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i 

25–090 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–24] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES HEARING 

ON

HIGH CONSEQUENCES AND UNCERTAIN THREATS: 

REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR 

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 23, 2017 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Chairwoman 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

KATIE SUTTON, Professional Staff Member 

LINDSAY KAVANAUGH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 2 

Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York, Chairwoman, 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Durand, Shari, Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Department of Defense ............................................................................................. 6 

Hopkins, Dr. Arthur T., Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, 

and Biological Defense Programs, U.S. Department of Defense ...................... 3 

Verga, Peter, Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Global Security, U.S. Department of Defense ........... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Durand, Shari ................................................................................................... 48 

Hopkins, Dr. Arthur T. .................................................................................... 31 

Stefanik, Hon. Elise M. .................................................................................... 29 

Verga, Peter ...................................................................................................... 38 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Gabbard ...................................................................................................... 70 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 70 

Ms. Stefanik ...................................................................................................... 69 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 69 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 77 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 75 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 76 

Ms. Stefanik ...................................................................................................... 75 

(1) 

HIGH CONSEQUENCES AND UNCERTAIN THREATS: 

REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY, 

POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS 

OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, March 23, 2017. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elise M. Stefanik 

(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Ms. STEFANIK. The Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [HASC] will come 

to order. 

I would like to welcome everyone here today for this very timely 

hearing on the Department of Defense [DOD] countering weapons 

of mass destruction [CWMD] policy and programs for fiscal year 

2018. 

The pursuit and potential use of weapons of mass destruction remains a high-consequence threat to our national security. To date, 

the Department of Defense efforts to prevent, protect against, and 

respond to weapons of mass destruction threats have kept the use 

of these weapons low. Despite these efforts, recent media reports 

of chemical weapons used in Iraq and Syria, continued nuclear 

weapons development in North Korea, and the asymmetric use of 

nerve agent remind us the threat is real, global in nature, and potentially growing. 

A key challenge in countering this threat is that many technologies that are used for peaceful civilian purposes can also potentially be used for developing weapons of mass destruction. Emerging examples of these dual-use technologies are in the fields of synthetic biology and gene editing. Rapidly developing biotechnologies 

that are easily obtained present new threats to the warfighter that 

we have yet to fully understand. 

Today’s hearing will allow our subcommittee to provide critical 

oversight on ensuring that the Department’s countering weapons of 

mass destruction policies, plans, and programs sufficiently address 

these emerging threats. 

Let me now turn to Ranking Member Jim Langevin of Rhode Island for any opening comments he would like to make. 
2 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. Dr. Hopkins and Mr. Verga, it is very nice to see you here. And Ms. 

Durand, great to be with you for the first time, so thank you. 

Before I give the rest of my opening statement, though, I do want 

to take a minute to acknowledge Ms. Katie Sutton, a Sandia National Laboratory fellow that has been on HASC for the last 2 

years. Katie returns to Sandia to work on cyber programs next 

week. 

During her tenure on HASC, Katie has been a tremendous asset 

and has worked in a bipartisan fashion, particularly on CWMD 

issues. She has many accomplishments to be proud of, such as the 

biodefense strategy provision in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], on which she was the lead. 

Katie, I just want to say thank you for your hard work on behalf 

of the ETC Subcommittee, and wish you well. 

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thanks. Well, today, we meet to review the efforts by the Department of Defense to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction. This is an important topic for oversight by 

the subcommittee, and I look forward to hearing about the policies 

and programs at the Department of Defense to counter this threat. 

During this past year, we have continued to receive media reports of the use of these weapons, including the use of chemical 

weapons by ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] in Iraq and Syria 

and the use of VX nerve agent by North Korea. These reports illustrate the importance of robust efforts to protect the services and 

the Nation from this continually evolving threat. 

Last fall, the agency formerly known as the Joint ImprovisedThreat Defeat Agency, or JIDA, was transitioned to the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization, or JIDO, within the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA]. This change offers the opportunity to achieve savings through common efficiencies and to leverage synergy in the organization’s missions. Efficiencies and synergy 

include streamlining the command structure of JIDO to align with 

DTRA, consolidating human resources and other overhead functions, and reducing mission and program overlap in order to focus 

JIDO on its core task and to avoid mission creep. 

It is important that we continue to evaluate the Department’s 

programs and efforts to ensure they are efficiently and effectively 

meeting the requirements of our warfighters. 

Over the last few years, we have been briefed by the Department 

on Constellation, a prototype of a new CWMD situational awareness technology. I certainly look forward to hearing what efforts 

the Department has been taking to work with Special Operations 

Command [SOCOM], which has recently taken over the mission for 

global synchronization for countering weapons of mass destruction, 
3 

to understand the requirements of the commander and leverage 

any existing systems to meet these needs. 

Finally, the confluence of the fiscal year 2017 end-of-year appropriations, fiscal year 2017 supplemental requests, and fiscal year 

2018 budget outline have no doubt created challenges in executing 

and planning programs. So I would like to ask our witnesses to 

talk about the day-to-day challenges of uncertainty and their priorities on all three of these funding mechanisms. 

With that, I thank you again to our witnesses for appearing before us today, and, Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Ms. STEFANIK. We have before us a panel of three distinguished 

witnesses: Dr. Arthur Hopkins, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; Mr. 

Peter Verga, performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security; and Ms. Shari 

Durand, Acting Director of DTRA, the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency. 

While detailed budget numbers for fiscal year 2018 are not available at this time, we look forward to a robust discussion on the 

policies and programs in place in the Department for countering 

weapons of mass destruction in 2018. 

Welcome to all of our witnesses. I would like to remind you that 

your testimony will be included in the record, and we ask that you 

summarize key points from that testimony in 5 minutes or less. 

And before we begin with Dr. Hopkins, I also would like to take 

a moment to recognize Katie Sutton, who will be returning to 

Sandia National Laboratories, having completed her 2-year fellowship with our committee. Katie has been an integral part of our 

team and helped us legislate and conduct oversight in many important and complex areas, indeed many of the same things we plan 

on discussing today. 

Katie, thank you for your hard work over the past 2 years, and 

we wish you continued success. 

And, with that, Dr. Hopkins, we can begin with you. And we look 

forward to your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ARTHUR T. HOPKINS, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL 

DEFENSE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I 

appreciate this opportunity to testify on the Department’s efforts to 

counter threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and 

Biological [NCB] Defense Programs has roots that go back to the 

establishment of the Department, when it was focused primarily on 

nuclear deterrence. Since then, the organization’s responsibilities 

have expanded to include nuclear, chemical, and biological defense 

programs, which are carried out by four organizations within the 

NCB enterprise: 

Our Nuclear Matters Office is the focal point for DOD activities 

and initiatives for sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

deterrent. 
4 

Our Chemical and Biological Defense Program develops capabilities that enable warfighters to deter, prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from traditional and emerging threats. 

Through our Threat Reduction and Arms Control Office, our 

oversight of the Nation’s chemical demilitarization program focuses 

on the safe, complete, and treaty-compliant destruction of the Nation’s remaining chemical weapons stockpile. In addition, we ensure DOD compliance with nuclear, chemical, and biological treaties and agreements. 

And our Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Systems Program strengthens situational awareness of global WMD activities. 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency addresses the full spectrum of WMD-related threats, including cooperative threat reduction programs and support to combatant commands, as well as 

threats from improvised devices. 

Today, I would like to highlight some of the enduring and the 

emerging challenges and threats in each area, the ongoing activities that we are conducting to address those challenges, and our 

priorities moving forward. 

To counter current and emerging threats like those enabled by 

synthetic biology and nontraditional agents, the Chemical and Biological Defense Program is developing new strategies to anticipate, 

prepare, and more rapidly respond, especially in the area of medical countermeasures, in addition to developing protective equipment and detection systems. 

In domestic chemical demilitarization, the Department continues 

to make significant progress in meeting the Nation’s commitments 

under the Chemical Weapons Convention by working toward eliminating the last of our remaining chemical weapons stockpiles in 

Colorado and Kentucky. In September 2016, the Department started agent destruction operations at the Pueblo, Colorado, site. At 

Blue Grass, Kentucky, facility construction is complete, and destruction systems are being tested. 

With the United States Special Operations Command’s [USSOCOM’s] new leadership role in the countering weapons of mass destruction mission, we have engaged closely with them to understand their mission needs for global situational awareness. 

WMD threat reduction programs executed by the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency continue to reduce the threat of weapons of mass 

destruction around the world by detecting and preventing proliferation and consolidating, securing, and eliminating dangerous pathogens and materials of concern. These efforts are conducted in cooperation with partners throughout the world as they enhance their 

own capacity to secure WMD materials, detect and interdict proliferation, and respond to WMD-related events. 

WMD threats are real. The Department’s activities to help reduce these threats include the full spectrum of countering weapons 

of mass destruction activities, from preventing acquisition, to containing and reducing threats, to supporting crisis response. 

I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify and also thank 

you for your enduring interest and support to these important mission areas. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hopkins can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 
5 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. 

Mr. Verga. 

STATEMENT OF PETER VERGA, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. VERGA. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, 

members of the committee, again, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today. I am honored to be here with Dr. Hopkins and Ms. 

Durand to present the Department’s approach to countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN] threats. 

Since the Department testified before the subcommittee on this 

subject 1 year ago, two CBRN-related threats have dominated the 

headlines: those posed by North Korea and the Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. Both highlight the complex nature of the 

threat we face. 

The North Korean regime has increased its dangerous and provocative CBRN-related activities over the past year. It has continued to test nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, in clear violation 

of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

ISIS poses a different sort of CBRN threat as a non-state actor 

not bound by longstanding norms and laws and with a demonstrated willingness to use chemical weapons against civilians 

and combatants alike. While ISIS’ capabilities are currently far less 

sophisticated than North Korea’s, its willingness to use and potentially proliferate CBRN-related materials or knowledge to its affiliates elsewhere is of grave concern. 

The Department’s strategic approach to countering these threats 

focuses on three lines of effort: preventing acquisition of WMD, containing and reducing threats, and mitigating the consequences of 

potential use. Our efforts to address these threats for North Korea 

and ISIS reflect this approach. 

To prevent the transfer of CBRN or dual-use materials to and 

from North Korea, the Department works closely with interagency 

partners, in part through outreach under the Proliferation Security 

Initiative, or PSI, to the 104 other PSI endorsees committed to preventing WMD proliferation. Relationships with committed allies 

and partners are foundational to our success. 

We also engage with partners through the DOD Cooperative 

Threat Reduction [CTR] Program, which remains, in the words of 

Secretary of Defense Mattis, ‘‘the Department’s most comprehensive and effective tool for working cooperatively with partners to 

mitigate CBRN-related threats.’’ 

Through DTRA’s capable implementation, CTR is engaged in 

over 30 countries, helping them detect, secure, or eliminate CBRNrelated materials and pathogens of security concern. These efforts 

are integrated with those of our interagency partners. In Southeast 

Asia, CTR is building the capabilities of our partners to detect and 

prevent maritime proliferation of CBRN-related materials, such as 

those headed to or from North Korea. 

Despite our best efforts at prevention, we must be prepared to 

contain and reduce CBRN threats once they have developed. For 

instance, to contain and reduce the CBRN threats from ISIS, the 
6 

U.S. and our coalition partners are also exploiting opportunities on 

the ground to better understand and disrupt their CW [chemical 

weapons] networks. 

The DOD CTR program is also strengthening Jordan’s and Lebanon’s capacity to prevent proliferation of CBRN materials from 

Iraq and Syria into their territories and to ensure that ISIS affiliates in Libya do not acquire or proliferate a CBRN capability. We 

supported interagency efforts to remove chemical precursors from 

Libya and initiated a proliferation prevention program with the 

Government of Tunisia along its border with Libya. 

Elsewhere, DOD is working with our key regional allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, to ensure that our focus remains postured to respond to CBRN contingencies on or emanating from the 

Korean Peninsula, complementing those engagements in the CBRN 

Preparedness Program, or CP2, which engages bilaterally with our 

partner nations to respond to and mitigate effects of a CBRN incident. 

In addition to being prepared to respond to events overseas, DOD 

must ensure we are prepared to support the Federal response to 

a domestic CBRN incident at home. Working closely with the Joint 

Staff, we continue to partner with a wide array of interagency partners, including the Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, 

and Justice, to ensure a coordinated response to any event in the 

homeland. 

In conclusion, the acquisition or use of CBRN weapons against 

the United States, our forces, or our interests remains among the 

most dangerous threats we face. With your support, the Department will continue to strengthen our capabilities and relationships 

to reduce these threats at home and abroad. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look 

forward to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Verga can be found in the Appendix on page 38.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. 

Ms. Durand. 

STATEMENT OF SHARI DURAND, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ms. DURAND. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, 

and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today 

to share with you the work of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 

DTRA makes the United States and our allies safer by countering threats posed by the proliferation and use of weapons of 

mass destruction. While not a direct focus of today’s hearing, DTRA 

also has a new mission area: countering improvised explosive devices and other improvised threats. Last October, the Department 

transitioned the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization, 

JIDO, under the authority, direction, and control of DTRA. 

DTRA is a unique organization with a broad portfolio that is accomplished by an incredibly capable and talented workforce. We 

are very proud of some recent milestones, including the accomplishments of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 

which celebrated its 25th anniversary last December. And this 
7 

coming April, we will celebrate the 70th anniversary of DTRA’s Defense Nuclear Weapons School, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 

Our expertise spans the full spectrum of WMD threats: chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and high-yield explosives. We are a one-stop shop, open 24 hours a day to support the 

Department’s functional and geographic combatant commands, the 

military services, and the interagency. 

Over the past 3 years, DTRA moved to a regional vice programmatic approach against WMD threats. This allows us to support warfighters and allies with more comprehensive and integrated methods that are better aligned with the combatant commands. Likewise, our regional approach ensures a more holistic 

prioritization of the science and technology [S&T] that DTRA pursues and a better understanding of how we transition those capabilities to the warfighter and military services. 

In Iraq and Syria, ISIS is using chemical weapons on the battlefield. Thankfully, the authorities and funding that Congress provides DTRA each year allows us to support Operation Inherent Resolve and respond to these and other emerging, long-term WMD 

challenges. 

I am proud of what our team has accomplished this past year 

and believe that we serve as good stewards of taxpayer dollars. As 

we look toward fiscal year 2018, I am confident that we are prepared to address future WMD and improvised threats around the 

world. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Durand can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Ms. Durand. 

My first question is, the FY [fiscal year] 2017 NDAA authorized 

funding for many critical activities within the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, the Chemical Demilitarization Program, 

and at DTRA. What have been the impacts of the continuing resolution, the CR, so far this fiscal year? And can you describe the impacts to your programs for a full-year CR for fiscal year 2017? 

Dr. Hopkins. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you, Chairwoman, for the question. 

We are making it work because it is the reality of the budget situation. But the continuing resolution really limits our ability to do 

longer-term planning because of the way the funds come in in increments. 

And so I would say that the nature of the people who do the 

work for us is such that they will make the programs work given 

the constraints. However, it does limit our ability to plan and 

adapt. Especially if things come up in the near term or medium 

term that require different levels of funding; the continuing resolution doesn’t allow that. So it does tie our hands a bit. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Verga. 

Mr. VERGA. I would just go along with what Dr. Hopkins said. 

It is obviously always better to have a full-year budget appropriation because it does allow you to implement a program that you 

have laid out in an orderly fashion, you know, given what you ex-
8 

pected to get in the appropriations that were asked for in the budget. And a CR, it just trips you up when you get started, and you 

can’t really do what you need to do. 

Ms. STEFANIK. And Ms. Durand. 

Ms. DURAND. I will give you a couple specifics from an agency 

perspective. 

One, it more than doubles our workload. When you do incremental funding as the CR funding comes in, we are having to incrementally fund all of our contracts. So that means for the contracting staff, who is already overworked, they are, in essence, doubling their work throughout the year. 

That also adds to our comptroller support office, who are also 

having to do a lot of accounting and other budgetary actions when 

the Department is working very hard towards our financial 

improvement and audit readiness. 

So part of that is just a workload capacity. As Dr. Hopkins said, 

we will get it done, but at a time when we need everybody more 

focused on direct mission support, that makes it difficult. 

For us specifically, another one that we encountered, when JIDO 

came under us, one of the things we didn’t expect was, in the 2016 

budget, was with the Army, because the Army was the executive 

agent for JIDA. Because of the continuing resolution, that funding 

was appropriated to the Army, and it did not come directly to 

DTRA. 

So, again, that means the accounting and the budgetary, means 

it has to go on—if the money goes to the Army, we have to get it 

from the Army. We have to do double budgeting and a lot of budgetary transfers in our books. So it just makes it very complicated. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you very much. It is important for us to 

get on the record the negative impacts that a continued CR would 

have on the DOD, so thank you for those thoughtful answers. 

My second question is for Dr. Hopkins. 

Recent technological advances in the areas of synthetic biology 

and gene editing have created a bio revolution that has increased 

the capability and availability of biotechnology. 

Last fall, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 

Technology released a report on this topic that concluded, quote, 

‘‘Just as rapid advances in biotechnology have increased the risk of 

misuse by bad actors, they have expanded the tools available to 

protect the public.’’ 

How is the DOD responding to the emerging threat faced by 

these new technologies? And can the Department apply these new 

technologies to counter the potential threat? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you, Chairwoman, for the question. 

You are absolutely right; the new technologies really are a double-edged sword. 

One of the challenges we have is, in looking at the potential effects on national security, we want to make sure that the things 

that we do to try to protect ourselves don’t interfere with the development of the application of the technology for peaceful, useful purposes. And so that, combined with the fact that it is an emerging 

area, really causes us to step back and try to understand what will 

be or what could be the potential national security impacts of synthetic biology. 
9 

We have asked the National Academy of Sciences to step in and 

help us, in an interagency study, to look at the potential impacts 

on security, about what timeframe would we expect potential nefarious capabilities to be available to bad actors, and what can we do 

about it. 

