OCCASIONALPAPERS

Cooperatively Enhancing Military

Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

Seongwhun Cheon

Senior Research Fellow

Korea Institute for National Unification

Seoul, South Korea

COOPERATIVE MONITORING CENTER
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April 1999

Cooperatively Enhancing Military

Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

Seongwhun Cheon

Senior Research Fellow

Korea Institute for National Unification

Seoul, South Korea

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/10

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

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4
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency

on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

Abstract

Discovering new ways to reduce military tension and build peace on the Korean peninsula has

become a dominant security agenda item in Northeast Asia. This report is a study of how to

cooperatively enhance military transparency between North and South Korea based on a

conceptual framework of information production and exchange. After examining the current

situation in Korea, the report proposes a conceptual framework of enhancing military

transparency between the two Koreas. Four general information production and sharing activities

that can increase military transparency are identified. Key considerations that affect feasibility

and practicality of transparency measures on the Korean peninsula are presented.

Comprehensive, “detour,” and gradual approaches are emphasized. Constructive roles for a third

party and a hypothetical Korean Peninsula Transparency Enhancement Organization (KTEO) are

of particular interest. Finally, a comprehensive strategy to enhance military transparency is

proposed in two ways. First, a basic strategy consisting of a variety of concrete measures is

discussed with respect to the conceptual framework. Second, a five-stage integrated strategy is

presented that could enhance military transparency and build confidence between North and

South Korea in a coordinated way. The author emphasizes concrete measures for the first two

stages of enhancing military transparency.
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

ATMS

CBMS

CCEJ

CD

CM

CMC

CPUF

Cwc

DMZ

DPRK

GRIT

IAEA

INF

JMC

KEDO

KPA

KTEO

MFO

MIA

MND

MOMEP

NGO

NTM

OSD

0S1

OSIA

0ss

ROK

SALT

SFM

SSM

START

Us.

UNEF

UNSCOM

Acronyms

Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring System

confidence-building measures

Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice

cooperative demonstration

cooperative monitoring

Cooperative Monitoring Center

Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland

Chemical Weapons Convention

Demilitarized Zone

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction

International Atomic Energy Agency

Intermediate Nuclear Forces

Joint Military Commission

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

Korean People’s Army

Korean Peninsula Transparency Enhancement Organization

Multinational Force and Observers

Missing in Action

Ministry of National Defense

Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru

nongovernmental organization

national technical means

on-site devices

on-site inspection

On-Site Inspection Agency

on-site station

Republic of Korea

Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty

Sinai Field Mission

Sinai Support Mission

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

United States

unilateral demonstration

unilateral monitoring

United Nations Emergency Forces

United Nations Special Commission
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

Contents

ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................................. ..........0.. 5

ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................ .....,0..6

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................... 9

1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 13

. INCREASING POSSIBILITIES OF ARMS CONTROL ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA ........... 15

2.1 EXTERNALFACTORS........................................................................................................................... 15

2.1.1 Gradual Improvements of the DPRK.U.S. Relations ............................................................ IS

1!.1.2 Four-Party Talks ................................................................................................................... 15

;!.1.3 Two Koreas’ Memberships in the Conferenceon Disarmament........................................... 15

2.2 INTERNALFACTORS............................................................................................................................ 16

:!.2.1 Better Possibilities of Improving Inter-Korean Relations ..................................................... 16

;?.2.2 Disar~ment Desire from the Inside ..................................................................................... 17

3. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCING MILITARY TRANSPARENCY .............. 17

3.1 (CATEGORIZING INFORMAmONPRODUCTIONAC~~S .................................................................... 18

3.1.1 Unilateral Monitoring (UM) ................................................................................................. 19

3.1.2 Cooperative Monitoring (CM) ............................................................................................... 19

3.1.3 Unilateral Demonstration (UD) ............................................................................................ 20

3.1.4 Cooperative Demonstration (CD) ......................................................................................... 21

3.2 ANEXAMPB:THESmAIEmERmNCE............................................................................................... 22

4. KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR ENHANCING MILITARY TRANSPARENCY ON THE

KORIEAN PENINSULA — A SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 24

5. A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO ENHANCE MILITARY TRANSPARENCY ON THE

KORIEAN PENINSULA ........................................................................................................................... 24

5.1 ]3ASICS~A~GY ................................................................................................................................24

.$.1.1 Unilateral Monitoring (UM) .................................................................................................24

5.1.2 Cooperative Monitoring (CM) ...............................................................................................25

5.1.3 Unilateral Demonstration (UD) ............................................................................................3O

:i.1.4 Cooperative Demonstration (CD) .........................................................................................32

5.2 AN INTEGRATEDSTRATEGY................................................................................................................ 33

5.2.1 Stage One: Initial Transparency ..........................................................................................34

5.2.2 Stage Two: Strengthened Transparency ...............................................................................35

5.2.3 Stage Three: Arms Control ...................................................................................................36

5.2.4 Stage Four: Arms Reduction ................................................................................................37

.5.2.5 Stage Five: peace ful Coexistence .........................................................................................38

6. CON~CLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 38

APPENDIX: KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR ENHANCING MILITARY TRANSPARENCY ON THE

KOREAN PENINSULA ........................................................................................................................... 41

1. POSSIEHUHES OF.~Y~LUCT~CE ............................................................................................. 41

2. ASYMMETRIES OFTHETwo KOREAS’INFORMATIONCOLLECTIONCAPABILITIES .................................. 41

3. LJNRAGEOFMILITARYANDNONMILITARYAFFAIRS.............................................................................. 42

4. “DETOUR”APPROACHFROMNONMDJTARYTOMILITARYAWARS....................................................... 43

5. INCREMENTAL ANDS~P.WSE &PROACH............................................................................................. 43

7
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

6. THECONSTRUCTIVE ROLEOFATHIRDPARTY....................................................................................... 44

7. GEOGRAPHICAL ANDPOSTURALCHARACTERISTICS OFTHEKOREANPENINSULA.................................. 44

8. COMBINATIONFTECHMCAL~DHUM~EWMENTS.......................................................................... 45

9. TACITACCEPTANCEOFNATIONALTECHNICALMEANS......................................................................... 46

10. POSSIBLEUSEOFCWmWSINS~ADOFMmITARYPERSON~L.......................................................... 47

7. ABOUT THE AUTHOR .............................................................................................................................. 48

DISTRIBUTION ................................................................................................................................................ 49

Tables

Table 1. Framework for Individual Information Production Activities ................................. 21

Table 2. Comparison of the Two Koreas’ Information Collection Capabilities .................... 4~

z

8
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency

on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

Executive Summary

Military transparency is the level of knowledge that parties have regarding other parties’

intentions, behaviors, policies, and postures in the military area. The core of increasing military

transparency is the production and exchange of information regarding the objects of

transparency. Efforts to enhance transparency encompass: (1) information collection activities by

one party regarding the other, (2) information revelation activities by one party regarding itself,

(3) cooperation in the production and exchange of information, and (4) information assistance

activities by a third party.

We can divide the information production or exchange activities that can increase

military transparency into four categories, as follows. Unilateral monitoring (UM) is carried out

independently by the parties. Cooperative monitoring (CM) is an information collection activity

performed by two or more parties acting together. Unilateral demonstration (UD) is an

information revelation activity carried out unilaterally by one party. Cooperative demonstration

(CD) is an information revelation activity by one party that incorporates the interests and

concerns of the other party. In addition, effective transparency activities require both concrete

information gathering measures and incentives for adopting them.

The following considerations are important for implementing military transparency

measures on the Korean peninsula:

Considering the sensitivities of the military issues and the tensions between the two Koreas’

armecl forces, efforts to increase military transparency may face opposition from bothl sides’

military authorities.

Militam-y affairs between the two Koreas are so tightly entangled with other bilateral or

international affairs in political, diplomatic, and economic areas that they can hardly be

settled with only a military-centered approach. A comprehensive approach involving broad

issues in various areas is more plausible.

Because little experience exists in bilateral military cooperation, it may be wise to take a

detour approach. At the beginning, the two sides might better focus on nonmilitary affairs

where they find common interests, rather than try to resolve the sensitive military issues

immediately.

In a tense relationship, an incremental approach in military affairs is particularly important

because any ambiguity or misunderstanding can easily increase tension. An initial

negotiating strategy may need to put more emphasis on “agreement and implementation,”

rather than on “importance of the content” of the measures.

9
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

. A third party can play a constructive role. As an alternative to a single country, a consortium

similar to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), with the aim of

enhancing military transparency on the Korean peninsula, might be established. This

hypothetical organization is dubbed Korean Peninsula Transparency Enhancement

Organization (KTEO).

Even with the existing tension and mistrust, North and South Korea could start

implementing preliminary measures to enhance military transparency. Notably, political and

financial burdens of the measures should be small enough that the two sides would be willing to

participate. Successful implementation of these measures could help make a breakthrough in the

bilateral relations and pave a way for further reducing military tension.

The incremental approach considers transparency measures in five stages. The first stage

of initial measures merely initiates information exchange and confidence building. Actual arms

control and arms reduction measures would be possible in later stages. A variety of measures

would be appropriate for the initial transparency stage, as listed below. The measures are

categorized by the four activity types in the conceptual framework.

