuation.

101. Anton interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

102. Ibid.; B Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG After Action Report: Mir Wais Hospital, dated 22 January 2002, 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. 

103. Ibid.

104. CW3 Carl Patterson is a pseudonym.

105. CW2 Aaron is a pseudonym.

106. CW3 Fontaine is a pseudonym.

107. Anton learned that later, the two explosive ordnance specialists who helped blast through the corridor wall 

in the hospital were killed in a demolition accident while clearing mines and unexploded ordnance near Kandahar. 

Anton interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

108. COL Mulholland ordered the CA assessment after he received the “mission accomplished” report from 

A-524. Anton interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

109. Jon West and Dwight Ashford (pseudonyms), and ODA 516, 10-11 July 2002, Fort Campbell, interview 

with Kalev Sepp, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as West and Ashford interview; 

Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048 (Hazar Qadam AQ Leadership Site),” 28 January 

2002, copy at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

110. Jon West, Dwight Ashford, Jesse Wilcox, Albert Payle, Jon Hsu, Colin Bermann, and Sterling Jackson are 

pseudonyms.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.
272

113. CFLCC is pronounced “SIFF-lick.”

114. West and Ashford interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Memorandum, “Narrative AfterAction Report of Target AQ-048.”

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. These modifi ed trucks bristled with fi ve M240 7.62mm machine guns and either an MK-19 40mm grenade 

launcher or an M-2 12.65mm (.50-caliber) heavy machine gun and carried 15 soldiers. They were benignly called 

ground mobility vehicles (GMVs).

118. West and Ashford interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Memorandum, “Narrative AfterAction Report of Target AQ-048.”

119. Ibid.

120. The company commander was not informed of the reason for the “mission abort” until his return to Kandahar, because at the landing zone, as per his plan, his force had not set up the satellite antenna needed to communicate with JSOTF-South at Kandahar. Jon West (pseudonym), 10-11 July 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev 

Sepp, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as West interview.

121. The two CH-53 helicopters came from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

122. This was the fi rst and only mission where any element of A-1-5 fl ew in U.S. Army Special Operations 

Chinooks in Afghanistan.

123. West and Ashford interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Memorandum, “Narrative AfterAction Report of Target AQ-048.”

124. Ibid.

125. One of the two drivers was U.S. Navy BM1 Jackson Stirling (pseudonym), one of four Navy explosive 

ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists attached to West’s company. West, Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action 

Report of Target AQ-048.

126. West and Ashford interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Memorandum, “Narrative AfterAction Report of Target AQ-048.”

127. Ibid.

128. Two other enemy fi ghters died of their wounds shortly afterward. Four of the detainees were found shackled 

in leg irons. West and Ashford interview.

129. West and Ashford interview, and Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”

130. Fullerton, “U.S. Was Misled in Deadly Raid, Afghans Say,” Washington Post, 31 January 2002.

131. Schmitt, “After January Raid, Gen. Franks Promises to Do Better,” New York Times, 8 February 2002. COL 

Mulholland, 5th SFG commander, later commented on the trade-off between the security and surprise inherent to 

unilateral action, and the intelligence gained by including local Afghan forces in operations. Mulholland interview.

132. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD New Briefi ng – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,” DefenseLINK

(21 February 2002), <http://defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/t02212002_t0221sd.html>.

133. West interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

134. West and Ashford interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; “AQ002 Overview” by Major 

David Crist, n.d., Kandahar, Afghanistan, tape recordings and notes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

135. Ibid.; SFC Rocky Salvadorini is a pseudonym. 

136. CPT Brian Acosta, SFC Steve Robinson, SGT Nolan Ward, SGT Mitchell Dennison, SP4 Ike Monroe, 

and SP4 Dale Stevenson (pseudonyms), TPD 910, A Company, 9th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion, 

interviews by C.H. Briscoe and James Schroder, 8 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, and SSG Morgan, 26 August 

2002, Fort Bragg, tape recordings and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

137. MAJ Mike Ryan (pseudonym), commander, C Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th SFG Operational Detachment 

Bravo 560, 5th SFG, interview by Richard Kiper, 26 April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Ryan interview. 

138. Sultan Shahin, “Islamabad’s plan to tame tribal areas,” 15 November 2001, <www.jammu-kashmir.com/

insights/insight20011201b.html>; The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Part IX, Chapter 3: Tribal 

Areas, 12 April 1973, <www/[alostamo/prg/pakistan/constitution>.

139. Ryan interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. Aaron Watson is a pseudonym.

140. “U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan on CNN,” Washington File, U.S. Department of State, 7 November 2001, 

<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01110718.htm>; LTC James Karnes (pseudonym), U.S. Army John F. 

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS), interviews by Richard Kiper, 19 and 21 August 2001, Fort 

Bragg, tape recording, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Karnes interview; Edward 
273

Cody and Kamran Khan, “Al Qaeda Prisoners Stage Revolt in Pakistan,” Washington Post, 20 December 2001, 1.

141. Ibid.

142. Karnes interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Schrader, “POWs Will Go to Base in Cuba,” 

Los Angeles Times, 28 December 2001, 1; “U.S. to hold detainees at Guantanamo Bay,” <www.cnn.com/2001/

US/12/27/ret.holding.detainees>.

143. Dao, 1; Moniz and Squitieri, 8.

144. CPT Barry Sanford (pseudonym), SFC Sol Sorrenson (pseudonym), SFC Forrest Kilbourne (pseudonym), 

and SGT Reginald Holloway (pseudonym), D Company, 96th CA Battalion, interview by Richard Kiper, 5 April 

2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter cited as Sanford 

interview.

145. “Fact Sheet: Humanitarian Aid to the Afghan People,” U.S. Department of State International Information 

Programs, 9 October 2001, <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01100916.htm>; “The U.S. Commitment to 

the Afghan People,” The White House, Offi ce of the Press Secretary, 19 November 2001, <www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2001/11/print/20011110-4.html>.

146. Sanford interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. Matt DiJurnigan is a pseudonym.

147. Dexter Yates is a pseudonym.

148. The crisis-response element (CRE) was pronounced “Kree.”

149. Dexter Yates, 8 May 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

150. Ibid.

151. Twelve Suunto watches with built-in digital barometers were ordered by the deployed teams, because the 

U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) personnel needed to make barometric pressure readings when 

planning precision-guided bomb attacks. ODA 595 requested the saddles, which were purchased from a tack store in 

Germany. The saddles were delivered after the detachment obtained four-wheel-drive trucks, which they preferred 

for transportation. Fuller interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid.

154. Dennis Steele, “Unconventional Logistics,” Army, November 2002, 8-10, and Fuller interview.

155. Fuller noted that these funds came out of EUCOM’s budget, and were beginning to be reimbursed by 

CENTCOM six months later. Fuller interview. “During the fi rst part of the Afghanistan campaign, the [21st Theater 

Army Support Command] was the sole supplier for U.S. military special operations teams and CIA special operating 

groups in Afghanistan, catering to every need and want made by military special operators or CIA agents in the fi eld. 

They located and bought . . . specialized batteries, nonmilitary tactical gear, civilian camping gear, mountaineering 

clothing and special food. . . . By the time the conventional supply system took over, the [21st TASCOM] had bought 

and shipped nearly 2 million pounds of wheat and 93,000 blankets for humanitarian relief, along with the tons of 

equipment and supplies to keep the military operation going.” Steele, 8-10.

156. Fuller interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

157. Jack Sykes (pseudonym), 8 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and 

tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Sykes interview.

158. Ibid.

159. Until 9/11 changed their planning calendars, 3rd/20th SF was programmed to send one of its companies 

to Bosnia in 2002, and conduct Operation TRADEWINDS again in 2003. Jorge Bustillo, 8 May 2002, Bagram, 

Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter 

referred to as Bustillo interview.

160. Sykes interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

161. Ibid.

162. These transfers were not as diffi cult as might be anticipated. Other non-SF National Guard units, short 

of personnel and not under the same requirements for physical fi tness, were eager to get new members. Also, many 

of the transferred soldiers left with invitations to rejoin their old unit when they could meet the physical testing 

standards again. Bustillo interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

163. Sykes interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

164. Justin Pine (pseudonym), 3rd SFG, 10 May 2002, Bagram, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and 

tapes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

165. MAJ Dalton Carlisle (pseudonym) and SGM Geoff Beckwith (pseudonym), B Company, 2nd Battalion, 

3rd SFG, interview with Briscoe and Beach, 2 May 2002, Camp Snoopy, Qatar, tape recording and notes, USASOC 
274

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. Julian McGinnis and Dwight Ashford are pseudonyms.

166. Ibid.

167. Akmed Astor is a pseudonym. SGT Akmed Astor, 8th PSYOP Battalion, interview by SSG Patricia 

Johnston, 6 June 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter 

referred to as Astor interview.

168. Mohammed Osterman is a pseudonym. 

169. 

170. Ibid.

171. Ibid.

172. Jason Lafayette (pseudonym), MST, B Company, 528th Support Battalion, Special Operations Support 

Command, interview with James Schroder, 10 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, tape recording and notes, 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

173. Ibid.

174. Ibid.

175. Ibid.

176. Alfred Mann and Jackson Ferrell are pseudonyms; Alfred Mann (pseudonym), HHC, 2nd Battalion, 160th 

Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), interview with James Schroder, 25 March 2002, Fort Campbell, 

tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

177. Curtis Jameson is a pseudonym.

178. James Brinks is a pseudonym; Jackson Ferrell (pseudonym), B Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special 

Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), interview with James Schroder, 22 April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape 

recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

179. Silas Greene and Karl Jurgens are pseudonyms. The Khowst airfi eld was a dirt runway almost 8,000 feet 

long built by the Red army during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The U.S. forces named the runway Chapman 

Field in memory of SFC Nate Chapman, the fi rst U.S. Special Forces soldier to be killed by hostile fi re during the 

American expedition. P.W.B., 26 April 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

180. A U.S. Air Force Special Operations Combat Control Team (CCT) is “A team of Air Force personnel 

organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Under clandestine, covert, or lowvisibility conditions, these teams establish and control air assault zones; assist aircraft by verbal control, positioning, 

and operating navigation aids; conduct limited offensive direct action and special reconnaissance operations; and 

assist in the insertion and extraction of special operations forces.” <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/

s/04881.html>.

181. Greene interview, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

182. Ibid.

183. Ibid.

184. Ibid., and David A. Duffy, 8 July 2002, Fort Bragg, interview with Kalev Sepp, and 24 September 2002, 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, telephonic interview with Sepp, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg.

185. Jed Samuels, Terry Sanders, Mickey Hensen, Rudy Madden, Gregg Corr, Max Gorley, Ty McFadden, Marc 

Lorenzo, Jason Thurman, Jake Millett, Jerry Rawlins, Stefan Morris, and Carl Hooper are pseudonyms. Samuels, et 

al., 10 May 2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, tape recording and notes, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

186. Ibid.

187. Ibid. Due to space constraints on transport aircraft, the team’s vehicles arrived four days after the team had 

landed. The ODA personnel traveled on two different aircraft as well.

188. Ibid.

189. Ibid.
275

Chapter 5

The New War

It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the 

strong man stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose 

face is marred by the dust and sweat and blood; who knows the great 

enthusiasms, the great devotions and spends himself in a worthy course; 

who at the best, knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and 

who, at worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly; so that his 

place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither 

victory or defeat.1

This chapter explains the role of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) during the 

transformation period of the war in Afghanistan. This period is marked by the U.S. resolve 

to help the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) eliminate the remaining pockets of Taliban and 

al-Qaeda resistance, to widely distribute humanitarian assistance to the previously repressed 

citizens of Afghanistan, to organize and prioritize reconstruction efforts, and to shift the control of the war to conventional American forces. By late winter 2001, the U.S.-led coalition had 

driven the Taliban leaders from Kandahar and Kabul, destroyed al-Qaeda training camps, and 

installed Interim President Hamid Karzai. However, Taliban and al-Qaeda forces had not been 

totally eliminated; many escaped across the border into Pakistan, others retreated to sympathetic villages, and some simply switched sides.2

Responding to the changing face of the war, ARSOF conducted not only unconventional 

warfare (UW) missions but also foreign internal defense (FID) missions—like UW, an umbrella 

concept that covered a broad range of activities focused primarily on helping a host government 

address internal threats and their underlying causes.3 And CENTCOM’s Special Operations 

Command (SOCCENT) agreed to a rotation plan derived from special operations commanders 

in theater. Many of the ARSOF units had been in combat zones since the war started and needed 

a respite and a refi t before conducting follow-on missions.

Figure 1. Marching was the “fi rst step” in building a national army.
276

Figure 2. Equipment issue is the fi rst, and sometimes last, offi cial act for some Army recruits.

During this transition period, the elusive enemy in Afghanistan was sometimes diffi cult to 

identify. In this “Wild West” environment, carrying a weapon provided some measure of selfprotection and symbolized manhood among the ethnic groups. Once the weapons were issued 

to many anti-Taliban fi ghters, they vanished into the night, not waiting for the payday that might 

never come. Groups of bandits roamed the countryside, terrorizing villagers and foreigners alike. 

More than a handful of journalists were either killed or wounded.4 On 4 March 2002, Canadian 

journalist Kathleen Kenna was wounded when dissatisfi ed Afghan gunmen threw a grenade into 

the rented vehicle she was sharing with other media personnel. Fortunately for Ms. Kenna, 160th 

SOAR medic Kerry Zimmer (pseudonym) was at a Special Forces base area just a few kilometers 

east of Gardez.5

 Zimmer treated her wounds, and once she was stable, Special Forces soldiers 

arranged for Afghan security forces to accompany the journalists who wanted to attempt another 

trip into the city. As the group approached the city, the convoy came under mortar and smallarms fi re. Everyone abandoned their vehicles until the shelling stopped, and then they returned to 

the Special Forces base. The SF soldiers offered a larger escort party, but the journalists declined 

and spent the night in their cars outside the compound in the cold.6

Special Forces soldiers routinely came under fi re at their base areas. Despite the visible 

presence of paid Afghan security forces who conscientiously guarded the Americans, enemy 

fi ghters were undeterred and fi red on soldiers at will. SF soldiers operating in and around the 

cities and in rural areas never forgot that Afghanistan was still “bad guy” country.

Impacting operations during this period were disputes over the spoils of war by antiTaliban commanders; victorious warlords claimed many rewards, many of which were inconsistent with the newly formed AIA government’s goals. Rewards went beyond war booty 

to control of humanitarian aid and reconstruction priorities. ARSOF commanders shifted their 

focus to another Special Forces mission, FID. The ODAs of the 5th SFG and 3rd Battalion, 3rd 

SFG, trained and equipped local tribal militias to provide the interim government with a viable 

defense force. That training convinced American conventional force leaders that the Afghan 

militias could have a major role in the upcoming ANACONDA operation.

The offensive into the Shah-i-Khot Valley quickly grew from a Special Forces initiative into 

a full-scale allied assault based on increased threat estimates. LTG P.T. Mikolashek, Combined 

Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), directed MG Franklin L. “Buster” Hagenbeck, 
277

10th Mountain Division, to take control of the largest contingent of U.S. ground forces to date. 

COL Frank Wiercinski, 3rd Brigade “Rakkasans,” 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), would 

command Task Force (TF) Rakkasan, made up of about 1,500 soldiers from his 1st and 2nd Battalions, 187th Infantry, and from 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division.7

 Two hundred coalition soldiers from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and Norway would 

conduct reconnaissance.8 Approximately 900 Afghans under several commanders supported by 

Special Forces ODAs were to participate.9 Having worked with the key anti-Taliban leaders and 

their forces, Special Forces elements were critical to synchronizing the assaults of the unconventional Afghan militia forces with the conventional American units in the combined offensive.

Operation ANACONDA allowed suffi cient overlap between the 5th SFG ODAs and the 3rd 

SFG teams to effect a smooth transition with local Afghan military forces and to appreciate the 

efforts of other ARSOF elements in the area. Before 3rd SFG assumed the CJSOTF mantle, LTC 

Terry Sanders (pseudonym), 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, was assigned to CJSOTF-South (TF Kabar) 

commanded by Commodore Robert Harward. The “Third of the Third” ODAs performed a variety 

of missions during ANACONDA while assuming the 5th SFG missions in southern Afghanistan. 

The 5th SFG returned to the United States at the conclusion of ANACONDA, and JSOTF-North 

(TF Dagger) at K2, Uzbekistan, stood down. There was a short period when CJSOTF-South (TF 

Kabar) served as the CJSOTF-Afghanistan, thus controlling all Army and coalition SOF in country. The 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG teams continued to provide high-quality training and emergency 

medical care as they established good, solid rapport with the Afghan forces.

During the fi nal stages of Operation ANACONDA, the 3rd SFG advance echelon (ADVON) worked feverishly to ensure that communications, automation, and infrastructure were 

established to assume the new CJSOTF-Afghanistan mission. During March 2002, 3rd SFG 

soldiers built the headquarters at Bagram with the assistance of contracted Afghan labor. COL 

Mark Phelan organized his operations, support, and signal centers for effi ciency while fully 

integrating the coalition forces into the command, notably making a New Zealander his deputy 

commander.10 Phelan continued the transition from UW to FID. Capitalizing on the coalition 

forces’ capabilities to broaden the special reconnaissance (SR) aspect associated with identifying and confi rming Taliban and al-Qaeda activity in the border provinces, Phelan expanded the 

hunt. However, the most important mission for the CJSOTF commander was to establish the 

Kabul Military Academy as a training center for the national Afghan army. A national army was 

a vital element of the AIA government plan for security and credibility.

Army National Guard (ARNG) Special Forces units entered Afghanistan in late February 

2002, after a brief stay at K2. The Special Forces ODAs from the 5th Battalion, 19th SFG arrived in mid-February at K2 and were integrated into the Special Forces campaign plan, initially to replace rotating 5th SFG teams. On 1 March, ODAs from B Company, 5th Battalion, 

19th SFG, replaced the 5th SFG Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) 

at Kandahar Airport, the location of the 3rd Brigade “Rakkasans,” 101st Airborne Division. 

ODA 981 conducted operations in the surrounding areas, coordinated Special Forces activities 

with the 101st, and supported the Special Forces operating base in Kandahar. 19th SFG was 

initially assigned to JSOTF-South during March before coming under 3rd SFG at Bagram on 

1 April 2002. Later in March, ODAs from the 2nd Battalion, 19th SFG arrived at K2 to assume control of the Special Forces facilities there. In late April 2002, ODA 923 and ODA 966 
278

relocated to Bagram to conduct sensitive site exploitation (SSE) missions, reconnoiter landing 

zones (LZs) for future humanitarian support, and search for burial sites and weapons caches in 

the Tora Bora region.11

B Company, 3rd Battalion, 160th SOAR, at Kandahar Airport assumed the Chinook mission 

from 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, at the end of Operation ANACONDA, and by 31 March, it 

was task organized under the Joint Special Operations Air Component–South (JSOAC-South). 

Just after its arrival at Kandahar, the 3rd Battalion Night Stalkers were called to Bagram to assist with the rescue effort on Takur Ghar during Operation ANACONDA. Afterward, the combat losses of 2nd Battalion MH-47Es—one destroyed and two battle damaged—led to a joint 

effort by both Chinook units to meet the constant ARSOF aviation mission.

When JSOAC-South relocated its headquarters and Air Force special operations aircraft to 

Masirah Island, Oman, and Qatar, the 3rd Battalion, based at Kandahar, picked up most of the 

CJSOTF-Afghanistan missions in support of coalition forces that were split.12 This was signifi -

cantly different from the joint basing of JSOTF-North and the JSOAC at K2. Despite having to 

request air assets through the JSOAC on Masirah Island, the coalition units, more familiar with 

a very structured system, quickly adapted to the formal procedures and received ample support 

for their missions.13

The CA rotation plan brought many more Army reservists into the war for longer durations 

than the single active duty unit. The 489th CAB from Knoxville, Kentucky, eventually replaced 

the 96th CAB. Through the spring, soldiers from the 96th and 489th CABs increased local support, managed humanitarian efforts across Afghanistan, and effected well-coordinated handoffs 

between units. The CAT-A personnel, looking like relief workers with beards and in civilian 

clothing, negotiated with local Afghans on humanitarian projects that ranged from rebuilding 

schools to providing electric generators and digging wells to rebuilding agriculture irrigation 

canals. The civil-military goal was to identify projects that would have an immediate impact 

but would not compete with those projects the NGOs were working. The CA teams in the fi eld, 

having unparalleled hands-on contact with ordinary Afghans, provided the catalyst necessary 

to stimulate national recovery. Military personnel wearing civilian clothing was a continuing 

“bone of contention” for many relief agencies, despite the absence of problems.14

PSYOP reservists also entered the war, and with the arrival of the 3rd SFG, COL Phelan 

stressed the integration of these force multipliers. Tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) provided continuity in the region and shared assessments on the Afghan population’s state of mind. While 

many ODA commanders, unfamiliar with PSYOP capabilities and their “value added,” were 

reluctant to integrate the tactical elements with their teams because they had never trained 

together, eventually, they were won over. CPT Brian Acosta (pseudonym), PSYOP detachment 

commander, was able to integrate PSYOP objectives into the campaign plan, and Phelan pushed 

direct coordination with ODA commanders.15

During spring 2002, Special Operations Media Systems–Broadcast (SOMS-B) teams capitalized on the radio listening culture to infl uence the Afghan population’s attitude toward U.S. 

and coalition forces. Through the work of CA teams that coordinated with Afghan radio stations in Khowst, Kabul, and Kandahar, messages and music tapes were accepted, integrated, 

and broadcast by local announcers. By 1 April, 66 soldiers of the 345th PSYOP Company 
279

(Airborne), San Antonio, Texas, had assumed the tactical PSYOP efforts for noncombatant 

humanitarian and stability operations. In April, the SOMS-B was broadcasting health messages 

about endemic diseases to support CA medical awareness campaigns in Afghanistan.16

The Kabul Military Academy began training the fi rst recruits for the Afghan National Army 

(ANA) on 1 May 2002. The mission of 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG was to train and organize an 

ethnically diverse national army. The ODAs from the First of the Third were to train nine 600-

man infantry battalions and six 300-man border guard battalions within 10 months. The biggest 

challenge for the Special Forces, besides three distinct languages, no Afghan understanding 

of teamwork, and age-old tribal rivalries and hatred, was to reduce the inculcated tribal norms 

suffi ciently to develop a national sense of unity. In the process, Special Forces troops worked 

to help Afghan recruits understand individual and unit relationships and responsibilities to a 

higher command and to embrace the lawful government of Afghanistan. When new recruits 

arrived without weapons or equipment, captured Taliban and al-Qaeda weapons were issued. 

Training ammunition for predominantly Soviet weapons came from the same source.

Figure 3. ANA offi cers course begins at Kabul Military Academy.

CJSOTF-Afghanistan took charge of Army special operations and coalition forces in Afghanistan on 31 March and pushed forward. As the war transitioned to its next phase, Phelan 

capitalized on CA and PSYOP units to help the interim government bring some stability to the 

country and humanitarian relief to the Afghan people. For as long as the United States remains 

committed to the Karzai government, ARSOF will continue to play a vital role in the stability 

of the region and present a powerful deterrent to enemy insurgency.

Army special operations soldier stories related to the developing fi ght in the Shah-i-Khot 

Valley will be chronologically integrated into the general narrative. In late January 2002, 

ODA 594, while conducting combat reconnaissance in the vicinity of Zurmat and Terghul 

Ghar Mountain in the Shah-i-Khot Valley, was warned by its Afghan security not to proceed 

any farther. The local villagers reported that groups of Taliban and al-Qaeda were concentrating in the valley. Based on ODA 594’s report, JSOTF-North focused intelligence collection on 

the area. By mid-February, the K2 intelligence analysts had collected and studied data from a 

variety of sources, particularly human intelligence (HUMINT), to surmise that al-Qaeda were 

probably reorganizing, refi tting, and preparing for a counteroffensive. Initial estimates were 

low—150 to 200 fi ghters.
280

The Shah-i-Khot Valley in Paktia Province encompasses an 

area of roughly 60 square miles between Gardez, Khowst, and 

Orgun. The valley begins near the fl ats of Gardez and runs in 

a southwesterly direction. To the east, a major mountain range, 

distinguished by steep ridges, caves, and deep ravines, rises to 

12,000 feet above sea level. Shah-i-Khot—which means “place 

of the king”—has been a safe haven for Afghans for more than 

2,000 years. The area contains a few main travel routes, traversing the valleys toward Pakistan, but numerous smaller goat 

paths that animal herders and smugglers used regularly offered 

additional avenues of escape for small groups. The towns of 

Serkhankheyl (Sair-khan-kell) and Marzak (Mar-zack), at the 

southern end of the valley, were thought to be harboring fugitive enemy fi ghters. The dominating terrain in the area consisted of a major ridgeline jutting west of the towns, Terghul Ghar, which the U.S. forces referred 

to as the “Whale” because it reminded many of the dominant terrain feature at the National 

Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. Takur Ghar, a high mountain peak south of the 

towns, offered an expansive westward view of the valley. The mountainous region was classic 

guerrilla terrain—easily defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of escape, and near a 

sympathetic border.

As the JSOTF-North staff continued to gather intelligence from all sources to develop the 

situation, the lessons learned from the Tora Bora operations were integrated into the analysis. 

As the threat estimate grew larger, COL John Mulholland, who had scrutinized the mountainous terrain, recognized that a deliberate attack against a well-entrenched enemy force exceeded 

the capabilities of his task force to plan and execute. Intelligence indicated that these gathering 

fi ghters would not follow the Tora Bora scenario.

Having discussed his concerns with MG Hagenbeck, commander, 10th Mountain Division, COL Mulholland arranged to brief the concept of the operation to LTG Mikolashek, the 

Figure 4. Terrain models for offi cer tactical training.

Figure 5. Focused view

of Paktia Province.
281

CFLCC, at Bagram. Senior representatives from every joint and conventional headquarters in 

theater, as well as the coalition force commanders, attended the briefi ng. Mikolashek directed 

10th Mountain Division to take the lead for planning and execution. JSOTF-North was to be 

heavily involved throughout. JSOTF-South was to develop the SR plan for the operation.

The center of gravity for planning became Bagram Air 

Base. COL Mulholland set up a small tactical operations 

center (TOC), JSOTF-North (Forward), next to the TF 

Mountain TOC. Almost simultaneously, LTC Terry Sanders, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, charged with developing the 

SR mission for JSOTF-South, left Kandahar to establish a 

planning cell at Bagram.17 SR teams were to maintain 24-

hour surveillance of major escape routes and direct close 

air support (CAS) against escaping enemy forces as well 

as serve as early warning of reinforcing elements.18 Coalition units from Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, 

and Norway totaled another 200 troops.19 Army Special 

Forces that had trained and equipped several Afghan forces would accompany about 900 fi ghters charged with launching the offensive operation.20

The urgency to get ANACONDA under way did not allow the intelligence picture to fully 

develop in the Shah-i-Khot. COL Mulholland consistently voiced his concerns that intelligence 

sources underestimated the strength and disposition of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the valley and nearby mountains. “I knew in my gut that there were more than a few hundred,” said the 

5th SFG commander.21 It was most important to have eyes on the targets well in advance of the 

main assaults into the valley area. That was the purpose of well-positioned SR teams.

But precipitous terrain limited helicopter LZ choices, and a rash of bad weather delayed 

insertion of the SR teams until just two days before. Still, for more than a week, coalition planners joined CW3 Arthur Solanis (pseudonym), the 160th SOAR fl ight lead, in the “Coalition 

Café” to scour map sheets and photo imagery for LZs to insert more than 25 SR teams. The 

LZs had to be tenable, afford good reconnaissance, and cover the identifi ed escape routes, or 

“ratlines,” into Pakistan.22 In retrospect, the most reliable intelligence picture came from earlier 

reconnaissance reports that ODA 594 had submitted.

Operation ANACONDA’s main effort was to be TF Hammer, an Afghan force comprised 

of three local militias led by Commander Zia, being supported by LTC Carl Hooper 

(pseudonym)and two Special Forces ODAs.23 Commander Lodi, an old mujahideen warrior, 

had appointed Zia as his successor to command his 500- to 600-man force that ODA 594 and 

ODA 372 had trained, organized, and equipped to conduct combat operations in the Gardez 

region. The Special Forces teams regarded Zia’s own 300-plus Afghans as “Tier One Pashtuns” 

because of their willingness to learn and to be trained to follow directions, and because they 

had a strong desire to kill al-Qaeda and Taliban members. According to the American plan, 

Zia’s forces were to move south from Gardez in a mounted formation and swing west to attack 

toward Terghul Ghar from west to east. Two other Afghan forces, labeled TF Anvil, would 

establish outer ring positions on the east and south to block escape routes into Pakistan. The 

300 to 500 Afghan fi ghters of Zakim Khan from Orgun, supported by ODA 542 and ODA 381, 

Figure 6. Bagram Air Base becomes 

the “center of the universe.”
282

would establish the southerly blocking positions. The 500 Afghan fi ghters of Kamel Khan from 

Khowst, supported by ODA 571 and ODA 392, would block on the eastern side of the outer ring.

To support the main Afghan attack from the west, U.S. light infantry forces from TF Rakkasan were to air assault into an inner ring of blocking positions on the eastern side of the valley fl oor. The objective was to hit the enemy (believed to be sequestered in Serkhankheyl and 

Marzak) with a swift and forceful attack, killing or capturing him, and to force the others to run 

into the blocking positions. As allied troops were massed at Bagram to support ANACONDA, 

the American force presence quadrupled in less than 10 days, thereby eliminating any element 

of surprise. The operation was to begin at dawn on 27 February, but heavy snowfall on the 26th 

delayed the start for two days.

Having established solid relationships with key anti-Taliban forces after living and fi ghting with them for months, Special Forces teams were critical to synchronizing the Afghan 

part of the combined offensive in the Shah-i-Khot Valley. The day before the operation began 

ODA 542 and ODA 381 had accompanied Zakim Khan’s 300 to 500 Afghans from Orgun into 

their blocking positions in the Naka Valley. From the village of Zerok, Zakim Khan’s forces 

conducted mounted reconnaissance patrols, established observation posts (OPs), and manned 

security checkpoints around the Naka Valley. On the same day in the east, ODA 571 and ODA 

392 assisted Kamel Khan’s movement from Khowst into the Shimal Valley.24

This basic summary of preparatory activities for Operation ANACONDA explains what 

was supposed to be happening. The next vignette will explain the Special Forces’ role with the 

Afghan force; amplify the diffi culties they encountered; and clarify some confusion about what 

the Americans expected, what support was promised, and what happened when conventional 

forces encountered resistance. The “fog of war” at the beginning of ANACONDA was almost 

impenetrable.

Entering the Valley

Special Forces ODA 372, along with the other detachments in 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, was 

preparing for a training exercise in Africa when the United States was attacked by terrorists on 

9/11. There was speculation that it might be diverted to Afghanistan when the company headquarters moved to Kuwait in early December. But Three-Seven-Two stayed behind to provide 

future operations planners for the operations staff at battalion and to support the Special Forces 

teams overseas until just before Christmas.

CPT Mike McHenry (pseudonym), a former Armor offi cer turned Special Forces team 

leader, knew that to plan realistically for missions in Afghanistan he had to establish contact 

with the 5th SFG headquarters.25 On 25 January, after fl ying into Kandahar where the 3rd 

Battalion’s advance party was based, McHenry and ODA 372 fl ew to K2 to talk with the 5th 

SFG. Based on discussions with COL Mulholland, their mission was changed from future 

planning on 7 February to being inserted into the Gardez-Khowst area. The mission, based on 

six PowerPoint slides, was “to conduct clear and sweep operations, and be prepared to conduct 

security zone operations,” and assist Hazara Afghan leader Commander Zia Lodin. They were 

assuming ODA 594’s missions. Since “clear and sweep” is not a doctrinal term, McHenry was 

to determine its meaning. The team quickly realized that most of the information they needed 
283

would come from the team on the ground, ODA 594. By 17 February, all members of ODA 

372 were together in Gardez.

Unbeknownst to McHenry and his team who were planning clear and sweep operations with 

Commander Zia’s forces around Gardez, TF Mountain Commander MG Hagenbeck was planning Operation ANACONDA in the Shah-i-Khot Valley to the south. When ODA 372 and ODA 

594 were told that their Afghan forces were to have key roles, another Pashtun leader, Commander 

Khoshkeyer, brought a company-size force to Gardez to join Zia. For seven days, the two Special 

Forces teams trained the Afghan forces in offensive tactical maneuvers, movement techniques, 

and basic fi rst aid and then using 82mm mortars, conducted company live-fi re exercises. Despite 

not having sights for their mortars, the Hazaras were able to place effective indirect fi re rapidly 

using only their thumbs as aiming devices. The teams also made arrangements to supply the Afghan soldiers with cold-weather clothing and boots, new rifl es, and much-needed ammunition.

A third Afghan force commanded by Zia Abdullah was based north of Gardez, but his 

questionable loyalties posed a dilemma. Animosity among Hazaras, Pashtuns, Zia Abdullah’s 

men, and the Gardez shura made for a tense situation.26 While Commander Khoshkeyer had 

agreed to be subordinate to Zia Lodin, the arrangements remained tenuous.

Command among the Afghans was not the only leadership issue. Which American was 

in charge of the forces? Although McHenry was senior to CPT Gary Towson (pseudonym) of 

ODA 594, neither team had been put in charge. To further compound the issue, the two Special 

Forces ODAs were from different SFGs. Because Towson had more experience in Afghanistan and had also established a close working relationship with Zia, the two captains mutually 

agreed that Towson should be in charge of operations. McHenry and ODA 372 concentrated on 

building rapport with Khoshkeyer. When LTC Hooper, commander, 2nd Battalion, 5th SFG, 

arrived, the command relationships were further obfuscated.27

In December 2001, ODA 594 had entered the northern end of Shah-i-Khot Valley near 

Gardez. Having been warned not to proceed farther by their Afghan security force, the Special 

Forces team was convinced that there were Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in the valley. After his 

arrival, Hooper had directed McHenry and Towson to develop a concept whereby the two teams 

could use their Afghan forces to attack the enemy. Conventional forces would be involved, but 

Hooper could not tell them the extent of that involvement, only that the Afghans were to be the 

main effort.

The plan presented to Hooper factored in the tense relations between the Afghan forces in 

Gardez. The combined force would leave Gardez together, moving west of the terrain feature 

known as the “Whale” and, at the town of Surki, swing north into the valley. An Afghan force under the command of CW2 Stanley Harriman (ODA 372) would place a blocking position on the 

northern pass into the valley. Three Special Forces soldiers from ODA 372 plus a few Afghans 

would establish an OP to bring close air support (CAS) onto the enemy. The main effort would 

be made by Zia and Khoshkeyer supported by most of the two ODAs. At the southern entrance 

of the valley, McHenry (ODA 372) would emplace the 82mm mortars to cover the main attack 

(Towson and ODA 594) toward the fi nal objectives—four small villages in the valley. The forces 

of Zia Abdullah would establish checkpoints on roads leading into the area, guard the outer perimeter of the Gardez SF base, and reinforce Harriman at the northern blocking position.
284

Coalition forces and other Special Forces teams would establish long-range OPs in the 

mountains south of Surki, covering the potential escape corridors or ratlines. An Australian 

liaison offi cer would accompany McHenry (ODA 372) to keep the OPs abreast of the American 

and Afghan locations. American conventional infantry forces were to airland via helicopters 

behind the Afghan Military Forces (AMF). If the AMF encountered resistance beyond its capability, the conventional infantry force would pass through it to continue the attack and defeat 

the enemy. The American conventional forces would also exploit gains the AMF made. Hooper 

approved the concept.

In late February, CPTs McHenry and 

Towson fl ew to Bagram to be briefed on the 

special operations part of Operation ANACONDA. Both offi cers became concerned 

when they learned that TF Rakkasan troops 

would land just short of the main objectives 

rather than behind the Afghan force as they 

had suggested. Now the ODAs and Afghans 

would attack toward the American forces, 

engaging enemy forces between them. The 

possibility of a fi refi ght between the forces 

was great. 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain soldiers had no means of identifying 

friendly Afghans from the enemy. According to McHenry, the decision had been made, and no changes would be made. The operation 

used standing operating procedures (SOPs) of American conventional forces and followed the 

NTC timetable of events for a deliberate attack. Afghan forces were not attuned to this level of 

coordination and a very structured sequence of events. After the TF Mountain briefi ng, the two 

ODA commanders were concerned about the Afghan role in this combined operation. The AMF 

was still labeled as the main effort, but how the operation was to be executed (paragraph three 

of the fi ve-paragraph Army standard operation order format) appeared contradictory. Both saw 

disaster looming on the horizon.

McHenry (ODA 372) and Towson (ODA 594) afterward returned to Gardez and briefed 

their teams and Commanders Zia and Khoshkeyer. Both Special Forces commanders knew 

they could do nothing to prevent the American conventional forces from firing on friendly 

Afghans during the heat of battle. They could, however, prevent the AMF from firing on 

the infantrymen of TF Rakkasan. Since most of the Afghans had never seen an American 

soldier wearing his standard combat gear—helmet, armored vest, load-bearing equipment, and rucksack—the two Special Forces commanders took advantage of the Army 

engineer squad collocated at their base. They had one of the combat engineers dress in 

his full combat gear and then took him around to all the Afghan encampments. They literally used the young American soldier as a “live training aid” to show the Afghans what a 

fully equipped conventional Army fighting man looked like. Satisfied that they had done 

all they could to prevent friendly casualties at their level, the soldiers prepared for the 

upcoming battle.

Figure 7. Coalition view of Operation ANACONDA.
285

Field Expedient Triage

Early on the morning of 2 March, Commander Zia Loden’s forces departed Gardez in a 

large column of 39 vehicles of various sizes and condition. CPT Towson understood that he was 

in command, although LTC Hooper accompanied the force. Although done under the cover of 

darkness, the moon was nearly full, providing 95-percent illumination. Still, the mounted column carrying 450 fi ghters experienced problems from the start. Concern for operations security (OPSEC) prevented the ODAs from reconnoitering the road before leaving. The American 

attempt to enforce vehicle light discipline failed completely; the Afghans were unfamiliar with 

and thoroughly uncomfortable driving at night with their headlights off. Concessions that every 

other truck could use lights were ignored. When a truck broke down, troops had to be crammed 

aboard other crowded vehicles.

Snow and rain had wreaked havoc on the unimproved dirt tracks that the column was forced 

to follow through rough terrain, skirting the valley to the west. The Afghan column was not a 

military convoy. “It was like trying to herd cats. If a truck slowed down, stopped, or got stuck in 

the mud, those behind would attempt to pass,” said one Special Forces soldier.

In the midst of the controlled chaos, a large Ginga truck carrying 30 to 40 soldiers slid off 

the humped dirt track and tipped over, spilling troops everywhere. That element of the column 

halted, and the call went out for the Special Forces medics. Having few radios, the vehicles 

ahead continued off into the darkness. When SFC Bill Athens (pseudonym), the 3rd Battalion, 

3rd SFG, senior medic traveling in the trail vehicle, fi nally reached the accident site, it looked 

like a surreal mass-casualty exercise.28 There seemed to be about 30 or 40 Afghans laying 

around on the cold, wet ground moaning and groaning. Based on experience, Athens calculated 

that only 10 percent were really injured and required medical treatment.

As SFC Athens said later, “Totally bewildered by the scene but having a moment of brilliance, I grabbed the nearest interpreter and told him to yell as loud as he could, ‘Anybody who 

is wounded, get on the other trucks now!!’ There was a fl urry of movement among the Afghan 

bodies on the ground as the ‘wounded’ leaped up and scrambled aboard the other trucks. When 

that group cleared out, I saw about 12 still lying on the ground. Having accomplished my ‘fi eld 

expedient triage,’ we (the other medics and me) could focus on the seriously injured left on the 

ground.”

Between the trucks stuck in the mud, broken-down vehicles, the wrecked Ginga truck, and 

vehicles diverted to carry injured soldiers back to Gardez, the mounted column evolved into a 

walking and rolling force that slowly moved toward its attack position. Now, with soldiers walking, for safety and to meet the established time to be in the attack position, the convoy turned on 

all headlights, thus alerting any Taliban or al-Qaeda sympathizers or the enemy force. At Surki, 

CW2 Harriman (ODA 372) and his force split off from the main body and headed northeast to 

the blocking position north of little Terghul Ghar (“Little Whale”) mountain.

Disaster and Frustration

Disaster did not wait long before striking in the night. As the Harriman convoy moved 

northeast, an Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunship, circling above on station to provide CAS, 
286

mistakenly fi red a 40mm cannon burst into the column. CW2 Harriman and two Afghans were 

killed instantly in the lead HMMWV.29 Two other Americans and 13 Afghans were seriously 

wounded.30 The surprise attack on the column was initially reported as an enemy mortar ambush. 

Fortunately for all concerned, frantic American calls after the initial barrage stopped the AC-130 

from continuing its attack. Now the main column was delayed as McHenry and Towson tried to 

deal with the emergency. Medical evacuation was needed for the Harriman column. The CAS 

capability from the northern OP was now gone. Since the ODA commanders were separated in 

the now-divided main column, McHenry (ODA 372) and LTC Hooper thought Towson (ODA 

594) had gone to the scene. He had not, and suddenly several Americans were giving orders to 

the disjointed column. The operation had quickly become very complicated amid the confusion.

After dealing with the Harriman convoy emergency, the column resumed its advance but 

was behind schedule. The Americans had coordinated 55 minutes of bombing preparation before the attack. That promise and CAS had been key to persuading the Afghans to participate. 

Expecting a massive allied bombing attack to clobber the enemy as the Americans had done 

against the Taliban in November and December, and then the al-Qaeda around Tora Bora, 

Commander Zia was surprised to observe and hear only seven explosions in the distance along 

the “Whale.” The bombing preparation turned out to be seven smart bombs directed against 

specifi c targets. Despite the lack of preparation, Commanders Zia and Khoshkeyer pushed their 

advance forces into the assault. The Afghans had gone less than 200 meters when they were 

pummeled by heavy mortar fi re. Now, having been promised extensive CAS, Zia angrily asked, 

“Where are the planes?” McHenry had no answer, and Zia had his advance elements withdraw, 

dragging their wounded with them. The main body remained poised near the tip of the “Whale,” 

awaiting the promised CAS. As the discussion continued between the American offi cers and the 

Afghan commanders about air support, TF Rakkasan began helicopter assaulting infantrymen 

into LZs near the four towns at the far end of the Shah-i-Khot Valley. After a second Afghan 

assault got mortared, Apache helicopters arrived to attack the enemy mortars but were soon 

recalled because American ground troops, who landed unopposed initially, came under heavy 

mortar and small-arms fi re when the helicopters departed. In the fi rst minutes of the attack, 

LTC Hooper remembered thinking, “The boss [COL Mulholland] was absolutely right! We 

were facing a well-prepared, well dug-in, much larger force than expected.”

The Special Forces offi cers realized that getting further CAS for the AMF would be slim 

as long as the Americans were engaged. Commanders Zia and Khoshkeyer pulled their forces 

back into covered positions to account for their soldiers since they had casualties. In a country 

where 80 percent of the people are illiterate, the ability to count is not a simple skill. What 

seemed like a routine task was, in reality, quite time consuming and diffi cult.

Zia’s mortarmen, called “jundees” by ODA 594’s SSG Cash Galtier (pseudonym) from 

Paducah, Kentucky, delivered counterbattery fi re against suspected and known enemy positions 

with their six 82mm mortars. It was the only effective fi re returned by Zia’s Afghans on D-day 

of Operation ANACONDA. In another of the few bright moments of an otherwise dark day, 

ODA 594 was credited with destroying one enemy mortar position.31 The arrival of a pair of 

AH-64 Apache attack helicopters from the 101st Airborne Division provided the most effective 

CAS for the Afghans during the campaign. Although not a preplanned mission or a specifi ed 

task for these attack pilots, they diverted to Zia’s location and put lethal fi re on at least two 
287

al-Qaeda mortar positions on the western side of Terghul Ghar, the “Whale.”

Because of the plight of TF Rakkasan, the ODAs and Afghans would get no further CAS. 

McHenry and Towson had to make a decision about the attack. Should they continue to advance 

into the valley with no air support where American soldiers were under fi re? If they succeeded, 

how would they prevent the AMF from taking fi re from American conventional elements? As 

they discussed the situation, the enemy mortar fi re became more accurate. McHenry and Towson realized that the Afghan force was no longer the main effort. It was no longer a concern 

to TF Mountain, and advancing toward the American troops would be futile and only result 

in more casualties. LTC Hooper explained the situation to COL Mulholland who agreed to 

withdraw based on TF Rakkasan’s continuing predicament. As the mortar fi re continued, Zia’s 

forces withdrew to Gardez, reaching the city by nightfall. Both Commander Zia and Commander Khoshkeyer lambasted the Special Forces offi cers for the weak bombing preparation, 

their resultant casualties, and the lack of CAS. They believed that they had been “hung out to 

dry,” and the complete shift of CAS to the American effort reinforced that opinion.

Various news media reported that much of the heavy fi ghting involving conventional Army 

units was caused by the Afghans retreating in the face of mortar attacks. What was not mentioned was the very limited bombing preparation before the attack and the lack of CAS for the 

Afghan assault force that stayed under heavy mortar fi re until it fi nally withdrew. There were 

other factors that infl uenced the intensity of the battle. Although Afghans had fought for years 

against the Soviets and then the Taliban, none of their “armies” could be likened to any army 

based on the Western model. One Special Forces offi cer made these comments about the Afghan performance in the early hours of Operation ANACONDA: “We can’t expect the AMF 

to be like an American military force, but that makes them no less noble, no less brave, and no 

less willing to get out and engage our common enemy, and that’s what the force has done.”32

The fact that this combined Afghan force remained cohesive in the confusion, attacked despite 

the lack of normal preparatory aerial bombardment, assaulted twice into enemy mortar fi re, and 

withdrew only when CAS was unavailable is testimony to Special Forces ODA 594 and ODA 

372 and the quality of the Afghan leadership.

Combat Multipliers

A major concern in combat is having enough infantrymen to perform an operation. This 

was especially relevant for TF Rakkasan, which planned to use PSYOP as a force multiplier. 

The infantry battalions reluctantly forfeited “shooter” seats on the initial CH-47D Chinook 

assaults for several three-man tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs). But the TPTs proved just how 

effective they could be in combat on two separate operations supporting the Rakkasans during 

Operation ANACONDA.

TPT 933 and CPT Acosta, commander, 910th TPD, boarded a 101st Airborne CH-47D 

Chinook on D-day, 2 March 2002, for Operation ANACONDA.33 The two Chinooks and two 

MH-60 Black Hawks carried a 10th Mountain combat engineer platoon and the PSYOP team 

to a remote airfi eld to establish a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) called Texaco. It 

would also serve as an enemy prisoner of war (EPW) facility if necessary. The FARP, with a 

constant fl ow of helicopters, attracted curious Afghans like a magnet, especially since it was located next to a large village containing 30,000 residents and four other villages within a 5-mile 
288

radius. It did not take long before the curious villagers approached the airfi eld to see what was 

happening. As women and children drifted toward the combat forces, TPT 933 immediately 

went to work with its loudspeakers to broadcast messages of caution and explanation in their 

native language. Most villagers stopped, listened for a few minutes, and then headed away from 

the airfi eld. TPT 933 broadcast almost nonstop for the fi rst 48 hours of ANACONDA.

The modus operandi was typical for Afghan loudspeaker missions. Engineer tape was 

strung around the perimeter as a “no cross” warning line and mine symbol placards attached to 

fl ap-like Tibetan prayer fl ags. The tape was well beyond hand grenade range and served as the 

fi rst line of warning to divert the noncombatants. Phony minefi elds were created between the 

lines to lend further credence to the warning lines around the perimeter. This control measure 

was backed up by progressively more emphatic warnings being broadcast loudly to deter the 

curious Afghans and to keep them “out of harm’s way.” The TPT leaders had developed these 

specifi c transcripts from the standard warnings. Normally, from daylight to sunset, the teams 

would start the broadcast when anyone was spotted about 400 to 500 meters away. The people 

would stop, listen to the message, and then turn around.

Team leader, TPT 933, SGT Norman Wilcox (pseudonym) visited the provincial Afghan 

military commander, General Gul Haidar, to explain the team’s purpose.34 Haidar wanted to 

support the U.S. forces in any way he could and asked what Wilcox needed. The sergeant requested that the general meet with all the leaders from the surrounding villages to explain that 

U.S. forces were conducting dangerous military operations. Four hours later, the collected leaders were told that to keep their people safe, the villagers had to be kept away from the airfi eld to 

avoid being shot, especially at night. The village leaders were very happy about the Americans’ 

presence, and they pledged their support.

General Haidar came back the next day and offered to provide a security force of a captain 

and 12 soldiers to help guard the FARP. CPT Acosta, SGT Wilcox, Haidar, and several Afghan 

Military Forces (AMF) soldiers reconnoitered the airfi eld and established six outer perimeter 

guard posts that were eventually occupied by 60 AMF soldiers. Afterward, the combat engineers and PSYOP personnel manned the inner security positions. By day 4 of Operation ANACONDA, civilian interference with FARP operations had ceased. The successful efforts of the 

PSYOP loudspeaker team contributed to the decision to extend the Texaco FARP beyond its 

original 48 hours to nine days.35 While TPT 933 had the FARP mission, the other two PSYOP 

loudspeaker teams were attached to the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain infantry battalions.

D-Day ANACONDA From the Viewpoint of Force Multipliers

SSG Jack Clinton (pseudonym) and his assistant team leader from TPT 912 had been attached to C Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, to broadcast “stay 

away” messages, warning the local populace not to approach the American blocking position. 

The team was carrying several broadcast theme scripts addressing civilian noninterference, 

support for the coalition forces, and mine awareness. However, when the fi rst lift of the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, suffered 26 casualties just after landing, the second lift of helicopters carrying TPT 912 was held on the ground at Bagram. Eventually, all further lifts of the 10th Mountain were canceled, and TPT 912 joined CPT Acosta and TPT 933 at the Texaco FARP. This 

proved helpful because TF Mountain set up another short-duration FARP operation. TPT 912 
289

broadcast for an hour while it was being set up. Never having to escalate to the second and third 

levels of warnings during ANACONDA validated the success of the PSYOP broadcasting effort.

TPT 913 was attached to C Company, 2nd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, to broadcast “stay away” messages, warning the local populace not to approach the blocking position “somewhere in the mountains.” After two rehearsals with C Company, weather 

delayed the start of the operation for two days. According to TPT 913 team leader SGT Mitchell Dennison (pseudonym), within three days, there were an additional 60 general purpose 

medium tents (general purpose medium tents can sleep 30 soldiers) and a second mess hall 

where previously there had only been a SOF and logistics center at Bagram. The American 

“signature” was very large. It had to be obvious to the local Afghans that a big operation was 

planned. The weather delay just added to the operations security (OPSEC) problem.36

Limited to two PSYOP personnel based on available helicopter seats, SGT Dennison and 

his assistant team leader, SPC Ike Monroe (pseudonym), carried 75- to 80-pound rucksacks 

when they boarded the CH-47D for a daylight insertion.37 The weight of portable broadcast 

equipment, batteries for extended operations, and cold-weather gear “fell on deaf ears” among 

the Rakkasan leaders because the mission was only going to last two days. As the Chinook 

made its fi nal approach to land, Dennison and Monroe looked out the window. It seemed like 

nothing was going on. Everyone ran off the helicopter and spread out in defensive positions 

until it lifted off. Since the LZ was on the high ground, they could see down into the valley in 

front of them. “It was like a scene out of a war movie. Although it was 4 ‘clicks’ [kilometers] 

away, you could hear the loud, crazy gunfi re and see tracers coming from the LZ where Charlie 

Company, 1/87 Infantry, was getting hit. All of a sudden some Apaches fl ew in from behind 

us and started fi ring Hellfi re missiles right into the side of the mountains. We could see the 

Apaches taking ground fi re. Obviously that was not the place to be so the company commander 

got everyone up, and we started moving out in a fi le up the fi rst hill,” said SGT Dennison.

As the lead elements of C Company crested a small pass about 500 meters from the LZ, two 

or three enemy soldiers opened up on the front of the column with rocket-propelled grenades 

(RPGs) and AK-47 rifl es. “That was my fi rst encounter with real fi re coming at me. Being close 

to the company headquarters and right behind the lead platoon, we could hear the ‘whizzes’ of 

bullets going by, the distinct crack of the AK-47s, and the ‘whooshes’ of the RPGs,” recalled 

Dennison. The fi re seemed to be coming from a small village of about 10 mud houses. We got 

down while three Special Forces soldiers fl anked the enemy forces. Using an M-240 machine 

gunner to lay down suppressive fi re, the Special Forces team used .50-caliber sniper rifl es to 

eliminate the threat. Suddenly, two Apaches came over, fi ring their machine guns, shooting at 

the Special Forces team. “That wasn’t too cool,” said Monroe, “and the radiomen in the Charlie 

Company headquarters stood up and started screaming and waving orange VS-17 panels. Although it was daylight, the Special Forces team was not dressed like us, so I could understand 

the mistake. It had been called in by a platoon behind us that did not know what was going on.’’

After the threat was eliminated, we moved to our blocking position and stayed there for several hours waiting. Although the soldiers had only walked about 1,500 meters from the LZ to 

the blocking position in the vicinity of several blownup mud houses, the 9,500- to 10,000-foot 

altitude left everyone short of breath. Dennison and Monroe realized then that there would be 

no need to broadcast because the locals had already left the area. With new orders, the infantry 
290

company loaded up and started “humping” through the mountains until 0100 or 0200. The soldiers watched the tracers of the attack helicopters working in the valley and the CAS being directed by the coalition reconnaissance teams before fi nally stopping to bed down for the night.

At daybreak on D+1, the infantrymen and the two PSYOP soldiers moved again for another 

3 or 4 km until they reached an area where they began receiving mortar and small-arms fi re 

from the surrounding three hills. This area was referred to as “Mortar Hill” by the Rakkasans. 

C Company was trying to link up with another Rakkasan company that was moving up a dry 

riverbed toward them. Afterward, it was discovered that the enemy had at least three mortar 

positions surrounding the hill and a truck-mounted .51-caliber DshK machine gun fi ring down 

the valley. The other Rakkasan unit sent a squad forward to effect a linkup with C Company.

The enemy mortared that infantry squad hard. The sergeant leading the squad had the chest 

plate blown completely out of his armored vest, and he was down with numerous shrapnel 

wounds all over his body. Other members of the squad were also wounded. As the Special 

Forces personnel dropped their rucksacks and moved down the ridge toward the mortar fi re, six 

C Company personnel ran to assist the trapped squad with a Skedco (Sked Company) stretcher 

and drag the squad leader back for fi rst aid and later medical evacuation.