And the things that we would do about it really fall into at least 

three areas. The ability to know it is happening in the first place, 

because if we are talking about a biological threat, how do you 

know what it is? How do you know it has appeared? And so we are 

working very hard on detection technologies to understand when 

and if we may be subject to those kinds of attacks. 

Protection is the second area. As you know, the classic chemicalbiological protection is a mask, a suit, a glove, individual protection, collective protection, that sort of thing. We have to make sure 

that our science base is up to the task and actually developing capabilities to protect the warfighter. And so challenging the things 

that we have on hand now that are classical in the face of those 

kind of threats is very important. 

The third area is mitigation, what are you going to do about it. 

And since we are talking about the biological side of things, medical countermeasure development is right at the forefront. The 

same tools, synthetic biology, that we are concerned about as being 

capable of being used against us we are also using in the laboratories to help develop countermeasures. And so our ability to come 

up with vaccines, therapeutics, even laboratory equipment that will 

help identify what the threat is—very important to us. 

And so those three areas—detection/protection and medical countermeasures and mitigation—are the places where we are investing 

to try to counter that. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Dr. Hopkins. I now recognize Mr. 

Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you to our witnesses again for being here. 

Ms. Durand, if I could start with you, JIDO was an organization 

that continually evolved and had an uncertain future. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the alignment of JIDO onto DTRA 

should result in both synergy and efficiencies as well as provide an 

opportunity to focus JIDO on its core mission and define its future. 

So I wanted to know, what synergies are there between DTRA 

and JIDO? What efficiencies have been achieved as a result of the 

realignment? And how is the Department using the alignment as 

an opportunity to focus JIDO on its core mission and the size and 

scope of the organization for that mission to achieve maximum effectiveness. And, finally, has the term ‘‘improvised threat’’ been defined? 

So if you want me to repeat any of those—I threw a lot at you— 

I would be glad to. 

Ms. DURAND. Thank you for those questions. 

Two weeks ago, we briefed the staffers on highlighting all the efficiencies that we have gained since JIDO came under us. I would 

preface all my comments with: It really has only been since October. So we spent, after the decision was made last January up until 

October, when they officially came under us, spending a lot of time 

getting everything ready to come under us. That was an enormous 
10 

challenge, just getting 235 JIDO civilian employees transferred 

from the Army into DTRA. 

One of the first things that we did is we have consolidated eight 

of the offices that were previously in JIDO. Those are the ones that 

you touched on: human resources, inspector general, contracts, 

comptroller, general counsel, legislative and public affairs, security, 

and counterintelligence. JIDA, at the time, was standing up to be 

its own defense agency, so those offices were standing up, so we 

just took those offices and those individuals and merged them into 

ours. And so we are moving forward with—they have entirely new 

systems that they have to learn, so we are spending a lot of time 

getting them up to speed. 

You had mentioned in your opening comments about the senior 

structure. So JIDO previously had four Senior Executive Service 

members. One of those was a term appointment, so that ended. So 

we are working on recognizing the need to shrink that senior 

leadership level down, so we are pushing towards that. 

The efficiency—so two key areas that we are looking at, in information technology [IT] and our research and development capacities. DTRA has a lot of testbed capacity in our research and development, test and evaluation world, and JIDO will be able to use 

those test ranges. So that will, in time, reduce their costs associated with test range costs. So that is one specific thing. 

JIDO is very proficient and has a great deal of experience in information technology, especially how it supports the warfighter. So 

all their efforts that they have spent years developing on situational awareness for improvised threats, on attacking those networks, we are finding to be very helpful to us in the CWMD community. So, in our IT worlds, they are working very much together 

to figure out what synergies that are there, what things can we 

combine, what things may need to remain separate. 

We have also, recognizing the committee’s desire to show savings, we are keeping track of those. I cannot sit here and tell you 

that we have gained a tremendous amount of savings. It takes 

quite a bit for this type of an integration. There are a lot of upfront 

costs and time that go into it. But we fully expect over a certain 

amount of time—and it may take a couple years—that we would 

be able to come back to you and show you specific metrics and dollar savings. 

One quick one I would give you is, when JIDO was going to 

stand up, they were going to have to buy their back-room human 

resources services. So that is the processing a lot of actions. They 

would have gained those services from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which is a working capital entity, so they would have 

been paying DLA for that support. So it was about $1.5 million. 

That is a cost avoidance that they avoided with that, and now they 

are just merged in with ours. 

So we are seeing some savings, but I would expect them to grow 

over time. 

To your question on focusing on the mission, so we do think that 

because they are now under DTRA and they are not having to do 

all the things related to being a separate entity and a separate 

agency, they will benefit from all the structure that we have in 

place already, so they don’t have to be bothered with that. 
11 

To your specific question, is ‘‘improvised threats’’ defined well? 

No. You could use the term ‘‘improvised threats’’ and that could be 

everything that goes on within the Department. So we are continuing to look at and to make sure that we are following, I think, the 

guidance the committee has been concerned about before of the 

mission creep. 

I hope I addressed each one. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. You did. You hit them all. That is very good. 

Thank you very much. 

My time has expired. Hopefully we will get to a second round, 

but if not, I yield back. Thank you. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it. Thank 

you all for being here today on a very interesting and concerning 

topic, as you well know. 

Dr. Hopkins, I want to talk to you for a little bit. I looked back 

at, like, DOD response to the Ebola virus and our engagement 

there, and I think, actually, a lot to be proud of with that mission 

and challenging situation. 

I also look at trying—the balance of Department of Defense or 

the military to serve in combat roles. And that is not a combat role, 

but we could be in a combat environment where there is an outbreak of some entity like that that we have to be concerned with. 

And then where does HHS [Department of Health and Human 

Services] come into play, and how do you see those roles? Do they 

cooperate? How are we engaging in that way? And what were the 

lessons learned from that mission? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Congressman, thank you very much for the question. 

I think the success of the Defense Chemical-Biological Defense 

Program is very, very much dependent on how well we coordinate 

with the other government stakeholders in this area: Health and 

Human Services, Homeland Security, CDC [Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention], National Institutes of Health, Agriculture. 

I mean, there are a number of government agencies, all of whom 

have a stake in this area. 

Our focus is on biological threat agents, and so in order to make 

sure that the warfighter has the therapeutics and the diagnostics 

and the capabilities to know that they are under attack and even 

protect them with vaccines. That is—I don’t want to call it a niche, 

but that is a very important part, that is a lead part of what we 

do. 

Having said that, the science associated with developing those 

countermeasures, as well as the coordination on the basic science 

for this, is something that we have to share. And I think that happens very effectively through a group called PHEMCE, the Public 

Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise. It is all 

the agencies that I just mentioned all coming together primarily for 

the purpose of making sure that the Nation has a stockpile of 

therapeutics and vaccines in the event of a natural outbreak, but 

we also leverage that capability to make sure that the Department 

has what it needs. 

As far as lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak, to me, the 

single largest lesson is that the Department has a lot to offer. 
12 

While we may not have the lead in a natural outbreak, the Department has quite a capability that we can leverage and we can contribute to natural outbreaks like that. 

Again, going back to my original point, the number one lesson we 

learned is it is really, really important to be talking to and collaborating with the other government agencies who have a stake in the 

successful outcome of events like those. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. In that particular situation, you know, you don’t 

know these outbreaks are coming; these are new viruses. I am just 

curious how the military trains for that mission. I guess it is more 

generic training and education as you roll out, I would imagine. 

Would that be the case? 

Dr. HOPKINS. I think it is actually that, but it is also the military 

laboratories—the Navy laboratories, the Army laboratories—are always forward-looking, and they are always coordinating with the 

civilian side to make sure that the military has the situational 

awareness and knows what capabilities are out there—our own and 

on the civilian side. 

So, again, I think it comes down to the collaboration and the situational awareness that is provided by the leading-edge researchers and developers at the service laboratories. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. And the coordination has been good, in your opinion? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Yes, it has been. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. 

Ms. Durand, if I could ask you real quickly, in the intelligence 

community, how is the cooperation between intelligence community 

and—with what is going on, we would always hate to hear that 

there wasn’t conversation back and forth. Do you feel like there are 

any gaps there that we need to address? Should Congress be helping in any way in that regard? 

Ms. DURAND. I will tell you that DTRA enjoys an incredibly 

strong partnership across the entire intelligence community. 

I would also tell you that, in the very short time that USSOCOM 

has had the synchronization mission, they are so interwoven with 

the entire intelligence community. General Thomas, in particular, 

is very actively going after this in terms of what else does he need 

from the intelligence community for the CWMD mission, and I 

have no doubt he will make great strides in that regard. 

We have also experienced in some recent exercises that some of 

my folks have participated in—the feedback that I get from them 

is that they have never seen a time when there was more involvement and better partnership across the entire interagency, with 

our allies, and with the intelligence community. 

So I can’t tell you that I see any gap. I can give you the assurance that if there is one, General Thomas will find it and he will 

correct it. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much. 

Prior to the first Gulf War, it was disclosed that Iraq had produced 19,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum-A toxin to be used 

in weapons. Given that 1 aerosolized gram of this toxin could po-
13 

tentially kill up to a million people, where would DTRA rank this 

toxin in terms of threat level, where we are today? 

Ms. DURAND. So that one, I am not sure. So I would like to take 

that one for the record and get back to you so I give you the correct 

answer. 

Ms. GABBARD. Sure. I appreciate it. As you go through that follow-up, I would be interested to see if there are any current programs or plans underway that recognize this threat and countermeasures to deal with it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 70.] 

Ms. GABBARD. Given that the FDA [Food and Drug Administration] approval process for medical countermeasures can be lengthy 

and unpredictable, what kind of risk does that present to the DOD 

in wait times for FDA approvals for any countermeasures that we 

may need in a tighter timeline? Generally, not specifically for this 

toxin, but generally. 

Ms. DURAND. DTRA is not specifically involved in that piece of 

the process. I would defer to Dr. Hopkins on any of those specifics. 

Ms. GABBARD. Sure. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you very much. 

First of all, let me say that the FDA approval process is critically 

important to the successful production of the vaccines and therapeutics that we need. 

And so, having said that, we are doing everything we can to work 

with the FDA, starting early in the process. We have learned over 

the years that it is best to engage with the Food and Drug Administration very, very early so that we can understand the process as 

well as work with them in speeding things up. 

We also, through the passing of the Cures Act, we in the Department have authority now to offer priority review vouchers and obtain orphan drug designations for some of our low-volume, limiteddistribution kind of products, and so that is very, very helpful to 

us. In fact, most recently, the plague vaccine has received FDA orphan drug status, and that was funded by the Chem-Bio Defense 

Program. 

So bottom line is we are using whatever means we can to accelerate and work very closely and early with the Food and Drug Administration because we know that their involvement is important 

to the production of safe products. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Dr. Abraham. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Chairwoman. I thank the witnesses 

for being here. This is a vital topic, in my opinion. 

And, Mr. Verga, thank you for your service in Vietnam. We appreciate that very much, sir. 

I am going to pony a little bit off of Dr. Wenstrup and Chairwoman Stefanik and go back to the synthetic biology. Of all this 

nuclear, chemical, and biological things that do keep me awake at 

night, I think the biological is the one that I spend most of the time 

looking at the ceiling, because it is cheap, it is available, and, as 

Dr. Wenstrup alluded to, you could have a human vector to transmit the pathogen. 
14 

And to weaponize a virus or bacteria with what you gentleman 

know, certainly you, Dr. Hopkins, with the CRISPR-Cas9 [Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats] technology, the genetic engineering, which can be done now in any biochemical lab with a person of just normal intelligence that has a 

master’s or certainly a Ph.D. in that type of instance, this can become a real threat very quickly. 

My question, Dr. Hopkins, to you first. You said you were, and 

I understand, talking to State governments and the people in those 

agencies that we need to talk to, but we all know that if a terrorist 

organization wants to do this, we are not talking to them. 

Are there any—and I understand it is difficult, but are there any 

checks and balances today that at least can give us a little hint of 

something that may be coming? Because, as Ms. Gabbard said with 

botulism, mitigation is not an option here because we are too far 

behind the power curve. So the question is, what is out there to 

stop this? And what can we as Congress do to help you accomplish 

that goal? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. The 

short answer is I am not aware of a specific action or a—— 

Dr. ABRAHAM. And I am not either. That is why I asked the question. I am not aware of any either. 

Dr. HOPKINS. But I think what that does is it really points to the 

importance of the study that we have commissioned with the National Academy of Sciences. Because, as you and I think about this, 

we would both conjure up notions of some really bad things that 

could happen in the hands of people who don’t need a lot of training or a lot of equipment—— 

Dr. ABRAHAM. It sounds like science fiction, but it is not. It is 

here. 

Dr. HOPKINS. It does. 

What we have asked the Academy to do is kind of separate the 

science fiction from the reality and recognize what reality is today 

and help us to understand the national security implications. What 

is the art of the possible in the near term, in the mid term, and 

the long term, as well as to identify what can we do about it. 

We know that the first step is detection. We know that, first of 

all, we have to know we are under attack. And so we know that 

the laboratories are already thinking about ways that we could detect a genetically modified version of some disease. So that is the 

starting point, and we are already working on that. 

But I really think the key to framing this, framing the whole potential threat is the National Academy, the national experts thinking through this, with the assembly of the various stakeholders, 

Health and Human Services and Homeland Security and so forth, 

and Department of Defense, so that we can wrap our arms around 

it. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Ms. Durand, anything we can do in Congress to 

help you guys out? 

Ms. DURAND. Not that I can think of right now. I would tell you 

that in the chem-bio S&T world for science and technology, one of 

our top priorities is finding an integrated early-warning system 

and process to do just what Dr. Hopkins had talked about, because 
15 

just finding what is out there and knowing it is coming is critical. 

So I would expect our work would progress in that area. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Anything to add, Mr. Verga? 

Mr. VERGA. Nothing other than just I think the recognition of the 

problem is the first step, you know, towards dealing with it. And 

I think it is important—— 

Dr. ABRAHAM. I think we recognize that it is out there. 

Mr. VERGA. Yes, sir. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Ms. Chairwoman. I yield back. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I had a question I wanted to ask you. I know that on this committee we have been closely monitoring military readiness levels. 

And I would like to hear your assessment of our current readiness 

levels dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear equipment, and personnel across the DOD and other agencies. 

And any of you can answer that. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you, Congressman. 

For the traditional agents and threats that we have been—mustard, nerve, chemicals, the known biological systems—I believe that 

the investments that the Department has been making for decades 

in masks, suits, gloves, individual protection, collective protection, 

and all of those areas have provided a certain degree of readiness, 

an adequate degree of readiness for encountering those classical 

agents. 

In the area of emerging threats, emerging infectious diseases, 

synthetic biological, engineered diseases, I don’t think we know 

how good we are or how bad we are. And that is an area where 

we are focusing and we have to continue to focus. 

Mr. VEASEY. Also, I wanted to switch to the Middle East and 

North Africa, and I wanted to ask if you could discuss how the current events there are impacting DTRA’s operations and planning. 

And have you received any additional requests for support from 

CENTCOM [Central Command] and AFRICOM [Africa Command]? 

And what are some of your largest concerns there? 

Ms. DURAND. So, obviously, as the military campaign against 

ISIS continues in Iraq and Syria, ISIS is regrouping, specifically in 

those areas of the Middle East and North Africa. DTRA works with 

partner countries in those regions to help contain and reduce those 

threats from terrorists that are obtaining WMD materials. That 

could certainly destabilize those regions and lead to large refugee 

flows. 

In countries where there is active, ongoing violence, such as in 

Iraq, our CTR operations have been curtailed significantly, and our 

engagements have been limited to VTC [video teleconference] instead of being able to go there in person. 

In countries where violence is sporadic and the security situation 

is delicate, such as in Lebanon and Jordan, our CTR operations 

have continued to provide the security environment—that that environment is stable enough for our operations. But we encountered 

delays, but they have been short in duration. 

So, in essence, our work there has been limited because we are 

always focused on the safety of our people before we send them 

over there. And so that limits us with what we can do. 
16 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you very much. 

And I wanted to also ask one more question related to Ebola. 

You know, we had one of the more high-profile cases in Dallas 

County, which is an area that I represent. And I wanted to know 

what lessons that you feel we have learned that have been put into 

practice. And how would you assess the DOD’s ability to respond 

similarly in future cases? 

Mr. VERGA. I will comment on that. 

The first thing, I think what DOD brings to a situation like the 

Ebola outbreak is our organizational ability, our planning ability, 

our logistics, and those sorts of things. 

I think we learned from the Ebola outbreak the necessity of having the capacity to transport folks. You know, we made an investment in the patient transportable pods that could be put into our 

military medical evacuation aircraft to do things like that. 

But I think the primary thing is early detection. I think the earlier we can recognize that that is what the problem is and the earlier we can get ahead of the curve on trying to deal with the problem is probably where we are at. And so I think our efforts in early 

detection and warning of outbreaks is probably where our best investment can be made. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik. And thank each 

of you for being here today and on these important issues. 

And, indeed, our subcommittee has been very fortunate to have 

a Sandia fellow, Katie Sutton, here. In fact, she brings good news 

and bad news. Last year, she brought bad news, but it needed to 

be addressed, and her professionalism has certainly come through. 

Last year, we had the mishandling of the live anthrax samples 

that were sent from Dugway to 86 government and private labs 

and other facilities in the United States and 7 other countries: Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, and South Korea. 

Mr. Verga, what is the status of the report requested in fiscal 

year 2017 NDAA regarding the mishandling of the anthrax shipments? What is the status of any corrective actions that have been 

put in place to make sure this type of incident is prevented in the 

future? And what efforts are being taken within the Department to 

reduce the amount of select agent number of labs that handle select agents? 

And this could be answered really by anyone, but if you would 

begin. 

Mr. VERGA. I am afraid I would have to get back to you on that 

because I don’t know the details, but I will provide that to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 70.] 

