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i 

25–822 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–36] 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE 

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN 

THE INDO–ASIA–PACIFIC REGION 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 26, 2017 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(Vacancy) 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KIM LEHN, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Harris, ADM Harry B., Jr., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command ............. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Harris, ADM Harry B., Jr. .............................................................................. 53 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Statement of GEN Vincent K. Brooks, USA, Commander, United Nations 

Command; Republic of Korea and United States Combined Forces Command; and United States Forces Korea ...................................................... 91 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 113 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 114 

Mr. Byrne .......................................................................................................... 116 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 114 

Mr. Gaetz .......................................................................................................... 116 

Mr. Gallagher .................................................................................................... 115 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 113 

Mrs. Murphy ..................................................................................................... 115 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 115 

(1) 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY 

CHALLENGES IN THE INDO–ASIA–PACIFIC REGION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 26, 2017. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

No one needs reminding of the escalating tensions in the AsiaPacific region. Recent weeks have witnessed intentionally provocative words and actions from the North Korean regime. We are all 

concerned that the decades of self-imposed isolation of North Korean leaders, and especially the cruel, erratic behavior of its current leader, make confrontation potentially more likely. 

In my view, we must work even more closely with our key allies, 

Japan and the Republic of Korea; we must continue to encourage 

China to help put North Korea on a different path; and we must 

increase our military presence and capability in the region. Enhanced missile defense is especially important. 

Of course, none of us wants another military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, but we must also remember the lessons of the 

past. As T.R. Fehrenbach wrote on the first page of his classic history on the Korean War, ‘‘This Kind of War,’’ quote, ‘‘Storm signals 

had been flying for more than 4 years, but the West did not prepare for trouble. It did not make ready because its peoples, in their 

heart of hearts, did not want to be prepared,’’ end quote. 

Well, whether we want it or not, we have to be prepared. 

Of course, North Korea is not the only concern in the PACOM 

[Pacific Command] area. China continues to build islands in the 

South China Sea and to militarize them. The future direction of the 

Philippines is unclear, and we are moving toward a closer relationship with new and developing allies like Vietnam. All of this and 

more are on the plate of our PACOM commander, Admiral Harry 

Harris, whom we are pleased to welcome today. 

Before turning to him, I would yield to the distinguished ranking 

member, Mr. Smith, for any comments he would like to make. 
2 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Admiral Harris, for being here and for your leadership in the Pacific. And I agree with the chairman’s comments 

about the importance of the region. U.S. presence in that region 

has never been more important. Our presence, working with our allies, can be a calming influence in what is a very unstable place, 

as the chairman described. 

And most disturbing, and most concerning, obviously, is North 

Korea. I would say, I don’t think we are ignoring it this time. This 

is not like the first Korean war. I think there has been a great deal 

of attention paid to this problem in North Korea for several administrations. And I think that is helpful, because the number one biggest thing that we need is a clear deterrent to North Korea. We 

are not going to make Kim Jong-un a rational leader. We are not 

going to make North Korea anything other than a pariah state 

anytime soon. Nor are we going to stop them from having some 

military capability. We are aware that they have already developed 

a nuclear bomb. 

But the one thing we can do is make it clear that we stand with 

our allies in the region, with South Korea and Japan in particular, 

and we will be a credible deterrent to any military action in North 

Korea. I think that is the most important thing to do, is to make 

it clear to Kim Jong-un that if he does anything, we have the 

power and the will to respond and destroy him, because the only 

positive thing I can think about North Korea is that there is no evidence that their regime is suicidal. They don’t want to be taken 

out. So we have to make sure we maintain a credible deterrent. 

And China fits into this as well. China wants increased influence 

in Asia, and on a certain level, that is understandable. They are 

a growing power. They want to have influence. What we need to 

do is to work with them to make sure that that influence is for 

positive instead of for ill, and North Korea is a very, very good 

place to start. They could be a lot more helpful than they have 

been being on calming those tensions, and it is in their best interests. They don’t want war to break out in North Korea any more 

than anybody else does. It would have a far more devastating impact on their interests. 

So there are a lot of challenges. I will just close by saying, I 

think there are also a lot of opportunities. The chairman alluded 

to some of those. We have a lot of allies in the region, and a lot 

of those relationships are growing. 

I would also mention—well, I am not sure—India in South Asia 

is certainly an ally and one that could become even more so. Australia. There are a lot of countries in that part of the world that 

want to work with us and that give us an opportunity to work together to make that place and the world a more peaceful place. 

And with that, I look forward to the admiral’s testimony. I thank 

him for his leadership and for his attendance today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, again, thank you for being with us. You 

are recognized for any comments you would like to make. 
3 

STATEMENT OF ADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir. Thank you Chairman Thornberry, Representative Smith, and distinguished members. It is an 

honor for me to appear again before this committee. There are 

many things to talk about since my last testimony 14 months ago. 

I do regret that I am not here with my testimony battle buddy, 

U.S. Forces Command Commander General Vince Brooks, but I 

think you will all agree that he is where he is needed most right 

now, on the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately for all of you, that 

means my opening statement is going to be just a tad longer. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your reference to the T.R. Fehrenbach’s book, ‘‘This Kind of War,’’ which is on the PACOM reading 

list. 

Mr. Chairman, I request that my written posture statement be 

submitted for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, without objection, it will be part of the 

record. I have to say, not to you, but to other folks, we got it about 

9 o’clock last night, which means nobody has read it, as well as 

General Brooks’ statement. 

So, again, not directed to you, but to all of the layers that such 

written statements have to go through, they need to be more timely 

for this committee if they are going to be relevant to our hearing. 

If it is just putting words down on paper, then fine. But we need 

to do better in the future. And I needed to say that, again not directed to you, but at those who seem to not have a sense of promptness. 

So without objection, so ordered. Please continue. 

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks. 

As the PACOM commander, I have the extraordinary privilege of 

leading approximately 375,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, coastguardsmen, airmen, and DOD [Department of Defense] civilians 

serving our Nation around half the globe. These dedicated patriots 

are really doing an amazing job, and thanks to them, America remains the security partner of choice in the region. 

That is important because I believe that America’s future security and economic prosperity are indelibly linked to the Indo-AsiaPacific region. And it is a region that is poised at a strategic nexus, 

where opportunity meets the four challenges of North Korea, 

China, Russia, and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. 

It is clear to me that ISIS is a threat that must be destroyed 

now. The main focus of our coalition’s effort is rightfully in the 

Middle East and North Africa, but as we eliminate ISIS in these 

areas, some of those surviving fighters will likely repatriate to 

their home countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. And what is worse, 

they will be radicalized and weaponized. So we must eradicate ISIS 

before it grows in the PACOM area of responsibility. 

Then there is North Korea, which remains the most immediate 

threat to the security of the United States and our allies in the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific. This week, North Korea threatened Australia 

with a nuclear strike, a powerful reminder to the entire international community that North Korea’s missiles point in every direction. 
4 

The only nation to have tested nuclear devices in this century, 

North Korea has vigorously pursued an aggressive weapons test 

schedule with more than 60 ballistic missile events in recent years. 

With every test, Kim Jong-un moves closer to his stated goal of a 

preemptive nuclear strike capability against American cities, and 

he is not afraid to fail in public. 

Defending our homeland is my top priority, so I must assume 

that Kim Jong-un’s nuclear claims are true. I know his aspirations 

certainly are. And that should provide all of us a sense of urgency 

to ensure PACOM and U.S. Forces Korea are prepared to ‘‘fight tonight’’ with the best technology on the planet. 

That is why General Brooks and I are doing everything possible 

to defend the American homeland and our allies in the Republic of 

Korea [ROK] and Japan. 

That is why the ROK–U.S. alliance decided last July to deploy 

THAAD, that is the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, 

which will be operational in the coming days and able to better defend South Korea against the growing North Korea threat. 

That is why the USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group is back 

on patrol in Northeast Asia. That is why we must continue to 

debut America’s newest and best military platforms in the IndoAsia-Pacific. That is why we continue to emphasize trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and the United States, a 

partnership with a purpose if there ever was one. 

And that is why we continue to call on China to exert its considerable economic influence to stop Pyongyang’s unprecedented weapons testing. While recent actions by Beijing are encouraging and 

welcome, the fact remains that China is as responsible for where 

North Korea is today as North Korea itself. 

In confronting the reckless North Korean regime, it is critical 

that we are guided by a strong sense of resolve, both privately and 

publicly, both diplomatically and militarily. As President Trump 

and Secretary Mattis have made clear, all options are on the table. 

We want to bring Kim Jong-un to his senses, not to his knees. 

We are also challenged in the Indo-Asia-Pacific by an aggressive 

China and a revanchist Russia, neither of whom seem to respect 

the international agreements they have signed onto. For instance, 

the arbitral tribunal in The Hague ruled last year that China’s socalled Nine-Dash Line claim is illegal under the Law of the Sea 

Convention. Despite being a signatory to the convention, China ignored this legally binding, peaceful arbitration. 

In fact, China continues a methodical strategy to control the 

South China Sea. I testified last year that China was militarizing 

this critical international waterway and the airspace above it by 

building air and naval bases on seven Chinese man-made islands 

in the disputed Spratlys. 

Despite subsequent Chinese assurances that they would not militarize these bases, today they now have facilities that support longrange weapons emplacements, fighter aircraft hangars, radar towers, and barracks for troops. China’s militarization of the South 

China Sea is real. 

I am also not taking my eyes off Russia, which just last week 

flew bomber missions near Alaska on successive days for the first 

time since 2014. Russia continues to modernize its military and ex-
5 

ercise its considerable conventional and nuclear forces in the Pacific. 

So despite the region’s four significant challenges, since my last 

report to you, we have strengthened America’s network of alliances 

and partnerships. Working with like-minded partners on shared security threats like North Korea and ISIS is a key component to our 

regional strategy. Our five bilateral defense treaty alliances anchor 

our joint force efforts in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. 

So I continue to rely on Australia for its advanced military capabilities across all domains and its leadership in global operations. 

As Vice President Pence and Secretary Mattis reaffirmed during 

recent trips to Northeast Asia, our alliance with South Korea remains steadfast and our alliance with Japan has never been 

stronger. 

Even with some turbulence this past year with the Philippines, 

I am pleased that we are proceeding with an enhanced defense cooperation agreement, and we are looking forward to conducting the 

Balikatan exercise with our Filipino allies next month. 

And this past February, I visited Thailand to reaffirm our enduring alliance and to communicate that we look forward to Thailand’s 

reemergence as a flourishing democracy. 

We have also advanced our partnerships with regional powers 

like India and Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri 

Lanka, Vietnam, and many others, all with a view toward reinforcing the rules-based security order that has helped underwrite 

peace and prosperity throughout the region for decades. 

But there is more work to be done. We must be ready to confront 

all challenges from a position of strength and with credible combat 

power. So I ask this committee to support continued investment to 

improve our military capabilities. 

I need weapon systems of increased lethality, precision, speed, 

and range that are networked and cost effective. And restricting 

ourselves with funding uncertainties reduces warfighting readiness, so I urge the Congress to repeal sequestration and to approve 

the proposed Defense Department budget. 

Finally, I would like to thank the Congress for proposing and 

supporting the Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative. This effort will reassure our regional partners and send a strong signal to potential 

adversaries of our persistent commitment to the region. 

As always, I thank Congress for your enduring support to the 

men and women of PACOM and to our families who care for us. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris can be found in the 

Appendix on page 53.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral. 

Let me just remind all members that immediately upon the conclusion of this open hearing we will have a closed classified session 

with Admiral Harris, and it will happen immediately after this 

open hearing has concluded. I know when we have done this before 

there has been some confusion about time apparently. So whenever 

we finish here, it will be upstairs as we usually do. 

Admiral, I appreciate your very strong comments about budgets. 

Obviously, that is of key importance to us this week, and no one 
6 

suffers the consequences of our failure to do our job than you do 

on the front lines. 

I want to ask my questions on defending against missiles, and 

actually I want to ask it in two different areas. You described some 

additional forces that we are putting into the region. I know there 

have been some press reports that say that somehow those forces 

are not able to defend against missiles launched from North Korea. 

Let me just ask, can American military forces in that region defend themselves against missiles launched from North Korea? 

Admiral HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, absolutely. There was an article 

that came out this morning from one of the outlets that suggested 

that the Carl Vinson Strike Group—and I think it is appropriate 

that we are talking about the Carl Vinson here in this room, the 

Carl Vinson Room—that the Carl Vinson Strike Group, with its incredible capability, to include two guided-missile destroyers, the 

Wayne E. Meyer and the Michael Murphy, and the Lake Champlain 

cruiser, that somehow that that carrier strike group would not be 

able to defend itself against ballistic missiles. I believe that that article and articles like that are both misleading and they conflate 

apples and oranges, if you will. 

We have ballistic missile ships in the Sea of Japan, in the East 

Sea, that are capable of defending against ballistic missile attacks. 

North Korea does not have a ballistic missile antiship weapon that 

would threaten the Carl Vinson Strike Group. 

The weapons that North Korea would put against the Carl Vinson Strike Group are easily defended by the capabilities resident 

in that strike group. If it flies, it will die, if it is flying against the 

Carl Vinson Strike Group. So I am confident in that strike group’s 

ability to not only defend itself, but to project power if that is the 

call that we received from the President and Secretary of Defense, 

sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Well, then let me ask you more broadly 

about missile defense. We have some limited interceptors in Alaska 

and California. You mentioned some ships. We are, with the South 

Koreans, installing THAAD. So there are several pieces of this. But 

would you agree with my proposition that we probably need to amp 

up, to increase our missile defense capability in this region? 

Admiral HARRIS. I agree with you completely, Mr. Chairman. I 

believe that across the range of integrated air and missile defense, 

IAMD, that we can and need to do more. I believe that the interceptors that we have that defend our homeland directly in Alaska 

and California are critical. I have suggested that we consider putting interceptors in Hawaii that defend Hawaii directly and that 

we look at the defensive Hawaii radar to improve Hawaii’s capability. 

I believe that the Flight IX DDGs, [guided-missile] destroyers 

that are coming online, are exactly what were needed in the ballistic missile defense space, if you will. And those are coming online, and I am grateful to the Congress for funding those. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Focusing on the chairman’s question in terms of domestic defense, the missiles in Alaska and in California, what greater capa-
7 

bility do we need in those missiles? Do we not have enough? Are 

we not confident that the ones we have are going to work? What 

capabilities is it that you are specifically focused on? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I am going out of my level of—my range of 

expertise, because that is a question that NORAD [North American 

Aerospace Defense Command] is concerned more with, North 

American Air Defense Command. But I do believe that the numbers could be improved; in other words, we need more interceptors. 

And then I believe that for the defense of Hawaii, which is covered also by those interceptors, could stand strengthening itself, 

and that is in terms of the defensive Hawaii radar and potentially 

interceptors. So that is something we need to study much more 

deeply, but I think it certainly merits further discussion. 

We have one of our key systems that is deployed now in the Pacific, the SBX [Sea-Based X-Band] radar. It is an X-band radar that 

is on an old oil platform that is self-propelled with a golf ball-like 

antenna. We only have one of those, and we use it a lot, and, you 

know, we have to be concerned about the material condition of the 

platform itself, which is old, and the civilian crews that man it. 

Mr. SMITH. What actions do you potentially see North Korea, 

Kim Jong-un, taking that are most concerning? And by that, I 

mean, putting aside for the moment what sort of capability they 

are building, what might they do offensively militarily? A few years 

back, I believe, they sank a South Korean vessel, they launched 

some missiles at a South Korean-controlled island. Do you see similar things that North Korea could do? 

