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00-Inside cover.indd 1 10/19/09 1:34:27 
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

A Cyberspace Command

and Control Model

Joseph H. Scherrer

Colonel, USAF

and

William C. Grund

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 47

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

August 2009

01-Frontmatter.indd 1 10/19/09 1:35:20 
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available 

electronically at the Air University Research Web site 

http://research.au.af.mil and the AU Press Web site 

http://aupress.au.af.mil.

01-Frontmatter.indd 2 10/19/09 1:35:21 
iii

Foreword

As the nation’s most technologically advanced service, 

the Air Force relies absolutely on cyberspace to perform 

its war-fighting missions. Underpinning this competency 

is the ability to command and control cyberspace operations, something the authors argue is in need of a fresh 

approach if the Air Force is to effectively fly, fight, and win 

in cyberspace. 

The authors assert that the lack of an effective cyberspace C2 structure critically reduces the responsiveness to 

combatant and joint task force commanders and increases 

the difficulty of integrating cyberspace capabilities into 

operational plans and execution. The traditional military 

hierarchies currently used for cyberspace C2 do not have 

the agility to deal with the high velocity of change that 

characterizes cyberspace. Instead, the authors argue for 

flexible organizational structures to match the complexity 

and pace of the cyberspace operational environment. 

As with all Maxwell Papers, the Air War College publishes this study in the spirit of academic freedom and 

open debate. We encourage your engagement on the issues 

the paper raises and solicit your responses. 

MAURICE H. FORSYTH

Major General, USAF

Commandant, Air War College

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01-Frontmatter.indd 4 10/19/09 1:35:22 


About the Authors

Col Joseph H. Scherrer, USAF, is a communications and 

information officer. He has commanded three communications squadrons, served on the Joint Staff, and participated 

in multiple contingency operations, including Deny Flight, 

Provide Promise, Deliberate Force, Joint Forge, Southern 

Watch, and Enduring Freedom. While on the Joint Staff, he 

led the Joint Staff team that produced the first National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations. Colonel Scherrer 

graduated from the Air War College with distinction in May 

2009 and currently is the commander of the 75th Mission 

Support Group, Hill AFB, Utah. He is married to the former 

Dina Leite Moraes of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Lt Col William C. Grund, USAF, is a communications and 

information officer. He has commanded two communications 

squadrons, served on the PACAF and Joint Staffs, and participated in multiple contingency operations including 

Southern Watch, Noble Eagle, and Enduring Freedom. 

While at PACAF, he brought the PACAF Network Operations 

and Security Center (NOSC) to initial operational capability 

(IOC), and at the Joint Staff, he coauthored the National 

Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations. Following 

graduation from the Air War College in May 2009, Colonel 

Grund assumed command of the 379th Communications 

Squadron, Al Udeid AFB, Qatar. He is married to the former Teresa Sue Archambault. They have three children: 

Carl (14), Patrick (11), and Krista (10).

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Introduction

Although the concept of command and control (C2) is 

firmly embedded in US war-fighting doctrine, organization, 

technology, and operations, a definitive method for cyberspace C2 has not been established across the joint force. 

This is despite ample evidence that the joint force is not 

optimally organized for C2 of cyberspace operations. Ongoing intrusions to the tune of six million per day and massive exfiltration of information remain unabated. Attacks 

appear to be growing ever more sophisticated and difficult 

to detect. In addition, the armed forces’ offensive capabilities 

are unnecessarily segmented, being that both the legal 

authorities and technical capabilities are wholly enabled by 

agencies other than the Department of Defense (DOD). This 

situation critically reduces the responsiveness to combatant 

and joint task force commanders and increases the difficulty 

of integrating cyberspace capabilities into operational plans 

and execution. 

The central thesis of this paper is that any approach to 

cyberspace command and control must be founded on the 

nature of the cyberspace domain itself. To investigate this 

proposal, this study examines possible alternatives for cyberspace C2 that are based on the nature of the strategic environment, the nature of the cyberspace domain itself, and the 

way in which conflict must be approached in this domain in 

order to improve the armed forces’ ability to successfully 

compete in cyberspace. The paper provides background on 

the pertinent threats arising in cyberspace; the definition of 

cyberspace; and the nature of the strategic environment, 

cyberspace, and competition in cyberspace. Next, a review of 

C2 models and associated organizational forms, including 

the current DOD approach, is presented. A set of cyberspace 

C2 criteria is then derived, followed by an analysis of the 

models in light of the criteria. Using the results of the 

analysis, implications for C2—with particular emphasis 

on organizational structure—are addressed.

Background

In late 2005, several media outlets published reports of a 

DOD code-named computer intrusion set titled Titan Rain. 

02-Text.indd 1 10/19/09 1:38:22 
These reports outlined a concerted and lengthy effort by supposed Chinese computer hackers who were systematically 

infiltrating DOD systems across the globe. Their intrusions 

were described as efficient and rapid: “They would commandeer a hidden section of a hard drive, zip up as many files as 

possible and immediately transmit the data to way stations 

in South Korea, Hong Kong or Taiwan before sending them 

to mainland China. They always made a silent escape, wiping their electronic fingerprints clean and leaving behind an 

almost undetectable beacon allowing them to re-enter the 

machine at will. An entire attack took 10 to 30 minutes.”1

These intrusions resulted in huge amounts of data being 

transferred outside the United States to ultimate destinations 

unknown. While the actual types and specifics of the data lost 

remain classified, suffice it to say they included operationally 

and tactically relevant information that could assist an adversary. More disturbing is that the intrusions could take place 

at all and that it normally takes the DOD quite a long time to 

even notice an intrusion has taken place. This does not bode 

well for a zero-day intrusion, which is integrated into a more 

conventional type of an attack. The point of the zero-day attack would be to slow our response down long enough to give 

our adversary an asymmetric advantage, with the end result being dominance over US forces.

To meet these and other intrusion attempts, the DOD 

has relied upon an exceedingly hierarchical and authoritylacking organizational C2 structure. This has led to a system that finds itself in a reactive, defensive crouch vice one 

that can execute active defense measures to preempt unrelenting intrusions while keeping cyberspace available 

and allowing freedom of action for users and war fighters. 

More specifically, the military is using the traditional template of assigning responsibility, without adequate authority, 

to a single combatant command (COCOM), United States 

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). As this paper shows, it 

is widely recognized that cyberspace is declared, at the 

highest levels, as the newest domain of warfare. However, 

unlike the other war-fighting domains, cyberspace responsibilities are assigned to a COCOM vice a “service equivalent.” 

Service equivalent means that primary air responsibilities 

reside with the Air Force, land operations with the Army, 

and maritime activities with the Navy and Marine Corps. 

02-Text.indd 2 10/19/09 1:38:23 
For these domains, no one COCOM executes operational 

responsibilities across other COCOMs’ lines of authority 

and responsibility. Nor do the various service chiefs attempt 

to direct air, land, or maritime operations within a different 

COCOM. This is not so with cyberspace; for this domain, 

the military treats a domain of warfare organizationally different while utilizing conventional C2 structures that result 

in significant C2 challenges.

However, functional component commands do exercise 

combatant command authority over assets of all the services, 

not unlike geographical combatant commanders do once 

they are assigned or attached forces. But the similarity ends 

there. Unlike the functional commands, USSTRATCOM 

does not enjoy the ability to command and control the services’ cyberspace forces in a unified manner to ensure 

cyberspace superiority. 

Nowhere is this borne out more than in the military’s 

own documentation regarding C2 of cyberspace. Joint Task 

Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), the DOD’s 

operational and tactical command for cyberspace, published the Joint Concept of Operations [CONOPS] for Global 

Information Grid Network Operations [GIG NETOPS] in 2006. 

In this document, JTF-GNO published a chart (fig. 1) designed to help guide it in deciding when and how it might 

intervene and exercise C2 over the GIG during an event.2 

Based on the chart, the DOD is using traditional, geographically based thinking in an attempt to delineate artificial C2 

boundaries when the global nature of cyberspace argues 

against this approach.

 Criteria

Incident

CROSSES 

THEATER

BOUNDARY

IMPACTS

MULTIPLE

COCOMS

IMPACTS

OTHER

AGENCIES

BEYOND

THEATER

CAPABILITIES

GLOBAL

EVENT?

Figure 1. JTF-GNO matrix to manage incidents. (Reprinted from

USSTRATCOM, Joint Concept of Operations for Global Information Grid 

NetOps [version 3], 4 August 2006.)

02-Text.indd 3 10/19/09 1:38:23 


Some might claim that cyberspace is purely an enabler 

best viewed as a functional area. Even if this were true, the 

current command structure does not reconcile with the nature 

of the domain. Unlike the US Transportation Command, the 

US Joint Forces Command, or other functional COCOMs 

which are organized around their functional area, cyberspace is relegated to one of many missions under the 

USSTRATCOM umbrella. 

Further complicating the picture is a recent secretary of 

defense–directed organizational change. In a November 2008 

memo, Secretary Robert Gates directed the USSTRATCOM 

commander to “place [JTF-GNO] under the operational control of Commander, Joint Functional Component Command [for] Network Warfare [JFCC-NW]).”3 This arrangement further creates gaps and seams as the DOD attempts, 

through a traditional, hierarchical approach, to exercise 

C2 over the cyberspace domain. Instead, the environment 

in which cyberspace is embedded necessitates a C2 structure that recognizes, embraces, and takes advantage of 

the nongeographic nature of cyberspace.

The cyberspace environment can best be characterized 

by the acronym VUCA: volatility, uncertainty, complexity, 

and ambiguity. As this paper illustrates, rapid technological advances and increases in the use and pervasiveness of 

cyberspace coupled with aggressive adversaries create a 

volatile environment. The DOD, along with the rest of the 

world, is uncertain about the future uses and exploitations 

that will occur in cyberspace and the impact to our military 

and society should the current intrusions we suffer from 

advance in a destructive manner. Furthermore, the domain’s technological aspects and usage make it difficult to 

understand. All of these factors, along with the challenges 

of attributing cyberspace intrusions, combine to create an 

environment of frustrating ambiguity. The correct military 

response lies in establishing a C2 structure for this new 

domain so that the armed forces can not only execute dayto-day defense but also fight through future intrusions in 

time of war.

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Cyberspace: A Definition

To begin a discussion on cyberspace, one must first define and reach a common understanding of the term. Much 

writing on this topic has occurred over the past decade as 

cyberspace matured and as the DOD realized that a new 

domain and form of warfare had materialized.

The term cyberspace has come to be accepted universally 

as what we, as humans, created and now inexorably rely 

upon both in a military and civilian sense. It was first coined 

by the novelist William Gibson in his 1982 story titled “Burning Chrome” and then published in his 1984 novel Neuromancer.

4 However, his definition differs greatly from our current understanding of the concept. To wit, he defines 

cyberspace as “a consensual hallucination experienced daily 

by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts. . . a graphic representation of data abstracted from banks of every computer 

in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light 

ranged in the nonspace [sic] of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding.”5 As one can 

quickly tell, Gibson’s idea of cyberspace hardly applies to our 

reality. Like the Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of 

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, definition of cyberspace, the universal understanding of cyberspace does not include a description of a “consensual hallucination,” “unthinkable complexity,” or “lines of light.” 

Although we have embraced the term cyberspace, the DOD 

quickly rejected the definition submitted by its creator.

Enamored with the possibilities of cyberspace, the term 

was employed in many contexts with many different meanings and definitions. The accepted DOD definition as published in JP 1-02 prior to August 2006 states that cyberspace is the “notional environment in which digitized 

information is communicated over computer networks.”6

Once again, the concept of a “notional environment,” that is, 

one that does not exist except in one’s mind, is encountered. 

As there are very real, physical pieces to cyberspace, this 

definition does not accurately describe it. However, efforts 

to properly define it or discuss the very nature of cyberspace in any type of official capacity were met throughout 

the past decade with indifference or outright stonewalling. 

02-Text.indd 5 10/19/09 1:38:24 
In 2003 the president of the United States recognized the 

importance of cyberspace to the nation and attempted to 

define it in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace as 

“composed of hundreds of thousands of interconnected 

computers, servers, routers, switches, and fiber optic cables 

that allow our critical infrastructures to work.”7 While an 

admirable effort, coordinated across the entire US government, this definition deals mainly with hardware aspects of 

the domain and fails to recognize that cyberspace is, in fact, 

a domain and does not really add more to the discussion 

past the definition provided by the DOD in JP 1-02.