Mr. WILSON. Okay. 

Ms. Durand. 

Dr. Hopkins. 

Dr. HOPKINS. On the status of the report, I will have to get that 

answer for you. If I could take that for the record, we will get that 

status. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 
17 

Dr. HOPKINS. As far as what the Department has done, we recognized as a result of those inadvertent shipments that the handling 

of those agents was being done in different chains of command and 

there was not unity of effort or unity of oversight over the years. 

And so one of the things—I think the most significant thing that 

the Deputy Secretary did is he designated the Secretary of the 

Army as the executive agent for all work with biological select 

agents. And that has had a unifying effect, and it has introduced 

a certain amount of discipline into the process. They are responsible for reviewing and inspecting all of the laboratories that handle biological select agents and toxins. And they have also looked 

outside themselves. They have gone to establish an expert panel to 

review the procedures, such as the ones that didn’t work at 

Dugway. 

And so I think we are in much better shape than we were 2 

years ago on this, primarily because of that action. There have 

been a number of actions below that in order to introduce more discipline and care at the laboratory level, but I think the most significant thing was establishing the Secretary of the Army as the 

Department’s executive agent for overseeing all work with those select agents. 

Ms. DURAND. I have nothing further to add. 

Mr. WILSON. And, again, Katie Sutton was just terrific, bringing 

this to our attention, monitoring this. Her professionalism always 

comes through. And we are going to miss her as she departs for 

another great assignment. 

Additionally, for Ms. Durand, Dr. Hopkins, the FY 2017 supple- mental budget request included a supplemental increase of $127 

million for the Chemical Demilitarization Program due to engineering challenges and increased contract costs. 

Can you explain the justification for this additional request? 

What is the impact if this funding is not received? Will the program be able to complete all required destruction by the 2023 deadline? What mitigation steps are being put in place for this program 

to prevent further cost and schedule overruns? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. 

Just for some context on this, the Chemical Demilitarization Program in the United States is working on eliminating the last 10 

percent of what the United States declared to the Chemical Weapons Convention. We declared 30,000 tons several years ago. 

And this Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives [ACWA] 

program is the program that has the two sites, one in Kentucky 

and one in Colorado, and there has been major progress at both of 

those sites. In Pueblo, they have started operations. In Blue Grass, 

they are going through systemization. 

There is a request in the supplemental for additional resources, 

and that is primarily to recover some schedule in order to make 

sure that we make the 2023. And, actually, in large-scale processes 

like these, the more we can invest up front, the higher the likelihood is that it is going to reduce the lifecycle cost of this. 

The need for the increase was really due to a number of factors. 

Primarily, we did not anticipate the fact that the first-of-a-kind 

technologies that are being used at both locations would require so 

much rework. And I could go into gory detail on some of the things, 
18 

like redoing welds and so forth, but, in both cases, in Pueblo and 

in Blue Grass, there has been unexpected, unplanned need for 

some additional rework in order to get the systems up and running. 

And when I say we didn’t anticipate it, I can be very specific; we 

didn’t anticipate last year. Because, last year, in an attempt to reduce the amount of money that the program carried over from one 

year to another, the ACWA program gave money back, returned 

money, so that it could be rephased in the out-years. And so, as a 

result, at the same time we are returning the money so that it can 

be rephased in later years, the need for this rework, the emerging 

challenges also appeared, and that resulted in an actual need for 

the money in 2017. 

So what we are essentially trying to do is put money back into 

2017 that we had reprogrammed into the out-years in order to 

make sure that we make the 2023 schedule. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Ms. Cheney. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you very 

much to our witnesses for being here today. 

I wanted to dig a little deeper in terms of what we are doing to 

protect our warfighters and, in particular, the extent to which we 

are facing increasing threats on the ground in Iraq and Syria. 

Mr. Verga, maybe we could start with you. Just in terms of the 

assurances that you feel, the confidence that you feel that we are 

in a position where we are providing our men and women in uniform with the very best possible protection against the growing 

threat that they may be facing on the battlefield from these types 

of weapons. 

Mr. VERGA. Well, we have a great deal of confidence in the equipment and the training that our forces have in order to deal with 

these threats. I mean, it is one that we have recognized over time, 

made significant investments in our ability to counter those 

threats, and are now working with our partners and allies in the 

area to, in fact, provide to the allies, to the Iraqis and to the Kurds, 

equipment through cooperative programs that DTRA and Dr. Hopkins can speak to a little bit more in detail to be able to deal with 

those. 

Again, I think the importance is recognizing the threat. I mean, 

ISIS has, in fact, used both chemical weapons and toxic industrial 

chemicals, you know, against our forces and against our allied 

forces there. 

I don’t know if you had anything to add. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you. 

In addition, we are making sure that our laboratories, such as 

Edgewood in Maryland, where they actually do challenge our ability to protect the warfighter with masks and suits and gloves, we 

are making sure that the things that we are giving the warfighters 

are effective against what we believe to be the actual materials 

that are being used in the field. 

Ms. DURAND. Just to add a little bit more, DTRA’s specific role 

in the science piece of that, our chemical and biological folks get 

a lot of feedback from the Joint Program Office on how the development that we did, how that is actually working. 
19 

Another great program that we have is the Scientists in the Foxhole program, in which we take our scientists who are working on 

the initial phases of developing that equipment that will give the 

best protection to the warfighter, we send those scientists out into 

the field with the warfighter so they can get that immediate feedback. And that helps them tremendously in understanding, as they 

are doing the research and the scientific work, what works for the 

warfighter and what doesn’t. So that has proven to be very successful. 

Ms. CHENEY. And just to follow up, in terms of the increasing capabilities that we are facing from our adversaries in these areas, 

could you provide a little bit of information about the extent to 

which our technology and ability to defend against what we are 

seeing and the increasing availability of some of these weapons, 

whether you feel that we are keeping up sufficiently in terms of the 

progress that is being made by our enemy? 

Mr. VERGA. My hesitation is I am trying to think if in an unclassified format we can talk about where we are in that. I think I 

would prefer to defer that, because we couldn’t get into any real 

specifics. 

Ms. CHENEY. All right. That is fine. Thank you. 

And I just wanted to follow up on where we are on the national 

biodefense implementation and strategy. I know you are going to 

be coming back to us in September of this year, but if you could 

talk a little bit about, sort of, the preliminary work that has been 

done and, you know, how you think things are going based on the 

requirement in the last NDAA. 

Mr. VERGA. Thank you. 

Of course, the Department of Homeland Security is leading that 

review. We and the Department of Defense are cooperating with 

them, along with HHS and Department of Agriculture and many 

other organizations. 

We did provide a briefing to staff on where we are at on it. And, 

as you said, the report is due in September, and we think we will 

be able to deliver that on time. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ma’am and gentlemen, 

thank you for your service to the country. 

And my question gets back to our interaction with other countries that we may not necessarily share values with, but we share 

interests with. Obviously, the country of Russia comes to mind. 

Russia and the United States were key to getting Syria to destroy 

their chemical weapons. 

How much dialogue do you have with counterparts in other countries about what the most pressing threats are and the most efficient ways to eliminate those threats? 

Mr. VERGA. I would describe the interaction we have with our allies and friends as robust. We have a—— 

Mr. SCOTT. If I may, I am also talking about people that we don’t 

consider to be allies or friends, but that we may have a shared interest with in this particular field. 

Mr. VERGA. Yeah, I would have to check on that one, sir. I am 

sorry. I don’t have that right offhand. 
20 

Mr. SCOTT. I would be interested in your answer if you think 

that perhaps that is something that we should pursue. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 70.] 

Mr. SCOTT. If you would, then, go ahead with our allies and 

friends, if you would. 

Mr. VERGA. With our allies, we do have a robust cooperative program with them, cooperative research and development programs, 

working very closely with, you know, particularly our NATO [North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and also others to be able to 

be share information regarding the threats and regarding the countermeasures. 

I know Dr. Hopkins can talk a little bit more about some of the 

specific programs. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Yes. In addition to the sharing information about 

the potential threats, we have very active, detailed engagements 

with our closest allies on mitigations and identifying ways to protect us, and especially in the NATO scenario, where we have a 

common standard for the performance of various countermeasures. 

So closest allies, very strong and very effective and helpful to us. 

Mr. SCOTT. I would be interested in your comments, as well, all 

of your comments, about whether or not this is something that we 

should look into, whether we should or should not potentially share 

information with countries where we have that shared interest, if 

you will, even though we don’t share values. 

I know that the issue with Syria, for example, is one where it 

took an agreement with Russia to actually get those weapons destroyed. 

But, with that, Madam Chair, I will look forward to the written 

response, and I thank you for your service to the country, and I 

yield back the remainder of my time. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. We will now go to the second round 

of questions for members who are able to. 

My question is a follow-up, Ms. Durand, to Mr. Veasey’s line of 

questioning. And in your testimony, you highlighted DTRA’s growing activities in the Middle East and Northern Africa both in the 

context of support to Operation Inherent Resolve and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. 

But can you discuss how DTRA prioritizes which nations receive 

support? And how does DTRA leverage other government agencies 

in these efforts? 

Ms. DURAND. I can. Thank you. 

A lot of our priorities come from the two offices that Mr. Verga 

and Dr. Hopkins represent. So the priorities flow from the Department of Defense down through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

In our own internal planning for our priorities, we have a lot of 

interaction with the combatant commands. So we get a lot of our 

priority input from them. We have our own robust strategic planning process within the agency on determining what are the greatest threats, what are those priorities, and then, as we build our 

budgets, we focus on those. But all those are fed through other avenues throughout the Department. 
21 

Ms. STEFANIK. And then how does DTRA leverage other government agencies in these efforts? 

Ms. DURAND. So that part is critical to us. We have very robust 

partnerships across the interagency. There are various things that 

the Department of State does with us related to the Cooperative 

Threat Reduction Program. We have mentioned before Health and 

Human Services. They do a lot of work. 

So we are constantly coordinating and synchronizing and making 

sure that no one is duplicating efforts. And, in essence, it ends up 

being a leveraging of capabilities across the entire government so 

everyone knows where their lanes are and they can focus on their 

specific areas of expertise. 

Ms. STEFANIK. It is clear that there are growing needs of support. 

And what are your concerns about the growing need for this support? 

Ms. DURAND. Support—— 

Ms. STEFANIK. In the region. 

Ms. DURAND. Can I take that one for the record? I will have to 

get back to you on that. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Absolutely. 

Ms. DURAND. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. I will recognize Mr. Langevin for his second round 

of questions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Again, thanks to our 

witnesses. 

Dr. Hopkins, as you know, for the last 2 years I have followed 

the program Constellation. And the program is being resourced by 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense and executed by DTRA to fulfill a STRATCOM [Strategic Command] requirement, although, I 

must say, it is worth noting our committee—I never heard directly 

from STRATCOM on this particular need or program, which I find 

curious. 

But now that the CWMD synchronization role has transferred 

from STRATCOM to SOCOM, how is the Department clarifying situational awareness requirements of that command? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you for the question. It is especially timely. 

As you probably could tell from the testimony, we have discontinued the prototype that was called Constellation, primarily due 

to the limitation of funds that was in the NDAA draft and in the 

final language. 

Having said that, though, the requirement for situational awareness is as strong or stronger than it ever has been. The commander 

of SOCOM has said more than once that he has a very firm, strong 

need for common intelligence and common operating pictures. And 

that is the essence of what situational awareness is, and that is the 

essence of what the Constellation prototype was intended to provide. 

Two things are happening. One is your language in the NDAA 

basically asked us to have an independent look at the system, the 

requirements, and the plans, and we are doing that. We have hired 

a federally funded research and development company to go ahead 

and objectively look at requirements, including the ones that you 
22 

referenced might have come from STRATCOM at the time, but the 

requirements for all the combatant commanders for situational 

awareness of WMD-related things. 

And our plan is to take the resources that we have and any future resources and work with STRATCOM and work with DTRA 

and adapt those parts where we did learn especially useful things 

from Constellation and adapt them to the common intelligence and 

the common operating picture that SOCOM needs in order to perform their function as the synchronizer. 

So we are in the process of doing that. We will get the requirements and the plans, in other words work with the FFRDC [federally funded research and development center], and then also adapt 

what we have directly to the needs of the combatant commander. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So how underresourced were you for the program 

that you had to cancel it? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Trusting my memory here, about $25 million. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So are you saying that you are coming up with 

a replacement program, Constellation Lite? Or is it—— 

Dr. HOPKINS. I don’t know what we would call it yet. We are 

looking at the requirements, and we are going to work with 

SOCOM and DTRA to understand what would be the most useful 

and helpful ways to obtain and depict situational awareness of people, places, and things in the various theaters having to do with 

weapons of mass destruction, what would be most useful to the 

warfighter in the field. And what form that takes, I am not quite 

sure yet. 

But we did learn a lot from doing the Constellation. So the plan 

this year is to use the funds we have to do that and then recovering next year and then investing more in those things that are 

useful to SOCOM. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Well, we know that the requirement hasn’t 

gone away; it is the funding—— 

Dr. HOPKINS. Correct. 

Mr. LANGEVIN [continuing]. That is the problem. Thank you. 

Mr. Verga, what process is the Department using to ensure the 

transition of necessary resources from STRATCOM to SOCOM for 

the CWMD mission? Has the hiring freeze impacted the ability of 

SOCOM or DTRA to bring people into key positions during the 

transition? 

And, Ms. Durand, how has the transition been for DTRA? What 

have been the challenges and opportunities identified? 

Mr. Verga. 

Mr. VERGA. To my knowledge, there have not been any issues 

that have been identified by SOCOM as far as the transition goes. 

I know they had their initial operational capability in January to 

do that, and, as far as I know, they are moving right along. The 

normal budgetary process in terms of the transferring of resources 

is the one that we are using. 

If I can take this opportunity, I may have misspoke when I was 

talking about ISIS’ use of chemical weapons. I believe I may have 

said that they had used them against U.S. forces. That is not true 

right now. Right now, it has only been Iraqi civilians and Iraqi 

forces that they have used chemical weapons against. And I would 

like to correct that, if I could. 
23 

Thank you. 

Ms. DURAND. So for the transition from STRATCOM to SOCOM, 

I will address how it has impacted DTRA. 

First, I will say our relationship with SOCOM is tremendous. We 

have had a longstanding relationship with them, and that has 

grown even stronger. 

Last December, General Thomas gathered up the entire interagency and DOD members and talked about, got their input for his 

overall plan. So he learned from that. We had a Global Synchronization Conference last month in bringing in all the interagency. He 

laid out his initial thoughts on the global campaign plan that he 

is developing, and he was gaining everyone’s input on that. So that 

has been going very well. 

Specifically to the agency, under STRATCOM, the Director of 

DTRA was dual-hatted as the Director of STRATCOM’s Center for 

Countering WMD. SOCOM is not following that organizational 

model, which is just fine. We still have most of the same people 

within the agency, so they are the SOCOM element with us. 

And that partnership is continuing, and, if anything, it has 

grown even stronger with General Thomas’ and his entire staff’s 

active participation in that. So I will tell you I think it is going exceptionally well. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you. 

I have other questions that I will submit for the record, and if 

you could respond to those in writing, I would appreciate it. Thank 

you. I yield back. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

And thank you so much to all of our witnesses, Dr. Hopkins, Mr. 

Verga, and Ms. Durand, for your expertise and testimony today. 

And no further questions from the committee members? 

I adjourn this hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 23, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 23, 2017 

(29) 

Chairwoman Stefanik Opening Statement 

Hearing: 

"High Consequences and Uncertain Threats: Reviewing Department of 

Defense Strategy, Policy, and Programs for Countering Weapons of Mass 

Destruction for Fiscal Year 2018" 

March 23rd 2017, I 0:30am, 2118 

The Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the House 

Armed Services Committee will come to order. 

I'd like to welcome everyone here today for this very timely hearing on 

the Department of Defense Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy 

and Programs for Fiscal Year 2018. 

The pursuit and potential use of Weapons of Mass Destruction remains 

a high consequence threat to our national security. To date, the Department 

of Defense efforts to prevent, protect against, and respond to weapons of mass 

destruction threats have kept the use of these weapons low. Despite these 

efforts, recent media reports of chemical weapons use in Iraq and Syria, 

continued nuclear weapons development in North Korea, and the asymmetric 

use of VX nerve agent remind us the threat is real, global in nature, and 

potentially growing. 

A key challenge in countering this threat is that many technologies that 

are used for peaceful, civilian purposes can also potentially be used for 

developing weapons of mass destruction. Emerging examples ofthese "dualuse" technologies are in the fields of synthetic biology and gene editing. 

Rapidly developing biotechnologies that are easily obtained present new 

threats to the wartighter that we have yet to fully understand. 

Today's hearing will allow our subcommittee to provide critical 

oversight on ensuring that the Department's countering weapons of mass 

destruction policies, plans, and programs sufficiently address these emerging 

threats. 

We have before us a panel of three distinguished witnesses: 

• Dr. Arthur Hopkins 

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and 

Biological Defense Programs 

• Mr. Peter Verga 

Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense & Global Security 

• Ms. Shari Durand 

Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
30 

While detailed budget numbers for Fiscal Year 2018 are not available 

at this time, we look forward to a robust discussion on the policies and 

programs in place in the Department for countering weapons of mass 

destruction in 2018. 

Welcome to all of our witnesses. I'd like to remind you that your 

testimony will be included in the record, and we ask that you summarize key 

points from that testimony in 5 minutes or less. 

Before we begin with Dr. Hopkins- I would like to take a moment to 

recognize Ms. Katherine Sutton who will be returning to Sandia National 

Laboratories having completed her 2-year fellowship with our Committee. 

Katie has been an integral part of our team, and helped us legislate and 

conduct oversight in many important and complex areas indeed many of the 

things we plan to discuss today. Katie, thank you for your hard work over the 

past 2 years, and we wish you continued success as you head back to Sandia. 