I mean, I don’t think any of us anticipate that they are just going 

to do a full-scale war because they know the cost of that, but are 

there places where they would try to push the envelope? And if so, 

what are your concerns about what they might do militarily 

against either our assets in the region or our allies? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I am not as certain about this as you are, 

that North Korea won’t do something precipitous, because the—— 

Mr. SMITH. Oh, I am not saying I am certain they are. I am asking what it would be. 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I mean, it could be what we have seen before, I mean, which provocations like the sinking of the Cheonan 

or the attacks on YP-Do Island and the continuing evolution of 

their nuclear and their ballistic missile testing. So all of that. 

Mr. SMITH. Just to be clear in the purpose of the question, I am 

not at all certain that they are not going to do something. I am confident, Admiral—I am not certain of anything at this point in my 

life, it is just the nature of the world—but I am reasonably confident that North Korea sees the threat of launching a full-on war 

against South Korea or Japan and the consequences of that. 

What I am worried about is that they will do these sort of little 

small things, thinking they can get away with it, and be wrong. 

And I am trying to get a greater clarity of what those small things 

are, which is why I cited those two previous examples. 

In the current environment, what are you worried about? Are 

they likely to, once again, you know, try to sink a South Korean 

ship? Are there disputed territories that they might try to take 

over? Where should we be looking for that small thing that could 

lead to the larger, much more dangerous war? 
8 

Admiral HARRIS. First off, sir, I don’t share your confidence that 

North Korea is not going to attack either South Korea or Japan or 

the United States or our territories or our States or parts of the 

United States once they have the capability. 

Mr. SMITH. Unprovoked, you think—— 

Admiral HARRIS. I won’t say that they will, but I don’t share your 

confidence that they won’t, with absolute certainty that they won’t 

do that. 

Mr. SMITH. Not absolutely certain, just playing the percentages 

here. But go ahead. 

Admiral HARRIS. All right. But I believe that we have to look at 

North Korea as if Kim Jong-un will do what he says. Right now, 

there is probably a mismatch between KJU’s rhetoric and his capability. He has threatened by name Manhattan, Washington, Colorado, Australia, Hawaii, and there is a capability gap probably in 

whether he can or not. 

Mr. SMITH. And I am sorry to belabor this point, because I want 

to get onto some other people here, but he has threatened those 

things in the context of don’t mess with us. Are you saying he simply threatened them as he is going to do it no matter what we do? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I can’t read his mind. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, I am not asking you to read his mind. 

Admiral HARRIS. All I can do is understand what he says. And 

when he threatens the United States, then that is one level, but 

when he threatens the United States with a capability of realizing 

that threat, that is a different place. And when that happens, that 

is an inflection point and we are going to have to deal with that, 

I believe. 

Mr. SMITH. I will let other folks get in here, and this is probably 

more for a classified setting, but understanding why he threatens 

the United States, I think, is enormously important. And again, 

granting your point that there is no certainty, there are still things 

that we can learn to understand why those threats are made, and 

it would definitely inform how we would respond to those threats. 

So we can do that more in a classified setting. 

I will yield back to the committee. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral, thank you for being here and for your 

service to our country. 

If this needs to wait until the classified session, please say so, 

but one of the needs you highlighted in your written statement was 

more munitions. We are running short of some critical munitions. 

Would you want to elaborate on that, or should we be more specific 

when we go up to the classified? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. I can elaborate on it in general here and 

then would ask that we reserve the details for the classified session. 

In general, we are short on things like small diameter bombs. 

You know, these are not exciting kinds of weapons. These are mundane sort of weapons. But they are absolutely critical to what we 

are trying to do, not only in North Korea—against North Korea— 

but also in the fights in the Middle East. 

And so we have a shortage of small diameter bombs throughout 

the inventory. So the stockpile of small diameter bombs that 
9 

PACOM has, for example, we send them to the fight we are in, and 

rightfully so, to CENTCOM, to Central Command and AFRICOM 

[Africa Command]. 

And so that is the fight we are in, and they need them. And so, 

you know, we send them there. And they use them, which is a good 

thing, but that means they are going to be short again, and we are 

going to send some more. So that is the fight we are in. 

We are also short in AAW, anti-air warfare weapons like AIM– 

9X and AIM–120Ds. These are weapons that our fighter aircraft 

use in air-to-air. I can use more of those. 

And in a bigger sense, the submarine issue itself. You know, I 

think our submarine numbers are low and getting smaller. And so 

the number of submarines, without going into the precise detail 

here, the Navy can only meet about 50 percent of my stated requirement for attack submarines, these are SSNs, and that is 

based on a submarine force today of 52 SSNs. By the end of the 

2020s, that number is going to be down to 42. 

So the requirement I have is not going to get smaller, but the 

percentages against the total number of submarines we have is 

going to be exacerbated because of that. And so those are the kinds 

of munitions that I worry about. Also, you know, Mark 48 torpedoes, and all of that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. And I hope we can address those 

issues seriously in the upcoming fiscal year NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] and appropriations bills. 

And lastly, what kind of leverage does China have over North 

Korea? I don’t think it is well understood how much. They don’t, 

I think, admit to having a lot of leverage to outsiders. I think we 

could benefit from your insight. 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. North Korea is China’s only treaty ally. 

So that says one thing right there, right? So we have five bilateral 

defense treaties, they are all in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and two 

multilateral treaties, the NATO and the Rio Pact. China has North 

Korea. So they are obligated by treaty to have this kind of relationship with North Korea. 

Eighty percent of North Korea’s economy is based on China, exports primarily. So 80 percent of their economy is based on China. 

So I believe that is a significant lever that China can employ, if it 

so chose to, against North Korea. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. Appreciate your service once again. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Harris, good to see you again. Thanks for helping us out 

last year. You were able to come talk to several of us last year, and 

I appreciate that. 

I want to explore a little bit more based on Mr. Lamborn’s comments, but specific to on the military side, because we discussed 

sanctions a lot, we discussed the State Department role, Treasury’s 

role with regards to North Korea. 

But I am wondering if you have any assessment about China’s 

relationship with DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] on 

the military side and if there is influence or if you are aware of any 

influence the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] can play on DPRK 
10 

with regards to them pursuing both the more advanced nuclear 

weapons program and missile testing. 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I am not aware of any direct relationship 

between the People’s Liberation Army and all its various subunits 

and the DPRK, New People’s Army. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah, okay. All right. Thanks. 

Related as well to our relationship or what we are trying to 

achieve on the peninsula, are you having or do you have any advice 

on whether or not you feel like you are in the position to sort of 

play every role, that is not just the Pacific commander but also 

somewhat of a diplomat’s—diplomatic role? Because we have a Secretary of State position, but we don’t have Deputy Secretaries of 

State, we don’t have Assistant Secretaries of State. We are only 

now getting ambassadors without having anyone. So there is a gap 

in that policymaking structure and that outreach structure. Are 

you having to fill that gap? 

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, sir. You know, I have been accused of 

many things, but never of being diplomatic. So—— 

Mr. LARSEN. All of us here too. Well, perhaps me. 

Admiral HARRIS. Part of the role of the combatant commander is 

to have relationships with not only our military counterparts, but 

also the leadership in the countries and the regions over which we 

exercise some degree of authority and influence. So I do have relationships with our partner nations, our allies in the region. But I 

think the State Department has a key role to play here, and I 

would defer in every case to Secretary Tillerson. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. And my point isn’t that you want to fill that 

role as much as, for whatever reason, the Senate hasn’t confirmed, 

the administration hasn’t put up folks to fill in those spots. 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. 

Mr. LARSEN. And therefore you are left having to fill the gap 

with your—— 

Admiral HARRIS. And so I am happy to do what I can in that regard. You know, just recently I was in Thailand and asked to deliver some messages about their return to democracy, which I was 

happy to do. And I think that is part and parcel of one of the roles 

of a geographic combatant commander in today’s military structure. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. It is also the role of ambassadors and Assistant Secretaries of State who aren’t in place. So—— 

Admiral HARRIS. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN. And I don’t know if you can answer this here, which 

is probably a prelude that you can’t answer it here. Yeah, but I 

have to ask, right? There is the issue of the nuclear tests and the 

issues of the missile tests, both of them, obviously, both very concerning. But I guess, I would like to hear your assessment maybe 

a little later about is there one—is it more concerning to have missile tests or nuclear tests? What is the difference between a sixth 

nuclear test from North Korea based on the fifth nuclear test as 

opposed to advances in missile testing? 

Admiral HARRIS. So I view them both very seriously. And the difference between the sixth nuclear test and the fifth nuclear test is 

if we notice an improvement between the two. So as I said in my 

opening statement, KJU is not afraid to fail in public and he fails 
11 

a lot. But I think Edison failed a thousand times before he got the 

light bulb to work. And so here we are, right? 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. 

Admiral HARRIS. So he is not afraid to fail in public and he continues to try. And then he is experimenting not only with—‘‘experiment’’ is probably not the right word. He is developing missiles 

that have solid fuel propellants. And I can talk in the other hearing 

about the implications of that. 

So we have that weapons development going on, longer-range 

weapons going on. He has a ballistic missile submarine, an SSB. 

It is not a BN [ballistic missile, nuclear powered]; it is not nuclear 

powered, of course, but it is an SSB. That is troubling. And then 

he is doing his nuclear testing. 

So all of that, if he puts all of that together, miniaturizes the nuclear weapon, puts it on an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] that he is testing over here, and then he figures out a way to 

have that thing survive reentry, then we have a serious problem 

on our hands, to go back to Congressman Smith’s comments earlier. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. Your assessment is very important. I appreciate it. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, could you talk about the value of joint military exercises with South Korea? It seems that whenever we do them, it 

seems to excite North Korea. Is there an advantage in terms of 

doing those? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, absolutely, Congressman. I would say it 

is critical, right? So we are obliged to defend South Korea by treaty, and so South Korea is one of those treaty partners. They have 

a very strong and capable military, as we do. But if we are going 

to defend them, if we are going to fight with them on the peninsula, then we have to be able to integrate with their military, we 

have to be able to work with their military, we have to understand 

their military, and vice versa. 

So we share a lot of common systems, you know, antisubmarine 

warfare aircraft, Aegis weapon system on their destroyers and our 

destroyers and cruisers, and on and on and on. And so we have to 

be able to operate together in peacetime so that we can operate together in wartime, if it comes to that. 

So we are at an armistice now on the peninsula, and that is what 

we have to do. We have to maintain our degree of readiness, not 

only unilateral readiness, but also our combined and joint readiness with our brothers and sisters in the ROK military. 

Mr. COFFMAN. To what extent would you say that there was 

pressure by the Chinese Government on South Korea to put pressure on them not to accept the THAAD system? 

Admiral HARRIS. There is clear pressure from China, economic 

pressure, against companies like Lotte Corporation, which owns 

the place that the THAAD is going to go into, Samsung, and other 

companies, big corporations in South Korea. 

And so I find it preposterous that China would try to influence 

South Korea to not get a weapon system that is completely defensive against the very country that is allied with China. So if China 
12 

wants to do something constructive, then they ought to focus less, 

in my opinion, on South Korea’s defensive preparations and focus 

instead more on North Korea’s offensive preparations. 

And I think we are in a good place, I am reasonably optimistic 

now that China is having an influence and they are working in the 

right direction with regards to North Korea, thanks to the efforts 

by our President and theirs. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Do you think that China holds all the cards in any 

kind of negotiated settlement to defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I don’t think they hold all the cards, but 

they hold a good number of them and important cards. Because 

regardless of whether I think that China’s influence on North 

Korea is waning, it still is the country that has the most influence 

on North Korea during peacetime. And I think if it came to a harder place, then we would exert the most influence. But in peacetime, 

China has the most influence on North Korea. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Am I correct that the South Korean or, I guess, 

Republic of Korea security forces have taken operational control of 

joint military operations and that we do not have forces on the Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]? 

Admiral HARRIS. No, sir. The OPCON transfer, the transfer of 

operational control, that is now pushed to the right, and it is a conditions-based transfer. So the ROK does not have operational control of our forces. But General Brooks, who is the U.S. Forces Commander, is also the United Nations Commander and the CFC, the 

Combined Forces Commander. So he is actually the commander of 

all of the forces on the peninsula, including the Korean forces, in 

terms of war. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Is that a goal though, operational control? 

Admiral HARRIS. Ultimately, OPCON transfer is a goal, but it 

has to be conditions based. You know, it has to be when they are 

ready to do it and all the other conditions are met. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Can you speak to whether or not we have— 

if you can speak in this setting—but do we have conventional 

forces on the Demilitarized Zone itself? 

Admiral HARRIS. We have conventional forces along the Demilitarized Zone just south of that, and I can go into more detail in 

the other session. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Admiral Harris. I enjoyed meeting you on a 

CODEL [congressional delegation] recently to Hawaii. 

On Guam, Admiral, you know we are directly and uniquely impacted by national security and foreign policy decisions in the region. So we seek to understand what if any strategy this administration has for the Indo-Asia-Pacific. 

We are in the process of realigning marines from Okinawa 

throughout the Pacific, which, as you noted in your testimony, is 

critical for modernizing our force posture in the region. So could 

you briefly discuss the military necessity, particularly the movements of marines to Guam, for which the Japanese are contrib-
13 

uting over one-third of the cost. You highlighted funding levels, but 

I am especially interested in not just the financial but also the political capital the Government of Japan has expended for its part. 

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, Congresswoman. 

The whole issue of moving marines from Okinawa elsewhere is 

important to our alliance relationship with Japan. And so the 

movement involves—today we have roughly 20,000 or so marines 

in Okinawa, and ultimately we want to get to a point around 

10,000 or 11,000 or so. And part of that is to move about 4,000 marines to Guam, about 3,000 or so to Hawaii, and about 1,300 or so 

to Australia. So that is sort of the rotation. 

We are looking at, as you know, the movement of the bulk of the 

marines to Guam would occur in the 2024 to 2028 timeframe and 

then to Hawaii after that. And we are already rotating forces 

through Australia now. 

Japan has invested a lot in this. This is all about, for everyone 

else’s benefit, to reducing the footprint in Okinawa and also closing 

Futenma. So the Futenma air base is an air base in an incredibly 

populated area, and so the Japanese have asked us to move that 

air base. It is a key base of operations for us in that region. 

So we told the Japanese back in the 1990s that we would do 

that, but their obligations under the treaty is to provide us a place 

from which to operate. Our obligations under the treaty is to protect Japan. And so their obligation is to provide a place. They selected a place called Henoko, right outside of Camp Schwab, and 

that is kind of where we are. 

So ultimately, when Henoko is ready, we will shut down 

Futenma and move to Henoko. But until then, we have to operate 

somewhere, and Futenma is where we are operating from. And 

then part of that agreement was to remove a large number of 

forces from Okinawa, and that is where the relocation to Guam, 

Hawaii, and so on. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So I think, Admiral, what I am trying to get is 

everything is on target, is that correct, pretty much? 

Admiral HARRIS. I believe things are on target. I think Henoko 

is delayed a little bit. I don’t know the amount. You know, that is 

something that we would have to ask the Japanese about. But they 

have said that they would have Henoko ready by 2022. I testified 

last year that I thought that that was in question. So now I am 

going to have to defer to the Japanese for a better year estimate. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, we have waited a long time for this, so we 

want it to continue. And we do have a visa problem on Guam now, 

a labor shortage, so I am working on that. 