Then the enemy forward observer shifted the mortar fi re on C Company. The Special 

Forces team scrambled back up the ridge to cover. When the mortar fi re started coming in, 

everyone dropped his or her rucksacks and headed for cover. “We sure didn’t need our loudspeakers to talk to someone who was trying to kill us. From then on, we were strictly infantrymen,” recalled Dennison. But the infantrymen were stuck for about 5 or 6 hours because they 

could not abandon the rucksacks with their cold-weather clothing and rations in them.

The Air Force enlisted tactical air controller (ETAC) was ready to call for CAS, but the 

enemy mortar forward observers had not been spotted. SPC Monroe grabbed some binoculars 

and climbed onto some boulders on the crest of the ridge. Monroe located a cave complex 

on one hillside with a stack of mortar rounds visible. He watched the enemy running out of a 

cave to fi re mortars and then retreating inside afterward. Having pointed out the activity to the 

ETAC, SPC Monroe used the laser rangefi nder to designate the target. The enemy got off three 

more rounds before a B-52 bomber carrying smart bombs came “on station” overhead. The 

enemy gunners hid during the bombing and survived to fi re again. By the time an F-16 came 

on station, Monroe had better grid coordinates on the position, and the mortar was eliminated. 

The al-Qaeda used piles of stones and sticks as aiming points for their mortars. SPC Monroe’s 

action, recommended for the Bronze Star for Valor by the company commander, permitted the 

company to be resupplied with water and rations. Since it was only supposed to be there for two 

days, the rations and water were gone by the third day.

The next morning (D+2), the two Rakkasan infantry companies moved down into the valley and assumed defensive positions on the high ground. The enemy had dug fi ghting trenches 

all over the area. SGT Dennison and SPC Monroe were put out on an observation post (OP) 

with a squad of infantrymen.38 There was no longer a loudspeaker mission. There were only 

enemy soldiers out there; the civilians had abandoned the area. That night C Company went 

on 100-percent alert until an AC-130 Spectre gunship overhead eliminated 200 enemy troops 

moving toward them. Later, SGT Dennison’s OP was pulled back when eight vehicles fi lled 
291

with armed men were sighted heading for the company position. Again, the AC-130 Spectre 

gunship destroyed the vehicles, providing a terrifi c “light show” for the infantrymen. In the end, 

TPT 913, SGT Dennison, and SPC Monroe ended up being infantrymen for 11 days.

After returning to Kandahar, the entire TPT 913 was called to support Operation APACHE 

SNOW, the follow-on mission to ANACONDA. This time, Dennison, Monroe, and SPC Dale 

Stevenson (pseudonym) supported a 101st Airborne infantry company that was searching local 

villages.39 The Rakkasan company surrounded a village and then sent in assault teams to deliberately search for weapons, munitions, and equipment. TPT 913 broadcast messages to explain 

what it was doing and warnings to keep away from the U.S. soldiers to ensure the villagers’ safety. The infantrymen found some RPGs, AK-47 assault rifl es, and large quantities of ammunition. 

The PSYOP soldiers demonstrated their value to the combat elements as force multipliers.

Figure 8. Objective Remington in the Shah-i-Khot Valley.

Figure 9. Babulkhel damage assessment. Figure 10. Serkhankhal aftermath.
292

ARSOF in Direct Support

Working in a split-team confi guration, combat-experienced ODA 563 supported the movement of TF Rakkasan infantry units during D-day operations as three Special Operations Team–

Alphas (SOT-As) collected signal and voice intelligence to provide early warnings to the commanders at the blocking positions on Objective Remington. ODA 563 split teams eliminated a 

machine gun and grenade threat from a village near the LZ. SOT-A 502 and SOT-A 503 landed 

in respective blocking positions with the Rakkasans and immediately began collecting intelligence from Marzak, Zerkikheyl, and Serkhankheyl, the villages in the Shah-i-Khot Valley 

reportedly harboring Taliban and al-Qaeda fi ghters. SOT-A 506, caught in the cross-fi re of 

small arms on landing, fought as infantrymen for 18 hours and directed CAS to cover the medical evacuation of casualties. When TF Mountain directed the unifi cation of all 101st Airborne 

Division units and the exfi ltration of 10th Mountain Division casualties, the Army SOT-As assisted ground commanders with consolidating and exfi ltrating at the pickup zones (PZs). These 

operations drew heavy small-arms and mortar fi re, and the SOF teams became embroiled in the 

fi refi ghts. As more Rakkasans were airlifted into the fi ght, these teams organized hasty fi ghting 

positions, engaged the enemy, called in CAS, and administered fi rst aid for more than 30 hours 

until everyone was successfully exfi ltrated by Chinook helicopters.40

Three tactical PSYOP loudspeaker teams were attached to the fi rst TF Mountain infantry 

assault companies, and more than 1 million leafl ets were dropped over the villages in and 

around the Shah-i-Khot Valley where Taliban and al-Qaeda fi ghters might seek refuge. On the 

second day, PSYOP leafl et bombs were dropped along possible escape routes (the ratlines) into 

Pakistan, encouraging surrender. Messages emphasized not supporting Taliban and al-Qaeda

resistance and that the coalition forces were there to disarm the Taliban, not to occupy their 

country. Of the 10 million leafl ets dropped over the Shah-i-Khot Valley during ANACONDA, 

only a few were found months later.41

Commander Zia Lodin regrouped his Pashtuns and returned to the vicinity of little Terghul 

Ghar Mountain (“Little Whale”) the following night, a tribute to the professional rapport the 

Special Forces teams enjoyed with the tough Afghan fi ghters. ODA 594 and ODA 372 set up 

an OP on the “Little Whale” and vehicle checkpoints around Zurmat. LTC Carl Hooper wanted 

to get Zia back into the fi ght, especially after the fi rst day fi asco. Returning to the fi ght signifi -

cantly improved the morale of Zia’s men, and they stayed for the rest of ANACONDA. More 

important, the CAS had increased in scope and duration by the next night. There was a vast 

difference from the nine smart bombs that had “prepared the battlefi eld” for an Afghan assault 

the day before. Now, Zia’s men witnessed the awesome power of the coalition air munitions.

The massive CAS on the “Whale” encouraged Zia’s forces to secure new vehicles and 

move closer to the battle. ODA 594 SSG Galtier and his jundees established mortar positions 

and began shelling suspected enemy positions on the “Whale.” The Afghan forces manning outer blocking positions captured several enemy fi ghters attempting to escape the valley, and they 

were taken to Bagram and Kandahar for interrogation. But just as the Afghans were “warming 

up” for another “go” into the Shah-i-Khot, in the early morning of 4 March, American attention 

shifted to Takur Ghar mountain.

While some ARSOF elements had been given a role in ANACONDA from the start, oth-
293

ers continued with UW missions elsewhere. This was also a transition period for the 5th and 3rd 

SFGs, the mobilized 19th and 20th SFG elements from the ARNG, the 96th CAB to the USAR 

489th CAB, the 4th POG battalions to the USAR 345th PSYOP Company (Airborne), the 3rd 

Battalion replacing the 2nd Battalion Chinooks of the 160th SOAR, a drawdown of JSOTFNorth in Uzbekistan and JSOTF-South in Kandahar while the CJSOTF-Afghanistan was being 

stood up in Bagram, and the relocation of JSOAC-North. Within these changes, the ODAs were 

doing battle handoffs in the fi eld, and missions changed rapidly in response to ANACONDA.

On Again-Off Again

Special Forces ODA 394 went through several mission changes in a span of days. After reorganizing, refi tting, and rehearsing to conduct special reconnaissance (SR) from two 

mountaintop OPs bordering the Shah-i-Khot Valley in enemy-held territory for two days, the 

Special Forces team “stood down” to allow Danish and German troops to conduct the operation that they had planned. Back at the “Rose Garden,” the disappointment of having three 

missions in succession canceled was wearing on the soldiers’ morale. The biggest action of 

the war since their arrival in Afghanistan was about to begin—Operation ANACONDA—and 

they were sidelined, held in reserve at Kandahar. Then, on D-day of the operation, as they 

listened to the various American and allied commanders sending orders and information 

over the radio, it became apparent to them that “ANACONDA was not going the way the 

commanders thought it would.” The raspy radio chatter indicated unexpectedly strong enemy 

resistance and numerous U.S. casualties from mortar and machine gun fi re.42

Figure 11. Millions of 4th POG leafl ets emphasized

hopelessness and encouraged surrender.
294

Then ODA 394 received a terse message: “You have 1 hour to pack your rucksacks for a 

dismounted mission.” Details would be provided later, but an aircraft was waiting to fl y them 

back to Bagram Air Base where the C Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, advanced operating 

base (AOB) had just been relocated. Several hours later that night, the Special Forces team 

was in the TF Mountain tactical operations center (TOC) for a grim intelligence briefi ng. Five 

AH-64 Apache attack helicopters had been badly shot up, and ODA 372 had taken casualties. 

CW2 Harriman, the team executive offi cer, had been killed when his Afghan truck convoy was 

attacked heading to the battle. 10th Mountain Division had 25 wounded who were still trapped 

near the landing zones (LZs) in the Shah-i-Khot Valley. “Not a good fi rst day,” commented one 

of the sergeants. The C-130 transport that carried the team to Bagram also had an empty metal 

coffi n aboard for Harriman.

Figure 12. AH-64 Apache attack helicopter.

Now at Bagram with only their rucksacks, ODA 394 received another SR mission. It was 

to land at night by helicopter and climb to an observation site blanketed by 3 feet of snow, 

10,400 feet above sea level. From the jagged escarpment, it could overwatch two trails (“ratlines”) that Taliban troops were thought to travel. Since the team had left almost all its equipment at Kandahar, it was pressed to borrow what it needed for the mission. Australian troops 

operating at Bagram were astounded at their lack of cold-weather survival clothing. “You 

blokes’ll perish up there,” they warned and generously provided snowshoes, walking poles, 

and camoufl age overwhite clothing. Team medic, SFC Jason “J.D.” Thurman (pseudonym), 

managed to get morphine auto injectors from the nurses at the Spanish military hospital. 

SSG Jake Millett (pseudonym) traded MREs to the Aussies for spare double-A and D-cell 

batteries.43

SSG Jerry Rawlins (pseudonym) particularly desired a Barrett M-82A1 .50-caliber 

sniper rifl e. The vast open spaces in Afghanistan permitted the engagement of targets beyond 800 meters, the range of the Remington M-24 7.62mm rifl es. Before leaving the 

United States, Rawlins had requested one of the “Barrett fi fty cals” from joint operational 

stocks, but their entire inventory had already requisitioned. In exchange for some of his 

extra 7.62mm match-grade cartridges, the 10th Mountain Division reconnaissance platoon 

introduced Rawlins to the explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) detachment leader who 
295

had an extra Barrett to spare. Rawlins signed for the rifl e and carried it into the ANACONDA battle.44 By midnight, ODA 394 was as ready as it could be and settled down to 

rest before its insertion.45

At 0430, 15 hours before their SR insertion, LTC Sanders woke up medic SSG Stefan Morris (pseudonym). “Get the guys up. Repack your gear,” the battalion commander said, “Your 

team is now part of the QRF for the downed helicopters” on Takur Ghar. Every available Australian, German, and American force at Bagram was urgently mustered to create a viable QRF. 

As the combined force was assembled, the team picked up rumors that an American had fallen 

out of a Chinook helicopter and that one, possibly more, of the Chinook cargo helicopters had 

been shot down by enemy ground fi re.

About noon, ODA 394 was detached from the QRF. The original SR mission was back 

“on.” Then, a few hours later, MSG McFadden (pseudonym) got word that their mission had 

been canceled. An estimated 200 enemy soldiers had been spotted in the vicinity of ODA 394’s 

LZ. The area was bombed instead.46

But the ANACONDA operation had been adjusted. An unplanned second phase would accomplish the original mission of destroying Taliban and al-Qaeda who had escaped to mountain hideouts around the Shah-i-Khot Valley. ODA 394 would work with a seasoned 5th SFG 

team, ODA 594, out of Gardez, a 41⁄2-hour drive away. While it would not be left behind when 

“the second push” of ANACONDA began, ODA 394 needed to get its equipment from Kandahar and return the borrowed gear at Bagram.

The team was elated. ODA 394 was going into combat. Its objective was the rocky massif, 

called the “Whale,” west of the valley, and they would work with Pashtuns. For the fi rst time 

since they had arrived in Afghanistan, their mission would not be changed.47

Although ODA 394 and other Special Forces teams were bumped from SR missions when 

they were assigned to coalition force teams, one American soldier serving an exchange assignment did participate.

With the Aussies

When Australia sent forces to fi ght alongside the other allied forces in Afghanistan, an 

American Special Forces soldier deployed with them. SFC Ray Lake (pseudonym) was the 

“Special Forces Exchange NCO” from 1st SFG to the Australian army at Perth. SFC Lake had 

been chosen by competitive selection for the highly popular posting and reported to his new 

unit for a 2-year tour on 13 August 2001.48

Well liked and respected by his Australian counterparts, the native Texan had served as a 

paratroop infantryman in Italy and a parachute rigger in Germany before qualifying for Special 

Forces. While assigned to the 1st SFG as an ODA communications sergeant, Lake had learned 

Thai and had been on training missions to Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines.49 By May 2002, Lake had participated in numerous combat operations with the Australians in Afghanistan and had the highest professional regard for the Aussie soldiers. He found 

them “less reliant on technology and more self-suffi cient” than the Americans because of their 

nearly constant operational deployments.50
296

In particular, Lake thought the Australians were better at the very arduous special reconnaissance (SR) mission than any of the other coalition and U.S. units in Afghanistan. While 

SFC Lake could converse easily with his American friends about how much he was enjoying 

his time with the Australians, he never let slip a word about the details of what his unit was doing or what it had done, where it was, or where it was going in the future. This was just part of 

serving with the Australians.51

During Operation ANACONDA, the ARSOF supported TF Mountain with its conventional 

forces. The news media focused on that operation until an incident on the top of Takur Ghar, 

a mountain fl anking the Shah-i-Khot, drew their attention. On the precipitous summit of that 

10,000-foot mountain, special operations soldiers would fi ght for more than 17 hours to rescue, 

fi rst, an SR team, and then an MH-47E Chinook crew whose helicopter was shot down delivering a Ranger QRF. Intense fi ghting during the rescue efforts would cost seven special operations servicemen their lives and leave even more wounded. The following vignette, the fi rst of 

four in chronological sequence, covers the attempted night insertion of a special operations 

reconnaissance team on Takur Ghar during Operation ANACONDA.

Forty-Five Seconds Too Long

Since late December 2001, the special operations aviators of 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, 

had been based at Bagram. By 3 March, they had inserted numerous coalition and U.S. reconnaissance teams into the Shah-i-Khot Valley in support of ANACONDA. Before this, the Night 

Stalkers, using MH-47E Chinooks, had done team insertions under the cover of darkness. The 

fl ights were routine with little enemy contact, but the helicopter LZs were at altitudes that 

ranged from 8,000 to 11,500 feet mean sea level (MSL) with limited space to land. The margin 

for error on the insertion was slim. The high altitudes of the LZs challenged aircraft performance and pilot skills to the maximum. Single-engine fl ight was never an option.

The SOAR air mission on the night of 3 March was not complicated: Two MH-47E Chinooks, radio call signs Razor 03 (Zero Three) and Razor 04 (Zero Four), were to infi ltrate 

Figure 13. Two-wheeled LZs became routine for 160th SOAR MH-47E pilots.
297

two special operations teams into two different LZs, one north of Objective Remington and 

the other south. The Night Stalkers fl ew their missions in pairs to provide emergency combat 

search and rescue (CSAR) in the event one aircraft had problems. Razor 03 planned to fl y to the 

northern LZ with Razor 04, drop off Razor 04, and then proceed to the southern LZ. Razor 04 

planned to land at the northern LZ, drop off its team, and then proceed north at a slow airspeed 

to allow Razor 03 to link up again. Once the two Chinooks had rejoined, they would return to 

Bagram Air Base and end the mission.

Razor 03 and Razor 04 departed the air base that night to fl y to an offset location. The fl ight 

arrived at the pickup zone (PZ) without incident, loaded the two Special Forces teams, and departed on time. Intelligence indicated that fl ight routes and the LZs were relatively secure, but 

Nail 21, an Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunship, was to double-check each of the LZs before the 

insertions to confi rm the assessment. When the fl ight was six minutes from the objective, Nail 

21 diverted because of its proximity to a B-52 bomber airstrike, and it failed to get “eyes on 

the objective.” In light of these factors, CWO Alfred Mann, the fl ight lead, and CPT Timothy 

Dickerson, the air mission commander (AMC) (pseudonyms), decided to return to the PZ since 

it was only a 15-minute fl ight to the objective and wait for the bombing operation to end. The 

fl ight of two Chinooks landed at the PZ and reduced their engines to ground idle to save fuel 

while they waited.52

Then an air assault by TF Rakkasan into Objective Remington further delayed the mission. 

The MH-47E Chinooks shut down. The delayed insertion was a problem for the ground force. 

They would not have suffi cient time to climb to their observation position under the cover of 

darkness. Mako 20, the team leader, wanted to fl y directly to the position. Mann calculated 

the performance fi gures and said that they could get in, but there was no guarantee that the LZ 

would be suitable for landing the team. The team leader had seen the imagery and was convinced that there were places to land.

As the Rakkasan air assault ended, the Chinook pilots began engine startup procedures. 

The right engine on Razor 03 exceeded its limits on startup. Mann knew that it was foolish to 

take an aircraft with a questionable engine to 10,000 feet MSL. He immediately shut down the 

helicopter while CPT Dickerson contacted the 160th SOAR operations center and requested a 

replacement aircraft. Coincidentally, two 160th SOAR Chinooks were in the forward arming 

and refueling point (FARP) called Texaco. Dickerson coordinated with the operations center for 

the Chinooks in the FARP to become replacement helicopters. Once the Chinooks arrived at the 

PZ, the pilots in Razor 03 and Razor 04 executed a “bump”—the pilots and aircrews swapped 

out aircraft because the aircraft were low on fuel.

Mann informed Mako 20, the ground force team leader, that “best case” they would get 

the team to the LZ by 0245. This would still allow an hour for movement under the cover of 

darkness. Mako 20 still wanted to go directly to the observation point (OP). At 0230, the two 

MH-47Es lifted off to fl y directly to the position and execute the rest of the mission as briefed. 

When Nail 21, the AC-130 Spectre gunship fl ying overhead, reached its fuel limit, the CAS 

mission was passed to Nail 22. However, after Nail 22 cleared the new LZ/OP, it left the area 

for another tasking about six minutes before Razor 03 arrived at the LZ/OP.

During Razor 03’s approach, the LZ/OP looked suitable, but as the Chinook began its fl are 
298

to land, the aircrew, wearing night-vision goggles (NVG) and manning the miniguns, spotted 

footprints in the freshly fallen snow. As the aircraft hovered closer, they reported an unmanned 

.51-caliber DshK machine gun (in good shape) at the 1 o’clock position and military hardware 

all over the place. Then, they spotted a donkey tied to a tree at 3 o’clock. As they touched down, 

Mann informed Mako 20 that they were not alone.

As the team stood near the ramp hinge poised to exit the helicopter, SGT Jerald Curtis (pseudonym), the left door gunner, reported that he saw a man duck behind a berm at 9 

o’clock.53 Mann told Mako 20, who said his team was taking the hill. SGT Derrick MacKenzie 

(pseudonym), the aircrewman on the right side of the ramp, held the Special Forces team back 

while this information was relayed.54 Just as he lowered his arm releasing the ground team to 

exit, an enemy soldier stood up and fi red an RPG at the left side of the Chinook’s fuselage. The 

RPG hit the left electrical compartment and knocked out all of the alternating current (AC) 

electrical power, something that had been considered impossible to do. The exploding round 

wounded Curtis, the left side M-134 minigunner, in the right leg. After the fl aming projectile 

passed through the left side electrical panel, it crashed into the electrical compartment on the 

opposite side, knocking out the transformer rectifi ers. With the transformer rectifi ers destroyed, 

all of the multifunctional displays, the Advance Flight Control System (AFCS), radios, and 

aircraft mission equipment, including the 7.62mm miniguns, were inoperative. Electrical and 

insulation fi res fi lled the cabin with smoke and obscured the vision of those in the back.

Small-arms fi re slammed into the multimode radar pod, severing the No. 1 hydraulic servicing line that caused the No. 1 hydraulic system to fail. The RPG had also knocked out most 

of the intercommunication (intercom) system between the aircrew in the back and the pilots. 

The ground team stayed aboard the aircraft, and Mako 20 yelled, “Get us out of here!” MacKenzie, the only one whose intercom worked, told Mann, “Fire in the cabin! Rear ready! Pick it 

up! Pick it up! Go! Go! Go!” and began fi ring an M-60 machine gun mounted in the rear right 

cabin window. Mann grabbed the controls from CWO Jerry Tucker (pseudonym) and quickly 

pulled the heavy Chinook skyward without using the AFCS.55

The oil-soaked ramp was stuck in the down position because the hydraulics had been 

drained by small-arms fi re damage. As Mann wrenched the helicopter off the ground, Petty 

Offi cer First Class (PO1) Neil Roberts slipped on the greasy fl oor and fell forward, tumbling 

toward the down ramp. SGT Paul Parcelli (pseudonym), the Chinook ramp gunner, lunged to 

arrest the heavily burdened SEAL and caught him.56 MacKenzie, seeing the desperate, scrambling movement, rushed after the two of them. Parcelli and MacKenzie managed to get a hand 

on Roberts at the edge of the ramp, but the force of the accelerating helicopter provided enough 

momentum to break their tenuous holds during the takeoff. As the helicopter did its liftoff shudder about 5 feet off the ground, Roberts and Parcelli fell out of the helicopter. Parcelli, the aircrewman, tethered by his safety harness (“monkey strap”), stayed attached to the Chinook, but 

Roberts fell to the ground 5 to 6 feet below. As the big helicopter cleared the ridgeline, Parcelli 

dangled 3,000 feet above the ground in the dark.

Using his fl ashlight to illuminate the backup attitude indicator, one of the functioning fl ight 

instruments, Tucker called out airspeed, altitude, and directions to Mann. MacKenzie, the only 

crew member with a functioning intercom system, confi rmed that both aircraft engines were 
299

running and told Mann that a man had fallen out of the helicopter at the LZ and that they had 

to go back. Then MacKenzie focused his attention on Parcelli, swinging below the helicopter 

ramp on his monkey strap and started to physically drag him back aboard as the lumbering 

Chinook took more small-arms fi re.

Mann immediately decided to go back, fully aware that the two M-134 miniguns were inoperative and that they only had the rear M-60 machine gun and their individual M-4 carbines. 

Mann banked the helicopter to the right to come around and felt vibrations in the fl ight controls. 

Having pulled Parcelli back into the safety of the helicopter, MacKenzie turned around, only to 

be enveloped in a red haze of hydraulic fl uid spraying from a severed line. It was obvious that 

the hydraulic systems were failing and the Chinook would soon be unfl yable, which basically 

meant crashing in the mountains. MacKenzie checked the maintenance panel and verifi ed that 

the hydraulic pressure for all three systems was zero. Aware of the gravity of the situation, he 

grabbed a quart can of hydraulic fl uid, one of four that he kept near the pump, slammed a pour 

spout in, and dumped it into the hydraulic fi ll reservoir. He then quickly hand-pumped the lifesaving liquid into the system. This maneuver temporarily restored cyclic control, but the cyclic 

controls would lock up again between each quart of fl uid.

Mann realized that he could not fl y the battle-damaged Chinook back to the LZ and that he 

had to land immediately to save those aboard. He identifi ed a potential LZ and set the helicopter in a landing attitude.57 The four quarts of fl uid exhausted, the cyclic controls locked up 10 

feet above the ground. Mann pressed down on the pedals to turn the nose, and he lowered the 

thrust. The aircraft hit the ground in a controlled crash. With the nose 15 degrees high and the 

right side 10 degrees high, the crew expected the helicopter to roll over. The pilots conducted 

an emergency shutdown, collected all sensitive items, and executed the emergency action plan. 

Mako 20 and his team exited the helicopter, established security, and used their radios to effect 

recovery. Minutes later Razor 04 arrived at the crash site.

“Leave no man behind” has become a tradition in SOF. Despite a severely damaged helicopter, the Night Stalker crew valiantly attempted to rescue Roberts. It was only when CWO 

Mann could no longer maneuver the unstable and virtually unarmed big helicopter that he was 

forced to abandon the rescue attempt. A combination of exceptional fl ying skills and quickthinking, responsive aircrewmen enabled Mann to land the badly damaged aircraft without 

further casualties. It was a testimony to the dedication and courage of the “Night Stalkers” who, 

in the face of overwhelming odds, “Don’t Quit!” The helicopter ambush on Takur Ghar mountain in the Shah-i-Khot Valley during the early morning hours of 4 March 2002 led to a chain 

of events that eventually ended with six special operations soldiers dead, more than a dozen 

wounded, and an incredible story of bravery and determination.

Never Leave a Fallen Comrade

Following the tradition of never leaving a fallen comrade behind, the actions that took 

place over 17 hours on Takur Ghar mountain demonstrated the valor, resolve, and honor of 

SOF soldiers. Facing heavy odds, two small elements of SOF warriors tried to rescue comrades 

captured by the enemy, only to fi nd themselves in a fi ght for their lives in an uncompromising environment. It was intense combat in a frantic situation that cost six lives. This vignette 

chronicles the events after Razor 03 had force-landed and the fi rst rescue attempt.
300

Figure 14. The impossible becomes inevitable.

Figure 15. The unlikely becomes fact.

Razor 04, the second MH-47E Chinook, had inserted its Special Forces reconnaissance 

team into Objective Ginger, an area occupied by infantry elements of TF Rakkasan. After departure, CWO Jackson Ferrell (pseudonym), the aircraft commander, fl ew the planned egress 

route to rendezvous with Razor 03, attempting to contact the other helicopter without success.58

When Ferrell reached the fl ats surrounding Gardez, he radioed Grim 32, an AC-130 Spectre 

gunship that was overhead, to provide CAS. Grim 32 told Ferrell that Razor 03 had been forced 

to land because of enemy fi re and passed the coordinates of his location. About 0330 local time, 

Razor 04 landed next to the battle-damaged MH-47E Chinook and extracted the crew and its 

ground force.

The ground force leader, Mako 20, and the 160th pilots quickly developed a plan to rescue 

PO Roberts from the mountaintop LZ/OP. CPT Timothy Dickerson, the air mission commander 

(AMC) of Razor fl ight, discussed the plan with the headquarters at Bagram Air Base and his 

pilots.59 He decided to take the Razor 03 crew, including the wounded minigunner, SGT Curtis, 

back to the Special Forces base at Gardez before returning to the LZ/OP where Roberts fell 

out. Dickerson and Ferrell knew they would be returning to a hot LZ and did not want extra 

personnel aboard. While they were discussing the options on the ground by the damaged Razor 

03 aircraft, Grim 32 warned Ferrell that enemy forces had gathered and were heading toward 

his location and recommended that he depart immediately. While the enemy was about 1,200 

meters away, several Razor 03 crewmen were still in the damaged Chinook making a fi nal 

sweep for sensitive items. When attempts to attract their attention using light guns were unsuccessful, Ferrell lifted off and hovered close by. This noisy maneuver got them out and aboard in 

a hurry. By 0340, Razor 04 was headed to Gardez, and Grim 32, the AC-130 Spectre gunship, 

had moved over the area where Roberts had fallen.

In the meantime, the 160th SOAR and the special operations TOCs were responding to the 

combat activity specifi cally involving their forces. Although separated by only 50 feet of space, 
301

each had its own mission focus and separate concerns. The special operations leaders and staff 

offi cers in their TOC were trying to interpret the video display coming from an unmanned 

aerial vehicle (UAV) Predator fl ying above the Takur Ghar LZ/OP area when quick-reaction 

force (QRF) leader CPT Nathan Self, A Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Rangers, walked into 

the operations center.60 Self discovered that there was a serious problem on the ground and 

realized his Ranger force would probably execute its QRF mission. Details were sketchy and 

somewhat confusing. Initially, Self believed his platoon would secure a downed helicopter in 

the Shah-i-Khot Valley. He collected the aerial imagery and started developing a plan with his 

squad leaders. It was 0400.

CWO Chris Gaines (pseudonym), the fl ight lead in Razor 01, had just returned from Gardez in the MH-47E Chinook that had the engine problem earlier in the night.61 CPT John Gates 

(pseudonym), Commander, B Company, 2nd Battalion, told him to take his aircrew and “bump” 

to an airworthy Chinook and prepare to launch the QRF.62 While Gaines’ crew “prepped” the 

new aircraft, CWO Douglas Talbert (pseudonym) went to the 160th TOC to get details.63 CPT 

Gates asked Talbert what he was doing in the TOC and told him to return to the fl ight line. Gates 

would relay information updates to the fl ight line.

The best “guestimate” of the situation was based on watching the UAV “Predator” video 

and piecing together radio transmissions from the 160th aircrews. Thus, special operations 

TOC offi cers thought that PO Roberts was alive but had been “joined” by several people and 

that Razor 03 had made a safe landing away from Takur Ghar. With this latest “guestimate,” 

CPT Self marshaled his Ranger QRF and moved down to the fl ight line.

Outside the Special Forces camp at Gardez, Razor 04 landed to drop off the Razor 03 crew 

except for CPT Dickerson, who remained aboard as the AMC. CWO Ferrell and the ground 

force leader, Mako 20, listened to the confused reports on various radios but satisfi ed themselves that only Roberts was missing. Mako 20, unable to contact any of the special operations 

stations, had Ferrell relay information to Grim 32, the AC-130 Spectre gunship orbiting Takur 

Ghar. Grim 32 was told that all other U.S. forces were accounted for and that Roberts was properly marked; therefore, anyone surrounding him was the enemy. Grim 32 acknowledged and 

passed the information to the TOCs at Bagram.

As the special operations TOC tried to understand the images on the video monitors, CPT 

Dickerson briefed Ferrell and his crew on what to expect on the LZ/OP. Mako 20 and his fi veman ground force was ready to go, but Razor 04 was now down to 3,000 pounds of fuel. Ferrell 

contacted Nail 22, another AC-130 Spectre, to tell Bagram that he needed to insert now or get 

fuel. Unfortunately, he did not have the coordinates for the 101st FARP, Texaco. With time of 

the essence and Texaco too far away for a round trip, Ferrell notifi ed Grim 32 that he was departing immediately and needed preparatory fi res on the LZ/OP to begin 5 miles out from his 

landing. The AC-130 Spectre gunship acknowledged and relayed the message. Razor 04 lifted 

off from Gardez at 0420 with the fi ve-man ground force and an Air Force tactical air combat 

controller, TSGT John Chapman.

As Razor 04 approached Takur Ghar, Nail 22, the AC-130 Spectre gunship, had not been 

“cleared” to fi re on the LZ/OP. Ferrell went into a holding pattern in a valley about a mile from 

the area, waiting for the preparatory fi res to begin. Grim 32 reported that the request was denied 
302

because Nail 22 could not positively identify Roberts on the ground. CPT Dickerson decided to 

insert the team and headed inbound. Just as Razor 04 turned inbound, Dickerson was told to get 

the team on the ground. The special operations commanders knew that time was running out 

for Roberts. The only option was to land on the same LZ/OP where Razor 03 had taken intense 

fi re. CWO Jacob Frost (pseudonym) stayed low, approaching horizontal to the LZ/OP, to use 

the terrain to mask the helicopter.64 When Frost began his approach at 0455, the other pilots in 

front spotted an enemy soldier on the DshK .51 machine gun. There were muzzle fl ashes off the 

nose of the big Chinook. Frost continued fl ying inbound through a small saddle while Ferrell 

directed “forward and down, forward and down.”

On fi nal approach about 40 feet above the ground, the left side M-134 minigunner yelled 

“we’re taking fi re from 11 o’clock.” Frost, concentrating on the landing, calmly asked, “Is it 

effective fi re?” “Hell, yes!” was the answer as a stream of bullets smacked the left side of the 

helicopter, making distinct pinging sounds as they hit. “Then return fi re!” About then, Ferrell 

and Dickerson saw muzzle fl ashes from the ridge of the mountaintop. Ferrell, backing up Frost 

on the controls, pushed the thrust down, and the Chinook landed in a white fl urry of snow. As 

tracers fl ew overhead, the ground force disembarked, took up defensive positions off the ramp, 

and paused until the helicopter lifted off. The terrain masked the effectiveness of the enemy 

fi re on the large helicopter. As Razor 04 crested the mountaintop, the left door gunner got off a 

short burst of 7.62mm fi re with his M-134 minigun before it jammed. However, the right rear 

window gunner managed to deliver a long volley into the DshK with his M-60 machine gun.

Despite having lost radio contact with Mako 20 shortly after liftoff, Razor 04 entered a 

holding pattern about a mile away a little after 0500 in the event an emergency extraction was 

needed. When his fuel dropped below 1,000 pounds, the margin necessary to get back to Gardez, Ferrell departed. During the return fl ight, CPT Dickerson heard a radio transmission that 

said the QRF was 30 minutes away. Ferrell literally landed “on fumes” at the Gardez Special 

Forces base and, in his postfl ight inspection, discovered several bullet holes in the left fuel tank 

and a wire bundle that controlled the left engine.

Back on the mountaintop, the ground force, wearing NVG, split into two-man elements and 

moved toward the higher ground. The most prominent feature on the hilltop was a large rock 

formation and a tree. As TSGT Chapman approached the tree, he spotted two enemy personnel 

in a bunker under the tree. As Chapman and the team leader killed the enemy, they came under 

fi re from another position 20 meters away. The airman was mortally wounded. The other two 

teams bounded forward through the snow, returned fi re, and began throwing hand grenades at the 

enemy position to their front. Apparently outnumbered, caught in cross-fi res, and with two men 

wounded, Mako 20 ordered his team to break contact. They glissaded 800 meters down the south 

side of the mountain. The natural sloping terrain of the escape route offered some protection, but 

another man was wounded in the process. Once sheltered from direct fi re, the ground force contacted Grim 32, the AC-130 Spectre above, for fi re support to cover their further withdrawal.65

Against All Odds

The scene at the Bagram fl ight line had become intense as the various special operations 

headquarters, all trying to stem the hemorrhaging situation of Takur Ghar—one soldier missing 

in action, one presumed dead, and three wounded; one downed MH-47E in hostile territory; 
303

and one battle-damaged, out of fuel, Chinook at Gardez. Several QRF packages had been rapidly assembled and competed for the available aircraft. Now, the initial rescue force needed to 

be rescued and another soldier, presumed dead, had been left behind on the mountaintop. What 

happened to PO Roberts was still unknown. Two things were certain: there was a well-dug-in, 

well-armed enemy force on Takur Ghar that was ready to fi ght, and the hours of darkness were 

shrinking.

Rescue was the primary focus, but a myriad of questions abounded. Was there a need for 

an MH-47E with internal FARP (“fat cow”)? How much fuel would each helicopter need? Who 

was the QRF? Who was the CSAR? What helicopters were actually launching? Would fast 

ropes be needed, and if so, where were the internal hardware and ropes? What was the plan? 

What was the situation on the mountain?

The 160th SOAR crews worked feverishly to prepare their aircraft. They started installing 

an internal fuel tank on Razor 02 to refuel the Chinook at Gardez, unaware that the battledamaged aircraft was unfl yable. In the end, the FARP mission was scrapped, but the partially 

confi gured tank was already aboard Razor 02. Crew members cross-loaded gear, reconfi gured 

aircraft, and tried to identify which QRF was going.

CPT Self fi nally convinced the aviators that the Rangers were the QRF. CWO Talbert and 

Self discussed how many Rangers could be carried based on aircraft weight and QRF needs. 

Having planned for every contingency, Self had personnel identifi ed by function and weapons 

and could adjust his numbers readily. But the Air Force CSAR team of enlisted tactical air 

controllers (ETACs) and pararescue personnel (PJs), with whom the Rangers had rehearsed the 

QRF mission, were away on another mission. Self acquired a 23rd Special Tactics Squadron 

(STS) CSAR crew that had worked with the 160th SOAR.

CPT Self’s QRF package was reduced to one team of Rangers. Dissatisfi ed with this latest 

development, he got the Ranger battalion operations offi cer involved to get another team approved for a complete package. The second team would prove critical. While awaiting the fi nal 

decision, Self briefed the new CSAR crew on order of exit and actions on the objective. When 

the senior special operations commander at Bagram became aware of the gyrations on the fl ight 

line, he directed that a Ranger QRF of two teams go and reduced the CSAR package to three men.

The SOAR crews were equally frustrated. CWOs Gaines and Talbert and SFC Charles 

Lafayette (pseudonym), the 160th senior medic, had bumped aircraft three times already and 

worked with a different crew each time.66 Eventually, Razor 01 loaded nine Rangers with the attached Air Force ETAC and a three-man CSAR team, and Razor 02 loaded 13 Rangers aboard. 

Shortly after 0500, the fl ight left Bagram on its third mission of the night. Gardez, about 40 

minutes away, was the clearance limit for the QRF. Since the commanders were now aware that 

Razor 04 had inserted the rest of Roberts’ team on Takur Ghar, they decided that it was best to 

get the QRF closer to the situation than to delay its launch any longer.67

The QRF aboard Razor 01 did not have a clear threat picture of Takur Ghar as the two 

Chinooks raced toward Gardez. With daylight rapidly approaching, the AC-130 gunship was 

ordered off station (Air Force policy since Operation DESERT STORM). A missile launch 

during the night had been reported. This was very unfortunate because Grim 32, the AC-130, 
304

probably had the best situational awareness concerning Takur Ghar. When CWO Ferrell heard 

the Chinooks approaching Gardez, he tried to raise Gaines on the radio to advise him of the 

threat, but he failed to reach him. CPT Gates in the 160th TOC told Gaines to proceed directly 

to the mountaintop and to contact Matchbox, a Navy P-3 Orion, for further guidance because 

over-the-horizon communications were intermittent.68 The time was 0540. Matchbox was an 

infrared search radar aircraft, not a command and control platform. When Gaines contacted 

Matchbox to confi rm the LZ/OP coordinates in his aircraft navigation system and the location 

of Razor 03, he was told that there was movement on top of the mountain near the LZ/OP.

While inbound to Takur Ghar, the Razor fl ight passed over the downed Chinook, Razor 

03. Surprised to discover the MH-47E only 4 miles away from their LZ/OP, Gaines questioned 

Matchbox on its LZ/OP coordinates. According to CWO Talbert, “the communications exchange was like pulling teeth.” Matchbox repeated the same coordinates to confi rm and passed 

on the location of a possible antiaircraft artillery (AAA) site nearby. Listening to additional 

radio traffi c convinced Gaines, Talbert, and Self that their mission was either to reinforce or 

extract the rescue team on top of the mountain. They were unaware that the team had escaped 

down the backside (southern) of the mountain and that TSGT Chapman had been left behind.

CPT Self passed instructions over the Ranger platoon net to SSG Arin K. Canon (pseudonym), his squad leader on Razor 02. It was almost 0600. The snow-covered ground was now 

visible without the aid of NVG. The Rangers took off their NVG and stowed them. As the fl ight 

approached closer, they began receiving sporadic ineffective small-arms fi re from the ground. 

Gaines instructed CWO Gary Corbin (pseudonym), the pilot fl ying Razor 01, “to keep the 

airspeed up and not to get too low” as they neared the mountain.69 That is when Gaines told 

CWO Roger Oliver (pseudonym), who was fl ying Razor 02, to hold 2 miles from the LZ/OP.70

Unknown to Gaines, Oliver was having radio problems and had received the message “broken.” 

Following one-half mile behind Razor 01, Oliver entered a holding pattern, but as he did so, 

he lost sight of Razor 01. A few moments later, Oliver fl ew up to the next ridgeline and tried to 

contact Gaines, but by then Razor 01 was another ridgeline away.

CWO Gaines decided to make a pass to confi rm the coordinates of the LZ/OP. As Razor 01 

fl ew by the mountaintop LZ/OP, everyone aboard looked for the rescue team on the ground. The 

aircrew reported footprints in the snow, apparent bombed areas, and possible muzzle fl ashes 

coming from a boulder by the tree on the hilltop. Gaines reported enemy activity to Matchbox 

circling above and again questioned whether the hilltop was the right place to land; Matchbox 

acknowledged that it was.

CWOs Gaines, Talbert, and Corbin shared their concerns that the LZ/OP just did not feel 

right. Something was very wrong. The three highly experienced pilots all felt the “hair standing up on the back of their necks”; it was daylight and two very big, noisy helicopters were 

obviously being watched. Gaines did not like the situation at all. Based on his 20-plus years 

of fl ying experience, Gaines, a former Ranger, understood the tactical advantages of two 

forces of Rangers, but the situation on the ground was too sketchy to risk two aircraft landing 

in daylight. “Better one aircraft shot down than two,” he thought. Gaines decided the situation warranted risking only one aircraft with a minimal ground force and sent Razor 02 back 

to Gardez to wait for instructions. He was unaware that Oliver had never received the LZ/OP 

coordinates. Gaines was also concerned about a midair collision if the small LZ/OP was hot. 
305

With Gardez only 10 to 15 minutes away, Razor 02 could respond quickly if necessary.

As CWO Oliver in Razor 02 started to circle for the third time, he heard the faint order to 

return to Gardez and departed holding. This drew an instant reaction from SSG Canon aboard 

the MH-47E who argued emphatically the need to have both Ranger teams on the LZ/OP 

should anything happen. Corbin made another pass over the mountaintop, still unaware of the 

threat. There was no communication with the stranded rescue team. As the pilots talked about 

the bunker spotted during the fi rst pass, Gaines gave the time warning for landing to CPT Self. 

Self shook SPC Marc A. Anderson, the machine gunner sitting next to him. Emotions were high 

among the Rangers; excitement fi lled the cabin. SPC Anderson leaned toward PFC David B. 

Gilliam, his assistant gunner, and said, “Today, I feel like a Ranger!”

Razor 01 was going in. Gaines and Corbin discussed the fi nal approach path, and Gaines 

warned him to keep his airspeed up. At 0610, Razor 01 was coming in low and fast, using the 

terrain for cover instead of making a standard high approach to a pinnacle objective. SSG Donald Deese (pseudonym), the left door minigunner, gave a “thumbs up” sign to SGT Phil Svitak, 

the right gunner and fl ight engineer, and told the Ranger force to “get ready.”71 On short fi nal, 

Corbin picked a landing site and thought, “Well, this is it, make it a good one.” Gaines was 

backing him up on the fl ight controls because at 10,000 feet there was little room for error. SFC 

Lafayette was looking over SGT Svitak’s shoulder until he said, “Doc, you better move back.”

Suddenly, about 40 feet above the ground, bullets peppered the front cockpit and side windows. Corbin stayed locked on the approach, continuing to the landing. Unconsciously, he 

planned his abort path—straight over the top of the hill. As glass exploded around him, Corbin 

sounded off, “Taking fi re at 2 o’clock!” as he felt several rounds hit his chest body armor hard 

and twisted his fl ight helmet to the left. As bullets raked the right side of the aircraft, Svitak 

opened up with his rapid-fi re 7.62mm minigun. SGT Steve Larken (pseudonym) fi red with the 

M-60 from the right rear window of the cabin.72 Then it seemed that both gunners paused momentarily at the same time when a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) hit the right engine. The big 

Chinook was 20 feet off the ground. Svitak, mortally wounded during the exchange of gunfi re, 

slumped and fell back into the cabin.

Then the fl ight controls became sloppy. Corbin knew that he could not make the landing 

area, and the wounded Chinook did not have the power to abort. On his left, Gaines had been 

hit fi rst in the left leg—a hot numbing pain—and then another round hit his fl ight helmet, slamming his head backward. At the same time, SSG Deese on the left minigun felt a sledgehammer 

hit his left leg. Looking down, he saw a spray of blood and instantly began sweeping his minigun left and right. Corbin wrestled with the controls and applied the remaining power to make a 

very fi rm but controlled landing. The landing impact threw everyone standing in the back to the 

fl oor. The right rear M-60 gunner, SGT Larken, wrenched his knee in the fall but quickly got up 

to drop the ramp. At 0610, with the Chinook receiving machine gun fi re from three directions, 

the Ranger force exited into a hail of fi re.73

The damaged aircraft seemed unstable, “almost like it was shuddering from the hard landing,” so Corbin held the controls, knowing that the Rangers were exiting. Gaines reached up 

and pulled the engines to stop. He tapped Corbin on the arm, grabbed his M-4 carbine, released 

his emergency door, and because a bullet had shattered his femur, threw his body out of the 

open doorway into 2 feet of snow. Corbin stuck his M-4 out the shattered window and returned 
306

fi re as smoke fi lled the cockpit from a fi re in the power panel by his seat. Talbert, the AMC, 

released his seat harness, turned around, and saw total carnage in the back of the aircraft. He 

threw himself over the companionway seat, grabbed his M-4, and headed toward the ramp.

Once on the ground, the bus-sized target was no longer moving, and it was easier to hit. The 

wounded Deese fell into the radio rack when the helicopter landed hard. On the fl oor he tore the 

lanyard off his M-9 pistol and used it on his leg as a tourniquet. The heavy volume of enemy fi re 

penetrating the fuselage turned the cabin soundproofi ng into confetti. Smoke was smoldering 

from the tracer bullets. Three rounds slammed into SFC Lafayette’s fl ight helmet, stunning and 

rupturing blood vessels in an eye as it knocked him backward. Ranger SPC Anderson was mortally wounded midcabin, and the Air Force PJ, Senior Airman Jason Cunningham was working 

on him. SGT Larken retreated from the open ramp to fi nd cover inside the Chinook. Then an 

RPG fl ew through the open right cabin door, striking the oxygen console hanging above the 

left window. Although the grenade did not explode, the impact sparks set the soundproofi ng on 

fi re. With the Rangers off, SGT Bradley Walters (pseudonym), the tail gunner; CWO Talbert; 

and the other Air Force PJ, SSGT Kerry Miller (pseudonym), set up a defensive position on the 

ramp.74

The Ranger force exited the Chinook into a withering barrage of small-arms fi re. SSG 

Raymond DePouli was the fi rst Ranger off the ramp. Exiting, he was hammered in the back and 

spun around. The bullet hit his armor plate inch above his exposed area. He quickly located the 

enemy fi ghter wreaking havoc from the 8 o’clock position and emptied a full magazine from 

his M-4 into him. SGT Joshua J. Walker exited the right side, immediately took several hits on 

his Kevlar helmet, but managed to empty his M-4 toward the bunker on the right. SPC Aaron 

Lancaster-Totten, an M-249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) gunner followed Walker into the 

knee-deep snow. PFC David B. Gilliam grabbed the fallen Anderson’s M-240B heavy machine 

gun and high crawled out the ramp to the right. Air Force SSGT Kevin Vance, the ETAC, 

slipped off his rucksack carrying the radio and dropped it off the ramp. Thrown backward on 

landing, CPT Self scrambled over several downed men to reach the ramp. He discovered PFC 

Matthew A. Commons dead and saw SGT Bradley S. Crose, one of his team leaders, lying 

motionless, face down in the snow. Both had been killed while exiting. Self rolled off the ramp 

and processed the surreal scene. SPC Anthony R. Miceli, a SAW gunner, had had his M-249 

shot out of his hands but was uninjured. He had picked up PFC Commons’ M203 grenadelauncher rifl e and was positioned on the left side for security.

Once the rotors had stopped, pilot Corbin released the emergency door, triggering a hail 

of fi re. Several bullets had gone through his left palm, exiting the back of his wrist, and blood 

was spurting everywhere. He applied pressure with his right hand and attempted to escape 

back into the cabin. As the stunned SFC Lafayette realized that he was basically okay, he 

looked up to see Corbin with arterial blood spurting 2 feet into the air, trying to get out of 

the cockpit. Lafayette had just pulled him over the companionway seat when another RPG 

slammed into the cockpit, exploding shrapnel into Corbin’s left leg. Lafayette immediately 

applied a tourniquet to Corbin’s shattered wrist and packed the injury with bandages. When 

Lafayette’s yelling provoked no response from Svitak, he moved over to him and checked for 

wounds and a pulse. Svitak was dead. Corbin hollered at Deese, asking if he was okay. Deese 

replied, “Take your helmet off and stop yelling!” Deese was pale but responsive and wanted to 
307

be left alone. Deese thought that Lafayette, the senior medic, “was in his element.”

The fi re inside had spread to nearby rucksacks. SFC Lafayette had to make a choice: either 

stand up and get shot at while putting out the fi re or allow the fi re to burn. Anytime someone 

moved inside, the enemy shot into the Chinook. CWO Larken could reach the rear extinguisher 

and tossed it to Lafayette. Lafayette stood up and extinguished the fi re. Relieved not to have 

been hit, he crawled to Cunningham who was fi xedly trying to revive SPC Anderson. The senior 

medic checked Anderson closely. Anderson was dead. There was nothing more they could do. 

He told Cunningham to get an IV started in CWO Corbin.

Outside the helicopter the battle raged. The enemy forces had shifted their fi re to the Rangers once the helicopter engine noise ceased. Covered by the fi re of SPC Lancaster, SGT Walker 

bounded forward through the snow to a small rock cropping on the right. CPT Self and Lancaster moved forward on the right side of the helicopter. On the left side down in the snow, Gaines 

looked underneath the Chinook and saw blood dripping from the cabin drain holes. Spotting a 

Ranger moving up the right side, he yelled over to him, “I might need a tourniquet.” The Ranger 

replied, “Can you cover the left side for us right now?” Gaines said, “Yes” and pulled his leg 

around, twisting his kneeboard to use the elastic straps as a tourniquet. As he covered the left 

with his M-4, Gaines mentally prepared himself for a life without a leg. Bounding forward 

while the others provided suppressive fi re, CPT Self, SPC Lancaster, and the ETAC, SSGT 

Vance, joined Walker at the rock cropping. In one of the fusillades of fi re, Vance had forgotten 

his rucksack with the radio at the base of the ramp.

The Ranger force was being fi red on from multiple sides. An enemy fi ghter popped up at 

the 4 o’clock position and launched an RPG that skipped off the ramp. SSG DePouli saw him, 

moved to the right side, and shot him in the head. Then DePouli and PFC Gilliam bounded to 

another rock pile farther to the right of the other Rangers. Beside the rock pile they discovered 

an enemy fi ghter riddled with bullets and simply pushed him out of the way. With fi ve Rangers 

and the ETAC abreast, Self concentrated on the boulder position on top of the hill 50 meters 

away. The enemy threw hand grenades, wounding Lancaster in the calf, Self in the thigh, and 

Vance in the shoulder. Several Rangers tried throwing hand grenades in return, but thrown uphill, they all fell short, exploding in the snow.

While the Ranger force engaged the enemy position at the boulder, Air Force SSGT Gabe 

Brown from the combat control team (CCT) set up his radios behind a rock about 20 meters 

downhill from CPT Self. He feverishly worked to get CAS, but since his team did not normally 

support the Rangers, Brown had different radio frequencies. Thinking quickly, he contacted the 

AWACS aircraft using his line-of-sight radio, and the controller provided him the correct CAS 

frequencies. Twenty minutes had passed since they landed.

Having dealt with the problems inside the aircraft, the Chinook aircrew members moved 

outside. CWO Talbert and SSGT Miller, the Air Force PJ, crawled up the left side of the aircraft to retrieve the wounded CWO Gaines. Each man grabbed a shoulder of his survival vest 

and dragged him to the rear of the Chinook where there was a casualty collection point 5 feet 

beyond the ramp. Gaines disliked being strapped down on the litter while SSGT Miller, the Air 

Force PJ, tended to his leg.

Having attended to the aircrew, CWO Talbert and SGT Walters asked CPT Self what he 
308

wanted them to do next. Self told them to collect as much ammunition and M-203 grenades as 

possible. SGT Larken retrieved the 7.62mm ammunition from the minigun cans and magazines 

from the wounded. Scrounging around, he also found some hand grenades and built a cache 

near the ramp. The lack of oxygen at 10,000 feet altitude severely hampered everyone’s movement. While the Rangers provided cover, CWO Talbert and SGT Walters “humped” ammunition and grenades to them. SGT Walker asked for the M-203 grenade-launcher rifl e, and in the 

midst of the enemy fi re, Walters ran it up to him. Walker tried bouncing the M-203 grenades off 

the boulder but ended up shooting over the hill. At one point, Talbert found it to be easier to roll 

across the snow than to run in it. Sometimes, he rolled two-thirds of the way and then tossed the 

ammunition to the closest Ranger. When Talbert asked one Ranger if he could throw him some 

M-203 grenades, he hurriedly said, “No, do not throw those!” After SGT Walters had carried a 

large cache of 7.62mm ammunition to PFC Gilliam, he stayed to be his assistant gunner.

Inside the helicopter, SFC Lafayette and Senior Airman Cunningham continued to tend 

the wounded. When Lafayette got ready to splint the minigunner’s leg, he told him, “This is 

going to hurt.” SSG Deese quickly realized just how much and asked for morphine. Lafayette 

regretfully said, “No, not at this altitude because it would slow down your heart rate.” “Thanks,” 

Deese thought. The two medics splinted his leg and strapped him on a rigid Skedco sled-like 

stretcher for evacuation. The wide ballistic resistant fuel tanks on the MH-47E offered some 

protection to the wounded lying on the fl oor. Having lost a lot of blood, CWO Corbin drifted 

in and out of consciousness. Since most of his medical supplies were shot up, Lafayette fi xed 

a mask from the helicopter’s portable oxygen system to Corbin’s face to keep him lucid. The 

infusion of oxygen “snapped Corbin up quickly.” The CWO aviator told SGT Larken to gather 

all the PRC-112 survival radios and try to contact someone on the search and rescue net. When 

he got no response, Larken left one radio on “beacon mode.” The aircrewman thought, “Why 

do we always carry this survival radio if it doesn’t work when it’s needed?”

By now, most of the enemy fi re had shifted to the Rangers outside. During a lull in the fi ring, PFC Gilliam tossed a set of “binoculars” to Self that he had found by his position; it was 

actually a set of NVG. Their appearance caused Self to wonder what other equipment the enemy 

had and to question whether the QRF had been landed in the wrong place. Before he had time 

to ponder these dilemmas, SSGT Brown, the Air Force CCT, called out that some F-15 fi ghters 

were inbound with “500 pounders.” Since Vance, the Air Force ETAC, did not have his radios 

with him, he had to relay instructions to the fi ghters through Brown. Self talked with Vance 

about the 500-pound bombs and decided to try the 20mm guns fi rst. Shortly before 0700, the 

two F-15 fi ghters arrived overhead. Vance called for a “dry run” and gave the approach heading 

to Brown. After the dry run, Vance told Brown to move the fi ghters farther to the west.