And with that Dr. Hopkins, we can begin with you, and we look 

forward to your opening statement. 
31 

Not for Public Release until Approved by the 

House Armed Services Committee 

Statement of Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological 

Defense Programs 

On 

Department ofDefense Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs 

Before the 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States House of Representatives 

March 23, 2017 

Not for Public Release until Approved by the 

House Armed Services Committee 
32 

INTRODUCTION 

Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to testizy on the United States Department of 

Defense's efforts to counter threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 

l serve as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and 

Biological Defense Programs, and currently, Acting Assistant Secretary. 

Our office focuses on ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear deterrent; 

developing capabilities to prevent the spread of, protect against, and respond to weapons of mass 

destruction threats; and ensuring DoD compliance with nuclear, chemical, and biological treaties 

and agreements. Our four organizational elements are Nuclear Matters, Chemical and Biological 

Defense Programs, Threat Reduction and Anns Control, and the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency. 

Our Nuclear Matters Office supports the Nuclear Weapons Council and is the focal point for 

DoD capabilities that sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and counter threats 

from nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The President has directed the Secretary of 

Defense to conduct a new Nuclear Posture Review, led by OSD Policy and the Joint Staff. My 

office will be involved in all discussions on our future nuclear posture in view of changes in the 

global security environment. 

We are also responsible for oversight, integration, and coordination of the Department's 

Chemical and Biological Defense Program. This program develops capabilities to enable the 

Warfighter to deter, prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from traditional and 

emerging chemical and biological threats. These activities cover the full spectrum of defining 

requirements, developing science and technology solutions, and acquiring materiel to protect 

warfighters. 

Our Threat Reduction and Arms Control Office oversees the implementation ofWMD threat 

reduction programs and manages the Department's treaty implementation activities to ensure 

compliance with nuclear nonproliferation agreements, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and 

the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We also manage the Department's governance 

process for the U.S. domestic Chemical Demilitarization Programs, as well as efforts to develop 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Situational Awareness capabilities. 

Finally, we oversee the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Their mission is to 

safeguard the United States and its allies by providing capabilities to counter, reduce, and 

eliminate WMD and improvised threats and mitigate their effects. As a combat support agency, 

DTRA provides operational support to Combatant Commands. 

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33 

While each component has unique responsibilities, we operate as a team, sharing intelligence, 

technologies and best practices to help ensure efficiency and effectiveness of products and 

services. 

To be successful, we must continue to innovate, not only in the technologies and operational 

solutions that we provide, but also in how we work together as an enterprise. Today, I would 

like to highlight some of the enduring and emerging challenges and threats, the ongoing 

activities we are conducting to address those challenges, as well as our priorities moving 

forward. 

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE 

Assessment o{Emerging Threats 

The Department continues to focus its chemical and biological defense efforts to protect against 

both state (e.g., North Korea) and non-state (e.g., ISIS) threats. We have developed and fielded 

protective equipment, detection systems, and countermeasures to protect against traditional 

chemical agents (e.g. Mustard and VX nerve agent). 

Looking toward the future, advancements in biology and chemistry (e.g., synthetic biology), and 

contributing technologies, such as improvised delivery systems, additive manufacturing, gene 

editing, and unmanned aerial systems, present potential new threats that the nation must 

anticipate and be prepared to counter. 

Synthetic biology is revolutionizing many sectors of our economy, from traditional biology and 

disciplines such as agriculture and medicine, to totally different areas like materials science and 

data storage. With advances in technology come potential risks, such as the development of new 

viruses and novel toxins. The Department continues to assess this field to understand the 

possibilities for potential emerging threats. We engage with the broader stakeholder community 

to help identify mitigation strategies. We are taking an agile, platform-based, approach to 

medical countermeasure development in order to rapidly defeat emerging biological threats. 

While synthetic biology is important to consider within the threat landscape, we should not 

constrain the technologies themselves as a means of risk mitigation, or we risk stalling our own 

research and development programs. Many of our own Chemical and Biological Defense 

Programs use elements of synthetic biology. Examples include the development oftilovirus 

vaccines and therapeutics, development of the recombinant plague vaccine, novel approaches to 

overcome antibiotic resistance, and the rapid development of monoclonal antibody therapies. 

The proliferation of non-traditional agents such as Pharmaceutical-Based Agents is also of 

concern. While these are currently law enforcement and public health challenges, the 

Department is assessing the potential for these agents to impact wartighters. PharmaceuticalBased Agents, initially developed and intended for legitimate uses, have proliferated and can be 

highly toxic at very low doses. Knowledge of how to develop these agents has expanded to a 

point that they could be used for nefarious purposes by both state and non-state actors. 

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34 

Efforts to Address Current and Emerging Threats 

To counter current and emerging threats, the Chemical and Biological Defense Program is 

developing new strategies to more rapidly respond, especially in the area of medical 

countermeasures. This new medical strategy encompasses earlier engagement in product 

development with the Services to ensure that we are responsive to operational priorities. 

Additionally, we are strengthening our partnership with the Food and Drug Administration and 

developing new incentives for industry engagement in developing medical countenneasures. 

From a product development perspective, the Chemical and Biological Defense Program is 

shifting toward platform capability development, which leverages synthetic biology and other 

emerging technologies to build medical countermeasures more efficiently and at a lower cost. 

The intent is to integrate these platfonn capabilities into a Department of Defense-dedicated 

production facility. 

To support the development and manufacturing of medical countermeasures and effective 

therapeutics, the Department has invested in a new, agile manufacturing capability through the 

Advanced Development and Manufacturing facility in Alachua, Florida. This facility provides 

the capability to rapidly develop and produce medical countermeasures for our unique 

population, on a smaller scale than those needed for the public health sector. We are pursuing 

novel manufacturing capabilities, which allow for modular and flexible approaches to meet the 

Department's needs more rapidly and cost effectively. 

The Department continues to engage with our interagency partners in the development of both 

physical and medical protection. We are a part of a broad interagency effort known as the Public 

Health Emergency Medical Countetmeasures Enterprise, which leverages our capabilities as well 

as those of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland 

Security to develop and deliver innovative medical countermeasures and effective therapeutics. 

The Department's development of chemical defense capabilities is a key component of an 

integrated national effort to address both traditional and non-traditional threats. We continue to 

invest in physical science programs, conduct research, and develop technologies for a range of 

chemical defense capabilities, including detection, medical countermeasures, decontamination, 

and protection. We are coordinating with several international partners to leverage their 

approved medical countermeasures against pharmaceutical-based agents. Enhanced warning, 

protection, and countermeasures will save lives and enable more effective consequence 

management. 

CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION 

The Department continues to make significant progress in domestic chemical weapons 

destruction programs. Our office oversees programs to meet U.S. commitments under the 

Chemical Weapons Convention and eliminate the remaining U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. 

ln September of last year, the Depmiment initiated agent destruction operations at the Pueblo 

Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant located at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado, 

using a neutralization destruction technology. More than 18,000 munitions containing 

approximately 90 tons of chemical agent have already been destroyed. Between March 2015 

4 
35 

and February 2016, the Explosive Destruction System, a supplemental destruction system, 

destroyed 560 munitions at the Pueblo Chemical Depot that were unsuitable for processing in 

the Pueblo main plant, equating to nearly two tons of chemical agent. 

While this is a significant milestone for the program, rapid progress after the completion ofthe 

pilot testing is needed to demonstrate the reliability, availability, and maintainability of the many 

first-of~a-kind systems and equipment at the Pueblo facility early next year. The Pueblo facility 

will be used to destroy nearly 780,000 mustard agent-tilled projectiles and mortars. 

With construction of the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant substantially 

complete in Kentucky, the preparation and testing of the people, procedures, equipment, and 

systems, known as systemization, is about 68 percent complete. The Blue Grass facility is 

scheduled to begin destruction operations in April 2020 after completing systemization. The 

facility will destroy nearly 87,000 nerve agent-filled projectiles and rockets. A supplemental 

technology, called a Static Detonation Chamber, will be used to destroy all 15,492 mustard-filled 

munitions stored at the Blue Grass Army Depot. Current plans are to begin Static Detonation 

Chamber operations aller completion of destruction operations in the Blue Grass main plant. 

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 

The Countering WMD Systems portfolio provides funding for development of situational 

awareness capabilities for the Combatant Commands, in response to requirements approved by 

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. This year will be a transition year for the 

Department's approach. We have been engaged closely with USSOCOM to understand their 

mission needs for countering weapons of mass destruction situational awareness. We are 

currently working with USSOCOM to develop a countering weapons of mass destruction 

common intelligence and operating picture, using existing software applications as well as the 

expertise resident in two small fusion cells at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the 

Defense Intelligence Agency. These fusion cells provide planning and analytical support to 

USSOCOM and other Combatant Commands. 

In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, we have 

commissioned a Federally-Funded Research and Development Center to conduct an independent 

review of countering weapons of mass destruction situational awareness requirements and the 

prototype inforu1ation system known as "Constellation." The results of this study will also 

inform future development of countering weapons of mass destruction situational awareness 

capabilities. Development and fielding of the Constellation prototype was discontinued in 

October 2016 due to the limitation in the NOAA and reduced funding in the Defense 

Appropriations bill. We learned valuable lessons from the development of the Constellation 

prototype, which will be incorporated into our support to U.S. Special Operations Command. 

Our office is also responsible for the report required by Section 1070 of the FY17 NDAA, which 

requires the Secretary to list and assess the Defense Department's existing and proposed 

capabilities and technologies that support U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies. 

We are collaborating with USSOCOM, the Joint Staff, and other parts of the Defense 

Department to produce a report that will meet the Congressional requirements, and provide 

5 
36 

useful infonnation for the Department's assessments of the countering weapons of mass 

destruction mission and required capabilities. 

WMD THREAT REDUCTION 

Globally, WMD threats continue to evolve. Potentially vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear, 

chemical, and biological materials remain at risk, with tratlicking networks that span the globe 

and an expanding set of state and non-state actors interested in acquiring, developing, or using 

WMD. The use of chlorine and sulfur mustard as weapons in Iraq and Syria highlights that the 

knowledge, technologies, and materials are accessible to adversaries. 

To address these challenges, DTRA implements a number ofWMD threat reduction activities, 

including the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear (CBRN) Preparedness Program; International Counterproliferation Prof,>ram; and 

engagements supporting the Proliferation Security Initiative. Collectively, these programs 

constitute some of the Department's most effective and flexible tools for addressing WMD 

threats. 

lbe Department's efforts continue to reduce the threat of WMD around the world, from activities 

to detect and prevent WMD proliferation in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and North Africa, to 

facilitating the transportation and removal of highly enriched uranium in Europe, to 

consolidating and securing collections of dangerous pathogens in Sub-Saharan Africa, to 

strengthening partners' capabilities to detect and mitigate biological threats and disease outbreaks 

in Southeast Asia. These programs help to build partners' capacities to secure WMD materials, 

detect and interdict proliferation, and respond to CBRN events, helping to strengthen the security 

of the U.S. and our allies. 

Our otlice provides programmatic guidance and oversight of these activities to accomplish 

mission objectives, ensure synchronization with other DoD and interagency programs and 

activities, and optimize the WMD threat reduction value of investments. 

CONCLUSION 

WMD threats are real and increasing in complexity. The Department's activities address the full 

spectrum of CWMD threat reduction, from preventing acquisition to containing and reducing 

threats, to responding to crises. We act in collaboration and coordination with numerous 

Department, interagency, and international partners to ensure effectiveness and efficiency. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. 

6 
37 

Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs 

Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 

Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, and currently, Acting Assistant Secretary. 

As the Principal Deputy, Dr. Hopkins advises the Assistant Secretary in all matters across 

the Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs portfolio, including nuclear 

matters, chemical and biological defense programs, chemical demilitarization, cooperative 

threat reduction, arms control, and countering weapons of mass destruction. 

Prior to his current appointment, Dr. Hopkins served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Threat Reduction and Arms Control, where he was the DoD Treaty Manager 

for implementation and compliance with international nuclear, chemical and biological 

treaties and agreements, and advisor to the Assistant Secretary for NCB on planning, 

acquisition, and execution of programs for countering weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) issues. 

Dr. Hopkins holds Bachelor and Master of Science degrees in Engineering, Aerospace and 

Atmospheric Sciences, and Master of Science and Doctoral degrees in Nuclear 

Engineering. 
38 

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

STATEMENT OF 

MR. PETER VERGA 

PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

FOR 

HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY 

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

EMERGING THREATS AND CAP ABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

MARCH 23,2017 

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
39 

INTRODUCTION 

Chairman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, and Members of the Subcommittee, I am 

pleased to testify today about the Department of Defense (DoD) e!Torts to counter chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. Over the past year, the CBRN threat 

environment has continued to evolve and increase in complexity in several ways. First, we have 

observed both State and non-state actors demonstrate interest in developing, acquiring, or using 

CBRN materials and programs. In Syria, for example, the Organization for the Prohibition of 

Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has found that chemicals 

have been used as weapons by both the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Syrian 

regime. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) also has continued its dangerous 

and provocative activities with both nuclear and missile tests. Second, continued advances in 

technologies such as synthetic biology, additive manufacturing, and unmanned aerial systems 

present great promise and opportunity for new defensive capabilities, but may also enable State 

and non-state actors to develop new CBRN threats at a pace never before seen. We must stay at 

the cutting edge of these technologies, so as to benefit from and defend against them, while also 

seeking new and creative approaches to supplement traditional tradecraft and nonproliferation 

tools to deter and prevent acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Third, 

stresses and tensions in the geopolitical security environment arc also creating additional 

pressures on international nonproliferation regimes. 

The office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security 

oversees the DoD's policies and guidance to protect our armed forces and other U.S. interests 

from a CBRN attack or any type of destabilizing CBRN-related event, such as the spread of a 

dangerous pathogen including pandemic influenza. We also represent DoD's interests on 

counterprolifcration and non-proliferation policy issues. Our organization contributes as well to 

international efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Health 

Security Agenda (GJJSA). We also support the Department of State (DoS) in implementation of 

commitments under the I993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the 1972 Biological and 

Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the I968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 

Finally, we provide policy oversight for execution of Homeland Defense and, in close 

coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other interagency partners, 

provision of Defense Support to Civil Authorities, particularly ensuring that the CBRN threats 

that exist outside our borders never threaten the Homeland while simultaneously preparing to 

provide DoD support to the Federal response to such an attack or incident. 

DoD is well postured to confront the myriad of CBRN-related challenges we face. Last year, 

USSOCOM assumed responsibility for leading the department's synchronization ofCounteringWMD (CWMD)-related planning. We are working closely with the Joint Staff and USSOCOM 

to ensure that USSOCOM has the necessary resources and guidance for this mission. 

Internationally, the community of nations has demonstrated renewed focus through reaffirmation 

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40 

of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, a vital catalyst to the global effort to 

prevent WMD or WMD-related materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. Although 

CBRN threats continue to evolve, we continue to adapt and improve our institutions to ensure 

that we are prepared for the CBRN challenges of the future. 

STRATEGIC APPROACH FOR COUNTERING TO DAY'S CBRN CHALLENGES 

The DoD Strategy for Countering WMD provides three Lines of Effort to address WMD threats. 

First, prevent acquisition of WMD by adversaries and potential adversaries. Second, contain 

and reduce threats by improving our ability and that of our partners to identify, locate, secure, 

and mitigate threats from WMD and WMD-related materials. Third, maintain the necessary 

posture, capabilities, and authorities to respond to emergent WMD crises. 

PREVENT ACQUISITION 

Preventing State and non-state actors from acquiring CBRN materials is a critical component of 

DoD's strategy. Due to the diffusion of dual-usc WMD-related technology, it has never been 

more ditlicult to prevent bad actors from acquiring the materials or knowledge necessary to 

develop WMD or to use CBRN materials in intentional attacks. llowever, targeted investments 

to prevent these materials from falling into the wrong hands are far more cost-effective than 

potentially responding to the use ofWMD. 

The DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program remains one of the most flexible U.S. 

Government tools for preventing acquisition of WMD and WMD-related materials. Secretary 

James Mattis has recently described the DoD CTR Program as DoD's "most comprehensive and 

effective tool for working cooperatively with international and interagency partners to mitigate 

WMD-related threats." For more than 25 years, the DoD CTR Program has worked with foreign 

partners to destroy existing WMD stockpiles successfully; to make nuclear, chemical, and 

biological weapons more difficult to acquire; and to detect and interdict dangerous WMD 

components and materials. 

In line with DoD's strategy, the DoD CTR Program has evolved in recent years in response to 

the changing threat environment. From an early emphasis on securing sources ofWMD material 

in the former Soviet Union to a focus in more recent years on eliminating State-based chemical 

weapons (CW) programs outside the former Soviet Union in Syria and Libya, the DoD CTR 

Program builds the capacity of partners to counter WMD proliferation threats posed by non-state 

or State actors, and from the potential emergence of diseases of security concern, such as by 

supporting the DoD response to the Ebola crisis last year. 

The use of a nuclear weapon by another State or a non-state actor is one of the most dangerous 

potential threats to the security ofthe United States. The DoD CTR Program's Global Nuclear 

Security (GNS) program and Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP) focus on keeping nuclear 

3 
41 

and related materials out of the hands of malevolent actors, and enable DoD to build capacity to 

enhance the security and prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials, thereby supporting 

broader U.S. Government nuclear security objectives. As one example of the PPP's bilateral 

engagement, the Program continues to secure vulnerable Soviet-era radiological materials at the 

former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in Kazakhstan. 

Recognizing that biological threats are ubiquitous, often endemic, and that potential adversaries 

can acquire pathogens of security concern from unsecure laboratory stores required for public 

health, the DoD CTR Program allocates significant resources to the Cooperative Biological 

Engagement Program (CBEP) to mitigate these complex and evolving threats. The CBEP 

continues to stop threats successfully "at the source" by preparing partners to detect and report 

disease outbreaks of security concern, irrespective of whether those outbreaks were intentionally 

or naturally occurring. The CBEP supports bilateral, regional, and global U.S. Government 

efforts to promote biological security. An example of one of the CBEP's bilateral efforts is the 

ongoing work in Kenya, a key security partner, to upgrade the safety and security of five human 

and animal laboratories to prevent potential acquisition and use of their stores of highly 

dangerous pathogens by non-state actors. 