But what importance would you give to the fifth SSN in Guam? 

Related, would your forces be better enabled by robust ship repair 

facilities in the Western Pacific? Just a yes or a no. 

Admiral HARRIS. On the SSN in Guam, I am a big fan of moving 

the fifth SSN to Guam. It is a Navy decision, and I am in consultations with Admiral Richardson and the Navy on it. But I believe 

it is important that we move that capability forward because it gets 

it closer to the fight. 

On the ship repair facility, I simply don’t know. I would defer to 

the Pacific Fleet commander—it is a Navy issue—on whether they 
14 

need a ship repair facility in Guam or if the facilities in Hawaii 

and eastward are adequate. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Okay. I have one last question, Admiral. As you 

know, a decade ago, PACOM issued a UON [urgent operational 

need] for significantly upgraded offensive antiship weapons to keep 

pace with evolving threats, and Congress has funded a rapid acquisition effort to field this capability. 

With significant munition shortfalls, I presume the requirements 

continue to grow. Would that be accurate? And can you discuss the 

risks we take with the shortfalls in standoff weapons like the Long 

Range Anti-Ship Missile? If you could just briefly. 

Admiral HARRIS. Ma’am, sure. I believe the UON is as relevant 

today as it was when PACOM—one of my predecessors issued it, 

I think it was Admiral Willard—issued it a decade ago. I am 

pleased and grateful to the Congress for funding weapon systems 

like Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles, LRASM, putting money 

against advanced Tomahawk and SM–6 in the antiship mode. So 

these are helpful, and this is good, and I am grateful for that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, how many of China’s land-based cruise and ballistic 

missiles have a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers? 

Admiral HARRIS. I believe that number is about 95 percent. In 

other words, 95 percent of China’s land-based cruise and ballistic 

missiles, 95 percent fall in that range and would be precluded by 

the Intermediate [Range] Nuclear Forces Treaty, INF Treaty, if 

they were a signatory to that treaty, which they are not. 

Mr. ROGERS. How many land-based cruise and ballistic missiles 

of that range do you have in your PACOM arsenal? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I have none in that range in my arsenal, 

nor does the U.S. military writ large have that, because we are a 

signatory to INF and we follow those rules religiously. 

Mr. ROGERS. In your opinion, should we consider renegotiation of 

the INF Treaty or withdrawing, declaring Russia in material 

breach of the INF Treaty? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, that is a policy question that I know is 

being looked at, and I believe that there are aspects of the INF 

Treaty which are salutary, the nuclear part of it that reduces the 

nuclear weapons and all of that. 

I am concerned that on the conventional side, both in terms of 

ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, we are being taken to the 

cleaners by countries that are not signatories to the INF because 

there is no expectation, right, we should have no expectation that 

China follow the INF because they are not a signatory to it. 

On the other hand, General Selva has recently testified that Russia has violated the conventional part of the INF. And so the INF 

Treaty is just us and Russia and a few of the other Soviet successor 

states, but it is really about us and Russia. And so Russia doesn’t 

adhere to it as strictly as we do. 

China and other countries, Iran, for example, don’t have an obligation to follow it. And they are proceeding apace in their weapons 

development. The DF–21, DF–26, for example, both would be pre-
15 

cluded by INF. And then here we are without a weapon in this 500- 

to 5,500-kilometer range, a critical range to be able to conduct warfare in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. 

Mr. ROGERS. So my understanding is that you are saying that we 

are basically unilaterally disarming when it comes to that capability? 

Admiral HARRIS. I would say we are unilaterally not being creative in developing our weapons. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Admiral Harris. Good to see you again. I just 

want to follow up on your comments to Mr. Lamborn regarding the 

need for submarines to fill the requirements that you have out 

there. 

Again, you mentioned we have a fleet today of 52 going down to 

41 in the 2020s. Your testimony, on page 16, actually tallied the 

number of submarines between Russia, North Korea, and China 

today, which is 160, which, again, I think helps sort of frame your 

comments even more sharply. 

And last December, Secretary Mabus came out with his Force 

Structure Assessment, which called, again, for an increase in the 

fleet size to 355. Mr. Wittman and I just got back a report from 

CBO [Congressional Budget Office] a few days ago that talked 

again about the sort of fiscal challenge of trying to achieve that 

goal. 

If you had to prioritize, again, in terms of fleet architecture about 

as we find our way forward to hit that target, what end of the fleet 

would you really want to emphasize in terms of new platforms to 

be available? 

Admiral HARRIS. Right. So I am not a fleet guy anymore. I am 

a joint guy. But from a joint combatant commander perspective, I 

need more submarines. And the Navy’s plan to build up to 355 

ships, 66 of those are submarines. And right now we are at 52 

going to 42, and that is completely in the wrong direction. 

And if we go from 52 to 42 to 66, that would make me a happy 

combatant commander, because I would think then that in that 

number of 66 that I would be able to meet more of the requirements than I am able to have met now. So really right now I am 

at 50 percent of my stated requirement. It will be worse, it will be 

exacerbated when we go down to 42, but if we go up to 66, that 

will be better. 

But that number is an important number because it highlights 

the shortfalls that we are currently in with regards to not only submarines, but other assets. So in that 355-ship number is a 12th aircraft carrier and all the ships that go with that. I think these are 

really important as we move out to face the threats that are going 

to confront us beyond those that already are extant now. 

And while we are doing this, China and Russia are significantly 

improving their submarine capabilities and their antisubmarine 

warfare capabilities. So today, I mean, today there is no comparison. I mean, it would be like comparing, I don’t know, a Model T 

to a Corvette. But there is no comparison between a U.S. Virginiaclass submarine and anything that China can field. 
16 

But that is not the point. The point is that in 20 years or so, that 

China will work hard to close that technological gap. And if we 

don’t continue to resource our submarine fleets and our military in 

general, then they will be able to close that gap, and that would 

put us, I think, in a bad place. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Another point in your testimony on page 10 was, 

again, talking about Russia’s more aggressive posture in the AsiaPacific. Again, the Pacific Fleet now is a new development in terms 

of, again, this whole question of your ability to meet requirements, 

isn’t that correct, that they are now back in business? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

Last week I had an opportunity to go out and visit one of our 

Seawolf-class subs, which were part of the pivot to Asia, the USS 

Connecticut, believe it or not. But I raise that point because that 

sub actually was supposed to be in for repair availability for—it 

was a big job. It was supposed to be about 2 years. It ended up 

being 4 years. And, again, it is because of this whole question of 

the Navy’s strain in terms of the public shipyards. 

I mean, again, that is another part of this story in terms of your 

ability to get your requirements met when, again, the pipeline in 

terms of repairs is just not moving fast enough. And, again, that 

obviously was a pretty key platform that you could use right now, 

I am assuming. 

Admiral HARRIS. It is. And so the numbers are affected. The 

numbers that I get, as opposed to the numbers that I have asked 

for in terms of submarines, are driven not only by the number of 

submarines—that is the easy answer, 52 spread out across all the 

combatant commanders—but it is also driven by availability. And 

the availability is driven by the industrial base and its capacity to 

repair the submarines that are going in for overhauls and all of 

that. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you 

again, Admiral. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I would like to hone in the questions on China 

some more and also readiness. So China has been investing in several next-generation military technologies, including hypersonic 

missiles, directed-energy weapons, autonomous weapons systems, 

and space-based weapons. Now, are you concerned about the progress China is making in its development of these technologies, and 

how can the United States maintain its edge? 

Admiral HARRIS. Without going into classified, I will answer yes 

to all of that. I am very concerned about their developments in 

these systems, particularly hypersonics. But what we can do is to 

develop our own hypersonic weapons and improve our defenses 

against theirs. 

One of the problems we have, though, is this INF Treaty issue 

before us. So hypersonics that could match the Chinese weapons 

would be precluded by INF. So we are precluded from developing 

land-based weapons that can match the Chinese land-based weapons by treaty. 
17 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Yeah, that is an excellent point. I am glad 

my colleague brought that up. We need to address that for sure. 

What is your assessment of China’s use of hybrid warfare methods, and how does China influence or otherwise affect our Asian 

partners and our allies? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So I believe that China is a learning machine. They are a learning organism. And they have watched the 

Russian example in Ukraine, and they are applying aspects of that 

in the South China Sea, particularly with their maritime militia, 

which is a compilation of fishing boats, merchant ships, and other 

small ships and entities that roam throughout the South China 

Sea. 

And they are using these in lieu of grey hull military ships. And 

I think they are having some effect with them, and we need to continue to monitor that activity and to call them on the carpet when 

they do something that would be counter to good seamanship and 

the like. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. In addition to their economic strategy, which I 

am very concerned about too, very shrewd on their part, but I want 

to move to readiness. So we have heard from the service chiefs and 

vice service chiefs of all the military branches, and there are a few 

common themes, such as: Due to our inability to modernize our 

forces our adversaries have closed the capability gap we once enjoyed. 

They also shared: The quality and quantity of training opportunities have declined significantly over the past several years, which 

has decreased our readiness. And they have talked about how our 

forces are undermanned. 

So I am wondering how these factors have affected you in 

PACOM. 

Admiral HARRIS. So today I believe I can meet the strategy in 

terms of fight tonight forces. And so that involves—you know, principally we are worried about North Korea. So my forces are ready 

to fight tonight if called on to do that. 

The readiness shortfalls and the challenges that the services 

have and how that affect me is on follow-on forces. So the fight tonight literally is tonight. But a lot of those forces, though, come 

from the mainland United States. And so that is an issue. 

And then the follow-on forces, the surge forces, how good is our 

airlift, how good is our sealift, how can we get all this stuff out 

there. And I worry about that quite a bit. And I think the lack of 

a budget is going to hurt us if we don’t get one. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Hopefully we will address that this week. 

Now, you have talked a little bit about the South China Sea, 

what they are doing. China’s attempts at land reclamation expansion in that area, coupled with its growing military capabilities, as 

you know, are causing tension across the globe. If these tensions 

continue to rise to the point where military confrontation is necessary, are you confident in both the quality and quantity of forces 

you will receive from the services? And will you have enough weapons and assets with access to the threat in order to reduce the risk 

to our forces and maximize their capability? 

Admiral HARRIS. So I can get into more details in the classified 

hearing on that. But I am concerned about China’s bases in the 
18 

South China Sea, because that complicates the anti-access/area denial problem that we face if we are called upon to conduct operations against China. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Great. I will look forward to visiting with you in 

the classified setting. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank you 

very much for joining us here today. 

I was the gentleman who asked Vice Chairman Selva about the 

Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the treaty that President 

Reagan signed in the mid-1980s with the Soviet Union. So I wanted to start with that following on my colleagues’ questions. 

What has been our response to Russia’s violation of the treaty? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I don’t know what our—— 

Mr. MOULTON. I am not aware of a response either. 

Admiral HARRIS. I know that General Selva brought it up. 

Mr. MOULTON. Yeah. I am not aware of any response either. 

Typically, when one party to a treaty violates the treaty, what 

do you try to do? You try to hold that party accountable. So there 

are other options than simply withdrawing from the treaty ourselves. Is that right? 

Admiral HARRIS. Right. 

Mr. MOULTON. Have we thought about having such a treaty with 

China as well? 

Admiral HARRIS. I have not, and I am not aware of discussions 

that would bring China into either the existing INF Treaty or a 

separate treaty with China. You know, when the INF Treaty was 

signed back in 1985, it was a bilateral treaty in a bipolar world. 

Now we are in a multipolar world with threats that we weren’t 

thinking about in 1985. 

Mr. MOULTON. I agree. I agree. I think President Reagan would 

be pretty shocked to hear that our initial response to a violation— 

to Russia’s violation of the treaty would be simply to abrogate the 

treaty ourselves. 

But I want to go back to North Korea. The Trump administration 

has said that, quote, ‘‘All options are on the table,’’ regarding a preemptive military strike. What range of options do we have? 

Admiral HARRIS. We have the full range of options, whether it 

is continued negotiations, continued—— 

Mr. MOULTON. I am sorry, Admiral, specifically military options. 

I mean, what effective military options would we have to counter 

the North Korean threat with a preemptive strike? 

Admiral HARRIS. The full range of options on the military side, 

whether it is presence operations, pressure operations, or kinetic 

operations. 

Mr. MOULTON. I am asking specifically about a preemptive 

strike. 

Admiral HARRIS. Okay. 

Mr. MOULTON. Not about continued pressure, not diplomatic 

pressure, not the presence of our submarines or carriers. But what 

sorts of preemptive strike options do we have against the North 

Koreans? 
19 

Admiral HARRIS. I will just say, sir, we have a lot of preemptive 

options, but I couldn’t begin to talk about them in this hearing. 

Mr. MOULTON. And what would the typical response, do you 

think, be from the North Koreans to such a preemptive strike? 

Admiral HARRIS. It depends on the level of the preemptive strike, 

sir. 

Mr. MOULTON. Would we be able to take out their artillery aimed 

at Seoul? 

Admiral HARRIS. I believe that we would have the ability to affect North Korea’s military calculus in preemptive strikes depending on the type of strike. But I am really treading on ground that 

I am—— 

Mr. MOULTON. I am not asking you to get into anything classified. There has been a lot of unclassified material about this. 

Admiral HARRIS. Right. But nothing from me on this. 

Mr. MOULTON. But my concern, Admiral, is that when you look 

at the options that we have in terms of a preemptive strike, there 

is not a lot we can do about North Korea’s artillery. And this has 

been well discussed in the open press, that a lot of South Koreans 

and Americans in South Korea might die if that option were exercised. 

Would you agree with that assessment? 

Admiral HARRIS. I will say that what we are faced with is that 

on one hand and a lot more Koreans and Japanese and Americans 

dying if North Korea achieves its nuclear aims and does what KJU 

has said it is going to do. 

Mr. MOULTON. I agree with you. I agree with you. But just to be 

clear, in that scenario, a lot of South Koreans and Americans in 

South Korea would be in trouble. 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. 

Mr. MOULTON. Are you concerned about a conflict between North 

and South Korea escalating into a conflict between United States 

and China? Is that a risk? 

Admiral HARRIS. It is a risk. I think it is a manageable risk, and 

I think that we would work hard to manage that risk. 

Mr. MOULTON. How would we manage that risk? 

Admiral HARRIS. I think communications with China, a relationship with China. I think the relationship between President Trump 

and President Xi is positive and encouraging, and I think that will 

go a long way to ameliorating the risk. 

Mr. MOULTON. So you are basing that off their recent meeting. 

Admiral HARRIS. No, not just the recent meeting. I am basing it 

on the idea that if we have a positive, productive relationship with 

China, then—— 

Mr. MOULTON. I agree. The Trump administration’s idea 

throughout the campaign and until that meeting was to have an 

unproductive relationship with China, to call him a currency manipulator, et cetera. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral, thank you very much for your being here today. 

And 2 years ago, I had the extraordinary opportunity of visiting 

with you in Hawaii, and I saw firsthand of your capabilities in the 
20 

briefings that you provided us. Your rapport with your personnel, 

it was just very, very inspiring. And your personal history and 

background is equally so inspiring to the American people, and I 

want to thank you for your service. I particularly say that as the 

grateful dad of a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy today, 

serving in Beaufort, South Carolina, hopefully maybe in PACOM 

sometime in the future. 