Just the presence of the two fi ghters provided some psychological relief, but CPT Self 

was worried about the small force being fl anked. He told SSG DePouli to take SPC Miceli 

and check their right fl ank to see if the enemy could slip around that side. As the two Rangers 

began to descend along the ridge, the Rangers saw that the terrain dropped very precipitously 

on that side. Further exploration uncovered two living positions cut into the hill. DePouli told 

Self about the cliff and the positions. He then cleared the two positions, fi rst fi ring into a blanket 

covering one. In them, he discovered a rucksack, a multiband inter/intra team radio (MBITR), 
309

and a bullet-holed helmet fi lled with blood. That report made Self wonder, “What is going on 

up here?” Leaving SPC Miceli to cover the right fl ank, SSG DePouli returned to his original 

position. When the two fi ghters made another pass, Vance aborted them before they started fi ring, pushing them even farther west. That done, the next series of strafi ng runs blasted the top of 

the mountain with 20mm cannon fi re. CWO Talbert, behind the Chinook, thought the exploding 

20mm rounds sounded like someone popping bubble wrap, only much louder.

Having discovered an MBITR on the mountain, SSG Brown pulled out his and raised the 

stranded special operations ground force. They told him where they were and their casualties 

but not why they were down below. When Self started to fi t the pieces together, he incorrectly 

assumed that “We landed in the wrong place, but at least I know where the team is.” Self had 

not been privy to Matchbox’s LZ/OP confi rmation. Meanwhile, Ranger SSG Canon, back at 

Gardez, was pushing to get his element on the mountain.

Joining the Fight on Takur Ghar

The communications problem that had kept the senior special operations commanders from 

acquiring situational awareness on the Takur Ghar problem continued into the following day. 

This prevented senior commanders from getting control of rescue efforts being launched from 

areas in “gray” communications zones. In the confusion at the tactical level, the senior operator on the ground making the most noise, with an incomplete situational picture as well, 

dominated decisions in this command and control “void.” This was the environment awaiting 

Razor 02 when he landed at the Special Forces camp at Gardez with half of the Ranger QRF.

Razor 02 landed at Gardez at about 0625, about morning nautical twilight, to learn that 

Razor 01 had been shot down on the mountain. CWO Mann, fl ight lead of the disabled Razor 03, 

found CWO Oliver and gave him the map coordinates of the LZ/OP where he had landed and 

where PO1 Roberts had fallen. CPT Dickerson came aboard Razor 02 as the air mission commander (AMC) and briefed the crew on what to expect. This would be Dickerson’s third time 

into the same LZ/OP. Then a special operations ground force offi cer climbed aboard with the 

Rangers because “his guys were trapped on the side of the mountain.” Oliver contacted the special operations TOC in Bagram. They were ready to depart at 0640 but were instructed to “stand 

by.” Twenty minutes later, Razor 02 lifted off from Gardez, heading for Takur Ghar mountain. 

Halfway to the LZ/OP, the stranded special operations ground team contacted Oliver on UHF 

and advised him that the LZ/OP was hot, that a CAS bombing run on the mountain was starting, and that he needed to hold. No information was provided concerning the downed MH-47E 

aircrew or the Ranger QRF. After Oliver received the team’s location, he fl ew into an adjacent 

valley to wait for the bombing to end. After the CAS was completed, the ground force team 

vectored Razor 02 into the vicinity of its location. Encountering no enemy resistance, Oliver 

inserted the rest of the Ranger QRF and the lone special operations ground force offi cer within 

300 meters of the ground force team and headed back to Gardez in search of fuel.75

Having heard the MH-47E initially approaching, CPT Self could not determine where the 

Chinook had landed. About 0800, SSG Canon called Self to tell him the bad news. The Rangers 

had landed but were closer to the ground force team than Razor 01 on the mountaintop. They 

would have to climb almost 2,000 feet up the mountain (from an 8,000-foot elevation to Self at 
310

about 10,000 feet) on a 70-degree slope and then traverse close to 800 meters, and the ground 

force offi cer wanted the Rangers “to help extract his guys.” Canon questioned the priorities and 

relayed the message to CPT Self. Canon received an emphatic “No!” “You need to move out 

and climb up here. We are in contact and have casualties.” Canon passed the information to the 

ground force offi cer who turned in the opposite direction and moved downhill to join his men.

For the Rangers, it was a daunting challenge, but the men on top needed reinforcement. 

Takur Ghar towered above them, heavily covered with snow—as it turned out, 3 feet deep in 

some places. Having no mountain-climbing equipment, the Rangers—carrying weapons, plenty 

of ammunition, and radios and all wearing 3-pound Kevlar helmets and body armor—surveyed 

the best route to the top. They did not feel like “the cavalry charging to the rescue.” Looking 

up from the bottom, trying to pinpoint the Ranger location on the top, SGT Eric W. Stebner 

described the terrain features to Self to get his advice. Initially, Self thought they might be 

able to fl ank on the backside of the bunker, but when Stebner passed his grid coordinates, Self 

realized they were northeast of his position and recommended a different mountain pass. According to SSG Canon, “Just the grade of the ridge made it an unbearable walk, not including 

the altitude.” The shale rock below the snow made climbing even more diffi cult as the Rangers 

slipped and fell, beating themselves up as they plodded and stumbled upward. Along the way, 

the Rangers shed some of their bulky winter clothing; they had dressed for comfort in the cold, 

not a horrendous mountain climb. Optimistically, SSG Canon estimated that the climb would 

take 45 minutes.76

With no visual sign of the other Ranger force and no radio report, CPT Self moved down to 

SSGT Brown’s location around 0900. Brown attempted to contact the special operations TOC 

in Bagram, but the radio operators there did not recognize his call sign and asked him to leave 

their net. Trying to reduce the confusion and to make things simple for TOC personnel to track 

Figure 16. The harsh terrain of Takur Ghar.
311

the situation on Takur Ghar, Self decided to limit radio traffi c to one call sign, that assigned to 

the CCT, for the entire day. This contributed to erroneous conclusions in the TOCs and, hence, 

distorted the account of what transpired on the mountain. While Self and CWO Talbert were 

discussing an LZ for extraction, 82mm mortar rounds started exploding around the helicopter. 

Self recognized that the enemy observers were bracketing their position. He hoped that the 

aircrew did not fully realize how bad the situation was becoming. Getting concerned, Self 

called Canon for an update. “Another 45 minutes” was the reply. Self called back, explaining 

the latest enemy development and said, “You’re moving too slow. Do you still have your back 

plates in?” When he was told, “Yes,” Self gave them the choice to get rid of the heavy back protection. Removing the plates would reduce the individual burdens and facilitate mobility. SSG 

Canon passed the option to his men. Some launched the plates like Frisbees down the mountain, while others chose to keep them. The plates provided protection against 7.62mm bullets, 

and that was what the enemy was using.77

Concerned that a mortar round might hit the big helicopter, CWO Talbert recommended 

moving the wounded. He was not sure they could wait and see if the CAS could destroy the 

latest threat. SFC Lafayette recognized the imminent danger but pointed out that the battledamaged MH-47E had withstood several RPGs and heavy machine gun fi re up to this point. Directly exposing the wounded—putting them in the snow—could cause hypothermia, especially 

in the case of CWO Corbin who had lost a lot of blood. When another round hit a little closer, 

the two decided to move everyone to a small depression 20 meters behind the helicopter. First, 

Talbert, Lafayette, Senior Airman Cunningham, and SGT Walters manhandled CWO Gaines 

and then CWO Corbin in the Skedcos through the deep snow to the casualty holding area. The 

combination of altitude, steep snow-covered terrain, less oxygen, and plain physical exhaustion made the transfers especially laborious and diffi cult. As the tired Cunningham prepared 

to lift SSG Deese, he tripped and lost hold of the Skedco straps. The toboggan-like litter with 

Deese strapped aboard started sliding downhill like a one-man Olympic luge. In a frantic effort, Walters and Talbert lunged downhill after the runaway Skedco, just managing to grab hold 

of the straps as Deese crashed into CWO Gaines. Gaines had been the only obstacle between 

Deese and an 800-meter plunge down the mountain into the rocks below. Having witnessed the 

helplessness of someone on a litter, CWO Corbin used his good arm to cut his chest straps and 

loosened his leg straps. Lying on his back, Corbin watched a UAV “Predator” circling overhead 

and wished it were an AC-130 Spectre gunship since they had just been driven out of the shelter 

of the MH-47E by 82mm mortars.

As the mortar rounds got closer and closer, CPT Self decided to assault the position on the 

mountaintop and gain control. The assault team of Self, SSGT Vance, SGT Joshua J. Walker, 

and SSG DePouli would be supported by fi re from PFC Gilliam’s M-240B machine gun assisted by SGT Walters, the 160th crewman. Once briefed, the assaulters bounded up shooting 

while PFC Gilliam laid down suppressive fi re. As they assaulted forward, CPT Self saw an 

enemy fi ghter stand up, shoot at them, and then duck back down behind a tree by a boulder 

about 30 meters away. The Ranger captain realized the enemy was well dug in and that it was 

a fortifi ed position. “Bunker! Bunker! Bunker!” Self yelled. “Get Back! Get Back! Get Back!” 

The three Rangers and one airman broke contact and returned to their original positions. Then 

the mortar fi re started up in earnest. They needed CAS badly.
312

Just as CPT Self told SSGT Vance to bring in the bombers, a pair of F-16 fi ghters came “on 

station” overhead. Self and Vance quickly devised a plan: Walk the 500-pound bombs from the 

backside to the bunker on top of the hill. To have bombs dropped “danger close” required the 

initials of the requestor. CPT Self was more than happy to do so, just to bring some air power 

to bear on the enemy positions. The fi rst bomb exploded on the backside, sending debris into 

the bunker and downhill. A second bomb landed near the bunker, and the shooting stopped 

momentarily. Then the shooting from the bunker started again. What Self did not know was that 

the bunker system provided good cover and allowed plenty of movement. Since bombs were 

not doing the job, Self told Brown to fi nd out if there was an armed UAV Predator in the area. 

Vance was reluctant to use an armed Predator because they carried Hellfi re missiles, and he 

thought they were too close to the bunker. In the meantime, the mortar rounds were impacting 

closer and closer. Self believed that they were out of options.

CPT Self called for the missiles. The fi rst Hellfi re was long—hitting north of the mountaintop and sending debris toward the huddled ground force and the climbing Rangers. Ignoring the 

complaints from below, Self thought to himself, “Up here we’re bringing in 500 pounders, and 

that missile wasn’t even close to you.” Despite the fi rst shot miss, the Predator pilot convinced 

Self that he could hit the enemy bunker, and he did just that. The next missile was dead on and 

blew the nearby tree apart. Although they never received another shot from the bunker, Self 

was suspicious and decided to wait for reinforcements. Something had happened because the 

mortar fi re had shifted; his men had to be getting closer.

Meanwhile, back at Bagram, the special operations headquarters was planning a deliberate extraction from Takur Ghar and was assembling resources. Two Chinooks loaded with 

more than 35 QRF personnel from various special operations task forces departed at 0830 for 

Gardez. Razor 54, the AMC for the extraction, was told to join Razor 02 at Texaco—a FARP 

located halfway between Bagram and Gardez—which, by coincidence, was approximately 50 

nautical miles from the crash site on Takur Ghar. All three 160th aircraft were on the ground 

by 0900. They were joined by two AH-64 Apache gunships from the 101st Airborne Division. 

The fl ight leads, AMC, and QRF commanders began fi nalizing plans. As they were working at 

Gardez, the size of the mission grew.

As news of the two MH-47E shootdowns and soldiers trapped on Takur Ghar spread at 

Bagram, JSOTF-South (TF Kabar) and TF Mountain became involved to add to the command 

and control problems. Chinooks from the 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Brigade, met an increased 

demand for fuel by ferrying more into FARP Texaco. When the JSOTF-South headquarters got 

the news early in the morning, the commanders prepared a plan to bring more SOF into the 

fi ght. MAJ Randal Schantz (pseudonym), B Company, 3rd Battalion, 160th SOAR, was alerted 

at 1030 to “be prepared to launch.”78 His company had just arrived in Afghanistan a week 

earlier. They set up camp at Kandahar, built up and tested their MH-47Ds, and conducted some 

preliminary mission planning. Their fi rst mission would be to rescue their comrades from a 

mountaintop far to the north. While special operations unit commanders mobilized their troops 

for a rescue mission, Schantz roused his aircrews and started the mission preparations to fl y the 

special operations troops to Bagram in four Chinooks.

Shortly after 1030, the second Ranger element was within sight of the Rangers on top. In an 
313

almost comical exchange, SSG DePouli on top and SSG Canon climbing upward, having talked 

on the radio, called and waved back and forth trying to confi rm the other’s identity. At one point, 

during a mortar barrage, SSG Canon tossed snow up in the air to confi rm his identity to DePouli. 

Twenty minutes later, the two groups of Rangers linked up. CPT Self quickly descended to the 

rock cropping where SSGT Brown had set up his radios and issued a brief fragmentary order 

(FRAGO) to deal with the bunker above. He explained the layout of the bunker and his plan 

of assault. SPC Randy Pazder and SPC Omar Vela, the heavy machine gun team, moved up to 

Gilliam’s M-240B position to add their guns to the fi re support. They had carried the heaviest 

load up the mountain and had a brief chance to rest. In preparation for the assault, CWO Talbert 

and SGT Walters had collected more than 2,000 rounds of 7.62mm from the helicopter. SGTs 

Walker, Stebner, and Patrick George; SPC Jonas O. Polson and SPC Oscar J. Escano; and SSG 

Harper Wilmoth comprised the “fresh” assault element of two three-man Ranger teams.79

Instead of giving an assault-initiation signal, CPT Self simply said, “When ready, go!” With 

that, the two machine guns opened up with a steady stream of fi re. The assault elements moved 

deliberately up the hill in the knee-deep snow, fi ring, maneuvering, and tossing hand grenades 

for 40 meters. When the aircrew yelled, “Slow down! You’re going to run out of ammo,” Self 

ignored the comments, knowing that his men were fi ring and maneuvering with precision and 

experience toward the objective. Within minutes, the Rangers reached the bunker by the large 

rock boulder. SGT Stebner reported fi nding the fi rst American body, lying face down in the 

snow near the boulder. When SSG Wilmoth’s team cleared the bunker, it found two dead enemy 

fi ghters and a second American amid the debris. With this “new” information, CPT Self was 

suspicious and a little confused: “What was the real story here? Had these two been captured 

and forced to call in an aircraft?” Self told SSGT Brown to ask the ground force below about 

them since they had not given him any information.

When SSGT Brown talked to Mako 20, the ground force leader, he confi rmed that both 

Americans were part of his team. Finally, after more than 6 hours into the fi ght, Self had a 

complete picture. When the Rangers stopped fi ring, he sent SSG Canon to the bunker area to 

identify the two dead Americans. They were Roberts and Chapman. Having done that, Canon 

took a team and pushed down the saddle on the left side of the aircraft, found two more bunkers, 

and killed another enemy fi ghter. All around the top of the summit was a network of enemy positions that took advantage of the terrain to conceal movement, stock ammunition, and provide 

good cover from air attacks. Dead enemy fi ghters littered the entire ridgetop as well as RPGs, 

ammunition, and small arms.

By 1115, the Rangers controlled the key terrain. CPT Self and Air Force SSGT Miller 

walked along the summit looking for a helicopter pickup zone (PZ). SSGT Brown called the 

special operations TOC in Bagram to relay that the PZ on Takur Ghar was cold. Self started 

back down to the disabled helicopter to direct that the casualties be brought up to the mountaintop when the situation changed.

Just as Self dropped below the summit, an RPG exploded behind his head. As he scrambled back to get a look, Self saw tracers coming from a group of enemy fi ghters on a parallel 

ridgeline about 350 meters away, slightly below his position. SSGT Vance scrambled to get 

some CAS. SSG Stebner, SGT Larken from the aircrew, and two other Rangers carrying SSG 
314

Deese in his Skedco “luge” were halfway up the ridge when the enemy fi ring started. At the 

command, “Take cover!” Deese in his “luge” was unceremoniously dropped in the snow as 

everyone dove for cover behind a rock outcropping. Left in the open, Deese was happy that he 

was not sliding down the mountain again but quickly grabbed a small bush nearby to anchor 

himself. Then he realized where he was and thought, “This is really bad.” As SSG DePouli 

turned PFC Gilliam’s M-240B machine gun downhill, SSG Stebner yelled to Deese from the 

rock outcropping, “Don’t worry sergeant. We’re coming to get you,” as PFC Gilliam let loose 

a stream of machine gun fi re. “You don’t have to,” replied Deese. Each time Stebner tried to 

retrieve him, bullets ricocheted closer to Deese. “Just leave me alone,” Deese called back, feeling like a “bullet magnet.” Stebner yelled back, “Shut up! I’m not going to leave you there.” 

On his third try, Stebner managed to reach Deese and drag him into the cover of the outcropping. Meanwhile, the Rangers returned fi re with their M-4 carbines and the machine gun, and 

launched rifl e grenades at the enemy’s location.

In the original casualty collection point, Airman Cunningham had just inserted an IV into 

CWO Corbin when the enemy opened up again. With nowhere to go, CWO Talbert, SFC Lafayette, 

and Airman Cunningham shot back. Lafayette thought, “I have to keep the enemy’s head down to 

protect these patients.” CWO Gaines yelled because Talbert was shooting about 18 inches from his 

head. The three men tried to move Gaines but needed more help. The enemy fi ghters would pop 

their heads up long enough to fi re and then duck down. In the midst of the fi refi ght, Talbert dashed 

to get some help from the Rangers. When he reached them, they said that CAS was inbound in a 

few minutes, and then an RPG fl ew over their heads and exploded near the helicopter.

The men in the casualty collection point were now “sitting ducks” for enemy fi ghters. SFC 

Lafayette remembered thinking that the RPG explosion was nothing compared to the 500-

pound bombs. While crawling toward Cunningham, a burst of fi re interrupted him. Lafayette 

turned around to shoot back. As he did so, he was hit twice in the abdomen. The impacting 

bullets “felt like a sledgehammer,” hitting him in the lower stomach below his body armor. The 

medic looked at his watch; it was 1130. Senior Airman Cunningham, only 6 feet away, had also 

been hit in the fusillade of bullets. The round penetrated his pelvis area and triggered heavy 

bleeding. Cunningham was still lucid and told Lafayette that he was in unbelievable pain. The 

fi ring continued all around them. That was when the Rangers above and the wounded below 

yelled at Lafayette and Cunningham to quit moving.

CWO Gaines theorized, “If we all play dead, maybe they’ll stop shooting at us.” The absence of motion seemed to work as the enemy shifted its concentration of fi re. Several minutes 

later, during a lull in the shooting, Lafayette mustered the courage to check himself. Being a 

medic, he knew that an abdominal wound was about the worst type to receive in this situation. 

He felt down and then looked; it was wet but not bleeding, possibly urine or snow. Lafayette felt 

a little better. During the fi ring, SGT Matthew LaFrenz, the Ranger medic, had low crawled to 

Cunningham and Lafayette and begun treating their wounds.

The Rangers continued to battle the enemy at long range. SPC Randy J. Pazder spotted 

and killed a foe that stayed exposed too long. Then, on a ridge to the east, they spotted another 

small group moving into position. SSG Canon sent SPC Vela to get more ammunition from the 

helicopter 150 meters away. As Vela rushed down through the snow to the helicopter, enemy fi re 

erupted around him and he dove for cover behind a rock with SSG Stebner. Then Vela crawled 
315

over to SSG DePouli’s position and quickly loaded 7.62 ammunition into the spare barrel bag 

and tossed it halfway to Canon, who retrieved the bag. Anticipating where the next fi ghter 

would emerge to shoot, SPC Pazder poured machine gun fi re into the surrounding area. When 

Navy F-14 fi ghters arrived carrying 500-pound bombs, SSGT Vance tried to hit the reverse side 

of the summit ridge with the bombs.

The aerial munitions were dropped closer than expected. One 500-pounder landed about 

75 meters from the Rangers, knocking SSG DePouli’s helmet off. He called back to CPT Self 

and asked for a “heads up” next time. “Sure, no problem” was the reply.80 CWO Talbert saw 

a piece of bomb shrapnel hit SGT Walker’s helmet. The Ranger simply looked around as if to 

say, “What was that?” and started shooting again. About 1215, during a JDAM strike “danger 

close,” Self heard a “whump, whump, whump” sound and then watched a baseball bat-sized 

chunk of metal fl y end over end about 100 feet over his head. That was too close even for his 

initials. The JDAMs turned the tree- and snow-covered ridge into a massive dirt pile. As CWO 

Corbin looked skyward from his Skedco, he saw enemy bodies and debris being fl ung through 

the air above him. The Rangers cheered in unison when they saw three enemy fi ghters fl y 

through the air, signifying the elimination of the current threat. Their cheers provided some 

comfort to the exposed casualties as well.

The Ranger medic, SGT LaFrenz, categorized the new casualties—the two medics, Lafayette and Cunningham—as urgent surgical, those with the most life-threatening injuries. He was 

very concerned about Cunningham. While he had controlled the external bleeding, he could 

not be certain if he had stopped any of the internal bleeding. SSGT Miller assisted LaFrenz in 

caring for the wounded and preparing them to be moved. The next big requirement was to get 

the casualties close to the new PZ.

Because of the high altitude and acute physical fatigue, it took four or fi ve men to carry an 

injured man on a Skedco litter the 80 meters to the summit and required several stops along the 

way. CPT Self calculated that a good move took 10 to 15 minutes per casualty. Since there were 

now six litter-bound casualties and six bodies to move, it would take 2 to 3 hours to move everyone to the PZ. The Rangers, airmen, and Night Stalkers were worn out. As each man reached 

his physical limit, Self rotated tasks to provide a brief respite. At 1300, SSGT Vance made an 

urgent request to the special operations TOC in Bagram for immediate casualty evacuation. His 

call was acknowledged. He was told, “Stand by.” The TOC requested the status of the PZ. As 

Vance replied “Cold,” another mortar round hit in the area.

At FARP Texaco, the QRF commanders, helicopter fl ight leads, and AMC were still working on a deliberate evacuation plan. By 1330, a plan was ready, and the pilots and ground forces 

returned to the three Chinooks. At the same time, CPT Self made an urgent request for casualty 

evacuation, trying to negotiate an immediate extraction of the six wounded and a nighttime 

exfi ltration of the remaining force if necessary. He told the special operations TOC that he had 

a good reverse slope PZ, protected from enemy fi re, and emphasized his medic’s opinion that 

the wounded might lose limbs or die if they were not evacuated before dark. The TOC replied 

that it understood the situation and that a 70-man QRF was standing by because intelligence 

reports indicated that the enemy leadership had called for reinforcements to converge on the 

Takur Ghar. Self did not want another 70 personnel crowded onto the mountain where there was 

no place for them to land.
316

A short time later, CPT Self sensed from radio traffi c that the tone of the operation had 

changed. The special operations headquarters was prosecuting targets identifi ed by long-range 

OPs manned by coalition troops and U.S. Special Forces. It was obvious that CAS was being 

called in on any enemy movement in the Shah-i-Khot Valley area. At 1430, with all three helicopters ready to launch on the 25-minute fl ight to Takur Ghar, the senior special operations 

commander at Bagram ordered Razor 54 to shutdown. The new extraction time was scheduled 

for 2015 local time.

Figure 17. Mountains and “Whales.”

The special operations soldiers on the top of Takur Ghar were not informed of the new 

extraction time. They continued to watch for the enemy and cared for the wounded men. CWO 

Talbert and SGT Walters rummaged inside the helicopter, stripping off the soundproof insulation to shelter the wounded and sharing the water and food they found aboard. Rangers provided security and helped to retrieve clothing, sleeping bags, and blankets, preparing for the drop 

in temperature as the sun dropped lower. SGT LaFrenz and SSGT Miller, the other Air Force PJ, 

made rounds of their patients every 15 minutes, monitoring vital signs and lucidity, changing 

dressings, and giving reassurance that help was on the way. LaFrenz was always positive. He 

repeatedly said, “Hey guys, they’re going to come get us. We’re going to be out of here soon.” 

But the Night Stalkers knew differently. The rescue force would not come until after dark. As 

SSG Deese kept talking to keep everyone alert, SGT Larken stuffed IV bags inside his shirt to 

keep them warm for the wounded.

At 1520, SGT LaFrenz, the Ranger medic, called the TOC at Bagram, to explain that “medical conditions were getting worse.” “Roger, we understand,” was the reply. Ten minutes later, 

the TOC told CPT Self that the recovery would be at 2015. He realized that no one wanted to 

risk losing another helicopter, but he also felt that he had better situational awareness on Takur 

Ghar; the Rangers did control the summit. Self also understood that no one had gotten it right 

yet and that it was a “no-win” decision for the commanders at Bagram. Now, it would truly be 

a struggle for survival among the wounded.

Over the next 4 hours, the temperature slowly dropped with the sun, and a wind began 

to come up. During a quiet moment, SGT Stebner told SSG Wilmoth how strange it was to 
317

be in such a beautiful place amid such dire conditions.81 Darkness descended around 1700. 

The wounded men were bundled up with piles of clothing and soundproofi ng. While CWO 

Talbert was holding a pressure bandage on Senior Airman Cunningham, the PJ passed on his 

fi nal wishes. A few minutes past 1730, Cunningham took a turn for the worst. LaFrenz and 

Miller immediately began emergency trauma care. SFC Lafayette began telling CWO Talbert 

what medical equipment to grab from his medical bag, giving its location and purpose. Talbert 

passed the equipment to LaFrenz or Miller as needed. After 30 minutes of trying everything and 

having exhausted his medical knowledge, LaFrenz angrily told CPT Self that Cunningham had 

died. It was 1800, and the helicopters were not due for more than 2 hours.

When the 3rd Battalion MH-47Ds arrived at Bagram at 1650, MAJ Schantz, the air mission 

commander (AMC), and his four aircrews were given an impromptu briefi ng. They were to carry 

another 59 Rangers to Texaco and depart in less than an hour. The death of Senior Airman Cunningham had been a crushing blow to the special operations commanders at Bagram and Texaco. Now an intimate sense of urgency fi lled everyone. CWO Charles Elkenback (pseudonym), 

3/160th fl ight lead, pushed the four Chinooks to reach the deliberate extraction briefi ng at FARP 

Texaco.82 While en route, Schantz was tasked to fi nd and deliver an Air Force CCT to the Gardez 

airstrip, the site arranged for the medical transfer. The CCT was to control the helicopter fl ow for 

the surgical team that was aboard a specially equipped MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft. Schantz 

told Elkenback to fl y to the FARP fi rst and then to deliver the CCT to Gardez. Meanwhile, the 

key planners gathered at Texaco for a fi nal update briefi ng.

The ground force recovery force, made up of CSAR teams and assault teams, needed 

a fourth Chinook. When the 3rd Battalion MH-47Ds arrived at 1850, CWO Daniel Henley 

(pseudonym), another fl ight lead, was tasked to support the recovery force.83 Because the MH47Ds had just arrived, CPT Brian Jefferson (pseudonym), Razor 54, the AMC, requested that 

the mission be “bumped” 30 minutes.84 When approval was granted, Jefferson ran over to Henley’s aircraft and briefed him on the scheme of maneuver, radio frequencies, and emergency 

contingencies.

The plan was not complex: Razor 02 would lead the fl ight to a release point where Razor 05 

would separate and fl y to the ground force’s location on the south side of Takur Ghar. Razor 06 

and Agile 03, Henley’s Chinook, would hold at the release point until Razor 02 had cleared the 

Ranger PZ as “cold.” Razor 02 would extract the critically wounded. Razor 05 would extract 

the KIA and noncritically wounded, and Agile 03 would pick up the remaining force on the 

ground. The two AH-64 Apache gunships would provide armed escort protection, along with 

two AC-130 Spectre gunships overhead. Each loaded helicopter would fl y, in turn, to Gardez 

to transfer the wounded to the surgical team’s MC-130 aircraft. The mixed fl ight of three MH47Es, one MH-47D, and two AH-64 Apaches lifted off from Texaco at 1945.

CWO Talbert and CPT Self had discussed the best approach path, landing area, and the 

priority of evacuation for each helicopter. SSGT Brown relayed the fl ight information to the 

TOC, and it passed the information to the inbound Chinooks: “Inbound heading 090 degrees, 

landing heading 135 degrees, departure heading 270 degrees.” The unmistakable sound of the 

Chinooks was the best sound CWO Corbin and the rest had heard all day, and many cheered. 

CPT Self radioed that the mountaintop was secure and that they needed help carrying the casualties. To his dismay and contrary to instructions, Razor 02 landed with its nose toward 
318

the casualties instead of its tail. Informed of his mistake, CWO Oliver felt that he would cause 

more damage by repositioning. The CSAR and QRF elements exited the aircraft, assumed a 

kneeling position in a perimeter, and did not move or attempt to help. In the heavy downwash of 

the rotors, the Rangers, 160th crewmen, and airmen struggled to carry their casualties through 

40 meters of knee-deep snow. The beleaguered men on the mountain were incensed. Physically 

exhausted, it took them 19 minutes to load their seriously wounded personnel, while a fresh 

recovery force watched. At one point, CWO Corbin fell completely out of his Skedco litter into 

the snow because of the steep slope of the terrain. Razor 02 left with 11 WIAs and the four-man 

CSAR team aboard.

The next two aircraft landed in the correct direction to facilitate loading. Once again, the 

QRF and CSAR exited the aircraft and set up a perimeter, and watched the men on the mountain stumbling down through the snow with the six KIAs. CWO Talbert recalled the feeling of 

relief once aboard the helicopter but also the uneasiness and vulnerability of waiting for what 

seemed like an eternity until the aircraft lifted off. Agile 03 swept the PZ and extracted the remaining Rangers and the third recovery force.

CWO Solanis, piloting Razor 05, knew that he was carrying too much fuel to land on the 

southern side of the mountain.85 He remedied the problem by dumping fuel during the 25-

minute fl ight to the PZ. Just before reaching the Shah-i-Khot Valley, Solanis achieved maximum landing weight for the altitude of the PZ. Having no communication with the ground 

force team, Razor 05 picked its way through the valley from the east. Luckily, the crew spotted 

a distant strobe light and picked up the laser designators from the team. Solanis knew that there 

were wounded among the ground force and that he needed to land as close as possible. CWO 

Derrick Donalds (pseudonym) went into a hover 80 feet above the team and descended straight 

down into a gorge with precipitous granite walls on three sides.86 Fortunately, a small mound at 

the bottom of the gorge provided a raised landing area. SSG Greg Law (pseudonym), the fl ight 

engineer, verbally guided Donalds until the aft wheels touched down very close to the team.87

With the front wheels off the ground, the ground force loaded aboard the hovering Chinook. 

Once aboard, Mako 20, the team leader, informed the crew that they had seen tracers fi red at 

the helicopter, but the steep granite walls had masked the fi res. Donalds eased the big helicopter 

straight up, then turned and picked his way back through the Shah-i-Khot Valley to Gardez.

Razor 05 arrived fi rst at Gardez. The surgical team’s MC-130 had taxied off the runway and 

was mired down in the mud. It was out of the mission. With three wounded aboard his aircraft, 

SGT Randal Kelley (pseudonym), a 160th medic, continued triaging the casualties.88 When 

Razor 02 arrived with the very seriously wounded from the mountaintop, Kelley and the chief 

surgeon decided that the best course of action was to load the most critical casualties on a Chinook and fl y them directly to Bagram. CWO Oliver and CPT Jefferson agreed and would use 

Razor 02 because it had the most fuel. The most critical were quickly loaded aboard Razor 02, 

and Oliver raced back to Bagram while SGT Kelley continued to work on his patients aboard 

Razor 05. By 2000, Razor 02 was delivering the critically wounded to the 274th Forward Surgical Team at the Bagram hospital pad.

Meanwhile, at Gardez, the less serious casualties were transferred to a British Chinook 

equipped with an operating room. The surgeons quickly stripped the wounded men, evaluated 
319

their conditions, sedated them, and began operating. Once the patients had been stabilized, the 

British Chinook fl ew them to Bagram and the 274th Forward Surgical Team. After Agile 03 

delivered CPT Self and his Rangers to Bagram, the soldiers accounted for their sensitive equipment, cleaned weapons, and treated their injuries before going to bed.

In an effort to rescue Navy PO1 Roberts, a number of actions were taken that set in motion 

a rescue action that ultimately cost six more lives on Takur Ghar mountain. These combat actions demonstrated SOF’s strong resolve to respond to comrades in peril on the battlefi eld. The 

extended fi ght was replete with examples of personal bravery under fi re, valorous acts, selfsacrifi ce, and cool professionalism. While there were communications problems and situational 

awareness was lost at times, decisions at all levels were made with the best intentions and with 

the best information available at the time. What should not be forgotten is that the Night Stalkers and Rangers with special operations airmen accomplished their mission.

What began as an Operation ANACONDA supporting operation—inserting a special reconnaissance (SR) team on Takur Ghar in the Shah-i-Khot Valley—took public interest away from the 

main effort by conventional forces. The popular attention span drifted off shortly after the rescue 

was complete. In the meantime, the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda holdouts was still being 

prosecuted in earnest by Army Special Forces teams working with Afghan Military Forces (AMF).

During 5 to 9 March 2002, offensive activities in ANACONDA hit a lull as the commanders 

adjusted plans for the next attack. TF Rakkasan, supported by coalition air power, deliberately 

swept across its objective area, clearing caves and fi ghting positions. COL John Mulholland, 

JSOTF-North commander at Bagram, asked LTC Carl Hooper whether armor or mechanized 

forces were needed to sweep around the “Whale.” His affi rmative response led to negotiations 

with the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) for additional Afghan forces and tanks. Defense Minister Fahim Khan specifi cally chose General Gul Haidar to lead a 700-Tajik force from Kabul to 

Gardez. At JSOTF-North, there was considerable concern that Haidar’s Tajiks and Commander 

Zia’s Pashtuns would not cooperate and that the two groups might actually fi ght each other! The 

Special Forces leaders and other representatives worked out a basic strategy to unite the Tajik 

and Pashtun effort. The Americans would dictate the boundaries and concept of employment. 

At least that was what they planned. Reality was much different. ODA 394 was assigned to the 

operation on D+4 to replace the decimated ODA 372.

ODA 394 Climbs the “Whale”

During the second phase of ANACONDA, 3rd SFG CPT Jed Samuels (pseudonym) 

and ODA 394 were paired with a seasoned team from 5th SFG, ODA 594, known by their 

radio call sign of “Texas 14.”89 The two Special Forces teams and security elements left 

Bagram on 6 March 2002 in a small convoy of Hi-Lux and Toyota 4-Runner pickup trucks 

and sport utility vehicles driving 41⁄2 hours to their new base just outside Gardez. To the 

soldiers of ODA 394, their camp “looked like an old West adobe fort, complete with towers.” Inside the mud-walled compound there were already more than 100 coalition soldiers 

and their trucks. LTC Carl Hooper (pseudonym), 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, was the command 

and control element (radio call sign “Shark”) of three Special Forces ODAs: 394, the combat-tested 594, and 372. There were also Australian troops; U.S. Army combat engineers; and 
320

Figure 18. Typical Special Forces base camp area in Afghanistan.

other Special Forces elements with guides, vehicles, and gear jammed into the small fort.90

ODA 394’s battalion commander, LTC Terry Sanders (pseudonym), originally told them 

that they had about 48 hours to plan and prepare before entering the combat zone.91 But events 

had moved along at a faster pace. At about 2100 that evening, Samuels and his team sergeant, 

MSG Ty McFadden (pseudonym), received their mission orders from LTC Hooper on the second fl oor of a small hut inside the compound. Eight hours later, half of ODA 394 drove out of 

the crumbling fort to join the second Afghan offensive into the Shah-i-Khot Valley.

While half of the team headed toward the valley, SFC Jason “J.D.” Thurman (pseudonym) 

and SFC Jules Arde (pseudonym), left at Bagram, headed toward Kandahar to collect the team 

equipment that was left behind. After hitching a ride aboard a C-130 transport going to Kandahar and collecting and loading the team’s equipment, the two found themselves stranded. With 

everything happening up north, the two sergeants and their equipment were bumped off fl ight 

after fl ight by personnel and equipment having much higher priority for air movement. While 

they sat on the boxes of team gear by the runway, an Air Force airfi eld supervisor strode up and 

asked where they needed to go. As the three talked, Thurman and Arde realized that with their 

beards, mixed uniforms, and weaponry, they might pass as members of another special operations unit. Arde quickly fi xed an unusual noise and fl ash suppressor to the muzzle of his M-4 

carbine. It worked. The Air Force fl ight operations director made an assumption, and Thurman 

simply asked to go to Bagram. In short order, their equipment was loaded and they were airborne. At Bagram, their good luck lapsed.

ODA 394 had already left for Gardez. Their team boxes, lashed on an Air Force aluminum 

air-delivery platform, had been unloaded elsewhere in the night. A day later, SFCs Thurman 

and Arde fi nally found their team pallet in a distant part of the airfi eld appropriately called the 

“frustrated cargo” area. After acquiring additional cold-weather clothing for the ODA, they 

found room for their team boxes on a truck convoy bound for Gardez and climbed aboard.92

When half of ODA 394 left the Gardez compound on 7 March for the Shah-i-Khot Valley, CPT Samuels and MSG McFadden planned to rotate the split teams into and out of the 

battle every 48 hours, as they had heard other Special Forces teams had done when directing 

airstrikes. The “split 394 team” moved with ODA 594, ODA 372, and several hundred Pashtun 
321

soldiers to “Checkpoint Charlie” where Samuels and SGT Stefan Morris (pseudonym), the 

medic, established a small command post with their Afghan translator and two sergeants from 

the other ODAs.93 The main body of the group then dispersed to three forward positions.94 McFadden, SSG Jerry Rawlins (pseudonym), and four members of ODA 372 went to Observation 

Post South (OP South), overlooking Tergul Ghar, that everyone called the “Whale” because of 

its close resemblance to the dominant terrain feature at the Army NTC in the Mojave Desert 

at Fort Irwin, California.95 The Special Forces soldiers at OP South were accompanied by 15 

Pashtuns, while another 15 guarded their trucks in the gully to their north.

Part of ODA 594, organized for 48-hour rotations like ODA 394, moved toward OP North 

on the northern knob of Tergul Ghar.96 This rocky knoll on the “Whale” had been dubbed the 

“Guppy” by the Americans.97 As 30 of Commander Zia’s Pashtuns climbed the northern end of 

Terghul Ghar mountain, two pair of Marine Corps AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters fl ew 

in ahead, fi ring rocket-propelled antitank missiles into cave openings on the “Guppy.”98

SSG Bernard Dubois (pseudonym), ODA 394, set up the mission support site, with several 

members of ODA 594, adjacent to the 82mm mortar position of SSG Cash Galtier (pseudonym) from ODA 594.99 Dubois, a weapons specialist, was amazed by how profi cient the Pashtun mortar crews were. He knew that ODA 594 had just managed a remarkable feat of training, 

turning several hundred “jundees,” as they referred to the Pashtun tribesmen, from illiterate 

peasant village recruits into armed fi ghters in less than four weeks. But they were rifl emen. The 

mortar is a fairly complex, crew-served weapon that requires close teamwork and trust. To fi re 

it accurately requires advanced military skills, even for American soldiers.

Yet SSG Galtier had his “jundees” dropping mortar rounds and hitting enemy positions a 

mile and more to their front. The three Soviet-made 82mm mortars were fi red without sights 

and fi re-direction equipment. Galtier made his own plotting board and computed ballistic data 

sheets with appropriate explosive fi ring charges. The Paducah, Kentucky, native, known for his 

thick Southern drawl, did not have a translator while he was training his Afghan mortar teams. 

According to the ODA 594 team sergeant, “Galtier spoke ‘Paducah’ to his ‘jundees,’ and they 

understood.”100 Observing them in action was “truly amazing” to SSG Dubois.101

For the next 48 hours, B-1 and B-52 bombers bombed the “Whale” around the clock. The 

main ridgeline was a “free-fi re zone,” and American, British, and French warplanes that could 

not fi nd targets anywhere else in Afghanistan fl ew to the Shah-i-Khot Valley and dropped their 

ordnance to avoid landing with it. “It literally looked like a fi reworks display,” said SGT Morris 

(ODA 394), who was 3 miles from the impact zone, “and when the 2,000-pounders [bombs] hit, 

they shook the checkpoint violently.”

The constant bombing promoted surrenders and attracted the press. In the midst of the 

two days of bombing, a wounded al-Qaeda fi ghter, still carrying his rifl e and barefoot in the 

freezing cold, walked to OP South and surrendered. He said he had been hit by the Pashtuns’ 

mortar fi re. The al-Qaeda prisoner was escorted back to Checkpoint Charlie where SGT Morris treated him. The combat medic was very impressed by how tough the prisoner was. “He 

had several ‘through-and-through’ mortar shrapnel wounds that I had to probe with my fi nger 

to see if the rib cage had been penetrated to make sure that no vital spot was hit,” said Morris. 

“The guy didn’t even fl inch.”102 A teenager who identifi ed himself as an al-Qaeda fi ghter also 
322

surrendered near OP South. All that he carried with him was a miniature copy of the Koran and 

a small radio.103 When a group of journalists tried to enter the Shah-i-Khot Valley on the rutted 

road near Checkpoint Charlie, CPT Samuels and SGT Morris turned them back. The reporters 

were from all the major news services—BBC, CNN, ABC, CBS, and Reuters. Samuels noted 

that along with their hired guards all were wearing sidearms. “They said that they purchased 

them in Kandahar,” Samuels recounted, “for self-protection.”104

As CPT Samuels and MSG McFadden had planned, their split-team elements switched positions on 9 March. McFadden, SSG Rawlins, and SSG Dubois returned to Gardez, and WO Max 

Gorley (pseudonym) brought the other half of ODA 394 to the front lines. SSG Jake Millett and 

Air Force SSGT Damon Hulse (pseudonyms), the team enlisted tactical air controller (ETAC), 

went to OP South. CPT Samuels, WO Gorley, and SGT Morris stayed at Checkpoint Charlie. 

While the heavy bombing continued, the three Special Forces ODAs waited for the arrival of an 

additional Northern Alliance force from the Kabul area, supposedly with Russian-made tanks 

that were already a day late. In the outer Afghan ring of blocking positions, ODA 542 conducted 

a battle handoff with ODA 381 at the Orgun base on 9 March and redeployed.105

Gul Haidar fi nally arrived late on 8 March with about 600 Tajik fi ghters and four T-54 

Russian tanks with 100mm guns. Although the tanks were early 1950s vintage, they were still 

effective combat machines. Six Russian BMP armored personnel carriers with small rapid-fi re 

cannons mounted on top also accompanied the Tajik column. Although the BMP appeared to be 

a small tank, it could carry a squad of soldiers inside its armored hull. Intermixed in the column 

of vehicles were also several truck-mounted rocket launchers.106

Despite the fact that Commander Zia Lodin was Pashtun and General Gul Haidar was 

a Panshjir Valley Tajik—traditional enemies—they entered into negotiations. Under the very 

close scrutiny and supervision of the American Special Forces leaders and some senior representatives from the AIA ministries of defense and interior, the two rival Afghan leaders talked 

together for almost 4 hours. One of the success stories of Operation ANACONDA was the 

considerable amount of cooperation and mutual support that Zia and Haidar displayed for one 

another to develop an acceptable command relationship and general plan for attack. The rapport that the Special Forces teams enjoyed with Zia and Haidar did much to contribute to the 

success of the negotiations.

LTC Hooper explained the next phase of the ANACONDA plan to the three ODAs. Haidar’s predominantly Tajik force would move to the northern end of the “Whale” while Zia’s 

Pashtun fi ghters would maneuver around the western side of the ridge and position themselves 

at the southern end of the “Whale.” At 0500 the next morning, the U.S. Air Force would drop a 

15,000-pound “daisy cutter” bomb on top of the “Whale” to signal the start of the attack into 

the valley.107 To better support the effort, CPT Samuels was to relocate part of ODA 394 to another observation position with a better view down the Shah-i-Khot. From that vantage point, 

it could direct close air support (CAS) for both the Pashtun and Tajik offensives into the valley 

when the attack started. That was the plan, anyway.

Controlling Gul Haidar proved to be impossible. While ODA 394 watched, bewildered, 

“the Gul’s troops” moved to their assault line at the base of the “Whale” and then dismounted 

troops who began climbing the mountain. As evening approached, the Tajiks were climbing up 
323

the northern end as bombs were falling on the crest of the “Whale.” Samuels reported that Haidar was “out of control.” LTC Hooper issued new orders: ODA 394 was to join the Northern Alliance force on the “Whale” the next morning “to regain control.” The split ODA was directed 

to form the Tajiks into a line, shoulder to shoulder, and sweep down the “Whale,” clearing out 

any enemy that had survived the aerial bombardment. That night, “Gul’s troops” built a huge 

bonfi re on the northern crest of the “Whale.” MSG McFadden thought that the Tajiks wanted 

to demonstrate their bravado and success. “It was like, ‘See what we’ve done.’” At any rate, the 

act of defi ance forced Hooper to cancel the “daisy cutter” bomb.108

 Figure 19. General Haidar at rest. Figure 20. General Haidar on the move.

ODA 394 was just reaching its new position with a contingent of Zia’s Pashtuns when it 

received new orders by radio. As the sun went down, the small truck convoy turned around to 

head back to Checkpoint Charlie. The Special Forces soldiers had refrained from using their 

NVG to drive in the darkness because Zia’s men had no goggles. They turned on their trucks’ 

headlights. Worried that the lights would attract enemy, and possibly friendly, fi re, ODA 394 

stopped the convoy and managed to convince the “jundees” that only every other truck needed 

its lights on. This compromise worked haphazardly. At every opportunity, the “jundees” challenged the Americans and each other for convoy lead, despite the darkness, extremely bad road, 

and uncharted minefi elds. Among the Afghans, the “pole position” was a matter of prestige, 

and high-speed, reckless jockeying was a constant problem day or night. It did not matter. By 

the time ODA 394 got back to Checkpoint Charlie, the members were wondering how many 

other changes were in store for them tomorrow.109

When Tajik guides led the Americans up the northern slope of the “Whale” the next morning, 

Gul Haidar was not there. “The Gul” was in the valley below them with his armored vehicles. 

The infantry on the “Whale” was led by his second in command. CPT Samuels talked with him 

through a 46-year-old American citizen named Hafi z. This interpreter had been arrested during 

the Soviet occupation and imprisoned for a year before he escaped and walked across the southern mountains into Pakistan. Hafi z eventually immigrated to the United States, where he became 

an American citizen, living in Anaheim, California. He had worked as a driving instructor for the 

California Department of Motor Vehicles for 13 years when he agreed to be a translator for the 

U.S. military in Afghanistan. Hafi z was sent to K2 to join ODA 372. From Gardez, he saw action 

in the fi rst phase of Operation ANACONDA. ODA 394 met Hafi z at Checkpoint Charlie as he 
324

helped manage the civilian traffi c along the road. To MSG McFadden, Hafi z seemed “extremely 

sensitive, almost effeminate,” and the Afghan-American scolded the Special Forces soldiers if 

they cursed in his presence. He was fl uent in English, Pashto, and Farsi; “perceptive about men’s 

characters”; and “physically very tough.” While carrying a duffel bag, Hafi z easily stayed up 

with the team during the climb up and over the boulders on the north end of Tergul Ghar.110

After getting Gul’s troops lined up abreast on the ridgeline, CPT Samuels had the Tajik commander begin the advance to clear the bare granite spine of the “Whale.” “Ten steps from the 

start line,” said Samuels, “Gul Haidar’s men saw the three small hamlets, Babulkheyl, Zerikheyl, 

and Marzak, in the Shah-i-Khot Valley below them to the southeast. “They simply abandoned 

the line,” he said, “and just ran off the mountain to steal stuff ” from the villages, each of which 

consisted of no more than a dozen “bombed-out huts.” Samuels tried to get the Gul to recall the 

marauding fi ghters to deal with the enemy on the mountain fi rst. He reminded the robed leader 

that U.S. infantrymen across the valley were not expecting this rush of Afghans into the valley 

and might fi re on them. Gul responded, “It does not matter if they are killed.” Then, sensing 

Samuels’ disapproval, Gul barked orders into his hand-held radio. Hafi z, the translator, leaned 

toward Samuels and McFadden and whispered, “He’s telling his men that a few must come 

back so the Americans will see them, but the rest can keep going. These are very bad men.”111

ODA 394 had been accompanied by 20 of Zia’s Pashtuns who now guarded the Americans 

from Gul’s Tajiks. The atmosphere became very tense as the Tajiks and Pashtuns traded insults 

about their tribes and provinces. “Zia’s men were well paid and well disciplined, and they were 

very protective of us,” said Samuels. They formed a circle around the Americans when the Tajiks and other Afghans came near.

The two groups could be distinguished in part by their uniforms. Gul’s troops wore foreignmade green camoufl age fatigues and caps. Only their commander wore traditional Afghan 

dress—a turban and long robe. When MSG McFadden was near the Tajiks, they reeked of 

burning hashish, which most smoked “all day long.” Zia’s Pashtuns wore American-made dark 

brown polyester fl eece trousers with sage green nylon coats or olive drab canvas jackets. On 

their heads they wore either American black wool watch caps or the native Panjshir Valley hats. 

They were armed with newly issued Russian and Chinese assault rifl es and machine guns, and 

wore ammunition magazine vests. The U.S. insulated boots, often too big for the Pashtuns’ feet, 

were often replaced by light shoes or slippers, even in the freezing winter weather.

Having organized the Pashtuns along Western military lines, the leaders wore improvised 

rank insignia fashioned by their Special Forces trainers. ODA 594 and ODA 372 bought safety 

pins and buttons at a local market and in a formal ceremony in front of their newly formed platoons and companies, pinned the symbols of rank on the combat leaders: Platoon commanders, 

in charge of 40 to 50 fi ghters, wore one silver button on their collar; company commanders, 

who led three or four platoons, wore two; and Zia Lodin, the battalion commander with three 

companies numbering some 500 troops, displayed three gold buttons on a safety pin. “Zia’s 

commanders were genuinely proud of those buttons,” said one of the Special Forces advisers.112

These men also wore strips of refl ective “glint tape” pinned to the tops of their caps and on 

one shoulder of their jackets. The sensor operators in the AC-130 Spectre gunships, prowling the 

night skies over Afghanistan, could see the glint tape readily. The glint wearers were friendlies.113
325

ODA 394 and its Pashtun platoon led the sweep southward down the “Whale.” About 300 

of Gul Haidar’s “infantry” troops, having fi nished looting the three abandoned villages, trailed 

behind. They met no resistance, but at each promontory along the bomb-blasted ridge, the Tajik 

commander carefully stationed a few of his troops “to mark their territory,” Samuels learned. 

When ODA 394 reached the south end of the massif about 1500, it formed a night defensive 

perimeter with their 20 loyal “jundees.”114

Hafi z’s warning about the Tajiks had not been taken seriously initially. SFC Arde was sitting on the slope checking his equipment when one of Gul’s men walked straight up to him and 

cheerfully tried to chat with him in broken English. While Arde was distracted, several Special 

Forces teammates watched in amazement as another Tajik crept up behind him and silently, and 

very deftly, unlatched, twisted, and removed the fl ash suppressor from the muzzle of the M-4 

carbine on his back. Earlier that day SFC Thurman and Air Force SSGT Millett were at the base 

of the “Whale” guarding their four pickups loaded with heavy equipment and had to chase away 

Gul Haidar’s men who slipped aboard the trucks to rifl e the team’s gear. “It was like dealing 

with professional thieves,” said Samuels.115

Once the Afghans supported by the Special Forces teams had cleared the “Whale,” Gul 

Haidar’s Soviet tank-led column entered the northern end of the Shah-i-Khot Valley. ODA 394, 

their Pashtun fi ghters, and Gul’s foot soldiers along the peaks of the ridgeline watched them enter the valley. On the east side of the valley, several 101st Airborne infantry companies from TF 

Rakkasan still manned blocking positions where they had been since Operation ANACONDA 

started the week before. The green-painted T-54 battle tanks clanked down the dirt road at the 

base of the valley, sending up dark exhaust plumes from their ancient diesel engines. All of a 

sudden, to the amazement of the Special Forces soldiers, the Gul’s tankers started fi ring their 

cannons at the American infantry soldiers guarding their fl ank.116 On his radio, SSG Hulse heard 

another Air Force special tactics airman across the valley urgently trying to stop the tank fi re.

Samuels yelled at the Tajik commander next to him that the Afghan tanks were shooting 

at Americans and that he had to stop them. The Special Forces soldiers were enraged by the 

Tajiks. “We were hoping,” said Samuels, “that the 101st had Javelins [antitank missiles] and 

would fi re back.” Fortunately, the Rakkasan company commander under fi re knew the tanks 

belonged to the anti-Taliban forces and had ordered his men to stay down under cover and hold 

their fi re. “It was chaotic,” remembered Samuels who quickly radioed MAJ Mike Hopkins 

(pseudonym), who was traveling with Gul’s armored column, to call a “cease-fi re.” Only two 

tank rounds were fi red at the U.S. troops before the Afghans stopped shooting, and they fell 

short. There were no American casualties, and the attack continued as the Soviet T-54 tanks 

traversed their cannons to the rear.117

During the advance down the valley, WO Gorley spotted several likely cave openings on 

the steep western slope of the “Whale.” SSG Hulse called for CAS, got a pair of Marine AH1 Super Cobra attack helicopters, and began the process of directing them to the targets. The 

craggy terrain and shadows made this diffi cult, but Gorley knew that there were no friendlies 

on that side of the mountain. As the slim gray Super Cobras circled to line up for their “rocket 

run,” Gul Haidar’s men ran to the Special Forces soldiers, yelling “No, no, stop the helicopters!” “Their people” were down below in the caves. Standing beside the Tajik second in command, MSG McFadden asked if any of his troops had moved down the slope. He replied, “Yes, 
326

we have a watering party down there.” Having seen Gul’s men wandering off in small groups 

during the day searching for loot, the Special Forces team sergeant could not be certain if the 

Tajik was lying or not. Rather than challenge the Afghan commander, McFadden told Gorley 

that there might be friendlies in the caves. Gorley said that it was not possible. He suspected 

that the Tajiks were afraid the helicopter rockets might destroy any booty the fl eeing Taliban

and al-Qaeda fi ghters might abandon. Frustrated but left with no choice, Gorley reluctantly had 

Hulse wave off the Super Cobras hovering near the ridge top waiting for clearance to fi re.118 As 

they banked to fl y away, MSG McFadden saw one of the Marine pilots saluting him.119

Zia pushed north along his planned route and quickly secured Babulkheyl, Zerikheyl, and 

Marzak. Haidar attacked through scattered resistance and cleared Serkhankheyl within 90 

minutes, meeting Zia’s forces at Babulkheyl. There, Zia’s Pashtuns stopped some of Haidar’s 

men from entering the village because they were intent on looting. The situation became very 

tense—Tajiks were fi ghting in Pashtun territory—until the accompanying Special Forces teams 

defused it by separating the two forces.120

As luck would have it, ODA 394 had to spend the night on top of the “Whale.” Perched at 

9,000 feet above sea level at the end of a long day, the team redistributed their limited supply of 

water and rations. The “jundees” melted snow from the scattered patches on the mountain for 

drinking water. SSG Morris was particularly short. When he left Gardez four days earlier, he 

thought he would only be away for 48 hours. Instead of carrying a large rucksack, he elected to 

bring a “three-day assault pack,” about the size of a student’s book bag, and go with the clothes 

on his back. Unable to return to Gardez, Morris recalled the old soldier’s joke, “Travel light, 

freeze at night.” And he did that night on the “Whale.” More serious was the situation with their 

Tajik allies. Angered by and distrustful of Gul Haidar’s troops, Samuels told the commander to 

move his men several hundred yards north away from the detachment’s overnight perimeter. For 

security against both the enemy and its allies, the team put out tripwires with fl ares attached to 

warn them of any unwanted intruders.121

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that Operation ANACONDA had entered a 

“mopping-up” phase.122 Early the next morning, 12 March, ODA 394 was alerted to prepare for 

the arrival of an American infantry battalion on top of the “Whale.” The Special Forces team 

was to select and mark three helicopter landing zones (LZs) north of its overnight position on 

the ridge of the mountain. Then ODA 394 was to support the infantrymen for “24 to 48 hours.” 