Preventing non-state actors in Iraq from acquiring the materials necessary to develop chemical or 

biological weapons is of the utmost importance to DoD, as such weapons could potentially be 

used against our Iraqi partners or even against U.S. forces in theater. The DoD CTR Program's 

Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) and CBEP programs continue to explore efforts to 

improve chemical and biological safety and security in Iraq, in close coordination with U.S. 

Embassy Baghdad. Through the relationships formed during biorisk management training 

provided to Iraqi government personnel, the CBEP worked with the Government oflraq to 

facilitate the formation of the Iraq National Biorisk Management Committee (NBMC), which 

works to reduce biological threats in compliance with relevant nonproliferation conventions and 

treaties through regulatory frameworks in Iraq. We continue to support the NBMC in its efforts 

to improve the security of pathogens of concern in Iraq. 

DoD's efforts to reduce biological threats overseas, including through the CBEP, directly support 

the goals of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), which includes a commitment to work 

with at least 30 partner countries to deepen their commitment to health security using a wholeof-government approach. In an increasingly interconnected world, it is imperative to promote 

cooperation among health, agriculture, security, development, and other sectors to tackle 

biological threats and ensure that dangerous pathogens are not accessible to terrorists. 

Strengthening the bridge between the public health and national security communities at home 

and abroad is essential to reduce the threats posed by the intentional, accidental, or natural spread 

of pathogens and diseases of security concern, and potential terrorist acquisition and use of 

biological weapons. DoD remains focused on reducing biological threats to U.S. forces and the 

U.S. homeland, working closely with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the U.S. Agency for International Development 

4 
42 

(USAID), along with other domestic and international partners, to ensure assistance is provided 

in the most holistic, effective, and efficient manner. 

DoD also continues to work to raise the barriers to acquiring WMD material through the 

Proliferation Security Initiative (PS£). Over the 13 years since its inception, the PSI has brought 

together 105 nations to build political will to stop the trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, and 

related materials. By supporting and participating in numerous bilateral and multilateral 

exercises, and through leadership in the PSI's Operational Expetis Group, DoD works alongside 

DoS and experts from other departments and agencies to engage with partners to address all 

aspects of the proliferation threat from rapid, national-level decision-making, to operational 

tactics and procedures. Last year, 70 of the 105 PSI-endorsing States met here in Washine,rton, 

DC, at the PSI's Mid-Level Political Meeting to reaffirm the importance of using the PSI and all 

other cooperative means to prevent the transfer of WMD technology to State and non-state actors 

of concern. 

DoD also participated in Asia Exercise Deep Sabre 2016, the third in a series of annual AsiaPacific exercises hosted by a rotating group of critical PSI partners. The 2017 Asia-Pacific 

exercise will be hosted by Australia, then Japan in 2018, and the Republic ofKorea in 2019. To 

keep pace with proliferators who continually adapt, the PSI itself is evolving, from an activity 

focused heavily on preparing for at-sea interdictions, to one that highlights the critical role that 

customs, treasury, and diplomatic tools play in detecting and preventing WMD proliferation. In 

an era of evolving WMD-related threats, PSI engagements underscore that interdiction is a 

whole-of-government effort that requires both strong institutional capacity and political will. 

International treaties that bring together like-minded nations and promote essential norms are 

foundational elements of the U.S. Government's efforts to prevent the development and 

proliferation ofWMD. For example, the NPT, the BWe, and the ewe remain essential 

foundations for the pursuit of nonproliferation and disarmament goals. In close partnership with 

DOS, we depend on these and related regimes as essential and evolving tools in countering 

CBRN threats. 

CONTAIN AND REDUCE THREATS 

The use of chemical weapons by ISIS in Iraq and Syria and by the Syrian regime in Syria over 

recent years has reinforced the importance of containing and reducing eBRN threats. We work 

with partners to contain and reduce threats should malevolent actors around the globe obtain 

CBRN-related materials, and ensure that partners are able to detect, interdict, and mitigate such 

threats at and within their borders. 

In addition to our vital partnership with the Government of Iraq, our bilateral relationships with 

Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia are crucial to containing and reducing CBRN threats in the Middle 

East and North Africa (MENA) region. In particular, the DoD CTR Program has continued to 

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43 

advance the capabilities of these partners to detect and interdict WMD material. In Jordan, the 

centerpiece of this effort is the Jordan Border Security Program (JBSP) an integrated 

surveillance, WMD detection, and interdiction system that the PPP has developed in partnership 

with the Jordanians along Jordan's borders with Syria and Iraq. In Lebanon, which shares many 

of the same proliferation threats as Jordan along its border with Syria, the PPP is developing, in 

close partnership with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), a Lebanon Border Security Program 

(LBSP) integrated command and control and surveillance system to defend the most vulnerable 

section of Lebanon's border with Syria. This effort is being fully coordinated with assistance 

provided to the LAF by the United Kingdom as well as other DoD assistance along Lebanon's 

border, and it will complement CERN-response assistance provided by the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency's CBRN Preparedness Program (CP2). In early 2016, the DoD CTR Program 

also initiated a proliferation-prevention cooperation with the Govemment of Tunisia along parts 

of its border with Libya in order to counter the proliferation risks resulting from the presence of 

ISIS affiliates and the potential transfer of knowledge and materials between ISIS affiliates. The 

PPP continues to work with the Tunisian government to establish a border-surveillance system 

along the most vulnerable section of that border. 

Our organization also plays a leading role for DoD in the development and maintenance of 

important relationships with international partners and allies to address proliferation and CBRN 

issues cooperatively. A good example is our relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO). The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as the 

permanent co-chair ofNATO's Committee on Proliferation in Defence Fmmat (CP-D), which is 

the senior advisory body to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on countering the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction and CBRN defense. Serving alongside a rotating European cochair (currently Germany, with Poland assuming the role in June), and working closely with 

NATO's WMD Center, we have enhanced NATO's CBRN preparedness through cooperation 

with other NATO bodies and coordinated the development, adoption, and implementation of a 

comprehensive policy for preventing, protecting against, and responding to CBRN threats. 

These efforts have significantly increased the Alliance capacity to address critical CBRN-related 

security challenges. 

RESPOND TO CRISES 

This element of the CWMD Strategy focuses on activities and operations to manage and resolve 

complex WMD crises. It includes strategic and diplomatic efforts to respond to WMD-related 

crises, kinetic action against hostile non-state actors who acquire CBRN materials of concem, 

efforts to train and equip our partners to defend against and respond to the use of CBRN 

weapons, and efforts to improve DoD capabilities continually to respond to CBRN threats 

against the Homeland or our interests overseas. 

There is no more important partner to support in responding to a CBRN weapons use than the 

Government of Iraq. Using the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) authority, DoD has provided 

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44 

our Iraqi and Kurdish partners with critical training and equipment to enable them to protect 

themselves and respond to chemical and biological weapons attacks. 

DoD will continue to support interagency diplomatic efforts aimed at WMD crisis management 

and response in light of the DPRK's efforts to advance its WMD programs significantly. Our 

approach to the DPRK spans multiple aspects of our strategy, from efforts to "prevent 

acquisition" of WMD-related materials by supporting interagency efforts to enforce relevant UN 

Security Council resolutions, to "preparing to respond to crises." The DPRK's recent nuclear 

and missile tests underscore the importance of a well-coordinated international response. 

Supported by other departments and agencies, we work closely with U.S. Pacific Command 

(USPACOM), U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and our Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japanese 

counterparts to ensure that our regional alliances remain postured to respond to WMD 

contingencies on, or emanating from, the Korean Peninsula. This includes the conduct of semiannual CWMD-focused bilateral engagements, support to regional exercises, and providing 

policy guidance to enable effective CWMD operations. 

The CBRN Preparedness Program, which works with partner nations to respond to and mitigate 

the effects of a CBRN incident, complements the threat reduction efforts of the DoD CTR 

Program. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 

authorized DoD, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to implement a whole-ofgovernment approach to build partner nation capacity by providing CBRN incident-response 

training and equipment to assist partner nations in developing the capabilities of its military and 

civilian first-responder community. Building partner nation response capabilities promotes 

regional security cooperation and bilateral and multilateral interoperability, and reduces the 

potential for a large U.S. Government requirement to provide assistance to international CBRN 

incident-response operations. 

DoD first exercised this authority in FY 2014 to provide WMD preparedness and response 

training to the military and civilian first responders in the Middle East, and in 2015 expanded to 

other key allies and partners. Although the training focused on CBRN incident preparedness and 

response, it also emphasized a whole-of-government approach to execute WMD incident 

operations effectively. In the current fiscal year, DoD will continue to improve the WMDpreparedness and response capability of key partners, identified collaboratively with the 

Combatant Commanders and DoS. 

10 U.S.C 333, as recently provided in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017, consolidates the training 

and equipping of foreign security forces, including activities conducted by the CBRN 

Preparedness Program, under a single authority. We anticipate that this new authorization will 

provide DoD with greater flexibility to assist our partner nations in developing their capabilities 

to respond to incidents involving WMD, which in turn may reduce the need for U.S. emergency 

assistance during an international CBRN incident. 

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45 

While enhancing the CBRN-response capabilities of our allies and partners, DoD must also be 

prepared to respond to a CBRN attack against U.S. personnel or our broader interests overseas. 

The U.S. Army's 20'h Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) 

Command continues to develop and refine the extensive capabilities and technical expertise 

necessary to deploy rapidly in support of U.S. forces around the world and conducts regular 

training exercises to operate in highly challenging realistic operational environments. Our 

organization also provides policy guidance to the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, 

which develops and acquires capabilities that allow the Joint Force to deter, prevent, protect 

against, respond to, and recover from CBRN threats and etlects within a layered and integrated 

defense. DoD also continues to work in close coordination with DoS to support allies and 

partners in the event of a CBRN crisis abroad, if necessary. 

Ensuring that DoD is poised to respond and support civil authorities in the event of a CBRN 

attack against the Homeland is of the upmost importance. The NDAA for FY 2017, Section 

1086, requires that DoD, DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) jointly develop a national biodefense strategy and 

associated implementation plan, which shall include a review and assessment ofbiodefense 

policies, practices, programs, and initiatives. This work is underway and DoD is reviewing 

existing policies to identifY relevance and gaps and to determine which updates and additions arc 

required to address current and emerging threats posed by biological agents. 

DoD recognizes the need to be prepared to support the Federal response to a domestic CBRN 

events at home. The DoD CBRN Response Enterprise (CRE) provides both Federal and State 

controlled capabilities to respond at the lowest level to natural or manmade CBRN events. In 

addition, we assist with the development of protocols and concepts of operation to enhance the 

ability of first responders, law enforcement agencies, and emergency services to execute largescale crisis response operations promptly and effectively. Through the analysis of past CBRN 

events (whether natural or manmade), the development ofwargames and exercises, and the 

promulgation of guidance and strategic policy, DoD has played a central role in developing the 

intellectual framework for developing best practices in domestic and international CERNresponse and mitigation operations. Working closely with the Joint Staf1', we continue to partner 

with a wide array of interagency partners, including DHS, the Department of Energy (DoE), the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) to address the challenge of a coordinated response to CBRN events in the U.S. homeland. 

CONCLUSION 

We must anticipate that our adversaries will continue to evolve and develop increasingly 

sophisticated methods to pursue, develop, or deploy CBRN weapons. These emerging CBRN 

threats intersect with challenges of political instability, violent extremism, and poor 

infrastructure in States suffering from natural outbreaks of devastating diseases. The DoD 

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46 

Strategy to Countering WMD continues to provide a framework for assessing and understanding 

these real and potential challenges. 

We will continue to work with other departments and agencies and international partners to 

confront the threats posed by WMD at home and abroad. As WMD-related crises continue to 

emerge, your continued support in the areas described today are critical to our ability to 

understand, anticipate, and mitigate these threats. 

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47 

Peter F. Verga 

Performing the Duties of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security 

Mr. Verga is the Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and Global Security, and is the performing the duties of the Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary. Additionally, Mr. Verga is Special Assistant to the Secretary and 

Deputy Secretary of Defense for Compmtmented Activities. Previously Mr. Verga was 

Defense Advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Prior to that he was the Chief of 

Staff and Senior Career Official for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy responsible 

for oversight of security cooperation policy implementation and the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency, technology security policy and the Defense Technology Security 

Administration, detainee policy, missing persons and prisoners of war issues and the 

Defense Prisoner of War-Missing Persons Office. Mr. Verga also oversaw the management 

and day-to-day operations of the Policy organization. Prior to that Mr. Verga served as the 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for llomeland Defense and Americas' Security 

Affairs, acting as principal advisor on matters related to homelat1d defense activities of the 

Department of Defense and regional security matters for the Western Hemisphere. He has 

served as a member of the Federal Emergency Management Agency National Advisory 

Council; as Director of the Department of Defense Homeland Security Task Force, 

developing the Depmtment's orgm1izational concepts and strategy to respond to the 9-11-

01 attacks; as the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Integration, successfully negotiating 

the return of a U.S. EP-3 Aircraft that made a forced landing in China in 200 I; and as 

Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Support. Born in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Mr. 

Verga holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Public Administration from the University of 

La Verne, La Verne California, and a Master of Science degree in Public Administration 

from Troy State University, Troy, Alabmna. Mr. Verga is a graduate of the United States 

Army Command and General Staff College, and a guest lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate 

School and the Anny War College. Mr. Verga has been a career member of the Senior 

Executive Service since 1998. 

Mr. Verga is a retired U.S. Army officer with over twenty-six years of service, including 

combat operations in Vietnam from September, 1969 to November, 1971 and has been 

elected to the lJ .S. Anny Officer Candidate School Hall of Fame. Prior to retirement from 

active service, he served in successive positions where he was responsible for a variety of 

special and sensitive activities and interagency matters including serving on the White 

!louse staff advising on matters including continuity of government and sensitive 

emergency plans and programs in direct support of the President. This followed duty as 

Deputy Director of the Office of Emergency Operations of the White House Military 

Office and in the Operations Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Mr. Verga has been awarded the Presidential Ranks of Distinguished Executive and 

Meritorious Executive a11d has been awarded three Defense Distinguished Civilian Service 

Awards and the Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Award. During his military service 

his awards included, among others; the Combat Infantryman's Badge, the Defense 

Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, four Bronze Star medals, the Purple Heart, 

three Defense Meritorious Service Medals, twenty-one Air Medals, and the Presidential 

Service Badge. 

Mr. Verga is married to the fonner Elizabeth Anne McAneny, they currently reside in 

Alexa11dria, Virginia. 

Current as of 3/20/2017 
48 

Not for Public Release until Approved by the 

House Armed Services Committee 

Statement of Ms. Shari Durand 

Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Posture Hearing 

Before the 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities 

Subcommittee 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States House of Representatives 

March 23, 2017 

Not for Public Release until Approved by the 

House Armed Services Committee 
49 

Acting Director Shari Durand 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Testimony to Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 

House Armed Services Committee 

March 23, 2017 

Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, and Members of the Subcommittee, it is an 

honor to be here today to share with you the work we do every day to make the United States and 

its allies safer by countering the threats posed by the proliferation and use of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) and improvised threats. 

WMD Threats 

Over twenty years ago, a small but dedicated group of radicalized criminals used sarin gas to 

attack critical transportation corridors in Tokyo. In a matter of minutes, their attack killed over a 

dozen people and sickened thousands, and images of the incident were splashed across TVs to 

billions around the globe. The attack clearly demonstrated the potential for terrorists to gain 

international attention with a relatively small amount of resources. It showed that the battlefield 

extends beyond declarations of war by nation-states. Further, this attack made it clear that WMD 

events are not just theoretical and were likely to happen again. It also revealed the challenges 

facing first responders and medical facilities when responding to even a small-scale attack. 

That incident, as well as other events and threats around that time, influenced then-Defense 

Secretary William Cohen to ask Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre to examine all of the 

Department of Defense (DoD) organizations dealing with threats from WMD. As a result of that 

study, the Department concluded that our nonproliferation and counterproliferation etTorts were 

not well focused in terms of an "institutional center of gravity within the Department." The 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was created one year later, in 1998, integrating three 

legacy Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) agencies into one. 

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In the nearly twenty years since, the barriers between WMD and those with the will to use it 

continue to fall- with the threat becoming increasingly complex and global in nature. In Iraq 

and Syria, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is using chemical weapons on the battlefield. 

These attacks demonstrate that ISIS has developed a clear intent to acquire and use WMD, and 

through trial and error, they may get better at it. 

The threat of terrorism is increasingly complex and transregional in nature. Social media is 

allowing terrorists to recruit more easily and spread their expertise more rapidly, across various 

nationalities and ideologies. Terrorist groups are no longer required to fund, train, and equip 

fighters in secret camps; instead, they can inspire unconnected but motivated individuals who 

will attack and declare their allegiance just prior to, or after an attack. And, along the way, these 

motivated individuals can receive technical assistance from a distance in their plans, all through 

today's technology. 

Who WeAre 

For all ofthese reasons, there is a clear need for on-call, comprehensive CWMD expertise. 

That's what the Defense Threat Reduction Agency provides. Our expertise spans the full WMD 

threat spectrum chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, high yield explosives, 

and improvised threats. While we are not the only players on the CWMD field, we provide 

critical support to a USG whole-of-government approach to this critical security mission. 

As DoD realized in 1998 when it established DTRA, the most effective way to leverage this 

expertise is to locate it in one place and provide efficient communication channels for 

collaboration. As a Defense Agency, DTRA operates under the authority, direction, and control 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, through the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. In this 

role, we support and enhance the nuclear enterprise; we support overall USG efforts to prevent 

the proliferation and usc of WMD and improvised threats; and we perform and manage a 

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51 

research and development portfolio to develop tools and capabilities in WMD and improvised 

threat environments. In fact, DTRA provides the United States Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM) with all of its WMD countcrproliferation Science and Technology capabilities. As 

a Combat Support Agency, DTRA communicates directly with the Otlices of the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs, and provides direct support to Combatant Commanders and the Services. 