A significant breakthrough occurred with the publication 

of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR is 

the fulfillment of the statutory requirement in 10 US Code, 

section 118, which requires the DOD to “conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a ‘quadrennial defense 

review’) of the national defense strategy, force structure, 

force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and 

other elements of the defense program and policies of the 

United States with a view toward determining and expressing 

the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a 

defense program for the next 20 years. Each such quadrennial defense review shall be conducted in consultation with 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”8 This high-level 

document, a coordinated effort across the entire Joint Staff, 

acknowledged cyberspace is, in fact, a domain not unlike the 

traditional domains of warfare (air, land, sea). However, the 

QDR in a sense backed into the declaration of cyberspace as 

a domain by treating it as a fait accompli. It uses the term 

cyberspace as a de facto domain as passages pulled from the 

document illustrate.

• “Capabilities to locate, tag and track terrorists in all 

domains, including cyberspace.”9

• “Contribute to the nation’s response to and management 

of the consequences of WMD attacks or a catastrophic 

event, such as Hurricane Katrina, and also to raise the 

level of defense responsiveness in all domains (e.g., air, 

land, maritime, space and cyberspace) if directed.”10

(emphasis added)

02-Text.indd 6 10/19/09 1:38:24 
Having treated cyberspace as a domain, the QDR did not 

find it necessary to define the domain, leaving that for followon efforts. However, it did create the necessary, official environment to begin shaping the discussion toward cyberspace 

being officially declared as a domain of warfare with all the 

associated challenges and opportunities.

Immediately building upon the efforts of the QDR and 

driven by foreign intrusions against the Nonsecure Internet 

Protocol Router Network, the Joint Staff’s Communications 

and Information Directorate (J-6) led a chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff–directed, staffwide effort to develop a strategy 

to deal with cyberspace. As part of the effort to create the firstever National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations 

(NMS-CO), the authors arrived at a DOD-wide coordinated 

definition of cyberspace as “a domain characterized by the 

use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to 

store, modify and exchange data via networked systems 

and associated physical infrastructures.”11 As Dr. Kamal T. 

Jabbour, senior scientist for information assurance at the 

Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, New York, accurately points out,

The word “domain” instead of “environment” carries legal implications under the laws of armed conflict. “Electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum” refer to the wave-particle duality of radiation 

which, when modulated with information, creates a signal. “Data 

and networked systems” refer to digital information and application 

programs, and the computers and networks on which they exist, in 

other words data and applications, at rest and in motion.12

Cyberspace consists of more than the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP)–based Internet, 

though to be sure, it is the Internet that currently dominates what most people think of as cyberspace. There are 

thousands of protocols, software architectures, and hardware implementations that comprise cyberspace. This includes networks not based on the Internet Protocol, such 

as specialized military networks, networks not connected 

to the Internet, and networks that use different or proprietary communications protocols. Examples include Link 

16 networks that use a time division multiple access method 

and standardized message formats and the Signaling System 7 protocol, which ties together the world’s telephone 

switch network. The point here is that cyberspace is more 

than just Internet-based computer networks.

02-Text.indd 7 10/19/09 1:38:24 
Building upon the definition provided by the NMS-CO, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff continued to refine the definition and finally arrived at the current definition which is incorporated into JP 1-02 and is the official 

DOD definition of cyberspace: “A global domain within the 

information environment consisting of the interdependent 

network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer 

systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”13 This 

definition is sufficient to enable further discussion about 

cyberspace, its place within the traditional domains of warfare, and the need to establish effective command and control structures enabling the military to operate effectively 

within and through the domain.

The Nature of Cyberspace

One central and vital point must be understood: the 

value of cyberspace is derived from the information that 

flows through it. This continuous, massive exchange of information has made cyberspace indispensable to modern 

civilization and, thus, central to modern military operations. The volume of global Internet traffic per year, estimated to range from 3,000 to 5,000 petabytes (1015 bytes) 

and the fact that overall Internet traffic is growing at 50 to 

60 percent yearly, are enough to provide ample support for 

this assertion.14 This phenomenon results from a combination of technological, economic, and sociological factors and 

gives rise to a rich, dynamic, and ever-growing web of 

human-to-human, human-to-machine, and machine-tomachine interactions. New applications, such as Web 2.0 or 

social networking, digital television streaming, and the 

“executable Internet” promise to open innovative avenues 

to conduct commerce, stay in touch, and fight wars. The 

armed forces would do well to anticipate disruptive threats 

to emerge from cyberspace given the domain’s facility to 

generate innovation and create crosscutting change.

Innovation and change are hallmarks of cyberspace. It is 

important to understand that the cyberspace infrastructure, 

like the information that flows through it, does not remain 

static. The technologies and architectural approaches that 

comprise cyberspace will continue to change over time, 

02-Text.indd 8 10/19/09 1:38:24 
meaning that the fabric of cyberspace itself will evolve. Advances in electronics engineering, fabrication, integration, 

and production; improved computing architectures, networking, and information exchange methods; and emerging nanotechnologies and biotechnologies promise to transform today’s cyberspace into ever more potent forms with more 

powerful capabilities for information transmission, storage, 

processing, and depiction. Another critical point is that 

cyberspace will continue to become increasingly complex, 

especially in terms of scale and control. Cyberspace is comprised of billions of devices—each with its own hardware, 

software, and purpose—with billions to follow. This results 

in an extremely heterogeneous systems environment that is 

becoming less and less amenable to direct and pervasive 

human control. From a military standpoint, this evolutional reality drives an enduring requirement for aggressive science and technology research that will in turn 

translate into systematic alignment and fielding of effective cyberspace operational capabilities.

Cyberspace: A Man-Made Domain of Warfare

Cyberspace is both linked to and distinguished from air, 

land, sea, and space in that it is a man-made domain established through the use of electronic technology and software, 

firmware, and hardware programs specifically designed to 

manipulate electromagnetic energy into encoded signals. In 

one sense, cyberspace is exactly like the other physical domains in that it relies on a scientific reality—in this case the 

electromagnetic spectrum—that is governed by physical laws 

(e.g., Maxwell’s equations). However, cyberspace differs from 

the other domains in that technology is an essential factor 

for its existence. Cyberspace is a man-made domain in the 

sense that the transmission of encoded electromechanical 

signals is only possible through the use of human designed, 

manufactured, and organized electronics-based technology. 

Cyberspace is also similar to the other domains in that it 

is globally distributed, which adds to the C2 complexities. 

Unlike the other domains, cyberspace is owned by commercial, 

state, or private interests. It is not as some would say a 

“global commons” or “a natural asset outside national jurisdiction such as the oceans, outer space, and the Antarctic.”15

02-Text.indd 9 10/19/09 1:38:24 
10

Within some areas of the DOD the term global commons

has taken on a sort of buzzword status and is used to support strategic concepts that have US military forces engaged 

in the protection of access to the global commons. Except 

for very narrow situations such as public cable access or 

amateur radio frequencies, the principles of sovereignty, 

property rights, and commercial enterprise apply to cyberspace, which, in turn, under US and international law, 

place constraints on when and how military force can be 

used in cyberspace. 

The effort to classify cyberspace as a part of the global 

commons is best viewed as a movement to internationalize 

its control and subject it to supranational legal regimes. 

This controversy centers largely around the Internet, which 

since 1992 has been overseen by a consortium of commercial, governmental, academic, and research organizations 

under the auspices of the Internet Society. In addition, the 

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 

(ICANN), which controls the assignment of Internet address 

space and is contracted to the US Department of Commerce 

to perform this task on behalf of all Internet users, has 

come under fire from both commercial and governmental 

interests as to whether ICANN has the authority to accept 

or reject the establishment of new domains. The Internet 

Society and ICANN exemplify the regulatory and standards 

complexity that accompany operations in cyberspace. 

Cyberspace is also distinguished from the other domains by its potential to drive extremely high operational 

speeds. Whereas operations in the other domains are subject to much lower limits on speed due to gravitational, 

hydrodynamic, astrophysical, propulsive, and ballistic 

forces, cyberspace operations can occur at much higher 

speeds. For instance, the transmission of optical signals 

has been registered at two-thirds the speed of light, which 

is orders of magnitude faster than speeds achieved in the 

other domains.16 Practical examples include AT&T’s 40-

gigabit-per-second transmission capability on its Internet 

backbone and the 1.2 seconds it takes for a one-way, endto-end, geosynchronous satellite transmission.17 The 

speed at which events occur in cyberspace serves to transform the classic time-space planning factor by reducing 

the tyrannies of time and distance. With innovations occurring 

02-Text.indd 10 10/19/09 1:38:25 
11

continuously, the upper limit of operational speed in cyberspace will only continue to increase. 

However, increased operational speed is not automatic 

and is attenuated by a number of factors. Perhaps most 

obviously, speed is affected by machine failures and 

faults. In addition, just as in the other domains, adversary operations and effectiveness of friendly planning, 

decision making, and operational processes place a drag 

on operational speed. Unless cyberspace operations are 

thoroughly augmented with technological automation—to 

include more precise and cogent methods for producing 

situational awareness and moment-by-moment domain 

understanding—the human-induced latency associated 

with planning and decision making will negatively impact 

operational tempos, resulting in a failure to capitalize on 

the potentially high speeds afforded by the domain.

Another limitation on operations is the difficult task of 

tracing and attributing malicious activity in cyberspace. 

Adversaries conduct attacks using multiple nodal hops and 

diverse network paths that can transit many national 

boundaries. Even if an attack is successfully traced, it becomes another task altogether to correlate the attack to the 

actor who initiated it, all of which takes time. In addition, 

anonymity is readily achieved using obfuscation, masquerade, 

and deception techniques. With sufficient expertise, especially when augmented by knowledge available in the Internet, cyberspace becomes a sanctuary where information 

exchanges are conducted in secrecy and large-scale attacks 

can be launched with low probability of attribution. This 

affords a tremendous asymmetric advantage to a cyberspace attacker.

Asymmetric advantage is also associated with the ease at 

which cyberspace can be accessed. Operating in cyberspace 

is an inexpensive proposition as compared to the costs of 

entry to compete militarily in the other domains, especially 

air and space. Commercial computing technology and 

connectivity can be readily obtained along with extremely 

sophisticated attack and exploitation tools. Successfully 

competing in cyberspace is not restricted solely to nation-states. 

Organized crime and extremist organizations increasingly 

exhibit the type of agility and innovation previously reserved 

for state-run military-intelligence establishments to conduct 

02-Text.indd 11 10/19/09 1:38:25 
12

sophisticated technical operations. As the scale and reach 

of cyberspace capabilities grow, nonstate actors should be 

expected to increasingly use cyberspace as an asymmetric 

offset to a state’s conventional forces and technical means, 

while state actors will gain skill in the conduct and integration of cyberspace operations with operations in air, land, 

sea, and space. Because of its dependence on cyberspace, the 

United States is especially vulnerable to such operations. 

Another intricacy of the cyberspace domain is that very 

little in the way of international law exists with regard to its 

use. Unlike the other domains, from a legal standpoint, 

cyberspace is not yet considered a “place” as such, and 

therefore traditional territorial-based law for international 

conduct does not apply cleanly to the domain. Given the 

speed and general anonymity with which information flows, 

it is difficult to clearly delineate a state’s territorial boundary 

in cyberspace at any given moment. Such a capability would 

require the instantaneous mapping of electronic traffic 

flows to precise geographic points as well as the technical and 

procedural means to identify and police such flows. In addition, since cyberspace is based on an open-access philosophy 

that is embedded within the protocols and architecture upon 

which it is built, “fencing off” the domain into territorial 

sections would require a massive reengineering of its fundamental architecture. So the legal problem is as much 

conceptual and technical as it is legal, which confounds the 

search for a solution. In the meantime, in the international 

arena, it can be said that all actors have tremendous freedom of action in cyberspace. 