As we face these issues, North Korea continues to be a significant threat to the security of the American people and our allies 

in the region. Can you explain how important the recent deployment of the THAAD system is to the people of South Korea? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I think it is very important. I mean, this 

system is a defensive system that will help protect South Korea 

from ballistic missile attacks from North Korea. It is a purely defensive system. It is aimed north, not east—or not west, rather. It 

poses no threat to China. And it is designed to protect our Korean 

allies and our American service men and women and their families 

and businessmen and others who live and work in Korea. 

Mr. WILSON. And I want you to be aware that Congress voted 2 

weeks ago overwhelmingly, 398 to 3, bipartisan obviously, to support the THAAD deployment and your service and back you up. So 

you have obviously incredible bipartisan support here in Congress. 

As North Korea continues to develop and test ballistic missile 

technology, can you explain who is supporting these activities with 

resources? Specifically, is there Iranian collaboration? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I don’t know if there is Iranian collaboration or not, but I will find out and get back to you on that or I will 

have an answer by the classified hearing. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

And, Admiral, the President has recently stated that all options 

are on the table concerning North Korea, as correctly cited by Congressman Seth Moulton just now. As chairman of the Readiness 

Subcommittee, I am concerned of noted shortages in funding, required munitions, and backlog maintenance on our ships and aircraft. 

What readiness concerns have you seen in the Pacific Command? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, just what you have said, sir. I am concerned about munitions shortfalls, maintenance backlogs, and development of weapons that would keep us ahead of our adversaries, 

principally China and Russia but that would have an effect in 

North Korea. 

Mr. WILSON. And are there specific shortfalls in munitions that 

we can help address here? 

Admiral HARRIS. There are. Small diameter bombs; AIM–9X and 

AIM–120D, AAW, anti-air warfare weapons; and Mark 48 torpedoes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carbajal. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Admiral Harris, for coming here today. 

The administration has sent the USS Michigan to South Korea 

as a show of force and continues to escalate its rhetoric against the 

current leader of North Korea. There is no question as to the sig-
21 

nificant threat North Korea poses in the region, especially as it 

continues to pursue its missile and nuclear ambition. 

However, I am extremely concerned about the provocation and 

direction this administration is taking to address the North Korea 

threat. It seems the United States has not developed a coherent national strategy when it comes to North Korea, and yet we are deploying military assets, increasing tensions, and considering military options against North Korea. 

When dealing with an unpredictable regime, empty rhetoric can 

be dangerous. And I think this committee would be interested to 

hear why there was so much confusion as to where the USS Carl 

Vinson was deployed to or not. 

Admiral Harris, what is the feasibility of the U.S. taking on 

North Korea without China becoming involved? What type of coalition effort would be required to take military action against North 

Korea? 

Denuclearization, at this point, seems unachievable unless the 

U.S. wages an outright war against North Korea or North Korea 

undergoes a regime change. What other options, other than denuclearization, are you and the administration looking at in order to 

limit the North Korean threat? 

Quite the question. 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, thanks for your—that is quite a number of 

questions. I will try to get through them. 

First is, I disagree that we lack a strategy on North Korea, sir. 

I believe we do have a strategy. I believe the President has that 

strategy. And my job is to provide options, and, as a military commander, my job is to provide military options. And that is what I 

do; that is what I have done. 

With regard to the Carl Vinson, that is my fault on the confusion, and I will take the hit for it. So I made the decision to pull 

the Carl Vinson out of Singapore, truncate the exercise that it was 

going to do south of Singapore, cancel the support visit to Australia, and then proceed north. And where I failed was to communicate that adequately to the press and the media. So that is all 

on me. 

But we have done exactly that, right? So we pulled out of Singapore, truncated the exercise, canceled the port visit, and then 

moved it north. And today it sits in the Philippine Sea, just east 

of Okinawa, in striking range and power projection range of North 

Korea if called upon to do that. And then, in a few days, I expect 

it will continue to move north. 

You started your questions by talking about the Michigan. The 

USS Michigan, an SSGN, a guided-missile, nuclear-powered submarine, is in fact in Busan, Korea, now as a show of solidarity with 

our Korean allies. It will be there for a few days, and then it will 

leave port and be operating in the area. This is a show of solidarity 

with our South Korean allies and a flexible deterrent show of force 

to North Korea, should they consider using force against South 

Korea. 

Now, with regard to coalition effort, I believe our biggest coalition partner in this effort, if it comes to some kinetic operation on 

the peninsula, is Korea itself, naturally, South Korea. And then, of 

course, Japan and our other friends, allies, and partners in the re-
22 

gion, I feel, would support the United States as we support our 

treaty ally of South Korea. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. I guess the only question I continue to have is, 

it has been difficult to discern that strategy. And I am hoping at 

some point we can hear a little bit more, whether it be in a classified hearing or not. But, to date, I don’t have the confidence to feel 

good about the statement you just made, that we do have a coherent strategy. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I am over here. 

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BYRNE. It is good to see you again. 

Before I get started, I just wanted to tell you there were 15 of 

us that met 2 weeks ago with General Brooks in Seoul, and I think 

we all came away from there understanding the seriousness of the 

situation, but we had 100 percent confidence in his leadership and 

the troops he has under his command and where he is going with 

that. And I just wanted to say that after having an hour and a half 

with him that day. 

Last year, you and I visited in Hawaii at the RIMPAC [Rim of 

the Pacific] exercise. And the, I think, 2 hours you spent with the 

eight of us that were there, I just have to tell you, that was a tour 

de force. Rarely in my lifetime have I been in the room with somebody who had such complete command over everything that you 

were talking to us about over an incredibly broad and diverse theater. So I wanted to compliment you on that. 

You and I had a little bit of a colloquy about the littoral combat 

ship [LCS], and you were talking to me about how it helped you 

increase and distribute your lethality in the theater. And you reminisced about the days when you were a young naval commander 

and you were dealing with the Soviet corvettes, the little, smaller 

vessels that the Soviets had that they could put a missile on. And 

you were very good about going over with me and the others there 

about having that small combatant out there, particularly now that 

we can put Harpoon missiles on them and add to what you are 

doing. 

Two months ago, I was in Singapore, and I noticed that you had 

an LCS and some EPFs [expeditionary fast transports] there. Last 

week, Admiral Gabrielson stated, ‘‘We’re ready and excited to welcome multiple LCSs to the region and put them to work, and 

there’s no shortage of meaningful work for these ships.’’ 

Can you discuss the impact of having the LCSs and the EPFs in 

the theater? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. So I have gone on record as being a 

fan of the littoral combat ship in both its principal forms, and I am 

a fan of it. I would be a bigger fan of the up-gunned, if you will, 

LCSs which—— 

Mr. BYRNE. The frigate? 

Admiral HARRIS. The frigate—thanks to the Congress, we are 

going to get. And I think it is important. 
23 

I want to acknowledge our great friend in Singapore, or Singapore as our great friend, that is, who allow us to rotationally deploy 

these ships to their country. So I am grateful for that. 

I think the Navy and Vice Admiral Rowden at SURFPAC, Surface Forces [Pacific], are on the right track with this theory of distributed lethality. And I think the LCS has a role to play in that. 

So, again, I am a fan of LCS. 

The story I told was, when I was a tactical action officer on the 

USS Saratoga back in the eighties, one of my jobs was to keep 

track of all these little ships that the Soviets had—the Nanuchkas, 

Tarantuls, and Osa II boats. These are small, small patrol boats. 

But the reason we had to keep track of them, the reason we were 

worried about them, the reason the captain and the admiral were 

on my case all the time—‘‘Where are these guys?’’—is because each 

one carried a Styx missile or more. So they carried a missile that 

could threaten the carrier and the carrier strike group, punching 

far, far above their weight. 

And I think that LCS should do that. And I want the Chinese 

every day to worry about where the LCS is, just like I used to 

worry about where the Osas, the Nanuchkas, the Tarantuls were 

back in the eighties. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I think the proposal from the Navy, or at least 

the way they are working on it today, both variants of LCS upgraded to be a frigate would have multiple missile tubes on them 

and would be able to respond the way that you said. 

So just to make sure I am understanding what you are saying, 

you want them to have the sort of missile capability that the Navy 

is trying to get to with the new frigate design. 

Admiral HARRIS. Absolutely. And I am agnostic on the type of 

missile. You know, that is a service decision. But I want them to 

be equipped with missiles that can sink ships. 

Mr. BYRNE. And having multiple numbers of those, not just—we 

only have the Coronado out there right now—but having more than 

one, having several out there that you can place around wherever 

you want, that adds to what the Chinese or any other adversary 

has to worry about with the placement of our fleet out there. 

Admiral HARRIS. Right. On our combat side, it does it, absolutely. 

And on the everyday, noncombat peace operations, humanitarian 

assistance, the whole range of operations and missions that the 

Navy has in the region, the LCS adds to that. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I really appreciate your comments on that. But, 

once again, your leadership, General Brooks’ leadership, I have a 

high level of confidence that we have the right people and the right 

things in place to do what we have to do if something bad happens 

there. And I appreciate your leadership and his leadership. 

And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Suozzi. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, thank you so much for your testimony today, and thank 

you for your service to our country. 

You said that the Carl Vinson is now in the Philippine Sea. God 

forbid you had to fly from the Carl Vinson to North Korea, how 

long a flight time is that? 

Admiral HARRIS. About 2 hours. Well within their capability. 
24 

Mr. SUOZZI. And there wouldn’t be any need for refueling to get 

there and back? 

Admiral HARRIS. There would be, but a modern carrier strike 

group has its own refuelers. 

Mr. SUOZZI. On the—— 

Admiral HARRIS. On the ship. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. 

When you talked about the basic munitions like small diameter 

bombs, is that a problem throughout the Navy, or is that a problem 

for just for the Pacific Command? 

Admiral HARRIS. No, it is not a Navy problem, it is a joint force 

problem, and it is a shortage across the joint force. And so, you 

know, we are sending them out to CENTCOM, Central Command, 

now because they are needed in the fight in the Middle East. So, 

you know, I have an allocation, other combatant commanders have 

an allocation—— 

Mr. SUOZZI. So you are sharing your allocation—— 

Admiral HARRIS. I am. 

Mr. SUOZZI [continuing]. With Central Command. 

Admiral HARRIS. Right. Except they don’t share them back, 

right? Hopefully they don’t share them back, because hopefully 

they use them. And so then they will need more. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So how would I go about finding out, like, what is 

the status of that, what is the inventory overall and where they are 

and that kind of thing? 

Admiral HARRIS. You just ask the question, and I will get back 

to you, sir. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Well, I am asking that question. 

Admiral HARRIS. You just did, and I will get back to you. 

Mr. SUOZZI. And what were the other two weapons that you mentioned before that were your priorities, other than the small diameter bombs? 

Admiral HARRIS. Anti-air warfare missiles, AAW missiles, AIM– 

9X, AIM–120D. These go on our fighter aircraft. And Mark 48 torpedoes. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So I would like to—I am trying to develop—I am 

new here, I have only been here for 100 days, and I am trying to 

develop an inventory of all the different equipment that we have 

and understand where things are and how much we use of 

what—— 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. I will get that to you. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. Thank you so much. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Admiral 

Harris, for being here. 

One, just again, it is a joint problem, the number of munitions 

and the lackage of stockpile that we have in order to comply with 

all contingencies that we would have at this time. Is that correct, 

Admiral Harris, in your opinion? 

And then I want to go back just a little bit to the leader of North 

Korea. And to the ranking member’s questions, like you, I don’t 
25 

share the same confidence that he understands the cost-benefit 

analysis of any actions towards the United States. And I thank you 

for being on the front lines, you and all our service members for 

being on the front lines every day. 

Do you know of any source, other than, I guess, maybe China, 

but does he—do you think based on the news sources and the people around him that are his advisers, do you think he gets any advice that he cannot totally annihilate the United States? Do you 

think there is any source that he gets that from? 

Admiral HARRIS. I do not. In his circle of advisers, you know, 

they pretty much, you know, follow his line or he pretty much 

eliminates the source of distrust or questioning. 

Mr. KELLY. I was with some friends when I was on the district 

work period, and I mentioned—I said, you know, some people think 

that God controls their actions or directs their actions or that they 

are in link with God’s actions. It is almost like he is a little more 

than that; he may even think he is God, based on the number of 

advisers. And if you in any way go against what he says is right, 

he has you killed, whether you be his brother, his uncle, anyone 

else. Would that be correct? 

Admiral HARRIS. That would be correct, sir. 

Mr. KELLY. The number of ships—and I know—but how does 

that impact PACOM directly, in an unclassified area, the lack of 

submarines and other surface ships? 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, so, as I have said before, the Navy fulfills 

about 50 percent of my stated submarine needs. And so the submarine force, in an unclassified way, for example, deal with the 

Russian submarine threat, the Chinese submarine threat, and they 

are also involved in surveillance missions and other kinds of missions, themselves, directly for Pacific Fleet, for the fleet, if you will. 

And so, because of the numbers of Chinese submarines that are 

underway and the types of submarines, and the same with the 

Russians, you know, I need to be able to keep track of those submarines in every way that I can. And by not having the number 

of submarines that I need to do that, then I have to make risk calculations and risk-based decisions on which ones to maybe not keep 

track of or what surveillance missions we are not going to do because I don’t have the submarine to do that, I need it to do something else. 

So those kinds of calculations are being done in real time every 

day, not only by me and by the PACOM staff but by Admiral Swift 

and the Pacific Fleet staff and on down the chain. So that is just 

one example. 

You know, right now, the Carl Vinson is on deployment. I extended the Carl Vinson by a month in order to ensure that we have 

a carrier available should the President need one, because the carrier that is based in the Western Pacific, the Ronald Reagan, is in 

maintenance right now. And so, you know, I wouldn’t have a carrier there right now were it not for the ability to extend the Carl 

Vinson. 

So, you know, that is just two examples for you right there. 

Mr. KELLY. And when I first got into the military many, many 

years ago, we always had a five-paragraph operations order. And, 

lately, you know, 10 years ago, we started adding risk. And that 
26 

is a risk that we as Congress can source to reduce some of that 

risk, but it is a—we ought to be doing the same risk assessment. 

If we don’t source this, then you take risk, and that means the 

lives and material and equipment and treasure. 

Would that be correct, Admiral Harris? 

Admiral HARRIS. Absolutely correct. 

Mr. KELLY. And then final question. We hear quite often about 

the funding at the Joint Chief level, the CRs and the impacts of 

CRs at the joint level. But at your level, as a commander, the 

PACOM commander, how significant is it to have funding that you 

can plan on to make sure we have the right strategic plans in 

place? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, it is very significant. And, you know, just 

in broad brush because of time, if we don’t get a budget or if we 

go into another CR, the services are going to start to enact some 

draconian measures in order to balance their books, right? 

And that includes things like they are going to cut back on carrier air wing training, which means that the pilots that deploy 

won’t be ready to deploy. The Air Force is going to cut back over 

100,000 flight hours across the Air Force. The Army will cut back 

exercises, important exercises like Pacific Pathways and things like 

that, in order to balance those books. And that will have an effect 

on the combatant commanders directly and on me directly in the 

Pacific. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Admiral Harris, 

thank you very much for your service and for being with us today. 

I wanted to ask you—and this is somewhat in line with some of 

the questions that people have been asking partly because I think 

it is what the public right now is looking for. In your testimony, 

you said that your goal is to bring Kim Jong-un to his senses but 

not bring him to his knees. And in light of that, what are you and 

General Brooks doing to reduce tensions on the peninsula specifically and prevent what some people are concerned could be an 

overreaction on our part? 