What We Do 

Our programs come in many shapes and sizes and we work with both military and civilian 

personnel. On any given day, tens to hundreds ofDTRA experts are dispatched overseas, and in 

certain cases to some of the most dangerous and sensitive of areas, in order to provide analysis, 

research, testing, training, and operational expertise. 

Within DTRA, we have nuclear physicists, microbiologists, chemists, current and former Special 

Operations Forces personnel, logisticians, linguists, lawyers, contract specialists, accountants, 

and many other expert professionals working side by side to eliminate WMD threats. If you 

observed our biweekly Director's Update Briefings, you would hear about our teams deployed 

throughout the world on specific missions. You would also hear about the critical science and 

technology work that feeds into our operational mission and across the DoD and Interagency; 

research and development testing taking place that week; analysis of WMD threats; key leader 

engagement and partnership opportunities, and significant events or decision points on the 

horizon. All of these discussions are shared and coordinated with every DTRA entity so that 

maximum collaboration and information sharing occurs continuously. 

Counter-ISIS 

An area of key interest in those biweekly meetings is DTRA's support to Operation Inherent 

Resolve (OIR). In September 2015, DTRA stood up a Counter ISIS Chemical and Biological 

Working Group composed of personnel from across the Agency. This Working Group 

coordinates capabilities for urgent need requirements supporting the Warfighter. DTRA's 

counter-ISIS activities specifically focus on: chemical agents, potential radiological or 

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52 

biological threats or threats from small unmanned aerial systems, commercial grade explosives, 

homemade explosives and their chemical precursors, and improvised explosive devices. 

DTRA enables OIR Coalition Forces and partner nations to counter ISIS through seven lines of 

support: 

I) Threat Awareness: DTRA identities critical links and nodes in ISIS improvised threats 

and WMD proliferation networks to inform the coalition's counter-ISIL campaign. 

2) Research and Development: DTRA develops material and non-material solutions 

against ISIS WMD and improvised threats. In January 2017, DTRA transitioned a novel 

chemical detection platform to the Warfighter. DTRA continues to support the broader 

U.S. government effort to provide the coalition with capabilities to detect and defeat ISIS 

small unmanned aerial systems. 

3) Planning: DTRA analyzes operational courses of action and available countermeasures 

to inform pre-mission planning for employing coalition forces in unique improvised 

threat and WMD environments in Iraq and Syria. In October 2016, DTRA provided an 

analysis of options to store, transport, and dispose of chemical and biological material of 

concern in the region. 

4) Deployable Capabilities: DTRA maintains deployable teams with specialized 

equipment and expertise available to assist the coalition in a WMD contingency. DTRA 

also integrated tactical improvised threat experts into the coalition's component 

commands. In the summer of 20 16 and in February 20 I 7, DTRA advised on the secure 

and timely movement of suspected chemical samples to labs for characterization. 

5) Training and Equipping Coalition Forces: DTRA leverages the Department's existing 

authorities, including the Iraq Train and Equip Fund, to provide military and civilian first 

responders with training and equipment to defend against chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear threats. DTRA supported a Warfighter request to provide the 

Government of Iraq handheld chemical detectors to enable Iraqi responders to identify 

and respond to incidents involving chemical weapons, including the use of toxic 

industrial chemicals. 

6) Building Regional Capacity: DTRA fosters enduring relations with partner nations' 

border security organizations to prevent WMD and illicit improvised threat related 

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53 

materials from crossing borders. DTRA continues to enhance the capabilities of 

countries like Jordan and Lebanon to detect, identifY, track, and interdict potential 

traffickers of illicit materials on the Syrian border. Along with a network of fixed and 

mobile sensors along these borders, DTRA also delivers critical WMD detection training 

and equipment enabling these partner nations to prevent illicit trafficking ofWMD. This 

work is crucial given the possible desire of some terrorist groups to use WMD materials 

against the United States and our partners. DTRA is training and equipping Turkey's 

explosive ordnance disposal units along the Turkey-Syria border. DTRA also works 

collaboratively with partners in the region to prevent non-state actor acquisition of 

dangerous biological materials while also providing them with the tools to detect a 

potential bioterrorism attack. 

7) Reach back: DTRA 's cadre of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear experts 

continue to provide the coalition decision support products for kinetic and non-kinetic 

operational planning and post-event analysis, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. During 

FY16, DTRA provided 522 technical products to USCENTCOM and OIR; further, we 

have provided over 60 Requests for lnfonnation products so far in FY17 that enabled the 

Warfighter to target ISIS facilities. 

DTRA's future support shifts from building regional capacity to sustaining regional capacity 

through enduring partnerships; efforts to determine how provided capabilities enable and 

improve operational results; and, innovating new capabilities to counter ISIS WMD networks 

globally. 

Chemical 

In addition, our chemical weapons experts arc working to improve the safety and security of 

toxic industrial chemicals in the Middle East and North Africa to make it more difficult for 

terrorist groups, such as ISIS, to use them as improvised weapons. We are also developing 

contingency plans to assist with the destruction of chemical weapons and related materials, both 

for legacy nation-state programs and for improvised terrorist programs, should a cooperative 

environment emerge. Our current government partners include the Edgewood Chemical and 

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54 

Biological Center in Aberdeen, Maryland; the State Department Chemical Security Program; the 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; the Sandia National Laboratory; the Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory; and the Government of Jordan. We are working to expand these efforts to other 

partners in the Middle East and North Africa. 

Biological 

Our biological security experts are consolidating and improving the security of dangerous 

pathogen collections across the planet, collaborating closely with other like-minded nations to 

prevent nefarious transfer of biological materials. We are working cooperatively with partner 

countries and the international community to minimize the threat posed by deliberate, accidental, 

and natural infectious disease outbreaks of security concern that place at risk U.S. national 

security and potential intentional attacks involving weaponized pathogens, while developing new 

means for protecting our military personnel against biological terrorism or threats 

As the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa demonstrated, outbreaks do not respect 

boundaries or borders, and pose a signiticant threat to the stability of countries and regions. The 

increased movement of people geographically means that devastating diseases, whether spread 

naturally, accidentally, or intentionally can be transmitted worldwide. DTRA addresses the 

outbreak risk of diseases of concern by promoting best practices in biological safety and security, 

improving partner countries' abilities to rapidly detect and report dangerous infections, and 

enhancing partnerships that facilitate information sharing. 

Radiological/Nuclear 

DTRA is involved with efforts to secure weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide, 

understanding and predicting nuclear weapons effects, and ensuring the survivability of United 

States Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications. 

DTRA provides nuclear enterprise support to the Department of Defense and Interagency 

stakeholders that helps to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of the U.S. 

nuclear deterrent force. Our nuclear experts are supporting sustainment of current and future 

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55 

nuclear deterrent capabilities; implementation of nuclear enterprise review recommendations; 

and nuclear enterprise recapitalization efforts. We have systems in place to guarantee that we 

have complete control and accounting of our nuclear weapons at all times. In response to DoD's 

2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review, DTRA's role was modified from conducting Nuclear Surety 

Inspections at each Air Force and Navy Nuclear Capable Unit to performing Oversight 

Inspections of all Air Force and Navy Nuclear Surety Inspection Teams. 

We make sure the Navy and the Air Force's inspections provide tangible proofthat every safety 

system is in place, maintained and in working order, and put the operations, maintenance, and 

security forces through drills and exercises to ensure that everyone knows their jobs; they know 

the proper procedures, and they know how to react when the situation changes. Our collective 

goal is to protect, control, and serve the nation with 100% assured predictability, reliability, and 

confidence in our nuclear weapons stewardship. 

DTRA is also the home of the Defense Nuclear Weapons School. This illustrious school will 

celebrate its 70'h anniversary in April2017 and remains a center of excellence in training our 

next generation ofCWMD experts. The school provides hands-on training on the DoD's only 

live radiological field training site and maintains the Nuclear Weapons Instructional Museum 

which allows for training related to all weapons that have been or are deployed in the U.S. 

nuclear stockpile. In fact, nearly 29,000 students attended classes or received distance learning 

instruction from the school in FYI6 including over 7,000 students attending in-resident, mobile 

training, and the Nuclear Weapons Instructional Museum. Students included domestic and 

international personnel- including U.S. Civil Support Teams and our allied partners. 

DTRA also provides nuclear forensics and attribution capabilities. For example, DTRA 

developed the Discreet Oculus Prompt Diagnostics Sensor System as a research and 

development etlort to create a ground-based prompt detection and diagnostics system. The 

system complements current global- and space-based prompt nuclear effects monitoring systems. 

It is designed to support the United States Government's efforts to develop timely and accurate 

technical nuclear forensics conclusions after a nuclear attack on the United States. Discreet 

Oculus systems are now deployed in three cities with the next deployment scheduled tor 2018. 

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56 

Maintenance of these systems will transition to the United States Air Force Technical 

Applications Center in 2018. 

Information collected by this system after an attack will be used to help national and military 

leaders identify what was detonated, where the materials came fi·om, and who launched or 

supported the attack. 

High Yield Explosives 

DTRA stmctural dynamics experts are working on solutions to protect military and related 

government facilities at risk while developing new means for mitigating blast effects resulting 

from a variety of explosive devices against structures and other infrastructure. Our products arc 

also used internationally and have been critical to our partners' efforts in constructing facilities 

that require the highest levels of protection for personnel and equipment. 

For example, DTRA developed the Vulnerability Assessment and Protection Option (VAPO). 

VAPO is a software modeling and simulation toolset designed to provide assessment capability 

in support of vulnerability assessment teams and force protection evaluators and planners. 

V APO allows users to evaluate a single or multi-building site to assess its vulnerability to an 

array of threats, including high explosive, chemical, and biological weapons inside or outside of 

buildings, nuclear threats, and vehicle barrier ramming. Using physics-based models validated 

through testing, the tool predicts structural, window, equipment damage; progressive collapse; 

and human injury. VAPO is currently used by the DoD, USG entities, and international allies to 

protect structures and infrastructure around the world. DTRA signed an agreement earlier this 

month with the Department of Homeland Security to make V APO available to State, Local, 

Tribal, and Territorial Government agencies. 

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57 

CWMD Strategy 

The Agency's focus is to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists and other enemies by locking 

down dangerous materials, destroying legacy weapons, preparing tor, and responding to WMD 

incidents, and developing technologies to prevent, defend against, and counter a WMD attack. 

Tn line with the Department's 2014 Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

DTRA supports the full scope of DoD's efforts to prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, 

and respond to crises. 

Prevent Acquisition 

The most effective means to reduce WMD threats is at the source. It is common sense to go 

where the problem begins and attempt to counteract and eliminate these threats as far away from 

American soil as possible. 

One of the core elements of DoD's efforts to prevent the acquisition ofWMD was created by 

your former colleagues Senator Richard Lugar and Senator Sam Nunn. In fact, the Nunn-Lugar 

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program celebrated its 25'h anniversary in December 2016. 

The evolution ofNunn-Lugar has been remarkable. The Program is responsible for destroying 

more than 7,000 Soviet-era warheads, 2,500 missiles, and 155 bombers and securing numerous 

nuclear sites. Following our success in eliminating access to materials in the former Soviet 

Union, however, the strategic environment has evolved as state and non-state actors seeking 

WMD have dispersed to other geographic areas and potential WMD sources. This evolution 

required a shift in our thinking as well and is the reason why we previously requested- and 

received- Congressional approval to expand Nunn-Lugar authority. Now, in close collaboration 

with our partners at the State Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration, 

CTR operates in over 30 countries across Afiica, Asia, and the Middle East. The CTR 

Program's unique combination of technical expertise, strategic relationships, and agile 

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58 

authorities ensure that the United States and our allies and partners have the tools necessary to 

counter the full scope of WMD threats facing the world today. 

For example, DTRA is focused on helping African nations secure naturally-occurring dangerous 

pathogens. Deadly agents on the African continent, like Ebola virus, Marburg virus, and anthrax 

were once used to make biological weapons during the Cold War; these lethal pathogens are now 

safeguarded, cataloged, and, if needed, destroyed as part ofCTR's Cooperative Biological 

Engagement Program. This program is reducing access to biological materials while expanding 

intemational partnerships to better counter natural and man-made biological events. These 

efforts advance the U.S. commitment under the Global Health Security Agenda to assist 31 

countries and I region to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats. As the entire 

world learned during the 2015-2016 Ebola crises, containment and safeguarding of such 

dangerous pathogens that could quickly evolve into broad threats, is extremely critical for our 

Warfighters' and the world's safety. 

DTRA, with primary focus on pathogens of security concern, works closely with the 

Departments of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and the United 

States Department of Agriculture and others to m<L'(imize expertise and relationships within the 

global health community to improve early warning and detection capabilities and to mitigate 

pandemic disease threats. In close coordination with our research and development arm, we are 

also creating partnerships with industry for advanced development and manufacturing of medical 

countermeasures to counter emerging bio threats and infectious diseases. For example, we are 

leveraging the capabilities of DoD's Advanced Development and Manufacturing (ADM) facility 

in Alachua, Florida to develop pretreatments that protect the force against Botulinum neurotoxin 

(toxin threats). 

Another critical nonproliferation function ofDTRA is our work implementing atms control 

treaties and confidence building and transparency measures. Through various agreements, the 

United States seeks to control, safeguard, and eliminate existing weapons and to verify and 

monitor compliance with agreements intended to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 

biological, and conventional weapons. As the focal point for U.S. treaty implementation, 

11 
59 

DTRA's inspectors provide the Secretary of Defense and interagency partners with first-hand 

evidence that international commitments arc fulfilled through the verifiable accounting for and 

reduction of the world's weapons stockpiles. DTRA inspectors and technicians provide critical 

subject matter expertise to interagency teams on the front lines of international negotiations and 

monitoring organizations. In addition to conducting inspections, DTRA researches and develops 

technologies to enhance the rapid detection and characterization of nuclear events worldwide, 

and upgrades and operates 31 international monitoring stations for nuclear events. We also 

provide support to COCOMs that receive foreign inspections and monitoring and provide 

valuable insights into mitigating techniques for sensitive U.S. facilities and activities. 

Contain and Reduce Threats 

If our progran1s and our efforts are unable to stop these WMD threats at the source before they 

proliferate, we help Combatant Commanders and military Service Components mitigate threats 

before they reach the U.S. homeland. Detection, interdiction, and if needed, destruction of these 

weapons and materials are the goal, thus disrupting the supply or smuggling routes and providing 

our national leadership with knowledge concerning important threat details. Working with our 

international partners, the Department's goal is to deter, dissuade, and deny those who both 

produce and attempt to gain access to these materials and drive them out of business. 

For example, the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program's Proliferation Prevention Program, or PPP, 

enhances the capacity of partner countries to deter, detect, interdict, and respond to the attempted 

proliferation or smuggling ofWMD. It provides specialized equipment, training, and facility 

upgrades for partner nation border security and law enforcement organizations. Training is 

institutionalized through a train-the-trainer approach and sustained with periodic local and 

regional WMD Integrated Exercises which enable participants to use program skills and 

equipment within a realistic training environment. The Proliferation Prevention Program's 

partners span the Caucuses, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Northern Africa, and 

the Middle East. 

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60 

DTRA also supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Support Cell, and thus helps 

facilitate engagements focused on ensuring that PSI endorsers are prepared to uphold their 

commitment to the Statement oflnterdiction Principles to prevent the proliferation of WMD and 

WMD-related material. There are now 105 PSI endorsees worldwide, and DTRA-facilitated 

engagements occurred in each AOR last year. 

Because of DoD and the broader U.S. Government's success in interdicting and eliminating 

weapons at the source, in many cases we have literally driven the enemy underground. As a 

result, our national security leadership and military commanders need non-nuclear capability to 

strike at Hard and Deeply Buried Targets. DTRA works closely with the Defense Intelligence 

Agency to find these targets and provide Combatant Commanders and Service Components with 

effective CWMD contingency responses. 

Respond to Crises 

Our DTRA workforce performs countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) planning and 

exercise support and provides expertise to the Combatant Commands and other customers. 

For example, DTRA leads, supports and participates in numerous joint exercise and training 

events throughout each calendar year, based on Joint Doctrine, Commanders' Objectives and 

mission requirements. The goal of these training events is to ensure the Military Services 

understand what would be needed in a WMD event and to prepare DTRA to successfully employ 

joint forces to conduct CWMD operations. 

One of the largest of these exercises is the Nuclear Weapon Accident Incident Exercise 

(NUW AIX). This exercise is a Secretary of Defense directed, United States Northern Command 

executed and DTRA led iield training exercise. This annual event exercises a whole of 

government response involving custodial nuclear weapons or materials. These efforts allow for 

the identification of gaps in nuclear weapons accident/incident response capabilities and means 

and methods to repair those vulnerabilities. NUW AIX involves as many as 1,000 people across 

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61 

the country and includes participants throughout the interagency and state and local participation, 

when possible. 

Overseas, DTRA's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, high-yield explosive (CBRNE) 

Preparedness Program (CP2) supports all the Combatant Commands by providing partner 

nations with skillsets to effectively respond to WMD incidents through increased tactical and 

operational capabilities. The goal of CP2 is to enhance regional and national CBRNE response 

planning and capabilities to minimize the impact ofWMD events and to decrease reliance on 

U.S. response assets. CP2 currently uses Section 1204 of the FY14 NDAA and plans to use 

Section333 of the FY17 NDAA, both provided by Congress, to train and equip both civil and 

military first responders within authorized countries to enhance their overall preparedness for 

CBRNE events. 