Cyberspace—US Legal Authorities

Within the US government, legal authorities for cyberspace are distributed among several different departments, 

agencies, and commissions. The United States Code prescribes defense in Title 10, commerce in Title 15 (technical 

standards–making), law enforcement in Title 18, intelligence gathering in Title 50, and communications regulation 

in Title 154 (Federal Communications Commission). In addition, the National Security Council has oversight responsibility for cyberspace policy making, and Congress shapes 

the cyberspace legal environment through law making, 

02-Text.indd 12 10/19/09 1:38:25 
13

legislative language, and funds appropriation. In contrast to 

the international arena, domestically, cyberspace operations 

must adhere to legal regimes concerned with law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and use of military force.18

Issues germane to cyberspace operations include homeland defense and posse comitatus; right to privacy, eavesdropping, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; 

and the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United 

Nations charter. 

With regard to the inherent right of self-defense, of 

particular interest is the question of when a cyber attack 

becomes an act of military aggression as opposed to espionage. Certainly, there have been large-scale cross-border 

cyberspace intrusions (e.g., Estonia and Georgia), but in 

those cases neither the United Nations nor the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization moved to declare the event an act of 

military aggression. A Schmitt Analysis yields two factors 

making such a declaration problematic: presumptive legitimacy and responsibility, which get to the issue of attribution.19 Presumptive legitimacy holds that “State actors have 

a monopoly on the legitimate use of kinetic force, while other 

non-kinetic actions—attacks through or in cyberspace—are 

often permissible in a wider set of circumstances; actions 

that have not been the sole province of nation-states are 

less likely to be viewed as military.” Also, “if a state takes 

visible responsibility for any destructive act, it is more likely 

to be characterized as a traditional military operation.”20

Therefore, this ambiguity makes it much more difficult to 

declare a cyber event an attack. As compared to the other 

operational domains, such grey areas in international 

law afford both state and nonstate actors considerable 

cover to conduct wide-ranging cyberspace operations with 

potentially severe effects. However, if an event were classified as an attack, a response by a nation-state, including 

one that uses cyberspace, would have to adhere to the law 

of armed conflict tenets of military necessity, distinction, 

proportionality, and chivalry. In this regard, the legal 

requirements for military operations in cyberspace are no 

different than operations in air, land, sea, and space. 

Further regulatory-like influence is exercised in the technical arena by industry consortiums and standards-making 

bodies. This complex of legal, regulatory, and standards 

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14

structures—while facilitating free enterprise, respect for 

privacy, and property rights—creates inherent hurdles, 

obstacles, and barriers for the conduct of cyberspace operations. To be sure, thoughtful change is always an option to 

reduce complexity when it comes to the conduct of cyberspace operations, but the most pragmatic approach is for 

military practitioners to acknowledge this complexity, incorporate it into their plans, find ways to increase cooperation with others who have interests in cyberspace, and use 

existing structures to the best military advantage while 

working to implement positive change.

Defending Cyberspace

Perhaps the most significant asymmetric advantage 

afforded to an adversary is derived from the difficulty of 

defending a globally distributed, highly technical domain. 

Cyberspace is comprised of literally hundreds of millions of 

addressable devices that use both network communications protocol stacks and computer software and hardware 

stacks. Add to this the ubiquity of the electromagnetic 

spectrum, and the immensity of the defensive task becomes 

clear. Report after report of intrusions and growing attack 

sophistication provide irrefutable evidence that—at the 

moment—cyberspace operations favors the offense.

The preceding analysis of cyberspace characteristics 

reveals the multidimensional nature of cyberspace. Fundamentally, cyberspace is a man-made, evolving, and 

technological domain firmly rooted in the scientific reality 

of electromagnetics. It relies on electronic devices, including communications switches and computer processors, 

to transmit and process modulated signals. Cyberspace 

is not a global commons but rather is owned, although 

the standards which underpin its technological fabric are 

largely a cooperative enterprise. In addition, cyberspace is 

based on an architecture designed for efficient and resilient 

data exchange. These three factors—commercial electronics, ownership, and ease of data exchange—have given rise 

to a situation wherein both access to the domain and acquisition of sophisticated data manipulation tools are inexpensive. Skilled practitioners can use access and tools 

to great operational effect, given the speed and anonymity 

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15

at which events occur under the cover of a complex maze 

of international and domestic legal, regulatory, and standards frameworks. Given that cyberspace operations currently 

favor the offense, cyberspace, properly used, can deliver an 

asymmetric advantage to both state and nonstate actors. For 

nation-states, cyberspace operations promise to be another 

powerful component of joint warfare; however, the armed 

forces must move out to achieve domain mastery to make the 

promise a reality.

Cyberspace is an enabler of globalization; rapid technological innovation; and faster decision making, product 

development, and service-delivery cycles.21 These factors 

all serve to shift and undermine the status quo not only in 

business but also in government policy making and social 

discourse. If an organization is to prosper, premiums must 

be placed on knowledge about the environment and the 

speed with which organizations can act to take advantage 

of opportunities or deal with challenges. Richard A. D’Aveni 

describes this situation as hypercompetition. Hypercompetition

is “an environment characterized by intense and rapid competitive moves, in which competitors must move quickly to 

build new advantages and [simultaneously] erode the advantages of their rivals.”22 Organizational survival hinges on the 

capacity for strategic and operational flexibility, leadership 

agility, and the ability to employ aggressive strategies to 

radically shift the status quo and destroy competitor advantage. Experimentation, rapid learning, and adaptation are 

prized, while penalties can be severe for slow and inappropriate responses. 

Hypercompetition is a strong metaphor for the fundamental task of the armed forces—fighting and winning the 

nation’s wars in a VUCA operational environment. From a 

war-fighting standpoint, hypercompetition evokes concepts, 

like full-spectrum dominance, the Clausewitzian Trinity, 

and operational art, that conceive of warfare as an intensely 

competitive struggle against cunning adversaries where 

measure is met by countermeasure in a lethal struggle 

to gain supremacy.23 In a similar manner, cyberspace 

operations exemplify the hypercompetitive metaphor as 

these operations are conducted in the very domain that 

drives the hypercompetitive reality. The armed forces 

are de facto competitors in this domain in much the 

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16

same way as commercial industry is, with the additional 

component of combat. 

In cyberspace, competition moves at a rapid rate, in part 

due to the speed at which technology changes. Therefore, 

any competitive advantage achieved in cyberspace is tenuous 

and transient, and military superiority must be viewed as 

temporary, local, and continually at risk. Just as successful business organizations must have the ability to quickly 

conceive of and employ technological solutions to challenges arising in and from the domain, so must the armed 

forces, especially in terms of cyber defense. Success requires 

the armed forces to effectively deal with rapid change and 

complexity in order to achieve efficacy in support of national 

security priorities—requirements that are especially pertinent for cyberspace operations.

Command and Control and 

the Cyberspace Domain

Command and control is often misunderstood and not 

surprisingly so. Surveys of C2 literature reveal a wide variety 

of definitions, approaches, and models. In order to provide a 

common intellectual framework for understanding the C2 

models to be discussed, this section describes how the term 

command and control emerged. In addition, particular attention will be paid to the match of organizational form to C2. Of 

central importance to this discussion is W. Ross Ashby’s law 

of requisite variety, which states that an organization’s internal regulatory mechanisms must be as diverse as the environment within which it is embedded.24 Building on Ashby, 

Henk Volberda further asserts that the ability to deal with a 

hypercompetitive threat is directly related to how well an 

organization is structured internally to match the environment.25 An organization with variety is capable of adapting 

appropriately to its environment or adapting its environment 

to the benefit of the organization. In the VUCA environment, 

careful consideration is needed to ascertain which organizational model will perform best, as the choice will directly 

affect the C2 method deployed to support the organization’s 

mission. Choices must be made between stability and 

flexibility, specialization and generalization, and centralization 

and decentralization.26 Too much internal complexity, and 

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17

operating costs go up. Too little, and the organization will not 

produce the requisite variety needed to survive. It is clear 

that the correct choice of organizational form is critical to 

achieving cyberspace superiority. 

After establishing a common understanding of C2, three 

main models for C2, with important variants, are presented: 

(1) the historical-traditional model (which includes the current DOD approach to cyberspace C2), (2) the cyberneticsystems model, and (3) the cognitive-psychological model. 

These models are also linked to the positive and negative 

characteristics of the hierarchical, heterarchical, and hybrid 

organizational forms. These three approaches are then 

vetted in terms of enduring C2 criteria, with particular focus 

on C2 organization and authorities. A recommendation is 

then made on a cyberspace C2 approach and what actions 

must be taken to implement it.

Historical-Traditional Model

The roots of the modern understanding of C2 can be 

traced to the industrial revolution with its requirements for 

the direction of large organizations engaged in complex 

mass-production processes. From this viewpoint, C2 is 

synonymous with the hierarchic organizational form and 

the emergence of the professional bureaucracy. Early organizational pioneers such as Max Weber, Frederick Taylor, 

and Frank and Lillian Gilbreth studied bureaucratic organization, work design, work measurement, standardization, 

and production control in order to best take advantage of 

the division of labor and specialization of tasks, thereby 

increasing production output and efficiency. Alfred P. Sloan 

is credited with establishing the modern hierarchical form 

of industrial organization with his divisional structure.27

This structure emphasizes strict hierarchical command 

chains, centralized finance and planning, cross-divisional 

integration at the corporate level, and tight control of and 

reporting on highly prescribed production activities. This 

basic construction endures not only in the business arena 

but also in the organization of the armed forces, as seen in 

the plan employed to mobilize for and conduct the Second 

World War, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1947, and the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1987.28

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From a technical perspective, the development of C2 as 

an organizational function reached new heights during the 

Second World War. The challenges brought on by the war 

resulted in the intensified development and use of mathematical methods to work on complex military C2 problems 

such as antiair defense, dynamic ballistic-firing solutions, 

large-scale logistics movements, and production and resource 

allocation decisions. During this period and shortly thereafter, statistical methods, operations research, linear programming, control theory, and systems analysis were applied 

to these problems on a nearly wholesale basis. In addition, 

the use of the first computers allowed mathematicians to 

solve more and more complex problems in less time. With 

the aid of computers, advanced computational methods 

were developed for simulation and forecasting of future results 

and to increase the efficiency of a hierarchical organization’s processes. The increasing use of computers to actually 

perform organizational control functions contributed to the 

identification of C2 as inherently technology-enabled, 

thereby serving to blur the distinction between the purposes of command and control. In essence, the two were 

viewed as synonymous. Further evolution of C2 occurred 

during the Cold War as increasingly sophisticated and comprehensive computerized command and control systems 

were developed. 

The Cold War ushered in yet another era of scientific 

development, given the need to ensure positive control of 

the destructive power of nuclear weapons and their delivery 

platforms, inform procurement decisions for increasingly 

complex weapon systems, manage the development and 

production of these systems, model and simulate nuclear 

warfare scenarios, and direct the actual conflict. With regard 

to nuclear conflict, it was quickly recognized that nucleararmed jet bombers, and soon thereafter ballistic missiles, 

dramatically reduced the time to detect and intercept Soviet 

equivalents. This drove the need for a responsive and reliable 

C2 system, one based on state-of-the-art communications 

and computing technology. Due to the consequences of 

nuclear conflict and the requirement to retain tight control 

of its inherent destructive power, the function of command—

the authority to direct military forces—was seen as inextricably tied to the organizational, procedural, and technical 

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apparatus that allowed command to be exercised. To address 

this situation, the military designed and implemented a tightly 

coupled C2 system composed of computerized command, 

control, and communications systems and highly specified 

operational procedures that were in turn reinforced by rigorous training, exercise, and inspection standards. This highly 

prescribed and vertically integrated C2 system resulted in 

positive weapons control, assured receipt of orders, and high 

launch probability from the order to launch at the presidential 

level to the turning of keys in missile silos. 

Historical-traditional C2 is virtually synonymous with 

the hierarchical organizational form, which has performed 

well during the industrial age and for modern government 

bureaucracies (fig. 2). Hierarchical organizations have a 

pyramidal structure and are characterized by specified 

superior-subordinate chains of command, specialization 

by function, uniform policies covering rights and duties, 

standardized procedures for each job, a career based on 

promotions for technical competence, impersonal relations, and all coordination being done from a level above 

the work being coordinated.29 They reduce transaction 

costs by increasing scale and by placing control of resources 

into the hands of top-level managers and are well matched 

to stable, predictable environments and large-scale production. Hierarchies take advantage of the division of labor and 

economies of scale for known, structured problems where 

there is less of a requirement to coordinate and share information across functional lines of authority. Position, rank, 

and experience are of paramount importance with regard to 

power relationships, decision-making authority, and control of resources. Power and decision-making authority are 

concentrated at the top of the hierarchy and decrease as 

one moves to the lower levels of the organization. 