Cooperative Monitoring (CM)

● Joint use of commercial satellites in nonmilitary topic areas:

— Investigate land use, water management, and environmental pollution on the Korean

peninsula in a joint effort of the two Koreas, possibly led by nongovernmental

organizations from the two sides.

. Joint use of monitoring equipment (on-site devices) and data exchange in nonmilitary areas:

— Exchange of data regarding environmental protection, weather, or agriculture

– Exchange of seismic data for scientific purposes

— Use of tracking and monitoring technology (such as the Authenticated Tracking and

Monitoring System, or ATMS) for tracking Kumgang Mountain tour cruise ships as they

transit between South and North Korea

. Invite military personnel from both Koreas to observe the Multinational Force and Observers

(MFO) in the Sinai peninsula or the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP) in

South America. U.S./Russian sites like Magna in Utah and Votkinsk in Russia might also be

potential destinations for learning about CM activity.

. Perform pilot operations of CM equipment for the DMZ by a third party at a neutral location

with similar geographical and weather conditions to the Korean peninsula.

– Invite the two Koreas to inspect and discuss the results.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Militay Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

Unilateral Demonstration (UD)

● The sunshine policy is important for strengthening North Korea’s incentives to engage in UD.

. South Korea could continue already implemented UD measures:

— Publish a defense white paper

— Reveal defense budget

— Reveal postures and structures (organization, line of command, personnel management,

military facilities, defense capabilities, etc.),

— Notify the North of major military exercises, movements, and their annual schedules

— Invite North Korea to observe major military exercises and movements

● South Korea could also take the following new UD measures:

— Reveal defense policies and doctrines

— Invite the Korean People’s Army (KPA) to visit certain Republic of Korea (ROK) units

Cooperative Demonstration (CD)

●

●

●

●

Invite military officials of North and South Korea to observe European Open Skies flights.

The cooperative tests between Hungary and Romania are perhaps most relevant to the two

Koreas.

Perform limited Open Skies flights for environmental assessment, e.g., flood clamage

assessment over nonmilitary areas, possibly led by nongovernmental organizations of the two

Korea.s.

Discuss mutual security concerns. North Korea’s weapon-related technology developments,

the no-nuclear-weapon status of the U.S. forces in South Korea, and the role of the U.S.

forces on the Korean peninsula can be possible agenda items.

Establish hot-line communication channels between the two military authorities.

After successfully completing the above transparency measures, North and South Korea

can continue the transparency process by adopting militarily more meaningful measures. Some

measures will be entirely new in character, while others are extensions of those already

implemented. At later stages, arms control and arms reduction measures can be feasible, based

on the confidence built in these first, very modest measures.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

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12
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency

on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

1. Introduction

The year 1999 is the 51st year since two separate governments were established on the

Korean peninsula and the 49th year since the start of the Korean War. The relations between the

two Koreas have been antagonistic, with a mixture of conflicts and occasional cooperation.

During the Cold War era, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic

of Korea (ROK), as spearheads of communism and democracy, respectively, competed with each

other on the front line of the ideological war. Ultimately, South Korea surpassed North Korea as

the Soviet Union and other communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed.

However, there were periods when the two sides had a modest degree of cooperation. In

the early 1970s, the mid-1980s, and the early 1990s, North-South Korean dialogue was very

active. During these periods, the two sides took steps for political reconciliation, positive actions

for humanitarian purposes (such as allowing separated families to visit their hometown), and

even exchanged cultural and sports visits. There was some economic cooperation as well. On

the other hand, bilateral dialogue on military affairs began only in the 1990s. Most notably,

Seoul and Pyongyang, in December 1991, signed the Agreement on Reconciliation,

Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation, in short, the basic agreement. In the nonaggression

part of the basic agreement, the two sides agreed, in principle, to negotiate on military confidence

building and arms-reduction measures. The North-South Joint Military Commission (JMC) was

established for that purpose. The JMC agreed to build a hot line between the two sides’ military

authorities. Unfortunately, the agreement was not implemented because of the tension resulting

from North Korea’s nuclear program. Since 1993, there have been no military talks between the

two sides.

For the pastfew years, external and internal environments have improved for reducing

military tension on the Korean peninsula. Externally, the bilateral relations between the DPRK

and the U.S. have slowly improved since the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. In addition, the

four-party peace talks are going forward and the two Koreas have become more familiar with

arms control negotiations by joining the Conference on Disarmament. Internally, the two Koreas

have changed. In the North, after a lengthy mourning period for the late Kim Ii-Sung, his son,

Kim Jong-11, debuted as the leader of the nation in September 1998. The anticipated stabilization

of the North Korean regime could reduce its fear of being absorbed by South Korea and thus

make it more confident and willing to talk with South Korean authorities. In the South, President

Kim DaeJung has begun his term with more pragmatic views on the relationship with North

Korea. The new government proclaimed a “sunshine policy” with three principles toward North

Korea: (1) it will not tolerate military aggression from the North, (2) it will not pursue an

absorption strategy, and (3) it will actively promote exchanges and cooperation. Therefore, it is

now more likely for the two sides to improve bilateral relations than in the past several years.

13
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

On the other hand, North and South Korea have never had in-depth negotiating

experiences in arms control. South Korea’s basic assumption for the bilateral dialogue has been

“nonmilitary affairs first, military affairs later,” meaning that, considering the sensitivities of

military issues, the two sides can approach that area only after mutual confidence is built by

cooperating in the political, economic, and social areas. Contrary to these traditional views, this

report argues that reducing tensions by enhancing military transparency can help improve

relations in other areas.

Observing that arms control issues will become important bilateral agenda items in the

near future, this report presents a strategy to enhance transparency in military intentions,

behaviors, policies, and postures with emphasis on mutual cooperation. 1 Military transparency

measures can be divided into unilateral transparency-enhancing measures and cooperative

transparency-enhancing measures. This report proposes a comprehensive transparencyenhancing strategy that incorporates both unilateral and cooperative measures within the

framework of mutual cooperation.2 Some measures can be immediately implemented without

formal agreements. Other measures rely on carrying out existing or new agreements; in this case,

these measures become verification measures. All the measures can be regarded as confidencebuilding measures (CBMS) since enhancing military transparency can lead to increasing mutual

confidence.

After examining the current situation in Korea in Section 2, the report proposes, in

Section 3, a conceptual framework for enhancing military transparency between the two Koreas.

Four conceptual information production and sharing activities that can increase military

transparency are identified. In Section 4, key considerations that affect feasibility and practicality

of transparency measures on the Korean peninsula are presented; these are elaborated in the

appendix. Comprehensive, “detour,” and incremental approaches are emphasized. In Section 5, a

comprehensive strategy to enhance military transparency is proposed in two ways. First, a basic

strategy consisting of a variety of concrete measures is discussed with respect to the conceptual

framework. The potential constructive role of a third party or a proposed Korean Peninsula

Transparency Enhancement Organization (KTEO) is of particular interest. Second, an integrated

strategy is presented (using five stages of arms control between North and South Korea) to

implement those measures in a coordinated way. We will highlight those concrete measures that

appear to be feasible in the beginning stages of the integrated strategy.

‘ Cooperation in international relations is a phenomenon arising from their interdependent nature. According to

Steve Weber, “Cooperation occurs in international relations when states adjust their policies in a coordinated way,

such that each state’s efforts to pursue its interests facilitate rather than hinder the efforts of other states to pursue

their own interests.” Steve Weber, Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 199 1), p. 6. In short, cooperation is goal-oriented behavior by concerned parties to recognize their

mutual interests and to adjust their policies in order to achieve the interests.

2 Some unilateral measures can be jointly performed for mutual cooperation or can be initiated by one of the parties

in order to foster cooperative environments to induce similar responses from the other party.

14
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

2. Increasing Possibilities of Arms Control on the Korean

Peninsula

There is a consensus that it is essential to limit and reduce the military forces of North

and South Korea in order to reduce tension between them. Without proper control of the armed

forces, real progress in sustaining peaceful relations cannot be expected. Thus, as the efforts to

build peace on the peninsula grow, added importance will be given to arms control and

disarmament. Recently, several important external and internal factors indicate that arms control

in Korea is becoming more likely.

2.1 External Factors

2.1.1 Gradual Improvements of the DPRK-U.S. Relations

Since the signing of the Geneva Agreed Framework3 in October 1994, the DPRK and the

U.S. have made slow progress in improving their relations. Based on the Agreed Framework, the

two sides have held various dialogues and taken positive steps in political, economic, and

military areas.

Ncmth Korean authorities have placed a high priority on improving relations with the U.S.

In proportion to the improvement of the bilateral relations with Washington, Pyongyang may

become confident of its survival and be willing to have formal dialogue with Seoul. Therefore,

improving relations between Washington and Pyongyang will be an important factor for reducing

tension and realizing arms control between the two Koreas.

2.1.2 Four-Party Talks

The ongoing four-party talks will become a forum where the parties can discuss arms

control issues on the Korean peninsula. South Korea and the U.S. originally proposed the fourparty talks in April 1996. There were four general meetings as of January 1998. The four parties

agreed that establishment of a peace system and reduction of military tension were the twc) major

purposes of the talks. When the four-party talks begin to negotiate on detailed measures to

reduce tension on the peninsula, the military transparency measures proposed in this report could

be possible agenda items.