DTRA Research and Development 

Our CWMD research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) program can trace its roots 

back to the Manhattan Project where we provided expertise in weapons effects- work that we 

still do today. DTRA does not own or operate any functional laboratory, but we are able to 

select from the full range of national expertise, wherever that may be. Our performers include 

the DoD laboratories and Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration 

(DOE/NNSA) labs, contractors, Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers, 

University-Associated Research Centers, academia, and of course both large and small 

innovative companies. We provide and operate unique and essential test and evaluation 

capabilities at government facilities in New Mexico and Nevada to meet our own mission 

requirements, and those of our various customers and stakeholders. 

DTRA RDT&E programs respond to the most pressing CWMD challenges including stand-off 

detection that seeks to identifY CBRN materials from safe distances, tracking, and interdiction of 

WMD; modeling and simulation to support weapons effects and hazard predictions; classified 

support to Special Operations Forces; defeat of WMD agents and underground facilities; and 

protection of people, systems, and infrastructure against WMD effects. 

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62 

DTRA RDT &E is unique- it is solely focused on CBRNE; tied closely with the Agency's 

Combat Support responsibilities; and is nimble and responsive to urgent needs. DTRA's test 

beds provide unmatched threat-representative target structures and threat-characteristic 

geologies. We support a number of Service, Joint Staff, and Combatant Command priorities, 

including development of the Large Caliber Penetrator; expanded tactics, techniques, and 

procedures for use of the Joint Programmable Fuse; and enhanced U.S. missile defeat 

capabilities. 

DTRA bas a comprehensive, balanced CBRNE Science and Technology portfolio that supports 

DoD goals and is well connected with DoD customers, the interagency, and our intemational 

partners. Our RDT&E approach balances the need for near-term pay-off with the need for longterm technology and capability development and investment. Our work is centered upon the 

following programs: Basic Research ( 6.1 ), Applied Research ( 6.2), Advanced Technology 

Development (6.3), and System Development and Demonstration (6.5). 

These programs have resulted in significant capability transfer to the Warfigbter. DTRA has 

transitioned nuclear detection and forensic capabilities to the Air Force Technical Applications 

Center and the Army's 20'11 CBRNE Command. All 57 National Guard Civil Support Teams are 

fielding the Mobile Field Kit, a hand-held device and application that integrates and coordinates 

the readings from multiple radiation sensors. Our National CWMD Technical Reach back 

Support Enterprise provides 24/7 CBRNE decision support capability for planning, operations, 

and post-event analysis to Combatant Commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Joint Staff, the Intelligence Community, and other USG agencies. We are developing 

capabilities for missile defeat, advanced analytics and discovery processes to predict the 

emergence of future threats, standards and technologies to protect critical systems from 

electromagnetic pulse, and models to predict the multidimensional etTects of nuclear weapons 

use for the United States Strategic Command. 

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63 

Authorities 

None of the activities or capabilities above would be possible without the unique authorities and 

funding that Congress provides to DoD each year that allows us to respond to these challenges. 

When DoD and the Warfighter are presented with a WMD challenge, we carefully review the 

Department's various authorities and funding, in consultation with our interagency partners who 

collaborate us in this mission space, and approach problems on a regional, mission-focused basis. 

We have internally organized ourselves to promote multi-directional communication, rapid 

innovation, and quick tum decision-making to achieve success. DTRA's ability to rapidly 

respond to the nation's requirements remains at the fundamental core of the Agency's mission 

and directly enables accomplishment of real-time U.S. national security objectives. 

Changes Impacting DTRA Mission Space 

There have been a number of significant changes in the DTRA mission space since we last 

appeared before the Committee in Febmary 2016. 

A key focus of these changes is our power to innovate. I don't just mean this in the technical 

research and development sense, although that is a part of it; innovation is about new partners 

and relationships, new forums of collaboration, new ways of doing business and thinking outside 

of the box. For DTRA, we are well positioned to innovate in ways not previously considered. 

Countering Improvised Threats 

On October l, 2016, the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization (.liDO) transitioned under 

the authority, direction and control ofDTRA, thus expanding DTRA's mission space to include 

countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and improvised threats. JIDO was previously 

known as the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Agency, or JIDA. The improvised threat defeat 

mission disrupts the planning and operations of violent extremist organizations and enables our 

Warfighters to rapidly adapt to and overcome emerging threat tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. Employment of IEDs and improvised threats against deployed U.S. forces and our 

16 
64 

partners presents significant tactical risk to operations and an increased strategic risk to the 

national goals of overseas conflicts. DTRA is now responsible for enabling DoD actions to 

counter improvised threats with tactical responsiveness in support of Combatant Commanders' 

effort to prepare for and to adapt to battlefield surprise. 

Just two weeks ago, we briefed the professional staff members on the House and Senate Armed 

Services Committees on the progress of JIDO's transition under DTRA. The takeaway message 

shared in that briefing is that there are many opportunities for coordination, collaboration, and 

integration. Collectively, we provide training, exercise support, threat analysis, forensics, sensor 

development, defeat tools, testing and evaluation, and more. Fmiher, the threat networks that 

use or facilitate the use of IEDs or other improvised threats also have an interest in using WMD 

- and vice versa. 

Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 

DTRA continues to conduct financial improvement and audit readiness (FIAR) activities to 

demonstrate that we are faithful stewards of the taxpayers' dollars. We have successfully 

undertaken corrective actions to address issues raised by the FIAR. Specifically, we continue to 

tackle integration of the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization into DTRA; the systemic 

Departmental challenges including Funds Balance with Treasury reconciliation; unsupported 

journal vouchers; and property reporting challenges. We will continue to aggressively correct 

any deficiencies and work with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service in preparation for 

examination. 

Management Headquarters Activities 

DTRA is in compliance with the Department-directed 25% reduction in costs associated with 

Management Headquarters Activities (MHA). This reduction will be fully achieved by FY 2020. 

The current MHA reduction includes 75 civilian full time equivalents (FTE). We anticipate that 

51% of our FTE reductions will be achieved by the end ofFY18. 

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65 

Conclusion 

In closing, I would like to thank the Committee for this opportunity to share some of our recent 

efforts and accomplishments. DTRA's workforce is incredibly capable and extremely proud of 

its contributions to making the world safer. There are a number of challenges on the horizon, but 

I am confident that we will find the right techniques and tools to address these threats. I hope 

that we will continue to maintain the Committee's trust and support in countering WMD and 

improvised threats and ensuring our security. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to be here 

today. I would be pleased to respond to your questions. 

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66 

Shari Durand, 

Acting Director 

Shari Durand, a member of the senior executive service (SES), is the Acting Director of 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) located on f'ort Belvoir, Virginia. The 

DTRA mission is to sateguard the U.S. and its allies from weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD), specifically chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive 

threats, and improvised threats by providing the means to prevent and counter the 

proliferation ofWMD and improvised threats and to reduce, eliminate, and mitigate their 

effects. This includes helping ensure the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, effective and 

credible nuclear weapons deterrent. As the DoD Combat Support Agency for the Counter 

WMD and improvised threats mission, DTRA develops and provides operational support 

for associated capabilities to warfighters worldwide. 

Prior to her current assignment, Ms. Durand was the Executive Director for DTRA, where 

she served as the senior career executive and oversaw day-to-day operations, strategic 

management, budgetary requirements, business planning and execution and 

communications for a worldwide combat support agency of more than 2,000 civilian and 

military personnel. Before becoming the Executive Director in 2012, she was DTRA 's 

associate director, business enterprise and component acquisition executive (CAE) from 

August 2007 through May 2012, and established and implemented policy and procedures, 

ensured adherence with applicable laws and regulations and monitored compliance in the 

areas of acquisition; contracts; finance; logistics; engineering; facilities; and 

environmental, safety, and occupational health. As the CAE, Ms. Durand guided annual 

acquisition strategies for the entire acquisition portfolio valued at over $1 billion. 

In November 2000, Ms. Durand was promoted to the SES as the assistant deputy 

commandant, installations and logistics (coutracts), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 

(HQMC), Washington, D.C. In June 2003, she was selected as DTRA's director, 

acquisition and logistics directorate and CAE. In October 2003, she was appointed deputy 

director, business directorate when the acquisition and logistics, resource management and 

information management directorates merged. In July 2005, the agency reorganized into a 

four-enterprise structure, and Ms. Durand was appointed deputy associate director, 

business enterprise/CAE. Additional career assignments include Naval Supply Center, 

Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D.C.; Navy Public Works 

Center, San Diego; Naval Facilities Contracts Training Center, Port Hueneme, California, 

and Naval facilities Engineering Command, Washington, D.C. 

Ms. Durand received a Bachelor of Arts in psychology from Athens State College in 

Alabama; a Master of Science in procurement management from American University, 

Washington, D.C.; graduated trom the Naval Air Systems Command's senior executive 

management development program, and is a member ofthe Department of the Navy's 

acquisition professional community. 

Ms. Durand's awards include a Presidential Rank Award in the meritorious category; a 

Secretary of the Navy Competition Award for her work as the contracting officer for the 

tirst low-rate initial production contract ofthe airborne self-protection jammer; a 

Department of the Navy meritorious civilian service award for her performance as the 

acquisition officer at Navy Public Works Center, San Diego; a superior civilian service 

award for her performance as assistant deputy commandant, installations and logistics 

(contracts), HQMC; a DTRA exceptional civilian service award, and a Secretary of 

Defense meritorious civilian service award. 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 23, 2017 

(69) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK 

Ms. DURAND. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continues to be 

volatile, with many destabilizing state and non-state actors posing threats across 

the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear spectrum. In this region, we are 

observing the use not only of traditional chemical warfare agents but also toxic industrial materials (TIMs) such as chlorine as chemical weapons. We also see the 

proliferation of radiological and nuclear materials and technologies that must be 

considered ‘‘high threat’’ due to their potential to cause WMD-like consequences. 

Most of these materials are in widespread use for legitimate medical, industrial, or 

commercial power purposes for domestic use and regional export. However, we have 

concerns when this material is not properly secured and/or accounted for at production or storage sites and in transit to end-use or disposition facilities. The DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program will continue to work together with 

interagency and international partners to ensure that security gaps are identified 

and reduced, to share best practices, and to coordinate efforts to prevent material 

from falling into the hands of nefarious regional actors who could use it against the 

United States, U.S. forces abroad, or U.S. allies. Another concern is that malevolent 

non-state actors may try to proliferate WMD-associated materials or knowledge 

from Iraq, Syria or other ungoverned territories such as Libya to threaten our allies 

and partners in the region. To this end, we are working with our partners in Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia to help them develop the capabilities to secure their borders and be able to interdict WMD-related materials on the move. Resourcing these 

urgent requirements has required us to reprioritize and reallocate CTR Program 

funds and manpower away from other emerging threats; however, we believe this 

is the correct decision. DTRA’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

(CBRN) Preparedness Program (CP2), which supports Operation Inherent Resolve, 

must also balance and prioritize training and equipping partner nations for countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) operations within a variety of constraints. DTRA’s work with the Combatant Commands through CP2 has successfully increased Turkey’s interoperability with U.S. Forces to respond to CBRN incidents on and around Turkey’s southeastern border and bolstered Iraq’s ability to respond to chemical threats posed by ISIS. It is only through constant vigilance with 

the Combatant Commanders, Embassy Country Teams and partner nations that 

DTRA assists a partner nation to develop their WMD preparedness and incidentresponse capability for the next threat, rather than reacting to the current WMD 

threat. Our concern in the long-term is ensuring that the partner nation can sustain 

DTRA’s CWMD security cooperation train and equip efforts under the new authority 

provided in Section 333 of the FY17 NDAA. [See page 21.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Dr. HOPKINS. The Secretary of the Army, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, 

will soon submit the requested 2017 NDAA report to the congressional committees 

on April 10, 2017. The report will address an assessment conducted between August 

and December 2015 to determine the optimal distribution of research, development, 

and production activities at the laboratories supporting the Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program (CBDP). The initial corrective action was to consolidate the oversight responsibilities that had been spread amongst numerous distinct chains of 

command. The Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army 

as the Executive Agent for the DOD-wide Biological Select Agents and Toxins 

(BSAT) Biosafety Program on July 23, 2015. The Secretary of the Army delegated 

authority to the Surgeon General of the Army as the Executive Agent Responsible 

Official (EARO) for the DOD BSAT Biosafety Program to consolidate oversight 

across the Department. To optimize the utilization of subject matter expertise, the 

Secretary of the Army approved further delegation of authority to the Commanding 

General, U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC). The 

Commanding General, USAMRMC, created the BSAT Biosafety Program Office 

(BBPO) to advise on biosafety, provide oversight of DOD BSAT laboratory operations, and serve as a unified DOD interface with regulatory agencies. To consoli-
70 

date the Department’s biosafety and biosecurity oversight responsibilities, the Deputy Secretary of Defense also designated the Secretary of the Army as the Executive 

Agent for the DOD BSAT Biosecurity Program on January 3, 2017. This facilitates 

the synchronization and unity of effort for both biosafety and biosecurity issues. Another corrective action that has already taken place is the realignment of oversight 

of the Dugway Proving Ground (DPG) Life Sciences Division (the source of the incompletely inactivated anthrax spore shipments) to the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The EARO is responsible for tracking the remaining biosafety recommendations and is available to provide more detailed information in this area. The CBDP is also conducting an infrastructure assessment that will support the analysis of options to reduce the number 

of labs that handle select agents and/or reduce costs. [See page 16.] 

Mr. VERGA. The Secretary of the Army, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, submitted the requested National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 

2017 report to the congressional committees on April 10, 2017. The report addresses 

an assessment conducted between August and December 2015 to determine the optimal distribution of research, development, and production activities at the laboratories supporting the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP). The initial 

corrective action was to consolidate the oversight responsibilities that were previously spread among numerous distinct chains of command. The Deputy Secretary 

of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for the 

DOD-wide Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) Biosafety Program on July 

23, 2015. The Secretary of the Army designated the Surgeon General of the Army 

as the Executive Agent Responsible Official (EARO) for the DOD BSAT Biosafety 

Program to consolidate oversight across DOD. To optimize the utilization of subject 

matter expertise, the Secretary of the Army approved further delegation of authority 

to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command 

(USAMRMC). The Commanding General, USAMRMC, created the BSAT Biosafety 

Program Office (BBPO) to advise on biosafety, provide oversight of DOD BSAT laboratory operations, and serve as a unified DOD interface with regulatory agencies. 

To consolidate DOD’s biosafety and biosecurity oversight responsibilities, the Deputy Secretary of Defense also designated the Secretary of the Army as the Executive 

Agent for the DOD BSAT Biosecurity Program on January 3, 2017. This facilitates 

the synchronization and unity of effort for both biosafety and biosecurity issues. Another corrective action that has already taken place is the realignment of the Life 

Sciences Division that was the source of the incompletely inactivated anthrax spore 

shipments from Dugway Proving Ground (DPG), Utah, to the U.S. Army Edgewood 

Chemical Biological Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The EARO is 

responsible for tracking the remaining biosafety recommendations and is available 

to provide more detailed information in this area. The CBDP is conducting an infrastructure assessment that will support the analysis of options to reduce the number 

of laboratories that handle select agents and to reduce costs. [See page 16.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. GABBARD 

Ms. DURAND. Weaponization of botulinum neurotoxin (BoNT) requires a high degree of sophistication, time, and expense. Work on a vaccine against BoNT A/B is 

nearing completion and full Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licensure of a 

DOD developed vaccine is planned for FY23. The DOD is also utilizing its Advanced 

Manufacturing Facility in Achalucha, Florida, to develop antibody drugs against 

BoNT A/B. The first product being developed on this platform is against BoNT A/ 

B. [See page 13.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. VERGA. A decision on whether and how to engage with a country that shares 

some of our interests, but not our values, would be made on a case-by-case basis, 

and would take into consideration the national security interests of the United 

States, the particular circumstances of the information and country in question, and 

applicable laws and regulations regarding information sharing with the particular 

foreign government. 

Regarding the Russian Federation, the Department will continue to urge Russian 

adherence to its obligations (such as under the Minsk Agreement and arms control 

treaties) and related global norms that uphold international peace and security. 

However, both as a matter of policy and pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, bilateral military-to-military cooperation with the 

Russian Federation Ministry of Defense remains prohibited. Interactions with the 
71 

Russian military are currently limited to those communications needed to de-conflict 

operations and ensure the safety of our forces in close proximity, as in Syria, to ensure compliance under international agreements, and activities required to support 

our efforts in Afghanistan. [See page 20.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 23, 2017 

(75) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK 

Ms. STEFANIK. Near-peer adversaries such as North Korea and Iran are building 

super-hard and deeply buried facilities to conceal weapons development and other 

activities. 

Could you describe the requirements that are currently articulated for detecting, 

characterizing and neutralizing such sites? 

Do you have any specific or unique requirements from any of the combatant commands? 

Would you consider the existing government-owned test sites at Fort Hood, White 

Sands, and other locations sufficient to conduct the kinds of research and development being planned to counter these developments? 

Are there any additional capability needs to test and demonstrate new technologies and methods to locate, assess, and characterize super-hard and deeply buried facilities that are not captured by any existing requirements? 

Ms. DURAND. Thank you for that question Congresswoman Stefanik. While 

warfighter and Combatant Commander requirements cannot be described in this 

open forum, I will address your question the best I can at an unclassified level. The 

Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) FY 2016–2026 Strategic Plan for DOD 

T&E Resources describes current and anticipated test facility requirements. DTRA 

research and development test and evaluation (T&E) capability needs evolve as intelligence assessments and combatant commander plans change. Existing requirements documents capture the hardened and deeply buried target T&E needs that 

we are aware of today. More details on the challenges associated with hardened and 

deeply buried targets may be found in the classified 2013–2014 Report to Congress 

on Weapons and Capabilities to Defeat Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets dated 

April 2015 and submitted jointly by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence. This classified report was transmitted to the Congressional Armed Services, Intelligence and Appropriations Committees in letters dated 4 May 2015, and signed by the then Under Secretary for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Frank Kendall. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Among the provisions in the new administration’s budget framework are reforms to key public health, emergency preparedness, and prevention programs. Changes would include the creation of a Federal Emergency Respond Fund 

for rapid response to health outbreaks, and a CDC block grant to address state-specific challenges. How do the proposals in the budget framework fit into the bio defense strategy mandated by the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA and being developed by the 

interagency? In what ways will the proposed increase of our nation’s emergency response funds enhance agency collaboration? 