Hierarchies also create “stovepipes,” which are vertical, 

tightly coupled component organizations that are optimized for narrowly focused functions (e.g., intelligence, 

logistics, maintenance, etc.). The systems that support hierarchies are built and controlled by these stovepipes, making 

interoperability difficult to achieve. This, in turn, drives the 

need for systematic coordination and integration if the organization is to achieve its overall purpose. Information flow 

in a hierarchy is necessarily aggregated and filtered as it 

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moves up the organization. Lower-level elements therefore 

have the most detailed local knowledge of the environment, whereas leaders at the top of the hierarchy have a 

broader picture of the global environment in which the 

organization operates. Courses of action are constructed 

globally at the highest command level and are progressively distilled down at each subordinate layer of command. Information flows within a hierarchy are largely 

confined to the stovepipes that created the information. 

There is little incentive to share information given that it 

is a source of knowledge—and therefore power—within the 

organization. Given the time it takes for information to 

flow from the bottom of the organization to the top, decisionmaking time horizons and perspectives are different between 

levels, yielding an asymmetry of decision-making focus. For 

the top of the pyramid, the longer time horizon and the higher 

position in the hierarchy result in decisions that are larger in 

scope and longer in term. 

The historical-traditional military C2 model is closely tied to 

the hierarchical form. However, despite its success, the effectiveness of the hierarchical form is challenged by environmental complexity, accelerating change, and hypercompetition. 

Hierarchies are slow to respond to environmental changes in 

part due to the restricted, up-and-down flow of information. 

Although hierarchies can sometimes react quickly to narrowly 

defined crises, they can lack the requisite variety to respond 

appropriately. Horizontal communication is hampered, and 

National Command Authority

National Security

Council

Secretary of Defense

Military Departments

Army Navy Air Force

Unified Commands Joint Chiefs of Staff

• Trains and equips

• Conducts operations • Plans and coordinates

President

Figure 2. National Command Authority. (Adapted from JP-1, Doctrine 

for the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 May 2007, II-5.)

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functional loyalties of stovepipes inhibit communication, 

problem solving, and coordination. The focus on efficiency 

means functional components can make decisions that benefit 

them rather than the organization as a whole. Interests become entrenched, and the organization as a whole resists 

change. Experience and position can be more prized than 

knowledge, leading to poor decisions or lack of acceptance of 

new ideas. 

Fast-forward to today, and it is readily apparent that the 

definition of C2 in JP 1-02 is at least partially a product of 

this industrial-age, nuclear-era understanding of the concept. The DOD, for example, defines command and control

as “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces 

in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 

personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, 

coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the 

accomplishment of the mission.”30 Rooted in this definition 

are the traditional-historical notions of hierarchy, authority, 

and management of scale, complexity, and force. This understanding results in a distinct military approach to C2 that 

tightly couples its functions for the purpose of controlling 

military force in a hierarchical organization.

With regard to current DOD organization for cyberspace C2, at the top of the hierarchy is USSTRATCOM. 

USSTRATCOM is tasked, via the Unified Command Plan 

(UCP), to defend the armed forces’ global information 

grid, the military-only portion of cyberspace. This means 

that USSTRATCOM has the combatant command authority 

to operate and defend the GIG. Indeed, USSTRATCOM 

states that part of its mission is “to ensure US freedom of 

action in space and cyberspace.”31 To accomplish this mission, it established two subordinate commands—the Joint 

Functional Component Command for Network Warfare and 

Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations. The JFCC-NW 

is responsible for coordinating and executing offensive operations enabled by the National Security Agency’s (NSA) exploitative cyberspace operations. The JTF-GNO executes its mission to operate and defend military cyberspace through the 

issuance of various operational and defensive orders to 

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22

subordinate commands. These orders direct GIG configuration changes, defensive measures, and reporting requirements. Until recently, these two organizations, while 

reporting to USSTRATCOM, were separate. However, 

understanding the lack of synergy and C2 difficulties 

encountered by “splitting” offense and defense, the DOD 

acted to remedy this with the November 2008 secretary of 

defense memo that placed JTF-GNO under the operational 

control of JFCC-NW.32 Interestingly, the commanders of 

both the JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW maintain their current 

dual-hatted roles: the three-star commander of JTF-GNO 

is also the Defense Information Systems Agency commander, and the three-star commander of the NSA is also 

the JFCC-NW commander. 

Within the USAF, the top-level organization for cyberspace now resides with Twenty-fourth Air Force under Air 

Force Space Command. Through Twenty-fourth Air Force, 

the USAF operates and defends its portion of cyberspace 

through its Air Force Network Operations command. It is 

from this organization that all operational and defensive 

actions are directed for Air Force cyberspace. AFNETOPS 

executes C2 of cyberspace through two Network Operations and Security Centers (NOSC). Each NOSC is assigned 

certain Air Force bases and is fully responsible for operating and defending the cyberspace that affects these bases. 

Agreements between the NOSCs and base communications 

squadron delineate responsibilities and help to ensure that 

the two organizations do not duplicate work. The implications for this arrangement are that wing commanders have 

lost control of the base-level computer network and have no 

say in the decisions regarding its operations and defense. 

Rather, these decisions are now made at AFNETOPS or the 

NOSCs. Another challenge arises when a squadron deploys 

to another combat command, thereby falling within that 

COCOM’s authority. 

Figure 3 shows the dual chain of command a communications squadron operates under in a deployed, wartime 

environment. Unlike the air, land, sea, and space domains, 

there is no discussion of combatant, operational, or tactical 

command as one expects regarding a domain of warfare. 

Instead, there are two lines of command authority directing 

the cyberspace activities of a base communications squadron 

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23

in a deployed environment. This arrangement not only 

causes confusion and duplication of effort but also violates 

the principle of warfare known as unity of command. Compounding the confusion is the fact that the Air Force NOSCs, 

which direct all activity on AF networks, are outside of the 

combatant command’s chain of command. Further, the 

COCOM is outside the functional line regarding how the Air 

Force operates, trains, and equips its forces. In the final 

analysis, the DOD, services, and COCOMs have established 

a traditional-hierarchical C2 structure that undermines 

unity of command, conflates the roles of the services and 

combatant commands, and—most critically—hamstrings 

the armed forces’ ability to rapidly adapt to events and innovations arising in the cyberspace domain. This situation 

unnecessarily constrains freedom of action and prevents 

the agility needed to successfully operate in the domain. 

In order to exercise cyberspace C2, legal authority must 

be assigned to a commander. Under the current cyberspace 

C2 construct, the authorities of the COCOMs and services 

overlap and are poorly defined, further complicating C2. 

The new UCP attempts to clarify some of these authority 

issues by clearly breaking out cyberspace operations as a 

new responsibility for the USSTRATCOM commander. Specifically, the new UCP states that

USAF

AFNETOPS

Combatant

Command

USAF

Communications

Squadron

STRATCOM

JFCC-NW

JTF-GNO

Command

Authority

Figure 3. Current DOD cyberspace C2

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USSTRATCOM is responsible for synchronizing planning for cyberspace operations, and will do so in coordination with other combatant 

commands, the Services, and as directed, appropriate U.S. government agencies. USSTRATCOM’s specific responsibilities include:

(a) Directing Global Information Grid operations and defense.

(b) Planning against designated cyberspace threats.

(c) Coordinating with other combatant commands and appropriate 

U.S. government agencies prior to the generation of cyberspace 

effects that cross areas of responsibility.

(d) Providing military representation to U.S. national agencies, U.S. 

commercial entities, and international agencies for matters related 

to cyberspace, as directed.

(e) Advocating for cyberspace capabilities.

(f) Integrating theater security cooperation activities, deployments, 

and capabilities that support cyberspace operations, in coordination with the geographic combatant commanders, and making 

priority recommendations to the Secretary.

(g) Planning OPE [operational preparation of the environment], and 

as directed, executing OPE or synchronizing execution of OPE in 

coordination with the geographic combatant commanders.

(h) Executing cyberspace operations, as directed.33

At first glance, this appears to show that USSTRATCOM is 

in charge of the operation and defense of cyberspace, or at 

least the GIG. However, in lengthy joint staff–tank sessions, 

a new phrase was defined, and it becomes a critical point for 

this new UCP. Specifically, the tank defined the phrase “synchronize planning” to mean “Combatant Commanders 

charged with synchronizing planning lead a global collaborative planning process that includes other Combatant Commanders, Services, Combat Support Agencies, and applicable 

Defense agencies and Field Activities in support of a designated global mission or campaign plan. The phrase ‘synchronizing planning’ pertains specifically to planning efforts only 

and does not, by itself, convey authority to execute operations or direct execution of operations.”34

This shows that disagreement remains between 

USSTRATCOM, the other combatant commands, and the 

services regarding overall authority for conducting cyberspace operations. The issue at hand is whether USSTRATCOM 

ought to have the authority to direct cyberspace operations 

within another COCOM’s area of responsibility. Although 

the 2008 UCP attempts to resolve some of this disagree02-Text.indd 24 10/19/09 1:38:29 
25

ment by specifically mentioning cyberspace and assigning 

the mission to USSTRATCOM, it stops short of assigning 

USSTRATCOM the full authority to conduct cyberspace 

operations across the globe by the inclusion of the phrase 

“synchronize planning.” In effect, this phrase allows the 

other combatant commands and services to disregard 

USSTRATCOM directives with which they disagree. There 

remains no clear authority for cyberspace C2.

This attempt to bring cyberspace operations under the 

command of a single COCOM will also cause other issues. 

For example, cyberspace activities such as network maintenance fall under the purview of the respective service, not 

a combatant command.35 However, in a recent memorandum, the secretary of defense recently approved a definition for cyberspace operations as “the employment of cyber 

capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military 

objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. Such operations include computer network operations and activities to 

operate and defend the Global Information Grid.”36 The 

memorandum goes on to state that (1) the term cyberspace 

operations is consistent with the language used in the 

National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, 

presidential directives, and the 2008 Unified Command 

Plan; (2) the methodology used for defining cyberspace 

operations is consistent with other joint operational definitions; and (3) cyberspace operations should encompass 

current computer network operations and activities to 

operate and defend the Global Information Grid.37

The first two points are significant because they show an 

attempt to forestall any further complaints or objections 

about this definition by declaring cyberspace operations to 

be fully consistent with all salient documentation currently 

published. The second point establishes cyberspace operations as an official DOD definition, to be incorporated into 

JP 1-02. However, the third point is significant because it 

states that network attack and network defense fall under 

cyberspace operations and include activities to “operate 

and defend the GIG.” When viewed in light of the 2008 UCP, 

it appears that operations and maintenance activities, legally 

a service responsibility, are now assigned to a COCOM. This 

creates a situation wherein two separate entities—

USSTRATCOM and the services—could validly claim the 

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26

authority to direct military cyberspace operations in accordance with Title 10 of the US Code and DOD guidance. 

Some would argue that USSTRATCOM can avoid this issue 

by labeling all its cyberspace directives as defensive in nature, 

which is well within their purview, versus operations and 

maintenance, the purview of the services. However, it is 

inevitable that the services will protest this situation as an 

encroachment on their congressionally mandated Title 10 

authorities to organize, train, and equip forces.

The current arrangement for cyberspace C2 mixes authorities and, as such, will continue to constrain the ability of the 

armed forces to conduct responsive cyberspace operations. 

The issues associated with USSTRATCOM, other combatant 

commands, and service prerogatives must be dealt with and 

call for a complete rethinking of the DOD’s approach to cyberspace C2.

