In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-23-00156-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2023-001176-1 

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr

LAIMA F. BROWN, Appellant

V. 

T-UNIVERSAL COPR., Appellee
2 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this eviction case involving pro se Appellant Laima F. Brown and Appellee

T-Universal Copr.,1

 Brown attempts to appeal from the trial court’s May 4, 2023 

order denying her postjudgment motion for injunctive relief.2 We wrote to Brown to

express our concern that we lacked jurisdiction over this appeal because the order that

she appealed did not appear to be a final judgment or appealable postjudgment order.

We warned her that unless she or any other party filed a response within ten days 

showing grounds for continuing the appeal, we could dismiss the appeal for want of 

jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. Brown has filed two documents in 

response, but neither addresses our jurisdictional concerns. 

We have jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments and from certain 

interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 

39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse, LLC, 

539 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. 2018). “[W]hen a final judgment exists, a subsequent order 

that has no effect except to enforce provisions of the judgment does not qualify as 

1

Although Appellee’s name is spelled “T-Universal Corp.” in the agreed final 

judgment, we spell Appellee’s name as it appears in the notice of appeal and the 

complained-of order. 

2

Brown did not appeal from or supersede the trial court’s March 22, 

2023 agreed final judgment, which awarded T-Universal possession of the real 

property that Brown occupied, ordered Brown to vacate the property by April 22, 

2023, and stated that a writ of possession would issue on or after April 23, 2023. The 

agreed judgment—which was signed by Brown and T-Universal’s attorney—also 

stated that Brown waived her right to appeal.
3 

another final judgment subject to appeal.” McFadin, 539 S.W.3d at 284. But a 

postjudgment order that imposes obligations in addition to or in excess of those in a 

final judgment is appealable, provided that the order disposes of all pending issues 

and parties. Id.

Here, the order denying Brown’s postjudgment motion is not a final judgment. 

Nor does it impose obligations in addition to or in excess of those in the final 

judgment; indeed, the order awards no relief at all.

3 Cf. Knoles v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., No. 05-12-00473-CV, 2012 WL 6685448, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 21, 

2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction after concluding 

that nothing in the record suggested that order denying appellant’s emergency motion 

to quash or stay writ of execution was issued for a purpose other than to aid in the 

enforcement of the judgment). Because the order denying Brown’s postjudgment 

motion for injunctive relief is neither a final judgment nor an appealable order, we 

dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr

Elizabeth Kerr 

Justice

Delivered: June 22, 2023

3

Brown’s motion for injunctive relief is difficult to decipher, but we interpret it 

as an attempt to prevent T-Universal from enforcing the agreed judgment by 

obtaining and executing a writ of possession.