Admiral HARRIS. So I believe the best way to reduce tensions on 

the Korean Peninsula is to provide credible combat power 24/7. So 

if you are a weak country or you have a weak military, then I think 

that encourages adventurism and puts us in a place with countries 

like North Korea that we wouldn’t want to be in if we had a choice. 

So we have a choice. And General Brooks and I provide those options up the chain to the President, but, within our own areas of 

authority, we provide that credible combat power to our allies in 

Japan and Korea. 

So bringing the Vinson up is one example of that. Bringing the 

USS Michigan, a guided-missile nuclear submarine, into Busan is 

another example of that. These B–1 and B–52 flights that we fly 

throughout the area are another example of credible combat power, 

which I believe has the effect of ameliorating Kim Jong-un’s worst 

impulses. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. Is there anything else you could share with 

us regarding your own work, essentially, with the White House 

through some of these escalations? 
27 

Admiral HARRIS. No, ma’am. I would be hesitant to share with 

you discussions that I have had with the National Command Authority. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, sir. 

I also wanted to turn to the budget discussions that we have 

been having here, which are critically important. In fact, in your 

testimony, you listed budget uncertainty as a noteworthy challenge, 

next to China, Russia, territorial disputes, North Korea, and ISIS. 

And when General Milley was here just a few weeks ago, he 

talked about the fact that what he views here in Congress actually 

is professional malpractice if we don’t pass this budget and get on 

with this important work. I suspect you probably share that, that 

sentiment in some way? 

Admiral HARRIS. I wouldn’t be quite as forthcoming as General 

Milley is, ma’am. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. But it is a real critical need. And—— 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I will say that the need is there, without 

criticizing the Congress by name. But the need—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. But sometimes that is appropriate, right? Okay. 

Admiral HARRIS. Please note I am silent on that. The need, 

though, is real. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. 

Admiral HARRIS. I believe we must have a budget. And I believe 

we must repeal sequestration. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. And I—— 

Admiral HARRIS. To do otherwise is going to put us in a very bad 

place. 

And those signals I was talking about earlier, the signals that I 

talked about earlier with North Korea and all of that, KJU will interpret that in a bad way. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. One of the things you just said in response to 

my colleague is that you think that commanders are going to start 

taking some draconian measures. 

Admiral HARRIS. I think the services are—when I said commanders, it is the services, because they have to man, train, and 

equip the military for their use of the joint force. But when I say 

the services, I mean the Navy, the Army, the Air Force, and the 

Marine Corps. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. Is there something that you see, and maybe 

even in some trends, that we continue to do that, in fact, given 

some other technologies or changes, that we don’t need to do any 

longer? 

Admiral HARRIS. I would have to think about that a little bit. I 

think that, in terms of R&D, research and development, that we 

are, in fact, looking at new ways of doing new business. And I 

think the Third Offset, for example, is getting at some of that. 

DIUx [Defense Innovation Unit Experimental]—I don’t know what 

that stands for, but it sounds cool—the DIUx is another way to try 

to jump-start some ideas. And I think these are all helpful. 

So I would say that the Department of Defense is looking at innovation as a means to overcome some of the challenges that we 

face from other—— 
28 

Mrs. DAVIS. Could I ask you, just briefly, because time is almost 

up, is the fact that we have struggled so much to have an audit 

out of the Pentagon, is that an issue for you? 

Admiral HARRIS. No, ma’am, it is not for me. 

Mrs. DAVIS. So no audit is not a problem, from your perspective. 

Admiral HARRIS. No, I don’t want to imply that, but if there is 

a problem with an audit in the Pentagon, that doesn’t affect me, 

as a combatant commander, directly. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral Harris, thank you for your leadership and what 

you are doing and your diplomacy and tact towards Congress. I 

thank you for that. But I would say it would be professional malpractice if we don’t get a budget passed and take care of our military right. 

I wanted to get your professional opinion for the committee here, 

just how hard it is and challenging to defend South Korea, with the 

location of Seoul and the number of artillery that North Korea has. 

Could you just go into a little detail, just the challenges that we 

are going to face if Kim Jong-un becomes aggressive? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, it is a very dramatic challenge. So Seoul 

is, I believe, the most densely populated city on the planet, 25 million people in a relatively small area, within artillery range of the 

DMZ and the heights north of the DMZ, where Kim Jong-un has 

a vast array of rocket forces and artillery. So it does pose a significant challenge. 

Mr. BACON. And it is an extraordinarily hard challenge to 

counter. 

Admiral HARRIS. Right. 

Mr. BACON. Do you think we have enough long-range strike aircraft, air-to-ground, air-to-air, close enough that deters Kim Jongun? Or do we need to add additional permanent presence in Japan, 

Guam, so forth? I know we have rotating forces, but is it enough 

to make clear to Kim Jong-un that he will lose if he crosses the 

line? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I believe that the military forces we have 

are sending the right signal to Kim Jong-un. 

So we routinely fly B–1 and B–52 flights. Just 2 days ago, we 

had an operation where we had a ship in the East Sea, Sea of 

Japan, and on the West Sea with the Koreans. The Japanese were 

involved, and we had a B–52 fly through there. The Japanese 

handed it off to the Koreans, who then escorted the bomber 

through the Korean Peninsula to the other side. 

So this is a pretty complicated operation, and it demonstrated to 

our allies and friends and also to Kim Jong-un that we have this 

capability, that we can bring these forces to bear from all around 

the Pacific to focus on him if need be. 

So I am pleased with the array of forces that we have, in terms 

of ‘‘fight tonight’’ forces. But as I answered a previous question, I 

am concerned about follow-on forces—— 

Mr. BACON. Right. 
29 

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. And the means to get them there, 

all of which is affected by readiness, which is affected by the budget, and on and on. 

Mr. BACON. It seems to me part of this is a whole-of-government 

response. Are we doing enough in the non-military instruments of 

power? For example, in the nineties, we used banking sanctions 

that I thought were very effective. Are there other things we 

should be doing to help put pressure on North Korea? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, sir, I believe that it is a whole-of-government effort and a whole-of-government effort would be required. 

And I believe that different parts of our government are involved 

in the North Korean problem set. 

Mr. BACON. Should we go back to the banking sanctions? It 

seems like, to me, that worked. 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I am not smart on banking sanctions. 

Mr. BACON. Okay. One last thing. Thinking of Kim Jong-un, he 

is the grandson of a dictator, son of a dictator. He has been surrounded by people his whole life that tell him what he wants to 

hear. So I sort of question his rational decision making on this, but 

how would you interpret his strategic objectives? What is he trying 

pursue? What are his goals with his behavior? 

Admiral HARRIS. So I believe there is an element of respect that 

he is going after. I believe he wants to be considered a nuclear 

state, a nuclear-capable state. I believe he seeks unification of the 

Korean Peninsula to his favor. And I believe that he seeks to have 

that dominance in that part of the world. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate 

the time. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Harris, aloha. 

Welcome. 

Admiral HARRIS. Aloha. 

Ms. GABBARD. I have just returned back to Washington yesterday 

after holding a whole string of town hall meetings across the State 

of Hawaii on each island. And the question and concern raised 

about North Korea’s threat, yes, to the United States but specifically to Hawaii, was a constant question and theme that came up 

on each of our islands there. 

Given Hawaii is home to your headquarters, how do you characterize the threat of North Korea specifically to Hawaii? And how 

confident are you in our current BMD [ballistic missile defense] capabilities against that threat? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. Thanks, Congresswoman. 

I am concerned about it. I believe that our ballistic missile architecture is sufficient to protect Hawaii today, but it can be overwhelmed. And, you know, if Kim Jong-un or someone else launched 

ballistic missiles, ICBMs, against the United States, then, you 

know, someone would have to make the decision on which ones to 

take out or not. So that is a difficult decision. 

I think that we would be better served—my personal opinion is 

that we would be better served with a defensive Hawaii radar and 

interceptors in Hawaii. I know that that is being discussed, and I 

don’t want to get ahead of those discussions. But I think we ought 
30 

to study it, for sure, and then make that decision as a department 

on what the best way forward is. 

But Kim Jong-un is clearly in a position to threaten Hawaii 

today, in my opinion. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. And in what you are suggesting, having a radar as well as interceptors in Hawaii specifically, how confident are you in that technology that is being discussed in being 

able to effectively intercept an ICBM coming towards us? 

Admiral HARRIS. It depends on the systems. You know, we are 

getting ahead of—I am getting ahead of ourselves just a little bit 

because, you know, I am suggesting that we study the basing of interceptors in Hawaii. The type of interceptors, you know, that is 

the next level of detail, which I am not part of that discussion. 

I think that the defensive Hawaii radar is coming. I think the 

interceptors piece is something that is yet to be determined. But 

I believe we should certainly look at it, and I think we would be 

somehow not doing our job if we didn’t look at it. 

Ms. GABBARD. And could you expand a little bit on what you 

mentioned on the current BMD capability being sufficient but if 

overwhelmed would create a situation where difficult choices would 

be made? Could you maybe just lay out a scenario? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. In this hearing room, I will just say that 

we have X number of interceptors that can shoot down Y number 

of targets, and if the opposition fired Y plus one, then that is at 

least one that will get through. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. Recently, I think about a month ago, 

the Acting Assistant Secretary of State made a statement basically 

saying that the pivot to Asia is effectively over. What is your take 

on that statement, and how have you seen the practical implications of that? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So I believe that the phrase was—well, 

you know, the term ‘‘pivot’’ and the term ‘‘rebalance,’’ those are just 

words that describe what America is doing. And I believe that what 

we are doing is continuing to place an importance on the Indo-AsiaPacific region. I believe that Secretary Mattis’ first trip was to the 

region. The Vice President, I was with him when he returned from 

the region through Hawaii. 

I believe that these send the right signal to our friends, allies, 

and partners and others that the United States remains steadfast 

in our placing of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region as the most important 

region for America’s future. 

I think the President’s relationships with Prime Minister Abe in 

Japan, with President Xi in China, and all of that are positive. And 

it demonstrates to the folks out there that we do value what is 

happening in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. 

Now, even though the terms, quote/unquote, ‘‘pivot’’ or ‘‘rebalance’’ or something may be out of vogue, I think our Nation remains focused on the region, as we should. 

Ms. GABBARD. Yeah. It is what is actually happening that matters. 

I appreciate your leadership through your long tenure of service 

based in Hawaii but really always bringing to light the challenges 

as well as the opportunities that we face there in the region. Thank 

you. 
31 

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Cheney. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

Admiral, for your service to the country and for your very frank answers and helpful answers here today. 

I wanted to follow up first on some questions about the INF 

Treaty and see if you could elaborate a little bit on the extent to 

which that treaty is now only, in fact, prohibiting the United 

States, only binding us, in many ways, if the Russians are violating 

it and if the Chinese are moving ahead in the production of weapons that we can’t produce under that treaty. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I think you have said it all. And my concern—so the INF Treaty doesn’t affect China’s weapons development or any other country’s weapons development with the exception of ours and Russia’s because they are not signatories to the 

treaty. It is a bilateral treaty signed in 1985 during a bipolar 

world, us and the Soviet Union and then now Russia and some of 

the republics that have come out from that. 

I don’t know if Russia is wholesale violating the treaty. I do 

know that General Selva testified that they have violated it in certain aspects. So we should hold them to account for that. 

On the nuclear side of the INF Treaty, I believe it is holding, and 

I would be hesitant to call for us to pull out of the treaty, because 

anything you could do to limit nuclear weapons is a good. 

But the treaty not only governs nuclear weapons but also conventional weapons in the ballistic and cruise missile regimes. And that 

is what I am worried about. So I am worried about Chinese weapons and what we are going to do about it. 

So we can’t stop the Chinese from developing weapons that run 

counter to INF, because they are not a signatory to INF. But we 

can’t develop weapons that can match those because we are a signatory to it and we follow it like you would expect America to follow a treaty, to the letter. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you. And, in particular, one of those kinds 

of weapons that they are developing that we are precluded from developing are the hypersonic weapons. Is that right? 

Admiral HARRIS. That is correct. 

Ms. CHENEY. Could you talk a little bit about missile defense 

against hypersonic weapons, in terms of, you know, what the capabilities are, if any, that we might have today? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I really don’t want to get into that in this 

hearing. Happy to discuss it in the classified section. 

Ms. CHENEY. Okay. Thank you. In terms of missile defense and 

our allies, is there more that we could be doing, for example, with 

respect to the sale of Aegis Ashore sites or THAAD to Japan? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I believe that there is more that we can 

do, and we should make available, I think, those systems to countries that are our allies and close friends that would want them. 

You know, I don’t want to get into a discussion with Japan, for example, on what is better. I think they can make that decision. But 

we should encourage them to go down that path. 

I think that, within our treaty structure, our alliance structure 

in Northeast Asia, for example, one of the things that could be 

done, which we can improve on, is the relationship between Japan 
32 

and South Korea, right? They both have Aegis weapons systems, 

they both have Patriot, they both have ballistic missile defense. 

And they need to get along better. And I am happy to report that 

they are, that we are having an effect in that, and they recognize 

the need to do this. And the relationship between both of them and 

the trilateral relationship is improving, which is helpful. 

Ms. CHENEY. And then just a little bit more on China. It has long 

been, sort of, the policy, including in the previous administrations, 

the Bush administration, the Obama administration, today, that 

we need to get the Chinese to put pressure on North Korea, as you 

have discussed at some length here. 

But could you talk a little bit about what you see as their real 

interests? I mean, if you look at the developments that they are 

making to prevent us from access in the same area, you know, how 

much do we really think we could count on them, in terms of— 

some of their interests seem very aligned with the North Koreans’ 

interests. 

Admiral HARRIS. So I think that, in regards to the peninsula, the 

Korean Peninsula, China’s interests include they don’t want to see 

a North Korean regime that collapses and then have a refugee 

problem from the millions of North Koreans that would probably 

head into China. So that is one problem. They don’t want to see 

a unified peninsula that is unified with Seoul, Korea, as its core. 

They don’t want an American ally on their borders. So that is problematic for them. 

So those are, I think, historically, their big concern with what is 

happening on the peninsula. And that has driven their actions. 

That has driven them to be helpful in some points and less helpful 

in others, both in terms of actual things and in the temporal sense. 

But I think that President Trump has convinced President Xi 

that there are other benefits to having a denuclearized North 

Korea and it is to China’s benefit that it be that way, and then we 

will go forward and see where it goes. And I think it is early days, 

for sure, but China seems to be helpful here, and, you know, I want 

to acknowledge that and be optimistic. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Halleran. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Harris, 

thank you for being here today. And I really want to thank you and 

all of your women and men underneath your command. 

I am going to get off of the subjects that we will deal with in the 

classified meeting, but I want to go back to ISIS for a second. You 

had mentioned that there were ISIS-inspired terrorism in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. These countries 

don’t have the best history as far as being able to adapt to those 

types of situations. And they are countries also that are within 

your area that could be helpful in the future. 

How do you see this developing as far as, if ISIS does get in 

there, how do we address that situation? And how confident are 

you that they are able to address it themselves or need our help? 

Admiral HARRIS. So I am encouraged by the activities of those 

countries—the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh— 

principally because they understand the problem set. And one of 

the subordinate commands to PACOM, Special Operations Com-
33 

mand Pacific, or SOCPAC, is involved in advising and assisting the 

militaries of those countries. And I think that is important. 

So SOCPAC is in the southern Philippines, for example, helping 

the AFP, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, go after the problem 

set themselves. So this is a Philippine problem set. The Philippine 

authorities are the ones taking direct action, and we are helping 

them where we can and where they want to have help. 