We argue that such an understanding of C2 is inappropriately restrictive for the cyberspace domain. What is 

needed is an approach to C2 that allows more flexibility to 

conceptualize and match the fundamental purpose of C2 to 

the environment in which it is exercised. Toward this end, 

we follow Berndt Bremer and George Orr, who view the purpose of C2 as the direction and coordination of operations 

to produce desired effects according to the commander’s 

intent through the positioning of forces at the time and 

place they are needed.38 From this perspective, effective 

command seeks to gain competitive advantage by controlling the military power distribution.39 Control is achieved 

by gathering information about the operational environment, synthesizing the information to understand what actions 

must be taken, and translating that understanding into 

orders and direction that are executed through one’s 

forces.40 This understanding of C2 emphasizes goal, adversary (environment), and process rather than specification 

of authority, command chains, and organizational structure which unnecessarily limit—perhaps catastrophically—

the action required of the C2 system. Given this understanding, we examine other alternatives for cyberspace C2 

and commensurate organizational forms.

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27

Systems Theory and the 

Cybernetic-Systems Model

First articulated by biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy in 

his book General Systems Theory, systems theory offers 

principles and methods with which to study the interactions, 

relationships, and structure of any set of interacting entities 

(a system).41 Systems theory therefore takes a holistic perspective instead of a reductionist one: the behavior of a system 

is understood from the interactions of its parts rather than a 

detailed understanding of each of its parts. It is directed toward the analysis of “any group of objects that work in concert to produce some result. This could be a single organism, 

any organization or society, or any electro-mechanical or informational artifact.”42 Based on Bertalanffy’s study of biologic organisms, two basic principles characterize systems 

theory. “First, all phenomena can be viewed as a web of 

relationships among elements, or a system. Second, all 

systems, whether electrical, biological, or social, have 

common patterns, behaviors, and properties that can be 

understood and used to develop greater insight into the 

behavior of complex phenomena.”43 Systems theory also 

endeavors to understand the interactions, processes, relationships, and macro behavior of the interdependent parts 

as a whole. Especially important are the complexity of the 

relationship of systems to their environments and the 

ability of systems to adjust to changes in the environment. Systems theory includes the following key traits:

• A system is a dynamic, complex, and interdependent 

whole, interacting as a structured functional unit.

• A system is holistic, exhibiting emergent properties not 

possible to detect by analysis of individual parts.

• A system is a community situated within an environment.

• Energy, materiel, and information flow among the different elements that compose the system.

• The elements of the system are differentiated and perform specialized functions.

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28

• Energy, materiel, and information flow from and to the 

surrounding environment via semipermeable membranes or boundaries.

• Energy, materiel, and information are transformed into outputs through processes by which the goals are achieved.

• Systems are often composed of entities seeking equilibrium but can exhibit other types of behavior (e.g., 

chaotic, oscillating).

• Systems are regulated through feedback.

• Systems can comprise parts of larger systems.

• A system is goal seeking, meaning that systemic interaction must result in some goal or final state.

• Systems exhibit equifinality, alternative ways of attaining the same objectives (convergence), and multifinality, 

attaining alternative objectives from the same inputs 

(divergence).44

The cybernetic-system model is the dominant C2 paradigm for nearly all researchers and systems builders and 

either explicitly or implicitly informs all C2 models (see fig. 

4). A cybernetic system is composed of three fundamental 

components: (1) sensors that accept input from the environment, (2) processors that accept the input and transform it, and (3) output mechanisms that take the processed 

information and use it to change the behavior of the system. The cybernetic aspect of military operations is readily 

apparent given that these operations are a process by which 

a commander (sensor and processor) directs forces (people, 

processes/organizations, and technology organized into a 

system to produce output) to achieve comparative advantage over an adversary (interaction with the environment) 

through maneuver and the application of firepower (output 

and feedback). The science of cybernetics observes internal and 

external interactions “guided by the principle that numerous 

different types of systems can be studied according to principles 

of feedback, control, and communications.”45 Also key to understanding the concept of cybernetics is the idea of self-regulation. When a system senses a change in the environment, 

that information is used to adjust the behavior according to 

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29

the goal of the system. The system then monitors the environment to ascertain if either the internal or external change has 

successfully aligned with the system’s goal. 

Figure 4. The Cybernetic Model. (Adapted from Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine

[Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1948]; and Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General 

Systems Theory: Foundations, Development, and Applications [New 

York: George Braziller, 1968].)

Management cybernetics applies the principles of cybernetics and systems theory to organizations. Pioneered by 

Stafford Beer in 1959, management cybernetics examines the 

problems of control and decision making and the development 

of models in terms of the organization’s goals; inputs, transformation of inputs, and outputs; regulation, control, and 

feedback; and capability to generate a variety of responses 

to environmental challenges.46 Beer’s Viable System Model 

(fig. 5) is an abstracted cybernetic description applicable 

to any organization that is a viable system and capable of 

autonomy. Beer developed the Viable System Model as a conceptual tool for designing, implementing, and reengineering 

organizations to improve an organization’s ability to adapt 

Cybernetic Model

Control Response

Apparatus Receptor Eector Stimulus Message Message

Feedback

The Basic Cybernetic Model

(sources: Wiener, 1948; von Bertalany, 1968) 

Key Characteristics of the Cybernetic Model:

- Self-regulation/self-adaptation

- Feedback loop

- Control

- Information

(source: Wiener, 1948)

EMERGED OUT OF WWII AND IS THE FOUNDATION

OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF C2 MODELS 

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Figure 5. Viable System Model. (Adapted from Stafford Beer, Brain of 

the Firm [London: Penguin Press, 1972].)

02-Text.indd 30 10/19/09 1:38:30 
31

and survive in its environment.47 Beer’s model examines 

five major elements that an organization depends on to 

achieve its purpose: (1) operations, (2) coordination between 

elements in the organization, (3) activity and resources that 

optimize the organization in relation to its environment, (4) 

the organization’s environment, and (5) normative rules and 

regulations. The model then diagnoses the information flows 

that tie all the elements together in terms of sufficiency and 

richness. Multichannel robustness is especially emphasized 

as it allows the organization’s structures and processes to 

work and deal with changes in the environment. Control, 

regulation, and communication are also optimized according 

to what the organization must do to be successful in its current operations, for its future, and in terms of its long-term 

identity and values.

Models Derived from Complexity Theory

The principles of cybernetics and systems theory have in 

turn informed the development of complexity theory. Complexity theory is a special application of systems theory, 

founded on biological science and the behavior of living 

organisms. It can be defined as “any system featuring a 

large number of interacting components, whose aggregate 

activity is nonlinear and typically exhibits hierarchical 

self-organization and evolving behavior when placed under 

stress from its environment.”48 From an organizational 

standpoint, complexity theory is used to explain how organizations adapt and survive in their environments.49 John 

H. Holland, a complex and nonlinear systems pioneer, 

cites such characteristics as self-organization, emergent 

behavior, dispersed control, and adaptability as hallmarks 

of a complex organization. He describes complex adaptive 

systems as having the following qualities:

• Many agents acting in parallel in an environment produced 

by their interactions with other agents in the system.

• Because the agent is constantly acting and reacting to 

the other agents’ actions, nothing in its environment 

is fixed. 

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32

• Control is highly dispersed, therefore any coherent behavior there might be in the system has to arise from competition and cooperation among the agents themselves. 

• Many levels of organization, with agents at one level 

serving as building blocks for the next level up. 

• Constant rearrangement of the building blocks as a result of learning, experience, evolution, and adaptation. 

• All anticipate the future to some degree, making attempts at prediction on the basis of models of their 

environment. 

• All have niches they can exploit. Filling up one niche 

often opens up new ones that can be exploited, so the 

system never reaches equilibrium. 

• Some dimensions can be improved upon but never 

optimized.

• The richness of the interactions within the system allows the system as a whole to undergo spontaneous 

self-organization.50

Self-organization is a process of attraction and repulsion 

in which the internal organization of a system, normally an 

open system, increases in complexity without being guided 

or managed by an outside source. Emergence is the process 

of deriving new and coherent structures, patterns, and 

properties as an organization works to fit itself to the environment. Emergent phenomena occur due to the pattern of 

interactions between the elements of the system over time 

and are observable at a macro level, even though they are 

generated by micro-level elements. Emergence is also related 

to dispersed control in that decisions are made by a variety 

of elements in the system rather than a central governor. 

Adaptability, or homeostasis, is the regulation of a system’s 

internal environment so as to maintain a stable, constant 

condition in relation to environmental changes. 

As a model for organizations, complexity theory has 

had a major impact on modern organizational theory. 

Some would even argue that cyberspace, despite being 

nonbiological, manifests such emergent properties. In fact, 

from an overall war-fighting standpoint, the United States 

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33

Marine Corps (USMC) elevated complexity theory as its fundamental viewpoint for war fighting and explicitly views 

war-fighting organizations as complex systems.51 The 

Marine Corps based its doctrinal decision on John Boyd’s 

“Organic Design for Command and Control” (fig. 6) in support of its all-important maneuver warfare doctrine. However, viewing Boyd’s design as simply a model for maneuver 

warfare diminishes its conceptual sophistication as a much 

broader model for organizational complexity in the face of 

complex operating environments. In this regard, Boyd was 

well ahead of his time and, in fact, has much in common 

with Stafford Beer and his Viable System Model. 

Boyd’s model more closely resembles a heterarchy. As an 

organizational form, a heterarchy more closely matches the 

requirements of a viable system or a complex adaptive system. A heterarchy is well suited to handling challenges from 

the environment that call for flexibility and adaptability. In 

a heterarchy, authority is laterally rather than vertically 

distributed and has no fixed superior decision-making 

chain. Heterarchies are characterized by interdependent 

relationships, dense information nets, and distribution of 

decision-making power. Organizational members participate in decision making regardless of their functional role, 

position, or rank. The premium for decision-making authority 

is based on knowledge and competence in solving problems 

rather than rank or time served in the organization. In addition, heterarchies process more information and use it more 

effectively than hierarchies. Communications channels are 

dynamic and are created and modified to reflect the needs 

of a particular situation or event. This ability to dynamically adapt to changing situations can be viewed as a way 

of employing requisite variety. The emphasis on knowledge 

contributes to the capacity of a heterarchy to generate a 

variety of solutions to problems that face the organization. 

Heterarchies have a greater ability to quickly integrate 

information from multiple sources and achieve flexibility 

to adapt to changing circumstances. A member of a heterarchy can be connected to any other members without 

needing to go through or get permission from anyone. In 

this way, a heterarchy distributes privilege and decision 

making among participants, in contrast to a hierarchy, 

which assigns more power and privilege to the members 

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Figure 6. Organic Design for Command and Control. (Reprinted from John Boyd, “Organic Design for Command and Control,” 

unpublished briefing, 1987.)

Observation Orientation Decision Act

Observations

Feed

Forward

Feedback

Feedback

Feed

Forward

Feed

Forward

Decision

(Hypothesis)

Action

(Test)

Unfolding

Interaction

With

Environment

Implicit

Guidance

and Control

Implicit

Guidance

and Control

Unfolding

Interaction

With

Environment

Unfolding

Circumstances

Outside

Information

New

Information

Previous

Experiences

Analysis

Synthesis

Cultural

Traditions

Genetic

Heritage

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35

higher in the structure. Heterarchies include these distinctive features:

• Temporary associations out of a pool of people are 

emphasized rather than permanent structures and 

changing people.

• Overlap of responsibility is viewed as an advantage.

• Knowledge is resident throughout the organization and 

valued wherever it exists.

• Lateral communication is preferred over vertical 

communication.

• Strategic nodes can emerge at any place in the organization based on environmental contingencies and where 

the requisite knowledge to solve the problem exists.

• Upper levels of the organization are viewed as orchestrators of communication rather than solely agents of 

control, monitoring, and resource allocation.

• Strategy is a product of contributions across the network rather than formulation and dissemination by 

higher headquarters.