2.1.3 Two Koreas’ Memberships in the Conference on Disarmament

The two Koreas have joined the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. This will have a

positive influence on the bilateral arms control environment by providing them with

opportunities to participate in the international arms control negotiations and thus to become

more acquainted with arms control in general.4

3 The Agreed Framework froze the alleged North Korean nuclear weapon program in exchange for two light-water

reactors ancl various other measures.

4 North and South Korea joined the Conference on Disarmament on June 17, 1996.

15
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

Many negotiating agenda items at the Conference on Disarmament are related to security

policies of the two Koreas. Regular participation in the negotiations and decision making at the

forum will help officials of the two countries have better understandings of arms control and

encourage them to make policies in line with international arms control trends.

2.2 Internal Factors

2.2.1 Better Possibilities of Improving Inter-Korean Relations

As previously mentioned, both of the two Koreas have gone through internal changes and

thus, the inter-Korean dialogue has better prospects than in the past several years. When the

dialogue resumes fully, arms control will be a key agenda item. This report presumes that North

Korea is in the process of gradual changes and will accept military arrangements with South

Korea if they are consistent with DPRK national interests.

Based on the three principles of the sunshine policy, the Kim Dae-Jung administration

has taken such policy steps as promoting bilateral trade, allowing for tourism on Kumgang

Mountain, and strengthening humanitarian aid to North Korea. On August 15, 1998, President

Kim Dae-Jung proposed to North Korea the formation of a permanent dialogue mechanism

represented by both sides’ ministerial-level officials.

On the other hand, North Korea’s policy toward South Korea seems less positive than the

South expected. In August, Pyongyang asked Seoul to change its policies regarding the presence

of U.S. forces in South Korea, the National Security Law, and joint military exercises with

foreign countries,5 and rejected President Kim’s August 15th proposal. Nevertheless, North

Korea has made some policy changes in foreign relations, especially in the economic area. While

the Juche doctrineb continues to dominate thinking, the DPRK government has demonstrated a

certain degree of pragmatism as shown in the establishment of the free trade zone, in changes in

the cooperative farm sector to introduce stronger material incentives, and in its request for

assistance from the outside.7 In September 1998, North Korea changed its constitution and

institutionalized some already existing market-economy elements in its society, for example,

expanding the scope of personal property and partially allowing for individual businesses.8

Within this framework, they also accepted South Korea’s policy of separating politics and

economy by pursuing limited cooperation with South Korean companies, e.g., the Hyundai

Group’s Kumgang Mountain tour business.

It maybe premature for observers to expect that policy changes on one side will create a

prompt opportunity for improving bilateral relations after the ordeal of the past few years.

Patience and enduring efforts from both sides are required. In terms of having new opportunities

5 Korean Central News Agency, August 20, 1998.

b The .Iuche doctrine emphasizes self-reliance, based on revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, and incorporating

“speed battles” for rapid industrialization – Janes Intelligence Review, June 1996, p. 272.

7 International Monetary Fund, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Fact-Finding Report, November 12, 1997,

~. 14.

National Security Planning Agency’s Report to the Intelligence Committee at the ROK Parliament, Joongang Zlbo,

November 7, 1998.

16
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Cornprehensive Approach

for North-.South Korean dialogue, internal rearrangements and stability of the North Korean

regime is expected to produce positive effects. With the official emergence of the Kim Jong-11

regime, North Korea will escape from the fear of absorption by South Korea and may become

more willing to talk with its southern counterpart. Although North Korea’s response has been

less than forthcoming, the ROK government seems to be committed to its sunshine policy..9 It is

also noted[ that President Kim is advocating the establishment of a regional security forum in

Northeast Asia,10 which is another positive sign for arms control. Observing these developments,

it seems more likely that bilateral relations will improve, compared to the last few years.

2.2.2 Disarmament Desire from the Inside

Economic difficulties in both Koreas have made the authorities of the two governments

give genuine consideration to the possibility of reducing defense budgets and armaments.

Although North Korea’s traditional idea of reducing both sides’ armed forces to 100,000 troops

may be rh~etorical, the economic hardship in the North must have made its authorities consider

cutting defense expenditures. In South Korea, the administration is already shrinking the clefense

budget.

Furthermore, nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) are leading public debates on

disarmament. For example, on May 21, 1998, a Declaration Calling for Peaceful Disarmament

on the Korean Peninsula was issued with the sponsorship of one of the most prominent NGOS in

the South~: Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ). The declaration argued that

disarmament is a necessity, not a choice, and asked for the following three steps: (1) North and

South Korea implement disarmament measures under the basic agreement, (2) the two sides carry

out conficlence-building measures within the four-party peace talks, and (3) the ROK military cut

its budget by managing its resources effectively. It is a very unusual event for such a respected

NGO to call for disarmament measures in South Korea.

3. A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Military Transparency

There is no authoritative academic definition of what transparency means.l ] Even

scholars working on transparency have differences in their defh-titions. For example, Nancy

Gallagher views transparency as “knowing what other countries are actually doing when they

claim to be in compliance.”12 Ann Florini defines transparency as “the provision of information

by an actor about its own activities and capabilities to other actors.”13 Ronald Mitchell describes

9 For example, on November 20, 1998, amid the disturbances made by North Korea’s suspected underground

nuclear site and the spy ship that was repelled by the South Korean navy, President Kim Dae-Jung reconfumed that

his administration will keep pursuing a sunshine policy. Yocmgang Zlbo, November 21, 1998.

‘0 For exampIe, in his address at the Beijing University on November 12, 1998, President Kim proposed to establish

a multilateral security forum among the two Koreas, the U. S., China, Russia, and Japan. Korea Herald, November

13, 1998. There is growing interest in this issue in the U. S., too. Interview with Katy Oh, The Institute for Defense

Analyses, December 17, 1998.

11 Discussions with Ronald Mitchell of University of Oregon, October 11, 1998.

12 Nancy Gallagher, “The Politics of Verification: Why ‘How Much?’ Is Not Enough,” Contemporary Securi~

Policy, vol. 18, no. 2 (August 1997), pp. 139-140.

13Ann Florini, “A New Role for Transparency,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 18, no. 2 (August 1997), p. 51.

17
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

promoting transparency as “fostering the acquisition, analysis, and dissemination of regular,

prompt, and accurate regime-relevant information.”14 A major reason for the lack of a commonly

agreed upon definition of transparency may be that the history of research on this subject is very

short. Only recently, in-depth academic research has begun on transparency.

Transparency is the openness or the levels of knowledge that parties have regarding other

parties’ intentions, behaviors, policies, and postures. In this report, transparency is more broadly

defined to incorporate the above mentioned viewpoints. That is, increasing transparency is

defined as eliminating uncertainties and making ambiguities clear through:

● information collection activities by one party regarding the other,

. information revelation activities by one party regarding itself,

. cooperative production and sharing of information, and

. information assistance activities by a third party.

Transparency-enhancing measures can perform four functions. First, they reduce one

party’s uncertainties regarding the intentions, behaviors, policies, and postures of the other patty

and thus reduce chances of misunderstanding and misjudgment. Second, they can provide time

for early warning, response, and damage control if a violation does occur, Third, by moderating

the crisis and preventing conflict, they will help manage a hostile relationship in a more stable

way. Fourth, they can facilitate political reconciliation by reducing tension and building mutual

confidence.

The core of increasing military transparency is the production and exchange of

information regarding the objects of transparency. In this section, we mainly focus on the

conceptual framework of information production activities of the two sides. In Section 5,

potential concrete measures are presented within this framework.

3.1 Categorizing Information Production Activities

In this report, we designate the party desiring information as the seeker and the

respondent party as the respondent. Information production activities are then distinguished

according to the following two concepts.

First, depending on who is the information producer, monitoring and demonstration are

distinguished. Monitoring is an information collection activity performed by the seeker

regarding the other side (the respondent) either with or without cooperation of the respondent.

Demonstration is an information revelation activity carried out by the respondent to provide

information about itself to the seeker. 15

14 Ronald Mitchell, “Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes,” International Studies

(#un-terly, vol. 42 (1998), p. 109.

The conceptual distinction between monitoring and demonstration is based on Kenneth Abbott’s viewpoint in

“’Trust but Verify’: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements,”

Cornell International Law’ Journal, vol. 26 (Winter 1993), p. 4. Instead of Abbott’s terms (verification and

18
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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Second, according to how information is produced, cooperation is discemecl from

unilateral action. Cooperation means that the respondent cooperates in the information collection

activities of the seeker. Conversely, the seeker cooperates in the information revelation activities

of the respondent. For example, a promise not to interfere with an information collection activity

is a form of cooperation that can help the seeker. On the other hand, a unilateral action means

that there is no cooperative exchange between the seeker and respondent.

Based on this conceptualization, four information production activities can be identified

in the bilateral relationship: (1) unilateral monitoring (UM), (2) cooperative monitoring (CM),lG

(3) unilateral demonstration (UD), and (4) cooperative demonstration (CD). In addition,

effective transparency activities require both a mechanism to increase knowledge17 and

incentives to participate. 18Based on this conceptual analysis, the four information production

activities are explained as follows.