So I think that is the approach that is good for the Pacific, and 

it is working, I think, right now. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. And do any of these countries, Admiral, have 

the ability to assist in anything that would occur in the South 

China Sea? Or if they don’t, what do we have to do in order to get 

them up to that level? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I think they are reluctant to be involved 

in activities in the South China Sea that would put them in a position of confrontation with China. It is the Philippines, though, that 

we have to remember is the one who started the arbitration case 

which got us in the place we are in the legal framework. 

But, you know, these countries are subject to economic pressures 

and other pressures from China. And they all have issues—not all 

of them, but Malaysia, for example, has issues in the South China 

Sea with China, as does Indonesia in an area north of Natuna, and 

Malaysia with the South Luconia Shoals, and all of the issues that 

we know about with the Philippines. 

So I think that we need to encourage them to stand up to China, 

and we need to backstop them where we can, especially with countries that we are allied with, like the Philippines. They are a treaty 

ally of the United States. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. But the Philippines also have some internal 

problems—— 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN [continuing]. That can cause us some problems. 

I guess, from your remarks, I am going to take it that depending 

on them for substantial help in that area is probably minimal. 

Admiral HARRIS. Right. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Banks. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Harris, thank 

you for being here today. 

In 2010, a Republic of Korea Navy ship was sunk by what is believed to be a North Korean torpedo. That same year, the U.S. 

Navy issued an urgent operational need to accelerate the development of the Navy’s Surface Ship Torpedo Defense system, which 

provides an advanced torpedo detection, classification, and countermeasures system to protect the Navy’s high-value surface ships 

and aircraft carriers from increasing torpedo threats. 

Since then, torpedo threats have continued to increase, with adversary submarines operating within torpedo range of carrier battle 

groups, as evidenced by encounters in 2015 with the USS Ronald 

Reagan battle group and today, highlighted by the current and aggressive threats we face from North Korea. 

I understand that four systems have been successfully tested, installed, and deployed since 2014 to help counter this threat, with 

over 20,000 operational hours on board high-value units. However, 
34 

I also understand that budget constraints may be threatening the 

further development and deployment of this system on all CVNs 

[aircraft carriers]. 

This is particularly concerning considering the recent provocations from our adversaries and specific threats this week from 

North Korea stating their intent to sink a U.S. Navy strike group 

led by USS Carl Vinson. 

With nearly $530 million invested in this technology to date, is 

there a renewed priority to ensure this system development continues and is rapidly deployed on every high-value unit in our 

fleet? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I am not an expert on the system, but I will 

say that the budget constraints are such that the Navy will have 

to make difficult decisions, and this will likely be one of those decisions that will be made. The system would be cut if we don’t get, 

you know, the budget or if the Navy doesn’t get the resources that 

it has asked for. 

Mr. BANKS. Can you defend the priority? 

Admiral HARRIS. I don’t know what the Navy has put above this 

in terms of other systems that they would keep and this one they 

would cut. But I will trust the Navy to be able to prioritize all of 

the systems they have, and then they are going to have to take 

cuts. I mean, you know, in a finite fiscal environment, then you 

can’t have everything. And I think the Navy will make those difficult decisions. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Admiral. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, welcome. 

And thank you for your testimony here this morning, and, most especially, thank you for your great service to the Nation. 

So we have recently seen an increase in military operations by 

the new administration, such as the cruise missile strikes in Syria 

and the large-yield bomb dropped in Afghanistan. And while I certainly think that both of those actions were appropriate, if we move 

the aperture over to North Korea, I fear that employing similar actions without broader, more strategic goals in place may have disastrous effects on the 20 million South Koreans and 24,000 U.S. 

troops living within range of North Korean Army artillery. 

How is PACOM ensuring that the broader strategic implications 

are being weighed when planning action on the Korean Peninsula? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I think it is a good question, sir, and, as 

I talked earlier, I believe that the best thing that we can do, as 

PACOM, the best thing that I can do is to ensure that we have 

credible combat power available all the time to face whatever 

threat comes out of North Korea. I think the lack of a strong, credible combat deterrence is actually an encouragement to Kim Jongun to do things that are provocative or dangerous or both. 

And so if we don’t have that capability or if he thinks we don’t 

have the capability, then that will make him, I think, adventurous. 

And that would, in fact, then threaten those 25 million people who 

live in Seoul. That would then require a response by us and our 

South Korean ally, and then we would be at it again. 

So I believe that the best thing that I can do is to provide that 

credible combat force in the face of Kim Jong-un’s provocations. 
35 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

On another topic, I strongly believe that multilateral exercises 

with our partners and allies are critical at achieving a unified front 

in the face of some of our more aggressive and challenging adversaries, whether they be in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, in the 

EUCOM [European Command] arena, or elsewhere. Unfortunately, 

we constantly hear that these exercises are at increasing risk of 

being canceled due to budget constraints and uncertainty. 

What lessons do you fear we risk losing if we are unable to work 

with our allies? And will these partnering countries seek or be approached by other powerful nations in the region to fill the void 

that the U.S. leaves? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, clearly, the exercises are important on a 

number of levels. For those countries that are our military peers, 

you know, the high-end militaries in the region—Japan, Korea, 

Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand—you know, these are highend militaries that we need to exercise with because we might be 

in a position to have to rely on them for some operation or they 

might be in a position to rely on us for some operation, and if we 

don’t know how to work with them, then it will be unproductive in 

the early days. 

And then there are countries that seek to be better, and exercises 

with us and countries like us are desired. If we can’t provide that 

level of exercise support, then the other countries will step in and 

do that in lieu of us. And when I say ‘‘other countries,’’ that is a 

euphemism for China. 

And so China will step in, and they will become, or they will try 

to become, the security partner of choice, if you will, for countries 

that we are their security partner of choice today, but that is because we invest time and resources and equipment, and the American people, reflected in the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, 

coastguardsmen, we invest in our relationships with these countries. 

And if we don’t do that because of budget constraints—and exercises are clearly on the table. The services will cut stuff and I will 

cut exercises in order to make my books balance. And the end result of that is we will have a lesser-capable military alliance structure, not only because our allies would be less capable but we will 

be less capable. And then we will also have less professional relationships with our friends and partners in the region. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. You have confirmed a lot of 

things that I feared or had concerns about. So thank you for the 

work you are doing. I have other questions I will submit for the 

record. 

But, Admiral, thank you for your service and the extraordinary 

work you are doing. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Admiral, for being here. I always appreciate people like yourself that give your life to protecting the rest of us. 

Admiral, you know that some of the times when we ask you 

questions, it is not just to be enlightened; it is sometimes we even 

have some idea what the answer is, but we are trying to inform 
36 

policy decisions, sometimes even use it for leverage for policy decisions. So that might reflect some of my questions here today. 

So the first one is a general question. About, in general, how 

much did we spend to field the Aegis Ashore test site at the Pacific 

Missile Range Facility [PMRF]? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I don’t know, but I will find out for you and 

get back to you. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. That would be fine. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. FRANKS. Then a followup: Does it make sense to defend Hawaii from Alaska, instead of using this particular site? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, in response to an earlier question, I believe we should do both—we should consider doing both. 

Mr. FRANKS. Redundancy. 

Admiral HARRIS. I think so. And while I am not advocating for 

interceptors in Hawaii, I am advocating that we study the issue of 

putting interceptors in Hawaii, which I think is prudent. 

Mr. FRANKS. Sure. Well, we have the Navy’s new SPY–6 and the 

TPY–2 radar at the Pacific Missile Range Facility. Can we use 

those radars to add to the defense of Hawaii today? 

Admiral HARRIS. I believe we can, but I am advocating for the 

defensive Hawaii radar a different radar, a different kind of radar. 

I think that there are two different—or a couple of defense contractors that are interested in providing that. So, you know, I don’t 

have a view as to which radar is better or all of that, but I think 

we need to have a defensive Hawaii radar system, and then we 

should look at the interceptors that would naturally go with that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Would it be better, in terms of some of the those 

mechanisms, to wait several years to conduct the environmental 

impact statement process and analysis of alternative processes to 

build a brand-new radar? 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I think we have to follow the rules, right? 

And so the EIS, the environmental impact statement, and all of 

that is important, and I think we must follow those rules. 

That said, there is a sense of urgency here. I mean, Kim Jongun just a few days ago threatened Australia. 

And so, you know, we have a sense of urgency and the rules, and 

I think we can bring them together in ways that don’t violate the 

law but also move this thing forward. 

Mr. FRANKS. Are you suggesting that if a warhead landed that 

it might have an environmental impact? 

Admiral HARRIS. It might have that, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Should we evaluate the capability of the 

SM–3 Block IIA to defend Hawaii from North Korea and its 

ICBMs? 

Admiral HARRIS. I think we should evaluate that. That should be 

one of the systems that we look at to see what is best for the defense of Hawaii. 

Mr. FRANKS. In terms of Hawaii’s defense, and specifically with 

North Korea in mind, is there anything that you would tell this 

committee that you think is a priority that has not been essentially 

elaborated on here today? 
37 

Admiral HARRIS. No, sir. I think I have been pretty clear that I 

am advocating for a defensive Hawaii radar, I am advocating for 

a study to see if it is worthwhile to put interceptors in Hawaii to 

improve Hawaii’s capability against North Korean missiles—or 

anyone else’s missiles, for that matter. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Admiral, thank you, and we will save any 

other questions for the classified moments. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Hello, Admiral Harris. 

Good to see you. 

And I would like to thank Congressman Franks for his concern 

over Hawaii. Some people think we are just an island, and it is 

good to hear that my colleagues are concerned about the safety of 

our islands. 

Congressman Franks also brought up PMRF, which I have always felt is essential to the defense not only of the PACOM or 

Indo-Asia-Pacific area but also for the rest of the United States. 

And I think what we are getting at here—and if we can’t talk 

about it except in a classified setting, I can understand that—and 

that is really, the land mass that we have, the question is whether 

we can have a permanent interceptor in Hawaii and still not sacrifice the missile ranges now, what it tends to do, which is to do 

all the testing. 

Do you have an opinion as to whether the two can coexist? Because I have heard the use of the phrase ‘‘conditional permanent’’ 

versus an actual permanent structure. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, I believe they can coexist. And I also believe that PMRF, the Pacific Missile Range Facility, is a national 

treasure. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I agree with you. I think you can’t duplicate it 

anywhere—— 

Admiral HARRIS. Right. 

Ms. HANABUSA [continuing]. Especially with the undersea component of it. 

Admiral HARRIS. The whole thing, the size of the airspace, the 

size of the range space, it cannot be replicated. It is a national 

treasure. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And I guess on that note, we should tell our colleagues in Hawaii that they should be very receptive to extending 

the lease surrounding PMRF, because that, of course, has kept it 

in the position that it is in. 

I am also interested in the concept of the undersea warfare that 

you wrote about in your testimony and that fact that out of the 230 

of the world’s 400 foreign submarines that are in the Indo-AsiaPacific region, 130 of them belong to China, North Korea, and Russia. 

I guess my other question is, who do the others belong to? But 

in addition to that, what is the capabilities of these submarines 

that we find? 

Admiral HARRIS. So the others are friends, allies, and partners 

and us—Japanese, Koreans, Indonesians, Indians, you know. And 

so they all add up. 
38 

The capabilities vary depending on the country. Some are very, 

very capable. The Japanese submarines, the French submarines 

that Australia is going to buy, highly capable submarines. Others 

are not so capable, the North Korean subs, for example. 

China has a range, so they have capable submarines at the high 

end and less capable older ones. But they are trying to make the 

capable submarines even more capable and close the gap with us. 

China has the full range—diesel boats, nuclear boats, guided-missile submarines, ICBMs—or SSBNs, their Jin-class ballistic missile 

submarines, and so on. So it kind of covers the range. 

Russia’s most advanced and newest class of submarines are now 

in the Pacific. The Dolgorukiy-class SSBN is now in the Pacific. 

So these are dramatic improvements in capability of competitor 

submarine forces. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And we hate to say this, but how do they compare to our submarines, Russia’s newest, top-grade submarines? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, as I have said before, I believe that there 

is no submarine on the planet that can touch an American submarine, a Virginia-class submarine. 

That said, that gap between us and the next best and the third 

next best is closing, and our competitors are working and investing 

hard to close those gaps. And we have to continue to resource our 

submarine force in order to keep that gap a gap. 

Ms. HANABUSA. In the testimony or the statement by General 

Brooks, he talks about a successful testing of North Korea’s developmental submarine-launched ballistic missile. Now, I am curious 

as to whether it launched from North Korea’s submarine or—and 

how many of them do they have floating out there? 

Admiral HARRIS. They have one. It is designated as SSB, as opposed to SSBN, because it is a conventional submarine. It is the 

Gorae, G-o-r-a-e. And that is the rudimentary ballistic-missilecapable submarine that North Korea has. 

Ms. HANABUSA. But it can launch, nonetheless, a ballistic missile? 

Admiral HARRIS. It can. It is a rudimentary submarine, but it 

can launch a ballistic missile. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. Thank you, 

Admiral. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Abraham. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral, 

for being here and for your very informative answers and direct answers. 

And I would postulate that, save the North Korean-Chinese border being heavily armed by their militia and their armies, that 

China would already be having a significant refugee crisis from 

North Korea because of the starving citizens under Kim Jong-un’s 

leadership. 

You answered most of the questions. I just have one. For your 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, your ISR requirements, in your command specifically—your command is so vast— 

are those requirements being met on the ISR platforms? 

Admiral HARRIS. They are not, sir. But I believe any combatant 

commander would sit here and tell you that his or her ISR requirements are not being met. 
39 

Dr. ABRAHAM. So it could use, certainly, more drones, more aircraft, certainly. 

Admiral HARRIS. Right. All of the above. You know, I call myself—I have an insatiable need for stuff because I think you all 

have an insatiable need for security. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you so much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, it is good to 

see you again, and thanks for your service. I served for 26 years. 

My squadron was on the hook in OPLANs [operation plans] to go 

support your theater if needed. 

I am deeply concerned about the North Korean threat. It certainly didn’t come overnight, but I think there is a sense of urgency, the grave nature of it, for them to be heading towards a potential to hold hostage United States cities with a nuclear weapon. 

From my view and many of us here, that is a nonstarter, and I am 

sure you agree with that. 

But as you have talked today, eloquently, about some of the options of how to address that, they are not easy options, right? And 

some people will argue whether we are dealing with a rational 

actor or not, trying to manage that escalation potential, while we 

ensure we have the combat power that you need to have a real deterrent. Because deterrence means you have to have capability and 

intent, right, in order to stop his action. And whether he is rational 

or not, these are all the factors that are needing to be considered. 

China is often considered to be in a critical role here, and some 

people think that maybe they are stepping up finally. But they 

have really not acted in good faith in the past. You know, they support U.N. [United Nations] Security Council resolutions, but then 

they don’t really enforce them. They are trying to kind of have it 

both ways. 

I am wondering, in your perspective, as a sailor, statesman, and 

your strategic mind and your understanding of the dynamics in the 

area, has something shifted recently, with China realizing it is in 

their best interest to do whatever it takes to stop this threat from 

happening? And if so, could you just share some of your perspectives on that? 

Admiral HARRIS. So, on the question of China being helpful now 

in the current framework, I think it is early days. And so President 

Trump had, I believe, an excellent meeting with President Xi, and 

China is doing things. 

Whether they continue to do things or not, I mean, we are going 

to have to wait and see. As you say, in the past, China has said 

they were going to do things and not done them or not said it and 

then done them and all of that. So it is early days. So we will just 

have to see how this goes. 