There are downsides to cybernetics, systems theory, and 

heterarchies. Save for Boyd’s theories, the major criticism 

of cybernetics and systems theory is that they do not explicitly incorporate human agency or moral factors. The human aspects of interaction, cognition, and relationships 

and the moral and emotional aspects of conflict and cooperation are perceived to be immaterial to the function of the 

system and its output. In effect, these approaches reduce 

humans to mere parts or black boxes, making the models 

necessarily incomplete. With regard to complexity theory, 

its concrete scientific applications are so constrained (e.g., 

cellular behavior) that the generalization of the theory to 

broader classes, especially complex systems, is called into 

question. With regard to heterarchies, a significant investment of time, energy, and administrative and technical 

support infrastructure is needed to maintain the dense 

communications nets required to keep information flowing at the volumes required for effective collaboration, 

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36

coordination, and action. In addition, the bias toward consensus in decision making in heterarchies creates the potential for confusion, sluggish response (although the response may be perfectly appropriate, it is too late to address 

the need), and gridlock. Finally, the lack of a central governor or prescribed chain of authority in a heterarchy results 

in difficulty in achieving global optimization, long-term 

plans of action, and predictable performance.

Cognitive-Psychological Models

As a remedy to the issues associated with cyberneticssystems models, several efforts have been made to address 

cognitive and psychological factors in command and control. Carl Builder’s “Command Concept C2” is one such 

effort.52 Builder’s analysis is “driven by the need to separate the intellectual performance of the commander from 

the technical performance of the C2 system.” (emphasis 

added) He further states that the “essence of command lies 

in the cognitive processes of the Commander.”53 Builder 

places emphasis on preparation for battle using the C2 

system rather than orchestration and improvisation. In 

addition, he views information as important when developing the command concept, but real-time information is 

not especially relevant to altering the outcome of a conflict. 

In this regard, Command Concept C2 diverges dramatically 

from the cybernetic-systems view, which holds that information is essential to adaptation. However, in the end, 

Builder’s theory is cybernetic in nature as he claims that 

“the formulation and transmission of the commander’s 

concept could be considered as the content of the C2 system.”54 This means that the Command Concept C2 would 

have to be integrated into an overall C2 model, which in all 

likelihood would be cybernetic. 

Another cognitive-psychological approach has been formulated by Ralph Stacey that incorporates relationship 

psychology to account for human interaction.55 Stacey is a 

proponent of complexity theory but believes it has been 

misapplied. His approach is in part a reaction to the functionalist point of view embedded in all systems thinking, 

exemplified by his opinion that “the radical potential of theories of chaos and dissipative structures for organization 

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37

theory tends to be obscured by simulations of this kind 

because the agents in the system are treated in an impersonal way.” Instead, he takes a constructivist approach 

and proposes organizations as “complex responsive processes” based on interacting themes, conversations, and 

relationships. In other words, members of the organization 

continuously build an organizational narrative and thereby 

shape and reshape the power relationships and actions 

that the organization takes to deal with its environment. 

Stacey’s approach is not so much a model as it is a competing philosophical viewpoint that places human interaction 

at the center of organizations. It is human-to-human interaction that exercises “ordinary daily human freedom. . . to 

weave actions into and around the system. . . in order to 

cope” with the environment and “get things done.”56 Stacy 

presents a compelling case, but at the moment it remains a 

theoretical one. Although models for complex responsive 

processes could emerge over time, for now the theory remains just that—theory.

The Hybrid Form

Both hierarchies and heterarchies have strengths and 

weaknesses. A critical weakness of hierarchies is that their 

top-down, authority-driven structure does not have the 

requisite variety to respond to the VUCA cyberspace environment. On the other hand, heterarchies lack a mechanism 

to provide for global direction and predictable performance. 

Another organizational option is to combine the strengths of 

both and minimize their weaknesses in order to provide the 

means to resolve the need for control and direction on the 

one hand and flexibility and adaptation on the other. A hybrid organization, properly designed, employs the best attributes of hierarchy and heterarchy. Command and control in 

a hybrid organization moves away from the traditional C2 

model by uncoupling command from control.57 Command 

involves the making of strategy and setting conditions for 

action through planning, resourcing, and facilitating information flow throughout the organization. Control is not a 

function of command but emerges as a function of organizational structure; resource, information, and knowledge flows; 

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38

and the environment (which includes adversaries).58 Beer’s 

Viable System Model exemplifies this approach. 

From a military standpoint, a key example of the hybrid 

form was during World War I on the Western Front when 

the German army formally implemented storm trooper tactics to break the stalemate of trench warfare with its lethal 

concentration of industrial age firepower. The Germans 

relied heavily on Auftragstaktik, or mission-type orders, as 

an approach to operations wherein “a military commander 

gives their subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the 

mission) and the forces needed to accomplish that goal with 

a time within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leaders then implement the order independently. The 

subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, the planning 

initiative and a freedom in execution which allows flexibility 

in execution. Mission-type tactics free higher leadership 

from tactical details.”59

To be sure, Auftragstaktik is a way of increasing the autonomy of the military organization, its capacity to maneuver 

quickly, and the initiative of its individual members in the 

face of a more complex and deadly battlefield environment. 

In effect, it patches around the inflexibility of a standard 

hierarchical organization and in its own way uniquely addresses the Clausewitzian realities of emotion, chance, and 

friction in the VUCA environment. Even though missiontype orders are institutionalized as part of US war-fighting 

doctrine, this does not go nearly far enough to allow the 

armed forces to succeed in the hypercompetitive cyberspace 

domain.60 Although not touted as such, the concept of network-centric warfare has the potential to move the armed 

forces toward a hybrid organizational form more in tune 

with the requirements of a VUCA cyberspace environment. 

To do this, network-centric warfare should not be viewed as 

a “value proposition” or “new form of warfare” but rather as 

a way to increase the requisite variety of military organizations to deal with the VUCA environment.61 Quite simply, 

an organization that is networked and provisioned with rich 

information flows, reconfigurable (and highly automated) 

processes, knowledge-based practitioners, and—especially 

key—control flexibility will display a greater capacity to 

successfully adapt to internal and external threats and 

exploit emerging opportunities. This type of organization 

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39

blends the best of the hierarchical and heterarchical organizational forms and best applies to the cyberspace domain.

Criteria for Cyberspace

Command and Control

Based on the above analysis, we argue that the historicaltraditional model of C2 is inappropriately restrictive for the 

cyberspace domain. What is needed is an approach to C2 

that allows more flexibility to conceptualize and match its 

fundamental purpose to the environment in which it is exercised. As stated previously, we use Bremer and Orr, who 

view the purpose of C2 as the direction and coordination of 

operations to produce desired effects according to the commander’s intent through the positioning of forces at the 

time and place they are needed.62 In addition, we adopt the 

positions of Builder and Georgiy Levchuk et al., and indirectly Volberda, who all advocate the conceptual delinking 

of command from control. In this view, the role of command 

is to continually survey the internal and external environments and ensure the organization’s inputs, processes, 

interactions, and information flows are calibrated properly 

to achieve the organization’s goals. Command involves the 

surveying, contemplating, and monitoring of the organization’s fitness to the environment, and—when necessary—

directing adjustments to the organization’s structure in 

order to assure ongoing performance and survival. On the 

other hand, control is distributed throughout the organization and supported by dense nets of information flows, interactions, and knowledge-based decision making and engagement within the organization and with the environment.

The environment in which cyberspace operations are conducted produces certain mandatory requirements for the 

armed forces to successfully compete in the domain. The 

VUCA strategic environment; the speed, multidimensional 

complexity, and rapid technological innovation characteristic 

of cyberspace; and the nature of competition and change in 

cyberspace call for a C2 function that can continually match 

this environment and impact the environment itself for the 

benefit of the objectives for which cyberspace operations are 

employed. We propose seven criteria for cyberspace C2 

that, if met, will place the armed forces in a position to 

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40

best orchestrate cyberspace operations. These criteria include speed, adaptability, alertness, flexibility, responsiveness, resilience, and efficiency.

Speed is the sine qua non of cyberspace operations. 

Two types of speed are needed to compete in the cyberspace domain. First, the cyberspace C2 function and the 

technology that supports it must be capable of operating 

at speeds that enable appropriate responses and preventive actions. The speeds required will be variable but 

should incorporate the potential to achieve two-thirds the 

speed of light, which is built into the infrastructure of the 

domain itself. Second, cyberspace organizations must exhibit a speed of adaptation, planning, innovation, and 

implementation that meets or exceeds the rate of introduction of new attack vectors; novel tactics, techniques, 

and procedures; and technological innovation and implementation. This type of speed is necessarily slower than 

the information flows that transit cyberspace; however, 

without it, cyberspace C2 would not be capable of the 

adaptation needed to maximize the opportunity offered 

by the raw speed of the domain. 

The hypercompetitive nature of cyberspace is characterized by continuous change and innovation. This requires an 

adaptable organization that is able through its C2 capability to (1) correctly perceive and appropriately deal with the 

external environment, (2) maintain high levels of information exchange and cooperation within the organization in 

order to formulate options, and (3) dynamically restructure 

processes, decision-making relationships, and behaviors to 

effectively implement change options to deal with the external environment. In terms of war fighting, cyberspace 

C2 must be adaptable in the face of all types of threats, 

across the entire range of military operations, and at all levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. The criteria 

of alertness, flexibility, responsiveness, and resilience are 

driven by the requirement for speed and are directly related 

to adaptability.

Alertness refers to timely awareness of existing or anticipated changes internal to the organization or in the operating environment.63 It implies a multidimensional understanding of the current and projected status of the 

cyberspace domain in relation to the larger operational 

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41

environment. Alertness also includes the capacity for situational awareness of the technical parameters that comprise the cyberspace infrastructure. Particularly important 

is the anticipation of adversary action and innovation, areas 

that require the intense application of intelligence operations. 

In addition, it points the organization toward the threats and 

opportunities associated with emerging capabilities and innovations and how the organization might deal with a threat 

or capitalize on an opportunity.64

According to Volberda, control flexibility is “the degree to 

which an organization has a variety of managerial capabilities and the speed at which they can be activated to increase the control capacity of management and improve the 

controllability of the organization.”65 Flexibility, then, can 

be viewed as the governor of adaptability and management’s 

most important C2 task. Without it, an organization could 

fail to adapt or perhaps yield to a series of mindless adaptations that lead to disintegration. It follows that cyberspace 

C2 must be flexible enough to continue to operate in new or 

changed scenarios rather than remaining set in static configurations.

Responsiveness refers to the change capacity of an organization’s processes once it is found that adjustments must be 

made to positively adapt to internal or external threats and 

opportunities.66 Responsiveness relates to the development of 

variety in the choice and design of C2 processes in order to 

ensure that information inputs and decisions are transformed 

into the effects needed for a particular situation appearing in 

the environment. Responsive processes must be rapidly reconfigurable (polymorphic), automated where possible, and 

supported by appropriate levels of information, knowledge, 

competence, resources, and a cultural bias in the organization that understands and supports the need for change. 

Resilience is the ability of cyberspace C2 to withstand attack or other forms of significant shock and discontinuity. A 

resilient cyberspace C2 capability would enable an organization to continue to operate, adapt, and survive in the VUCA 

cyberspace environment in the face of damage, degradation, 

disruption, or destruction.

Cyberspace C2 efficiency relates to how well information, 

time, and resources are used throughout the organization 

to feed processes and decision making in order to produce 

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42

the desired output in the fastest, most economical, and 

highest quality way. In practice, cyberspace C2 efficiency 

can also reduce the deployed footprint, decrease the demand for scarce resources, and leverage economies of 

scale across time and space. Achieving cyberspace C2 efficiency requires a well-designed technical architecture, 

high-volume yet appropriately tailored and calibrated information flows, multidimensional situational awareness, 

and well-trained and educated practitioners.

To be sure, this set of criteria is abbreviated. However, 

the criteria are based on solid academic research and the 

practical experience of today’s operational environment, 

and therefore for our purposes they are sufficient to begin 

to relate the requirements of the cyberspace domain to the 

choice of an appropriately matched C2 model. If one assumes that C2 is as essential for cyberspace operations as 

it is in any other war-fighting domain, the question at hand 

becomes what is the best form of C2 to exercise command 

and achieve desired military results in cyberspace? Although it stands to reason that cyberspace operations share 

similar C2 elements as other war-fighting domains such as 

organization; technical systems; and tactics, techniques, 

and procedures, we assert that the most effective C2 method 

for cyberspace operations will be heavily influenced by the 

nature of the domain itself and the environment within 

which it exists.67

Evaluation of Models

To arrive at a decision regarding which C2 model to recommend, we developed a straightforward decision matrix to 

evaluate each model based upon the seven criteria described earlier. We chose the decision matrix because we 

felt this tool would help us arrive at a quantitative decision 

even though the evaluation of how each model met the criteria is subjective. We will explain later how we arrived at 

each of our evaluations.