3.1.1 Unilateral Monitoring (UM)

Unilateral monitoring is carried out independently by the seeker. Among the four

activities, UM is the most widely performed national activity. Intelligence gathering by means of

national technical means (NTM) is a UM activity.

UM is driven by the natural asymmetry of information between the parties where one

party has good knowledge of itself but has uncertainties regarding the other side. The incentives

are increased in times of tension, particularly when societies are very secretive.

3.1.2 Cooperative Monitoring (CM)

Cooperative monitoring is an information collection activity performed by the seeker and

the respondent working together, usually based on an agreement. There are various CM

measures]s to increase the knowledge level of the seeker. They can be classified into two groups,

as follows:

1. Measures that directly increase information collection ability include various

formats of on-site inspection (0S1), manned on-site station (0SS), unmanned on-site

devices (OSD), and cooperative aerial inspection.

assurance), this report uses monitoring and demonstration because they are thought to be proper terms that carry

more precise meanings.

16 Cooperative monitoring in this report is defined more narrowly than the concept used in the Cooperative

Monitoring Center (CMC), Sandia National Laboratories. The CMC regards cooperative monitoring more broadly,

incorporating not only CM but also some aspects of UD and CD described in this report.

17 Ronald Mitchell used the term “capacity” instead of knowledge in “Sources of Transparency: Information

Systems in International Regimes,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 42 (1998), p. 116. But “capacity” can be

confused with the seeker’s technical and human capacity in the case of monitoring.

18 Ronald Mitchell, ibid., pp. 116, 118, 121.

‘9 In this report, a particular information production activity is distinguished from the specific measures that consist

of that activity. For example, “UM’ refers broadly to the unilateral monitoring activity while a “UM measure” is the

detailed measure to provide the information.

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2. Measures that enhance the “monitorability” of objects include coordination of objects in order to facilitate monitoring,20 passive and active noninterference measures,21

identification measures,22 tamper-indicating tags, and location measures .23

Several potential applications of CM technologies in Korea are proposed in the concrete

measures of Section 5.

The underlying motivation for participating in CM is to reduce tension, suspicion, and

uncertainties in order to improve security. Given the inherent information asymmetry, as

situations become more tense or as countries are more prone to secrecy, CM becomes more

important; at the same time, encouragement to engage in CM by third parties becomes more

important. The role of a third party can vary from simple encouragement to provision of detailed

rewards for participation in CM. Of course, careful design of CM measures is necessary to avoid

revelation of information not included in the agreed CM.

3.1.3 Unilateral Demonstration (UD)

Unilateral demonstration is an information revelation activity carried out unilaterally by

the respondent and thus assists the seeker. Generally, there is no formal agreement between the

two sides. Examples of UD are publication of a defense white paper or other documents that

may contain the defense budget, force structure and policies, or major weapon test data. Other

measures could include invitation of militmy personnel to visit military units, or notification and

observation of major military exercises and movements.

The incentives for revealing information are primarily to defuse a tense situation through

reducing an adversary’s suspicions or to encourage reciprocal actions from the other side.

International measures to help maintain domestic acceptance of UD can be very important.

There are other considerations as well. The recipient can compensate the respondent for his

efforts or refrain from criticizing what is revealed in order to encourage further UD activity .24

Third parties can offer important support or encouragement, too.

‘o For example, a complete ban of certain items or activities is a form of coordination of information collection

objects that makes it easier to monitor than a partial ban.

21 For instance, all major arms control agreements after the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 stipulate that neither

party will interfere with each other’s NTM (passive) or deliberately act to conceal restricted activities from

monitoring (active).

‘2 For example, SALT II stipulates “functionally related observable differences” to distinguish heavy bombers that

are permitted to carry missiles from other large aircraft.

23 For instance, the INF Treaty designates specific areas for dismantling treaty-limited items.

24 For example, International Atomic Energy Agency did not criticize President de Klerk of South Africa when he

acknowledged the existence of his country’s nuclear weapons program. Instead, the IAEA was patient enough to

cooperate with South Africa for three years to clarify the truthfulness of de Klerk’s statement and to confirm that the

country halted the program. Rodney Jones and Mark McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in

Maps and Charts, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), p. 243.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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3.1.4 Cooperative Demonstration (CD)

Cooperative demonstration is an information revelation activity by the respondent that

incorporates the interests and concerns of the seeker. CD adds cooperation to UD. CD can make

a greater contribution to confidence building than UD since the respondent attempts to meet the

needs of the seeker. CD may also have the effect of institutionalizing UD measures.

Many of the CD measures are realized when UD measures are implemented mutually by

both sides. That is, unilateral notification is replaced by mutual notification and unilateral

revelation of information by mutual revelation. In addition, CD can include Open Skies

measures,, use of hot-line communication channels, mutual notification of dangerous events,

establishment of consultative mechanisms, and discussion of mutual security concerns.

The respondent’s incentives to reveal information are basically the same as in UD except

the two sides, based on reciprocity, exchange the same information with each other. Thus, each

side gains as much as it loses. Moreover, cooperation assures that the information exchanged is

relevant to both parties’ concerns.

The framework for individual information production activities is summarized in Table 1.

Here we Icmphasize the measures to increase knowledge about the objects in comparison to the

incentives that might encourage participation. Some incentives may derive from a desire for an

improved security situation. Other incentives, as noted above, may come from third-party

encouragement and compensatory support. Feasible measures for Korea will be introduced in

detail in the discussion of Section 5.

Table 1. Framework for Individual Information Production Activities

Increase Knowledge Level Incentives

UM . Develop NTM capabilities . Inherent information asymmetry

● Tense relations

● Secretive policies

CM . Increase information collection . Improved security through better

ability knowledge

— Various formats of 0S1 . Inherent information asymmetry

— Manned 0SS, unmanned OSD ● Tense relations

– Cooperative aerial inspection ● Secretive policies

● Enhance monitorability of ● Third-party encouragement

information collection objects . Reassurance against collection of

— Coordination of objects collateral information

— Passive/active noninterference

measures

— Identification measures

– Tamper-indicating tags

– Location measures

Continued on the next page...

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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Table 1. Framework for Individual Information Production Activities, continued

Increase Knowledge Level Incentives

UD . The respondent mostly knows about . Improve security through reducing

itself adversary’s suspicions

. Encourage respondent’s reciprocal

UD by seeker’s UD

. Compensate for losses from

demonstration, if any

– Third-party compensation may

be important

. Refrain from criticizing any

anomalies revealed from demonstration

CD ● Increase the respondent’s ability to . Basically the same as in UD

choose better objects for . Same demonstration measures

information revelation carried out, based on reciprocity

3.2 An Example: The Sinai Experience

The peace-building process followed by Egypt and Israel in the Sinai peninsula is a

successful example in which various information production activities were performed in a

mutually reinforcing way to improve military transparency and build confidence between the two

parties.25 After the October War in 1973, Egypt and Israel entered into the process by signing the

Sinai Separation of Forces Agreement in January 1974 and the Sinai Interim Agreement in

September 1975. They gradually enlarged the buffer zone and improved transparency and, based

on the trust built, finally signed the peace treaty in March 1979.

In the peace-building process, the role of a third party was critical. The United Nations

(UN) dispatched UN Emergency Forces II (UNEF II) to perform the peace-keeping mission in

1974. UNEF II carried out on-site inspections and patrols in the disengagement zones. In 1975

the U.S. established the Sinai Support Mission (SSM) and its operating arm, the Sinai Field

Mission (SFM), to fully participate in verifying the implementation of the agreements. SFM was

responsible for ground sensors and on-site inspections, while the U.S. Air Force also performed

independent reconnaissance flights. After the peace treaty was signed, the Multinational Force

and Observers (MFO) was established in 1981 to supervise the treaty implementation. The roles

25 For details on the Sinai experience, refer to Mohamed Abdel

Field Marshall E1-Gamasy of Egypt (The American University

Ghani E1-Gamasy, The

in Cairo Press, 1993);

October War: Memoirs of

Brian Mandell. The Sinai

Experience: Lessons in A4ultimethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management (Ottawa: Department of

External Affairs, Canada, 1987); Michael Vannoni, Sensors in the Sinai: A Precedent for Regional Cooperative

Monitoring, SAND96-2574 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Sandia National Laboratories, reprinted June 1998).

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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played by UNEF II and SFM were transferred to MFO. Currently, the MFO consists of 1,896

troops and civilians from 11 countries.2G

Both Egypt and Israel had strong incentives for monitoring because of the need for

information in this hostile situation. The UM measures the two sides performed were (1) to

maintain national surveillance stations in the buffer zone, and (2) to operate other NTM tools,

including aerial reconnaissance flights.

The CM measures in the Sinai peninsula were facilitated by the active participation of the

third parties: UNEF II, the U.S., and MFO. In particular, the U.S. did not spare its efforts to

provide technical, human, and financial support. For instance, the U.S. constructed a national

surveillance station in the buffer zone for Egypt. To compensate for the withdrawal of troops

and for th~eacceptance of cooperative monitoring, the U.S. provided Israel with various political,

economic, and military rewards .27 The following CM measures were accepted in the Sinai to

increase knowledge:

. On-site inspections in the buffer zone by UNEF II, SFM, and MFO

● Operation of three watch stations and four unmanned ground sensor fields by SFM

. Inspections of the two sides’ national surveillance stations by SFM

. Aerial inspection by the U.S. and MFO

E{:ypt and Israel received the same information from these measures. It was also a CM

measure for the two sides’ liaison officials to accompany UNEF II personnel in carrying out

inspections.