CPT Samuels sent WO Gorley with Air Force SSGT Hulse, Hafi z, and fi ve Pashtuns to reconnoiter for LZs. Given the broken, rough terrain, it took an hour for the LZ party to reach the potential landing area. However, only two Chinooks would be able to land simultaneously. SSGT 

Hulse was to be the air traffi c controller for the helicopters. An hour later, the party spotted 

three CH-47s enter the Shah-i-Khot Valley, but Hulse was unable to contact them on his radio. 

WO Gorley had “a ringside seat” as the three Chinooks fl ew by his LZs and, instead, landed in 

a cloud of dust 600 yards to his west where the valley fl oor met the base of the “Whale.”123

As the fi rst lift of medium-cargo helicopters fl ew off, Gorley could hear squad leaders shouting to their men in English to spread out and take cover—“very professionally done,” he thought. 

Then he picked up a bright orange signal panel (VS-17), about the size of a small tablecloth, and 

waved it about until he could see the soldiers below him pointing up at him on the mountain. Hav-
327

ing attracted their attention, Gorley walked down the slope with his arms out to his side, yelling, 

“Don’t shoot, we’re Americans!” “Don’t worry, Yank,” came the reply from the coalition point 

man. The lead element of the coalition battalion had arrived. They were soon joined by the rest 

of their battalion, the 2nd Brigade headquarters of the 10th Mountain Division, and an American infantry company. Gorley was told that the coalition forces were participating in Operation 

HARPOON, a cave-clearing mission on the “Whale” planned fi ve days earlier. WO Gorley 

wondered why his Special Forces team had only been advised of this operation 2 hours earlier.124

The “24- to 48-hour” support of Operation HARPOON forces lasted six days. The coalition 

forces impressed the Special Forces soldiers. “They knew what they were doing,” said Gorley, 

“and they went out and did it.”125 The caves they discovered and searched were mostly empty. 

It was the American infantry that had fi rst contact with the enemy on a hilltop only 300 yards 

from ODA 394’s fi rst overnight position. When the U.S. infantrymen approached the cave, they 

followed an established procedure of fi ring two antitank rockets and a machine gun into the 

opening fi rst. When they did, an enemy fi ghter “came running out of there, spraying [bullets] 

with an AK.” He was instantly gunned down; the hail of bullets tore his head off.

The fi ring prompted several reactions. First, the shooting roused several of the American 

infantry heat casualties sitting on the ridgeline who got to their feet and started running toward the sound of the gunshots. The suddenly alert infantrymen were also surprised by the 

coincidental, unexpected arrival of a 30-truck Pashtun convoy with the vehicles displaying 

VS-17 orange panels led by Special Forces MAJ Mike Hopkins along the base of the “Whale.” 

The American infantrymen—a “very aggressive” bunch, according to WO Gorley—instantly 

swung their weapons on the line of vehicles. Fortunately, from a vantage point on top, Gorley 

and COL Kevin Wilkerson, commander, 2nd Brigade, witnessed everything and with a few 

radio calls, defused the situation. In another nearby cave, ODA 372 discovered quantities of 

discarded ammunition and several dead Taliban fi ghters.126

East of the “Whale,” droves of journalists began streaming into the Shah-i-Khot Valley. 

The leaders of the various Afghan militias arrived at 1400 on 12 March to be photographed and 

interviewed. In an agreement with the reporters, ODA 394 had made a creek bed a “no-camera 

zone” to isolate the Special Forces teams. The next day, ODA 394 discovered the validity of an 

agreement with the press when it saw satellite television clips of itself in the creek bed area, 

taken surreptitiously by the journalists.

On 12 March, the three Special Forces detachments still in the valley—ODAs 372, 394, 

and the newly arrived 395—met with the battalion commanders who had directed them during 

the Shah-i-Khot Valley combined operations to assess the results. All concurred that they needed to cease relations with Gul Haidar and his Tajiks and that all Afghan forces should withdraw 

back to Gardez. After the press conference, the Soviet T-54s led the “the Gul’s” column out of 

the valley. Half of ODA 395 and 100 Pashtuns of Commander Zia Lodin were left guarding the 

entire Shah-i-Khot Valley. Only CPT Samuels, MSG McFadden, SSG Rawlins, and SGT Morris of ODA 394 stayed the night at Checkpoint Charlie; the rest of the team returned to the old 

fort at Gardez. As the sun set, they were keenly aware that suddenly there were only 10 Americans in the Shah-i-Khot where several thousand coalition and Afghan troops had maneuvered 

and fought for more than two weeks. For ODA 394, Operation ANACONDA was over.127 On 
328

15 March, the forces of Zakim Khan withdrew from its outer ring blocking positions, and ODA 

571 conducted a battle handoff with ODA 392 for all operations at Khowst.128 Two months of 

counterguerrilla warfare in the dun-colored Afghan mountains still lay ahead for the 3rd SFG 

teams. While Special Forces assisted and advised the AMF units in the continued search for 

Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance, civil affairs teams (CAT-As) expanded their efforts in the cities and towns of Afghanistan.

Integrating Civil Affairs

As the 3rd SFG prepared to assume the Afghanistan special operations mission from 

JSOTF-North and JSOTF-South, MAJ Ron Sutherland (pseudonym) brought several planners 

from E Company, 96th CAB, to join the group staff. Sutherland had built a solid relationship 

with 3rd SFG during several overseas exercises. The 3rd SFG knew how tactical CA teams 

could assist ODAs in accomplishing their missions. Although not involved in mission planning 

for the Special Forces teams, the CA company commander stayed attuned to where the teams 

would be operating. This enabled him to orient the preparations of his CAT-As toward those 

specifi c areas. Consequently, when the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan, CAT-A56 arrived with them on 7 February 2002.

During its fi rst month in Afghanistan, CAT-A56 produced the CA annex to the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG plan for Operation ANACONDA. That accomplished, CPT Ken Harrison (pseudonym) moved his team to Gardez.129 Using his infantry and military intelligence backgrounds, 

the team commander assessed the local situation from a tactical viewpoint and with an eye 

to providing information that could affect future operations. After ANACONDA ended, the 

CA soldiers thought that the Afghans in and around the Shah-i-Khot Valley would need food, 

blankets, fi rewood, and building supplies. Delivery was coordinated with the CJCMOTF staff 

in Kabul. CPT Harrison; his team sergeant, MSG Mike Ewell (pseudonym); and their engineer, 

SFC Karl Cantwell (pseudonym) went to Gardez with the Special Forces soldiers of ODB 390 

to conduct a deliberate assessment. There, they discovered that the city was divided between 

two local warlords when rivals pointed weapons at them. That “no-win” situation caused the 

team to move to Khowst on 29 March.

Shortly after CAT-A56 arrived in Khowst, a 14-truck convoy carrying food arrived unexpectedly. At Khowst, the team arranged to meet with village offi cials to discuss supply distribution. 

Figure 21. Humanitarian aid arrives.
329

Because culturally the Afghan women in the countryside did not appear in public meetings, the

CA teams were forced to rely on the leaders for population fi gures. The continuing concern was 

that some leaders would infl ate their numbers, receive extra food, and then use the “profi ts” as 

bargaining chips in the local political arena. CA teams could not prevent this problem because 

they could not be perceived as interfering in village or tribal government. While they were in 

Khowst, the tenuous nature of Afghan tribal relations became evident. The former Paktia province governor, Padsha Khan, attacked the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) at Gardez that were 

loyal to Taj Mohammad Wardak, who Hamid Karzai had appointed governor in February.130

About two weeks later, CAT-A56 returned to Gardez when the commander of ODB 390 

felt the situation had calmed down. Although the team distributed food, their main project was 

to assess education needs. Their recommended projects included replacing windows in a girls’ 

school, building desks, and replacing the fence around the school. They were submitted to the 

CJCMOTF staff for funding in mid-April. The 3rd Battalion commander had only praise for 

CAT-A56. “They had a focus on the right things,” he said.131

In late April, the team received a new mission from the CJSOTF-Afghanistan. It was assigned to a combined task force (TF Jacana) made up of 19th SFG ODAs, AMF personnel, 

and the British Royal Marine Commandos. The combined task force was to assess the military 

situation in Paktia Province between Gardez and Khowst. The British Commandos did not understand CA and initially wanted to use CAT-A56 for PSYOP missions to pass out propaganda 

leafl ets. CPT Harrison quickly educated the British on their mission capabilities. Then, after 

learning that only two people in the village of 

1,000 were literate, they worked with the leaders of Soran to distribute wheat and blankets 

to the population. Having demonstrated their 

capabilities to the satisfaction of the British, 

CAT-A56 became a “force multiplier” for the 

combined task force until mission completion 

on 10 May.132

Although the CA soldiers were convinced 

of the importance of their mission, they also 

felt great frustration. CAT-A56’s team sergeant, MSG Ewell, saw the potential impact 

of quickly approved and funded projects as 

had CAT-A32 and the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) working at Bamian. As Ewell and SFC Cantwell explained, “It 

was extremely critical that the local Afghan 

people saw and made a direct connection between the arrival of American and Afghan 

soldiers who represented the Afghan Interim 

Authority (AIA) and very tangible help being provided to a village.” After examining Figure 22. Good wells are vital to life in Afghanistan.
330

schools or talking about the absence of wells with the villagers, they then expected you to do 

something about the problems. “When you leave and nothing gets done,” Cantwell said, “that 

becomes a problem. High-visibility projects that have immediate impacts must be executed 

quickly to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. Not doing that means lost opportunities.”133

MSG Ewell added, “If the people see Afghan soldiers with rifl es protecting them and American soldiers getting wells dug and schools upgraded to help them, their attitudes toward both 

groups of soldiers will be positive. In effect, wells and schools provide security for all Americans because, in contrast to the Soviets, we are in Afghanistan to help the people build a future 

that includes a stable national government.”134

The countrywide hunt for al-Qaeda and Taliban continued throughout Operation ANACONDA. Leaders and ranking staff personnel classifi ed as high-value targets (HVTs) were 

always being sought. Arms, munitions, and equipment caches and the midlevel Taliban and alQaeda were the focus of sensitive site exploitation (SSE) missions conducted by Special Forces 

and SOF elements. The following vignette details a successful HVT and SSE mission executed 

on very short notice by ARSOF elements using Night Stalker Chinooks from two different battalions of the 160th SOAR.

Ambush at 80 Knots

This aviation mission during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) showed that all the 

aviators in the 160th SOAR had been trained to the same high level of profi ciency and shared 

a common aggressive fl ying spirit. During the Takur Ghar rescue operations on 4 March 2002 

in which several MH-47E Chinook helicopters from the 2nd Battalion were damaged or forced 

down by enemy fi re, the 160th SOAR used MH-47Ds from the 3rd Battalion to fulfi ll SOF air 

missions in Afghanistan. This practice would continue until the 2nd Battalion Chinooks rotated 

back to the United States.

On 16 March 2002, the 1st and 3rd Battalions were alerted for an HVT mission. The next 

day, Chinook helicopters from both units would carry a Special Forces element to intercept a 

convoy of al-Qaeda forces to either capture or destroy them. CWO Gary Black (pseudonym), 

the MH-47E fl ight lead who had served with the 3rd Battalion Chinook company, had overall 

responsibility for the mission.135 He assembled all the helicopter crews and briefed the mission, diagramming the intercept procedure on butcher-block paper. Once he was sure that all 

aircrews understood their tasks and the emergency contingencies, Black released them to get 

some rest.

In the early morning hours of 17 March, the fl ight crews got a quick update brief, loaded 

the Special Forces element, and the combined fl ight departed with an MH-47E leading. Daylight came quickly for the Night Stalkers who use the dark to reduce the risk to aircraft and 

personnel. En route to the target area, the fl ight received continuous updates from a surveillance 

aircraft that routinely monitored activity on the battlefi eld.136 As the fl ight raced toward the enemy convoy, the Special Forces element aboard the MH-47Ds wanted to remove the Plexiglas 

windows to allow them to fi re if one of the Chinook’s M-134 miniguns failed or jammed. The 

pilots agreed and the windows were jettisoned.

The al-Qaeda convoy of three trucks was driving in a dry stream bed (wadi) that served as 
331

a road, and a fourth vehicle trailed them about 2 miles behind in the same wadi. The Chinook 

pilots had expected to be able to spot the vehicles far enough away to plan their approaches to 

mask the insertion of the assault forces. However, 30-foot granite cliffs bordered the stream bed 

and prevented the aviators from spotting the convoy until they were almost on top of it. When 

the lead MH-47E responded to the last-minute sighting, it forced the trailing Chinooks to react 

very quickly to the situation.

CWO Black executed a gut-wrenching 90-degree right turn with a rapid deceleration to 

land his helicopter approximately 20 feet in front of the lead vehicle. The convoy was forced to 

stop. According to the rules of engagement (ROE), if the vehicle occupants pointed weapons at 

the helicopters, the door gunners could fi re. When the convoy stopped, everyone jumped out of 

the trucks with their weapons aimed at the helicopters. The gunner on the left minigun opened 

fi re from the lead Chinook, disintegrating truck doors and killing several enemy soldiers.

Black’s maneuver forced CWO Charles Elkenback, fl ying the second helicopter, to bank 

hard to the left to avoid a collision.137 As Elkenback banked the helicopter, SGT Christopher 

Eaton (pseudonym) on the right door minigun and SSG Greg Parker (pseudonym), the ramp 

gunner with an M-249, fi red on the convoy.138 As the other Chinooks moved into position to 

engage their assigned vehicles, the enemy fi ghters scrambled out of their trucks, fi ring at the 

helicopters as they attempted to run for cover in a nearby ravine. A hailstorm of gunfi re from 

miniguns, M-4 carbines, and M-249 machine guns hit them as they tried to fl ee.

As CWO Mark Reagan (pseudonym) maneuvered to land his helicopter, SGT Roger Wilkerson (pseudonym), trying to follow his target simultaneously, only got off a short burst from 

his minigun before the ammunition belt broke and the gun jammed.139 SSG Charles Martin 

(pseudonym), the fl ight medic and a former Ranger SAW gunner, immediately stepped into 

the open door with his M-4 carbine.140 Firing semiautomatic, Martin killed the truck driver 

and then shot a second fi ghter as Wilkerson began to fi re his M-4. As the aircrew and Special 

Forces element continued to fi re from the window ports, the pilots quickly repositioned the big 

Chinook to a new spot just over the crest of a small hill. The new position masked the helicopter 

and gave the assault force a superb fi ring position overlooking all three trucks in the convoy.

In the meantime, CWO Elkenback and his crew spotted the fourth truck to the north in the 

same stream bed. They rapidly closed on the vehicle and forced it to stop by performing a 180-

degree decelerating turn. SGT Shane Gerhing (pseudonym), mindful of the ROE, had the left 

minigun trained on the truck.141 There was no place close to land, so Elkenback hovered the big 

Chinook close to the vehicle. A woman got out of the truck holding up a child; the other fi ve 

people inside simply stared at the helicopter in amazement. Strict fi re discipline was maintained 

as the assault element made a quick assessment. The Special Forces leader told the pilots to 

“abort,” and Elkenback fl ew back to the main convoy.142

The ground force commander directed two Chinooks to perform an extensive search of 

the fourth vehicle. This time, one Chinook hovered in front of the stopped truck as the second 

helicopter landed nearby to unload the ground force. At the sight of the helicopters again, the 

Afghans got out of their vehicle, moved away from it, sat on the ground, and waited for the 

Special Forces team to search the vehicle. The two helicopters moved away while the search 

was being conducted. Afterward, they fl ew the team back to the convoy site.
332

As the ground force searched the area; secured and treated its wounded prisoners; and 

prepared the vehicles, weapons, and munitions for destruction, the helicopters were released to 

refuel from an MC-130P tanker fl ying nearby. After they had refueled, the Chinooks returned 

to exfi ltrate the ground force. The HVT operation netted 18 enemy fi ghters—16 dead and two 

wounded prisoners—and the destruction of three vehicles, weapons, and munitions. The MH47s suffered only minor battle damage, despite moderate enemy fi re. The combined Chinook 

force from the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 160th SOAR, had performed a high-speed chase exceedingly well together in the best Night Stalker tradition.

As Operation ANACONDA wound down, SSE missions increased to locate arms and munitions that would support further Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance. The Shah-i-Khot Valley 

and surrounding mountains had to be painstakingly searched and battle-damage assessments 

submitted to the JSOTF. That mission fell to 3rd SFG ODA 372, ODA 395, and a group of 15 

Pashtun fi ghters from Zia Lodin’s forces.

Trail of Caches

By 13 March 2002, most U.S. and coalition soldiers and AMF personnel who had participated in Operation ANACONDA had left the Shah-i-Khot Valley. Commander Zia Lodin 

was not convinced that all Taliban and al-Qaeda forces that escaped ANACONDA had fl ed to 

Pakistan. Thus, he was concerned that the Afghan people would view the operation as a defeat, 

despite the acknowledgment that “a very few number of al-Qaeda may have escaped,” made by 

MG Franklin L. Hagenbeck, the combined commander. The only real way to determine who or 

what remained in the valley was for someone to physically look. LTC Carl Hooper, therefore, 

ordered ODA 372, ODA 395, and 15 AMF soldiers to return to the valley. Their mission was 

to reconnoiter and search sites that possibly could hold sensitive material or supplies. Special 

Forces ODA 372 would again work with Pashtun Commander Khoshkeyer and his Afghans.143

Since CPT Mike McHenry (pseudonym) had gone to the United States to attend CW3 

Harriman’s funeral, MSG Jason Doolittle (pseudonym) was in charge, and SFC John Veringer 

(pseudonym) became acting team sergeant. Although Veringer had only been in Special Forces 

since 1999, his 18 years in the Army, plus combat experience in Operation DESERT STORM, 

prepared him well for the responsibility. Their immediate task was to rebuild rapport with the 

Pashtun leaders and soldiers that had been damaged during the fi rst days of ANACONDA. Simply sharing a cup of tea with the Pashtun troops paid huge dividends. Suddenly, the American 

soldiers were treated like “rock stars.” The Afghan fi ghters were anxious to meet them because 

it was obvious that the Special Forces soldiers cared about them.144

There appeared to be no enemy remaining in the valley, but the reconnaissance and search 

of the entire area was the mission. SF ODA 372 was looking for intelligence data, arms, ammunition, bodies of enemy fi ghters, and other evidence of destruction. On 14 March, the team 

conducted its fi rst sensitive site exploitation (SSE) patrol. By the end of the day they had cleared 

seven buildings and found three footlockers fi lled with medical supplies, American money, 

passports, visas, drivers’ licenses, and other documents. Having discovered so much in a single 

day, ODB 390 and 150 AMF soldiers arrived that evening to expand the effort and provide more 

security. The next day, MSG Doolittle and ODA 372 carried their materials back to Gardez.
333

Four days later, ODA 372 returned to the Shah-i-Khot. ODB 390 had established a base 

camp, and Commander Khoshkeyer had established his base near the village of Marzak. On 

20 March, ODA 372 and half of ODA 395 conducted the fi rst foot patrol into the valleys that 

led to Pakistan. They found nothing that day, but what they discovered the next morning sent 

chills up the spines of ODA 372. As they moved into a valley, they came across an abandoned 

Russian 12.7mm DshK machine gun that was pointed straight down the route that ODA 372 

had planned to take into the Shah-i-Khot Valley that fi rst day of Operation ANACONDA. They 

also found numerous Russian BM-12 rockets still set up on rocks, again pointed toward their 

route into the valley.

The SSE patrols continued for the next several days. Among the discoveries were truckmounted Russian ZSU antiaircraft guns, some of which had been destroyed and some that 

were still functional; stockpiles of BM-12 rockets; and cave complexes that had sleeping 

areas, kitchens, offi ces, and communications bunkers. As the two ODAs carefully worked 

their way through the valleys leading to Pakistan, they noticed that the defenses between the 

Shah-i-Khot Valley and the Pakistan frontier appeared to be constructed in sequential belts. 

Each defensive line was covered by the next, all the way to the border. SSG Carey Robeson 

(pseudonym) had to admire the tactical sense of his enemy. “They were masters at using the 

terrain,” he said.145

Contents in the caves varied from mundane food supplies to computer diskettes. Some 

caches contained only a few items, while others would best be described as “stores” that had 

mattresses; blankets; cold-weather items; and 50-kilogram bags of rice, fl our, and sugar. Several caves had 5-foot-tall metal storage containers, almost like fi ling cabinets, fi lled with a variety 

of things. Munitions caches had 14.7mm and 23mm ammunition as well as rocket-propelled 

grenades (RPGs), Russian SA-7 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and recoilless antitank rifl es. 

In one position, there was a functional 57mm antiaircraft weapon. Several caves contained 

computers with their hard drives still inside. Excitement coursed through the team when it 

found one computer disk labeled USS Cole. Within hours, that diskette was evacuated from the 

valley and was on its way to headquarters for analysis.

Figure 23. Destroyed DshK antiaircraft weapon system in the Shah-i-Khot Valley.
334

Figure 24. Cave caches produced a surprising variety of items.

Destroyed large cargo and pickup trucks, often with hundreds of mortar rounds scattered 

alongside, littered the trail avenues leading from the Shah-i-Khot. It was obvious that a sizable 

enemy force had used the valley as a major movement route between Pakistan and Afghanistan, 

as a well-concealed and covered storage and resupply point, and possibly as an alternate command post headquarters. GEN Tommy Franks, CENTCOM commander, had declared Operation ANACONDA “an unqualifi ed success,” and MG Hagenbeck told reporters that the Americans and Afghans had “rid the world of hundreds of trained killers who will now not slaughter 

innocent men, women, and children.”146

The Special Forces soldiers of ODA 372 had killed few of the enemy, but they had collected 

valuable intelligence about Taliban and al-Qaeda operations in the Shah-i-Khot. And they had 

done something else of equal importance. They had developed close relationships with Afghan 

fi ghters who would continue to seek out and destroy enemy resistance. They had shown the 

AMF that America was on its side and that America was willing to fi ght with the AMF to free 

the nation.

On 18 March, Pentagon spokeswoman Torie Clarke declared, “Operation ANACONDA 

will end today.” She reminded that the operation was designed to fi nd and root out a relatively large pocket of al-Qaeda and Taliban fi ghters and was considered successful.147 The cave 

searches revealed large caches of ammunition and arms, intelligence documents, and information that would be useful in future operations and in preventing future terrorist attacks. The total 

enemy killed varied from 800 to 1,500; the Afghan tradition of quickly burying the dead made 

identifying the actual count diffi cult.

In retrospect, allied forces faced a tough, dedicated enemy that had several months to prepare 

solid defenses. The al-Qaeda had well-fortifi ed cave systems. On the “Whale,” they used concrete 

to make solid bases for mortars and crew-served machine guns. The bunker systems in the high 

terrain were well outfi tted and carefully concealed, taking advantage of the terrain. They afforded 

plenty of protection and had good interlocking fi elds of fi re. The enemy fi ghters were acclimated 

to the altitude, terrain, and weather and were profi cient with their rudimentary artillery systems.

Unlike the Tora Bora operation, the al-Qaeda and Taliban soldiers chose to stay and fi ght. 

The tough defenses and a willingness to “stand and fi ght” created some serious challenges for 

the allied forces during ANACONDA. Sometimes things just did not go as planned. The en-
335

Figure 25. Cave caches commonly were uncovered in sweeps of Shah-i-Khot Valley.

emy exercised its “right to vote” on all courses of action. However, in the end, the Taliban and 

al-Qaeda were defeated and pushed out of the Shah-i-Khot; the Pashtuns were able to reclaim 

their villages. The allied hunt went on for remaining pockets of enemy fi ghters.

In the midst of Operation ANACONDA, Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters; Special Forces groups (SFGs), battalions, and ODAs; CA and PSYOP tactical teams; 

160th SOAR Chinook companies; and individual augmentees did mission “handoffs” throughout Afghanistan. ARSOF soldiers established a new CJSOTF-Afghanistan that had closer ties 

to the coalition forces, continued to rebuild the infrastructure of villages and towns, and prepared the facilities to train an “all Afghan” national military force in Kabul. This was all being 

done as the JSOTF was subordinated to support the conventional force commander of TF 180.

In mid-January 2002, COL Mark Phelan received orders to send one of his Special Forces 

battalion headquarters and a Special Forces company to Afghanistan to augment JSOTF-South 

at Kandahar. Phelan chose the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, explaining that “Three Three had just 

fi nished Focus Relief [in Nigeria], and it was a well-seasoned battalion.” He still believed that 

most of 3rd SFG was “going to the Horn of Africa.” Two weeks later, however, CENTCOM 

canceled the deployment to Africa and directed Phelan to move the 3rd SFG to Afghanistan 

to assume the missions of both JSOTF-North and JSOTF-South. His new command would be 

called the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan (CJSOTF-Afghanistan) 

based at the Bagram Air Base. COL Phelan was to assume command of all U.S. and coalition 

SOF inside Afghanistan not later than the end of March 2002.148

The following vignettes explain what happened during the establishment of the new CJSOTF-Afghanistan at Bagram Air Base, the continued expansion of the CA mission, and the 

preparations in Kabul to train an “all Afghan” national military force. There were different 

challenges to be faced in Bagram versus K2, Uzbekistan. But the major requirement was that 

CJSOTF-Afghanistan would be operational not later than 1 April 2002.

Establishing CJSOTF-Afghanistan

After three months of preparation in North Carolina and Virginia for operations in the Horn 

of Africa, the 3rd SFG, in mid-January 2002, was ordered to deploy to Afghanistan.149 In many 

ways, this change did not have much of an impact on the ongoing effort to transport the unit 
336

overseas with its vehicles and equipment to establish a new CJSOTF headquarters in the global 

war on terrorism. The issues of different languages and cultures had to be considered, but the 5th 

SFG had not operated in Afghanistan before October 2001 either. Practically speaking, Afghanistan was just farther away than eastern Africa, near the extreme limits for high-frequency (HF) 

radio communications to the United States. What was signifi cantly different in Afghanistan was 

the requirement for the 3rd SFG to replace two CJSOTFs conducting combat operations and to 

assume the mantle for coalition SOF while the nature of the war was changing.150

Setting up the new headquarters facility was the primary task of LTC Phillip Reese (pseudonym), deputy commanding offi cer, 3rd SFG. Reese was widely known inside ARSOF because the Plymouth, England, native had never lost his British accent. He had immigrated to 

the United States in 1975 and enlisted in the Army the next year. After service in Korea and 

graduation from Offi cer Candidate School, he became a U.S. citizen in 1982 and later joined 

the Special Forces. In mid-February 2002, Reese led an advance echelon (ADVON) of 14 3rd 

SFG soldiers to K2, Uzbekistan, and then to Bagram, Afghanistan, to survey likely sites for the 

joint command facility and support facilities. He returned to Bagram in late February with four 

men to begin work on the central layout of the joint operations center (JOC), the nerve center 

of the CJSOTF.

The idea had been conceptualized by COL Mark Phelan, commander, 3rd SFG. He developed and tested it over a six-year period that began when he was a battalion commander in 

the 5th SFG and Reese was his executive offi cer. Two internally framed tents, large enough to 

serve as airplane hangars, formed the central structure of the JOC.151 This obviated the need to 

renovate any of the existing Soviet-era buildings at Bagram Air Base, which the 10th Mountain 

Division already occupied.152

Reese found a suitably large fi eld to put in the JOC facility and the “tent city billets” for 

the troops that would be needed to support it. The fi eld and the few decrepit concrete buildings 

on its borders were empty and unclaimed because they were seeded with buried mines, boobytrapped mines, and rockets left behind when the Soviet military withdrew from Afghanistan. 

MAJ James Pearl (pseudonym), 3rd SFG engineer, took on the task of getting the site cleared. 

First, a “Norwegian Flail,” a tank that thrashed the ground with spinning chains, worked over 

the open fi eld area, detonating mines every few seconds for several hours. Then two bulldozers—one from the Marine Corps and another contracted from a local Afghan—were used to 

clear off the top 12 inches of soil, moving away more buried mines. The bulldozing also created 

a protective dirt wall around the new base; unfortunately, a lot of unexploded ordnance (UXO) 

had been pushed into it. A grader leveled the fi eld, followed by a roller to tamp the earth, which 

made a fi rm base for tents and vehicles.153

In the midst of clearing the fi eld and cleaning out the long-abandoned, decrepit buildings, 

Reese and his team were approached by local Afghans who claimed the buildings and intended 

to reoccupy them when the Americans were fi nished. With only a few men, Pearl knew that it 

would be almost impossible to prevent the Afghans from sneaking back at night to establish 

their claim by “squatting” in the structures. In a fl ash of inspiration, SGM Rich Keogh (pseudonym), 3rd SFG operations sergeant major, suggested a simple scheme to keep the Afghans 

away until more of the 3rd SFG arrived and the camp construction was done. The Americans 

hammered 3-foot-long steel tent stakes around the perimeter and hung white cloth engineer tape 
337

with the universal minefi eld warning placards between them to mark the area as still “mined.” 

Keogh added mounds of dirt to give further credence to the subterfuge of unexploded mines. 

When MAJ Pearl and his men left the site that evening, they were satisfi ed that the ruse would 

deter the Afghans.154

Early the next morning when MAJ Pearl returned to the JSOTF site, he found a team of 

Bosnians with their Alsatian “mine dogs” checking the fi eld. Embarrassed, Pearl and Keogh 

quickly told the de-miner leader that the markers were a subterfuge. The Bosnian leader shook 

his head and informed them otherwise in broken English. Alsatian dogs were unusually skilled 

at sniffi ng out explosives, even underground wooden box types. The dogs were also trained to 

listen for the sound of air-vibrating trip wires. To signify a discovery, the dogs sat down near 

the suspected site. In their careful search of the new JSOTF base, the Bosnians and their dogs 

found even more UXO, including 122mm artillery shells, deeper in the soil. The Bosnian chief 

specifi cally pointed out that one of the 3-foot steel tent stakes driven by Pearl’s team to mark the 

perimeter had just missed a buried Russian 107mm rocket by a fraction of an inch. The soldier 

who drove that stake visibly blanched.155

Now that their fi eld was almost certainly clear of UXO, MAJ Pearl arranged the pouring 

of concrete for the slab foundations of the JOC tents. The local Afghan contractor assured him 

that he would be done in fi ve days. The local construction crew used a miniscule cement mixer 

powered by a sputtering two-stoke engine. The crew moved the cement with wheelbarrows and 

laid all the rocks and reinforcing bars in the molds by hand. Five days stretched into 15, but 

the slabs were fi nally fi nished. The JOC tents were erected as the main body of the 3rd SFG 

headquarters arrived at Bagram. By the end of March, LTC Reese was able to tell COL Phelan 

that the JOC facility and staff would be ready for activation 24 hours ahead of the 1 April deadline. As the JSOTF-South headquarters at Kandahar Airport turned off its radios and literally 

struck its tents, CJSOTF-Afghanistan assumed operations at midnight 30 March 2002. Inside 

the JOC, staff offi cers and NCOs heard, over the constant low growl of generators powering 

their radios and computers, the crunching detonations of antipersonnel mines as the chains of 

the “Norwegian Flail” cleared other UXO fi elds around the air base.156

Communications continued to be the key to effective command and control, and ARSOF 

was no exception. The 3rd SFG communicators were determined to have the CJSOTF operational by its deadline. They wanted to capitalize on the lessons learned from the 5th SFG’s 

experience at K2, Uzbekistan, with its teams operating all over Afghanistan.

Communications at Bagram

Until mid-February 2002, MSG Tony Santana (pseudonym) was not certain where the 3rd 

SFG would deploy.157 This was important to him because distances between transmitting and 

receiving stations, as well as geographic locations, were critical to “making and maintaining 

communications.” The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 3rd SFG had been preparing to deploy to the 

Horn of Africa to attack suspected terrorist bases in that region, but most of the 3rd Battalion 

had gone to Afghanistan. When it was confi rmed that the 3rd SFG would replace the 5th SFG, 

but be stationed at Bagram, Santana prepared his communications plan.

MSG Santana knew that the 5th SFG relied heavily on single-channel, wide-band satellite 

communications. The system was very reliable, and the 5th SFG ODAs were constantly on 
338

the move as the anti-Taliban forces marched and rode hundreds of kilometers cross-country, 

capturing city after city. However, with the conclusion of this “maneuver phase” of the war, the 

Afghan Military Forces (AMF) had returned to their tribal provinces. The 3rd SFG faced a different military situation. Their ODAs would likely be more stationary, conducting operations 

locally from small bases throughout the country. Santana also knew that other SOF were still 

hunting for Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants as well as Taliban leaders. Those missions would have top priority, and those units would be allocated most of the available satellite 

bandwidth. The group communications sergeant recommended relying on HF and extremely 

high-frequency (EHF) radio communications.158

During his three years as the NCOIC, 3rd SFG Communications Section, MSG Santana 

had been pushing the importance of good communications and pushing advanced training to 

improve the profi ciency of all the communications sergeants from the Special Forces battalions 

to the individual ODAs. COL Phelan reinforced his efforts by regularly conducting long-range 

communications exercises. Even though their HF radios were only rated to 2,000 miles, the 

3rd SFG communicators could “talk” reliably between Fort Bragg and virtually anywhere in 

Africa and the Persian Gulf, distances that ranged from 4,000 to 9,000 miles. This challenging 

and rigorous training would pay off in Afghanistan where the distances were shorter—it was 

no more than 700 miles from Bagram to any point in the country—but the high, 10,000-foot 

mountain ranges were a factor.

When the 3rd SFG communications section arrived at Bagram, Santana and the signal offi cer, MAJ Kent Willard (pseudonym), methodically emplaced their systems. Willard, Santana, 

and the radio men cleared debris away and had mines exploded in the areas they selected to 

erect their satellite dishes and antennas. They set up their tactical satellite (TACSAT) systems 

fi rst because they were quickest and easiest to install. Iridium satellite telephones were initially 

used to coordinate establishment of their communications bases, but within weeks, the Iridiums 

were put aside to be used only for emergencies. Tents came next and then the “big pipes”—the 

large antenna dishes for the global telecommunications systems that linked the new CJSOTF 

at Bagram to U.S. military command posts around the world—were erected. The large size and 

weight of these systems required four days of work to put them in place properly. Finally, in 

conjunction with the group Information Management Section, they installed the computer local area network (LAN) and telephone lines and programmed the JSOTF headquarters’ laptops 

and servers.159 While establishing secure radio communications continues to be important, the 

computer automation part is equally critical on today’s modern battlefi eld.

High Desert Automation Management

The digital information system that every American special operations unit and coalition 

element relied on for communications daily was run by a half-dozen soldiers and their captain from inside a dusty tent at Bagram. CPT Morris Washington (pseudonym) was in charge 

of six soldiers, technically designated “Seventy-Four Bravos” (74Bs), Systems Automation 

Specialists, but who acted simply as “loaders” and “fi xers.”160 A year before, Washington had 

broken his back while serving in the 7th SFG and had been trained in automation management at Fort Gordon, Georgia, during his recovery. Having earned an undergraduate degree 

in accounting at the University of Central Florida, “working with numbers was no problem 

for him.” Although Washington was now a “certifi ed computer geek,” he was happy to return 
339

to Special Forces as the head of the 3rd SFG’s Information Management Section.161

Washington’s principal task was to help the group commander manage the fl ow of all information inside the headquarters and to maintain the “technical arrangement” of equipment 

that made this possible. The demands of the job were heavy enough without the challenges of 

operating computer systems in Afghanistan’s harsh climate. The micro-dust blown up by the 

windstorms on the northern Shomali plain would hang in the air like a faint khaki haze, and unprotected computer disks were unusable within 24 hours. The power for all computer systems 

came from generators that ran constantly, night and day. And there were soldiers whose sole 

duty was to ensure that their assigned generator never quit.162

The volume of message traffi c in the CJSOTF headquarters was tremendous. Each day, 

between 500 and 1,000 messages were transmitted by the joint staff, and close to 90 percent of 

those were digital. The rest of the message traffi c came on paper. To support this fl ow, Washington and his team of male and female technicians maintained two networks: one exclusively 

for the “secure,” or classifi ed, message traffi c and a second one for more routine, nonsecure 

communications. The secure net connected 167 laptop computers to four 50-gigabyte servers. 

The smaller nonsecure net had two like-size servers to link 89 additional laptops and 10 laptops 

that were specifi cally dedicated to coalition force users. The computers were tied to switches by 

“backbone switches” to the servers and then to routers accessing communications satellites.163

Getting this system set up was a challenge because the young technicians, who Washington 

proudly called “the best soldiers in Special Forces Command,” had not been permitted to train 

on the system before deploying. At Fort Campbell, like most military installations, civilian 

contract technicians operated the networks. Contractual specifi cations prevented the soldiers 

from doing any training on the installation computer networks, hence his team could not “train 

as they would fi ght.” But overseas in the combat environment of Afghanistan, the 74Bs were 

loading software, managing the networks, confi guring routers, and troubleshooting their systems, and Washington felt they were doing it “superbly” after a period of learning on the job 

and practical experience.164

The automation team’s hardest job was managing the servers and fi xing the scripting errors 

inherent in the new Web Interface Computer System that was intended to allow users simple access to organizational information like operation orders, intelligence summaries, and the like. The 

5th SFG automators had similar problems that were only partly addressed by bringing a technical 

contractor to K2. The system worked while the technician was present, but after he left, it failed 

again. Washington worked with the Land Information Warfare Activity liaison offi cer to develop an “HTML starter page” to help solve the ongoing problems with the new web interface.165

Not all the automation team’s troubles were as diffi cult to solve. Washington reported that 

“half of all our work orders dealt with untrained users.” He smiled and added, “and that included sergeants major and colonels,” the segment of the unit population that grew up before 

the desktop computer was common. His 74Bs would quickly fi nd and fi x these simple faults: 

“Usually a network or power cord was not plugged in.” Big problems or small, Washington’s 

automation team successfully dealt with the challenges of digital information management in 

wartime in as “computer-hostile” an environment as anyone could imagine. Inside CJSOTFAfghanistan, the loaders and fi xers of 3rd SFG made those electrons fl ow.166
340

While the 3rd SFG ADVON scrambled to establish the JOC, its communications and computer systems, and the support facilities for JSOTF-Afghanistan at Bagram Air Base to meet 

a 1 April deadline, a radio broadcast element of the 3rd Psychological Operations Battalion 

(POB), attached to the 8th POB, was preparing to assume the Air Force Commando Solo role in 

the country. It would use the rapidly deployable Special Operations Media System–Broadcast 

(SOMS-B) in its fi rst combat mission. It was also part of the joint transition and battle handoffs 

that were taking place all over Afghanistan.

“Good Morrrrning, Afghannnnistan”

Everything about the new SOMS-B broadcasting as part of the global war on terrorism 

in Afghanistan would be a fi rst, CPT Ben Crenshaw (pseudonym) discovered.167 The tall, lean 

PSYOP offi cer led an eight-soldier operational detachment of the 8th POB at Fort Bragg. Since 

mid-September 2001, TPD 812 had been writing scripts for radio broadcasts to a variety of 

Afghan audiences. Kentucky born and of Scotch-Irish descent, Crenshaw had served in Bosnia 

as an artilleryman before studying Arabic. In early February 2002, Crenshaw was alerted that 

the Commando Solo airborne radio station fl ying over Central Asia would be replaced by the 

SOMS-B from the 3rd POB. Crenshaw was placed in charge of a 3rd POB element consisting 

of a SOMS-B platoon and a broadband satellite communications team. It would be the fi rst 

“real-world” deployment of the SOMS-B station.

Created and fi elded after Operation DESERT STORM, the SOMS-B had not been used in 

a combat zone. “It was a real scramble,” Crenshaw recalled, “to meet the operational deadline 

of 8 March 2002, the day before the Commando Solo EC-130 aircraft would cease operations. 

Commando Solo had been broadcasting 10 hours a day, every day, since November 2001.168

Not only did the SOMS-B team make the deadline but it also increased its broadcast time 

to 15 hours daily in less than a week of operation. CPT Crenshaw’s detachment established two 

radio broadcast stations, one at Bagram Air Base in the center of the country and the other in 

Figure 26. SOMS-B broadcasts the news.
341

the south at Kandahar Airport. They also scored another fi rst when they boosted the SOMS-B’s 

original design to broadcast a maximum of 18 hours a day using 6,000 watts of power to 24 

hours a day at 10,000 watts. This accomplishment was not without problems. Adjustments were 

required because, although the SOMS-B easily performed beyond its design specifi cations, “it 

was wiping out all tactical communications” in the area around its Bagram antenna. Using a 

voltmeter solved the problem and “brought the signalers down from a very high hover,” Crenshaw recalled.169

The SOMS-B was much more than an ordinary radio station. Being “frequency agile,” it 

was not confi ned to a single channel and could broadcast on any frequency. The SOMS-B could 

serve as an AM, FM, shortwave, and television transmitter—any or all simultaneously—and 

broadcast different programs over the airwaves at the same time. Linked to the Digital Video Distribution System (DVDS), which can receive and transmit two programs concurrently, 

the SOMS-B could provide a secure video teleconferencing (VTC) capability with any other 

DVDS station in the world. For the SOMS-B team, this terminal was at Fort Bragg where the 

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) was based, supporting its detachments in 

Afghanistan and around Central Asia. When Crenshaw managed to interview Afghan General 

Babazhan, he used the DVDS to transmit a videotape of the war leader’s comments about education for Afghan women, rebuilding the Bagram valley, and destroying terrorism and his goal 

of a lasting peace. The interview was transmitted to the JPOTF at Fort Bragg moments later and 

then passed to CENTCOM in Tampa for approval to be disseminated across Afghanistan.170

The longer duration and increased power of the broadcasts did not guarantee the population 

was listening or that they were having an impact. CPT Crenshaw began pre- and posttesting in 

the neighboring communities, and the SOMS-B team ran “power surveys” two or three times 

a week to check signal strength. Tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) canvassed Afghans face to face 

during their daily rounds of the villages and towns, but the best feedback came from three 

prominent local political leaders Crenshaw interviewed.

All were regular listeners of the SOMS-B station, and each Bagram politician provided 

several specifi c suggestions for improvement. They all objected to Hindi music in the daytime; 

it was considered much more appropriate in the evening. They thought that constant repetition 

of some of the messages and themes was tiring and pointed this out. They wanted more timely 

stories, especially international soccer scores and local news.171 As a scriptwriter and Bagram 

radio station manager, Crenshaw appreciated their insightful comments.

Variety was the key ingredient in music and news. The SOMS-B team deployed with more 

than 100 compact discs (CDs) of Afghan music, purchased beforehand from a music store in 

an Afghan-American community in northern Virginia. Since they did not have an operational 

fund, the team depended on Fort Bragg for “fresh” music. Although Crenshaw transmitted 

script proofs over the DVDS in a matter of seconds, the approval process through the JPOTF 

and then through CENTCOM took another nine to 11 days. This meant “stale” news, which 

could have been improved with a decentralized script approval process for simple items such 

as sports scores and international news items. Dedicated interpreters for the SOMS-B detachments would support using news items from local sources. Instead, Crenshaw borrowed interpreters from the Army CA units nearby.172
342

Nonetheless, the popularity of the SOMS-B and the perseverance of the team paid off 

when they were invited to videotape a parade in the nearby town of Chair-Icar. Hamad Karzai, 

the newly appointed Prime Minister of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), was the guest of 

honor, and CPT Crenshaw, bearded and wearing an Afghan scarf around his neck, was invited 

to join Karzai and the leading citizens on the outdoor dais.

The colorful procession celebrating Afghanistan’s emancipation from the Soviets went on 

for 21⁄2 hours. Crenshaw was amazed and amused. “It was like a Soviet May Day parade, the 

Olympics’ festive opening ceremony, and your hometown Fourth of July parade all together,” 

he said. Tanks, armored cars, battalion-size units of AMF troops in various uniforms, schoolchildren in their best clothes, local sports teams, and circus performers paraded before the distinguished guests on the reviewing stand. Crenshaw said the day was “the most exciting thing 

I’ve done in Afghanistan.” “It was an honor,” Crenshaw said, “to capture Karzai and his fellow 

Afghan leaders on video.” After the excitement of the parade, CPT Crenshaw and his crew were 

back at the SOMS-B, broadcasting support for a new Afghanistan.173

As the PSYOP soldiers broadcast 24 hours a day from Bagram and Kandahar air bases, the 

tactical CA teams expanded their operations throughout Afghanistan. But, most signifi cantly, 

a natural disaster served as the catalyst to clear the Salang Tunnel. CAT-A41 was the driving 

force behind that operation.

A Disaster Provides a Catalyst

A disastrous earthquake in the northern Afghan city of Nahrin on 25 March catalyzed action 

to clear the Salang Tunnel. The late winter catastrophe had leveled many of the typical mudbrick houses in the town and surrounding villages, and initial casualty estimates reported 2,000 

dead. An American working in a French NGO told MAJ Silas Greene (pseudonym), the leader 

of CAT-A41, that humanitarian relief to the earthquake victims was hampered by the condition 

of the tunnel.174 Not only was water still leaking from the ceiling to create large ice stalagmites 

akin to 6-foot-tall skiing moguls, but travelers also were stranded because their cars had run out 

of gas while they waited in the extreme cold. Groups were literally “camping out” in the tunnel 

because it offered some shelter. Even the open lane was severely restricted as a result of these 

conditions. To exacerbate the problem, a large truck had turned over inside the tunnel, blocking 

all traffi c from moving in or out. Because sunlight never reached inside the tunnel, the roadway 

was heavily coated with ice. “It was basically a nightmare,” Greene reported.

Greene and MAJ Keenan Jacobson (pseudonym), 10th Mountain Division staff engineer, 

had a solution to remove the overturned vehicle that blocked the tunnel. They loaded the back 

of a 5-ton cargo truck with sand and put chains aboard. Before leaving Bagram, CAT-A41 

briefed the TF Mountain commander. MG Hagenbeck approved the mission, provided a security force, and arranged to have two Air Force A-10 Warthogs on standby.175

The convoy encountered backed-up traffi c 10 km from the tunnel, and the closest they 

could get to the entrance with their vehicles was 2 km. At dark, when CAT-A41 reached the 

entrance on foot, it was met by clouds of blue exhaust fumes billowing from the tunnel. The 

Afghan truck drivers would not turn off their engines. The carbon monoxide danger was quite 

high. Weaving in and out and around traffi c, inching by with millimeters of clearance, the 
343

vehicle convoy fi nally reached the tunnel at 1900. After carefully walking the tunnel length, the 

CA major calculated that the convoy could transit the tunnel, which it did. Then it set up for 

the night outside the north entrance. When the team got up early the next morning, it was told 

that another truck had gotten stuck in the tunnel during the night. The Americans set to work 

immediately. Enlisting some Afghans to spread sand, the soldiers used picks to crack the ice 

in the worst places, as the 5-ton truck dumped sand as it backed into the tunnel to the disabled 

vehicles. Eventually, both trucks were dragged out of the tunnel.

Normally, traffi c alternated using the single lane—odd days for north to south traffi c and 

even days for south to north traffi c. But there was no Afghan authority fi gure to control the 

sequence to prevent traffi c jams when the direction changed. MAJ Greene initially solved the 

problem by blocking one entrance with his 5-ton truck and used the security force to control 

the growing crowd. With these simple control measures, the Americans cleared the congestion 

from one end of the tunnel and then opened the road to traffi c.

In the midst of clearing the traffi c jam, CAT-A41 dealt with a Russian cameraman who, 

after demanding priority to drive through, attempted to run the American roadblock. When 

the security force surrounded his vehicle, the Russian backed off and eventually apologized 

for his behavior. A bona fi de emergency was an Afghan with a compound leg fracture caught 

in the stalled traffi c. SFC Bart Schuyler (pseudonym), the Special Forces medic on CAT-A41, 

splinted the Afghan’s badly broken leg and escorted the vehicle in which the man was riding 

around the stalled traffi c so that he could get to a hospital.

The assessment stressed several points: communications were imperative between the two 

entrances; someone with authority had to be placed at each entrance; and moveable barriers had 

to be constructed to prevent vehicles from ignoring the odd-even day system, at least until both 

lanes inside were cleared of broken-down vehicles and the tunnel road surface was repaired. 

More important, they needed a heavy vehicle with a tooth device on the front to break up and 

clear away the accumulated ice stalagmites and moguls that narrowed the tunnel to a single 

lane. Before leaving, the remaining sand was used to fi ll some of the holes in the road’s surface. 

The CAT-A fi ndings went to the 10th Mountain Division because it had the heavy engineer 

equipment to make the necessary repairs. “We told them what it was like,” said MAJ Greene.

Fortunately, the weather cleared for several days and CH-47 helicopters were able to fl y 

assistance from Bagram to Nahrin. En route back, the team had to deal with a large truck that 

had its front wheels off the edge of the road and was about to fall into the gorge. After several 

hours, Greene located a crane in a nearby village that was able to extricate the truck.

Opening the Salang Tunnel was important for several reasons. The route was critical to supporting the military commander’s ground operations. The highway north from Kabul was the only 

road in eastern Afghanistan that reached from the capital to the northern cities and on to Uzbekistan 

and Tajikistan. The tunnel was key terrain and had to be controlled to facilitate moving military 

supplies for future operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Because the tunnel was a critical 

link to the north, control of that point facilitated moving humanitarian assistance between distant 

points within the country as well as from countries to the north. Finally, the road and tunnel were 

essential for farmers and merchants to move their agricultural products to markets. Establishing a 

viable economy and reliable sources for food were foundational to Afghanistan’s future stability.
344

Not only did CAT-A41 perform its humanitarian assistance responsibilities superbly, but also 

as MAJ Greene concluded, “This is one way we supported the military operations.” The team’s 

work was so signifi cant that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called the TFMountain commander 

because he wanted to personally thank the team that opened the tunnel. That telephone call symbolized the outstanding missions that CA soldiers performed. Although the work usually was 

done at the tactical level, it often had strategic implications. The accomplishment of this critical 

mission occurred as CJSOTF-Afghanistan assumed control of special operations in country.

The Communications Handoff

JSOTF-North turned off its radios on 1 March 2002, and MAJ Derrick Jacobi and MSG 

Don Sullivan (pseudonyms) passed their J6 staff communications responsibilities to JSOTFSouth at Kandahar Airport.176 Since the night of 18 October when the fi rst Special Forces ODAs 

entered Afghanistan, the JSOTF-North joint base station had operated continuously for 135 

days without interruption. In that period, the 5th SFG communications section processed 27,000 

digital messages. At 1700, local time, on 30 March 2002, the CJSOTF-Afghanistan base station 

at Bagram went on the air, communicating with all special operations units inside Afghanistan. 

MSG Sullivan stayed at Bagram throughout March to work with his counterparts in the 

3rd SFG, MAJ Kent Willard and MSG Tony Santana (pseudonyms), until their operations 

were successfully under way. He departed Afghanistan on the night of 30 March aboard an 

Air Force C-17 Globemaster III transport bound for Fort Campbell, Kentucky. MSG Sullivan 

earned the distinction of being the last member of the 5th SFG headquarters, who had not been 

transferred to other commands, to leave Afghanistan.177

Better Communications

MAJ Willard and MSG Santana organized their base communications station as the “hub,” 

or master station, to “terminate traffi c” for the four subordinate outstations: the 1st Battalion at 

Kabul; the 2nd and 3rd Battalions at Kandahar Airport; and the 2nd Battalion, 19th SFG, at K2 

where JSOTF-North was originally headquartered. These unit stations, in turn, terminated traffi c from their subordinate stations, which were near other cities and towns across Afghanistan. 

But they still needed to establish a portable secure radio link.

By the end of April, however, they had almost achieved their goal to have every station in 

the CJSOTF connected at their base with an EHF digital Single-Channel Antijam Man-Portable 

radio, called a SCAMPI. The SCAMPI had the range, power, and retransmission capability that 

gave the CJSOTF and all of its units the best communications capability possible, given the 

rugged mountainous terrain and harsh climate. To see the CJSOTF’s complex, diverse communications work so well was very professionally satisfying to Santana. He had started out in the 

Army more than 20 years before as a radio operator, hauling a heavy battery-powered radio set 

in his backpack. “I enjoy making communications,” Santana said, “but not carrying it.”178

When JSOTF-North was formed at K2, Uzbekistan, the Joint Special Operations Air 

Component–North (JSOAC-North) had already established itself and collocated its 

Air Force and Army aircraft at the air base. JSOAC-South, with its Air Force assets, stayed 

in Pakistan when JSOTF-South was stood up at Kandahar. As the joint SOF mission changed 

from supported to supporting and the two JSOTFs handed off their missions to CJSOTFAfghanistan, JSOAC-North command and control and Air Force assets left the country. This 
345

was a major change in modus operandi for the CJSOTF in Afghanistan supporting SOF operations throughout the country.