We grouped the various C2 constructs discussed earlier 

into three bins for the purpose of evaluation. These groupings centered on hierarchical, heterarchical, and hybrid C2 

models. The matrix is filled in using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1

being the least effective and 5 being the most effective. We 

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43

did not weight any criteria higher than any other because 

we felt each item was equally important to the evaluation of 

the C2 models (see fig. 7).

Hierarchical Heterarchical Hybrid

Speed 3 4 5

Adaptability 1 3 3

Alertness 3 5 5

Flexibility 1 3 3

Responsiveness 3 5 5

Resilience 5 1 5

Efficiency 3 3 4

 Totals 19 24 30

Figure 7. Decision matrix

As previously discussed, the hierarchical model is not 

quick to react to change in the environment nor is it a very 

quick method to disseminate orders from top to bottom. 

This is due to the necessary vetting and approval process 

that a hierarchical organization employs. The heterarchical 

model is very quick due to its distributed nature and reliance upon very distributed decision making. However, unlike the hierarchical model, there is a significant loss in 

uniform, homogenous decision making and synchronized, 

macro-oriented direction. The hybrid model, while not as 

quick to disseminate orders, still retains lower-level decision-making authority, which enables local C2 of an issue 

while still incorporating the best aspects of a hierarchical 

command structure. This allows time to be used most efficiently at multiple layers within this model due to each organization working its level of the action.

A heterarchical system is adaptable, depending upon the 

local organization. How the lower echelons of command decide to adapt to a certain situation results in a disjointed 

and inconsistent effort across the spectrum, as one organization will adapt to a changing environment one way while 

another adapts differently. While there should be resilient 

communication flows between the organizations’ best practices and past lessons learned, this does not mean that 

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44

these will necessarily be incorporated. In contrast, the hierarchical C2 structure is adaptable only so far as the parent 

command allows. In today’s remote, deployed environment, 

commanders far removed from the scene may not fully understand the problem set or the need to deviate from established parameters. Additionally, the downward-directed 

adaptation may fall well short in time and purpose of what 

is needed at the local level and may not be feasible across 

the entire cyberspace domain. The hybrid C2 structure results in an organization that can adapt as the situation 

presents itself while still conforming to an established set of 

goal-oriented guidelines. 

Assuming a level playing field (sufficient and similar 

technologies deployed across the three models), we believe 

that all three models can achieve similar levels of alertness. 

The technological advances of the last decade enable commanders in all domains of warfare to be cognizant of the 

lowest level of tactical events on the battlefield. So it can be 

with cyberspace. It is feasible for any C2 structure within 

cyberspace to be aware of the lowest-level event, to monitor 

it, and to direct actions mitigating the seriousness of the 

event. We could not discern a difference between the three 

models worthy of distinction.

As with adaptability, the hybrid model is the most flexible 

of the three. As stated before, combining the best attributes 

of each allows for a C2 structure that can change based 

upon localized mission requirements while still preserving 

a similar enough structure that it retains strong similarities 

to others. The hierarchical model, again, will flex as much 

as parent commands allow, which may not be enough for 

the situation and may not apply or be useful to the entire 

hierarchical C2 structure. The same adaptability detractors 

for the heterarchical model apply here as well.

Assuming proper intelligence and warning, a hierarchical model can be highly responsive. To pretend otherwise 

would be to dismiss centuries of warfare and all relevant 

examples. There are, obviously, instances where intelligence and warning were not available or properly utilized 

(the attack at Pearl Harbor as an example); however, this is 

not indicative of the entire C2 model. Likewise, a heterarchical model can also be exceptionally responsive across 

the entire range. Once again, one does run into the disjointed 

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45

approach that a heterarchical model would employ across 

the entire cyberspace domain. As also mentioned before, 

the hybrid model would enjoy the benefits of being responsive 

to an event while working within the hierarchical guidance.

Both the hybrid and hierarchical models would prove to 

be resilient. By virtue of their nature, these two models enjoy the advantages of parent command structures enabling 

higher-level commands to implement initiatives to deal with 

eventualities. These types of issues could range from the 

physical destruction of a site to the failure of a local organization to implement certain actions designed to protect the 

entire cyberspace domain. However, a heterarchical organization could benefit from a resilient command structure 

that would enable it to survive multiple failures (regardless 

of source, duration, or effect) without serious degradation 

of the domain.

Assuming a level playing field, all of these C2 models can 

be efficient—there is no salient feature of the models that 

causes any to be unnecessarily inefficient. The heterarchical model could be the most inefficient of all three. While it 

can execute with minimal overhead, the disparate nature of 

the model results in increased overhead in training variances coupled with technical variances. The hierarchical 

model is likewise inefficient in that it seeks an overall approach to events and can be inefficient in allocation of resources and command guidance to deal with cyberspace 

events. The hybrid model incorporates the strengths of both 

as it enables C2 that is as efficient as the other attributes of 

the domain and C2 model allow.

Recommendations

The current hierarchical C2 structure which serves other 

domains well does not work at optimal levels for exercising 

global C2 of our newest domain—cyberspace. Accordingly, 

our research and analysis point to a new model to be embraced by the DOD—a hybrid model. To be sure, this model 

possesses its own unique weaknesses, and it will take time 

and effort to fully vet this new approach. Nevertheless, the 

hybrid model is the strongest of the three we analyzed for 

cyberspace C2. Figure 8, shown below, is how we envision 

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46

the command and informational relationships in this new 

model. It is important to note the difference between the 

command and informational connections. We believe it is 

essential in the hybrid model that information about the 

domain as a whole, as well as specific incidents, is shared 

quickly and without prejudice so that commanders at all 

levels can take the necessary actions within their span of 

control. Important to note is that information flows exist at 

and between all levels of the C2 model and across current 

organizational lines. These flows enable the advantages discussed previously by allowing all levels of command to 

tackle problems simultaneously while also ensuring a unified higher headquarters command approach. Perhaps 

most importantly for this model, the power to respond to 

and deal with events is placed in the hands of personnel 

who have the best knowledge, no matter their rank. Teams 

are then rapidly formed, disbanded, and reformed as events 

continue to ebb, peak, and flow. 

The next model (fig. 9) shows a basic organizational element of the hybrid model. We envision that these organizaFigure 8. Proposed hybrid C2 model

Higher HQ

Cyberspace

NAVY

NETCOM

AF Cyber

(24th AF)

MARINE

CORPS

NOSC

ARMY IO

COMMAND

SUBORDINATE

UNITS

SUBORDINATE

UNITS

SUBORDINATE

UNITS

SUBORDINATE

UNITS

Command and Information

Control and Information

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47

tions will utilize this basic model and its method of command and control to become part of a learning organization 

where all levels are informed and cognizant of events and 

activities, regardless of where these occur.

In order to successfully implement the hybrid model, it 

will be necessary to identify, recruit, and develop a new set 

Figure 9. Organizational implementation of the hybrid C2 model

of “cyberspace warriors” who receive not only the unique 

training demanded of this domain but also the training and 

education regarding the new C2 model and how they are to 

operate within it. As author Col Thomas Hammes, USMC, 

states in his groundbreaking treatise on fourth-generation 

warfare (4GW), it will be necessary to “select and promote 

intelligent, innovative people and ensure that they are free 

to experiment and fail—provided they learn from those failures.”68 Not only is this important in 4GW, it will also be 

important to cyberspace in order to enable “a creative member [to] literally tap the world for information, ideas, and 

techniques that apply to his or her mission.”69 This will 

also require reeducating a whole new cadre of leaders who 

understand the importance of unconstrained information 

flow and how command must be employed in a highly adaptive organization.

Higher HQ

Org

Services and

other orgs

- Information

- Direction

- Guidance

- Information

- Compliance

- Actions Taken

Activities

- Decision Making

- Policies

- Actions

- Information

- Actions Taken

- Directives Received

- Guidance

- Policies

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48

There will also be a need to increase resource assignment 

in this domain. In order to establish these robust information 

links where data, intelligence, and information regarding the 

domain are passed effortlessly and seamlessly, resources 

will need to be applied to enable this connectivity. Not only 

will large and redundant communications links need to be 

installed but also the necessary hardware and software to 

take advantage of these increased sources of information. 

These resources must be implemented such that these organizations embrace the new technologies which enable fast, 

adaptive processes using distributed, recombinant—and 

evolutionary—capability based on threat and environmental 

changes. We must continue to move to an autonomic technological infrastructure focusing on speed and “smart automated” infrastructure management.

Additionally, organizations will have to produce new doctrine and guidance on how to deal with the new information 

available to all. Joint Vision 2020, originally published in 

2000, is on target—information superiority and the use of it 

is a requirement for successful cyberspace dominance as is 

network-centric warfare, properly understood. History is 

replete with examples of information being available but not 

acted upon with disastrous results (e.g., Maj Gen Joseph 

Hooker at Chancellorsville). 

Changes in higher-level, presidential-granted authorities will also be required. While the 2008 UCP is a positive 

step forward, the lines of authority are still confused, ill 

defined, and ultimately inappropriate for cyberspace C2. It 

is necessary in the hybrid model to set the parameters for 

organizations to exercise their authority in a productive, 

collaborative fashion. This could require the movement 

away from the investiture of the cyberspace domain into a 

multirole functional combatant command and toward a 

domain-oriented command where the power of cyberspace 

can be maximized. This would also fulfill the tenants of 

unity of command and unity of effort, two long-enduring 

principles of warfare.

Another area to address is how joint and coalition forces 

will implement and work within this construct. One option 

to investigate further to organize and employ joint forces in 

accordance with the hybrid model is a joint force cyberspace component commander (JFCCC). A JFCCC will con02-Text.indd 48 10/19/09 1:38:35 
49

solidate the planning and operations functions currently 

performed by the various J-6 staffs across the combatant 

commands and place them in a full-time operational command structure. Additionally, it will elevate the cyberspace 

domain on par with similar functional components such as 

the joint force air, land, and maritime component commanders. Given that events are occurring continuously in 

cyberspace, it is possible that the JFCCC could be established as a global, full-time component of USSTRATCOM. 

Following this logic, it would be necessary to extend the 

cyberspace C2 model on a worldwide basis and ensure additional linkages to the operational level. To this end, one 

can conceive of “cyberspace coordination elements” or “directors of cyber forces–forward” embedded within the other 

combatant commands and service components. This is an 

area for further investigation as the DOD moves to adopt 

the hybrid model for cyberspace C2.

Conclusion

Based on the results of this study, it is clear that for 

the armed forces to have any realistic chance of success in 

cyberspace, they must acknowledge that the hybrid form is 

best matched to respond to the hypercompetitive, complex, 

and technological nature of the cyberspace domain. The 

hybrid form necessarily moves the armed forces away from 

the doctrinal superficialities of organizational wiring diagrams and traditional military-bureaucratic biases toward 

hierarchies and vertical control. Instead, with the hybrid 

form, cyberspace C2 is established upon a force that prizes 

knowledge ahead of rank and experience and that is bound 

together by rich, ubiquitous information flows that connect 

all participants at all levels of the cyber fight. It is able to 

achieve high operating speeds both in terms of the raw potential of information transfer and in terms of adaptation, 

planning, dynamic restructuring, decision making, innovation, and implementation. Such an organization is also able 

to handle the continuous change that is characteristic of 

the domain. 

With the hybrid form, the cyber force is intrinsically postured to meet emerging threats at all levels of war due to 

its alertness, flexibility, responsiveness, and resilience. C2 

02-Text.indd 49 10/19/09 1:38:35 
50

is based on a pervasive understanding of the internal and 

external operating environments, where decision makers 

translate deep situational awareness into anticipatory operational responses, scaled and tailored technologically and 

procedurally to the situation. Cyber leaders demonstrate 

war-fighting skill according to their ability to decisively calibrate the control needed to deal with an event and improve 

the controllability of the organization in the face of novel, 

fast-developing situations arising from the larger operational 

environment. These leaders are also the guarantors of the 

principle of variety in the choice, design, resilience, and 

efficiency of C2 processes. In the hybrid model, the cyber 

leader is the governor of cyberspace C2. 