CD played a part too. The two countries operated a Joint Commission and a Liaison

Office sy>tem to resolve compliance problems and to communicate.

An important lesson of the Sinai experience in terms of confidence building is that the

two hostile nations implemented a transparency enhancement regime successfully and could

move forward to building political confidence. Through successful implementation of the

agreements, the two sides were able to assure each other of their intentions, build confidence, and

finally reiich the peace treaty of 1979.

26 The Multinational Force and Observers, Annual Report of the Director General (Rome: MFO, January 1998),

f; 3.

From the U. S., Israel obtained such concessions as bilateral military cooperation, assurances on Israel’s c)il supply

and consut’tations in the event of Soviet military intervention in the Middle East. Michael Vannoni, Sensors in the

Sinai: A Precedent for Regional Cooperative Monitoring, p. 29.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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4. Key Considerations for Enhancing Military Transparency on the

Korean Peninsula — A Summary

There are ten key considerations in designing a strategy to enhance military transparency

in Korea. Only a strategy that takes the following into account will have both feasibility and

practicality: (1) possibilities of military reluctance, (2) asymmetries of the two Koreas’

information collection capabilities, (3) linkage of military and nonmilitary affairs, (4) “detour”

approach from nonmilitary to military affairs, (5) incremental and step-wise approach, (6) the

constructive role of a third party, (7) geographical and postural characteristics of the Korean

peninsula, (8) combination of technical and human elements, (9) tacit acceptance of national

technical means, (10) possible use of civilians instead of military personnel. See the Appendix

for a thorough discussion of each consideration. In particular, we draw upon comparisons with

the Sinai experience in discussing these considerations.

5. A Comprehensive Strategy to Enhance Military Transparency on

the Korean Peninsula

In Korea, the existing information production activities are unilateral. This report

proposes a comprehensive strategy to enhance military transparency between North and South

Korea. According to the reciprocal relationship, the two Koreas are both the seeker and the

respondent. The strategy is designed to increase transparency of each other’s intentions,

behaviors, policies, and postures through monitoring and demonstration activities.

Implementing the following basic strategy and integrated strategy could enhance military

transparency in Korea. The basic strategy is a set of measures to carry out individual information

production and exchange activities. The integrated strategy establishes several stages and

allocates measures into each stage according to feasibility. The integrated strategy identifies the

feasible measures that can be taken at each stage.

5.1 Basic Strategy

In order to implement information production and sharing activities in Korea, both

concrete information gathering measures and incentives for adopting them are needed. It is of

particular importance to note that incentives from third parties maybe necessary to encourage the

two sides to participate in the activities.

Furthermore, to promote cooperation, the South may develop experience with some UM

technologies (such as the use of commercial satellites and on-site devices for nonmilitary

purposes) in hopes of eventual cooperation with the North. The South may also implement

certain UD measures to encourage reciprocal cooperative response from the North.

5.1.1 Unilateral Monitoring (UM)

Under the information asymmetry relationship between the two Koreas, there are constant

incentives for each side to collect information about the other. Whenever bilateral tensions

increase, the two sides’ incentives for collecting information by UM increase.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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Tcl increase knowledge levels regarding each other, North and South Korea may need to

develop their own NTM capabilities. Lack of certain technical capabilities may lead the two

sides to ask for direct or indirect assistance from a third party. Providing equipment and helping

research and development of the technologies are examples of direct assistance. Providing a

regular or ad hoc supply of information is an example of indirect assistance.

Th~eROK has received indirect assistance from the U.S. However, direct assistance

seems to be limited.28 The DPRK had received indirect assistance from the Soviet Union before

the collapse of the USSR. As its relationship with Russia improves, it is possible that the

bilateral intelligence cooperation will resume. For example, the Russian space observation

center wa~ prompt to confirm Pyongyang’s statement that a satellite was launched on August 31,

1998.29 ‘rhis indicates that North Korea may have notified Russian officials in advance of

launching the satellite,30 which signals a possible increase of bilateral intelligence collabori~tion.

Bc~th Koreas can take advantage of the commercially available satellite images for

unilateral monitoring. Commercial satellites have already been used in such areas as the

environment, agriculture, and resource exploration. Some satellite images with good resolution

can be used to improve military transparency between North and South Korea. In acquiring

satellite images, the country of origin might be important. Purchasing images from countries that

do not have strong security ties with either of the two Koreas, such as India or France, may be

helpful in introducing cooperative elements into UM image analysis.

5.1.2

5.1.2.1

Cooperative Monitoring (CM)

Potential Cooperative Measures to Increase Knowledge Levels

Most CM measures to increase knowledge levels presume the existence of agreements on

limiting or reducing armaments. We cart divide the potential measures into two broad categories:

direct and indirect.

First, there are measures to directly enlarge one side’s information collection capabilities

in cooperation with the other side. On-site inspections, manned on-site stations, unmanned onsite devices, and cooperative aerial inspection are included in this category. Instead of military

personnel, civilians from both sides can be employed or a suggested Korean Peninsula

Transparency Enhartcement Organization (KTEO) can be used as a multilateral organization.

Each CM measure can have several formats depending on the level of cooperation and th~eycan

be implemented incrementally.

● On-site inspection (0S1): 0S1 can be performed by human observation of major military

facilities and equipment. Previously, North and South Korea have demanded 0S1 rights at

various military bases and other sites. Detail of scrutiny can be increased gradually.

28 Interview with the ROK MND ofilcials, October 28, 1998.

29 ITAR-TASS News Agency, BBC News, September 5, 1998.

30 For example, Vladimir Yakovlev, the head of the Russian rocket forces, was quoted as saying that Russia had

been notified about the launch in advance. However, other officials denied that there was prior notification. The

Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, NAPSNet Daily Report, August31, 1998.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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● On-site station (0SS,): The core of 0SS is the presence of human beings at the site. 0SS can

be developed initially by reorganizing the existing ground observation posts near and inside

the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In later stages of transparency, new 0SS can be deployed

along the boundaries of the DMZ and further inside each side’s territories.31

. On-site device (OSD,): Two formats can be considered in using OSD in the military area:

(1) monitoring anomalies in the DMZ and (2) monitoring the weapon storage facilities when

the two sides agree on the withdrawal of a certain number of major weapons from the front.

Initially, the first format may need encouragement from a third party because the two Koreas

are not accustomed to using monitoring technologies cooperatively. OSD will become an

important part in the process of operating 0SS as well.32

. Cooperative aerial inspection: Cooperative aerial inspection can develop in a series of

gradual stages depending upon the specific context of the agreement, for example,

deployments or reduction of armaments.

Second, measures can indirectly increase each side’s information collection capabilities

by improving the monitorability of agreed on objects. Coordination of observed objects,

passive/active noninterference measures, identification measures, tamper-indicating tags, and

location measures are all included in this category, as follows:

●

●

●

●

Coordination of observed objects: The two Koreas could select major offensive weapons,

instead of troops, as the relevant arms control objects. 33 That way, the agreement could focus

on objects that are more readily monitored.

Noninte@erence measures: A noninterference measure is to display major offensive

weapons outdoors at specified frequencies and durations per year. It also can be agreed not to

use camouflage or other concealments that can hamper monitoring by satellites or aircraft.

Identification measures: If North and South Korea agree on conversion of weapons to

peaceful purposes (e.g., converting aircraft fighters to trainers), identification measures can

be used to distinguish weapons permitted under the agreement from items converted to

nonmilitary purposes.

Tamper-indicating tags: Tamper-indicating tags can be attached to major offensive weapons

that have been removed from service but not destroyed. The inactive status can be checked

during 0S1. Tags can also be used on weapons remaining in service.

31 Because many of the major military facilities in North Korea are placed underground, South Korean military

officials put stronger emphasis on 0S1 and 0SS than NTM and cooperative aerial inspection. Interview with the

ROK military oftlcials, October 30, 1998.

31 Various OSDS are commercially available. In the Sinai, seismic, acoustic, magnetic, strain, and infrared sensors

and video cameras were used. Currently available technologies have superior capabilities to those used in the 1970s.

33 Troops have many disadvantages for monitoring. They are too numerous, difficult to identify with remote

monitoring, easy to hide, difficult to distinguish from civilians, and may move swiftly.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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. Location measures: An example of a location measure is to designate storage or destruction

sites for weapons withdrawn from the front. These sites could be made subject to 0S1.

Sensitivities to military affairs may lead to a “detour” approach, which uses the CM

technologies in the nonmilitary affairs first and later moves to the military affairs. The relevant

technologies are commercial satellites and OSDS. This means that a UM measure may be

converted into a CM measure by mutual agreement. Possible areas of cooperation am those

where the two sides have common concerns. Initial emphasis on environmental issues matches

common interests for both sides because environmental pollution and floods have emerged as

important social and economic problems.

● Joint use of commercial satellites:

– Environmental area: As an immediate step, NGOS34 in the two Koreas could investigate

the sources of environmental pollution on the Korean peninsula and North Korea’s

frequent floods, and to identi& cooperative solutions.