Dr. HOPKINS. As we’ve seen with H1N1, MERS CoV, Ebola, and now Zika, swift 

and efficient response to biological threats is the best way to mitigate the impact 

of the event. As DOD will always be in support of civilian response to biological incidents when requested, we defer to DHS and HHS on assessing how coordination 

might be enhanced by the creation of Federal Emergency Respond Fund for rapid 

response to health outbreaks. However, the creation of such a fund would likely facilitate provision of DOD support during a response to a biological incident. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The 2014 Department of Defense CWMD Strategy identifies a 

foundational activity and task as maintaining and expanding technical expertise. 

What investments and programs is the Department undertaking to maintain and 

expand technical expertise for a robust workforce? Do efforts include investment in 

STEM programs for a future workforce? 

Mr. VERGA. DOD recognizes that being on the cutting-edge of science and technology in any discipline requires an adaptive technical workforce that has access to 

the best equipment and facilities. DOD has significant investments in these areas 

relevant to technology. DOD routinely makes targeted investments in areas of 

emerging technology of future relevance to Defense innovation. For example, DOD 

recently committed $45 million in funding to build and strengthen its laboratory 
76 

workforce and equipment to perform Synthetic Biology for Military Environments 

in a manner that builds a multi-service DOD community of researchers that collaborate on meeting defense objectives. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Among the provisions in the new administration’s budget framework are reforms to key public health, emergency preparedness, and prevention programs. Changes would include the creation of a Federal Emergency Respond Fund 

for rapid response to health outbreaks, and a CDC block grant to address state-specific challenges. How do the proposals in the budget framework fit into the bio defense strategy mandated by the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA and being developed by the 

interagency? In what ways will the proposed increase of our nation’s emergency response funds enhance agency collaboration? 

Mr. VERGA. As we’ve seen with H1N1, MERS CoV, Ebola, and now Zika, a swift 

and efficient response to biological threats is the best way to mitigate the impact 

of the event. As DOD will always be in support of domestic response to biological 

incidents, we defer to the Department of Homeland Security and the Department 

of Health and Human Services on assessing how coordination might be enhanced 

by the creation of a Federal Emergency Respond Fund for rapid response to health 

outbreaks. However, the creation of such a fund would likely facilitate provision of 

DOD Defense Support of Civil Authorities during a response to a biological incident. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency doing to leverage existing information management systems, such as the NGB’s Civil Support Team 

(CST) Information Management System (CIMS), to ensure such prior investments 

are efficiently used by follow-on forces like the NGB’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) 

and Homeland Defense Response Force (HRF)? 

Dr. HOPKINS. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is currently working 

with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to field the tools (Mobile Field Kit—CBRN 

and Tactical Assault Kit) that currently comprise the Chemical Biological Radiological & Nuclear Information Management System (CIMS 2018) to all 57 Civil Support Teams. We recently began a new pilot program with NGB to explore how this 

technology would be applicable to the CERFPs & HRFs. To date, this has included 

providing initial training and conducting exercises with the Massachusetts CBRN 

Task Force & Homeland Response Force. These exercises have enabled DTRA to 

work with NGB to determine requirements for, and begin developing, additional capability required of CIMS 2018 to be applicable to these forces. In addition to working with NGB, DTRA is currently working with others to leverage existing capabilities to ensure CIMS 2018 data can inform and receive data from other decision 

makers as necessary. An example of this work recently occurred during the 2017 

Presidential Address to the Joint Session of Congress when Mobile Field Kit— 

CBRN (MFK–CBRN) was used to pass information from the 33rd CST to the Situation Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE), NORTHCOM’s situational awareness 

platform and to the DTRA Joint Operations Center. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Do you have a timeline and investment plan for the deployment of 

NGB’s Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management System (CIMS) to follow-on forces? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Congressman, I respectfully suggest this question should be referred 

to the National Guard Bureau. 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency doing to leverage existing information management systems, such as the NGB’s Civil Support Team 

(CST) Information Management System (CIMS), to ensure such prior investments 

are efficiently used by follow-on forces like the NGB’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) 

and Homeland Defense Response Force (HRF)? 

Mr. VERGA. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) continues to work with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency on leveraging, to the maximum extent possible, 

available capabilities of the current NGB Civil Support Team (CST) Information 

Management System (CIMS) for the National Guard (NG) CIMS. NG CIMS package 

fielding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)–CSTs, CERFPs, and HRFs is projected to begin in late Fiscal Year (FY) 2018. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Do you have a timeline and investment plan for the deployment of 

NGB’s Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management System (CIMS) to follow-on forces? 

Mr. VERGA. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is currently conducting implementation activities for the National Guard (NG) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
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Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise (CRE) Information Management System (NG 

CIMS) Phase I capabilities (initial common operating picture and sensor integration 

capability). Phase I pilot testing includes multiple weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD)-CSTs and the Massachusetts Homeland Response Force and runs through 

the end of FY 2017. The NGB is currently conducting planning activities for Phase 

II (information management tools) and Phase III (enterprise and interagency systems interoperability) capabilities. NG CIMS fielding to WMD–CSTs, CERFPs, and 

HRFs is projected to begin in late FY 2018. Adequate funding is programmed to 

support NG CIMS through Phase II, Phase III, and unit fielding. 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency doing to leverage existing information management systems, such as the NGB’s Civil Support Team 

(CST) Information Management System (CIMS), to ensure such prior investments 

are efficiently used by follow-on forces like the NGB’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) 

and Homeland Defense Response Force (HRF)? 

Ms. DURAND. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is currently working 

with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to field the tools (Mobile Field Kit—CBRN 

and Tactical Assault Kit) that currently comprise the Chemical Biological Radiological & Nuclear Information Management System (CIMS 2018) to all 57 Civil Support Teams. We recently began a new pilot program with NGB to explore how this 

technology would be applicable to the CERFPs & HRFs. To date, this has included 

providing initial training and conducting exercises with the Massachusetts CBRN 

Task Force & Homeland Response Force. These exercises have enabled DTRA to 

work with NGB to determine requirements for, and begin developing additional capability required of, CIMS 2018 to be applicable to these forces. In addition to working with NGB, DTRA is currently working with others to leverage existing capabilities to ensure CIMS 2018 data can inform and receive data from other decision 

makers as necessary. An example of this work recently occurred during the 2017 

Presidential Address to the Joint Session of Congress when Mobile Field Kit— 

CBRN (MFK–CBRN) was used to pass information from the 33rd CST to the Situation Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE), NORTHCOM’s situational awareness 

platform and to the DTRA Joint Operations Center. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Do you have a timeline and investment plan for the deployment of 

NGB’s Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management System (CIMS) to follow-on forces? 

Ms. DURAND. Congressman, I respectfully suggest this question should be referred 

to the National Guard Bureau. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. How can the DOD defend against EMP detonations over international waters (beyond 24 miles)? 

How does DOD/DTRA and other DOD units propose to defend the Nation from 

high-altitude EMP attacks initiated over international waters near (e.g. within 500 

miles) of U.S. coasts? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Congressman, this question should be directed to U.S. Northern 

Command for defense against incoming missile or airborne threats. 

Mr. FRANKS. How would DOD/DTRA and other DOD units defend against a slowmoving weather balloon containing a nuclear device launched 50 miles from the 

United States coast at night? How would it be detected and destroyed without triggering an EMP detonation? Would the detection/destruction method work if the device was launched opportunistically inside the eye of a hurricane? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Congressman, this question should be directed to U.S. Northern 

Command for defense against incoming missile or airborne threats. 

Mr. FRANKS. What is DOD policy on the extent to which all DOD offensive, defensive, and logistic support equipment and facilities are to be mitigated against EMP, 

and for facilities to have on-site EMP mitigated reliable long-term power? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Per Department of Defense Instruction 3150.09, it is DOD policy 

that the force will be equipped to survive and operate in nuclear environments, including electromagnetic pulse (EMP), as a deterrent to adversary use of weapons of 

mass destruction against the United States, its allies, and its interests consistent 

with the DOD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. The ability 

of the force to operate in these environments must be known and assessed on a regular basis, and mission critical systems that must survive and operate in nuclear 

environments will be specified. Mission critical facilities with EMP-survivability requirements will be equipped to survive and operate in EMP environments, including 

their necessary power supplies. 
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Mr. FRANKS. How can the DOD defend against EMP detonations over international waters (beyond 24 miles)? 

How does DOD/DTRA and other DOD units propose to defend the Nation from 

high-altitude EMP attacks initiated over international waters near (e.g. within 500 

miles) of U.S. coasts? 

Mr. VERGA. The United States is currently protected from high-altitude electromagnetic pulse detonations by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. Due to 

the classification levels associated with this threat, the Department can make the 

appropriate personnel available to provide a briefing on this specific threat scenario 

to Congressman Franks should it be requested through Legislative Affairs. 

Mr. FRANKS. How would DOD/DTRA and other DOD units defend against a slowmoving weather balloon containing a nuclear device launched 50 miles from the 

United States coast at night? How would it be detected and destroyed without triggering an EMP detonation? Would the detection/destruction method work if the device was launched opportunistically inside the eye of a hurricane? 

Mr. VERGA. Military forces and posture to defend the United States from attack 

are employed under U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific 

Command (USPACOM). Due to the classification levels associated with this threat, 

the Department can make the appropriate personnel available to provide a briefing 

on this specific threat scenario to Congressman Franks should it be requested 

through Legislative Affairs. 

Mr. FRANKS. What is DOD policy on the extent to which all DOD offensive, defensive, and logistic support equipment and facilities are to be mitigated against EMP, 

and for facilities to have on-site EMP mitigated reliable long-term power? 

Mr. VERGA. DOD remains fully committed to ensuring the ability of defense critical assets to execute essential DOD missions in any environment. The Department 

recognizes the unique challenges posed by electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) and the 

impact that EMPs can have on critical systems and capabilities. The Department 

addresses the vulnerability of and mitigation for EMP through several mechanisms, 

and works collaboratively across the Department and with other Federal departments and agencies, such as the Department of Energy, so that risk can be appropriately managed to ensure the Department’s ability to execute critical missions in 

all threat environments. 

Mr. FRANKS. What are the major outcomes to date of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) EMP mitigation project responsive to RFP DTRA152–006? 

What are the major outcomes and findings of the DTRA pilot projects under contract responsive to the RFP DTRA152–006 to make Defense Critical Infrastructure 

(DCI) mitigated against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threats, including extreme 

solar storms causing geomagnetic disturbances (GMD)? 

Ms. DURAND. Work on High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) research on 

the effects on DOD facilities and systems has been performed for over 30 years. This 

research has resulted in the publication of HEMP environmental and protection 

military standards and handbooks for the ground facilities and systems, military 

aircraft, military surface ships. We have a long history of both HEMP phenomenology, testing and effects on systems as well as critical facilities. This has led to 

research and development of technologies that protect our most critical facilities and 

systems against HEMP. Recently, attention has been focused on HEMP and its effects on Defense Critical Infrastructure. This emerging research area is looking at 

the effects of HEMP and the loss of power on critical defense installations in the 

performance of their missions. The national power grid survivability and performance is the responsibility of the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security. 

DTRA has recognized the need to perform R&D on the technologies and methodologies required for critical military installations to seamlessly ‘‘island’’ off the power 

grid in the event of a national disaster, including HEMP, in order to sustain mission 

operational capabilities. Consequently, DTRA initiated three SBIRs to explore the 

current state of related technologies and methodologies. The R&D of the SBIR efforts will be focused on the new technologies, renewable power sources and stateof-the-art switching capabilities to island off the grid and seamlessly reconnect to 

the grid. Cost efficiency in successful islanding concepts is a priority of the research. 

We expect our vast experience in HEMP hardening of complex military systems and 

facilities can be leveraged in this new research area to be more cost-effective. The 

SBIR Phase II efforts will focus on taking the concept from idea to prototype and 

working with more realistic scenarios such as designing an optimization model for 

a specific site based on their load requirements, available resources, and incorporation of renewable energy. Phase II efforts may also include designing and testing 

EMP hardened prototype components. As of February 2017, one Phase II has been 

awarded and the others are being evaluated. At this time there are no major out-
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comes or findings to report. We expect to have the Final Reports finished by approximately Dec 2019. 

Mr. FRANKS. What was learned to date regarding the DTRA152–006 projects concerning costs for mitigating DCIs against: a. Direct EMP damage? b. For on-site 

electrical power what are the costs and/or energy savings regarding having energy 

generated on-site? c. Is it worthwhile for NDAA legislation to require such EMP 

mitigation and on-site power generation at other DCIs? 

Ms. DURAND. The DTRA152–0006 proposals are not yet awarded. The process of 

evaluating contractor proposals is on-going. Contract awards are expected by Oct 

2017. We do not feel that it is necessary that the NDAA require such EMP mitigation or on-site power generation at other DCIs. 

Mr. FRANKS. Will DTRA publish an unclassified DTRA152–006 report with a classified appendix as appropriate? Is it worthwhile for the NDAA 2018 to require this? 

Will DTRA publish an unclassified report for the House Armed Services Committee that describes in detail the outcomes and findings to date of the DTRA 152– 

006 pilot projects—and include as a separate appendix any classified material? 

[Such as within two months so the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can 

use the information while preparing its strategy for protecting the Homeland from 

EMP/GMD (as required by 6 U.S.C.) Such unclassified report will be helpful for 

other projects with similar goals to protect other infrastructure.] 

Ms. DURAND. DTRA will publish an unclassified report containing the detailed 

outcomes and findings upon conclusion of the Phase II SBIR contract efforts in response to RFP DTRA152–006. If applicable, a classified separate classified annex 

will be submitted. We do not feel it necessary that the NDAA 2018 require this specifically. The Phase II SBIRs are two-year R&D efforts. We expect to have the Final 

Report finished approximately Dec 2019. 

Mr. FRANKS. What are DTRA plans to support EMP mitigated DOD telecommunications between DCIs and central NORTHCOM command? What are DTRA plans 

to support EMP mitigated DOD telecommunications between DCIs in event of nationwide EMP, including supporting signal regeneration/repeater stations across the 

Nation (every 40 to 50 miles) that boost decreasing signal strength using electric 

power that may likely be disabled? 

Ms. DURAND. Congressman, this question should be directed to U.S. Northern 

Command for defense against incoming missile or airborne threats. 

Mr. FRANKS. To enable logistic support to DCIs from civilian infrastructures, what 

challenges must be overcome for civilian signal regeneration stations every 40 to 50 

miles nationwide to have on-site EMP mitigated long-term/renewable power to enable these stations to pass telecommunications signals to and from DCIs to such civilian infrastructure? 

How does DTRA intend to ensure DOD domestic communications between DCIs 

can travel distances if the commercial regeneration/repeater stations nationwide are 

disabled either due to: a. The direct effects of an EMP destroying the electronic systems of such regeneration stations? b. The loss of electric power from commercial 

sources? 

Would NDAA 2018 legislation requiring certain rulemaking by the Federal Communications Commission regarding civilian regeneration stations be helpful regarding logistic support asked about in the questions above? 

Since DCIs receive logistic support in terms of food, fuel for vehicles and air 

transport, equipment supplies from across the Nation, how does DTRA envision this 

need being met as far as the suppliers of these logistic needs having the electrical 

power and telecommunications to facilitate meeting these needs? 

Ms. DURAND. Congressman, the Department of Homeland Security is the most appropriate organization to address this question. 

Mr. FRANKS. What civilian telecommunications support might the NDAA 2018 require to help ensure civilian infrastructure providing logistic support to DCIs have 

needed telecommunications? 

Ms. DURAND. Congressman, the Department of Homeland Security is the most appropriate organization to address this question. 

Mr. FRANKS. Should NDAA 2018 require expanding the entities served by the 

First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) to include as deserving of priority access DCIs, other national security and homeland security personnel and personnel 

providing critical logistic support to DCIs, explicitly require FirstNet homeland security, national security, and civilian sites providing logistic support to them to be 

adequately mitigated against EMP—and require any FirstNet contracts not doing 

so to be re-negotiated or cancelled and replaced by contracts providing such support? 

FirstNet has defied and ignored its Congressional mandate and defied its requirement that it adequately ‘‘address special considerations for areas or regions with 
80 

unique homeland security or national security needs.address special considerations’’ 

[47 U.S.C. 1426(b)(2)(D)] 

In order to increase the likelihood that civilian logistic support will be available 

to DTRA DCIs in the event of a nationwide EMP, should NDAA 2018 require 

FirstNet’s National Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN) to meet its mandate, including mitigation against EMP? 

In the NDAA for 2017, PL 114–328, Sec. 1913(a)(2) it established 6 U.S.C. 

121(d)(26)(A)(i) which states, that DHS is to provide 6 months after December 23, 

2016, ‘‘a recommended strategy to protect and prepare the critical infrastructure of 

the homeland against threats of EMP and GMD.’’ 

Does this recent legislation justify the NDAA requiring FirstNet to explicitly ensure the security and resiliency of the NPSBN against EMP? 

Does DTRA see it within its scope to coordinate with FirstNet to identify the feasibility, installation impacts, maintenance, training, and associated costs to implement the issues above? 

Ms. DURAND. Congressman, the Department of Homeland Security is the most appropriate organization to address this question. 

Mr. FRANKS. Would it be helpful that federally owned electric power generation, 

transmission, and distribution assets be required by NDAA 2018 legislation to make 

their assets EMP mitigated so that civilian supporting infrastructure in such areas 

can better support DCIs? 

Ms. DURAND. Congressman, the Department of Homeland Security is the most appropriate organization to address this question. 

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