CJSOTF-Afghanistan and the Joint Air Component

Unlike the JSOTF-North commander, COL Mark Phelan did not have a JSOAC in the immediate vicinity of Bagram. With the dissolution of JSOTF-North, the JSOAC relocated to Masirah Island, off the coast of Oman, and came under the control of RADM Bert Calland’s Special 

Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). The SOF Army air assets were based at Kandahar 

Airport—the 3rd Battalion, 160th SOAR MH-47D Chinooks. The Air Force SOF air assets were 

based out of Pakistan. LTC Phillip Reese, deputy commander, 3rd SFG, and chief of staff, Joint 

Operations Center (JOC), at Bagram, thought this to be a “novel approach” that good staff work 

would make viable.179 As he saw the issue, the aircraft needed to support the 3rd SFG elements, 

and coalition troops did not need to be either at the task force or air component headquarters, or 

under his colonel’s direct command. The CJSOTF staff just needed to communicate their aircraft 

requirements effectively. However, he did believe that the transport helicopters needed to be close 

to the troops who would ride in them and use them for support. What LTC Reese really needed 

were the JSOACC air planners with the expertise to integrate air and ground operations inside his 

JOC. In April 2002, when CJSOTF-Afghanistan took charge, that was not yet the case.180

When COL Phelan was told that his JSOACC would not be collocated with his own task 

force headquarters at Bagram but was based in Jacobabad, Pakistan, he was initially “very disappointed.” He knew what support COL John Mulholland had available “within arm’s reach” at 

K2. But, after meeting COL Joe Tinan, commander, JSOAC, Phelan felt better, and as combat 

operations proceeded, he became completely satisfi ed with the arrangement. “Joe Tinan and his 

Air Force crews supported every single request I made,” said Phelan, “except for the bad weather days” when they could not fl y. The Air Force even allowed an AC-130 Spectre gunship to fl y 

during daylight hours at Phelan’s request.181 His only real concern was the Air Force MH-53 

helicopters. Despite their excellent aircrews and avionics equipment, the “fi fty-threes” were 

50-year-old airframes, with very limited cargo-carrying capacity and high-altitude operational 

capabilities. Phelan’s staff commented that “it took two of them to do what one [Army MH-47] 

Chinook did.” But, as far as coordinating support with the air component, the CJSOTF-Afghanistan commander said, “I never had a problem, not one time.”182

VTCs and operating time were two constants of the daily routine at CJSOTF-Afghanistan. 

Synchronizing watches before the big attack looked good in combat movies, but those players 

were not dealing with a four and one-half-hour time difference with the U.S. East Coast. VTC 

times were dictated by the senior commanders and staffs’ normal working schedules in Tampa 

and Washington. Thus, overseas in combat zones, preparing for and implementing instructions 

to units in the fi eld afterward naturally stretched commanders’ “working days” early into the 

morning of the following day. In the special operations “nerve” centers in Afghanistan, 24/7—

24 hours a day, seven days a week—was reality.

CJSOTF-Afghanistan and “Zulu Time”

Synchronizing watches—working together on a common time zone reference—was essential to coordinating the operations of an international military coalition.183 The global connectivity that instantaneous satellite-based communications provided; the distant location of 
346

the headquarters directing operations in Afghanistan; the odd four and one-half-hour time zone 

difference from Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) in Afghanistan; and the Air Force standard of 

running all of its worldwide operations on GMT, or Zulu Time in military parlance, compelled 

the CJSOTF at Bagram to follow suit.184

For LTC Reese, this meant that his day began on Afghanistan time but then quickly switched 

to Zulu Time. He rose at 0430 local time to read the latest situation reports in the JOC at 0500. 

By 0700, he had fi nished reading and was on his way to breakfast, after which he would switch 

his digital watch to Zulu Time. 0800 local time became 0430 Zulu, or zero-four-three-zero hours 

Zulu, or “Zee,” Time. Then the deputy attended the daily commander’s update briefi ng before his 

regular meeting with the JOC chief and offi cer in charge of current operations. Afterward, Reese 

met with the future operations staff offi cer to direct the formulation of operational concepts for 

projected missions and issue the necessary orders to the various staff to develop and execute them.

After verifying priorities with his principal staff offi cers, Reese attended his second commander’s update of the day at 1100 Zulu (1730 local time) and “prepped” his boss, COL Phelan, 

for his 1200 Zulu meeting with the commanding general of JTF Mountain and the 1300 Zulu 

VTC with GEN Tommy Franks and his deputies at CENTCOM in Tampa. At 1400 Zulu (2030 

local time), Reese attended a second VTC with a different echelon of staff offi cers in the United 

States to address unconventional warfare (UW) topics. The CJSOTF staff meeting followed to 

digest the information and guidance COL Phelan received in the VTCs. A late dinner afterward, 

and LTC Reese was ready to call it a day and return to local time, which now was 2300. For the 

CJSOTF chief of staff, Zulu Time and local time had something in common—in either zone, 

he had no time off.185

Command Guidance and VTCs

For mission guidance in Afghanistan, COL Mark Phelan received his orders from RADM 

Bert Calland, special operations commander for CENTCOM, and GEN Tommy Franks, the 

combatant commander of U.S. CENTCOM and the war campaign in Afghanistan. Phelan spoke 

with Calland three times before activating the new CJSOTF. The fi rst and second meetings with 

Calland were at As Sayliyah, Qatar, during his trips into and out of Afghanistan on his survey of 

Bagram as the potential site for his task force headquarters. En route to take command in Bagram, 

Phelan had his third meeting, during which he laid out his plan for organizing and operating the 

CJSOTF-Afghanistan. “You are responsible for all SOF operations in Afghanistan,” Calland 

told Phelan, and you are to “integrate the coalition units” into your campaign. MG Franklin 

Hagenbeck, commander, JTF Mountain, gave him similar instructions at Bagram Air Base.186

Although the 3rd SFG and CJSOTF-Afghanistan were under Calland’s operational control 

at SOCCENT, COL Phelan received daily orders from MG Hagenbeck, who had tactical control over his special operations task force. “I had my guidance and I stayed on my azimuth,” said 

Phelan. One of his fi rst initiatives to fully integrate the coalition forces into his campaign plan 

was to make the senior offi cer from New Zealand his deputy commander. After two commanders’ conferences with coalition leaders, Phelan arranged controlled access to intelligence for 

planning and integrated coalition staff offi cers into the JOC with dedicated computer terminals. 

These acts raised morale among the coalition forces as the foreign contingents fi nally joined the 

Americans on the combined team bench.
347

To ensure that he accomplished his assigned missions as expected, COL Phelan personally attended every Bagram VTC chaired by GEN Franks in Tampa, missing only one during 

his three-month tenure as CJSOTF commander. The VTCs were conducted daily in the JTF 

Mountain operations center, alongside the taxiway at Bagram Air Base. Phelan thought that it 

was most important to be part of the conferences because then “I heard exactly what the CINC 

[GEN Franks] said and I better understood what he wanted done.”187 From As Sayliyah, Calland 

directed CJSOTF-Afghanistan to develop a special reconnaissance (SR) plan for the continuing 

campaign against the remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda. But it was a verbal order with no details 

or guidance provided. MG Hagenbeck’s staff gave all their orders to the CJSOTF in written 

form. Phelan felt that the two headquarters enjoyed a “great relationship” at Bagram.188

Creating an Afghan army that integrated all ethnic groups into a national military force 

was one of the primary missions assigned to the 3rd SFG before it left Fort Bragg. This foreign 

internal defense (FID) mission would be accomplished in conjunction with the UW campaign 

still being prosecuted throughout Afghanistan. The training mission was assigned to the 3rd 

Battalion, 3rd SFG, but the training facility it would use to accomplish this required extensive 

renovation and repairs.

Rebuilding the Kabul Military Academy

The challenge of rebuilding the dilapidated facilities at the Kabul Military Academy was 

assigned to a 1991 West Point graduate, MAJ Jeff Bosley (pseudonym).189 He had a wealth of 

experience in engineer operations and reconstruction in underdeveloped and war-ravaged countries, based on his battalion deployments to Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia and to “clean up” after 

Hurricane Andrew. Late on Friday afternoon, 25 January 2002, Bosley was in his offi ce at the 

Seattle District Corps of Engineers when his commander called to tell him he would be a staff 

augmentee for U.S. CENTCOM for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

A week later, MAJ Bosley reported to Fort Benning, Georgia, for deployment to Camp 

Doha, Qatar, for a 30-day tour of duty with the facilities and construction staff (C7) of the 

Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). From there, Bosley was sent to Kabul, Afghanistan, for another 30 days with the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task 

Force (CJCMOTF) in Afghanistan. When President George W. Bush announced that the U.S. 

military would begin training a new Afghan national army on 1 May 2002, Bosley got the job 

to prepare the site where this would be accomplished.190

“My mission,” stated Bosley, “was to renovate and reconstruct the facilities at the Afghan 

National Army (ANA) training site.” It would be the former Kabul Military Academy, built for 

the Afghan government by Czech and Russian engineers in 1956. The sprawling, well-ordered 

campus, set at the base of the mountains on the eastern edge of the capital city, had clearly once 

been the pride of the Royal Afghan Armed Forces. Finely etched marble tablets, still in place 

in the front courtyard, commemorated its opening. It had been a battleground during the civil 

war, and its fi ring ranges made it a target for coalition bombing during the campaign to oust 

the Taliban government. Portions of several of the three-story dormitories had been blasted 

away. Roofs had collapsed, and every window had been smashed. There were land mines and 

unexploded artillery shells scattered everywhere. Inside the once-grand auditorium, the tiered 

seats had been torn out, and the movie projection booth was ankle deep in 35mm movie fi lm 
348

that had been carefully cut into 3- and 4-inch strips by former Taliban occupants. Every wall in 

the complex was pockmarked by bullets and bomb fragments. “It looks like Godzilla walked 

through here,” remarked a Special Forces sergeant during the initial survey.

MAJ Bosley fi rst had to prepare a “scope of work” report, which became 25 pages long, 

describing what had to be done to make the academy a functional facility again.191 This engineering “scope” document enabled Bosley to request initial funding to start work as soon as 

possible. The document was processed by the CJCMOTF before going to the CFLCC for approval to hire local contractors to begin the cleanup before reconstruction and renovation work 

could be started. Bosley had been appalled to discover that in almost every single one of the 

hundreds of rooms on the campus, the fl oors were covered with dried human feces, even on the 

top fl oors. In the latrines, piles of feces were 3 feet high on top of the toilets. It was a “cleanup 

nightmare” that would require more than 100 workers.

Bosley started with a cleaning contract for 200 workers at the rate of $3 per person per day 

to sweep out the buildings. As disgusting as the labor was, the opportunity to work for pay outweighed everything. The laborers went to work energetically, squatting and sweeping the crumbling waste up with small whisk brooms. It did not seem to bother anyone. They made a game of 

tossing chunks of rubble out of upper-story windows, cheering loudly when the mortar and brick 

pieces landed squarely on the litters below that another group of workers carried away to dump 

trucks. During the 10 days of cleaning, the laborers also fi lled in some of the bomb craters.192

Bosley’s second priority was force protection for the Army engineer battalion, which would 

do the major construction work. This meant restoring water and electricity to the area. Special 

Forces engineers from the 3rd Battalion installed a temporary water system and began work 

on defensive bunkers and observation posts (OPs) around the perimeter of the academy. This 

perimeter would later be guarded by 101st Airborne Division infantry platoons that rotated up 

from Kandahar Airport. These infantry platoons received their force protection guidance from 

the Special Forces staff working at the academy.

At the end of April 2002, shortly before the fi rst Afghan recruits were due to arrive for 

Figure 27. The “scope of work” was immense.
349

training, MAJ Bosley welcomed the 92nd Engineer Battalion from Fort Stewart, Georgia. This 

combat-heavy engineer unit had the major construction equipment that he needed to repair 

roads and move away debris as well as the technical specialists to install large generators and 

wire the complex for electricity. The 92nd had power and lights in the undamaged parts of the 

campus in time for the start of the fi rst basic training course on 1 May 2002.

As MAJ Bosley walked the Kabul Military Academy grounds, now called the ANA Training Site, with LTC Kip Mantle (pseudonym), the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG commander in charge 

of the base, he discussed the next series of work projects. As the two offi cers made the tour, 

their conversation was regularly interrupted by “booms” as the British explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) teams blew up mines in the hills behind the academy. “There is three to fi ve 

years of work still to be done, just to fi x the bomb damage,” advised Bosley. How much of that 

work might be his responsibility, Bosley was not sure. He was already 30 days past the end of 

his “only 30 days” tour in Kabul, and the job was far from over.193

Another View of the Kabul Military Academy Task

After several months in the SOCCENT forward command element in Qatar “making myself useful,” as MSG “Dex” Yates (pseudonym), C Company, 3rd Battalion, 20th SFG, Florida 

ARNG, remembered his service there, an opportunity for some interesting work presented 

itself.194 In early April 2002, MSG Yates accompanied a site survey team from the 1st Battalion, 

3rd SFG, going to the Kabul Military Academy. They were to determine the suitability of the 

bomb-cratered academy as a training base for the post-Taliban regime Afghan defense forces. 

The survey was completed on 11 April, but when the team returned to Qatar, it was ordered 

to return immediately. “We were told the French wanted the Academy,” recalled Yates, and the 

Americans rushed back to ensure it stayed under U.S. military control because President Bush 

had announced that training of the new Afghan army would begin 1 May 2002, barely two 

weeks away.195

By 14 April, the 3rd SFG team was back at the academy. MSG Yates provided a very graphic description of the task at hand: “No power, no water, just dirt, debris, dust, and feces.” Two 

hundred Afghan laborers with two interpreters began to clear away the rubble of airstrikes and 

the fi lth left by the Taliban fi ghters. As work proceeded, Yates developed a personal relationship 

with the long-term custodian of the academy, COL Habib Rachman. The slight, bespectacled 

Pashtun had served in the pre-Taliban Afghan army for 13 years. He lived at the academy during the Taliban regime. Rachman had just completed basic training with the “1st Battalion of 

the Afghan National Guard.” His battalion had been organized and trained by the British 2nd 

Parachute Battalion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).196 Rachman spoke 

enough English to converse with Yates, whose foreign languages were Greek and Spanish. As 

they came to know each other, they passed several evenings discussing the future of Afghanistan. 

Rachman was most concerned about balancing the ethnic makeup of the new national army.197

The outgoing Floridian enjoyed his relationship with Rachman. An English-language copy 

of the Koran, the Muslim holy book, provided by Yates, helped Rachman improve his English. 

Yates was proud of his positive interaction with the curious Afghan children who wanted to 

meet and speak to Americans. But a residual resentment and dislike toward the foreigners 

was still evident. While riding through Kabul aboard an armed reconnaissance truck one day 
350

in May, his convoy stopped at an intersection. A boy dressed in black wearing a black turban 

smiled up at Yates and asked, “You happy?” “Yeah,” Yates replied cheerfully. “We’ll soon see 

about that,” responded the boy, who turned and melted into the crowd.198

ARSOF elements in the fi eld continued to prosecute the UW campaign while simultaneously 

conducting foreign internal defense and development missions. The active Army 96th Civil 

Affairs Battalion (CAB) tactical teams had been replaced by the USAR 489th CAB from 

Knoxville, Tennessee, and 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) tactical teams had been 

augmented by the 345th PSYOP Company (Airborne) from Dallas, Texas. The 19th SFG ODAs 

had assumed some missions originally assigned to 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, which rotated home 

to Fort Bragg in early May 2002.

“Chiclets” and PSYOP Teams in Kandahar

While deployed to Afghanistan, two coalition humanitarian liaison cells (CHLCs), called 

“Chiclets,” of the 489th CAB, Knoxville, performed similar tasks but worked for different 

commands and coordinated programs with quite different populations. Getting troops into 

Afghanistan to do a “battle handoff ” with the 96th CAB teams in the fi eld and to sustain the 

momentum of the humanitarian effort already started was critical. Members of CHLC 6 lived 

out of their rucksacks for a month at Kandahar Airport while supporting the 101st Airborne 

Division’s TF Rakkasan.

Initial meetings with the Afghan regional commander responsible for the outer perimeter 

security of Kandahar Airport enabled CHLC 6 to hire local interpreters and lease two pickup 

trucks to transport the team to outlying Afghan Military Force (AMF) camps and villages. With 

two Iridium telephones, MAJ Gregory Jernigan and SSG Eric Nolan (pseudonyms), both of 

whom were civilian law enforcement offi cers, established communications, and CHLC 6 was 

“in business” in less than a week.199 Working in conjunction with local elders and government 

offi cials, the four- to six-man CHLCs were responsible for assessing humanitarian needs (water, food, shelter, clothing, and education), establishing priorities according to need, preparing 

specifi c contract requirements for projects, arranging food and clothing delivery, and overseeing humanitarian projects in progress.

Using common civilian transport and wearing civilian clothes and beards, the CHLC minimized the “footprint,” or obvious presence, of their military connection. But the impact of 

their presence was signifi cant. Within two weeks, 42 village elders had gathered at Kandahar 

Figure 28. Local leaders help decide what comes next.
351

Airport. Some walked as far as 30 miles to meet Jernigan and to listen to his proposals. Since 

Afghanistan had been plagued by drought for seven years, all of his proposals—ranging from 

well-digging to irrigation projects—involved water. For the fi rst time, the village leaders were 

being invited to share in prioritizing solutions. They were also seeing some response to requests 

for assistance, which was a radical change. In the past, the farther the villages were from Kandahar, the less prosperous they were. Distance reduced government interest.

While refi ning, validating, and updating the contract process, CHLC 6 used ARSOF and 

TF Rakkasan helicopters to begin distributing wheat, rice, dates, beans, and blankets to the 51 

villages and towns around the airfi eld. Having visited most villages and talked with the elders, 

CHLC 6 and TPD 910, A Company, 9th POB, wanted to repay the hospitality of the villages. 

As a way of reciprocating, they established links with relatives in Palm Beach, Florida, and 

Knoxville, Tennessee, and with family support groups at Fort Campbell and Fort Bragg. They 

donated simple toys and school materials for the Afghan children. The stateside response was 

tremendous, and the actions of the families and the family support groups built strong bridges 

for the future.

Despite limited communications in outlying areas, “word of mouth” quickly spread the 

news that a small village without an internal water supply for more than 10 years had a new 

well. Staff engineers from the 489th CAB provided the necessary technical supervision and 

the experience to ensure that drilling went to the bottom of the aquifers—the critical part of 

reliable water sourcing. In Afghanistan, the CHLCs focused on basic necessities and sought to 

create positive impressions for future generations. Their mission was tough and demanding; it 

Figure 29. One of America’s favorite pastimes appeals to others as well.
352

required consummate professionalism and a “can-do” attitude in the face of daily frustrations.

Meanwhile, in Kandahar, some 40 miles from the former Soviet airfi eld, the soldiers of CHLC 2 

performed “hands-on” missions in a different way. CHLC 2 was an integral part of an ARSOF team 

built around a Special Forces company from the ARNG’s 19th SFG. ARSOF integration had been 

prompted by rocket attacks, the deaths of a Special Forces medic and three members of an EOD 

team, and the wounding of a Special Forces lieutenant on patrol in the Kandahar market area.200

MAJ Harry Singletary, MAJ Gregory Mulligan, and CPT Terry Rounds (pseudonyms) emphasized that combat tactical skills became primary when CHLC 2 was to help defend the 

ARSOF team compound at night and when CHLC 2 was dispatched to clear suspected rocketlaunch sites in a nearby apartment building.201 However, during the day, CA missions (medical, 

food distribution, and education) took priority.

The CHLC 2 medical and education team, SPC John Harriman and SPC Arthur Walton 

(pseudonyms), dressed in civilian clothes to conceal their rank because the Afghans were very 

status conscious.202 They concentrated on signifi cant projects that would help residents and that 

would counter Iranian-sponsored anti-American propaganda. One of their dual-purpose projects was to get air conditioning to the building that housed the popular Afghan radio station.

The radio station project expanded communications to a population that was 75-percent 

illiterate. Because the antiquated Croatian radio equipment Iranian broadcasters used tended 

to overheat after 2 hours, air conditioning the Afghan station would allow them to dominate 

the local airways. Harriman also learned that employing locals who could “talk comfortably to 

the people and connect with them” as radio announcers was preferable to using U.S.-schooled 

Afghans. Employing locals also improved the station’s credibility and expanded its listening 

audience. Both Harriman and Walton admitted that their toughest task was convincing nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to shift from simple emergency actions to more complicated 

developmental projects that would yield long-term benefi ts.203

Figure 30. Deliveries were always a signifi cant priority.
353

As CA projects, such as rebuilding the Mirawyse Hospital, were completed, the PSYOP 

team—Detachment 1-2 of the 345th PSYOP Company (Airborne) from Dallas, Texas—publicized the successes. However, when the 19th SFG Special Operations Command and Control 

Element (SOCCE) liaison team at Kandahar Airport discovered that Detachment 1-2 had an M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) and an M-203 grenade launcher with basic loads of ammunition, the Special Forces soldiers “reassigned and transported” the tactical PSYOP detachment 

to their advance operating base (AOB) in Kandahar. Within 48 hours, Detachment 1-2, with its 

SAW and M-203, was part of a Special Forces and Afghan vehicle-mounted task force en route 

to Nowzad to capture a noted Taliban leader. Because almost everyone in the village was illiterate, the assistant team leader, SGT Tim Elton (pseudonym), brought along several loudspeakers. 

The team sergeant, SSG Charles Milton (pseudonym), a veteran of Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, 

was carrying the M-203. Milton, Elton, the SAW gunner, SPC Joshua Danner (pseudonym), and 

12 other Americans were crammed into four small pickup trucks. Two hundred fi fty Afghan 

soldiers were stuffed aboard 10 other trucks for the 18-hour cross-country trek. “It was a ‘Rat 

Patrol’ but twice as hairy. It was not a convoy—it was more like a herd racing across the high 

desert at night—like the Mel Gibson movie, ‘Mad Max,’” remembered Milton.204

When the task force arrived, the entire village was totally dark; it had no electricity and no 

generator. Night visitors usually meant trouble, so an explanation was necessary to reassure the 

villagers that they were not in danger and to explain the “unexpected” intrusion. That was when 

Elton’s loudspeakers were brought into play. Although the Taliban leader was not in the village, 

Detachment 1-2 demonstrated technical and tactical skills that made it a force multiplier. True 

ARSOF integration was achieved in the heart of Afghanistan.

Their Lucky Day

The 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG had been ordered to prepare to deploy by mid-January 2002 to 

Kandahar, Afghanistan, for assignment to JSOTF-South. Special Forces ODB 390 arrived about 

15 February. Three weeks later, MAJ Mitchell Harris (pseudonym) and his company headquarters 

moved fi rst to Bagram and then, on 17 March, to Gardez where they set up an AOB. The ODB’s 

missions were to resupply the ODAs that operated in its vicinity and, because the company had 

ground mobility vehicles (GMVs), or armored HMMWVs, to escort ARSOF convoys.205

On 8 April, three members of ODA 395 were in Gardez when three vehicles carrying AMF 

soldiers approached the town, responding to a report that a truck had run an AMF roadblock. 

As the lead Afghan vehicle approached a bridge, an individual jumped out of a taxi blocking 

the road, walked up to one of the trucks, and calmly dropped a hand grenade into the driver’s 

lap, mortally wounding him. Two others then quickly ran out from under the bridge and threw 

several more grenades at the three AMF vehicles. Other individuals reportedly fi red on the 

convoy with AK-47s. Five Afghans in the second truck and several more in the third truck were 

wounded by the grenades. The AMF soldiers fi red on their attackers, killing two. At least one 

of the attackers fl ed into Gardez.

As soon as the Special Forces soldiers at the AOB heard about the attack, the ODB immediately deployed four GMVs from ODA 361 to protect the area around the headquarters. 

Three other GMVs with ODA 394 aboard moved to an overwatch position to protect AMF 
354

reinforcements being sent forward by local Afghan Commander Zia Lodin. Protected by the 

heavy weapons aboard ODA 394’s GMVs, the AMF quickly cordoned off the area into which 

the assailants had fl ed and awaited the arrival of another 60 or 70 Afghan soldiers to conduct a 

house-to-house search. While this was happening, ODA 395 returned to the AOB. As ODA 394 

provided overwatch, the Afghans swept through the area and captured three suspected attackers.206

SFC Fred Anderson (pseudonym) began preparing to receive the casualties at the AOB.207

Four AMF soldiers with minor wounds walked to the base camp and were treated by the team 

medic. Soon, the seriously wounded casualties arrived, escorted by the medics from ODA 395, 

SSG James Atkinson and SSG Mike Davis (pseudonyms), who had gone to the scene. One 

Afghan had suffered a critical grenade wound on the right side of his head and had extensive 

shrapnel wounds along the right side of his body. Another had a serious abdominal wound with 

obvious internal bleeding. A third had a chest wound. Another had severe facial wounds. Several had extensive leg wounds. One had a broken leg, and others had sustained wounds to the 

shoulders and other extremities.

Two 20th SFG medics, who had stopped in Gardez en route to Orgun, delayed their departure to assist with the wounded. This raised the total to fi ve 18Ds (Special Forces medics) 

treating the eight seriously wounded Afghans. The medics did a quick triage to separate the 

most critical and initially concentrated on them. Although the medics could detect no pulse in 

the individual with the abdominal wound, his heartbeat could be detected by stethoscope. They 

immediately administered blood expander and saline, and these measures probably saved his 

life. A surgically opened airway saved the life of the patient with the head wound. The third 

worst casualty was saved with an Asherman chest bandage that covered the half-inch hole in 

his chest. Then, as the most critical were brought under control, the medics began treating the 

other fi ve seriously wounded Afghans.

A 101st Airborne UH-60 Black Hawk medical evacuation helicopter and an MH-47D Chinook helicopter arrived with the 3rd SFG fl ight surgeon and a fl ight medic aboard. The medics

Figure 31. Special Forces medics conduct triage of Afghan wounded.
355

placed the three critically wounded on the Black Hawk and the two seriously wounded onboard 

the Chinook. Two 19th SFG soldiers accompanied them as security. Although neither of them 

was an 18D Special Forces medic, SFC Anderson, the ODB 390 senior medic, knew that they 

were competent, having had Special Forces training. He instructed them to watch the casualties, 

apply new dressings if needed, and ensure that the intravenous drip was fl owing. At Bagram 

Air Base, the forward area surgical team took over the medical treatment. One Afghan with a 

serious leg injury had to have it amputated, but all 13 wounded men survived. As SFC Anderson 

said, “This was those Afghans’ lucky day. There were fi ve 18Ds in one place.”208

In the harsh environment of Afghanistan, constantly working with AMF personnel whose 

reliability and capabilities varied greatly and doing most movement at night, sensitive items 

were occasionally lost. These were serious matters that impacted all ARSOF units in the fi eld. 

But these things happen in war. Being prepared to deal with these mishaps enabled the fi eld 

commanders to continue combat operations with minimal delays. The key to reducing the potential impact was rapidly notifying the headquarters.

Dealing With Cryptographic Compromise

Cryptographic keys—secret documents and electronic equipment that encoded radio communications—were lost on occasion during combat operations in Afghanistan.209 One Special 

Forces ODA lost its communications security (COMSEC) material when the mule carrying the 

package ran off into the night. During an intense gun battle, Taliban forces got into the Special 

Forces vehicle park before they could be driven out. The team had no way of detecting whether 

the enemy fi ghters had suffi cient time to extract electronic codes from the radios on the trucks 

in the brief period they were around them. A coalition force lost its “crypto” during a long night 

movement when a piece of equipment fell off its truck.210

Figure 32. Special Forces medics stabilize the wounded.
356

As a veteran communications specialist, MSG Tony Santana (pseudonym), the 3rd SFG 

communications sergeant, actually expected accidental losses. “This could happen to any soldier in any unit in any theater,” he said. “The most important thing was immediately reporting 

the COMSEC loss so that immediate actions could be taken to safeguard the larger communications systems from enemy “listening.” The automatic response was much like quickly reporting the loss of a credit card to cancel the card before a thief could use it.

3rd SFG commander COL Mark Phelan had made all radio operators in the JSOTF headquarters rehearse the procedures involving what to do in the event they received a report of lost 

cryptographic keys. They would reencode their radios immediately by digitally transmitting 

new codes, a system called “over-the-air rekeying.” To prevent an enemy from also getting the 

new keys on their radios, U.S. and coalition radios had been preloaded with unique electronic 

keys that were needed to receive the new cryptological codes. In this way, when an item of 

COMSEC was lost or suspected to have been compromised, the hundreds of radios connected 

to the JSOTF communications net could be reencoded in minutes.211

Special Forces ODAs daily reconnoitered and searched their areas of responsibility (AOR) 

for signs of continued Taliban and al-Qaeda activity. Unconventional warfare (UW) never 

ended in Afghanistan. Army National Guard (ARNG) Special Forces ODAs assumed many of 

the 5th SFG missions and operational sites during the transition that took place while Operation 

ANACONDA was ongoing in the Shah-i-Khot Valley.

Caves and Graves

Any doubt about the capabilities of the ARNG Special Forces units meeting active Special 

Forces standards was dispelled by ODA 923, 19th SFG from Utah. These guardsmen unhesitatingly exchanged their civilian clothes for desert camoufl age uniforms (DCUs) when called to 

duty in December 2001. Exercises in Thailand, Korea, Tonga, and the Maldives in the previous 

two years had prepared the 19th SFG for special operations missions to support national objectives. Those objectives became crystal clear on the morning of 11 September 2001.

After a preparatory period at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, ODA 923 arrived in K2, Uzbekistan, 

in early March 2002. There it was made a quick-reaction force (QRF) for Pakistan to interdict 

Taliban and al-Qaeda fl eeing Afghanistan—a mission that was never executed. On 25 April, 

the 2nd Battalion, 19th SFG sent the team to Bagram where CJSOTF-Afghanistan further 

assigned it to conduct and support cave searches in the Tora Bora region. The team was under 

the tactical control of TF Rakkasan of the 101st Airborne Division. Specifi cally, the team was 

to reconnoiter potential helicopter landing zones (LZs), determine the level of enemy activity 

in the region, and confi rm suspected enemy cave sites.212

Jalalabad was a long way from the Utah drug store where CPT Kerry Barnes (pseudonym) 

worked as a pharmacist.213 However, on 27 April, CPT Barnes was moving to Jalalabad to meet 

ODA 966 and its Afghan Military Forces (AMF) element. Because ODA 966 had established 

rapport with the Afghans, Barnes added six members of that team and 50 Afghans to his 

operation. On 30 April, the combined force began to move by truck.

Although the distance to the objective from Jalalabad was just 50 km, vehicles could only 

traverse the fi rst 30 km. While the AMF leader, Commander Malek, sent a reconnaissance 
357

element to Alefkhel, the Special Forces soldiers enterprisingly contracted for 16 mules to move 

their equipment from Tangi Qolleh. The force left Tangi Qolleh at 0700 on 1 May and reached 

Alefkhel at 1100. At Alefkhel, the terrain was so steep and the trails so narrow that the mules 

could go no farther. Amazingly, the “hard scrabble” rough area was fi lled with wheat and poppy 

fi elds. Ironically, tents stenciled with large “UNHCR” letters sat in the poppy fi elds. The Special 

Forces teams contracted for porters from among the villagers.

The straight-line distance from Alefkhel to the proposed observation post (OP) was 2,500 

meters to the west, but the elevation increased 1,500 meters in that short distance. After 11⁄2 

hours, the two teams had covered only 300 meters, straight-line distance. The lack of oxygen at 

that altitude and the elevation change made progress for the Americans slow. After climbing for 

31⁄2 hours, the Special Forces soldiers fi nally reached the OP site. From there, the teams could 

observe two ridges, and they discovered what appeared to be two large caves on each. They also 

located three potential helicopter LZ sites, but all required demolitions to make them usable. 

On 2 May, two Special Forces engineers arrived carrying explosives, and the next morning they 

began clearing the LZs.

ODAs 923 and 966 observed the caves and then, with the AMF, went to investigate the 

four sites. Two caves had been sealed by bombs. The third proved to be only the illusion of a 

cave caused by shadows from overhanging rocks. The fourth suspected cave turned out to be a 

fi ghting position with overhead cover and good fi elds of fi re. Nearby were several bunkers that 

appeared to have been recently occupied.214

The ongoing search for Osama bin Laden required all reputed grave sites to be investigated. 

Village porters from Alefkhel reported that about 25 Arabs were buried in a mass grave nearby. 

The ODAs also found two graves on one of the ridges. Permission had to be obtained from the 

local elders to excavate the graves. In exchange for this permission, CPT Barnes, ODA 923, 

made arrangements with CA personnel to have more than 12,000 pounds of humanitarian 

assistance delivered to Alefkhel for further distribution to the outlying villages.

On 4 May 2002, American and Canadian conventional forces, accompanied by news reporters and a team of forensic experts, arrived at Alefkhel. The news media rushed to fi lm the 

mounded mass grave because they would be denied access to the area once the forensic team 

began to exhume the bodies. Twenty-fi ve bodies were found at the two sites. The forensic experts took DNA samples, and the bodies were reburied. The operation appeared on CNN and 

was reported in major newspapers.215 On 7 May, CH-47 helicopters brought in the aid, and the 

village elders began to distribute it.

By truck, by mule, and by foot, ODAs 923 and 966 moved into the high mountainous objective area to accomplish their mission—“putting eyes on possible caves and locating landing 

zones,” said CPT Barnes. In addition, after locating grave sites, they were culturally sensitive 

and politely sought permission to exhume the bodies for identifi cation. The humanitarian aid 

arranged assisted a town of 2,000 inhabitants as well as those Afghans in smaller surrounding villages. Superior training, fl exibility in solving issues, and dedication are the hallmarks 

of Special Forces soldiers. ODAs 923 and 966 clearly demonstrated that these attributes were 

common among ARNG Special Forces soldiers as well.
358

Vietnam-Style A Camp at Orgun-e

As his ODA loaded supplies aboard two CH-47 helicopters on the runway apron at Bagram 

Air Base, MSG Danny Woburn (pseudonym) explained the mission to the pilots.216 The 101st 

Airborne Division Chinook pilots were fl ying Woburn and ODA 361 with supplies to Orgun-e, 

more than an hour south of Bagram. After unloading its equipment, the Special Forces team 

would then load several hundred boxes of Soviet 82mm mortar rounds recently abandoned by 

the Taliban into cargo nets to be evacuated out. These would be carried, or “slung,” underneath 

the helicopters as “sling loads” to be delivered to the 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG at the Kabul Military Academy. There, they would be used by new recruits of the Afghan National Army (ANA) 

for mortar training.217

As they fl ew over Orgun-e, MSG Woburn told the B Company, 159th Aviation Regiment 

pilots to look for a large triangle of fortifi ed entrenchments. As far as Woburn knew, in May 

2002, his was the fi rst purposefully built, fortifi ed Special Forces A Camp in Afghanistan. The 

very large “fi ghting base camp” had been constructed by ODA 361 and named Camp Harriman in honor of CW3 Stanley Harriman who had been killed in action during Operation 

ANACONDA. The camp, based on plans used by Special Forces units in Vietnam more than 

30 years before, was guarded by the 3rd Platoon, B Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 

101st Airborne Division.218 Three hundred AMF soldiers were based at Camp Harriman. ODA 

361 advised them in their operations. The AMF elements served as “strike forces” to hunt down 

die-hard Taliban and al-Qaeda survivors.219

Although MSG Woburn and his team were very aggressive in accomplishing their UW and 

FID missions at Orgun-e, they often joked about the “noncombat actions” that they had carried 

out. During “Operation Tea Marathon,” they had to sit for hours in a jirga drinking tea with 

local Afghan dignitaries, testing bladder capacities to the extreme, not wanting to offend their 

hosts. “Afterward, we would fl ee en masse to the nearest facilities. It was every man for himself 

then,” laughed one sergeant.220 On another mission, the Special Forces team hired a local guide 

to lead it to a village that did not appear on its maps. The guide led the team on a circuitous 

fi ve-hour-long drive through the rugged countryside. When it arrived, Woburn checked his 

satellite global positioning system (GPS) device and discovered that it was only 6 miles from 

its point of origin. That experience became referred to as “Operation ‘Century 21’” for all the 

real estate they saw during their wanderings. Good humor took the edge off the isolation in the 

hinterlands.221

A National Army for Afghanistan

Years of civil war left Afghanistan without a national army. Tribes and ethnic groups of 

mujahideen led by regional warlords had forced the Soviet withdrawal and then these warlords 

fought the Afghan army, fought among themselves, and fi nally fought the Taliban movement. 

Subsequently, beginning in October 2001, the few remaining dominant warlords, with American assistance, managed to drive out the Taliban regime by mid-December. The most successful 

of these war leaders and their “armies” became the dominant Afghan Military Forces (AMF) 

within the country. The Afghanistan Interim Authority (AIA) and the antiterrorist coalition 

recognized that the future security of Afghanistan could only be ensured by a well-trained army 

composed of all ethnic groups and tribes in Afghan society. In May 2002, President George W. 
359

Bush pledged $2 million to interim Afghan leader Hamid Karzai to train and equip a national 

army for Afghanistan.222

To accomplish that task, soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG began to train the fi rst 

battalion of recruits for an ethnically diverse Afghanistan National Army (ANA) on 1 May 

2002. GEN Tommy Franks, commander, CENTCOM, emphasized the importance of that mission. “The national army of Afghanistan is going to be an essential element of their long-term 

security,” he declared.223 Military training is a basic Special Forces mission—one that soldiers 

do constantly to enable governments to protect their people from subversion or insurgency. The 

cross-cultural communications skills and regional expertise of Special Forces soldiers help 

them to organize and train host government forces to enhance the nation’s security.

The 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG was given the mission to train the ANA in just 10 months. It was 

to organize and train nine 600-man infantry battalions and six 300-man border guard battalions. 

Afghan military cadre trained by Special Forces soldiers would then begin training additional 

forces. The objective, according to LTC Keith McDaniels (pseudonym), commander, 1st Battalion, was to build “a credible, capable force.”224

ANA recruits were selected by provincial offi cials and sent to Kabul for training. Travel 

to Kabul was extremely diffi cult. Although transportation was a government responsibility, the 

U.S. and coalition forces intervened periodically to assist with movement to ensure that suffi cient physically capable recruits were available to train. Birth certifi cates do not exist in Afghanistan. Verifying the age requirement was virtually impossible. There was no identifi cation 

system in the country; therefore, the Special Forces soldiers had to devise methods to ensure 

that only those recruits who passed an initial medical screening would begin training.

Each recruit for the ANA was to bring an AK-47 rifl e, four magazines, and extra clothing 

but few did. The AIA was responsible for basic recruit training equipment. Obtaining necessary 

gear proved to be a slow process. The Special Forces trainers adapted to the situation by using 

their personal equipment to teach basic infantry tasks such as camoufl age, cover, and concealment. They also taught rudimentary soldier skills—discipline, marching, marksmanship, map 

reading, fi rst aid, physical fi tness, and small-unit tactics. Prospective offi cers received more 

leadership training after the fi rst two weeks before assuming their positions in the infantry battalions. The training progressed to advanced skills like mortar fi ring and communications. The 

Afghans had no tradition of sergeants, or noncommissioned offi cers (NCOs), as intermediatelevel leaders in the armed forces. Therefore, recruits/soldiers with leadership potential were 

identifi ed early to receive additional leadership and management instruction after basic training 

to create an NCO corps. Compounding the diffi culties of training were that most recruits were 

illiterate; the recruits spoke a mix of languages—Dari, Pashto, and Farsi; culturally, the concept 

of teamwork was foreign; and the recruits had come from tribal groups that had been fi ghting 

one another for centuries.

Tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) assisted the Special Forces soldiers by teaching history, 

geography, and government classes covering the history of Afghanistan; its geography; the 

ethnicity of the various tribes; the concept of a national government; and free elections. Few 

recruits knew more than a few simple “facts” about any of these topics. All classes, formal and 

informal, emphasized national unity, identifi cation, and ready recognition of AIA leaders and 
360

the legitimacy of the new government. Since many of the AIA leaders were unknown to the 

recruits, the Special Forces trainers emphasized the ability to recognize the leaders by physical 

appearance and then associate them by position. Critical to the success of the ANA and the 

nation was helping the recruits understand their individual and unit relationship to higher 

headquarters and to the government of Afghanistan—the “chain of command”—instead of 

traditional tribal hierarchal and oligarchic loyalties.225

This ANA training mission was what Special Forces units were created to do. Experience 

from previous training missions had prepared the 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG to operate from a 

“bare-base” facility and to train a local military force.226 No other force in the U.S. military has 

the capability and fl exibility to perform such an important political mission with such global 

implications. One member of the 3rd SFG company summed up the importance of the mission: 

“That we are here during this time is key to stabilizing Afghanistan for long-term growth and 

development.”227

The preceding soldier vignettes illustrate the ARSOF combat operations and activities that 

took place in Afghanistan and Pakistan from mid-December 2001 through late May 2002, the 

established end date of this work. Transitions dominated the period. They infl uenced how the 

war to eliminate the remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance was fought and how the United 

States and its allies sought to bring stability to Afghanistan. The fi ghting to drive the enemy 

from the Shah-i-Khot Valley dominated this period, and because this was the case, those stories fi ll a large part of this section. However, that does not mean this was the most important 

success of the total war. Not every story could be included. It is hoped that those provided 

will give readers a balanced picture of what Army special operations soldiers were doing in 

Afghanistan.

The fi nal section contains observations and refl ections on the preparations for the military 

deployments overseas; the combat operations directed from Uzbekistan to collapse the Taliban

regime; the combat operations and activities directed from Afghanistan against the remaining 

Taliban and al-Qaeda forces; and the internal defense, reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and 

stability operations to support the AIA as elements of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

in Afghanistan from September 2001 to mid-May 2002. These are not proffered as lessons 

learned. They are objective observations and refl ections from the ARSOF in Afghanistan writing team—all of whom are retired Army special operations soldiers. This is not intended to be 

a public relations piece, nor is it to be a critique. It is simply a presentation of how the ARSOF 

fought the war in Afghanistan. Thus, it is not “all sunshine and roses.” There were minor mistakes made in achieving success in Afghanistan. Some ARSOF soldiers committed some valorous acts to ensure that success. None of the errors were ever “mission stoppers.” The sacrifi ces 

ARSOF soldiers made contributed to the freedom provided to the Afghan people. These will 

always be remembered by Army special operations soldiers who preserve freedom and combat 

terrorism worldwide.
361

Notes

1. “Citizenship in a Republic,” Speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, 23 April 1910, The Works of Theodore 

Roosevelt, Vol. XIII, 506-29.

2. Donald Rumsfeld, “Testimony as Delivered to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: The Situation in 

Afghanistan,” June 26, 2002, Washington, DC, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020626-depsecdef2.html>.

3. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, U.S. Army John F. 

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS), Fort Bragg, North Carolina. August 1999, 2-4; COL John F. 

Mulholland, interview with C.H. Briscoe, 12 July 2002, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, transcripts and tapes at U.S. Army 

Special Operations Command (USASOC) Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

4. Ann Scott Tyson, “Al Qaeda: Resilient and Organized,” Christian Science Monitor, 7 March 2002, 2

5. Kerry Zimmer is a pseudonym.

6. Peter Baker, “These Guys Will Kill Anybody,” Washington Post, 5 March 2002, 1; Jackson Ferrell (pseudonym), B Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment interview with James Schroder, 

22 April 2002, Fort Campbell, tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Ferrell 

interview.

7. U.S. Army, “Coalition Joint Task Force Mountain,” Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, 

New York, slide presentation, 5 April 2002, copy in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

8. Rowan Scarborough, “Enemy Forces Allowed to Regroup,” Washington Times, 5 March 2002, 1.

9. John Hendren, “U.S. Took Time for This Afghan Raid,” Los Angeles Times, 4 March 2002; Ann Scott 

Tyson, “US, Allies in a Riskier Kind of War,” Christian Science Monitor, 5 March 2002, 1.

10. COL Mark Phelan, Commander, 3rd Special Forces Group (SFG), Fort Bragg, interview with C.H. 

Briscoe, 12 July 2002, Fort Campbell, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter 

referred to as Phelan interview.

11. Karl Kramer, 5th Battalion, 19th SFG, Co., interview with C.H. Briscoe, 9 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, tape recording USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

12. MAJ Randall Schantz (pseudonym), commander, B Company, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations 

Aviation Regiment, interview with James Schroder, 8 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, transcripts and tapes at 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Schantz interview.

13. Phelan interview.

14. Silas Green (pseudonym), CAT A-41, 96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion, interview with Kalev Sepp, 28 

August 2002, Fort Bragg, tape recording USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Scott Peterson, “Special Ops 

Tackle Aid Mission, Afghanistan is a Laboratory for a New Kind of US Military Humanitarian Mission,” Christian 

Science Monitor, 1 March 2002, 1.

15. Brian Acosta is a pseudonym.

16. Charles Burton (pseudonym), 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, interview with MAJ Teresa Johnson, 

11 June 2002, tapes in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Burton interview.

17. Terry Sanders is a pseudonym.

18. “Coalition Joint Task Force Mountain.”

19. Scarborough, 1.

20. John Hendren, “U.S. Took Time for This Afghan Raid,” Los Angeles Times, 4 March 2002; Tyson, “US, 

Allies in a Riskier Kind of War,” 1; .

21. Mulholland interview.

22. Arthur Solanis (pseudonym), B Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, 

interview with Jamee Schroder, 25 March 2002, Fort Campbell, tapes and transcripts in USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg; Rumsfeld. 

23. Carl Hooper is a pseudonym.

24. Drew Dice (pseudonym), commander, ODB 380, B Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, interview with 

Kalev Sepp, 8 July 2002, tapes and transcripts in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as 

Dice interview; Paul Blanchard (pseudonym), commander, ODB 530, C Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, interview 

with Kalev Sepp, 26 April 2002, Fort Campbell, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, 

hereafter referred to as Blanchard interview. 

25. CPT Mike McHenry (pseudonym), A Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, interview with Richard Kiper, 

31 October 2002, Fort Bragg, NC, tape recording and notes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter 

referred to as McHenry interview.
362

26. The shura is a council of elders that functions as the de facto government of many Afghan towns and villages.

27. Gary Towson and Carl Hooper are pseudonyms.

28. SFC Bill Athens [pseudonym], Headquarters and Support Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, interview 

with C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, 

Fort Bragg.

29. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) news release number 02-11-04, “Results of Investigation Into Death 

of U.S. Service Member,” 8 November 2002.

30. On 8 November 2002 CENTCOM released a summary of the results of the investigation. It concluded 

that the AC-130 crew experienced “continuous problems with their navigation systems,” and “misidentifi ed ground 

reference points.” McHenry states that he transmitted to the AC-130 the exact location of Harriman’s convoy. According to McHenry, a crewman informed the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) with the ODAs that the aircraft’s 

computers were malfunctioning. Soon thereafter the crewman stated the computers were functioning and asked if 

friendly forces were at a specifi c grid location south of the main body. The TACP said no because there were no 

forces at the location. The AC-130 then fi red into Harriman’s vehicle. See “Results of Investigation Into Death of 

U.S. Service Member”; CW3 Sandy Belliard (pseudonym), ODA 594, 5th SFG, telephonic interview with Richard 

Kiper, 20 November 2002, Fort Bragg, NC, Memorandum For record, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

31. ODA 594 dispersed to four sites: O.P.-North (MSG DC, SSG J.C., SSG J.K., and U.S. Air Force Tech. SGT 

B.S.), the Mission Support Site and Mortar Position (CPT G.T., SFC J.S., and SSG C.G.), Checkpoint Charlie (SFC 

C.B.), and the old fort at Gardez (CWO S.B., U.S. Air Force MSG B.M., SFC M.G., and SSG G.S.). The team traveled in four armored Mercedes-Benz jeeps, donated by Norway when its peacekeeping force left Bosnia. The jeeps 

still had “SFOR” stenciling visible on the doors, and the operator’s manuals were in Norwegian, which caused some 

diffi culties for the American drivers. CPT G.T., Memorandum, “ODA 594, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,” 14 

March 2002, Fort Campbell, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

32. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Afghan’s Retreat Forced Americans to Lead a Battle,” New York Times, 

10 March 2002, 1; Peter Baker and Pamela Constable, “Afghans Prepare for Final Assault,” Washington Post, 12 

March 2002, 1.

33. CPT Brian Acosta (pseudonym), 910 Tactical Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Detachment, A Company, 

9th PSYOP Battalion, interview by James Schroder, 8 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, tapes and transcripts at 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Acosta interview.

34. Norman Wilcox is a pseudonym.

35. Acosta interview.

36. SGT Mitchell Dennison (pseudonym), 910 Tactical PSYOP Detachment, A Company, 9th PSYOP Battalion, interview by James Schroder, 8 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, tapes and transcripts at USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

37. SGT Mitchell Dennison (pseudonym) and SP4 Ike Monre (pseudonym), 910 Tactical PSYOP Detachment, 

A Company, 9th PSYOP Battalion, interview by James Schroder, 8 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, tapes and 

transcripts at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

38. Dennison are Monroe are pseudonyms.

39. SGT Mitchell Dennison (pseudonym), SP4 Ike Monroe, and SP4 Dale Stevenson (pseudonyms), 910 

Tactical PSYOP Detachment, A Company, 9th PSYOP Battalion, interview by James Schroder, May 8, 2002, 

Kandahar, Afghanistan, tapes and transcripts in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

40. 5th SFG, “SOT-A Support to Operation Anaconda,” n.d.; 5th SFG, “Lessons Learned Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM: ODA 563,” 20 May 2002, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

41. Burton interview.

42. Jed Samuels (pseudonym), et al., 10 May 2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, 

transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Samuels, et al., interview.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Rawlins never fi red his Barrett during the ANACONDA battle. Because the al-Qaeda fi ghters often 

concealed their weapons beneath their robe-like coats, he was unable to positively identify any of the distant fi gures 

he spotted as “defi nitely enemy.” Jerry Rawlins (pseudonym), et al., 10 May 2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, 

interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

46. Samuels, et al., interview.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.
363

49. Raymond W. Lake (pseudonym), 11 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, 

transcripts at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Mann and Dickerson are pseudonyms; Alfred Mann (pseudonym), HHC, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special 

Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), interview with James Schroder, 25 March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape 

recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

54. Derrick Mackenzie is a pseudonym.

55. Derrick Mackenzie (pseudonym), A Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), interview with James Schroder, 9 July 2002, Fort Campbell, tapes and transcripts at USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

56. Paul Parcelli is a pseudonym.

57. Mann is a pseudonym.

58. Ferrell interview.

59. Timothy Dickerson (pseudonym), A Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), interview with James Schroder, 9 July 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Dickerson interview.

60. CPT Nathan Self, A Company, 1st Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry Regiment, interview with C.H. 

Briscoe, 19 September 2002, Fort Benning, Georgia, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg, hereafter referred to as Self interview.

61. Chris Gaines (pseudonym), HHC, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), interview with 

James Schroder, 9 July 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

62. John Gates is a pseudonym.

63. Douglas Talbert (pseudonym), HHC, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment 

(Airborne), interview with Schroder, 26 March 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

64. Jacob Frost is a pseudonym.

65. Department of Defense Release, “Executive Summary of the Battle of Takur Ghar,” 24 May 2002, <www.

defenselink.mil/news/May2002/d20020524takurghar.pdf>.

66. Charles Lafayette is a pseudonym.

67. The accounts of this article are drawn from interviews with Self and the 160th personnel involved with the 

mission. Footnotes are annotated for specifi c interviews located at the USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

68. Callsign Matchbox is a pseudonym.

69. Gary Corbin is a pseudonym.

70. Roger Oliver is a pseudonym.

71. Donald Deese (pseudonym), A Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment 

(Airborne), interview with James Schroder, 9 July 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

72. Steve Larken is a pseudonym.

73. Gary Corbin (pseudonym), B Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), phone interview with James Schroder, 13 November 2002, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

74. Kerry Miller is a pseudonym. 

75. Dickerson interview.

76. Self interview; Bradley Graham, “A Wintry Ordeal at 10,00 Feet,” Washington Post, 25 May 2002, A01.

77. Self interview.

78. Schantz interview.

79. Names and minor accounts for the 2nd Ranger Squad are culled from the following reference: Bradley 

Graham, A01.

80. Graham, A01.

81. Ibid.

82. Charles Elkenback is a pseudonym.

83. Daniel Henley is a pseudonym.

84. Brian Jefferson is a pseudonym.
364

85. Solanis is a pseudonym.

86. Derrick Donalds (pseudonym), B Company, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, interview with Kalev Sepp, 17 April 2002, Fort Campbell, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg.

87. Greg Law is a pseudonym.

88. Randal Kelley is a pseudonym.

89. Jed Samuels, Terry Sanders, Max Gorley, Ty McFadden, Jason Thurman, Jake Millett, Jerry Rawlins, 

Stefan Morris, Carl Hooper, Jules Arde, Bernard Dubois, Damon Hulse, and Cash Galtier are pseudonyms.

90. Samuels, et al., interview.

91. Terry Sanders is a pseudonym.

92. In the same way, Thurman was later mistaken for a U.S. Navy SEAL and a U.S. Army colonel. Jason 

Thurman, et al., 10 May 2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

93. The other two special forces noncommissioned offi cers were SSG B.G. of A-372, and SFC C.B. of A-594. 

CPT G.T., Memorandum, “ODA 594,” USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

94. Only ODA 394 members called this roadblock by the name “Checkpoint Charlie.” Several weeks 

previously, ODA 594 had established a roadside guard post several miles north of the Shah-i-Khot which they 

designated “Checkpoint Charlie.” The 5th SFG soldiers called the new roadblock manned by ODA 394 simply “the 

security site.” CPT G.T., Memorandum “ODA 594,” USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

95. ODA 372 was dispersed to three sites: The “old fort” at Gardez (SFC J.V.A., SSG J.C., and SSG C.R.); 

Checkpoint Charlie (SSG B.G.); and O.P. South (MSG J.D., SFC B.A., SSG B.W., and U.S. Air Force SSG C.S.). 

This O.P. South, sited on Hilltop 2322 (height in meters above sea level), should not be confused with a previously 

named O.P. South, planned for use by ODA 372 before the change in operations. The team’s executive offi cer, CWO 

Stanley L. Harriman, had been killed by fi re from a U.S. Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunship on 2 March 2002, at the 

beginning of Operation ANACONDA. SSG. L.W. and SSG C.C., wounded alongside Harriman, had been evacuated 

to the U.S. medical facility at Landstuhl, Germany, and then on to the United States. A-372’s team commander, CPT 

M.M., had returned to the United States to oversee Harriman’s burial ceremony. J.V.A., 22 November 2002; Terry 

Sanders, 4 December 2002; and M.M., 6 December 2002; Fort Bragg, personal and telephonic interviews with Kalev 

Sepp, transcripts at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

96. CPT G.T., Memorandum, “ODA 594.” G.T., the ODA 594 team leader, gained some notoriety because of 

his appearance and popularity with Afghan military commanders. A Japanese-American, G.T. acquired a strikingly 

Afghan-like appearance as his hair and beard grew out. G.T., 21 November 2002, Fort Campbell, telephonic interview 

with Kalev Sepp, transcripts at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg (hereafter referred to as G.T. interview).

97. The exact locations of the checkpoint, observation posts and mortar position, per Universal Transverse 

Mercator grid on the Sar Wahzeh 1:100,000 mapsheet (Ed. 2-DMA, Series U611, Sheet 2883), were: Checkpoint 

Charlie, 42SWB/099995; O.P. North, 42SWB/152970; O.P. South, 42SWB/123954; and the Mortar Position and 

Command/Mission Support Site, 42SWB/143977. Ty McFadden, et al., 10 May 2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, 

interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to 

as McFadden, et al., interview.

98. During their advance, the Pashtuns found the tough copper wire strands used to guide the missiles, called 

TOWs (pronounced “toes,” for tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile), loosely strung for hundreds of 

yards across the slopes. However, none of them knew why the wires were there. When they pulled on one of them, an 

unexploded TOW missile detonated inside a cave in front of the band of fi ghters, and they stopped moving forward. 