I am encouraged—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. And I believe that Kim Jong-un 

has noticed that there is a change afoot with regard to China, and 

I think that is important. 

With regard to the issue of whether he is a rational actor or not, 

I think the term ‘‘rational’’ or ‘‘crazy’’ or ‘‘irrational,’’ I don’t think 

those are helpful, because he is what he is. This is what Dr. Perry 
40 

said a long time ago. You have to deal with Korea as it is, not as 

you want—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Not as you want it to be. 

Admiral HARRIS. And so he is what he is. Rational or not, he is 

in control of his country, he is in absolute control of his military—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. But that matters for our deterrence theory, 

right, whether somebody is doing that cost-benefit analysis. 

Admiral HARRIS. It does. It does. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah. 

Admiral HARRIS. And he is on a quest for nuclear weapons and 

has stated—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. Threatened American cities, Australian cities, and the like. 

I believe that part of deterrence is also signaling. You know, so 

you have capability times result times signaling. And the signaling 

part is what we are doing. I think that is where your military 

comes into play. 

So all that together comes down to what I responded to earlier, 

that my job is to provide options to the President but also to provide credible combat power—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. Visibly, so that KJU will think 

about that when he does the things that he does. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. And, in your testimony, I am also concerned—and you laid it out pretty clearly—about the aggressive increase of China’s activity in the South China Sea, East China Sea. 

And these are things we have talked about the last few years. 

A lot of the public, I think, is not aware. You know, they have 

created islands where they previously didn’t exist before—7 military bases, capability for 72 fighter hangars. They are closing the 

capability gap. 

Are our options in the area, militarily, complicated by the fact 

that we are now sort of pressuring China to deal with North Korea 

in addressing their aggressiveness in the region? It seems we have 

to look at it all together. 

Admiral HARRIS. I believe, Congresswoman, that we can walk 

and chew gum at the same time, and great powers can have disagreements in one area and agree in another and can do both. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Admiral HARRIS. And I think that we should encourage China 

and be appreciative of what they are doing with us with regards 

to North Korea, and we should also be willing to criticize them for 

their aggressiveness and coerciveness in the South China Sea. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. And these bases they have created, you 

have talked eloquently about the destruction to the marine ecosystems and how this is being an environmental catastrophe. Are you 

hearing, since last year when we talked about this, any outcry from 

environmentalists, international groups? I mean, this is a major destruction. Are you seeing anything shift? 

Admiral HARRIS. I am not seeing anything from the environmental community. Dr. McManus and his team down at the University of Miami continue to say that this is the worst ecological 
41 

disaster in human history. The U.S.-China Commission, which is 

an arm of Congress, has written about this in their 2016 report, 

about the damage that China has done to the fragile ecosystems in 

the South China Sea. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. I am over my time, but the silence is 

deafening, I think. Thanks. I yield back, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Khanna. 

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral 

Harris, for your service. 

As you know the history, President Clinton, in 1994 through 

2002, got North Korea to agree to freeze plutonium production. And 

the fact is that we had a deal where we were going to buy all of 

their medium and intermediate missiles. And then President Bush 

came and disregarded both of those deals and labeled North Korea 

as part of the axis of evil. 

Isn’t it a fact that if President Clinton’s approach had been followed and those agreements had been followed through on, that we 

wouldn’t be in the situation we are in today? 

Admiral HARRIS. You know, as I review the history, I don’t want 

to be accused of, you know, being a revisionist historian, but I believe that, you know, agreements have to go both ways, and I don’t 

know that we could have believed with certainty that Kim Il-sung 

would have followed that agreement. 

We know that Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un—or Kim Jong-il, I 

guess, in 1992, and Kim Jong-un have raised the level—especially 

KJU has raised the level of threats against us and our treaty allies. 

And that is what I have to focus on. What I think about is where 

we are today. 

Mr. KHANNA. But we know, sir, that for 8 years there was no 

plutonium production. Do you believe that direct talks, the kind 

that President Clinton initiated, where we had a plan to buy the 

long and medium-size missiles, would be an approach? And do you 

think it was a mistake in 2002 to label them part of the axis of 

evil and give up on both diplomatic efforts of the Clinton administration? 

Admiral HARRIS. Again, sir, you are asking me to grade the 

homework of a Commander in Chief, and I am just not going to do 

it. 

Mr. KHANNA. The other question I had is: The recent ballistic 

missile launch in North Korea was launched with Prime Minister— 

the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit. And I am sure you are familiar with Nobusuke Kishi, the Prime Minister’s grandfather. The 

Prime Minister’s grandfather was, under the United States, labeled 

a war criminal. And the North Korean—KJU’s grandfather fought 

Nobusuke Kishi in World War II. 

Do you think the North Korean missile launch may have had 

something to do with the fact that Prime Minister Abe’s grandfather, who was a war criminal and fought the Koreans, fought his 

own grandfather, had something to do with the history? 

The reason I ask these questions is I feel our foreign policy needs 

to be dictated with an understanding of the complexity of history 

in President Clinton’s approach, which, in my view, was successful. 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I will just say that my father fought my 

mother’s relatives in Japan. My father was an American sailor in 
42 

World War II, my mother’s family are Japanese, and they fought 

each other. But that doesn’t change the fact that Japan and the 

United States are the closest of allies today. 

And I don’t think that—my personal opinion is I don’t think that 

KJU’s grandfather’s history with Prime Minister Abe’s grandfather, 

Nobusuke Kishi, I don’t think that that affects how KJU acts today 

in Northeast Asia. 

Mr. KHANNA. I mean, he has been making these threats, and I 

agree with your testimony, sir, about the crazy threats against 

Australia and New Zealand. And he has been making these threats 

for the last number of decades. But you would not—would you be 

open to at least exploring direct talks again of the kind we had in 

the Clinton administration? And do you think that there is any 

possibility to get to buying missiles? 

And the reason I say this, because you understand better than 

any of us—and I admire not just your service but your family’s 

service to this country—that the nuclear missiles there—as I understand it, there are 15,000 underground sites that have this. 

North Korea is not—they have got 200,000 special forces or an 

army. I mean, it is not an insignificant country. 

And so, when we are looking at what the options are, shouldn’t 

one option be the type of diplomatic approach that President Clinton took? 

Admiral HARRIS. I believe that, as the President has said, that 

all options should be on the table, whether they are all kinetic options, where I come in, or whether they are other options, where 

the State Department could come in, Treasury, Commerce, and the 

like. I think we need to have all the options on the table. 

But simply because North Korea is getting stronger militarily is 

no reason for us to turn our back on our allies and on ourselves 

and acknowledge and roll over and suggest that because they are 

stronger we should do nothing. 

Mr. KHANNA. I appreciate your service, sir. 

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I am over here, Harry. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, and appreciate you being here, your 

service. 

Trent Franks’ comments about self-serving questions, I am a cosponsor of the 12th carrier authorization. Would that make life 

easier in the Pacific, if you had another carrier at your disposal? 

Admiral HARRIS. In the Pacific? Yes, sir, it would. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. You mentioned a couple of times that 

you have to balance your books. Turning to a little more mundane 

issue that doesn’t rise to the level of criticality of some of the other 

things we are talking about but nevertheless important, you have 

mentioned balancing your books several times, sequestration impact, CR’s impact. I am concerned that the Navy cannot audit its 

books and records, as everyone in the system is concerned. 

Are there any issues—and your team is not directly responsible 

for auditing, but you buy a lot of stuff, you have a lot of internal 

controls that have to be functioning in order to be auditable. Are 
43 

there any things going on in your command that you can’t get fixed 

in order to allow the Navy to reach their audit capabilities? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, sir, I am not an expert on the audit issue. 

And the combatant commands don’t—we don’t buy a lot of stuff. 

You know, we don’t have—you know, the services get the budget, 

their part of the budget. They are the ones that go out and buy 

ships, airplanes, submarines, tanks, and all that kind of stuff. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. 

Admiral HARRIS. But I—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. But you buy fuel, you buy ammunition. You are 

responsible for keeping track of fuel, ammunition, other things that 

do affect—— 

Admiral HARRIS. Right, the services are, through the service 

components underneath PACOM. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. 

Admiral HARRIS. But I am not charged with auditing what Pacific Fleet does with fuel and that kind of stuff. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I know, but you are in charge of those who 

do. 

Admiral HARRIS. I am. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Is it an issue that, if it came to your attention, 

you would weigh in on it—— 

Admiral HARRIS. I would, if I could understand how my weighing 

in would have an effect or if it can move the process along. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Admiral HARRIS. I believe in auditing. I think it is important 

that not only we have enough money to buy the things that we 

need, that we buy them in ways that comport with the law and no 

wastage. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah. At some point, though, American taxpayers’ 

support for getting you enough money will hinge on whether or not 

we can prove to the American people that we keep track of it properly through these audits. 

Turning back to North Korea, the election is next month for a 

new President. Any sense of what impact that will have on our alliance, our relationship with that country? 

Admiral HARRIS. I don’t think it will have any impact on our alliance or our relationship. I think that the North Korean threat is 

so big that the Korean people writ large appreciate the alliance and 

what the alliance does for them and for us. It is a two-way street. 

And I believe the major candidates—you know, we are down to 

five candidates now. And the frontrunners have come out strongly 

in favor of THAAD, strongly in favor of the alliance. And I think 

that it will be good no matter who wins. 

And I think that is a tribute—you know, we should acknowledge 

what this is. I mean, here you have an ally, a country, South 

Korea, that is under this enormous threat. Their President was impeached. They have a strong military. And yet they are proceeding 

apace with the democratic process, which I think is just terrific. 

And they are going to elect a new leader here, a new President 

here, the 10th or the 9th or so of May, and I think we will go forward from there. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well put. I think the strength of that democracy 

and the republic there is shown by the ability to handle these cri-
44 

ses that are going on right now. And we are proud of those folks, 

but obviously want to make sure that they know that they have 

our support to make sure that whatever that threat is up north is 

handled. 

Again, thank you for your hospitality when I was in your area 

a couple years ago, and appreciate that. Thank you for your service. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Admiral. 

And, luckily, this was just brought up. What is the current communication and decisionmaking process, considering that South 

Korea is going through a political leadership vacuum right now? 

Who is our counterpart? Who is helping at least the South Koreans 

make the civilian military decisions? 

I am concerned, obviously, that we are going through an election, 

and I am glad that, obviously, it is going to continue going forward. 

But in these tough times, like, who are we talking to within the 

South Korean leadership right now on the political side and on the 

military side also? 

Admiral HARRIS. So, on the political side, they have an acting 

President. They have a strong Minister of Defense. 

Mr. GALLEGO. But—— 

Admiral HARRIS. And so I think on the political side things are 

working fine. 

On the military side, even more so. I mean, my counterpart is 

General Lee, the chairman of the ROK military. General Brooks, 

U.S. Army, the U.S. Forces Command Korea commander, is incountry. You know, he would normally be here except he is busy 

right now. And so he has daily, if not even hourly, contact with 

General Lee and with the folks, the military folks, and with Minister Han, the Minister of Defense there in Korea. 

We have a charge ́ d’affaires there, in lieu of an ambassador. And 

General Brooks and the charge ́ are closely connected so that the 

military and the diplomatic dimensions of American power are in 

place and operating with their South Korean counterparts on the 

peninsula against the North Korean threat. I am very confident in 

General Brooks and his team. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Admiral. But it does scare me that we 

don’t have a South Korean ambassador while at the same time 

South Korea doesn’t have a fully vested President. 

Does the acting President right now have the full confidence of 

its military leadership, or at least the political backing of the parties, to act in concert with whatever needs to occur in the next couple weeks, should something occur? 

Admiral HARRIS. Absolutely. I mean, as I mentioned to the previous question, I think South Korean democracy is very strong, 

very vibrant. And the military in South Korea understands its 

place in the civil-military structure and that civilian control of the 

military is primary there just as it is here in America. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Okay. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, let me just touch on a few things we 

haven’t gotten to yet. Maybe one or two sentences on our mil-tomil relationship with some other countries? So, for example, Philippines? 
45 

Admiral HARRIS. We have a great mil-to-mil relationship with 

the Philippines, despite some of the perturbations that we have 

talked about over the past year. We have a strong relationship 

with them, with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and in all the 

areas that we have had before, we still have. 

So we have Balikatan. We have Sama Sama, a new exercise. We 

are continuing with the EDCA, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation 

Agreement, and working on those sites with the Philippines. 

SOCPAC, Special Operations Command Pacific, is deeply involved 

in the counterterror operations in the south, in support of—not in 

lieu of, but in support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 

So I am positive about our relationship in the mil-to-mil space, 

and I am encouraged by it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Vietnam? 

Admiral HARRIS. Vietnam is a great opportunity for us. I believe 

that the work that is being done in maritime security is positive. 

And we have this theory, this approach, called sense, share, and 

collaborate. It is where we are now building out their ability to 

sense what is going on in the maritime domain. Soon, they will be 

able to share that with each other and the other countries in the 

area; and then to coordinate with us and other countries with what 

they find in their maritime domain. 

So I am very positive about where we are with Vietnam. 

The CHAIRMAN. How about India? 

Admiral HARRIS. India presents, I think, the biggest opportunity 

for us. We share values, both large democracies, a lot of cultural 

commonalities with Indian Americans here in the United States 

and Americans who live and work in India. 

Their military is strong and growing. I think that we could be 

helpful to them in terms of jointness and demonstrating to them 

the value of jointness within their military. They are a major defense partner of us. We are helping them across the space and the 

defense realm. 

So I am very pleased with where we are with India. I have had 

the chance to address the Raisina Dialogue in its first two 

iterations, and I hope to return to India within a year to continue 

the relationships that we have built up with the Indian military. 

The CHAIRMAN. And, finally, we haven’t really talked about the 

freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. How frequent? Do you command those? Can you talk a little about that effort? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, so I command them through Pacific Fleet, 

down echelon. So the Pacific Fleet commander, he does the same 

with 7th Fleet. So, you know, generally it is a Navy operation, and 

so that will go through the fleet. 

I command them from a combatant commander perspective. I 

take direction and guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the 

National Command Authority on the conduct of those operations. 

I think we will be doing some soon. 

But that is kind of where we are on that today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Mrs. Murphy, do you have a question? 

Mrs. MURPHY. Yes. Thank you. Admiral Harris, thank you for 

being here today. 
46 

I had the pleasure of working for Admiral Fallon in the CAG 

[Commander’s Action Group], and I appreciate your assessment of 

the security challenges in the region and how these conditions compared to my time at PACOM years ago. 

I wanted to know a little more about your vision for strengthening and modernizing our alliances and partnerships in the region. You described the effort in your testimony as ‘‘partnerships 

with a purpose.’’ What does partnerships with a purpose look like, 

and where are there opportunities for growth? 

And I am asking you this today because I am introducing two 

bills to try to get at the enormous security challenges in the AsiaPacific region by strengthening both our interagency and international commitments to the region. 

The first bill would create an interagency intelligence integration 

cell, which would streamline, synthesize, and synchronize intel on 

North Korea so that U.S. national security policymakers would 

have the best information possible to make decisions. 

And the second bill would authorize the President to create an 

Asia-Pacific defense commission comprised of the U.S. and willing 

partner nations to deepen cooperation between the United States 

and its regional allies to improve our ability to address some of the 

security challenges in the area. 

I think you may agree that the strength of our relationships in 

the region comes from trust, credibility, and across time. And these 

measures were meant to send a clear signal to both our allies and 

our adversaries that the U.S. is committed to the Asia-Pacific region in a credible and enduring manner. 