— Military area: Environmental cooperation with commercial satellite images might lead to

gradual military transparency exchanges. These might start as simple exchange of images

of major military facilities, exercises, and movements. Then, they could grow to joint

analysis of the images, joint education and training of technical personnel, and the

establishment of a center for joint analysis of the images at Panmunjom.

. Joint use of OSD and data exchange in nonmilitary areas:

— Environmental: OSD can be used in the nonmilitary area at the nongovernmental level,

which will increase the two sides’ familiarities with cooperative use of monitoring

devices. Some OSD might be used in environmental protection, weather forecasting,

water use management, or agriculture.

— Scientific research: For example, both sides might exchange seismic data for scientific

research purposes.

35

– use of Authenticated Tracking and ~onitoring system (ATMS): h 1998, North Korea

agreed to allow South Korean tourists to visit Kumgang Mountain. The mountain has the

most beautiful scenery in Korea, and visiting the mountain is a lifetime dream for many

Koreans. The cruise ships are escorted by each side’s navy in their sea area, respectively.

Although both sides’ military are presumed to track the course of the cruise ships, ATMS

34 There may be no NGOS in North Korea. However, in order to facilitate cooperation, South Korea could accept

the NGO status of an entity introduced by North Korean authorities.

35 It is typical that major research organizations or universities having programs on geology have some seismic data

collection equipment. If this is not the case in North Korea, such equipment could be supplied by the academic

communities to assist the North’s educational development.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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technology could be used to locate and check the safety of the ship.36 The merit of the

ATMS is that the data can be received any place where a portable computer system is

equipped and a communication line is set up. Even nongovernmental organizations could

use the technologies. For example, the partners in North-South tourism, the Hyundai

Group, and the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland (CPUF) could

set up portable systems in Seoul and Pyongyang to track the cruise ships in near-real time.

When the parties’ NTM capabilities are limited (as in Korea) or the area where NTM

could be used is restricted (as in the Sinai),37 a third party’s assistance may be crucial,

particularly in aerial and satellite imaging. For example, the two Koreas might allow for the U.S.

to carry out reconnaissance flights and to distribute the information equally to the two sides.3g

Or, they might propose to establish a joint U.S.-Russia or U.S.-China technical information

cooperation committee to provide the two Koreas with reconnaissance information collected on

or around the Korean peninsula.39 Establishing a regional satellite monitoring center could be a

feasible CM measure in the long run.40

5.1.2.2 Third Party Role in Encouraging the Two Koreas to Participate in CM

A third party can be important for encouraging North and South Korea to participate in

cooperative monitoring. A third party can either be a single country or a UN organization, as in

the Sinai. On the other hand, a consortium similar to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development

Organization (KEDO), with the aim of enhancing military transparency on the Korean peninsula,

could be established. This hypothetical organization is dubbed Korean Peninsula Transparency

Enhancement Organization (KTEO).

KTEO could be financed and administered by member states. KTEO could have a

monitoring arm with similar functions as the SFM in the Sinai (that is, carrying out on-site

inspection and operating ground sensors). The Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru

(MOMEP), which is supervising the border dispute between those two countries, is another

example of the usefulness of a multilateral collaboration. 41 Human resources could be called

3S The ATMS monitors and collects sensor information through the Intemationat Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT)

communication system. J. Lee Schoeneman and Eric Fox, Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring System (ATMS):

System Description (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Sandia National Laboratories,NST-071, December 1997).

37 Recomaissance flights of Egypt and Israel were limited to the middle of the buffer zone and only the U.S. could

fly the whole zone.

38 Because it is presumed that both sides benefit equally from agreeing on a third party’s use of NTM, a third party’s

participation is regarded as a CM measure.

3YIn this regard, it is noted that, based on the experiences of UNSCOM, authorities of the U. S., Russia, Europe, and

Japan discussed the possible use of national intelligence satellites for crisis management and peace keeping.

“Cooperative Recon Gains Momentum,” Aviation Week& Space Technology, October 9, 1995, pp. 28-29.

40 Notably, in July 1985, Sweden proposed that neutral and nonaligned countries possess an arms control and

conflict observation satellite to verify the implementation of international arms control agreements and collect

information regarding disputed regions. Bhupendra Jasani, “Satellite Monitoring-Programmes and Prospects,” in

Bhupendra Jasani and Toshibomi Sakata, eds., Satellites for Arms Control and Crisis Monitoring (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1987), pp. 41-43.

41 MOMEP consists of the two countries and four guarantor states (the U. S., Chile, Brazil and Argentina.) A group

(a few dozen) of inspectors from the guarantor states perform 0S1 on the border. Military officials from Ecuador

and Peru accompany the inspectors as observers. Regarding the activities of MOMEP, refer to David Palmer, “Peru28
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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upon by major member states, as in KEDO and MOMEP. KTEO might be formed within the

framework of the ongoing four-party peace talks. The two Koreas, the U. S., and China. could

become key member states governing activities of KTEO and other countries could provide

financial and technical assistance. If successfully implemented, KTEO could be developed into a

regional transparency regime or a verification apparatus of a regional cooperative security

agreement in the future.

A third party could take other incremental steps to foster favorable circumstances under

which both Koreas could begin CM activity. First, it could invite North and South Korean

personnel to the MFO in the Sinai, or the MOMEP in South America, to observe a successful

peacekeeping operation. The major concerns in the MFO and the MOMEP are the roles of a

regional organization and procedures of 0S1. Invitations to visit the Intermediate Nuclear Forces

(INF) bilateral monitoring stations at Votkinsk in Russia and Magna in Utah42 would also lead to

better understanding of CM activities. The main focus in Votkinsk and Magna ale the

maintenance of 0SSs at these key sites and some technical inspection procedures.

Measures to acquaint the two sides with CM technologies could be taken by a third

country or KTEO. Familiarity measures could develop gradually. For example, detection

systems for the DMZ could be tested in the following stages, with no obligation to reduce troops

at the front during the tests:

● Demonstrate CM technologies at a neutral location with geographical and weather conditions

similar to the Korean peninsula and invite the two Koreas to examine and discuss the results

. Move the test area to the DMZ, perform a pilot operation, and have similar discussions

● Have the two Koreas perform a pilot operation under a third party’s mediation at the DMZ

. Have the two Koreas fully operate the CM technologies in the DMZ and later expand the

scope to the inside of their territories (e.g., place OSD on the strategic corridors deep inside

of eaclh other’s territories)

The effects of third-party assistance would be doubled if the party could provide North

and South Korea with concrete rewards. For example, the two Koreas could be provided with a

variety of assistance to facilitate CM activity or to satisfy their interests in other areas c)f their

concerns. Security guarantees, financial and technical assistance, and better trade relations are

examples.

On the Korean peninsula, if the U.S. or KTEO could provide technical, financial,

diplomatic, political, and military assistance, it could facilitate CM activities. Particularly, in the

military area, the following incentives might be needed:

Ecuador Border Conflict: Missed Opportunities, Misplaced Nationalism and Multilateral Peacekeeping,” Journal of

Znterameric,an Studies & World Affairs, vol. 39, no. 3 (Fall 1997), pp. 109-148; David Mares, “Detemence

Bargaining in the Ecuador-Peru Enduring Rivalry: Designing Strategies Around Military Weakness,” Security

Studies, vol 6, no. 2 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 91-126.

42 According to the INF Treaty, the U.S. and Russia operate one 0SS at each other’s missile production facility.

29
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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● For DPRK: South Korea and the U.S. might guarantee that CM would not cause any military

disadvantages by reconfirming their peaceful intentions, and halting large-scale military

exercises that appear to threaten the North

. For ROK: The U.S. could compensate for risks that might be caused by CM by increasing

intelligence support and reconfirming the security alliance with the South

The two Koreas may require additional incentives to accept 0S1 concepts. Outside

parties may help them devise an on-site inspection process that prevents inspectors from

collecting collateral information. This has been addressed carefully in international arms control

treaties. START I, for example, specifies the maximum number of spare flashlight bulbs and

length of rulers that inspectors may carry.43 A simpler and easier way is to standardize, if

possible, and computerize the reporting format for the inspectors. This method was successfully

used in the Sinai peninsula,” and could be adopted in Korea, as well.45 A concept of managed

access used in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is another measure. The procedure

limits the inspectors’ access to the sensitive materials and facilities that are irrelevant to treaty

verification.

5.1.3 Unilateral Demonstration (UD)

5.1.3.1 Potential Measures to Increase Self-Knowledge

In demonstration activities, the knowledge level is self-knowledge of the respondent.

Unilateral demonstration requires both a will to release information and also accurate

knowledge of one’s own situation. In reality, the parties may not have complete understanding of

every aspect of its milit~ affairs. The more efforts North and South Korea put into periodic

updates of major weaponry and sensitive materials, the more effective their UD measures would

be.4G

5.1.3.2 Measures That ROK Can Take to Encourage DPRK to Participate in UD

South Korea’s UD measures may offer important incentives to encourage the North to

take reciprocal actions. In this case, the South’s goal would be to build trust and eventually

convert its UD measures to CD measures in collaboration with North Korea. South Korea can

43 START I, Protocol on Inspections, Annex 8.

w The United States Sinai Support Mission, Peace in the Sinai (Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Department of State,

1982-1983), p. 10.