Over his radio, G.T. explained what had happened, and soon the advance continued. G.T. interview.

99. ODA 594 dispersed to four sites. CPT G.T., Memorandum, “ODA 594.”

100. D.C., 18 November 2002, Fort Campbell, telephonic interview with Kalev Sepp, transcript at USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

101. B.D., et al., 10 May 2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes 

at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

102. Stefan Morris, et al., 10 May 2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts 

and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

103. McFadden, et al., interview.

104. For a description of the threat to journalists by various Afghan factions at the time, see Peter Baker, 

“‘These Guys Will Kill Anybody,’” Washington Post, 5 March 2002, 1; Samuels, et al., interview.
365

105. Dice interview; Blanchard interview.

106. Barry Bearak, “Kabul Rushes 1,000 More Men to Join G.I.’s on Battle’s Sixth Day,” New York Times, 8 

March 2002, 1; Samuels, et al., interview.

107. Samuels, et al., interview.

108. McFadden, et al., interview.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Samuels, et al., interview.

112. ODA 372 worked most closely with Commander Khoskhyar, a Pashtun from Gardez. Commander Rasul 

and Commander “Engineer” commanded the other two companies. J.V.A., 22 November 2002, Fort Bragg, interview 

with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

113. Max Gorley, et al., 10 May 2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts 

and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Gorley, et al., interview.

114. The locations of the overnight position, per Universal Transverse Mercator grid on the Sar Wahzeh 

1:100,000 mapsheet (Ed. 2-DMA, Series U611, Sheet 2883), was 42SWB/155926. Samuels, et al., interview.

115. Samuels, et al., interview.

116. The Tajiks’ tank crews reportedly fi red at two tents they saw in the U.S. positions, which were not marked 

by orange panels as had been directed. The radio call sign of the U.S. commander whose troops came under fi re 

was “Hard Rock Six.” Carl Hooper (pseudonym), 10 December 2002, letter to Kalev Sepp, and Terry Sanders 

(pseudonym), 5 December 2002, letter to Kalev Sepp, Fort Bragg, in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

117. Samuels, et al., interview.

118. Gorley, et al., interview.

119. McFadden, et al., interview.

120. Jed Samuels (pseudonym), commander, ODA 394, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, interview with Sepp, 10 May 

2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Kathy 

Gannon, “U.S., Allies Seize Shah-e-Kot Valley,” Associated Press, 13 March 2002.

121. Stefan Morris, et al., 10 May 2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts 

and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

122. BG John Rosa, “DOD News Briefi ng,” 12 March 2002, <http://www/defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/

t03122002_t0312asd.html>.

123. Gorley, et al., interview.

124. Ibid.

125. In contrast, the U.S. infantry company had just arrived in Afghanistan about a week before and had not yet 

adjusted to fi eld conditions. The American rifl emen wore all their heavy cold-weather clothing, even during the day 

when the temperatures warmed. When they moved to the top of Tergul-Ghar the morning after they landed, Gorley 

saw the young soldiers “dropping left and right from the heat. . . . All along the ridgeline, they’ve got a couple guys 

here getting I.V.’s [saline fl uid given intravenously through a tube and needle], a couple guys there drinking I.V.’s, 

other guys with their feet up in the air, [others] pouring water on [soldiers].” Gorley and Hulse helped the unit’s 

physician’s assistant in administering fi rst aid. Gorley, et al., interview.

126. Gorley, et al., interview.

127. After maneuvering with Zia’s men southward along the west side of Tergul-Ghar, ODA 594 returned to 

Gardez and shortly afterward redeployed to the United States. Half of ODA 372 stayed in the Shah-i-Khot Valley for 

subsequent operations. Samuels, et al., interview.

128. Dice interview; Blanchard interview.

129. CPT Ken Harrison (pseudonym), CAT-A56 team leader, 96th CA Battalion, interview by Richard Kiper, 

11 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; “25 killed 

as Afghan Rivals Fight,” Dawn, the Internet Edition, 28 April 2002, <www.dawn.comj/2002/04/28/top11.htm>.

130. Ibid.

131. LTC Tom Sherman (pseudonym), 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, interview by Richard Kiper, 2 October 2002, 

Fort Bragg, notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

132. MAJ Don Barton (pseudonym), e-mail to Kiper, 3 October 2002, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

133. MSG Mike Ewell (pseudonym) and SFC Keith Cantwell (pseudonym), CAT-A56 team members, 96th 

CA Battalion, interview by Richard Kiper, 11 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording and notes, USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.
366

134. Ibid.

135. Gary Black is a pseudonym.

136. Bill Gertz, “U.S. Attacks Afghan Convoy,” The Washington Times, March 19, 2002, 6.

137. Charles Elkenback (pseudonym), B Company, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, 

interview with James Schroder, 8 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Elkenback interview.

138. Eaton and Parker are pseudonyms.

139. Roger Wilkerson is a pseudonym.

140. Charles Martin is a pseudonym.

141. Charles Martin (pseudonym), B Company, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, 

interview with James Schroder, 8 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, tapes and transcripts at USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

142. Elkenback is a pseudonym.

143. Elkenback interview.

144. McHenry interview. 

145. SFC John Veringer (pseudonym), ODA 372, 3rd SFG, interview with Richard Kiper, 31 October 2002, 

Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg; Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, 

“U.S., Allied Forces Patrol Battle Zone, Pursue Survivors,” Washington Post, 15 March 2002, 14. Jason Doolittle is 

a pseudonym.

146. Carey Robeson is a pseudonym.

147. Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon Loeb, “Commander: Largest Ground Offensive is Over,” Washington Post, 

19 March 2002, 16; Geoffrey Mohan and John Daniszewski, “Assault Set Back Al Qaeda, U.S. Sets,” Los Angeles 

Times, 15 March 2002.

148. Jim Garamone, “Anaconda Ending; Defense Looks at Combat Air Patrols,” American Forces Information 

Service, 18 March 2002, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/n03182002_200203181.html>.

149. Phelan interview.

150. Phillip Reese, James Pearl, and Rich Keogh are pseudonyms.

151. Phillip Reese (pseudonym), 11 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts 

and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Reese interview.

152. Each of the “circus tents,” so called for their size, cost $137,000.

153. Reese interview.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid.

157. Ibid.

158. Tony Santana and Kent Willard are pseudonyms.

159. Tony Santana (pseudonym), 6 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts 

and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Santana interview.

160. Ibid.

161. Morris Washington is a pseudonym.

162. Morris Washington, 10 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes 

at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid.

168. Ben Crenshaw is a pseudonym. Ben Crenshaw, 6 May 2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, interview 

with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid.

171. Ibid.

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid.

174. Silas Greene (pseudonym), CAT-A41, 96th CA Battalion, interview with Kalev Sepp, 28 August 2002, 
367

Fort Bragg, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg. Gray Jaffe is a pseudonym.

175. Keenan Jacobson is a pseudonym. Dexter Filkins, “Toll in Thousands Feared as Quake Hits Afghan Town,” 

New York Times, 27 March 2002, 1. By 28 March the death toll stood at 737. It was not expected to rise much beyond 

that. See Pamela Constable, “Quake Aid Sped To Afghans,” Washington Post, 28 March 2002, 1.

176. Don Sullivan and Derrick Jacobi are pseudonyms.

177. Don Sullivan (pseudonym), 24 April 2002, Fort Campbell, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tape 

at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

178. Santana interview.

179. Phillip Reese is a pseudonym.

180. Reese interview.

181. An AC-130 was shot down at the Battle of Al Khafji in Saudi Arabia in 1990, during the Persian Gulf war, 

when it stayed over the battlefi eld after the sun came up. As a result, the large, slow-fl ying gunships were restricted 

to fl ying over hostile areas only at night. It was considered an extraordinary exception for the USAFSOC to deviate 

from its policy to support Phelan’s task force.

182. Phelan interview.

183. Phillip Reese is a pseudonym.

184. The U.S. Armed Forces refers to all the world’s time zones consecutively by letter designations, from A 

(Alpha) to Z (Zulu). Each letter of the alphabet is read with a unique phonetic pronunciation to aid understanding in 

radio communications: Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, etc.

185. Reese interview.

186. Phelan interview.

187. “CINC” (pronounced “sink”) was verbal shorthand for commander in chief, the former title for the 

four-star theater commanders. The title had just been changed to “combatant commander,” but the old term CINC 

remained in informal use. In 2002, commander in chief was reserved to refer only to the President of the United 

States. Phelan later refl ected that his attendance at the daily VTCs “kept me from going out to visit the troops [of 

the CJSOTF, across Afghanistan], but . . . I felt very secure knowing I heard exactly what the CINC said.” Phelan 

interview.

188. Phelan interview.

189. Jeff Bosley is a pseudonym.

190. Jeff Bosley, 11 May 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts at USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

191. Ibid.

192. Ibid.

193. Ibid.

194. Dexter Yates is a pseudonym.

195. Dexter Yates, 8 May 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts and tapes at 

USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Yates interview.

196. The British and Americans referred to these ISAF-trained units as the “First BANG,” “Second BANG,” 

etc. The Afghan national guard battalions were intended for internal security duties in Kabul.

197. Yates interview.

198. Ibid.

199. Gregory Jernigan and Eric Nolan are pseudonyms.

200. Gregory Mulligan and Terry Rounds (pseudonyms), CHLC-2, 489th CA Battalion, Knoxville, Tennessee, 

interview with C.H. Briscoe, 10 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

201. Harry Singletary, Gregory Mulligan, and Terry Rounds are pseudonyms.

202. John Harriman and Arthur Walton are pseudonyms.

203. John Harriman and Arthur Walton (pseudonyms), CHLC-2, 489th CA Battalion, Knoxville, interview 

with C.H. Briscoe, 11 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, transcripts and tapes at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg.

204. SPC Joshua Danner, SGT Tim Elton, SSG Charles Milton (pseudonyms), 345th PSYOP Company, 

Dallas, Texas, interview with C.H. Briscoe, 12 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan, transcripts and tapes at USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

205. USASOC Crisis Response Cell Briefi ng, 15 February 2002, 2 March 2002, 17 March 2002 in USASOC 

Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.
368

206. Message, 082100Z APR 02, CDR AOB 390, Gardez, Afghanistan, to CDR FOB 33, Bagram, Afghanistan, 

subject: OPSUM GRENADE INCIDENT, in USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

207. SFC Fred Anderson (pseudonym), C Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG, interview with Richard Kiper, 

5 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter 

cited as Anderson interview. James Atkinson and Mike Davis are pseudonyms.

208. Anderson interview.

209. Santana interview.

210. Ibid.

211. Ibid.

212. MSG Andy Stewart (pseudonym), B Company, 1st Battalion, 19th SFG, interview with Richard Kiper, 10 

May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

213. CPT Kerry Barnes (pseudonym), B Company, 1st Battalion, 19th SFG, interview with Richard Kiper, 10 

May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg.

214. Ibid.

215. Ryan Chilcote, “Hunt for Bin Laden’s Remains,” <www.cnn.com>, 7 May 2002; Peter Baker, “Mass 

Grave is Discovered At Tora Bora,” Washington Post, 8 May 2002, 16; Carlotta Gall, “Allies Exhume 23 Bodies 

Thought to be Qaeda Fighters,” Washington Post, 8 May 2002.

216. Danny Woburn is a pseudonym.

217. Danny Woburn (pseudonym), 9 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, interview with Kalev Sepp, transcripts 

at USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort Bragg, hereafter referred to as Woburn interview.

218. See Thomas A. Jones, “On Camps,” unpublished manuscript, 1992, held in the Marquat Library collection, 

SWCS, Fort Bragg.

219. Woburn interview.

220. A jirga is literally a circle and is often used to describe a meeting.

221. Woburn interview.

222. “U.S. to Help Equip Afghan Army,” Washington Post, 3 May 2002, 5.

223. Laurie Goering, “Kabul Sees Army as Key to Peace,” Chicago Tribune, 22 May 2002.

224. J.S. Newton, “New ranks emerge from dust,” Fayetteville Observer, 2 June 2002, 1A. Keith McDaniels is 

a pseudonym.

225. MAJ Henry Deaver (pseudonym), CW4 David Carson (pseudonym), 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG, interview 

with Richard Kiper, Kabul, Afghanistan, 7 May 2002, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed Archives, Fort 

Bragg, hereafter cited as Deaver interview.

226. CPT John Montgomery (pseudonym), MSG Charles Dunleavy (pseudonym), 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG, 

interview with Richard Kiper, Kabul, Afghanistan, 7 May 2002, tape recording and notes, USASOC Classifi ed 

Archives, Fort Bragg.

227. Deaver interview.
369

Observations and Refl ections

The presentation of observations and refl ections follow the organizational chapters of the 

book, after the historical background of Afghanistan—preparation for war, ARSOF in the supported role (forcing the Taliban regime from power), the transition period, and ARSOF in the 

supporting role through mid-May 2002. To provide continuity for the reader, the sequence of 

observation and refl ection discussions generally follow the standard fi ve paragraphs of the 

Army fi eld order:

• Situation—what is known about the enemy and what the enemy is most likely to do.

• Mission—what is to be accomplished by the allied forces in general terms.

• Execution—who will do what tasks and how things will be accomplished.

• Administration—including legal aspects, rules of engagement (ROE), and logistics 

(all types of support for the combat forces plus equipment accountability).

• Command and control—who is in charge of what and when that responsibility is to be 

transferred, including communications and how orders and plans will be issued.

The observations are based on offi cial documents and interviews with participants at all 

levels, including coalition allies, and the refl ections are situational assessments by active and retired ARSOF offi cers who participated in this operation’s history. The overthrow of the Taliban

government in Afghanistan represents the fi rst success in America’s global war on terrorism 

(GWOT).

The purpose of this book is to tell the general American public what the Army special 

operations soldiers did to drive the Taliban from power, to destroy al-Qaeda strongholds, and 

to support the organization of a democratic government in Afghanistan as part of the GWOT. 

Thus, the average American is the intended audience. It is not the purpose of this book to capture lessons learned, resolve special warfare doctrinal issues, create doctrine, or clarify defi nitions for ARSOF. The Taliban was driven from power by American captains, warrant offi cers, 

and sergeants on tactical teams and aircrews supporting Afghan forces. If ARSOF operations 

and how tactical teams were employed in Afghanistan create doctrinal debate, the appropriate 

venue to resolve these issues is the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 

School (SWCS). The chapter introductions and sanitized vignettes have been written so that 

readers with little or no military background can understand and appreciate the contributions a 

variety of ARSOF units made.

The historical vignettes selected tell the total ARSOF story. Many demonstrate tactical 

and technical skills and the determination and bravery of Army special operations soldiers and 

aviators. There was a conscious effort to ensure that the story included all ARSOF elements. 

Thus, to provide a representative sampling of the different ARSOF capabilities, operations, and 

activities within the security constraints, not all interviews became vignettes. This historical 

effort was not designed to be a defi nitive study. It is an “ARSOF snapshot” of the war from 

11 September 2001 until mid-May 2002. Since the published word promotes analysis and 

provokes discussion, it is most appropriate that the fi rst offi cial account should come from an 

Army special operations organization because these forces spearheaded the unconventional 
370

warfare (UW) campaign that caused the collapse of the Taliban government and initiated the 

foreign internal defense (FID) and development campaign in Afghanistan.

The command decision to have professional historians with ARSOF experience capture 

the history of operations in Afghanistan indicated that the book was not intended to be a public relations piece. War and combat fi ghting have never been “all sunshine and roses.” Just as 

campaign plans and orders tend to “go to the winds” once the fi ghting starts, reluctant and illprepared leaders were replaced, confusion and incomplete information were relegated to “fog 

of war,” and perfect recollections from the headquarters as to what happened on the ground that 

often dominate after-the-battle reports have been cross-referenced with the tactical teams that 

were involved. When everything goes according to plan, most professional soldiers consider it 

to be an anomaly. And, since this book would be carefully read by the participants at all levels, 

the old sports adage, “It’s easy to fool the fans, but you can’t fool the players,” was adopted to 

provide more than 95-percent objectivity.

Preparation for War

During the preparation for ground war from 12 September through 18 October 2001, the 

day before the insertion of U.S. troops into Afghanistan, the situation and anticipated Taliban

and al-Qaeda reaction based on available intelligence was vague, incomplete, and associated 

with the mujahideen guerrilla tactics that caused Soviet forces to withdraw in 1989. Afghanistan was a “backwater” Muslim nation that merited little attention from the Department of State 

and offi cial intelligence sources. The terrorist attacks on America prompted unity as well as unprecedented collaboration among U.S. intelligence agencies to coordinate efforts and integrate 

the mosaic of data and products. Topographical mapping that dated to the Soviet regime was 

modifi ed and rapidly updated using current imagery.

To project signifi cant American ARSOF combat power in Afghanistan required overseas 

basing in adjacent countries and U.S. Air Force tankers to refuel the troop-carrying helicopters 

and their armed escorts. To support the original conventional ground war plan that was to be 

initiated by an air campaign, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), using its Special Operations Command, SOCCENT, made the 5th SFG the Joint Special Operations Task Force–North 

(JSOTF-North). JSOTF-North was to initiate the ground force offensive in mid-October 2001, 

in conjunction with another joint special operations headquarters. Army Special Forces ODAs 

were to support the anti-Taliban warlords, and other SOF would attack specifi c targets deep 

inside of Afghanistan.

Army Special Forces teams were to advise and support two identifi ed anti-Taliban factions. These teams were to arrange the air delivery of arms, munitions, and supplies; advise 

the warlords on tactics and strategy; and support offensive operations by directing close air 

support (CAS). Army Rangers were to seize an airfi eld by parachute assault and attack a suspected al-Qaeda stronghold, Objective Rhino. From this airfi eld, 160th SOAR AH-6 attack 

helicopters attacked assigned targets and refueled and rearmed. At the same time, the MH-60L 

Direct-Action Penetrators (DAPs) and MH-47E helicopters were to insert Special Forces teams 

into Afghanistan. The air campaign initiated psychological operations (PSYOP) warfare with 

airdropped leafl et bombs.
371

Operations security (OPSEC) concerns affected mission preparation and planning at all 

levels. Compartmenting projects, imposing limited and special-access requirements to Secret 

materials and relationships, and issuing Top Secret plans from CENTCOM reduced access 

in the operational units and compelled tactical commanders at the colonel and below level to 

grant temporary access to information deemed critical to mission planning. The number of positions in an SFG that require Top Secret clearances are minimal, and it requires a fi nal Secret 

clearance to technically grant access to Focal Point programs. The small intelligence sections 

at the tactical level faced an administrative nightmare. Conventional forces assigned as security forces at ARSOF forward operating bases (FOBs) had to be briefed, and the number of 

personnel with security clearances at the infantry rifl e company level was miniscule. Despite 

the fact that only limited information fl owed down to “junior leaders and soldiers,” morale 

remained high—ARSOF soldiers knew they would be committed to the fi ght early, and CNN 

media coverage provided some information on the combat zone. The only question was when?

Based on unit strengths, operational readiness for overseas deployment, the ongoing worldwide commitments of active duty ARSOF, and the unknown duration of the war, U.S. Army 

Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) units and individual personnel were mobilized to meet and sustain wartime requirements. These needs covered a wide variety of staff 

requirements in the United States and overseas headquarters to accelerate schooling and expand student capacities to train more ARSOF soldiers, to accommodate units’ overseas rotations, and to mobilize the personnel and units for federal service. The higher headquarters 

(CENTCOM, SOCCENT, and USSOCOM) in Tampa and Fort Bragg (USASOC, USASFC, 

and USACAPOC) charged with mobilization fi lled their personnel staff augmentation needs 

fi rst while the lower-level Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs) deploying overseas 

to fi ght the war were fi lled last. The impact of this action was exacerbated when CENTCOM 

and SOCCENT elected to “direct the war” from Tampa. SOCCENT established a forward regional command and control cell (Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander [JFSOCC]) at Doha, Qatar, and relegated command of the combat zone to the 5th SFG commander 

as JSOTF-North. The Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, 

Virginia, immediately conducted a “crash JSOTF course” for 5th SFG commanders and staff 

personnel. It also helped prepare the mission needs statement to specify joint as well as Army 

Staff personnel augmentation, automation, communications, and intelligence systems required 

as well as combat equipment and supplies. Because the “warfi ghting” JSOTF-North was given 

the lowest priority for staff augmentation, SOCJFCOM stripped personnel from its experienced 

joint staff to fi ll critical staff voids and coordinated with CENTCOM and USSOCOM for priority fi lls from the other services.

The mobilization and sponsorship of USAR and ARNG SOF units and personnel, while 

deemed critical to sustain a prolonged war against terrorism and support the rotation of active duty elements, were not well executed. Active component headquarters wanted Army Reserve mobilization groups to handle the physical requirements of mobilizing USAR and ARNG 

personnel and units. Unfortunately, the USAR mobilizers were activated after most ARSOF 

personnel and units had been. It was not uncommon for ARNG units to be mobilized twice 

before being federalized, especially the composite Special Forces units formed from the 19th 

and 20th SFGs that were spread throughout several states. Not only did this complicate state 
372

responsibilities for resourcing, it also created very disparate command chains. Active duty 

sponsors for USAR and ARNG units either had “their hands full” getting themselves deployed, 

or those elements left behind did not have the suffi cient equipment and personnel assets to assist these units in preparing for overseas deployment. Having been mobilized and then not sent 

overseas during Operation DESERT STORM, the ARNG Special Forces units were so determined to be deployed that few issues were raised until they were in Afghanistan. One can ask 

most reservists or national guardsmen who were mobilized to elaborate on these problems.

A 5th Battalion, 19th SFG company of the Colorado ARNG was mobilized and trained 

at Fort Carson, Colorado, before being processed again for mobilization with the 2nd Battalion headquarters before federalization at Fort Knox, Kentucky. When the two Special Forces 

companies from the other battalions arrived at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, all personnel were 

again mobilized when they were attached to the 2nd Battalion, 19th SFG from West Virginia. 

When the 19th SFG units arrived, only one 5th SFG company was left at Fort Campbell. The 

company’s equipment had already been palletized pending deployment. Concern that the 19th 

SFG units might not be considered operationally ready if mobile training assistance teams were 

requested from the SWCS precluded formal orientation on advanced radio and weapon systems 

common to active duty Special Forces units. Some very motivated NCOs at the ODA level took 

the initiative and arranged classes on PSC-5 radios and security devices.

The 489th CAB, Knoxville, Tennessee, mobilized at Fort Bragg to replace the 96th CAB, 

faced many of the same frustrations as the 19th SFG. In its case, OPSEC concerns limited 

unit access to daily operations and intelligence updates by the active duty forces. Individuals 

mobilized for ARSOF staff and instructor positions at the SWCS were processed by fellow 

reservists activated to conduct mobilization. Mandatory administrative processing and equipment issue that normally took less than 24 working hours were “compressed” into 10 working 

days. Individual service members were not available to “report” to their duty assignment until 

fully processed. Still, the individual guardsmen and reservists took it “all in stride” because 

they wanted to do their part to combat the terrorism that struck America on 9/11. They were not 

going to lose the opportunity to demonstrate their tactical profi ciency and prove to the Active 

component that they were indeed force multipliers. Throughout the 2001 Christmas holiday 

period, the USAR conducted accelerated basic civil affairs (CA) offi cers classes as the fi rst part 

of the SWCS “gear up.” Once in-processed, the diffi culty lay in getting the forces to the fi ght.

While more than two decades of planning had gone into a computerized, prioritized, and 

carefully timed fl ow of men, equipment, and supplies into the forward areas of combat zones 

by various U.S. Air Force and contract aircraft, the reality was that once the time-phased force 

deployment data (TPFDD) process started, regardless of whether it was tied to an obsolete 

or seriously modifi ed plan, it was very diffi cult to alter by any of the military services. First, 

delays in negotiations for basing rights interrupted the fl ow as aircraft were held at intermediate bases throughout Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Then, when access to 

Karshi Kanabad (K2), Uzbekistan, was limited to only Air Force C-17 Globemaster III cargo 

jets and C-130 Hercules turboprop aircraft, this created problems that rippled down to the lowest levels. The 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, which had always deployed its MH-47E Chinooks 

on C-5 Galaxy jumbo jets, had rapid helicopter buildup load plans with specially designed 

transmission stands and a four-wheeled lifter (SCAMP) to support rapid deployments. The 3rd 
373

Battalion had shipped its MH-47Ds overseas aboard C-17s, but the 2nd Battalion had only done 

static load training with a C-17. Separating MH-47E transmissions and the SCAMP meant 

that an MH-47E could not be built up until the second C-17 carrying the other transmission or 

SCAMP arrived. With the MH-47Es broken down and the equipment palletized for C-5s, the 

arrival of C-17s at Campbell Army Airfi eld to transport the aircraft created quite a stir in the 

160th SOAR. Aircraft loads had to be completely reconfi gured and the helicopters broken down 

further. Since the 160th SOAR had been tasked to provide four MH-47Es as primary combat 

search and rescue (CSAR) for the air campaign in the north, only luck prevented a potential 

delay in the war.

Simultaneously, AH and MH-6s, MH-60Ls, and more MH-47Es from the 1st and 2nd Battalions were being prepared for deployment. Some scheduled departures were delayed while 

others were moved ahead. As the air movement of ARSOF elements began, the U.S. Secretaries 

of Defense and State were still coordinating diplomatic clearances for Uzbekistan and country 

overfl ight permissions. The resulting traffi c jam caused by aircraft being held throughout the region awaiting clearance and the arrival of larger aircraft (Air Force C-5s, C-141s, and contracted civilian airplanes) to transload personnel, equipment, and supplies to C-17s and C-130s for 

entry into Uzbekistan grew worse each day. When landing clearance was granted, the TPFDD 

order was hopelessly torn apart as the disparate planeloads of personnel were disgorged at K2, 

and equipment and supplies had to be manually unloaded because K-loaders and forklifts had 

not arrived at the old Soviet air base in suffi cient quantity. Confusion was rampant.

For the active duty units that regularly deploy overseas, the experienced air movement offi cers and NCOs “pushed the units out,” and advance echelon (ADVON) parties of operations 

and logistics personnel in theater were used to dealing with these crises. It was a different story 

for the USAR and ARNG units whose commanders and staffs relied on “the system” to get their 

personnel, equipment, and supplies to the right place, together. These units lacked the practical 

experience and knowledge to cross-load personnel, equipment, and materiel to provide some 

operational capability in the event of problems as well as to function for extended periods without key equipment and supplies. When the 489th CAB headquarters arrived, it went to Kabul 

while its tactical teams were scattered throughout the country. This meant the small tactical 

civil affairs teams (CAT-As) lived out of their rucksacks for 30 days and contracted vehicles to 

accomplish their humanitarian missions in the villages of the desolate countryside.

At Fort Bragg, the major Army command (MACOM) and major subordinate command 

(MSC) staffs worked with the deploying units to validate statements of need based on personnel 

and equipment shortages. The USASOC headquarters looked fi rst within the command to 

correct key personnel shortages and shortfalls in language capabilities. The MACOM staff 

reprioritized equipment on hand, worked with the Department of the Army staff to accelerate 

fi elding of new systems, shifted outyear funds to accommodate war requirements, and appealed 

to USSOCOM and Department of the Army for critical unfunded and unprogrammed equipment 

needs as well as critical military occupational specialty (MOS) and linguist shortages.

Combat service support for the ARSOF deployed overseas was the responsibility of the 

Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM). The 528th Special Operations Support 

Battalion (SOSB) provided initial logistics support at K2, while the 112th Signal Battalion 
374

furnished “long-haul” communications for JSOTF-North. The European signal detachment 

supported SOCEUR at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and Incirlik, Turkey, as part of the aerial 

resupply mission. CENTCOM had operational command of ARSOF while SOCCENT had 

operational control of the USASOC forces.

Since most of the Army CA and PSYOP forces are in the USAR and two SFGs are in 

the ARNG, unit mobilizations and federalization for overseas deployment were approved. Although the USAR CA and PSYOP and ARNG Special Forces personnel had been mobilized as 

individuals for overseas duty before, this was the fi rst time that large numbers of ARSOF units 

had been mobilized and deployed into combat overseas since the Vietnam war, although the 

13th PSYOP Battalion was deployed during Operation DESERT STORM. The unit mobilizations required prior mobilization of USAR and ARNG personnel to fi ll the MACOM and MSC 

staffs involved in the process. The move to bring forces onboard was balanced with measures 

to prevent soldiers from leaving the service.

The “stop loss” program that froze retirements, enlistments, and resignations had four 

parts. The fi rst part had the most impact on Active ARSOF components: Special Forces career management fi eld (CMF) 18 and 180 series that also included senior enlisted personnel 

and aviation warrant offi cers (WOs) and CMF 150 series, with additional skill identifi ers 

(ASIs) 4, 5, and 6 for 160th SOAR WO pilots and crew chiefs with a 67U MOS. The second 

captured ARSOF skills in the Active Army and USAR: functional area (FA) 39 PSYOP offi cers, USAR FA 38 CA offi cers, ARNG CMF 18 series and enlisted MOSs, WO UH-60 and 

CH-47 aviators, and 67U crew chiefs. The third iteration expanded the freeze to critically 

short conventional MOSs, and the fourth partially lifted some of the non-ARSOF specialties 

and added information management offi cers, artillery enlisted MOSs, explosive ordnance 

demolition (EOD) specialists, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operators. The EOD specialists worked closely with Special Forces personnel in Afghanistan, destroying weapon 

systems and stockpiled munitions in caches discovered after signifi cant fi ghts with al-Qaeda

and Taliban.

The “stop loss” was an ARSOF “personnel Band-Aid fi x” to deal with the immediate crisis 

affecting Special Forces and special operations aviators. Expanded recruiting was a long-term 

solution (two years or more) because the two-time volunteers (fi rst time being airborne or parachute qualifi cation) still had to qualify for Special Forces training (assessment and selection); 

complete the basic Special Forces qualifi cation course; complete advanced skills training as 

communications, engineer, or medical specialists; and graduate from foreign language training before being fully qualifi ed for assignment to an operational SFG. ARSOF aviators and 

aircrews undergo assessment and selection and several months’ advanced training, and spend 

up to a year becoming fully mission qualifi ed. Thus, “stop loss” assets moved through the personnel artery like an aneurysm, or air bubble, on the way to the heart of ARSOF—its highly 

trained people, not equipment.

While CENTCOM and SOCCENT tactically commanded and controlled the ARSOF 

forces, the responsibility for arranging the shipment of the units with equipment and basic logistics loads into the combat zone fell to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). 

USSOCOM arranged transportation through the Air Force Air Mobility Command based on 
375

TPFDD schedules and deployment priorities and missions. CENTCOM approved the forces 

coming into its area of responsibility (AOR), and USSOCOM worked to ensure they arrived in 

theater on time and got where they belonged. The AOR war campaign plan was CENTCOM’s 

responsibility, and the SOF annex addressed ARSOF missions in the theater.

SOCCENT was the only regional Special Operations Command (SOC) without assigned 

forces. As such, SOCCENT headquarters had the smallest staff and wartime augmentation 

from the services and was almost entirely Reserve personnel. Traditionally, command of regional SOCs rotate among the services. A Navy rear admiral (SEAL) commanded SOCCENT, 

and the key warfi ghting staff billets (deputy, chief of staff, and operations offi cer) were fi lled by 

Navy SEALs. There were few staff offi cers in the SOC who had prepared and issued warning 

orders and operation plans (OPLANs), let alone write a SOF campaign plan.

To fi ll the void and assist tactical units that were preparing to fi ght the war, USASOC, 

USACAPOC, 5th SFG, and the 4th POG sent teams of experienced operations and intelligence 

planners to Tampa to minimize the turbulence. They prepared multiple courses of action for 

presentation at CENTCOM and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and then wrote the necessary orders and messages to implement the decisions. The Joint Psychological Operations Task 

Force (JPOTF) headquarters was created at CENTCOM and staffed almost entirely by 4th 

POG personnel. This JTF headquarters was augmented predominantly with USAR and ARNG 

personnel.

ARSOF communications in the combat zone was the responsibility of the 112th Signal 

Battalion. SOCJFCOM, during its training of the 5th SFG to assume the role of the JSOTF 

in the combat zone, coordinated additional information systems requirements with the 112th. 

One responsibility was to operate all video teleconferences (VTCs). The Joint Communications 

Signal Element (JCSE) supported CENTCOM, SOCCENT, and the SOC forward command 

cell, the JFSOCC. Exactly where they operated and the condition of the site depended on the 

outcome of basing rights negotiated by the Department of State and DOD.

When permission was granted to use the former Soviet air base at K2, Uzbekistan, as an 

ARSOF logistics base and the headquarters for JSOTF-North and the Joint Special Operations 

Air Component (JSOAC), access was limited to C-17 Globemaster IIIs and C-130 Hercules 

cargo and smaller aircraft. When the TPFDD airfl ow bottlenecks were broken, K2 began receiving aircraft around the clock. Some of the chaos intrinsic to ADVONs “staking claims” to 

available real estate was an unsettled issue until COL John Mulholland, commander, 5th SFG, 

arrived to head JSOTF-North. To preclude any service squabbling, the 16th Special Operations 

Wing (SOW) commander became the deputy JSOTF commander.

The Army controlled JSOAC-North because the four MH-47Es and two MH-60L DAPs 

were the primary CSAR for the northern half of Afghanistan during the air campaign. JSOACSouth provided CSAR coverage of southern Afghanistan with four MH-53M helicopters from 

the 16th SOW. Each JSOAC had MC-130P aerial refueling aircraft assigned to support the 

helicopters as well as Air Force special tactics squadrons with combat control tactical and 

medical elements. The CSAR mission became subordinated to other tactical requirements after 

the ground war was launched, but it never went away.
376

Having dealt with the diffi culties of getting an ARSOF headquarters operational in a “bare 

base environment,” the 112th Signal Battalion and 528th SOSB were fl exible and carried extra 

equipment and special supplies (plywood and 2 x 4 lumber proved invaluable). Getting the four 

MH-47E and two MH-60L helicopters “built up and tested” to meet the air campaign CSAR 

deadline required 24-hour maintenance operations until complete. The Night Stalker forklift 

operator worked with all elements to unload aircraft and relocate containers as the 160th SOAR 

bulk fuel team refueled all arriving Air Force and contract aircraft until Thanksgiving. It was a 

“beehive of activity” as all services and elements pitched in together to make K2 fully operational as quickly as possible.

As JSOTF-North “stood up” for operations, ARSOF tactical teams moved to FOBs in the 

region to prepare for the ground war. An integral part of the air campaign was distributing psychological warfare materials. Leafl et bombs were dropped on specifi c Taliban and al-Qaeda

targets along with explosive munitions, and PSYOP messages were broadcast from aerial 

platforms. It was a well-coordinated joint effort.

When ARSOF forces were committed to Afghanistan, they were to be resupplied by air by 

the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) under the direction of COMSOCEUR. Transloading 

supplies and equipment began at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, before shipment to the forward 

supply base in Incirlik, Turkey. Logisticians and parachute riggers, American and German, 

prepared loads for airdropping throughout Afghanistan. SOCEUR controlled the MC-130H 

Combat Talons, while EUCOM controlled the C-17 Globemaster III aircraft until they entered 

the CENTCOM AOR when the JSOAC took charge in theater. Air Force C-17 aircraft, operating from a variety of bases, did the humanitarian relief airdrops, mostly high-altitude drops 

from above 30,000 feet mean sea level (MSL).

As soon as JSOAC-North had MH-47Es and MH-60Ls operationally ready to do the CSAR 

mission, pressure to demonstrate America’s resolve to take the war to the Taliban and al-Qaeda intensifi ed. ARSOF soldiers were anxious to respond to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Weather 

along the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border did not cooperate.

Driving the Taliban From Power: ARSOF in the Supported Role

When the air campaign began against key Taliban and al-Qaeda targets throughout Afghanistan, the initiation of the ground campaign to drive the Taliban from power and to seize 

or eliminate key al-Qaeda leaders was delayed by adverse weather in the northern mountains 

bordering the country. A primary consideration in launching a UW campaign was establishing 

relations with two principal anti-Taliban warlords while intelligence assets worked to clarify 

and update the enemy situation on the ground. The intelligence picture would remain unclear 

throughout the ground war in Afghanistan.

The multiple ARSOF missions on the night of 19 October 2001 demonstrated to the alQaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan that the United States could project awesome military power 

worldwide when and where its government decided and launch a UW campaign at the same 

time. The 75th Rangers conducted parachute and helicopter assaults into two separate areas to 

put “American combat boots on the ground” as other 160th SOAR helicopter crews inserted 

Special Forces ODAs to support anti-Taliban leaders and attack deep enemy targets. The Ranger 
377

airborne assault into central Afghanistan was the initial event in a well-orchestrated special operations ground and air attack on multiple targets. The rapid airfi eld seizure (Objective Rhino) 

was key to establishing a helicopter refueling and rearming site to support other Special Forces 

teams conducting direct-action (DA) assaults on key ground targets. With the completion of 

all missions, the deep-penetration assault force loaded all troops, equipment, and helicopters 

for return to their overseas launch bases. Army and Air Force SOF elements had demonstrated 

that American combat forces could successfully accomplish what they had tried and failed to 

do in Iran in spring 1980. A Ranger helicopter assault into Objective Honda secured an airstrip 

to serve as a CSAR base, forward arming and refueling point (FARP), and medical evacuation 

support site for Rhino operations. Unfortunately, that successful mission was clouded when 

an MH-60K Black Hawk helicopter carrying additional troops into the secured airfi eld crashlanded, killing two of the Rangers onboard.

While these operations were taking place, simultaneously, Special Forces ODA teams 

were inserted deep into northern Afghanistan by MH-47E helicopters to rendezvous with antiTaliban leaders to organize forces for the UW campaign. MH-60L DAPs had protected the 

Chinooks. Extremely high mountainous terrain and the distance to the landing zones (LZs) 

dictated multiple aerial refuels during ingress and egress of Afghanistan. The “be prepared” 

mission for all 160th SOAR helicopter fl ight crews was to conduct self-CSAR and insert more 

ODAs to advise and assist other anti-Taliban leaders as they made known their willingness to 

join the fi ght. The unexpected offensive spirit of the fi rst two anti-Taliban leaders, encouraged 

by U.S. military advice, assistance (money, arms, munitions, and supplies), and CAS, determined the pace of the unconventional war in Afghanistan.

With the start of the ground campaign, JSOTF-North essentially became the SOF tactical 

command post (CP) for CENTCOM and SOCCENT that had their main CPs in Tampa, with 

USSOCOM supporting. With this arrangement, the USASOC headquarters at Fort Bragg acted 

as the de facto Army special operations rear CP because it served as the major resourcing 

command for the ARSOF that constituted most of the SOF of JSOTF-North, the tactical SOF 

warfi ghting headquarters. Situational awareness was critical for all commands but more so 

for USASOC because that headquarters had to anticipate aviation maintenance issues, rapidly 

respond to combat losses—personnel and equipment—coordinate ARSOF-unique supply and 

equipment requirements, and recommend viable plans of action.

Twice daily VTCs between CENTCOM combatant commander GEN Tommy Franks; 

RADM Bert Calland, SOCCENT, Tampa; and COL John Mulholland, commander, JSOTFNorth, K2, Uzbekistan, kept the main and de facto rear CPs abreast of the situation in the 

combat zone. Daily VTCs for primary staffs were interspersed between commanders’ sessions. 

The 112th Signal Battalion proudly stated that it supported 14 VTCs per day. The contrast 

between the tactical CP overseas and the main CP in Tampa was stark, but computer systems 

linked all headquarters staffs, and electrons delivered orders to the combat elements in the fi eld 

overseas.

Starting the ground war at the beginning of winter in Afghanistan brought the reality 

of high-altitude cold weather warfare to the forefront. This proved to be a challenge even 

for ARSOF units accustomed to operating at night wearing NVG and with experience in 
378

the western Rockies. Getting into Afghanistan by helicopter meant crossing mountain ranges 

above 17,000 feet MSL, fl ying in extremely variable weather (often zero/zero conditions), two 

or more aerial refuels in the frontier ranges to accomplish combat missions, responding to antiaircraft artillery (AAA) threats during ingress and egress, and no oxygen and limited heat for 

personnel riding in the cargo compartments of the MH-47E helicopters. The MH-47E Chinooks 

were the only SOF helicopters with the lift capability and avionics suitable to accommodate 

the high altitude and harsh weather conditions. The longer fl ight “legs” meant normal missions 

consistently exceeded 6 hours, many averaging 10 to 12 hours, depending on the launch and 

recovery locations. Another MH-47E helicopter was dedicated to carrying emergency fuel for 

mission aircraft.

Flying below 200 feet above ground level (AGL), “nap-of-the-earth” (NOE) ingress and 

egress routes, and wearing NVG in zero/zero conditions for those long hours placed tremendous stress on the MH-47E pilots. To minimize the effectiveness of the enemy AAA (guns and 

missiles) in the high mountains, the MH-47E pilots fl ew extremely narrow corridors between 

the mountains, which reduced left and right limits of error to 200 meters, causing the airmen 

to refer to the fl ight route as the “line of death.” Larger-capacity portable oxygen systems were 

required for aircrews fl ying higher and longer than ever before. The variable weather conditions 

in and around the high mountains further complicated fl ying. The seldom-used fuel dumping 

capability enabled the MH-47Es to carry more weight and still clear the initial barrier of K2 

mountain ranges, but it meant another aerial refuel before entering Afghanistan.

To add to the diffi culty, Air Force weather forecasters at K2 invariably used the Kuwait 

computer-generated forecasting model until forced by the harsh weather realities to physically 

collect data and modify their predictions based on pilot reports of radical weather changes in 

fl ight. When climbing over the mountains (the “Bear” outside of K2) and descending down 

into the narrow “lines of death,” it was not uncommon to experience heavy rain, then snow, and 

fi nally sleet conditions and face the same conditions again in reverse order negotiating a gradient of less than 1,500 feet wearing NVG. Aerial refueling in these conditions was especially 

harrowing for both parties at night because “refuel windows” were highly regulated to protect 

the Air Force C-130P supplier and the MH-47E and MH-60L customers. Knowing the criticality of an aerial refuel to the Army helicopters, the Air Force refuelers routinely went “above and 

beyond” to accomplish the mission.

With Air Force air weather teams on a 90-day rotation, each team tried to make the Kuwait 

computer model work for three weeks before reverting to “old-fashioned” weather-data collection and forecasting based on realities. Depending on the experience of the weather team, it required another three to four weeks before K2 forecasts were reliable enough for aircrews. Thus, 

half of each 90-day rotation was spent learning the regional weather phenomena of Afghanistan, and the learning sequence repeated itself with each new team rotating into the theater.

To add confusion, stateside Air Force weather forecasters using the same Kuwait computer-generated model promulgated generalized Afghanistan forecasts for their headquarters in the United States, which regularly caused bad weather reports in the combat zone 

to be questioned. Kabul, located on a high desert plateau, would be clear while the mountainous regions of southern Uzbekistan and northern Afghanistan would be “zeroed in” to cancel 
379

the fl ights. Since these missions had to be fl own by helicopters and refuel airplanes, it was an 

“all or none” fl ying situation. The winter weather delayed the start of the ground war and then 

caused complaints when high-altitude airdrop missions were aborted.

Special Forces resupply doctrine proved to be woefully outdated. Adjustments to a fl uid and 

rapidly changing battlefi eld and unique supply requirements—from saddles, tack, and feed for 

the animals used by American Special Forces personnel advising horse-mounted anti-Taliban

guerrillas to Toyota 4-Runner vehicles for warlord commanders—challenged the SOCEUR 

logistics teams responding to JSOTF-North. Requests came primarily by electronic mail (email), but they still had to be collated and tracked. Contracting became the primary way to 

do business quickly and effi ciently. There were grave concerns that a hard, cold winter could 

cause famine throughout a country that had been plagued by a seven-year drought. Sometimes, 

delivering humanitarian aid was the priority. This disrupted the necessary arms, equipment, 

and supplies from being airdropped to build and maintain guerrilla forces. This required constant “deconfl icting” and priority shifting between DOD and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) to maintain the war against terrorism while helping the impoverished 

Afghan population.

The Taliban AAA threat caused the Air Force C-17s to airdrop humanitarian aid from much 

higher altitudes than normal. Thus, drops were consistently made between 17,000 to 20,000 

feet AGL. This equated to 30,000 feet MSL, which reduced small, mountainous resupply drop 

zones (DZs) to postage stamp-size targets. Wind velocity and direction at drop altitude differed 

radically with ground-level conditions. Accordingly, complete loads were lost in the darkness, 

never seen by ground personnel, while others were dispersed over miles in the mountainous 

terrain. Unable to spend precious daylight hours searching for these scattered parachute loads, 

the advancing guerrilla forces abandoned the effort. Their priority was freeing the country from 

Taliban control and driving al-Qaeda from Afghanistan.

Despite the almost paranoid attention given to battlefi eld airspace control by JFACC since 

the Korean war and limiting CAS direction to specially trained Air Force personnel except in 

emergency situations, incidents of fratricide killed more ARSOF soldiers than enemy fi re. Airspace control had been focused primarily on preventing midair collisions between combat jet 

aircraft. The collision part seemed to have been fi xed; however, the almost carte blanche discretionary authority given to AC-130 Spectre gunships and day-fl ying jet fi ghters to engage visually acquired ground targets was a problem. This discretionary authority to engage targets without verifi cation from ground elements led to the following “accidents”: a 3rd SFG HMMWV 

being shot up by an AC-130 Spectre gunship before the start of Operation ANACONDA; the 

destruction of a crashed 160th SOAR MH-47E helicopter and the 3rd SFG HMMWV awaiting battlefi eld recovery; and an F-16 attack on Canadian soldiers training at Tarnac Farms less 

than 10 km from Kandahar Airport. The Ranger accounts of CAS on Takur Ghar revealed how 

poorly a jet pilot could discern ground targets at high speed and altitude. Incomplete passage 

of battlefi eld conditions (maintaining situational awareness) by rotating Air Force aircrews during mission handoffs between AC-130 Spectre gunships could have prevented one debacle. 

Ground force “boxed off-limits areas” marked on aircrew maps might have prevented 

the destruction of the crashed MH-47E helicopter and HMMWV and protected the 

Canadians training within 10 km of a major allied air base and cantonment area. Un-
380

fortunately, the MH-47E Chinook helicopter could have been repaired and returned to an 

ARSOF helicopter fl eet whose airframes are as tightly managed as Air Force C-5 Galaxy jumbo 

transports.

ARSOF combat units had more attached Air Force CAS teams on the ground than ever before. There were extremely sophisticated airborne CAS control platforms monitoring activities 

above the battle areas. “Smart” munitions were delivered by manned and unmanned aircraft. 

Combat fl ight altitudes varied wildly between the DOD air services as well as AAA precautions 

whether or not the threats had been confi rmed. C-17s continued to fl y high altitudes and to land 

only at night in Afghanistan as late as May 2002, long after C-130s were conducting daylight 

operations and fl ying low-level profi les throughout the country.

CAS direction “rules” between the services also varied widely. Artillery was never a factor 

in this war as it was for eight years in Vietnam when Army, Marine Corps, and Navy SEAL 

junior enlisted personnel, sergeants, lieutenant platoon leaders, and two-year in-service captain 

company commanders managed to control CAS, naval gunfi re, artillery, and mortars effectively 

in much more intense close combat with fewer per capita fratricide incidents. Instead of having 

just the Air Force involved in airspace management in today’s battlefi eld environment where 

there are more helicopters than “fast movers” operating by day and especially at night, this 

should be a joint Army-Air Force-Navy-Marine Corps endeavor worked in close coordination 

with ground force commands. Pushing most of the CAS direction responsibility down to the 

lowest level—Air Force specialty teams—has not solved the fratricide nor do these “ground 

airmen” have any control over the discretionary authority given AC-130 Spectre gunships and 

“fast-mover” pilots to expend ordnance rather than land with it aboard. Responsibility for surface targets was also abnegated by ground forces that either brought no experienced fi eld artillerymen (in the absence of artillery) to coordinate fi re support and manage airspace or did not 

have assigned fi re support offi cers (FSOs) like Army SF groups. If the Afghan war provided 

little else, it demonstrated that CAS fratricide has to be fi xed at the services level, and the 

ARSOF ground forces, Special Forces, and SOF aviation have to have FSOs and get directly 

involved in battlefi eld airspace management.

Besides the heavy fi ghting, two signifi cant things occurred during the Qala-i-Jangi prison 

uprising. The fi rst was the outstanding crisis management performed by two majors in FOB 

53, the battalion executive offi cer who directed the crisis action cell (CAC), and the battalion 

operations offi cer who led the QRFs. This model CAC operation would have been benefi cial 

during the rescue efforts on Takur Ghar during Operation ANACONDA several months later. 

The second was the discovery of an American among the captured Taliban and al-Qaeda

at Mazar-e-Sharif. This compounded the complex issue of the legal status of terrorists and 

detainees versus prisoners of war (POWs) protected by Geneva Conventions. As soon as John 

Walker Lindh was given medical treatment by FOB 53 medical personnel, custody was transferred to the U.S. Justice Department, and FBI agents removed him to the United States and 

charged him. The implications associated with posse comitatus to U.S. Armed Forces in war 

and appropriate responses should be addressed in all ARSOF courses.

The other issue that received international media attention, promulgated by the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), was CA tactical teams wearing civilian clothes in Afghanistan 
381

and Pakistan. The GWOT has provided many challenges regarding understanding and applying 

the Law of Armed Confl ict. ARSOF commanders and the military lawyers assigned to special 

operations tactical operations centers (TOCs) deal with many operational matters, including 

rules of engagement (ROE) and targeting confl icts. They also address issues involving combatant status and identifi cation that did and will continue to require deliberate analysis on the 

nonlinear GWOT battlefi eld.

The experiences of ARSOF soldiers throughout Afghanistan demonstrated that the education and training the SWCS conducted was on target. The success of the UW campaign promulgated by Special Forces ODAs working with anti-Taliban resistance forces, assisted by PSYOP 

and CA teams and supported by the 160th SOAR, validated the individual selection process 

for ARSOF schooling. It also substantiated SWCS’ qualifi cation training, training assistance 

team concepts, unit training standards, and the 10-year investment the U.S. Army made to build 

ARSOF capabilities.

Flexibility, ingenuity, innovation, and current battlefi eld reality have to be applied to doctrinal issues and mandatory training. Topics to be addressed include aerial resupply for guerrilla 

support and humanitarian relief; DA missions in a variety of urban environments; doctrinally 

specifi ed isolation periods for mission preparation; the necessity to compress air mission planning cycles; 528th SOSB forward support teams to serve as the interface with conventional 

logistics elements until all ARSOF elements redeploy; consistent attachment of tactical PSYOP 

and CA teams to Special Forces battalions to integrate force multipliers; contract offi cer representative training and operational funds management for all captains, warrant offi cers, and 

sergeants major in Special Forces, PSYOP, and CA; and a “how to be a staff battle captain 

in the battalion operations section” of the offi cer Special Forces qualifi cation course, Special 

Forces warrant offi cer training, and CA offi cer courses. The issue of operational funds for CA 

tactical teams can be addressed doctrinally based on the experiences of these elements in Afghanistan.

Air mission planning times vary greatly between ARSOF and AFSOF elements. There is 

no fl exibility in Air Force air mission planning. It has been “locked in concrete” while Army air 

mission planning can be compressed to accommodate crisis action. Consistency may be more 

applicable for peacetime training, but there has to be fl exibility in combat. Instead of “living 

with the problem,” this is a joint issue that affects conventional as well as ARSOF commands 

and the regional combatant commands.

The philosophy of “training as you will fi ght” should cause careful scrutiny of “lessons 

learned from the war in Afghanistan” to determine applicability. The Afghan unconventional war destroyed the long-proselytized World War II example of special operations personnel 

meeting indigenous resistance groups as “fi rst” American encounters. The number of other 

American actors involved in a secret rendezvous with indigenous forces and those encountered 

all over the GWOT battlefi eld has vastly increased. Sorting out the players has become a game 

in itself. Daily fusion of intelligence and information from a myriad of sources is mandatory 

to reduce the confusion, improve management of assets, and quickly disseminate information 

to tactical units.
382

Coalition allies for the GWOT were politically vital, and several countries quickly 

dispatched their special operations forces to assist. Unfortunately, the allied responses outran 

the CENTCOM preparation to smoothly assimilate those welcome assets into the war. Thus, a 

collection of very frustrated, highly trained coalition special operations elements was relegated 

to Qatar bases while the CENTCOM and SOCCENT theater staffs worked employment options. One national element returned home while others used political clout to overcome the 

military inertia, and another fl ew directly into K2 to confront the JSOTF-North commander in 

Uzbekistan. The coalition part would not be fi xed until CJSOTF-Afghanistan was organized at 

Bagram in late March 2002.

Command guidance and daily direction were given during unrecorded VTC sessions (to 

protect the privacy of senior offi cers [“back-channel” communications]). Computer systems 

were used to direct daily operations and produced electronic, paperless deployment orders; 

OPORDs; warning orders; and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) that rarely included all fi ve paragraphs of the standard OPORD. Acknowledgment was often simply an e-mail reply, and proposed courses of action or concepts of operations (CONOPS) were sent as attachments.

The sheer volume of offi cial electronic message and order traffi c, most of which is still 

classifi ed, made traditional documentary cross-referencing impossible. The recorded interviews with leaders, staff, and soldiers could be readily cross-referenced and thus provided 

the best primary source material. The dilemma facing postwar analysts and historians will be 

the security classifi cation of most material and the limited hard-copy documentation. While 

records management personnel pride themselves on having “harvested” vast quantities of offi cial electronic traffi c by downloading command and staff computer fi les, the limited screening 

beforehand and absence of cataloging afterward to facilitate keyword searches will frustrate 

the most dedicated researchers, even if they have the appropriate security clearances to access 

the stored fi les. Since the twice-daily VTC sessions were not recorded, senior commanders’ 

specifi c guidance, as well as intent and involvement in daily operations, will be “best recollections” long after the event instead of documented fact.

Higher-headquarters battlefi eld situational awareness was often acquired from computer 

monitor views, a situation akin to the echelons of fi eld commanders in helicopters orbiting 

above a battle site in Vietnam, trying to infl uence actions on the ground by listening to radio 

traffi c. Downlinked video from UAVs provided situational awareness for many. Unfortunately, 

this was a very distorted reality at times because enlisted operators were remotely controlling 

the UAVs from various locations, some as far away as the United States. Neither JSOTF-North 

nor any of the TOCs in the combat zone controlled these assets. The video image provided a 

“soda straw” view of a very small section of the battle area that had attracted the attention of a 

UAV operator, often thousands of miles away. A bank of computer monitors in the TOCs was 

updated every few hours to refl ect changes.