Admiral HARRIS. I think that on the partnerships with a purpose—and you will recall from your time there that almost all of 

our relationships heretofore have been hub-and-spoke relationships. These are bilateral relationships with all of the different 

countries that we have relationships with. 

I get it that our treaty allies by nature are bilateral, and that 

is what they want and that is what we want, for treaty allies. But 

I think that we need to go beyond hub-and-spoke to have partnerships with a purpose. And I will give you three quick examples. 

Our two treaty allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and Korea—we 

are really about defending Northeast Asia, So that becomes a naturally forming trilateral relationship. There is no way, I don’t think, 

that Japan and Korea are going to have an alliance, but we should 

have a trilateral relationship focused on defending Northeast Asia. 

I think there is a naturally forming, democracy-centric, multilateral, quadrilateral relationship between Japan, the United States, 

Australia, and India. I think there is a naturally forming partnership focused on counterterrorism: Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, 

Bangladesh, us, and Australia and New Zealand. 

So these are some of the ideas that we are trying to advocate for 

and forward and push these partnerships with a purpose. 

And I think the legislation that you have described, I think they 

are excellent. And I will need to study it more to get into the 

eaches of it, but I think, on the surface, based on what you just 

said, that they are commendatory. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Well, I appreciate that. Thank you. 
47 

And what do you think are some of the resource challenges or 

opportunities in actually resourcing the ability to do partnerships 

with a purpose? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, so I think that, in the resources world, 

all I face are challenges, right? There is no glut of resources. 

But I think that the work of the Congress to forward the AsiaPacific Stability Initiative is terrific, if that comes through. The 

last 2 years, we have had the Maritime Security Initiative, about 

$500 million or so spread out over a number of years, and I think 

that is helpful. But the Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative I think will 

help significantly as we go forward over the next few years. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Great. Thank you. 

Admiral HARRIS. You bet. 

Mrs. MURPHY. I yield back the remainder of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you. For what it is worth, I think 

you all made the right call in keeping General Brooks on duty, 

given what is happening in the world. I appreciate your answers. 

The committee will reassemble upstairs in classified session in 

approximately 5 minutes or so. 

And, with that, this hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 26, 2017 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 26, 2017 

(113) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can you briefly discuss how ISIL and various other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) have moved into the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, what additional risks that poses, and how PACOM is monitoring and disrupting that challenge? Does that focus detract from PACOM’s more traditional focus? How successful in disrupting these extremist networks have the multinational efforts with host 

nations been? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As terrorist fighters in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region have made 

their way to the Middle East and North Africa to train and gain tactical experience, 

has intelligence-sharing between CENTCOM and PACOM been proactive in regard 

to identifying and tracking potential actors before they pose a significant threat? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. Information sharing is critical to our success across the 

globe. We have systems and processes that allow us to share information quickly. 

For example, USPACOM and USCENTCOM coordinate on a bi-weekly basis 

through a USPACOM-hosted video tele-conference (VTC) regarding terrorism issues 

that affect the seam between the USPACOM and USCENTCOM AORs. Regarding 

the broader issue of foreign fighters, USPACOM and USCENTCOM, along with 

other combatant commands and the interagency, coordinate as often as twice per 

week through various venues hosted by Operation Gallant Phoenix out of Zarqa, 

Jordan. Operation Gallant Phoenix is a multi-national coordination effort to disrupt 

the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. Intelligence coordination through all of these 

various venues has resulted in a number of operational effects, to include kinetic 

strikes against Indo-Asia-Pacific-origin foreign fighters operating in the conflict 

zones in Iraq and Syria. Even so, we will remain challenged to discover threats 

against our allies and Westerners due to the complex nature of the adversary and 

improving extremist abilities to protect information. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. How important is it to maintain our U.S. defense, economic and political relationships with the Freely Associated States, which include the Republic of 

Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands? Does the U.S. relationship we currently have with the FAS play any importance to the overall strategy of PACOM? 

Admiral HARRIS. The relationships that the U.S. Government maintains with the 

three Freely Associated States provide valuable strategic advantages. First, the 

Compact agreements allow the U.S. military to establish defense sites in these countries. These sites could potentially include new airfields or expansion/modification 

of existing airfields. These sites could also include port facilities, bases for land 

forces, radar and weather facilities, and communication stations. These locations are 

just as strategically important today as they were 75 years ago during World War 

Two. Indeed, as our adversaries’ power projection capabilities grow, these areas are 

becoming more strategically important over time. They would play a vital role in 

a future contingency. Second, the Compact agreements permit the U.S. to foreclose 

these countries to the military forces or military purposes of any third party nation. 

This provision is absolutely essential in preventing third party nations from establishing a military foothold in these countries which would be detrimental to U.S. 

interests. In addition to maintaining defense relationships with these countries, the 

economic and political relationships are just as vitally important. It requires a 

strong bilateral partnership to maintain these Compact relationships in a fully-operable condition. When the U.S. asks for defense sites in some future contingency scenario, the speed and efficiency with which those sites will be established will rely 

heavily on the bilateral relationship which has been fostered to date. 

Mr. BISHOP. Under the current terms of our Compact of Free Association with the 

Freely-Associated States (FAS), the United States provides guaranteed financial assistance over a 15-year period in exchange for full international defense authority 

and responsibilities of the FAS. Through our Compacts with these tiny island na-
114 

tions, PACOM essentially has charge over an area of the Pacific larger than the 

width of the continental United States. How important to PACOM’s defense strategy 

is having this vast swath of the Pacific under strong U.S. influence? 

Admiral HARRIS. The Compact agreements give the U.S. an enormous zone of 

strategic advantage in the western Pacific. This provides significant advantages in 

establishing the air and maritime dominance that would be required to ensure U.S. 

military capabilities in a contingency involving our allies in the region such as the 

Philippines or Japan, or our partners, such as Taiwan. More broadly, air, maritime, 

land, and logistics dominance in this zone is essential to maintaining our interests 

throughout East Asia. Military advantage in the western Pacific sustains the credibility of U.S. combat power and defense commitments that underpin our influence 

and relationships regionally. Were an adversary to control these areas, the results 

could be catastrophic for U.S. power and influence, and regional stability and prosperity. 

Mr. BISHOP. In 2010, the U.S. and the Republic of Palau conducted a review and 

renewal of the Compact, which was then signed by both nations, but has yet to be 

authorized by the Congress. In the interim, China has expanded its soft power reach 

into Palau through the construction of luxury beach resorts and other economic development projects, in an obvious attempt to undermine the U.S. relationship with 

the island nation. It is reasonable to anticipate that China will continue to movein a similar fashion to their regional neighbors by expanding its footprint either 

through military posturing or tempting gestures of economic assistance. Does 

PACOM have specific concerns on the impact to U.S. interests potentially caused 

by continued delay by our government in living up to its commitments in funding 

the Compact with Palau? 

Admiral HARRIS. The authorization by Congress of the 2010 U.S.-Palau Compact 

Review Agreement will send a strong message not only to Palau, but to the entire 

region. Specifically, it will undermine adversarial moves, it will reinforce U.S. commitment and legitimacy, and it will enhance regional confidence. Chinese interest 

in development projects in Palau is particularly concerning. If the U.S. is unable to 

maintain its financial commitments to Palau, it is unclear how willing Palau will 

be to adhere to Compact requirements and resist commercial projects from China 

which have a dangerous dual-purpose potential. Without financial assistance, U.S. 

influence may erode to the point where it becomes detrimental to U.S. security interests. When it comes to influence in Palau, the U.S. will ultimately get what it 

pays for. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. Outline the value of the Palau Compact for you as PACOM Commander? What does it enable in terms of hard- and soft-power for the United States 

in the region, and at what cost? Would you advocate for Congress to renew this compact? 

Admiral HARRIS. The Palau Compact allows the U.S. military to maintain presence in a critical location in the Western Pacific. In terms of soft power value, it 

offers us the ability to assure Palau and regional neighbors that the U.S. is committed to stability and security in the region. Simultaneously, it provides us the 

hard power option of serving as a base of power projection to address issues in the 

South China Sea while in close proximity to our allies in Australia, Japan, Philippines, and Thailand. The U.S.-Palau Compact is, by a large margin, the least expensive of the three Compact agreements. If the 2010 U.S.-Palau Compact Review 

Agreement is authorized by Congress, it will cost only a fraction of what the U.S. 

currently provides in direct assistance to the Marshall Islands and Federated States 

of Micronesia. However, despite the low cost of its Compact, Palau occupies one of 

the most advantageous strategic locations in the region, providing the U.S. with its 

greatest return on investment of all three Compacts. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. How much did we spend to field the Aegis Ashore test site at Pacific 

Missile Range Facility? 

Does it make sense to defend Hawaii from Alaska instead of using this site? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. FRANKS. We have the Navy’s new SPY–6 radar and the TPY–2 at Pacific Missile Range Facility. Can we use those radars to add to the defense of Hawaii today? 
115 

Or would you rather wait several years to conduct environmental impact statement 

process and analysis of alternatives processes to build a brand new radar? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. FRANKS. Should we evaluate the capability of the SM–3 IIA to defend Hawaii 

from North Korea and its ICBMs? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. Long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) in 

an anti-access/area denial environment is critical in gathering the necessary intelligence against threats in the PACOM strategic environment. I understand that 

USPACOM has assessed the current capabilities and needs to support Pacific theater exercises and maritime operations and has identified ISR gaps which need to 

be addressed. 

1. What are PACOM’s long-range surveillance capability needs in the Pacific, particularly in light of China’s deployment of long-range surface to air missile systems? 

2. Does PACOM believe that it is positioned to meet current and future ISR requirements in light of this threat? 

3. Are you aware of budgetary and/or authority shortfalls that are need to addressed in order to meet these capability needs? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY 

Mrs. MURPHY. In 2008, U.S. Pacific Command identified, and the Navy issued, an 

Urgent Operational Need Statement calling for a significantly upgraded offensive 

anti-ship weapon to keep pace with high-threat maritime targets. The U.S. Navy requested, and Congress has funded. a rapid acquisition effort to field an advanced 

anti-ship capability in 2018 through the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) 

program. During this acquisition timeline, however, the number of high-threat adversary surface combatants has grown considerably, by some accounts in the order 

of roughly 6 times what it was in 2008. 

I understand that the initial requirement 8 years ago called for 110 munitions. 

1) Has the requirement for offensive anti-ship weapons kept pace with the increased 

threat? 2) Can you please characterize our nation’s capacity to counter heavily-defended, moving maritime surface action groups in severely contested electronic attack environments with limited or no surveillance support 1) at present, and 2) over 

the 5-year defense plan (FYDP)? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER 

Mr. GALLAGHER. China, and now Russia, continue to field advanced anti-ship missile systems to hold our Navy at risk. Just recently, an Admiral Grigorovich-class 

Russian frigate was sent to hold off the USS Porter and USS Ross, off from the coast 

of Syria. Armed with 8 advanced SS–N–26 Strobile missiles, the 3,000-ton ship has 

more capability than both 9,000-ton destroyers combined. Considering the increased 

lethality of peer nation frigates, what specifically ought the fleet be planning to field 

on our frigates? Are we doing enough to field a U.S. capability that holds enemy 

peer combatants at risk and to deter, dissuade and, if need be, defeat these threats? 

Specifically, I understand that there is an effort underway to arm LCS with an 

offensive anti-ship missile. In 2008, U.S. Pacific Command issued an ‘‘Urgent Operational Need’’, or UONs, calling for a significantly upgraded offensive anti-ship 

weapon to keep pace with high-threat maritime targets. This urgent requirement 

called for a weapon capable of striking heavily-defended, moving maritime surface 

action groups in severely contested electronic attack environments with limited or 

no surveillance support. Will this effort to outfit the LCS with an over-the-horizon 

weapons system meet the requirements PACOM outlined in the Urgent Operational 

Need Statement? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 
116 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ 

Mr. GAETZ. You have testified in the past that 80 percent of North Korean imports to China is coal. Because China has ceased acceptance of North Korean coal 

imports, to what extent will this impact China’s leverage in negotiating an end to 

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. GAETZ. To what extent will North Korean resources for nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities be impacted by China’s prohibition of North Korean coal imports? 

Admiral HARRIS. China announced on 26 February 2017 it was suspending coal 

imports from North Korea (NK) after having reached the United Nations-imposed 

annual quota of $400 million/7.5 million tons. That decision is unlikely to have a 

significant negative near-term impact on Pyongyang’s nuclear development and ballistic missiles programs. Pyongyang will continue to prioritize its strategic weapons 

programs and will likely allocate/divert funds generated from other sectors to ensure 

its strategic weapons programs research and development is minimally impacted. 

Despite China’s ‘‘enforcement’’ of banning coal imports from NK, cross-border trade 

activity continue between the two countries. Total NK-China trade volume increased 

by approximately 37 percent ($220 million) in the first quarter of 2017 from the 

same period in 2016. NK exports to China surged nearly 20 percent in the first 

quarter of 2017 after China announced its decision to suspend coal imports from 

NK. NK exported approximately $500 million worth of goods to China, to include 

minerals, seafood, and manufactured garments to China. NK’s ore exports to China 

also surged 270 percent in January and February compared with the same period 

in 2016. Despite the coal ban, NK continues to attempt to export coal to Chinese 

buyers illicitly, exploiting the lack of transparency and loose enforcement of sanctions. Multiple NK vessels reportedly carrying coal were previously identified at 

Chinese ports. Pyongyang will likely seek out other potential customers willing to 

purchase NK coal. Additionally, NK very likely will aggressively pursue alternative 

means to generate foreign currency in an effort to offset revenue losses caused by 

China’s ban on NK coal imports. NK was able to unload approximately 6,300 metric 

tons of coal in Malaysia in March 2017, a month after China announced its coal ban. 

NK’s overseas laborers are assessed to generate approximately $350 million annually, in addition to an estimated $40 million generated annually through its overseas information technology-related businesses. 

Mr. GAETZ. How will China respond to a rapidly destabilizing situation on the Korean peninsula? What is China’s tactical response in relation to North Korean nuclear assets? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. GAETZ. Given the increasingly mobile nature of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, how will this impact the United States need for enhanced capability in the 

missile defense realm? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BYRNE 

Mr. BYRNE. Given the rising tensions with North Korea and the proximity of Hawaii as the closest U.S. State to the DPRK, how do you characterize the threat to 

Hawaii and our current defensive capabilities? You have previously cited on record 

your desire to activate the Aegis Ashore site at PMRF with the Standard Missile3 in order to enhance our defense immediately; and a number of subject matter experts have publically shared your views. Has your opinion on this or the urgency 

surrounding the need to activate the site changed? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. BYRNE. MDA has indicated plans to develop a new discrimination radar 

(HDR–H) in order to enhance defense of Hawaii against the North Korean threat. 

Are you concerned that MDA’s plan is a new development program, in a remote location which will not be operational until 2024 at the earliest? While more and larger sensors are always desirable, based on the imminent threat, should we be more 

focused on a near-term defense solution? Would you advocate spending resources on 

leveraging the existing assets (Aegis Ashore, AN/TPY–2, THAAD) and filling the 

launchers with additional inventory or procuring the new discrimination radar? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 
117 

Mr. BYRNE. Appreciating Hawaii’s unique location relative to the threat and the 

challenges that presents from a defense perspective (cruise missiles, ICBMs, sublaunched threats, air threats), should a new radar for HI be designed as strictly a 

ICBM radar or should it be more multifunctional? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

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