45 In the nonmilitary area, reducing the possibility of revealing collateral information by agreeing on a clear and

simple reporting form has provided the respondent with incentives to reveal information. Ronald Mitchell, “Sources

of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes,” International Studies Quarterly,vol. 42 (1998),

p. 126.

4G North Korea successfully launched a three-stage, intermediate-range missile on August 31, 1998. Four days later,

the North revealed a detailed track record of the missile and proclaimed that the purpose was to put a satellite into an

orbit. Korean Central News Agency, September 4, 1998. Without the North’s voluntary revelation, suspicions

would have been worsened. Therefore, Pyongyang’s prompt amouncement was a UD measure.

30
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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utilize the concept of Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction (GRIT)47 to take some

modest UD measures. GRIT is a strategy to encourage mutual cooperation gradually and to

facilitate negotiations between the parties with sustained hostilities. The purpose of using a

GRIT concept is to change North Korea’s negative perception of South Korea and to build

mutual confidence for strengthening cooperation.48 Under the GRIT concept, South Korea

would take the following UD measures to demonstrate to North Korea its goodwill and intention

to reduce tension:

. Publication of a defense white paper

● Revelation of the defense budget

. Revelation of defense policies and doctrines

. Revelation of military administrative structures and status

. Invitation to KPA military officials to visit certain units

. Notification and release of annual schedule of major military exercises and movements

. Invitation to observe major military exercises and movements

Among these, South Korea has already published its annual defense paper, revealed a

rough defense budget, and notified and invited observers for major military exercises. ROK has

also opened the military structure partially by taking part in the UN Register of Conventional

Arms. For the Team Spirit exercises that concern North Korea most, South Korea has invited

North Korea to observe the exercises since 1982. Unfortunately, North Korea rejected these

invitations; however, members of the Neutral Nation’s Supervisory Committee have observed

the exercises.4s

5.1.3.3 Measures to Encourage ROK to Participate in UD

Scuth Korea may need incentives to engage in UD measures, as well. There are two

important considerations. First, if the South’s UD measures appear to damage the current

comparative advantage of technical monitoring over the North, additional intelligence support

from the U.S. might be necessary to allay the concerns of the military. Second, the ROK

government must secure strong support of various domestic factions for the UD measures.

Having domestic support is more difficult in Seoul than in Pyongyang because South Korean

society is more pluralistic, has more divergent interest groups, and is more strongly influenced by

public opinion. Third-party encouragement may be helpful in maintaining domestic support.

47 Charles Osgood, “Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism,” Journal of Conjlict Resolution

(December 1959), pp. 295-325; Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois

Press, 1962).

48 In reality, there were cases where the GRIT concept was utilized. Kennedy administration ot%cials notified

Charles Osi~ood that important principles of GRIT were used to formulate U.S. policies during the Cuban Missile

Crisis. Ale~ander George, “Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation,” Alexander George, Philip Farley and Alexander

Dallin, eds,, U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures and Lessons (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1982), p. 706. During the negotiations of neutralizing Austria, the steps taken by the Soviet Union can be

interpreted as based on the GRIT concept. Deborah Larson, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty,”

International Organization (Winter 1987), pp. 34-52.

49 Interview with officials of the North-South Dialogue OffIce, the Ministry of National Unification, October 28,

1998. The Team Spirit exercises have been stopped since 1994.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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5.1.4 Cooperative Demonstration (CD)

In CD, the two sides take the same demonstration measures based on reciprocity.

Reciprocal exchanges of the same information make each side gain as much as it loses. That is,

North Korea’s information revelation is compensated by South Korea’s revelation of the same

information and vice versa.

Many of the possible CD measures to be taken by the two Koreas are those listed above

for UD. In addition, new measures of CD can include:

. Open Skies: Measures like those of the Open Skies treaty are important to CD. The first step

might be to invite officials from both Koreas to observe the continuing Open Skies test

flights in Europe.50 The cooperative tests between Hungary and Romania are perhaps most

relevant to the two Koreas. The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), which is responsible for

U.S. participation in Open Skies, has already expressed unofficial interest in making the

necessary arrangements.

In detail, an Open Skies agreement can be implemented based on a detour approach

and gradualism. For example, the two sides can start from joint and limited overflight over

certain areas of each other’s territories for collecting scientific data for assessing

environmental damage, pollution levels, and natural disasters. At the beginning, it may be

better for NGOS from the two sides to initiate this process. When a certain level of trust is

established, the two sides can move on to the military area and take incremental steps .51

. Talks: Exchanging views and holding seminars on defense policies and doctrines are

important CD measures. According to the European experience, seminars on military

doctrine would contribute to mutual understanding of each other’s defense policies and

postures.52 Since the military doctrine is a fundamental guideline of using military forces,

candid discussions about the doctrines will help the two Koreas have better understandings of

the other side’s intentions and concerns as reflected in the doctrine.

50 Twenty-seven member states of the Open Skies Treaty in Europe are now performing bilateral Open Skies flights

even though the treaty is not yet ratified. Historic rivals Hungary and Romania have signed and implemented a

separate bilateral Open Skies agreement.

51 For an example of gradual steps in the military area, refer to Amy Smithson and Seongwhun Cheon, “’Open

Skies’ over the Korean Peninsula: Breaking the Impasse,” Korea and World Affairs, Spring 1993, pp. 57-77.

52 For example, the military doctrine seminars held in January 1990 and October 1991 between the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact countries are good illustrations proving the importance of such seminars

between the antagonistic parties. The two sides had in-depth, extensive discussions on each other’s military postures

and structures (organization, a line of command, personnel management, military facilities, defense capabilities,

etc.), military exercises, and expenditures. With regard to the military exercises, the problems caused by large-scale

exercises were discussed frankly. Mutual exchange of information in the seminars contributed to improving

transparency and mutual understanding, building confidence, and achieving stability in the two sides’ military

relations. Peter Almquist, “The Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar: Flexible Response vs. Defensive Sufficiency,”

Arms Control Today, vol. 20, no. 3 (April 1990), pp. 21-25; Wendy Silverman, “Talking ‘Sut%ciency’ in the

Hofburg Palace: The Second Seminar on Military Doctrine,” Arms Control Today, vol. 21, no. 3 (December 1991),

pp. 14-17.

32
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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Another type of CD measure in this regard would be to recognize the existence of

security concerns of the other side and to discuss the concerns. Accepting the other side’s

concerns as a subject of discussion has an element of cooperation by recognizing the

existence of the problem. Delivering one’s own positions on the concern of the other side is

a form of cooperative demonstration. Agreement to talk about the broad issues of mutual

concerns, including the U.S. forces in South Korea, in the ongoing four-party talks is an

important CD measure.

More detailed protocols for the basic agreement: Based on the basic agreement, mutual

notification and release of annual schedules of major military exercises and movements and

mutuaJ observation of them are feasible CD measures. Scale and frequency of military

exercises and movements can be regulated in a step-wise way. In the long term, the two

Koreas could supplement the basic agreement with other protocols to prohibit dangerous

activities that could escalate into inadvertent war.

Hot lines: Establishing communication channels for emergencies is a well-known CD

measure. According to the basic agreement in 1991, North and South Korea agreed on

establishing a hot line between the two military authorities. It failed at that time because

bilateral dialogue stopped during the subsequent North Korean nuclear problem. When

formal negotiations resume, a hot line would be one of the most promising agenda items.

Crisis management would argue for the revitalization of other existing dialogue forums such

as the Military Armistice Committee and Joint Military Commission.

5.2 An Integrated Strategy

An integrated strategy is necessary for making effective use of various measures

presented above. An integrated strategy is designed according to a series of stages based on an

order of feasibility. In the following, we classify the feasible information production and

exchange measures into five stages. In reality, the stages may be different, because they are

based on future prospects; thus, the classification of the measures into each stage may also be

different.

This report establishes five stages according to progress made in the bilateral arms control

on the Korean peninsula. The first is the initial transparency stage. This includes those

measures that North and South Korea can take independently or that need only modest

cooperation in the nonmilitary areas. The second is the strengthened transparency stage where

militarily meaningful transparency measures are implemented. During the first two stages,

agreements on arms control or disarmament are not needed. The third is the arms control stage

where the two Koreas agree on having limitations on military operation and deployment. At this

stage, some of the offensive weapons deployed in the front would be withdrawn to the rear. The

fourth stage is the arms reduction stage, where major offensive weapons are reduced. The fifth

stage is the peaceful coexistence stage, where a solid and stable peace is maintained through

continuing the transparency and tension reduction of the previous four stages.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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5.2.1 Stage One: Initial Transparency

Under the existing tension and mistrust, DPRK and ROK start seeking preliminary

measures to enhance military transparency. Notably, political and financial burdens of the

measures at the first stage should be small enough so that the two sides would be willing to start

the process. The following measures, categorized by the four activity types, could be appropriate

for the initial transparency stage.