If the case for the hybrid form is convincing, the next 

step is to implement it throughout the DOD. In that regard, 

a JFCCC is a potential solution, providing a solid doctrinal 

basis for war-fighting organizations while also setting the 

stage to go beyond traditional doctrinal notions of C2 as applied to the exacting requirements of the cyberspace domain. 

The JFCCC organization must embody the very essence of the 

hybrid model wherein processes are rapidly reconfigurable, 

automated, and supported by a well-designed technical 

architecture, high-quality information flows, deep awareness, and thoroughly educated practitioners. The JFCCC 

must be simultaneously global, regional, and local in 

focus, an objective that will be achieved through the very 

structure, processes, practice, and governance of the hybrid 

form itself. 

To be sure, some will question whether the hybrid model 

can work within the strict, hierarchical environment of the 

US military. True, our argument for a “new” cyberspace C2 

approach is not exactly new. It has been echoed throughout 

the military literature since the onset of the “information 

revolution” in the 1990s, and the DOD has been wrestling 

with it for much of that time.70 In the organizational development literature, the recognition goes back to the 1960s. 

However, what is new and what this study has shown is 

that the evidence for the need to move to the hybrid model 

is irrefutable—theory has merged with practice. The nature 

of the hypercompetitive cyberspace domain is such that the 

DOD must change its approach if cyberspace military superiority is to be achieved now and into the future. One need 

02-Text.indd 50 10/19/09 1:38:35 
51

only recognize the astonishing number of computer network intrusions and data exfiltrations to understand the 

scope of the threat. Even our most sophisticated weapons 

systems are not exempt. Increasingly sophisticated cyber 

weaponry is readily available on hacker Web sites, and attack anonymity is easily achieved, making attribution and 

response problematic. Offensive overmatch is the rule, 

given that our defenses are largely reactive—engineered to 

respond after attacks have already occurred—if they are 

detected at all. As the world’s most technologically advanced 

military, the armed forces are absolutely dependent on 

cyberspace to perform their war-fighting, intelligence, 

and business missions. The interdependent joint team 

cannot fight without cyberspace. 

That is why, at its heart, this study is an urgent call for 

radical cyberspace C2 reform across the DOD. In order to 

meet the challenge of cyberspace operations today and into 

the future, the armed forces must move away from their 

traditional, hierarchical C2 structure. Instead, they must 

embrace the hybrid model and the opportunities for warfighting performance offered by the establishment of a JFCCC 

structured along the lines of the model. We further call 

upon all cyberspace leaders to fight and overcome the endemic bureaucratic pathologies that mitigate against the 

needed change. Nothing less than the armed forces’ ability 

to fight and win the nation’s wars is at risk. 

Notes

1. Nathan Thornburgh, “The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (And 

the Man Who Tried to Stop Them),” Time.com, 29 August 2005, http://

www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html.

2. USSTRATCOM, Joint Concept of Operations for Global Information Grid 

NetOps (version 3), 4 August 2006. (Information extracted is unclassified.)

3. Hon. Robert M. Gates, secretary of defense, to secretaries of the military departments; chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; under secretary of 

defense for policy; under secretary of defense for intelligence; assistant 

secretary of defense for networks and information integration; commander, 

US Strategic Command; and director, National Security Agency, memorandum, 

12 November 2008.

4. Wikipedia, s.v. “Cyberspace,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberspace 

(accessed 15 November 2008). 

5. Ibid.

02-Text.indd 51 10/19/09 1:38:35 
52

6. James M. Liepman, “Cyberspace: The Third Domain,” The Wright 

Stuff 2, no. 23, 13 December 2007, 6, http://www.au.af.mil/au/aunews/

archive/2007/0223.html.

7. Pres. George W. Bush, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 

(Washington, DC: The White House, February 2003), vii.

8. 10 US Code, sec. 118, “Quadrennial Defense Review,” 8 January 

2008, http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview

+t09t12+54+0++%28QDR%29%20%20AND%20%28%2810%29%20ADJ

%20USC%29%3ACITE%20AND%20%28USC%20w%2F10%20%28118 

%29%29% 3ACITE%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%.

9. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, February 2006), 23.

10. Ibid., 37.

11. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy for 

Cyberspace Operations, December 2006, ix. 

12. Dr. Kamal T. Jabbour, 50 Cyber Questions Every Airman Can Answer

(Rome, NY: Air Force Research Lab, 2008), 3. 

13. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, April 2001 as amended through 17 March 

2009, 141. 

14. University of Minnesota, “Minnesota Internet Traffic Studies,” http://

www.dtc.umn.edu/mints, 2008; and Andrew Odlyzko, “Threats to the Internet: Too Much or Too Little Growth?” Internet Evolution, 25 February 2008, 

http://www.internetevolution.com/author.asp?section_id=592&doc_

id=146747.

15. United Nations, Glossary of Environment Statistics: Studies in Methods, 

series F, no. 67 (New York: United Nations, 1997).

16. This is the speed of light through glass.

17. OC-768 supports rates of 40 gigabits per second on a fiber-optic carrier using dense wavelength division multiplexing. The 1.2-second calculation 

is using quadrature amplitude modulation, a method of conveying data in 

which the amplitude of two transmission waves which are 90 degrees out of 

phase with each other is changed. These changes represent the data signal.

18. Thomas C. Wingfield and James B. Michael, An Introduction to Legal 

Aspects of Operations in Cyberspace, Technical Report no. NPS-CS-04-005 

(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 28 April 2004).

19. Ibid., 11–12.

20. Ibid., 12.

21. Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the 21st 

Century (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005).

22. Richard A. D’Aveni, Hypercompetition: Managing the Dynamics of 

Strategic Maneuvering (New York: Free Press, 1994), 217.

23. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, defines full spectrum 

dominance as “the cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime, 

and space domains and information environment that permits the conduct 

of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference” 

(223); Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); and JP 3-0, 

Joint Operations, 2006, II-5. 

02-Text.indd 52 10/19/09 1:38:36 
53

24. William Ross Ashby, Introduction to Cybernetics (London: Chapman 

& Hall, 1957). 

25. Ibid.; Thomas R. Burns and George M. Stalker, The Management of 

Innovation (London: Tavistock Publications, 1961); and Henk W. Volberda, 

“Toward the Flexible Form: How to Remain Vital in Hypercompetitive Environments,” Organization Science 7, no. 4 (July–August 1996): 359­–74. 

26. Marshal Van Alstyne, “The State of Network Organization: A Survey 

in Three Frameworks,” Journal of Organizational Computing 7, no. 3 (1997): 

83–151.

27. John C. Wood, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.: Critical Evaluations in Business 

and Management (New York: Routledge, 2003).

28. Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

(Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1991); US Congress, National 

Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 

495) as amended (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 

1953); and US Congress, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986).

29. Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 

Publications, 2006).

30. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, 103. 

31. USSTRATCOM, “USSTRATCOM Vision, Mission, Priorities,” http://

www.stratcom.mil/mission.

32. Gates to secretaries of the military departments et al., memorandum.

33. Robert M. Gates, Unified Command Plan 2008 (Washington, DC: 

US Department of Defense, 3 October 2008). Document was signed on 23 

December 2008. 

34. Ibid., 30.

35. Lt Col Sam Arwood, “Cyberspace as a Theater of Conflict: Federal 

Law, National Strategy and the Departments of Defense and Homeland 

Security” (graduate research project, Air Force Institute of Technology, 

2007), 15–16.

36. Gen James E. Cartwright, vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, to deputy secretary of defense, memorandum, 29 September 2008.

37. Ibid.

38. Berndt Brehmer, “Understanding the Functions of C2 Is the Key to 

Progress,” The International C2 Journal 1, no. 1 (2007): 211­–32, http://

www.dodccrp.org/html4/journal_v1n1.html. 

39. George E. Orr, Combat Operations C3I: Fundamentals and Interactions

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004).

40. Brehmer, “Understanding the Functions of C2,” 211–32. 

41. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development, and Applications (New York: George Braziller, 1968).

42. New World Encyclopedia, s.v. “Holism: Systems Theory,” http://www 

.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Holism (accessed 1 February 2008). 

43. Ervin Laszlo, “The Meaning and Significance of General Systems 

Theory,” Behavioral Science 20, no. 1 (1974): 9–24. 

44. Wikipedia, s.v. “Systems thinking,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Systems_thinking (accessed 11 July 2009).

02-Text.indd 53 10/19/09 1:38:36 
54

45. David A. Mindell, “Cybernetics: Knowledge Domains in Engineering 

Systems” (research paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fall 2000), 

http://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/Cybernetics.PDF.

46. Stafford Beer, Cybernetics and Management (London: English University Press, 1959).

47. Stafford Beer, Brain of the Firm (London: Penguin Press, 1972).

48. Luis M. Rocha, “Complex Systems Modeling: Using Metaphors from 

Nature in Simulation and Scientific Models,” BITS: Computer and Communications News, Computing, Information, and Communications Division, Los 

Alamos National laboratory, November 1999, http://informatics.indiana.edu/

rocha/complex/csm.html.

49. Philip Anderson, “Complexity Theory and Organization Science,” 

Organization Science 10, no. 3 (May–June 1999): 216–32. 

50. John H. Holland, Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity

(New York: Basic Books, 1995), 10–34.

51. United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrine Document 1,

Warfighting, 1997.

52. Carl H. Builder, Steven C. Bankes, and Richard Nordin, Command 

Concepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control (Monterey, CA: National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, 1999).

53. Ibid., xiv.

54. Ibid.

55. Ralph D. Stacey, Douglas Griffin, and Patricia Shaw, Complexity and

Management: Fad or Radical Challenge to Systems Thinking? (New York: 

Routledge, 2000). 

56. Ibid., 6, 60.

57. Georgiy M. Levchuk, Feili Yu, Krishna R. Pattipati, and Yuri Levchuk, 

“From Hierarchies to Heterarchies: Application of Network Optimization to 

Design of Organizational Structures,” Proceedings of the 2003 International 

Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Washington, 

DC, June 2003, 2. 

58. Ibid.

59. Thomas H. Barth, “Auftragstaktik: A Leadership Philosophy for the 

Information Age” (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 1995). 

60. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, 

Operations, 2006.

61. Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Gartska, “Network-Centric Warfare: 

Its Origins and Future,” US Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 1 (January 

1998): 28–35. 

62. Brehmer, “Understanding the Functions of C2,” 211–32.

63. Clyde W. Holsapple and Xun Li, University of Kentucky, “Understanding Organizational Agility: A Work-Design Perspective” (paper presented at the 13th International Command and Control Research and 

Technology Symposia, 17­–19 June 2008, Seattle, WA). 

64. V. Sambamurthy, A. Bharadwaj, and V. Grove, “Shaping Agility 

through Digital Options: Reconceptualizing the Role of Information Technology in Contemporary Firms,” MIS Quarterly 27, no. 2: (2003): 236–63. 

65. Henk W. Volberda, Building the Flexible Firm: How to Remain Competitive (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 100.

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55

66. Ibid., 104­–5. 

67. Thomas R. Burns and George M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation (London: Tavistock Publications, 1961). 

68. Col Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, The Sling and The Stone: On War 

in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 274.

69. Ibid., 275.

70. Authors: The DOD has seen many approaches to cyberspace, none 

of them all encompassing or entirely satisfying. They include command and 

control warfare (C2W); command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I); command and control intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C2ISR); command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); information warfare; the 

various iterations of information operations; and network-centric warfare.

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Abbreviations

COCOM combatant command 

CONOPS concept of operations

C2 command and control

DOD Department of Defense

4GW fourth-generation warfare

GIG global information grid

ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names

 and Numbers

JFCCC joint force cyberspace component

 comander

JFCC-NW Joint Functional Component Command 

 for Network Warfare

JP joint publication

JTF-GNO Joint Task Force-Global Network 

 Operation

NETOPS network operations

NMS-CO National Military Strategy for 

 Cyberspace Operations

NOSC Network Operations and Security Center

NSA National Security Agency

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/

 Internet Protocol

UCP Unified Command Plan

USMC United States Marine Corps

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

VUCA volatility, uncertainty, complexity, 

 and ambiguity 

03-abbreviations.indd 57 10/19/09 1:38:58 
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