When the decision was made to expand the UW campaign into southern Afghanistan, SOCCENT decided to create another JSOTF in the south. The headquarters for JSOTF-South would 

be Naval Special Warfare Group One (NSWG-1), San Diego, California, and SOCJFCOM was 

tasked to train the Navy staff on JSOTF duties, responsibilities, and joint planning. The initial 

proposal to divide SOF responsibilities in Afghanistan along the latitude 30° line was countered 
383

by COL Mulholland. He proposed that JSOTF-South be responsible for all coalition SOF, DA, 

and special reconnaissance (SR) missions in the combat zone while JSOTF-North would retain 

the UW missions and take the FID mission to train the Afghan National Army (ANA), traditional Special Forces missions.

NSWG-1, a Navy west coast command, was minimally staffed primarily by SEAL offi -

cers. JSOTF-South received only a portion of its service staff augmentees. While SOCJFCOM 

trained the staff (almost entirely NSWG-1 personnel) at Qatar in November 2001, that joint 

command, having provided experienced joint staff augmentees to JSOTF-North from internal 

assets, made the same offer to the JSOTF-South commander. The offer was politely declined. 

JSOTF-South facilitated the deployment of coalition SOF elements into Afghanistan but did not 

correct the integrated employment problems. The JSOTF-South staff, minimal from the start, 

picked up a few of the JSOTF-North augmentees, but that did not make a dramatic change. 

Initially, only A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, and the coalition SOF units were allocated to 

JSOTF-South. SEAL platoons were informally detailed from the deployed Mediterranean Fleet 

assets. The MH-53M Pave Low IIIs controlled by JSOAC-South in Pakistan would support DA 

and SR missions. Interjecting a second JSOTF with minimal staffi ng and few forces into the 

combat zone as the Taliban regime collapsed was seen as politically driven to get the coalition 

SOF elements into the fi ghting during the fi nal days of war.

Thus, JSOTF-South had a very short life during the transition period when the ARSOF 

changed from being the supported command to supporting the U.S. conventional forces. During this period, instead of proposing CONOPS for assigned missions in the standard fi ve-paragraph fi eld order format that included all critical elements of planning, ARSOF commanders 

had to present them to the JSOTF staff in PowerPoint “bullet” formats. When approved, these 

briefi ng slides served as the OPORD for assigned missions. The completeness of electronic 

OPORDs and FRAGOs degenerated another level at JSOTF-South and, more important, shifted 

the burden of joint staff coordination down to the combat tactical commander. This could be 

attributed to the lack of experienced joint staff offi cers in the new headquarters, the minimal 

staffi ng, and the fact that Navy offi cers and NCOs do not receive the DOD command and staff 

procedures training as part of their advanced professional education, training other service offi cers receive at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff 

College, the Air Staff College, and the Marine Corps Staff College.

Transition and Combat Operations

The fall of Kandahar and Kabul in November 2001 marked the collapse of the Taliban

government and the disintegration of its fi ghting forces. While the organization of the Afghan 

Interim Authority (AIA) was taking place, JSOTF-North consolidated the stabilization effort 

by assigning UW to the three 5th SFG battalion commanders. The Special Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCEs) were formed to better control operations by the various 

Alliance warlords and to reduce bypassed pockets of Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance around 

Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan. A second Ranger parachute assault (Objective Bastogne) 

seized a remote airfi eld to support ARSOF attack helicopter operations. Destroying al-Qaeda

leaders became a secondary mission for JSOTF-North under the new functional alignment 

directed by SOCCENT. That was to be the primary mission of the new JSOTF-South. The 
384

ADVON of that headquarters relocated to Kandahar Air Base when Marine Corps forces at 

Objective Rhino moved there. The 10th Mountain Division left K2 for Bagram Air Base, south 

of Kabul. Just days after Hamid Karzai became interim prime minister, the Joint Civil-Military 

Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) was established in Kabul to direct and coordinate civil and 

humanitarian affairs in rebuilding Afghanistan. In mid-January 2002, TF Rakkasan from the 

101st Airborne Division deployed to Kandahar Airport to replace the marines.

While ARSOF combat operations focused on the Tora Bora region, the amount of fl ux 

generated by mission shifts, the arrival of Army and departure of Marine Corps conventional 

forces, the formation of two new joint headquarters (JSOTF-South and the CJCMOTF) directing ARSOF forces, the arrival of TF Mountain and TF Bowie headquarters, and individual rotations were very signifi cant. Add the euphoria and welcome respite that accompanied the surprisingly swift collapse of the Taliban regime to the focused effort to create an interim Afghan 

government, and there was suffi cient disorder and distraction to allow al-Qaeda and Taliban

resistance forces to regroup, reorganize, and get resupplied and time for key leaders to leave the 

country or move into the mountainous areas along Pakistan’s uncontrolled frontier.

With a new interim Afghan government in power, Pakistan was anxious to get rid of suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda, to obtain the release of its nationals who had been detained as 

suspects in Afghanistan during the war, and to block escape routes for al-Qaeda and Taliban

fi ghters. Special Forces ODAs advised and assisted in transferring detainees to and from Pakistan and trained military forces as QRF blocking elements. In the meantime, other ARSOF 

changes were being planned to further exacerbate the turbulence in the combat zone.

3rd SFG at Fort Bragg had been alerted to replace 5th SFG in the combat zone, and 19th 

and 20th SFG (ARNG) battalion staffs and ODAs were arriving in theater. Mobilized USAR 

CA and PSYOP units had been “earmarked” to replace Active Army forces in the theater. Since 

the 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR MH-47Es had borne the brunt of the high-altitude missions in 

the mountains in north, east, and southwest Afghanistan for nearly three months, aircraft phase 

maintenance intervals dictated the rotation of these medium helicopters that had relocated from 

K2 to Bagram in January 2002. At Fort Campbell, B Company, 109th Aviation Maintenance 

Battalion (ARNG) from Iowa and Nebraska had been mobilized and integrated as intact platoons into the 160th SOAR maintenance companies to accelerate the phase inspections of the 

rotating helicopters. This ARNG aviation maintenance affi liation with the 160th SOAR during 

wartime proved to be a godsend and validated this practice for the future. The 3rd Battalion, 

160th SOAR was tasked to assume the 2nd Battalion’s mission. Ranger units were likewise rotating into Afghanistan from other regional bases. Forty-fi ve-day overseas tours for some DOD 

services were common. SOCJFCOM’s experienced joint staff personnel were released as soon 

as augmentees had been oriented.

In January 2002, A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, the primary JSOTF-South directaction (DA) and special reconnaissance (SR) force conducted some very successful missions. 

Since JSOTF-South focused its DA efforts on middle-echelon al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders 

and staff, this larger group provided a very “target-rich” environment for A-1-5. However, since 

the supporting MH-53M helicopters were based at Shabaz Air Base outside of Jacobabad, Pakistan, missions could only be fl own during hours of darkness. Because of the distances, this 
385

meant no mission rehearsals, less than 15 minutes to brief aircrews on target areas and LZs, 

and minimal loiter time awaiting the assault force’s pickup to get them back to Kandahar and 

give the helicopters suffi cient time to return to Pakistan during darkness. Since 5th SFG rarely 

trained with AFSOC MH-53M helicopters, both units suffered “growing pains” while performing high-stress, time-sensitive, violent DA missions. While the MH-53M fl ight crews did not 

have to contend with high mountains in the south, the winter snow and sleet conditions delayed 

the missions. Still, A-1-5 accomplished some of the most successful DA missions of the Afghan war.

Meanwhile, also in January 2002, the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG arrived at Kandahar Airport 

assigned to JSOTF-South. By mid-February 2002, headquarters site surveys of the Bagram Air 

Base had been completed by 3rd SFG ADVONs. Replacement MH-47Ds from 3rd Battalion, 

160th SOAR had been built up at Kandahar. In the midst of the SR and DA missions being 

conducted by JSOTF-South, JSOTF-North elements continued to hunt al-Qaeda in the eastern 

areas of Afghanistan, and the regional SOCCEs advised and assisted the Afghan Military Force 

(AMF) leaders to stabilize their operational areas. In the midst of UW operations in the east 

and south and the arrivals and departures of personnel and units, planning was under way to 

conduct the largest combined operation in the war to date. One new PSYOP combat capability 

validated during this period was the Special Operations Media Systems–Broadcast (SOMS-B) 

that assumed the Air Force Commando Solo aerial broadcast mission. It then rapidly increased 

broadcast hours to 24/7 from both Bagram and Kandahar.

In late January 2002, ODA 594, on a ground reconnaissance mission, reported that its Alliance security forces were reluctant to enter the Shah-i-Khot Valley. The Afghans warned that 

there was a major enemy concentration in the valley. This got the interest of various commands. 

As intelligence reports began to escalate enemy force estimates as high as 800 to 1,000 Taliban

and al-Qaeda fi ghters, the JSOTF-North commander recognized that Special Forces ODAs 

supporting the attack of AMF elements into the valley alone was not viable. Conventional and 

coalition forces would be needed in the well-defended area.

By mid-February 2002, TF Mountain was in charge of Operation ANACONDA. The modifi ed OPLAN had offensive and defensive roles for the AMF and Special Forces elements. The 

main attack of Afghans supported by Special Forces would be into the southern end of the 

Shah-i-Khot Valley while another AMF moved into the northern end of the valley. Additional 

Afghan forces would form an outer ring of blocking positions (to prevent what happened during Tora Bora). U.S. and coalition SOF would perform SR. TF Rakkasan (headquarters, 2nd 

Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division; and 

1st and 2nd Battalions, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division) would air assault into the valley as a show of force and occupy blocking positions near the three villages along the eastern 

side. Intelligence believed that concentrations of enemy fi ghters were in and around the valley 

villages. PSYOP loudspeaker teams were attached to TF Rakkasan to encourage the enemy 

to surrender and to keep “curious locals from getting too close to the show” at the helicopter 

FARP. The plan was to hit the al-Qaeda hard enough to kill or capture some in the valley and 

to squeeze the others against the blocking positions to be eliminated.

An aerial bombardment of the valley villages, the proposed helicopter LZs, and suspected 
386

enemy positions surrounding the area was to precede the main Afghan attack. This bombardment 

was expected by many to be equal to an intense 15- to 30-minute artillery and mortar barrage 

that would normally precede a deliberate attack. SR teams on high mountain ridges had snipers 

and could direct CAS. Other reconnaissance assets would be used to track “escapees” as they 

moved along natural avenues called “ratlines” to the Pakistan border. Since the allied forces 

planned to employ no artillery, Operation ANACONDA relied totally on aerial fi re support 

from Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps aircraft. The U.S. conventional and Afghan forces had 

organic 60mm, 81mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars with them.

During the planning for Operation ANACONDA, Army CA teams, previously introduced 

into Afghanistan from Uzbekistan and Pakistan in November 2001, operated out of Mazar-eSharif and Bagram to coordinate humanitarian relief and assistance countrywide. These CA 

teams were integral elements at the Special Forces base areas, sharing internal defense responsibilities, providing information gathered during their forays into the countryside, and working 

with the NGOs and USAID to store and distribute humanitarian assistance and identify critical 

infrastructure projects. These coalition humanitarian liaison cells (CHLCs, called “chicklets”) 

assessed basic survival needs (water, food, and shelter) in remote villages that NGOs were 

reluctant to visit. After distributing humanitarian assistance supplies, the CA teams proceeded 

to community work projects such as wells, schools, and medical clinics. Opening the Salang 

Tunnel to improve land delivery of humanitarian aid from Uzbekistan was a priority project.

Weather delayed the start of Operation ANACONDA for two days. Having heard only 

seven of the explosions made by 48 JDAMs and two thermobaric bombs that were the battlefi eld preparation, AMF leader Commander Zia Lodin, charged with the main attack, had grave 

concerns, especially since elements of his column had already been attacked moving into position. More important, of the seven explosions that Commander Zia heard, none were seen 

between him and the suspected enemy positions. Nevertheless, Zia’s Pashtun force moved into 

the attack. After advancing forward about 400 meters, the attacking Afghans were hit by heavy 

mortar fi re just as lead elements of the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, 

and 2nd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, air assaulted into their LZs. As 

101st AH-64s responded to the calls for CAS, both American infantry units received mortar 

and ground fi re that stopped their movement. The enemy proved to be better armed than anticipated and was quite willing to fi ght. Priority for CAS was shifted from the main attack to the 

American infantry under fi re. Zia Lodin’s 300 Alliance fi ghters were likewise halted by heavy 

mortar fi re. When Special Forces requests for CAS were rebuffed, Zia Lodin withdrew his AMF 

forces from the valley. When the threat posed by the main attack from the south was removed, 

the Taliban and al-Qaeda concentrated on the American units who, by then, were calling for 

aeromedical evacuations.

ODA 563, operating as a SOCCE for TF Rakkasan, called in helicopter CAS while Air 

Force enlisted tactical air controllers (ETACs) directed F-15E and F-16 jet fi ghters and B-52s 

against suspected enemy positions. By the end of the fi rst day, fi ve of six AH-64 Apache attack 

helicopters from the 101st Airborne Division were nonoperational due to combat damage from 

RPGs, heavy machine guns, and ground fi re. TF Mountain got Marine Corps AH-1W Super 

Cobra attack helicopters through JSOTF-South and more AH-64 Apaches from Kandahar. The 

military axiom that “no plan survives the fi rst round” proved appropriate. TF Mountain sent 1st 
387

Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, to reinforce and reorganize the effort on the 

second day as enemy positions were bombarded with CAS. A decision to position more Special 

Forces reconnaissance teams on high ridges overlooking the battle sites resulted in the fi ght on 

Takur Ghar on the third day of ANACONDA.

Inserting the SOF team on Takur Ghar was the third mission of the day for two 160th SOAR 

MH-47E aircrews. As the lead MH-47E landed on the LZ/OP, it found itself in the midst of 

bunkers and trenches and fl anked by a heavy machine gun position. Then, the big helicopter 

was hit by a heavy fusillade of ground fi re and RPGs. To break out of the killing zone, the pilot 

applied full power “to wrench the helicopter aloft.” During that violent forceful maneuver, 

PO1 Roberts, a Navy SEAL poised to exit, tumbled out of the helicopter. Unable to return 

for the lost seaman because of severe hydraulic problems, the Night Stalker pilot managed to 

“hard-land” the badly damaged helicopter several kilometers away. The second MH-47E picked 

up the aircrew and SOF team and returned them to Gardez where a rescue party was hastily 

organized to recover the missing seaman. Going in just below the LZ/OP used by Razor 03, the 

second MH-47E, Razor 04, escaped a hot reception when it delivered the rest of the team. As 

the big helicopter lifted off, it was fi red on, as was the rescue force. They fi red and maneuvered 

uphill to the original LZ/OP. With one KIA and two WIA, the ground force broke contact and 

withdrew about a kilometer south to a protected position. Actions to this point in the scenario 

had been orchestrated by the SOF commander at Gardez. Poor radio communications between 

Bagram and Gardez, uncoordinated rescue efforts, and poor dissemination of crisis information 

between the TOCs hampered the acquisition of situational awareness as conditions deteriorated 

on Takur Ghar. Fortunately, the Ranger QRF was alerted, assembled, and prepared for commitment.

In the confused scramble to deploy a QRF, neither the Rangers nor the supporting 160th 

MH-47E aircrews were given updated information about the enemy threat on Takur Ghar or 

what had happened to the fi rst rescue attempt. The AC-130 Spectre gunship overfl ying the 

action had the best situational awareness on what happened on the mountaintop, but it was ordered “off station” just before daybreak. Thus, Razor 01, with the fi rst group of Rangers, landed 

“almost magnetically” in the “hot LZ” at daybreak. During the second landing on the hot LZ/

OP, the MH-47E, Razor 01, was fatally disabled by a heavy fusillade of RPG and machine gun 

fi re. Razor 02, carrying the rest of the QRF, was held up until the Gardez and Bagram TOCs 

could clarify the situation. With two crashed MH-47Es and another severely combat damaged 

(nonoperational) at Gardez, a risk assessment became critical based on the available ARSOF 

Chinooks and the necessity to reinforce stranded Rangers and Night Stalkers fi ghting on a 

snow-covered high Afghan mountain ridge.

The rest of the Ranger QRF would be inserted, and priority for CAS would be given to the 

Takur Ghar force to break up the enemy attacks. Razor 02 delivered the rest of the QRF well 

south of the hot LZ/OP. From 8,900 feet, the Rangers climbed more than 2 km in 2 to 3 feet 

of deep snow in 31⁄2 hours to reach their comrades and the aircrew at 10,000 feet. The Ranger 

QRF cleared the ridge top and fought off an enemy counterattack. In all, the Ranger QRF and 

the Razor 01 aircrew suffered fi ve KIAs and more than 10 WIAs. After assaulting an enemy 

bunker, the Rangers found the bodies of PO1 Roberts, who had fallen from the helicopter, 

and TSGT Chapman, an Air Force combat controller, killed during the fi rst rescue attempt. 
388

All told, the Rangers and Night Stalkers fought well, endured the worst to fulfi ll expectations, 

and succeeded in the toughest special operations mission of the war.

Situational awareness had been lost by the Bagram TOCs, and Gardez reports and UAV 

videos did little to recapture it. In the confusion, several command and control elements made 

plans to use the limited MH-47Es. This exacerbated the problem, and control of an escalating 

bad combat situation was lost. In the ensuing efforts by all to do the right thing, the communications problem was not fi xed. Temporary establishment of a ground radio relay station 

was not factored into the equation. ANACONDA was taking place during the transitions of 

several headquarters and units. Aerial refueling was not part of the conventional plan because 

only SOF helicopters had this capability. The element that kept the situation at Qala-i-Jangi 

from turning into a debacle was a crisis-action cell directed by probably one of the most experienced offi cers in the battalion, the executive offi cer. A separate cell, for SOF emergencies 

only, composed of a handful of experienced ground and air operations offi cers led by a senior 

staff offi cer, could orchestrate and deconfl ict necessary crisis actions without the distraction 

of other ongoing combat actions. Finally, the reason for landing twice in the same hot LZ/OP 

can be attributed to a confused tactical situation on Takur Ghar; little time to coordinate alternate LZs with beleaguered, tired aircrews; the available LZs in the mountainous terrain near 

the battle site; and the absence of situational awareness after the AC-130 gunship departed. 

The fi ght on Takur Ghar showed “in fl ashing red lights” how few were the helicopters capable 

of all-weather, night operations in high mountainous terrain in the winter.

Operation ANACONDA revealed that conventional Army commanders had seriously underestimated the capabilities of the AMF and the contribution of CAS to the collapse of the 

Taliban regime. Special Forces-directed CAS had been critical to the successes Alliance forces 

achieved, and it was dedicated CAS that kept up the offensive initiative. The Taliban and alQaeda forces in and around the key Afghan cities could not defend effectively against unrelenting pressure made possible by the constant CAS preparation of the battlefi eld. When that 

did not happen on the opening day of ANACONDA, the Afghans attacked because their Special Forces advisers had never failed to produce air support. The realization that their priority 

for CAS had been lost once the American forces came under fi re prompted AMF withdrawal.

Just moving AMF into assault positions was a complicated operation and a constant challenge. Alliance vehicle columns had little semblance of order. The fi ghters were packed, standing 40 to 50 deep in the open back of a Ginga truck. Dismounted for an attack, the fi ghters 

(wearing no body armor or helmets and carrying a variety of weapons and an assortment of 

ammunition) moved in groups of 30 to 50 in the general direction of an objective. There was 

no fi re and maneuver and little coordination. Few Afghan fi ghters had ever seen a conventional 

armed U.S. soldier in full battle dress, and the reverse was likewise true. Yet, the Afghan and 

American forces, plus the coalition SR elements, were to fi ght a coordinated, conventional 

battle to destroy a determined Taliban and al-Qaeda force defending well-prepared positions 

in the mountains in winter. The fact that AMF fi ghting elements did not fi ght like a NATO 

military ally was clearly driven home the fi rst day. Nevertheless, the enemy had been fi xed, and 

his intention to fi ght had been established.
389

Throughout ANACONDA, transition continued among ARSOF units and headquarters. 

JSOTF-North and JSOTF-South established small tactical CPs in Bagram adjacent to the 

TF Mountain operations center. On day 2 of ANACONDA, with the Special Forces ODAs 

and Afghan forces involved in that operation, the base at Khowst was attacked. It would be 

CAT-A41 and the Alliance security force that drove off the enemy. The 528th SOSB rotated 

most of its elements in December 2001 when the transitions started. The absence of ARSOFspecifi c logistics support connectivity between the 5307th Theater Army Support Command 

(TASCOM) and the tactical ARSOF units still fi ghting the war in Afghanistan was felt immediately, especially since the turbulence occurred during the Christmas holidays at home. The 

need for 528th forward area support teams to provide that connectivity was reinforced. Interim 

ARSOF logistics assistance was deployed by USASOC to fi ll the gap afterward.

3rd SFG was building its base and the CJSOTF-Afghanistan command center to be able 

to assume control of U.S. and coalition SOF in Bagram by 1 April 2002. Like the other two 

JSOTFs, the shortage of staff augmentees caused COL Mark Phelan to assimilate 3rd Battalion, 20th SFG (ARNG), into the combined joint staff. 19th SFG (ARNG) ODAs moved from 

K2 into northern Afghanistan to work with 5th SFG teams before battle “handoffs.” The 489th 

CAB and the 345th PSYOP Company (Airborne) were in the TPFDD pipeline to replace or 

augment elements of the 4th POG and 96th CAB. The MH-47Ds of 3rd Battalion, 160th SOAR, 

at Kandahar were pulled into the Takur Ghar rescue mission and supported ARSOF units until ANACONDA was terminated. As CJSOTF-Afghanistan became operational, JSOTF-North 

and 5th SFG turned over their responsibilities, fi rst to the JSOTF-South, which, in turn, passed 

everything to CJSOTF-Afghanistan on 31 March 2002. In the meantime, the JMOTF in Kabul 

evolved into a CJMOTF headquarters with 150 personnel assigned.

The CJSOTF-Afghanistan Era Begins

With the establishment of CJSOTF-Afghanistan by COL Mark Phelan, commander, 3rd 

SFG, the coalition SOF were truly integrated with U.S. SOF. The ranking coalition SOF commander from New Zealand became the deputy commander of the CJSOTF. Because many of 

the coalition elements were based at Kandahar, liaison staffs were granted limited access to 

the integrated intelligence with certain constraints established by COL Phelan. Two commanders’ conferences “ironed out” most problems, some dating to October 2001. By these actions, 

Phelan established professional rapport with the coalition SOF. But there was a price for the 

3rd SFG.

Coalition forces had to use single-channel satellite communications, thus one-third of the 

SATCOM channels had to be dedicated to them. This left only two-thirds of the few allotted 

SATCOM channels to divide among the 3rd SFG fi eld elements. The Special Forces ODAs 

used demand-assigned multiple-access channels based on assigned 15-minute block times. 

To make secure communications, several sequences of numbers had to be properly entered. 

This increased the opportunity for error. Despite Phelan’s emphasis on high-frequency (HF) 

communications to avoid crowded satellite communications channels and priority traffi c 

“bumping” that disrupted connections, the reduced clarity, additional weight, and time to set up 

antennas for HF made the system very unpopular among the moving ODAs. Thus, well before 

the morning and evening commanders’ VTCs, fi eld reports were required. As the numbers 
390

of ODAs in the fi eld grew, it became a challenge to avoid the “logjams” and “hit the report 

windows” twice daily to complete transmissions.

A major change from the JSOTF-North modus operandi was the absence of a collocated 

JSOAC to facilitate coordination of ground and air for UW operations. With the disestablishment of JSOTF-North at K2, the JSOAC-North and its aircraft relocated to Masirah Island. 

The JSOAC-South at Jacobabad, Pakistan, relocated its headquarters to Masirah Island, leaving 

its Air Force SOF aircraft behind. The CJSOTF-Afghanistan staff was provided an Air Force 

JSOAC liaison offi cer to assist the predominantly SOF ground command. The 3rd Battalion, 

160th SOAR’s MH-47Ds remained based at Kandahar, the new location of 2nd Battalion, 3rd 

SFG, numerous coalition SOF elements, and most of the conventional forces, TF Rakkasan.

Limited SOF helicopters, uncertain weather conditions, and the need for the CJSOTF commander to be present for both daily commanders’ VTCs virtually eliminated any senior Special Forces offi cer presence in the fi eld with deployed ODAs and ODBs. Even the battalion 

commanders had a diffi cult time establishing or maintaining presence in the fi eld due to wide 

dispersion of units countrywide. This meant centralized planning and decentralized execution 

with limited guidance, counseling, and mentoring of junior leaders. Careful assessment and selection and training of Special Forces personnel by the SWCS should emphasize this reality.

Although the international community was committed to training a “national” Afghan 

army and the central government promulgated the need for ethnic balance, the achievement of 

that goal was problematic. The provincial warlords were levied by the AIA to provide specifi c 

numbers of recruits from their tribal groups to receive national army training. Those drafted 

were also to bring their weapons. This proved to be a “hit or miss” requirement that was impossible to enforce. Primary loyalty, as it had been for hundreds of years, was to the tribe, not 

the nation, as the fi rst-, second-, and third-world allied countries imagined. The recruit “washout” rate (medical problems and age) ranged between 25 and 30 percent. Each warlord was 

obligated to replace the losses with new draftees from his tribal group. Just as infl uence and 

money were used to avoid national service on both sides during the American Civil War, so it 

continues to be practiced in Afghanistan.

One of the most distinct observations was the MH-47E Chinook as the preeminent SOF 

long-range penetration helicopter for high-altitude, adverse-weather, and night operations. The 

MH-53M Pave Low III was conspicuously absent above 8,000 feet MSL. The assignment of 

primary CSAR for the air campaign in northern Afghanistan to the 160th SOAR was tacit 

acknowledgment that capabilities and airlift capacity of the MH-47E Chinook at altitude were 

superior to all other rotary-wing platforms. Air Force Pave Low IIIs were most active at lower 

altitudes in the southeastern part of Afghanistan. More signifi cantly, the MH-47E Chinooks 

became the primary rotary-wing assault platform for all SOF. The MH-60L DAPs performed 

armed escort for MH-47E long-range, high-altitude penetrations. Multiple aerial refuels were 

a “given” for the combat operations launched into Afghanistan from bordering countries. Doing all of these tasks wearing NVG has been accepted as another “given” by ARSOF forces 

that must be highlighted when discussing SOF missions with the rest of the Army, DOD, and 

Congress. Collocating JSOTF-North, JSOAC-North, and Army and Air Force SOF air assets 

at K2 was key to collapsing Taliban power in Afghanistan in two months—the tactical battle 
391

commander had the necessary elements within arm’s reach to direct combat operations. What 

he did not have, and what no other JSOTF commander had in the combat zone, was necessary 

staff augmentation. With 90 percent of the nationally mobilized personnel staff augmentees siphoned off by a multitude of stateside higher-level commands, the JSOTF-North and CJSOTFAfghanistan commanders were compelled to meet their staffi ng requirements using Army National Guardsmen from the 19th and 20th SFGs. These were calculated risks.

These observations and refl ections cover the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan from 

October 2001 to mid-May 2002. They are not intended to be lessons learned or criticisms of a 

successfully prosecuted UW campaign, nor are they provided to accord any single ARSOF the 

lion’s share of credit. This was an unconventional war (collapsing the Taliban regime) in which 

ARSOF contributed to the success, and the situation in Afghanistan is far from being settled. 

Since this fi nal chapter is based on nonattributable sources, I accept responsibility for these 

observations and refl ections.—C.H. Briscoe 

393

Glossary

AAA antiaircraft artillery

ADVON advance echelon

AFCS Advance Flight Control System

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AGL above ground level

AIA Afghan Interim Authority

AMC air mission commander

AMF Afghan Military Forces

ANA Afghan National Army

AOB advanced operating base

AOR area of responsibility

ARCENT U.S. Army Forces, U.S. Central Command

ARNG Army National Guard

ARSOA Army Special Operations Aviation

ARSOF Army Special Operations Forces

ARSOTF Army Special Operations Task Force

AT antitank

ATV all-terrain vehicle

AVIM aviation intermediate maintenance

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System (E-3A aircraft)

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

C2 command and control

CA civil affairs

CAB civil affairs battalion

CAC crisis-action cell

CAS close air support

CAT civil affairs team

CCT combat control team

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CFACC Combined Forces Air Component Command

CFLCC Combined Forces Land Component Command

Combined Forces Land Component Commander

CHLC coalition humanitarian liaison cell

Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Center

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CJCMOTF Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

CJCS Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force

CMOC civil-military operations center

COMSEC communications security
394

COMSOCCENT Commander, Special Operations Command, Central 

 Command

COMSOCEUR Commander, Special Operations Command, Europe

CONOPS concept of operations

CP command post

CQB close-quarters battle

CRE crisis-response element

CSAR combat search and rescue

DA direct action

DAMA Demand-Assigned Multiple Access

DAP Direct-Action Penetrator (MH-60L)

DCU desert camoufl age uniform

DERF Defense Emergency Response Fund

DLS desert landing strip

DOD Department of Defense

DPPC Deployable Print Production Center

DVDS Digital Video Distribution System

DZ drop zone

EHF extremely high frequency

EOD explosive ordnance demolition

EPW enemy prisoner of war

ETAC enlisted tactical air controller

EUCOM U.S. European Command

FARP forward arming and refueling point

FAST forward area support team

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Area

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FID foreign internal defense

FLIR forward-looking infrared radar

FM fi eld manual

FOB forward operating base

FRAGO fragmentary order

FSO fi re support offi cer

FST forward surgical team

FY fi scal year

GMT Greenwich Mean Time

GMV ground mobility vehicle

GPS global positioning system

GTMO Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
395

HAST Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team

HEMTT heavy expanded mobility tactical truck

HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

HUMINT human intelligence

HVT high-value target

IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 

IP Internet protocol

IR infrared

IRF Immediate Reaction Force

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISB initial staging base

ISOFAC isolation facility

ISR infrared search radar

IV intravenous

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCSE Joint Communications Signal Element

JDAM joint direct-attack munition

JFCOM U.S. Joint Forces Command

JFSOCC Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command

jihad Islamic holy war

JOC joint operations center

JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

JSOAC Joint Special Operations Air Component

JSOACC Joint Special Operations Air Component Command

JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force

JSRC Joint Search and Rescue Center

JTF joint task force

K2 Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan

KIA killed in action

Koran (Quran) Islamic holy book

LAN local area network

LBE load-bearing equipment

loya jirga grand council

LRDG Long-Range Desert Group

LZ landing zone

MACOM major Army command

madrasa Islamic school

main CP main command post
396

MBITR multiband inter/intra team radio

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MIA missing in action

MMR multimode radar

MOS military occupational specialty

MPS Modular Print System

MRE meal, ready to eat

MSC major subordinate command

MSL mean sea level

MST maintenance support team

mujahideen Afghani freedom fi ghters

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVSPECWARCOM Naval Special Warfare Command

NCO noncommissioned offi cer

NCOIC noncommissioned offi cer in charge

NGO nongovernmental organization

NOE nap-of-the-earth

NSWG Naval Special Warfare Group

NTC National Training Center

NVG night-vision goggle(s)

ODA Operational Detachment Alpha

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

OJCS Offi ce of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

OP observation point

 observation post

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

OPSEC operations security

OSD Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense

OSS Offi ce of Strategic Services

PDD Production Development Detachment

PJ para-jumper/pararescue man

POB psychological operations battalion

POG psychological operations group

POW prisoner of war

PR personnel recovery

PSYOP psychological operations

PZ pickup zone

QRF quick-reaction force

rear CP rear command post
397

ROE rules of engagement

RPG rocket-propelled grenade

RSC Reserve Support Command

SALT II Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II

SAM surface-to-air missile

SATCOM satellite communications

SAW squad automatic weapon

SCAMPI Single-Channel Antijam Man-Portable radio

SCIF Secure Compartmented Information Facility

SEAL sea-air-land (team), Navy

SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SFG Special Forces group

SKEDCO Sked Company

SOAR special operations aviation regiment

SOCA team special operations communication assemblage (team)

SOCCE Special Operations Command and Control Element

SOCCENT Special Operations Command Central

SOCEUR Special Operations Command, Europe

SOCJFCOM Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOMS-B Special Operations Media Systems–Broadcast

SOP standing operating procedures

SOR statement of requirements

SOS special operations squadron

SOSB special operations support battalion

SOW special operations wing

SR special reconnaissance

SSE sensitive site exploitation

STS special tactics squadron

SUV sport utility vehicle

SWCS U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 

School

TACP tactical air control party

terminal attack control party

TACSAT tactical satellite (radio)

TALCE tanker airlift control element

Talib religious student

Taliban religious students

TASCOM U.S. Army Theater Area Support Command

TDA table of distribution and allowances

TOE table of organization and equipment

TOC tactical operations center

TPD tactical PSYOP detachment
398

TPFDD time-phased force deployment data

TPT tactical PSYOP team

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UHF ultrahigh frequency

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USAR U.S. Army Reserve

USASFC U.S. Army Special Forces Command

USASOC U.S. Army Special Operations Command

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command

UW unconventional warfare

UXO unexploded ordnance

VOA Voice of America

VTC video teleconference

WIA wounded in action
399

About the Contributors

Dr. Charles H. Briscoe has been compiling current Army special operations history in 

Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq as the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historian for 

three years. He is a retired airborne infantry and Special Forces offi cer who served overseas in the 

Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Germany, Italy, and Panama. Briscoe earned a Ph.D. in history 

from the University of South Carolina in 1996. He is the author of La Fuerza Interamericana 

de Paz (1999, 2000) and Treinta Años Después (2001). Briscoe teaches U.S. military and Latin 

American history at Campbell University.

Dr. Richard L. Kiper earned a Ph.D. in history at the University of Kansas. He previously 

served as an offi cer in Special Forces, airborne, and infantry units stateside and overseas. He 

also served on the Army Staff and as an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), West 

Point, New York, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas. Kiper is the author of Major General John Alexander McClernand: Politician in 

Uniform, which received the Fletcher Pratt Award for best nonfi ction Civil War book in 1999. 

He edited Dear Catherine, Dear Taylor: The Civil War Letters of a Union Soldier and His Wife, 

published in 2002. Dr. Kiper teaches history at Kansas City, Kansas, Community College.

James A. Schroder earned an M.B.A. at Murray State University. A retired aviation chief 

warrant offi cer, he previously served seven years with the 160th Special Operations Aviation 

Regiment as an MH-47E Chinook pilot. He also served in military intelligence, Special Forces, 

and aviation units stateside and overseas, and earned two Air Medals piloting CH-47D Chinook 

helicopters in the Gulf war. 

Dr. Kalev I. Sepp is on the defense analysis faculty, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 

California. He was previously a consultant for the RAND Corporation. He holds a Ph.D. in 

American diplomatic history from Harvard University, a Master of Military Art and Science 

degree from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and a B.A. in English from 

The Citadel. He was a U.S. Army Special Forces offi cer who served in Latin America and 

earned a Combat Infantryman Badge as a brigade adviser in the Salvadoran Civil War. Dr. Sepp 

also served in airborne, Ranger, artillery, and armored cavalry units and on General Staffs in the 

United States, Germany, and Korea. He also taught history at the USMA.

401

INDEX

“60 Minutes II”: 227–28

*Aaron, Watson CW2: 235

ABC News: 23, 24–25

Abdur Rahman Khan: 5–6

AC-130 Spectre

capabilities: 367n181

friendly-fi re incidents: 285–87, 362n30

missions: 97, 111, 162–63, 168–69, 170, 176, 

297–98, 301–03

*Acosta, CPT Brian: 278, 287–89

Aerial refuels: 79, 261–63

Aerial resupply: 100–101, 146, 174, 195n128, 209, 

253–55, 379

Afghan Interim Authority: 240–41, 384

and cooperation between ethnic militias: 322

and planning for Operation ANACONDA: 319

prime minister: 107, 176, 178

PSYOP role in building support for: 62, 258–59

Afghan Interim Government: 17 (same as Afghan 

Interim Authority cited above)

Afghan Military Forces: 203

command and control issues: 283, 286–87

diffi culties in movements of: 285

equipment for: 283, 379

killed by friendly fi re: 180–81, 277, 386–88

in Operation ANACONDA: 277, 282–87

operations in the Tora Bora region: 213–14

training for: 277, 280–81, 283, 390

Afghan National Army

equipment for: 279, 359

training: 211, 277, 279, 347–50, 358–60, 390

Afghan Revolutionary Council: 14–15

Afghanistan

civil war of 1979: 9–10

Communist Party of: 9

demography: 33

guerrilla resistance to Soviet occupation: 11–16

lack of maps of: 53

role of tribal ethnic groups in: 2–3, 276, 279, 322, 

329–30

Ahmad Shah Durrani: 3

Air Expeditionary Wing, 332nd: 199n266

Air Mobility Command: 374–75

Air traffi c control procedures: 66, 67

Airborne Division (Air Assault), 101st: 208, 210

and CSAR at Takur Ghar: 312

military information support teams: 245

mission: 218

PSYOP units attached to: 244–45

Rakkasan Brigade: 216, 218, 245, 270n55, 277, 

325, 350, 356

Aircraft. See also AC-130 Spectre; MH-47E Chinook; 

MH-60L Black Hawk.

AH-6: 104, 141–43, 370

B-52 Stratofortress: 63, 96, 101, 126–27, 149, 

180–81, 214–15

C-17 Globemaster: 46, 65–66, 67, 100–101, 105, 

131, 146

CH-53 Super Stallion helicopter: 206, 229–32, 

272n121

EC-130 Commando Solo: 46, 50, 63, 89n79, 103, 

183, 186, 192n43, 340, 385

F-18: 161, 162

MC-130 Combat Talon: 47, 100, 109, 111, 128, 

131, 140–41, 142–45, 209, 253–54, 263, 317, 

318

MC-130P Combat Shadow tanker: 63, 83, 85, 96, 

97–98, 135, 209, 261–63, 375–76

MH-47D Chinook: 208, 330–32, 372–73

MH-53 Pave Low helicopter: 345, 375–76, 384–85,

390

Mi-17 (Russian): 99

Albright, Madeleine: 21–22, 23–24

Alefkhel, Afghanistan: 356–57

Ali, Hazrat: 109, 213–16

Al-Jafr Air Base, Jordan: 58

*Allison, CPT Chuck: 222

al-Qaeda: 1–2

in the Arghastan wadi: 174–75

at the Arghendab Bridge: 176–77

battle with at Mir Wais Hospital: 209, 232–35

Chechens: 139

encouraged to surrender: 292

at Hazar Qadam: 235–41

leaders of sought in Afghanistan: 205, 208–09, 

210–11, 213–16, 330–32

and Operation ANACONDA: 210

in Pakistan: 204

prisoner uprising at Qala-i-Jangi: 104, 158–65

prisoners: 158–65, 198n207, n211, 204, 215, 233, 

237, 240, 244, 250–51, 272n128, 321–22

psychological warfare: 259

PSYOP role in loss of public support for: 186–87

and terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities abroad: 

22–24

in the Tora Bora: 203–04

U.S. formation of a coalition to fi ght: 34–36

Amanullah: 6–7

Amerine, CPT Jason: 155–57, 172, 173, 175–76, 180, 

182, 183

Amin, Hafi zullah: 9, 10

Amu Darya River: 5, 6, 10

*Anderson, SFC Fred: 354–55

*Anderson, SFC Kevin: 74

Anderson, SPC Marc A.: 305, 306, 307

Anglo-Russian Convention: 5–6

Anti-Taliban Forces. See Afghan Military Forces.

*Anton, CWO Doug: 232–33, 234, 271n107

*Arde, SFC Jules, 320, 325
402

Arghastan Wadi/Bridge: 167, 169–71, 174, 175

Arghendab Bridge: 175–78

Armitage, Richard: 192n45

Army National Guard

aviation battalions: 105–06

aviation maintenance units: 43

capabilities: 356–57

equipment for: 255–56

individual augmentees: 256, 371, 374

logistical support for: 373

mobilizations: 43, 44, 216–17, 255–56, 273n162, 

371–72, 374

stop-loss program: 374

training: 217–18, 255–56

units assigned to CJSOTF-A: 210

Army Special Operations Task Force

background of: 38–39

coordination with conventional units: 218

need for ARNG and USAR personnel to perform 

missions: 216

precombat activities: 46

rotation plan: 275

staffi ng for: 52

stop-loss actions: 43

training: 43–44, 371

*Arquette, CPT Mason: 78, 212

*Ashford, CWO Dwight: 236–37, 238–40, 257

*Aspen, SGT Harold: 151

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 

and Low-Intensity Confl ict: 49–50, 62

*Astor, SGT Akmed: 257–59

*Athens, SFC Bill: 285

*Atkinson, SFC Fred: 354

Atta, Mohammad: 77, 190n17

Atta, Commander Usted: 139

Auckland, Lord: 4

Auslev, Ruslan: 38

Australian forces: 34

at Kandahar Airport: 204–05

and Operation ANACONDA: 277, 281, 284, 

294–96, 319–20

Aviation Battalion, 109th: 105–06, 151–53

Aviation maintenance units: 43, 44, 151–53, 384

Aviation Regiment, 159th: 358

Aviators, special operations, training for: 43

Babulkheyl, Afghanistan: 324, 326

Bacon, Ken: 44

*Bagby, Sam: 123, 146–47

Bagram, Afghanistan: 21, 25, 96, 101, 103, 191n33, 

226, 227, 228

Bagram Airfi eld: 171

19th SFG at: 277–78

communications: 337–40

humanitarian relief efforts at: 184–85

operations at: 101, 208, 210, 229–30, 266, 335–37

radio broadcasting from: 340–41

and rescue of forces on Takur Ghar: 312, 317, 

318–19

*Bain, CPT Douglas: 172

Balkh, Afghanistan: 4

Balkh Valley: 101–02

*Ball, SGT Barry: 123

*Ball, SGT Gene: 114–15

Bamian: 4, 23, 24, 99–100, 103, 221

Bank, COL Aaron: 38

*Barnes, CPT Kerry: 356, 357

*Barrington, SSG Thomas: 220

*Barstow, MAJ Walter: 115–17, 153–54, 186

*Bartley, SSG Michael: 137

Bastogne airstrip: 104

Battle Command Training Program: 44

*Battles, LTC Kim: 117

Baumann, Robert: 10

*Beckwith, SGM Geoff: 256–57

*Bell, LTC Marc: 88n69, 158, 198n211

*Bender, SFC Pete: 161, 162

*Bennington, MAJ Del: 90n118, 171–72, 176–78, 

199n257, 200n271

*Bennington, MSG Jason: 77, 90n118

*Berdeau, SPC Timothy: 260

Berger, Sandy: 23–24

*Bermann, CPL Colin, USMC: 239

Bhutto, Benazir: 18–19, 25

bin Laden, Osama: 1, 23–24, 26–27, 33, 147, 241–42

sought in the Tora Bora: 203–04, 205, 213, 215–16, 

269n40

and the Taliban: 22, 23–24, 25, 35

and terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities abroad: 

22–23

*Black, CWO Gary: 330, 331

*Blackaby, MAJ Henry: 187

Blair, Tony: 34

*Bojune, LTC Mark: 138, 164

*Bondurant, SFC: 143

*Bosley, MAJ Jeff: 347–49

Bosnian forces: 337

Boucher, Richard: 46

*Bowdler, MSG: 74

*Bowman, MAJ John: 150–51, 221, 222

*Boyd, SFC Stan: 166, 168, 175

Boykin, MG William G.: 88n40

Brezhnev, Leonid: 10, 16, 36

*Bridgewater, ILT Michael: 73

*Brinks, LTC James: 71, 72, 78, 79, 82, 262–63

British forces: 211

at Bagram: 103

and Kabul Military Academy: 349

and Qala-i-Jangi uprising: 104, 160–62

with Sherzai: 178

British Royal Marines: 103, 206–07, 329

*Broderick, MAJ Steven: 74

Brown, LTG Bryan D.: 42, 53, 93

Brown, SSGT Gabe, USAF: 307, 308, 309, 310–11, 

312–13, 317–18

Brussels Accord of 14 December 2001: 206

Brzezinski, Zbigniew: 11, 29n30

Burford, COL David: 216
403

Burns, John F.: 267n3

Bush, George W.: 1, 33, 34, 36–37, 38, 41, 44, 60, 85, 

181, 182, 347, 349, 358–59

*Bustillo, SGM Jorgé: 255

Calland, RADM Albert M.: 41, 52, 53, 55–56, 57, 

102, 158, 159–60, 161, 198n211, 208, 345, 

346–47, 377

Camp Doha, Kuwait: 148

Camp Freedom, Uzbekistan: 68, 70–71, 72–73

Camp Mackall, North Carolina: 257

Camp Pickett, Virginia: 59

Camp Rhino: 107, 108, 113, 180–81

Camp X-Ray (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba): 250–51

Canadian forces: 265, 277, 357

*Canberra, SFC Lyle: 227, 228

Cannistraro, Vincent: 13

*Canon, SSG Arin K.: 304, 305, 309–10, 312–13, 

314–15

*Cantwell, SFC Karl: 328, 329–30

*Carlisle, MAJ Dalton: 256–57

*Carr, SFC Brandon: 79

Carter, LT: 143

Carter, Jimmy: 10–11

Carter Doctrine: 11

Castro, Fidel: 11, 16

Casualties

Afghan allies: 269n38, 285–86, 353–55

allied at Qala-i-Jangi: 162

British: 162

from the earthquake: 342, 367n175

enemy at Hazer Qadam: 239, 240

friendly Afghan due to U.S. bombing errors: 162, 

285–87

friendly fi re: 180–81, 285–87, 379–80

helicopter crashes: 98

Karzai, Hamad’s forces: 180–81

in Khowst: 206

at Objective Honda: 113

at Objective Rhino: 97

Operation ANACONDA: 285–87, 289–90, 293–94, 

302–03

at Qala-i-Jangi: 162, 164

Rangers: 98

at Takur Ghar: 293–94, 302–19, 387

Taliban: 157

*Cavanaugh, CPT Marty: 61, 183

Cave clearing operations: 203–04, 327, 333, 334, 

356–57

CBS: 227–28

Central Intelligence Agency: 191n25

logistical support for: 273n155

offi cers attacked at Qala-i-Jangi prison: 104, 

192n48

Special Activities Division: 190n12, 193n67

Chamberlin, Wendy J.: 248, 249, 250

Champion, COL Gregory: 255

*Chandler, SSG Wilfred: 219

Chaplains: 138–39

Chapman, TSGT John: 301, 302, 304, 387–88

Chapman, SFC Nate: 206, 267n14, 274n179, 313

Charikar, Afghanistan: 4

*Charles, CW4 Roger: 82–84, 121, 135, 137–38, 

139–40

*Chase, MSG Morton: 88n54

Chemtal, Afghanistan: 140

*Chesterfi eld, SGT Bobby, USAF: 163

*Childs, CPT: 70

China: 5, 10

Christopher, Warren: 11

Civil Affairs Battalion, 96th

and Afghan refugees: 206

CAT-As: 207, 328

coordination with nongovernmental organizations: 

183–84

and humanitarian aid: 207, 220–25, 278

at Karshi Kanabad: 45, 150

liaison element at JSOTF-North: 150

liaison offi cer to CENTCOM: 60, 61

missions: 220–21, 225, 251–52, 271n108

and reconstruction of Mazar-e-Sharif: 102, 

150–51

Civil Affairs Battalion, 489th: 278, 350–52, 372, 373

Civil affairs teams: 373

A32: 150, 184–85, 191n33, 223–24

A33: 150–51, 184, 186, 191n33

A34: 150, 222

A36: 150, 224–25

A41: 184, 226–28, 264, 342–44

A42: 251–52

A46: 61, 183–84, 252

A56: 328–30

B30: 150

Civil affairs units

command and control of: 79

mobilization of: 43, 44

planning for humanitarian aid missions: 46, 150

role of: 41

Civil-military operations center, Islamabad: 183–84

Civil-Military Operations Center-North: 184

Civil-military operations centers: 60–61

Civilian noninterference warnings: 113–14

Clarke, Torie: 334

*Clauden, SSG Lee: 133, 136, 138

Clausewitz, Carl von: 37–38, 155, 156

*Clewell, 1LT Carol: 148–49

Clinton, Bill: 23, 25

*Clinton, SSG Jack: 288–89

Close air support

for Afghan Military Forces: 285–87, 292, 387, 388

failures of in Operation ANACONDA: 285–87, 

311–12

guided by forces with General Dostum: 95

guided by forces with General F. Khan: 96

guided by ODA 555: 96

guided by ODA 595: 96

guided by Special Forces soldiers on horseback: 95

for ODA 583: 167–69, 170, 174–75
404

Operation ANACONDA: 285–87, 289, 292, 311–12, 

313–14, 315, 316, 322, 325–26, 386–88

problems with: 379–80

provided by the 101st Airborne Division: 286–87

and the Qala-i-Jangi uprising: 161–63

in support of Karzai: 176

in support of Sherzai: 167–69, 170, 174–75

at Takur Ghar: 311–12, 313–14, 315, 316

at Tarin Kowt: 157

Coalition forces: 103

communications support for: 338

integration with U.S. forces: 41, 346–47, 382, 383

and JSOTF-South: 41

morale: 346

PSYOP support for: 50

Coalition humanitarian liaison cell: 183–84, 197n178, 

252

at Bagram: 150

in Kandahar: 350–53

at Mazar-e-Sharif: 150–51, 184

in Pakistan: 252

Cohen, William: 23

Cold War: 7, 8, 9

*Colter, CPT Paul: 51

Combat search and air rescue operations

Air Force teams: 303

aircraft for: 375, 376

command and control of: 45–46, 70, 229–30, 303, 

309, 312, 316–17

communications support for: 75–76

for a MC-130P aircraft: 261–63

at Takur Ghar crash: 299–319

training for: 72, 230

Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force: 

206–07, 347, 348, 384

and funding for civil affairs projects: 184, 329

and humanitarian aid: 221, 222, 224, 252

tactical control of the 96th CAB: 150, 184

Combined Joint Special Operations Task ForceAfghanistan: 269n29, 277, 278, 279, 293, 

335–37, 389–91

command and control: 346–47

communications: 337–40, 344, 389–90

forces assigned to: 210

integration of coalition forces: 346–47, 382, 389

and the Joint Air Component: 345, 390

mission: 211

synchronized time for: 345–46

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-South: 

241, 256, 389

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-West: 

253

Command and control issues: 374

Afghan militias: 322–23

air support: 375

at Bagram Air Base: 229–30

for CSAR operations: 45–46, 70, 229–30, 303, 309, 

312, 316–17

at Karshi Kanabad: 67, 74–75, 373–74

of ODAs: 145

Operation ANACONDA: 283–84, 286

PSYOP units: 50, 79, 151

quick reaction forces: 265–66, 303

Commons, PFC Matthew A.: 306

Communications

at Bagram: 337–40, 344

equipment: 56, 81, 219

integration of Air Force and 112th Signal Battalion 

systems: 75–76

JSOTFBNorth problems with: 55, 56–57, 75–76, 

80–82

lost cryptographic materials: 355–56

problems on Takur Ghar: 304–05, 307, 308–09, 

310–11, 318

signal base station for JSOTF-North: 145–46, 375, 

377

standard deployment packages: 81

tactical satellite: 81, 145–46, 196n171

training: 217, 220

training exercises: 81, 338, 339

Computers

for coalition forces: 346, 389

hardware: 53, 56

helicopters: 118

local area networks: 53, 55, 56, 219–20, 338

need for environmentally controlled work space: 

116, 339

personal: 81

power for: 339

Web Interface Computer System: 339

*Cook, Chaplain Daniel, USAF: 138

*Corbin, CWO Gary: 304–07, 308, 311, 314, 315, 

317–18

*Cornell, SGT Gus: 168

*Corr, MSG Gregg: 265

*Crenshaw, CPT Ben: 340–42

Crose, SGT Bradley S.: 306

Cuba: 11

Cunningham, Senior Airman Jason: 306, 307, 308, 

311, 314, 315, 317

*Curtis, SGT Jerald: 298, 300

*Czyrnyck, SSG Wally: 168, 175

Danish forces: 205, 265, 277, 281, 293

Daoud Khan: 7–8, 9

Dari-a-Souf Valley: 95, 96, 101, 122–28

Davis, MSG Jefferson: 176, 180, 212

*Davis, SSG Mike: 354

*Davis, PFC Paul: 186

Dawkins, SSG Carl: 185–86

Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying 

the Land of the Two Holy Places, by Osama bin 

Laden: 23

*Deese, SSG Donald: 305, 306–07, 308, 311, 313–14, 

316

Defense Emergency Response Fund: 42

Defense Intelligence Agency: 77

Deh Dadi airfi eld: 139–40, 158
405

Dehi, Afghanistan: 123, 125–26

Demining operations: 227

*Dennison, SGT Mitchell: 246–48, 289–91

Department of the Army, stop loss actions: 43

Deployable Print Production Center: 151

DePouli, SSG Raymond: 306, 307, 308–09, 311, 

312–13, 314–15

Desert landing strips

Anzio: 143

Bastogne: 140–41

Bulge: 143–44

Objective Rhino: 109–13

security for: 142–45

*Dickerson, CPT Timothy: 297, 300, 301–02, 309

Diemer, COL Manuel: 51, 52

*DiJurnigan, MAJ Matt: 60, 61, 183–84, 252

Disraeli, Benjamin: 5

*Donalds, CW3 Derrick: 132–33, 135–36, 137–38, 

318

*Donovan, SSG Logan: 147, 148–49

Donovan, MG William J.: 38

*Doolittle, MSG Jason: 332

Dost Mohammad Khan: 4–5

Dostum, General Rashid: 17–18, 19, 21, 22, 26, 59, 

77, 95, 192n42, 198n211

5th SFG liaison offi cers with: 59–60

and battle for Mazar-e-Sharif: 101–02

and bombing of Taliban forces: 126–27, 134, 139

campaign planning with: 123–25

coordination with Atta: 98

early ARSOF contact with: 82, 83–85

ODA 595 coordination with: 96, 119–27, 134, 

146–47

offensive against Konduz: 158

and Qala-i-Jangi uprising: 159–60

rivalry with Fahim Khan: 98

security forces: 123, 134

Special Forces advisors to: 98

*Dubois, SSG Bernard: 321, 322

Dubs, Adolph: 9

*Dugan, SSG Tom: 136–37

Dupree, Louis: 3, 6

Durand, Mortimer: 5

Durand Line: 5, 7

*Earnhardt, MSG Pat: 122–23, 195n122

Earthquakes: 342

*Eaton, SGT Christopher: 331

Edmunds, Specialist Jonn: 113

Educational facilities: 184, 329–30

Efran, Shawn: 227–28

Eisenhower, GEN Dwight D.: 187

*Elkenback, CWO Charles: 317, 331

*Emerson, CW5 Brian: 132–33, 135, 136, 137

Engineer Battalion, 92nd: 349

Engineers, Special Forces, at Mazar-e-Sharif: 102

Escano, SPC Oscar J.: 313

*Ewell, MSG Mike: 328, 329–30

Exercise BRIGHT STAR: 57–58

Exercise EARLY VICTOR: 58

*Exley, SSG Mark: 123

Fahkir, Commander, 159, 161, 162–63

*Falkerie, SSG Landon: 188

*Fan, SFC Chuck: 168

Farah: 12

Farooq, MG Ahmad Khan: 248, 249

*Fazal, SSG Charlie: 172

Federal Bureau of Investigation: 237, 251

*Felico, SGT Jack: 260

*Ferrell, CWO Jackson: 261, 262–63, 300, 301–02, 

304

Fighter Squadron, 391st: 199n266

Findlay, COL Michael: 51, 53, 55–56, 57, 154

*Fitzgerald, CPT Daniel: 218

*Fontaine, CW3 Mike: 235

Force protection

for civil affairs units: 227, 228

at crash sites: 232

at Gardez: 353–54

at Kabul Military Academy: 348

at Kandahar: 352

at Karshi Kanabad: 66, 74

at Landing Zone Albatross: 83–84

provided by Afghan security guards: 122, 126, 134, 

276, 288, 324, 325

at the Salang Tunnel: 342, 343

Foreign internal defense mission: 275, 276

*Forsythe, LTC Don: 58, 88n69, 171–72, 173, 174, 

176–77, 178, 180, 182–83, 200n271, 218, 232–33

Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 39, 40, 55–56, 58–59, 62, 

98, 103, 208, 255, 341, 372, 373, 377

Fort Campbell, Kentucky: 52–54, 56, 63, 90n110, 

128, 138, 151, 217, 339, 356, 372

Fort Carson, Colorado: 216, 372

Fort Irwin, California: 44

Fort Knox, Kentucky: 216–17

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 44

Fort Polk, Louisiana: 44

Fort Stewart, Georgia: 349

Forward arming and refueling points

at DLS Bastogne: 140–41

at DLS Bulge: 144

at Karshi Kanabad: 68

MH-47E Chinooks used as: 119

mobile: 140–41, 142–45, 377

in Operation ANACONDA: 287–89, 312, 315, 317

Forward Operating Bases

33: 208, 219–20, 260–61

53: 159–65

Forward Surgical Teams

244th: 232

274th: 187–88, 318, 319

Franks, GEN Tommy: 38, 41, 50, 51, 113, 158, 

193n67, 215–16, 334, 346–47, 359, 377

Fratricide

during the Qala-i-Jangi uprising: 104

ODA 574: 107
406

Fratricide–Continued

Pashtun soldiers with Karzai: 107

at Sayd-Alim-Kalay: 180–82

French forces: 211, 277, 281

Friendly-fi re incidents: 162, 193n61, 379–80

efforts to prevent: 284, 287

in Operation ANACONDA: 285–87, 289–90, 

362n30

at Sayd-Alim-Kalay: 180–82

*Frost, CWO Jacob: 302

*Fulkerson, MSG Adam: 217

Fuller, BG Lesley: 100, 129–30, 131–32, 195n125, 

209, 253–55, 273n155

*Gaines, CWO Christopher: 230, 231, 232, 301, 303, 

304–06, 307, 311, 314

*Galtier, SSG Cash: 286, 292, 321

Gardez, Afghanistan: 282–83, 285, 287, 300, 303–05, 

309, 312, 317, 318–19, 320, 322, 326,

327–28, 332, 353

*Garrison, 1SG Dan: 139

*Garvey, CWO Vincent: 52

*Gates, CPT John: 119–20, 132–33, 135, 137–38, 

187–88, 230, 231, 301, 304

Genghis Khan: 2

George, SGT Patrick: 313

*Gerhing, SGT Shane: 331

German forces: 205, 277, 281, 293, 295

Germany: 7, 211

Ghazni: 4, 19

Gilliam, PFC David B.: 305, 306, 307, 308, 311, 313, 

314

*Glasgow, CPT Douglas, USMC: 231–32

Global positioning system: 101–02, 126–27, 141, 

162, 181

Golts, Aleksandr: 38

Goodman, Capt Randy, USN: 53–54, 59

Gorbachev, Mikhail: 16

*Gorley, CWO Max: 265, 322, 325–28, 365n125

Goryeev, General Makmut: 38

Grave sites, investigation of: 357

Great Britain

forces for Afghanistan operations: 34, 103, 104, 

160–62, 178, 206–07, 211, 329, 349

historical role in Afghanistan: 4–6, 7

and humanitarian aid: 60, 61

Green Beret (as offi cial Special Forces headgear): 

38–39

*Greene, MAJ Silas: 226, 227, 228, 263–64, 342–44

*Gregg, CPT Bill: 163

Grim 32: 300, 301–02, 303–04

Gromov, LTG Boris: 38

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: 204, 250–51

Habibullah Khan: 6

Hafi z: 323–24, 325, 326

Hagenbeck, MG Franklin L.: 276–77, 280–81, 283, 

332, 334, 342, 346–47

Hahn, Satar: 123

Haidar, General Gul: 288, 319, 322–23, 324–28

*Hall, CPT Bill: 243

*Hall, SSG Jim: 234

*Halstedt, LTC Sam: 48, 49–50

Haq, Abdul: 16–17, 29n46, 98–99

*Harriman, SPC John: 352

Harriman, CW2 Stanley: 283, 285–86, 294, 332, 358, 

362n30, 364n95

*Harris, MAJ Mitchell: 353

*Harrison, CPT Ken: 328, 329

*Harrison, CPT Rick: 151

Harward, Commodore Robert, USN: 108, 193n68, 

204, 208, 236, 238, 243–44, 277

Hazaras: 20, 22, 30n55, n61, 99–100

Hazar Qadam, Afghanistan: 208, 235–41

Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin: 11, 14, 16–18, 21, 30n58

Helicopters. See also Aircraft; MH-47E; MH-60L.

antiaircraft threat to: 99, 118–19, 120–21, 138, 

139

buildup of at Karshi Kanabad: 71–72, 372–73, 376

fi red on: 133, 135, 136–38, 139

in the high mountains: 78–79, 96, 99, 117–22, 

132–33

lack of adequate intelligence for: 82

maintenance of: 151–53, 376

night infi ltrations: 78–79, 96

visibility problems: 82, 83, 84–85, 117, 118, 

119–20, 132

weather problems: 78–79, 82, 83, 84–85, 96, 

118–19, 132–33

*Henderson, MAJ Mark: 71

*Henley, CWO Daniel: 317

*Hensen, MAJ Mickey: 265–66

Herat, Afghanistan: 2–3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12–13, 14, 17, 18, 

20, 22, 100, 183, 192n39, 222–23

*Hernandez, CPT Carlos: 77

*Herndon, LTC Dan: 172

High value target missions: 330–32

Highway 4, effort to block Taliban use of: 167–69, 

174–75

Hindu Kush mountain range: 53–54, 99, 117, 134, 

135, 213

Holland, GEN Charles R.: 93

*Holloway, SFC Reggie: 251, 252

*Holman, SSG Stef: 168

*Holmes, SSG Celeste: 73

*Hooper, LTC Carl: 53, 88n69, 281–82, 283, 284, 

285, 286, 287, 292, 319–20, 323, 332

*Hopkins, MAJ Mike: 325, 327

Horn of Africa, preparation for operations in: 58–59, 

253

Horses

saddles for: 125, 128, 195n122, 273n151

used with General Dostum’s forces: 96, 123–25, 

128

Hospitals: 151, 184, 207, 222, 228, 232–35

*Hsu, SFC Jon: 239

*Huffman, MSG Mike: 234, 235

*Hulse, SSGT Damon, USAF: 322, 325–26, 364n125
407

Humanitarian aid

to Afghan refugees: 206

airdrop operations: 46, 100–101, 206–07, 252, 

263–64, 269n28, 376, 379

at Bagram: 184–85

blankets: 130, 185, 263–64, 273n155, 329

CMOC role in: 60–61

coordination of nongovernmental organizations’ 

efforts: 183–84, 185, 206–07, 222, 223–24, 252, 

278, 386

to earthquake victims: 342, 343–44

food: 130, 131, 150, 184–85, 191n28, 263–64, 

273n155, 329, 351

funding for: 223, 224, 273n155, 329–30

in the Kandahar area: 173, 351

at Khowst: 263–64, 328–30

at Mazar-e-Sharif: 102, 150–51, 184

needs assessment: 220–22, 223–24, 328–30, 

350–51, 386

organization of: 60–61, 150–51, 185, 191n25, 

350–51, 386

overland deliveries of: 252

planning for: 41, 46, 60–61, 221, 278, 350–51

SOCEUR’s role in delivery of: 130

toys: 150, 351

used as a bribe: 357

water-related: 351–52

winter clothes: 150, 221, 351

Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams: 220–21, 222

Immunizations: 222

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey: 66, 100, 130, 131, 254

India: 4, 5–6, 7, 9

Infantry, 87th: 74, 192n49, 198n223, 277, 288

Infantry Regiment, 187th: 270n55, 277, 289, 358

Infrastructure repair: 102, 209, 225–27

Intelligence

based on video from unmanned aerial vehicles: 382

failures of in Operation ANACONDA: 281, 285, 

297–98

failures of regarding Dostum: 123, 125

failures of with respect to Afghan leaders: 165–66

general inadequacy of: 370, 376, 382

incomplete threat information: 82, 281

limitations of regarding threat picture for aviators: 

134–35, 138

limited access to: 371, 372

regarding enemy forces on Takur Ghar: 302–03

from satellites and aircraft in the Arghastan wadi: 174

Intelligence operations

at Hazar Qadam: 235–41

JSOTF-North: 77–78, 79

Operation ANACONDA: 281–82

in the Shah-i-Khot Valley: 279–80, 281, 296

near Shkin: 241–44

International Islamic Front for Holy War Against Jews 

and Crusaders: 23

International Security Assistance Force: 206–07, 211, 

349, 367n196

Iran

and history of Afghanistan: 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 28n15

and response to 9/11: 34

and the Taliban: 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 30n55, n58, n61

Islamabad, Pakistan: 252

Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan: 

11

Islamic fundamentalists and the Taliban: 17–18, 

19–20

Islamic Martyrs Brigade: 30n58

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: 26, 64, 134

Islamic Society of Afghanistan: 12–13, 16

Islamic Unity of Afghan: 16–17

Izvestia: 16

Jaamat-e-Islami militia, supported by ODA 534: 98

*Jackman, SGT Dwayne: 220

*Jackson, MAJ Martin: 151

Jacobabad, Pakistan: 345

*Jacobi, MAJ Derrick: 74, 75–76, 146, 344

*Jacobson, MAJ Keenan: 342

*Jaffe, MAJ Gary: 226

Jalalabad, Afghanistan: 4, 6, 12, 17, 19, 21, 192n41, 

214–15

*James, SSG Carey: 123

*Jameson, CWO Curtis: 231, 232, 261–63

*Jefferson, CPT Brian: 121, 317, 318

*Jefferson, CWO Erick: 79, 138

*Jernigan, MAJ Gregory: 350–51

Jihad, calls for against the Soviets: 11

*Joes, SSG Kim: 168, 174

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 7, 40–41

Joint Combined Exchange Training: 44

Joint Communications Signal Element: 375

Joint direct-attack munitions: 180–81

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

mission: 41, 48–49, 244, 375

precombat activities: 47–50, 62, 63

Product Development Company: 46

Joint Readiness Training Center: 43–44

Joint Search and Rescue Center, Saudi Arabia: 230, 

231, 232

Joint Special Operations Air Component: 71–72, 79, 

81, 82,122, 138, 278, 375

Joint Special Operations Air Component Command: 

46, 172

Joint Special Operations Task Force-North

civil affairs liaison element at: 150

command and control issues: 74–75, 79–80, 371

and command and control of CSAR operations: 

45–46, 53, 68, 70–71

command and control of PSYOP units: 50

communications responsibilities: 56–57, 70, 75–76, 

80–82, 90n110, 145–46, 373–74

intelligence operations: 77–78

and planning for Operation ANACONDA: 319

and planning of aviation operations: 79

problems getting established: 41, 53–54, 70–71, 

74–75, 78, 79–80
408

Joint Special Operations Task Force-North–Continued

responsibility for planning: 57

role of: 41

staffi ng for: 51–52, 53, 55–56, 57, 60, 78, 79–80, 

105, 371

standup of: 41–42, 54–57, 70–71, 75–76, 77–78

tactical guidance on battle for Kandahar: 178–79

training for staff of: 53, 55, 56–57, 79–80

Joint Special Operations Task Force-South: 269n29

command and control issues: 208, 277

communications: 204, 272n120

forces assigned to: 204–05, 208, 382–83

foreign forces assigned to: 41, 204–05

mission: 41, 204, 383–84

move to Kandahar: 108, 209–10, 385

Joint Task Force Mountain: 346–47

Jomini, Antoine Henri de: 72

Jordan: 58, 102, 151, 171, 184, 207

Journalists: 276, 322, 327, 357

*Jurgens, MAJ Karl: 264

Kabul, Afghanistan: 4, 5, 6

as base for humanitarian operations: 224–25, 226

as base for peacekeeping operations: 206–07

and the Soviet occupation: 12–13, 16, 17

and the Taliban: 17–18, 19–21, 25

U.S. embassy in: 211–12

Kabul International Airport: 10

Kabul Military Academy: 211, 277, 279, 347–50, 358

Kahlili, General Kareem: 99

Kaiserslautern, Germany: 130

Kandahar, Afghanistan: 2–3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

fall of: 178–79, 182–83

Mir Wais Hospital: 209, 232–35

planning the offensive against: 166–67, 173, 178

and resistance to the Soviet occupation: 11–13, 14, 

16, 17

and the Taliban: 18, 19, 20, 25, 106–08, 156

Kandahar Airport: 166–67, 170–71, 174–75, 178

JSOTF-South stationed at: 204–06, 209–10, 218

radio broadcasting from: 340–41

Karimov, Islam: 26, 65

Karmal, Babrak: 10, 12, 14–15, 16

*Karnes, LTC James: 250–51

Karp, Aaron: 29n38

Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan

advance echelon coordination with Uzbeks: 64–66

aircraft based at: 195n129, 373

base operations responsibilities: 79–80

civil affairs function at: 184

command and control issues at: 67, 74–75, 375

communications support at: 81–82, 373–74

construction of base at: 53

development of: 105, 373

food service: 73

force protection at: 66, 74

forces based at: 44–45, 102, 208

fueling operations: 68

isolation facility: 74

logistics support: 72–73, 373–74

real estate management: 74

Karzai, Hamad: 18, 106, 191n27, 342

and battle at Tarin Kowt: 106–07

and the battle for Kandahar: 172–74, 182–83

guidance on U.S. PSYOP activities: 153–54

and humanitarian aid: 206

injured by U.S. fi re: 180

intelligence gathered by in Oruzgan Province: 106

as leader of Pashtun efforts in the south to oust the 

Taliban: 154–58

ODA 574 assigned to support: 155–58, 172, 173, 

175–78

as prime minister of the Afghan Interim Authority: 

176, 178, 182–83, 193n64

sudden loyalty of former Taliban to: 183

wounded by U.S. forces: 107

Kasymov, General: 65, 74

Keegan, John: 194n75

*Kelley, SGT Randal: 318

*Kellogg, TSGT Alan: 168–69

Kenna, Kathleen: 276

*Keogh, SGM Rich: 336–37

Khan, General Bismullah: 98

Khan, Burillah: 98

Khan, General Daoud: 99

Khan, Fahim: 77, 95, 119, 319

5th SFG liaison offi cers with: 59–60

and ODA 555: 96

rivalry with Dostum: 98

summit meeting on Northern Alliance campaign: 

158

Khan, Ismail: 12–13, 17–18, 19, 20, 77, 100, 183, 

191n24, 192n39

Khan, Kamel: 281–82

Khan, Padsha: 329

Khan, Zakim: 281–82, 328

Khoshkeyer, Commander: 283, 284, 286, 287, 332–

33, 365n112

Khowst, Afghanistan: 13, 14, 17, 274n179

civil affairs with units based in: 328–29

date drop at: 263–64

Special Forces bases in: 206, 208

*Kilbourne, SFC Forrest: 251

*Killinger, MAJ Kyle: 66

Kim, by Rudyard Kipling: 4

Kipling, Rudyard: 4

Kisner, COL Frank: 68, 72, 74, 75, 85

*Kittridge, SFC Jack: 234

*Kitts, SGT Sol: 123

*Knapp, CPT Mark: 138, 139

Kohat, Pakistan: 249

Konar Province: 12, 14

Konduz, Afghanistan: 21, 158, 186–87, 192n42, 

198n209, n211, 221–22, 223–24

*Kramer, SSG Karl: 216

Kratzer, BG David: 206–07

*Kupinski, SFC Kip: 218

Kuwait: 102, 108, 148
409

Lackey, CSM Ray: 259

*Lafayette, SFC Charles: 231, 232, 303, 305, 306–07, 

308, 311, 314, 315, 317

*Lafayette, SSG Jason: 260–61

LaFrenz, SGT Matthew: 314, 315, 316–17

*Lake, SFC Ray: 295–96

Lambert, MG Geoffrey: 50–51, 52, 53, 88n40, 93

Lancaster-Totten, SPC Aaron: 306, 307

Land Information Warfare Activity: 339

Landing zones

Albatross: 83–85, 119, 120–22, 132–33, 135–39

desert: 109–13, 140–41, 142–45

Elspeth: 119–20

markers for: 113, 120, 132–33, 140–41, 142, 144

Language diffi culties: 125–26, 227, 258–59

*Largent, SSG Sylvester: 216

*Larken, SGT Steve: 305, 306, 307, 308, 313–14, 316

*Latimer, CPT Karl: 162

*Law, SSG Greg: 318

Leafl ets: 63, 89n79, 103, 147–49, 186–87, 292

dropped in leafl et bombs: 103, 149, 292, 370, 376

encouraging surrender: 292

guidance from Karzai regarding: 153–54

used at Mazar-e-Sharif: 102

used at Objective Rhino: 113–14, 115

used in Operation ANACONDA: 292

warning about minefi elds: 186

Lindh, John Walker: 104–05, 198n233, 380

Linguists: 172, 373

Lisinenko, Lieutenant Igor: 35

Literacy: 8, 9, 14, 15, 286, 329, 352, 359

*Loach, CPT Jack: 172

Lodi, Commander: 281–82

Logistics support

aerial resupply by SOCEUR: 129–32

planning for: 41–42

resupply of ODA 595 in the Dari-a-Souf Valley: 

127–28

and SOCEUR: 41–42, 273n155, 374

*Loomis, SSG Cory: 168, 174, 175

Looting by Afghan militias: 324–26

*Lorenzo, CSM Marc: 266

Loudspeaker broadcasts: 288 

at Mazar-e-Sharif: 185–86

at Objective Rhino: 111, 113–15

Love, COL Albert: 187–88

Loya jirga: 3, 7, 9, 11, 14, 211

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: 47–50

*MacGinnis, CPL John: 114–15

*MacKenzie, SGT Derrick: 298–99

Macnaghten, William: 4

*Madden, SGM Rudy: 265–66

*Madison, SSG Walter: 177, 200n270

*Magione, MAJ Mario: 160, 161–65

*Mahoney, MAJ Charles: 72

Maintenance support teams: 260–61

Mako 20: 297–98, 299, 300, 301, 302, 313, 318

Malek, Commander: 356–57

Malik, General Abdul: 21

*Mann, CWO Alfred: 120–21, 139, 261–63, 297–99, 309

*Mantle, LTC Kip: 349

Maps: 53, 88n54, 370

Maqdoom: 126, 127

Marine Expeditionary Unit, 26th: 272n121

Marine Expeditionary Units: 204–05

Marion, BG Francis: 38

*Marks, CPT Steve: 76

*Martin, SSG Charles: 331

*Martinez, SSG Jesus: 218

Marzak, Afghanistan: 282, 292, 324, 326, 333

Masirah Island, Oman: 108, 116, 205, 278, 345

Massoud, Ahmad Shah: 12, 13, 14, 16–17, 18, 19–21, 

24, 25, 26, 29n35, 95

*Masterson, 1SG Martin: 76

*Matteson, LTC Darrin: 51

*Matthews, SSG Timothy: 73

*Maxey, 1SG Karl: 144

Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan: 6, 12–13

fi ght for control of: 139

humanitarian relief efforts in: 102, 150–51, 184

ODA 595 operations at: 101–03

PSYOP in: 185–87, 191n33

Qala-i-Jangi prison uprising: 158–65

struggle for political control of: 101–02

and the Taliban: 21, 22

Mazari, Abdul: 20

McClure, BG Robert: 38

*McCracken, CWO Walter: 139–40

*McDaniels, LTC Keith: 359

*McDonald, SFC Roger: 227, 228

*McFadden, MSG Ty: 263, 295, 320–21, 322, 323–

24, 325–26, 327

McGhee, COL Phillip: 42

*McGinnis, LTC Julian: 257

*McHenry, CPT Mike: 282–84, 286, 287, 332, 

362n30

*McKellar, MAJ Wes: 70

*McLemore, MAJ Jim: 150, 221–22, 223

Medical care for Afghans: 222, 234, 246–47, 277, 

285, 343, 354–55

Medical Civil Action Program teams: 222

Medical evacuation: 107, 112–13, 162, 180–81, 187–

88, 200n270, 234, 286, 315–19, 354–55

*Mercado, MAJ Victor, USAF: 70

Messenger, SGM Jim: 248

*Messinger, MAJ Stan: 171–72

Meyer, GEN Edward: 39

MH-47D Chinook: 208, 330–32, 372–73

MH-47E Chinooks

attacks on: 296–99, 303–09

buildup of at Karshi Kanabad: 71–72, 372–73

capabilities: 99, 118, 132, 378, 390

crashes of: 299, 301–09, 387–88

CSAR operations: 209, 230–32, 262–63, 267n15

maintenance of: 105–06

missions: 47, 83, 85, 95, 119–22, 132–33, 135, 

 301–09, 330–32, 370, 375, 376, 377
410

MH-47E Chinooks–Continued 

navigation: 119–20, 121, 132–33, 135–36

Operation ANACONDA: 296

refueling needs: 79, 119

shot at: 135–39

MH-60L Defensive Armed Penetrators Black Hawks

buildup of at Karshi Kanabad: 71–72

capabilities: 82, 118, 121, 139

crashes: 113

missions: 82–85, 95, 103, 119, 135, 139–40, 370, 

375–76

navigation: 119, 121, 135

refueling needs: 79

Miceli, SPC Anthony R.: 306, 308–09

Mikolashek, LTG P. T.: 276–77, 280–81

Military history detachments: 44

*Millender, Lt Cdr: 65, 66

Miller, SSGT Kerry, USAF: 306, 307, 313, 315, 

316–17

Millet, SGT Jake: 294, 322, 325

*Mills, CPT Jason: 79

Mine clearing operations: 337

Minefi eld awareness: 186, 245, 246

*Ming, SGT Vinsong: 123

Mir Wais Hospital, Kandahar: 209, 232–35, 269n26

*Mix, SGT Al: 123

Modular Print System: 147–48

Mohammed, General Atta, and battle for Mazar-eSharif: 101, 102

Mohammed, Khan: 233–34, 271n99

Mohaqqeq, General Mohammed: 99–100, 102

Mojadeddi, Sibghatollah: 17–18

*Monroe, SP4 Ike: 246, 289–91

*Morris, CWO Joseph: 141–42

*Morris, SSG Stefan: 295, 321–22, 326, 327

*Moss, CPT Charles: 162

Mountain Division, 10th: 74

at Bagram Airfi eld: 208, 384

Operation ANACONDA: 201, 280–82, 284, 

287–89

at Qala-i-Jangi: 161–63, 192n49

Quick Reaction Force: 231

and the Salang Tunnel: 343–44

Mujahideen: 11–16, 18

Mulholland, COL John: 51, 52, 53–54, 75, 190n11, 

211–12, 271n108, 272n131, 375, 377, 382–83

and advisor for Karzai: 107

and assignment of advisors to Afghan resistance 

leaders: 98

liaison offi cers assigned to the Northern Alliance: 

59–60

and medical evacuations: 180–81

planning for insertion of ARSOF into Afghanistan: 

88n69

and planning for OperationANACONDA: 280–81, 

286, 287, 319

planning for operations in the Tora Bora region: 

213–14

and reorganization of JSOTF-North: 105

responsibility for planning: 57

and staffi ng of JSOTF-North: 79–80, 88n52, 

89n70

summit meeting on Northern Alliance campaign: 

158

and taking of Kandahar: 178–79

*Mulligan, MAJ Gregory: 352

Musharraf, General Pervez: 25–26, 34–35, 249, 

250

Myers, GEN Richard B.: 115, 117, 215

Nadir, Shar: 3

Nahrin, Afghanistan: 342, 343–44

Nail 21: 297

Nail 22: 297, 301–02

Najibullah, Mohammad: 16–17, 21, 95, 190n8

Naka Valley: 282

Naqid, Mullah: 107

Naqueebullah, Mullah: 108, 182–83

*Nash, CPT Mike: 122–28, 134, 146–47, 159

National Security Council: 7, 8

National Training Center, ARSOF training at: 43–44

Naval Special Warfare Group One: 41, 57, 108, 

209–10, 382–83

New York Times: 241

New Zealand, forces for Afghanistan operations: 34, 

205, 236–37, 265, 346, 389

Night Stalkers. See Special Operations Aviation 

Regiment, 160th.

Night vision cameras: 97–98

Night vision goggles: 137, 142, 143, 176, 208, 237, 

238, 241–42

*Nolan, SSG Eric: 350

Nongovernmental organizations relief efforts in 

Afghanistan: 60–61, 102, 183–84, 185, 206, 252, 

352

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 34

Northern Alliance: 21, 35–36, 59–60, 77, 82–85, 

88n69, 93, 95, 98, 190n7, 191n32, 194n75, 377

Norwegian forces: 205, 265, 277, 281

*Nutting, MSG Neal: 168, 174

Objective Bastogne: 140–41

Objective Honda: 113

Objective Raptor: 142–43

Objective Rhino: 97–98, 107, 109–17, 370, 377

Objective Wolverine: 142

Offi ce of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 49–50

*Oliver, CWO Roger: 304–05, 309, 318

Oman: 72–73, 102, 116, 205, 278

Omar, Mohammad: 18

Omar, Mullah: 11, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30n57, 35, 

156, 182, 183, 205, 215, 219

Operation ANACONDA: 210, 277–84, 319–23, 

333–35, 385–89

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM: 40, 42, 50

Operation HARPOON: 327

Operation NOBLE EAGLE: 42

Operation RELENTLESS STRIKE: 144
411

Operational detachment As

aerial resupply of: 131, 135, 146–47

close-air-support teams: 101–02

command and control of: 145, 232–33

for initial parachute assault: 47, 376–77

integration of PSYOP teams: 278

missions: 231–32, 370

sent to Northern Alliance leaders: 119, 377

training for: 217–18

used to direct tactical airstrikes and guide smart 

bombs: 101

Operation Detachment As (units)

361: 353, 358

372: 281–84, 287, 292, 294, 319–21, 324, 327, 

332–33, 334, 364n95, 365n112, n127

381: 281–82, 322

391: 365–66

392: 282, 328

394: 210, 265–66, 293–95, 319–28, 353–54, 364n94

395: 327, 332, 333, 353–54

511: 236–37

512: 236–37

513: 236–37

514: 236–37, 241–43

515: 243–44

516: 236–37, 239–40

524: 180–81, 209, 232–35, 269n26

534: 98, 101, 162–63, 190n17

542: 281–82, 322

550: 211–12

553: 99–100, 221

554: 100, 183

555: 96, 99, 101

561: 216–17

563: 292, 386–87

570: 232

571: 282, 328

572: 109, 214–16

574: 106–07, 155–58, 172–78, 180–81, 212, 232, 

252, 269n38

575: 211–12

581: 216

583: 107, 165–71, 172, 173, 174–75, 178–79

585: 98

586: 99

592: 163

594: 99, 279, 281–84, 286–87, 292, 295, 319–28, 

362n31, 364n94, n96, n99, 365n127, 385

595: 96, 101–03, 119–28, 134, 146–47, 159, 185–

86, 192n42, 273n151

923: 277–78, 356–57

966: 277–78, 356–57

981: 218–19, 277

984: 219

Operational Detachments Bs (units)

390: 328, 329, 332–33, 353

560: 248–50

570: 107, 180–81

580: 74

Opposition Group Forces. See Afghan Military Forces.

Ordnance units: 44

*O’Reilly, SSG Jim: 151, 186

Oruzgan Province: 106, 156, 172, 236

*Osterman, SPC Mohammed: 258

Pace, Frank: 62

Pact of Neutrality and Nonaggression (with Russia): 6, 7

Pakistan

Afghan refugees in: 16–17, 206

al-Qaeda prisoners in: 250–51, 384

blocking of escape routes to: 281–82, 283, 384

diplomatic relations with the Taliban: 103, 192n45

Federal Autonomous Tribal Areas: 206, 249

forces sent by mullahs to reinforce the Taliban: 

199n209

historical relationship with Afghanistan: 5, 7, 8, 9, 

10, 11, 16–17

humanitarian aid organizations in: 252

jihad brigade from: 98–99, 267n3

and resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan: 13, 14, 

16–17

and the search for Taliban and al-Qaeda in border 

areas: 206, 248–50

Special Service Group: 249–50

supply line to the Taliban: 107–08, 167–69

and the Taliban: 18–19, 20, 21, 22, 24–26, 34

U.S. Embassy in: 60–61

U.S. relations with: 7, 8, 9, 34–35, 248–50

Pakistani army

American advisors to: 206

U.S. air support to: 249

U.S. combined operations with: 249–50

U.S. training for: 249–50

Paktia Province: 10, 14, 279–80, 329–30

Panjshir Valley: 12–13, 14, 16, 120

Parachute assaults: 47, 97–98, 103–04, 107, 109–13, 

140–41

*Parcelli, SGT Paul: 298–99

*Parker, SSG Greg: 331

Parker, COL Richard, USAF: 74

*Parsons, SSG Jeremy: 215

*Parsons, SSG Mark: 73

Party of Islam: 11–12, 13, 14, 16

Pashtun tribes

and Afghan history: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11

anti-Taliban leaders: 94–95, 106, 154–58, 165–67

in battle with the Taliban: 106–07, 167–71

Karzai role in enlisting in the U.S. efforts against 

the Taliban: 153–55

killed by U.S. airstrikes: 107

ODA 574 assigned to support: 155–58

and Operation ANACONDA: 280–83, 319–28, 

364n98, 365n112, 386

operations at Mir Wais Hospital: 209, 233–35

and rise of the Taliban: 17, 18, 30n61

and sensitive site exploitation missions: 332–35

training for: 281–82, 283, 321

U.S. efforts to form an alliance with: 35–36
412

*Pasquez, SPC Martin: 111

*Patterson, CW3 Carl: 234–35

*Pavitt, Jim: 190n3

*Payle, MSG Albert: 239

Pazder, SPC Randy: 313, 314–15

Peacekeeping operations: 206

*Pearl, MAJ James: 336–37

Pelley, Scott: 228

People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan: 9, 10, 16

*Perez, SGT Mario: 114–15

Persia: 2–3, 4–5, 28n15

Persian Safavid Empire: 2–3

Peshawar region: 4, 16–17, 19

Petithory, SFC Daniel: 180, 212

Phelan, COL Mark: 58–59, 256, 257, 277, 278, 279, 

335, 336, 337, 338, 345, 346–47, 356, 367n187, 

389

*Phipps, CWO Bill: 122–23, 128

Pickering, Thomas: 25–26

*Pierce, CPT Mel: 232–35

*Polson, SPC Jonas O.: 313

Powell, Colin: 33, 34–36, 44–45, 150–51

Pravda: 10

Prisoners: 158–65, 198n207, n211, 204, 215, 233, 

237, 240, 244, 250–51, 272n128, 321–22

Prosser, SSG Cody: 172, 180, 212

Psychological operations: 41

approval for: 49–50, 62, 259, 341

funding for: 50

leafl ets. See Leafl ets.

in Mazar-e-Sharif: 102, 185–87

planning for: 62–64, 278

precombat activities: 47–50, 62, 376

radio programs. See Radio broadcasts.

units: 43, 44, 50, 62

Psychological operations battalions

3rd: 98, 116–17, 147–49

8th: 46, 48–49, 50, 62, 63, 244, 258–59, 340–41

9th: 39, 111, 113–17, 186, 244, 351

Psychological Operations Company, 345th: 278–79

Psychological Operations Group, 4th: 45, 62–64, 

147–48, 375

*Puller, CPT Mark: 151

Qadir, Abdul: 17, 192n41

Qal-e-yeh, Afghanistan: 223

Qala-i-Jangi, prisoner uprising at: 104–05, 158–65, 

198n207, n211, n212, n213, 380

Qalat, history of: 4

Qarabagh, Afghanistan: 226

Qatar: 58, 253, 278, 382

Quartermaster Companies

5th: 130

421st: 130, 131–32

Quartermaster units: 44

Quick reaction forces

aircraft for: 249, 250

combined U.S. and Pakistani: 249–50

command and control of: 265–66, 303

ODB 560 as: 248–50

for Operation ANACONDA: 295, 301

for rescue on Takur Ghar: 295, 301, 303–19, 

387–88

Rabbani, Burhannudin: 17–18, 19, 21

Rachman, COL Habib: 349–50

Radio broadcasts: 62, 63, 278

of Afghan music: 103, 186–87, 245, 258–59, 

278–79, 341

aircraft used for: 63, 116, 186, 248, 376, 384

broadband satellite communications teams: 340–41

guidance from Karzai regarding: 153–54, 258–59

in Kandahar: 352

keep-away messages: 288–89, 291

leafl ets advertising: 148–49, 186

medical awareness campaigns: 279

mine awareness: 245

in Operation ANACONDA: 288

precombat: 46, 89n79, 103, 192n43, 245, 248, 376

used in Mazar-e-Sharif: 102

Radios distributed in Afghanistan: 89n79, 149, 

185–86, 245

Ramstein, Germany: 130, 376

RAND studies: 11–12

Ranger Infantry Regiment, 75th: 47, 88n63, 104, 107

1st Battalion: 301, 303–19

3rd Battalion: 97–98, 109–13, 140–41, 143–45, 

208, 370, 376–77

Rashid, Ahmed: 19

Rasmussen, COL Dave: 55–56

*Rauch, CPT Stan: 230

*Rawlins, SSG Jerry: 294–95, 321, 322, 327, 362n45

Razor 01: 303, 309

Razor 02: 303, 304–05, 309, 317–18

Razor 03: 296–303, 304

Razor 04: 296–97, 299, 300, 301–02, 303

Razor 54: 312, 316, 317

*Reagan, CWO Mark: 331

*Reese, LTC Phillip: 336, 337, 345, 346

Refugees: 206, 221–22

*Regent, CPT Kerry: 231, 232

Reserve Special Operations Command, U.S. Army: 

39

*Rhinehart, LTC Matt: 51, 88n40, 165, 172

Rice, Condoleeza: 37

*Richards, LTC Warren: 54–55, 57, 75, 78, 79, 154, 

155

Richardson, Bill: 22

Roadblocks: 169–70, 285, 288–89, 364n94, 384–85

*Robards, SSG: 234–35

*Roberts, LTC Mike: 179

Roberts, P01 Neil: 298–99, 300, 301–02, 303, 309, 

313, 319

*Robeson, SSG Carey: 333

*Rogers, SFC Charles: 185

Rogers, MAJ Robert: 38

*Roswell, CWO Tim: 172

*Rounds, CPT Terry: 352
413

Rules of engagement

high value target missions: 331

for SOAR DAP crews: 139

Rumsfeld, Donald: 33, 35, 36, 38, 40, 46, 65, 67, 98, 

102, 117, 182, 184, 191n31, 208–09, 215, 241, 

250–51, 326, 344

Russia, historical role in Afghanistan: 4–6, 7, 28n15

*Ryan, MAJ Mike: 248–50

*Ryder, SGM Rich: 172

*Sage, SFC Elias: 166, 168, 169, 175

Salang Pass Tunnel: 7, 10, 207, 225–27, 342–44, 386

*Salvadorini, SFC Rocky: 243, 244

Sams, BG Ronald: 60, 248, 249, 250

*Samuels, CPT Jed: 265, 319–25, 326, 327

*Sanders, LTC Terry: 265, 277, 281, 295, 320

*Sands, SSG Nick: 172, 176–78

*Sanford, CPT Barry: 251, 252

*Santana, MSG Tony: 337–38, 344, 356

*Santiago, SSG Bobby: 168

Saudi Arabia: 21, 22, 24–25, 34, 230

*Sault, MAJ Kevin: 160, 162

Sayd-Alim-Kalay: 174, 179–81, 182

Sayd-Alim-Kalay bridge: 107, 175–77

*Schantz, MAJ Randal: 312, 317

Schools: 221, 222

*Schroeder, CPT Pat: 162

*Schuyler, SFC Bart: 227, 228, 343

*Searcey, SFC Ron: 111

Secure Compartmental Information Facility (SCIF): 

81

Security classifi cation of information: 57

*Seifert, SSG Wallace: 216

*Seims, CPT Chuck: 143, 144

Self, CPT Nathan: 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307–13, 

315–19

Sensitive site exploitations

Pashtun forces used for: 332–33

in the Shah-i-Khot Valley: 332–35

in southern Afghanistan: 206, 208, 235–41, 256–

57, 265–66

specialized equipment for: 256–57, 265

Serkhankheyl, Afghanistan: 282, 292, 326

Shah-i-Khot Valley: 210, 276–77, 279–80, 281–82, 

283, 286, 292, 294, 320–28, 332–35, 365n127, 

385–86

Sharif, Nawaz: 25

Shariff, General: 96

*Shaw, LTC Richard, USAF: 74

Sheberghan: 22

Shelton, General Henry: 23–24, 36

Sher Ali Khan: 5

*Sherman, CWO Will: 52

Sherzai, Gul Agha: 106, 107–08, 167–71, 271n99

and the battle for Kandahar: 173, 174–75, 178–79, 

182–83

and Mir Wais Hospital: 233

ODA 583 support for: 165–69, 173, 174–75, 

178–79

Sherzai, Pashta: 178

Shi’a Muslims: 20, 30n55, n61

Shimal Valley: 282

Shin Narai Valley: 166, 167

Shkin, Afghanistan: 241–44

Shomali Plains: 96, 98

Shuja Mirza, Shah: 4

Sicily: 66

*Simpson, LTC Edward: 151

*Sims, CPT Harry: 165–70, 173, 174–75, 178–79, 

182–83

SCAMPI: 79, 81, 82, 90n128, 344

*Singletary, MAJ Harry: 352

Sisler, 1LT George K.: 199n266

Sisler, MAJ Jim: 199n266

*Slater, SFC: 243

*Small, MAJ Steve: 185

*Snow, SSG Wes: 123

*Solanis, CW3 Arthur: 120, 132–33, 135–36, 137–38, 

281, 318

*Solis, MAJ Jeffrey: 58, 171

Somalia: 59

Soran, Afghanistan: 329

*Sorrenson, SFC Sol: 251, 252

Spain: 66, 67

Spann, Johnny Michael: 104, 160, 164, 192n48

Special Forces Group, 3rd: 39, 58–59, 335–37, 

384

2nd Battalion: 256

3rd Battalion: 208, 211, 260–61, 265–66, 267, 279, 

280–83

at Bagram Air Base: 210, 335–37

as CJSOTF-Afghanistan: 277, 335–37

Information Management Section: 338–40

integration of civil affairs: 328–30

and Kabul Military Academy: 349–50

mission: 359–60, 385

preparation for role in Afghanistan: 41–42

surveillance and reconnaissance: 280–81

training for: 59

Special Forces Group, 5th: 39, 45, 47, 88n69, 105, 

209

1st Battalion: 108, 204, 235–44

2nd Battalion: 57–58, 171–74, 206

3rd Battalion: 159–60, 209

and assignment of ODA 574 to support Karzai: 

155–56

base operations responsibilities at Karshi Kanabad: 

79–80

command and control issues: 45–46, 60, 79–80, 

145

handicaps: 41

mission: 41, 55, 370, 384–85

ODA as Quick Reaction Force: 231–32

operations at Hazar Qadam: 208–09

preparation for role in Afghanistan: 41–42, 52–54, 

90n110

problems adjusting to role as JSOTF-N: 52–54, 57, 

78, 79
414

Special Forces Group, 5th–Continued

PSYOP liaison offi ces with: 63

role as ARSOTF: 52–54

training for: 53, 55, 56–57, 79, 371, 375

Special Forces Group, 19th: 218, 277–78, 371–72

1st Battalion: 217

2nd Battalion: 208, 216–19

5th Battalion: 216, 277

mission: 218–19, 277–78, 329–30, 352, 356

Special Forces Group, 20th: 79, 210, 255–56, 

273n159, 354, 371–72

Special Forces Groups, mobilization of ARNG units: 

44, 371–72

Special Operations Aviation Regiment, 160th: 39

1st Battalion: 141–43, 370

2nd Battalion: 96–97, 206, 296–99, 370

3rd Battalion: 88n63, 208

aborted missions: 132–33

aircraft used: 330, 372–73

ARNG units assigned to: 151–53

CSAR mission: 46, 70–71, 206, 229–32, 296–99

and delivery of forces to fi ght with the Northern 

Alliance: 117–22

FARP units: 68

helicopter buildup at Karshi Kanabad: 45, 71–72

incompleteness of threat picture for: 134–35

at Kandahar: 204

maintenance teams: 105–06

and operations in the Hindu Kush Mountains: 

117–22

parachute assaults: 47, 96, 141–43, 370

rules of engagement: 139–40

training: 43

Special Operations Command, 1st: 39

Special Operations Command, Europe: 41, 100–101, 

129–32, 195n125, 209, 253–54

Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command: 41–42, 53, 55–56, 57, 90n108, 371, 

375, 382–83, 384

Special Operations Command and Control Elements: 

218–19, 383–84

52: 171–72, 177–78, 182–83, 199n257

540: 180–81, 218

Special Operations Command, Central: 40–41, 58–59, 

70–71, 275

coordination with SOCEUR on resupply of forces: 

131–32

and planning for the SOF campaign: 50–51, 53, 56, 

57, 370

staffi ng of: 56, 57, 375

Special Operations Communication Assemblage 

teams: 81, 82, 279

Special Operations Media Systems’ Broadcast radio 

stations: 186–87, 258–59, 278–79, 340–41, 385

Special Operations Signal Battalion, 112th: 39, 45, 

55, 70, 75–76, 80–82, 204, 219–20, 373–74, 375, 

376, 377

Special Operations Squadrons

6th: 88n63

9th: 68, 85, 120, 122, 209, 261–63

19th: 172

Special Operations Support Battalion, 528th: 39, 44, 

45, 68, 72–73, 207, 249, 260–61, 373–74, 376, 

389

Special Operations Wings

16th: 68, 131, 195n129, 209, 254, 375–76

352nd: 209, 254

Special reconnaissance searches: 204, 205–06, 

235–41

Special Tactics Squadron, 23rd: 303

Special tactics squadron teams (Air Force): 135, 

140–41, 143, 144, 167, 187–88, 192n38

Spin Boldak, Afghanistan: 19, 167, 169–70, 175

Stanhagen, COL Eric: 51

*Stark, SSG Michael: 83

*Staunton, SFC Robert: 234–35

Stebner, SGT Eric W.: 310, 313–15, 316–17

*Steinmann, LTC Marcus: 51–52, 165

*Stevenson, SP4 Dale: 246, 248, 291

Steverson, SFC Douglas: 68

*Stirling, BM1 Jackson, USN: 272n125

Stonesifer, PFC Kristofor: 113

Straw, Jack: 34

*Striker, CWO Walter: 187–88

Stronghold Freedom. See Karshi Kanabad, 

Uzbekistan.

Sudan: 23

*Sullivan, MSG Don: 75–76, 90n110, 145–46, 344

Sun Tzu: 47

Sunni Muslims: 2, 30n61

*Sutherland, MAJ Ron: 328

Svitak, SGT Philip: 187, 305, 306

*Sykes, LTC Jack: 255–56

Tactical air control parties: 172, 180–81, 199n258, 

273n151

Tactical PSYOP Detachments

812: 340

910: 244–45, 248, 287–88, 351

930: 151, 245

940: 113–15

941: 114–15

943: 114–15

Tactical PSYOP Teams: 278, 287–89, 359–60

912: 288–89

913: 244–45, 246, 247, 248, 289–91

922: 102

933: 287–88

Tahk-te-pol, Afghanistan: 167–69

Tajikistan: 224–25

Tajiks: 16, 17–18, 20, 365n116

ODA 394 in support of: 322–28

ODA 534 assigned to work with: 98

Takur Ghar: 280, 295, 296, 299–300, 302–13, 387

*Talbert, CWO Douglas: 301, 303, 304–06, 307–09, 

311, 313, 314, 315, 316–17, 318

Taliban

airstrikes against: 101, 174–75
415

Taliban–Continued 

antiaircraft artillery: 133, 135–39, 170–71

battle with Karzai’s forces: 106–07

bombing of in the Dari-a-Souf Valley: 126–27, 134

defectors: 176–77

and effort to re-take Tarin Kowt: 156–58

encouraged to surrender: 292

entrenched in Pakistan: 203

entrenched in the Tora Bora: 203–04

force concentrations in Kandahar: 156, 170

Karzai guidance on turning the people against: 153

Karzai negotiations with: 182–83

at Konduz: 192n42, 198n211

leaders of sought in southern Afghanistan: 205, 

208–09, 210–11, 213–16

morale: 194n75

Northern Alliance resistance against: 94

and Operation ANACONDA: 210

order of battle: 138

Pakistani: 198n207

Pashtuns enlisted in the fi ght against: 154–55

prisoners: 204, 215

PSYOP role in loss of public support for: 186–87

relations with bin Laden: 22, 23–24, 25, 35

relations with foreign governments: 18–19, 20, 21, 

22, 24–26, 34

road to power in Afghanistan: 18–20

sudden loyalty to Karzai: 183, 203

supply line to Pakistan: 107–08, 167–69

U.S. efforts to form a coalition against: 35–36

withdrawal from Kandahar: 178–79, 182–83

Taloqan, Afghanistan: 158, 221–22

Tampa, Florida: 40

Taraki, Nur Mohammed: 9, 10

Targeting lasers: 101

Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan: 106–07, 155–58, 172–73

Tarnak Farms: 178, 265

al-Qaeda training base at: 167, 170

Task Force 3/75 Ranger, and Objective Rhino: 109–

15, 116–17

Task Force 180: 211

Task Force Dagger. See Joint Special Operations Task 

Force-North.

Task Force Kabar. See Joint Special Operations Task 

Force-South.

Task Force Mountain: 280–82, 284, 287, 292, 294, 

296, 312, 385, 386–87

Task Force Rakkasan: 277, 384

and cave searches in the Tora Bora region: 356–58

and humanitarian aid: 350, 351

and Operation ANACONDA: 282, 284, 286, 287, 

292, 385–87

Tenet, George: 26, 36, 159

Terghul Ghar (the “Whale”): 280, 321, 322–23

Terrain

and crash on Takur Ghar: 302, 308–09, 311, 313, 

315

and defense of Tarin Kowt: 156–57

descriptions of: 33, 53–54

and direct action operations: 241–42

and helicopter operations: 78–79, 83, 96

and intelligence operations: 281

role in Afghan history: 2

and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan: 12

in the Tora Bora region: 213, 357

Texas 14. See ODA 594.

Theater Army Support Commands

21st: 128, 130, 131–32, 191n25, 209, 273n155, 

389

*Thomas, SSG Jack: 114–15

*Thompson, CPT Alison: 229, 231

*Thurman, SFC Jason: 294, 320, 325, 364n92

Tinan, COL Joe: 345

Tora Bora region: 108–09, 193n70, 203–04, 213–16, 

269n40, 356–58, 383–84

*Torgelson, CW3 Dwayne: 214

*Towson, CPT Gary: 283–84, 285, 286, 287

Training

3rd SFG: 59

19th SFG: 217

Afghan militias: 174, 276, 277, 281–82, 283, 321, 

367n196

Afghan National Army: 211, 277, 279, 347–50, 

358–60

ARNG units: 217–18, 255–56, 371–72

ARSOF: 43–44, 374, 381

aviation mechanics: 152

civil affairs offi cers: 43, 372

communications support: 81, 217, 338, 339, 372

for CSAR missions: 230

with foreign militaries: 44, 102

JSOTF staffs: 53, 55, 56–57, 79–80, 90n108, 371, 

375, 382–83

lack of ammunition for: 218

language: 43

Pakistani forces: 249–50

Pashtun forces: 156, 233

psychological operations: 43

for sensitive site exploitation: 256–57, 265

special operations aviators: 43

at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 

Center and School: 39, 43, 256–57, 372, 381

Transportation units: 44

Treaty of Gandamak: 5

Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919): 6

*Tucker, CW3 Jerry: 135–36, 298–99

Turkey: 66, 67, 205

Turkmenistan: 252

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy: 49–50, 62

UNICEF: 183

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

invasion and occupation of Afghanistan: 10–16

military advisors in Afghanistan: 7, 9–10, 16

United Arab Emirates: 34, 102

United Islamic and National Front for the Salvation of 

Afghanistan (Northern Alliance): 21. See

also Northern Alliance.
416

United Nations

humanitarian relief efforts: 60–61, 252

Joint Logistics Cell: 60–61

response to 9/11: 34, 35, 36

and the Taliban: 21, 22, 24

United Nations Charter: 10

United Nations General Assembly: 11

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: 

226–27

United Nations Security Council: 22, 26

United States

and the Cold War: 7, 8, 9

and efforts to capture bin Laden: 23–24, 25–26

Embassy in Afghanistan: 267n2

goals for the confl ict in Afghanistan: 35–36

reaction to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: 10–11

relations with Pakistan: 7, 8, 9, 34–35

support for Hekmatyar: 17

and the Taliban: 21–22

terrorist attacks on facilities abroad: 22–24

U.S. Agency for International Development: 223, 

226, 386

U.S. Air Force personnel

pararescue medics: 180–81

special tactics airmen: 101, 103–04, 112

U.S. Army Field Manual 41–10, Civil Affairs 

Operations: 185

U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 

and School: 39, 43, 256–57, 372, 381

U.S. Army Recruiting Command: 43

U.S. Army Reserve

civil affairs units: 43, 278

logistical support for: 373

mobilizations: 43, 44, 50, 216, 371–72, 374, 384

PSYOP personnel mobilized: 62, 278

PSYOP units: 43

quartermaster units: 130

U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command: 39

U.S. Army Special Operations Command: 39, 40, 42, 

44, 377

U.S. Central Command: 40–41, 192n36

Combined Forces Land Component Command: 

236, 237, 250–51, 347, 348

command and control issues: 373–74

funding for resupply efforts: 273n155

intelligence information provided to JSOTF: 79

JPOTF: 48–49, 62, 63

liaison to U.S. Embassy in Pakistan: 60–61

and logistics support for Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM: 129–30, 374–75

and operations in the Horn of Africa: 59

operations security: 371

planning for unconventional warfare in Afghanistan: 

93–95, 109, 211, 370–71

and precombat PSYOP activities: 47–50

reconnaissance and surveillance and direct action 

operations: 235–41, 243–44

response to 9/11: 40–42

U.S. European Command: 40, 41, 129–30, 273n155

U.S. Marine Corps

engineers at Kandahar Airport: 204–05

forces at Kandahar: 108

and guarding of the U.S. Embassy: 267n2

helicopter crash: 206, 229–32

infantry battalions: 107

and medical evacuation: 180–81

U.S. Navy

and medical evacuation: 180–81

Seabee engineers at Kandahar Airport: 204–05

U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams: 54, 56, 107, 

193n61

U.S. Special Operations Command: 40, 54–55, 

374–75

Uzbekistan: 5, 10, 26

humanitarian aid based in: 207, 252

U.S. and coalition forces based in: 44–45, 64–66, 74, 

102. See also Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan.

Uzbeks: 2–3, 17–18, 22

Vance, SSGT Kevin: 306, 307, 308–09, 311–12, 

313–14, 315

*Vandiver, SGM Marvin: 164

*Vargas, SGT Charles: 186

Vela, SPC Omar: 313, 314–15

*Veringer, SFC John: 332

*Victoro, SGM Manuel: 74

Video teleconferences: 56, 76, 341, 345–47, 375, 377, 

382

Videotapes of action at Objective Rhino: 98, 116–17

Volckmann, COL Russell: 38

Walker, SGT Joshua J.: 306, 307, 308, 311, 313, 

315

*Walters, SGT Bradley: 306, 307–08, 311, 313, 

316

*Walters, SGT Charles: 150, 221

*Walters, LTC Jack: 56, 57, 79–80

*Walton, SPC Arthur: 352

*Wannamaker, SGT Paul: 123, 125

*Ward, SSG Nolan: 247

Wardak, Taj Mohammad: 329

*Washington, CPT Morris: 338–39

*Washington, 2LT Tom: 82

Washington Post: 38, 40, 241

Water for farming: 223

*Watson, MSG Aaron: 249

*Watson, CPT David: 140–41

Weather

dust storms: 82, 96

in the high mountains: 117–18, 119–20, 132–33, 

376, 377–78

and intelligence operations: 281

and need for humanitarian aid: 46

and Operation ANACONDA: 282, 285

problems forecasting: 378–79

problems with rain at Karshi Kanabad: 77–78, 

376

sandstorms: 66, 82, 83, 84–85, 117, 119–20
417

*West, MAJ Jon: 236–41, 243

*West, CPT Paul, USAF: 65–66

“Whale,” the. See Terghul Ghar.

White, Thomas: 38

White Mountains: 204, 213, 215–16, 269n40

*Whitley, MSG Shannon: 215

Wiercinski, COL Frank: 277

*Wilcox, SSG Jesse: 239

*Wilcox, SGT Norman: 288

Wilkerson, COL Kevin: 327

*Wilkerson, SGT Roger: 331

*Willard, MAJ Kent: 338, 344

*Willet, SSG James: 64–65, 66

*Williams, Karen: 251

Wilmoth, SSG Harper: 313, 316–17

*Woburn, MSG Danny: 358

Wolfowitz, Paul: 33, 154, 155, 213, 252

Women

aviation mechanics: 152

broadcasts promoting the roles of: 259

role of: 7–8, 9, 15

and the Taliban: 18, 19, 21–22

World Food Program: 184

*Yates, MSG Dexter: 253, 349–50

Yemen: 102

Yosif: 178–79

Yousuf, Muhammad: 8–9

Zahir, Ahmed: 259

Zahir Shah, Muhammad: 7, 8, 9

Zaman, Hajji Mohammed: 109

Zerkikheyl, Afghanistan: 292, 324, 326

Zhob, Pakistan: 249

Zia Abdullah, Commander: 283

Zia Lodin, Commander: 281–83, 284–85, 286–87, 

292, 321, 322, 323, 324, 326, 327, 332, 353–54, 

365n 127, 386

Zia ul-Haq: 16–17

*Zimmer, Kerry: 276
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