Unilateral Monitoring

● Independent use of commercial satellites for military purposes

Cooperative Monitoring

● Joint use of commercial satellites in the nonmilitary areas

– NGOS from DPRK and ROK investigate land use, water management, and environmental

pollution problems in Korea

. Joint use of monitoring equipment such as OSD and data exchange in the nonmilitary areas

– Exchange data regarding environmental protection, weather, or agriculture

– Exchange seismic data for scientific purposes

– Use tracking and monitoring technology (such as ATMS) for tracking Kumgang

Mountain tour cruise ships

. Invite military personnel from both Koreas to observe MFO, MOMEP, Magna, and/or

Votkinsk

. Have a third party perform pilot operations of CM equipment for the DMZ at a neutral

location with similar geographical and weather conditions to the Korean peninsula.

– Invite the two Koreas to inspect and discuss the results.

Unilateral Demonstration

● ROK reinforces already implemented UD measures

– Publish defense white paper

– Reveal defense budget

– Reveal military administrative structures and status

– Notify the North of major military exercises and movements and their annual schedules

– Invite the North to observe major military exercises and movements

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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. ROK also takes the following new UD measures:

— Reveal defense policies and doctrines

– Invite the KPA to visit certain ROK units

Cooperative Demonstration

●

●

●

●

Invite DPRK and ROK military officials to observe European Open Skies flights

Hungary and Romania

Perform limited Open Skies flight for environmental assessment, e.g., flood damage

between

Discuss mutual security concerns. North Korea’s weapon-related technology developments,

the nc~-nuclear-weapon status of the U.S. forces in South Korea, and the role of the U.S.

forces on the Korean peninsula can be possible agenda items.

Establish hot-line communication channels between the two military authorities

5.2.2 Stage Two: Strengthened Transparency

Based on the experience built in Stage One, DPRK and ROK continue the transparency

process by adopting militarily more meaningful measures. Some measures are new and others

are the extension of those begun in the first stage. The level of confidence at Stage Two is still

short of being able to make an arms control agreement. Assistance from a third party may be

important to facilitate the process.

Cooperative Monitoring

● Reorganize ground observation posts in the DMZ into permanent 0SSs that share some

speciftc data between both sides, e.g., operational status of the stations

. Exchange commercial satellite images of major military facilities, exercises, and movements

● Continue testing CM technology for the DMZ (without troop removal, so this would be a “no

risk” field trial)

— A third party’s pilot monitoring operation area is moved to a DMZ sector.

— Later, DPRK and ROK assume responsibilities for the pilot operation of CM equipment

in the DMZ.

. Strengthen DPRK & ROK’S incentives to engage in CM. U.S. and/or KTEO participation is

essential.

– Technical: Train DPRK and ROK personnel, supply, and assist for research and

development.

— Diplomatic: Foster favorable environments for performing CM measures in Korea..

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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– Military: For DPRK, guarantee no military disadvantages from taking CM measures. As

a reaffirmation of their peaceful intentions, the U.S. and ROK might consider halting

large military exercises that appear threatening to the North. For the ROK, increase

intelligence cooperation and continue to affirm U.S .-ROK security alliance.

Unilateral Demonstration

● Both sides continue with Stage One measures, perhaps to the point of establishing an

informal tradition. The U.S. and/or KTEO continue to encourage this process.

. Assure KPA that no military disadvantage would result from its UD measures.

Cooperative Demonstration

● The two Koreas implement, based on mutual agreement, many of the UD measures

performed by ROK during Stage One

. In addition, the following measures could be taken:

– Begin Open Skies flights for military purposes

– Exchange views and seminars on defense policies and doctrines

– Operate Military Armistice Committee and Joint Military Commission as forums for

exchanging views on security issues or for crisis management

5.2.3 Stage Three: Arms Control

Based on the experiences in the first two stages of military transparency, and with strong

outside encouragement, DPRK and ROK can make some arms control agreements. For example,

part of the offensive weapons can be withdrawn from the front. The scale, frequency, and

dangerous nature of major military exercises and movements could be restricted. Arms control

agreements of Stage Three may necessitate some transparency measures (especially CM

measures) to be used for verifying compliance with the agreements.

Cooperative Monitoring

● Direct measures:

– Perform 0S1s in an incremental way. Agree to standardize and, if possible, computerize

the reporting form and restrict inspectors’ access, based on the managed access approach.

– Deploy an 0SS on both boundaries of the DMZ.

– Use OSDS to monitor the storage sites for offensive weapons pulled back from the front.

– Begin cooperative or third-party aerial inspection. Allow the U.S. or KTEO to carry out

aerial reconnaissance flights over the Korean peninsula.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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● Indirect measures:

– Coordinate agreed on objects by focusing on major offensive weapons.

– Deploy offensive weapons without concealment for a certain period of time.

— Designate storage sites for weapons withdrawn from the front.

. Commercial satellites:

– Perform joint analyses of image information of major military facilities, exercises, and

movements.

— Eclucate and train technical personnel of both sides together, or at least provide equal

training in separate venues.

. Operate CM technologies in the DMZ and expand the area gradually. Operation of

technology may be related to troop reduction at this point.

Cooperative Demonstration

● Expand the military Open Skies measures started at the second stage.

5.2.4 Stage Four: Arms Reduction

Stage Four requires that a variety of transparency measures and verifiable arms control

agreements have established a strong sense of confidence and cooperation between the two

Koreas. Thus, a way is paved for them to negotiate and reach arms reduction treaties. The

disarmament era in Korea begins at Stage Four.

Cooperative Monitoring

● Direcl measures:

— Perform more intrusive 0S1 and deploy 0SSs further inside of each side’s territories.

. Indirect measures:

— Distinguish between permitted weapons and those converted to peaceful purposes or

disabled.

— Attach tamper-indicating identification tags to treaty-limited and disabled items.

. For using commercial satellites, establish a center for joint analysis of satellite images.

. Form a U.S.-Russia, U.S.-China, or KTEO technical information cooperation committee for

Korea, to provide independent intelligence information to both sides.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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5.2.5 Stage Five: Peaceful Coexistence

Through successful implementation of transparency measures, arms control and arms

reduction agreements, solid peace has been established. A stable and peaceful coexistence

between DPRK and ROK is maintained.

Cooperative Monitoring

● A bilateral cooperation experience can be extended for regional purposes. For instance, a

regional satellite monitoring center could be established, based on the cooperative experience

between the two Koreas.

6. Conclusions

This report proposes a comprehensive transparency enhancement strategy for improving

military transparency on the Korean peninsula under the conceptual framework of information

production. The comprehensive strategy provides a variety of transparency measures that can be

taken unilaterally, bilaterally, or with third-party assistance. These transparency measures are

categorized according to five stages of arms control between North and South Korea. There

should be particular emphasis on the modest measures that can be readily taken by the two

Koreas at the early stages of the transparency process. The political and financial burdens of

these measures are small enough that the two sides may be willing to participate.

This strategy can help make a breakthrough for reducing tension and also improving

relations between the two Koreas. Because the strategy provides various verification measures

for arms control agreements in the future as well, it could become an important element for

establishing a new peace system on the Korean peninsula.

Observing the linkage between military and nonmilitary affairs in Korea, this report

argues that a comprehensive approach encompassing broad issues in many areas is more

appropriate than a narrow military-centered approach. Considering the tense relationship

between the two Koreas, this report also argues that a detour approach maybe desirable, starting

from the nonmilitary affairs in the beginning and later moving to the military affairs. In the

military area, an incremental approach is also needed for facilitating the transparency

enhancement process.

During the process, it is necessary for the two sides to have strong support and assistance

from the third parties that have common interests in peace on the Korean peninsula. Because

military affairs are entangled with other issues and involve not only the two Koreas but also

several other countries, there would be certain limitations for North and South Korea working

alone to increase military transparency and move forward to controlling and reducing armaments.

Keeping the constructive function played by the KEDO in the nuclear field in mind, it may be

appropriate to establish a consortium to enhance military transparency in Korea: the Korean

Peninsula Transparency Enhancement Organization (KTEO).

Specific measures that could be taken in the earliest stages of an incremental process of

enhancing military transparency have been identified. Transparency measures in nonmilitary

areas may readily occur between the two Koreas, while measures touching on military affairs

38
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Aj]proach

may benefit greatly from assistance from third parties, such as the U.S. or a KTEO. The

following are concrete cooperative monitoring and cooperative demonstration measures:

Cooperative Monitoring (CM)

●

●

●

●

Data exchange on nonmilitary topics such as environmental assessment and disaster mitigation. The two Koreas could cooperate directly to utilize commercially available meteorological and environmental sensors to address problems of pollution, flooding, and land use

management.

Tracking and safety sensors on the Hyundai-sponsored cruise ships going to Kumgang

Mountain in North Korea could be observed from Seoul and Pyongyang and provide data to

supplement military tracking methods.

Third parties might introduce new military transparency measures by increasing the two

Koreas’ exposure to methodologies in use elsewhere in the world. For example, Korean

delegations could be invited to observe peacekeeping operations in the Middle East (MFO)

and South America (MOMEP). Alternatively, Koreans could observe the U.S./Russian

monitoring stations at Magna, Utah or Votkinsk, Russia that are operating for the INF Treaty.

Third parties could also test monitoring sensors that could be useful in the DMZ in locations

of similar climate and invite Koreans to examine the results. This might lead to “zero risk”

tests in the DMZ, the sensors would merely be supplemental to existing observation pasts.

Cooperative Demonstration (CD)

● Military officials of both Koreas could be invited to fly as observers on Open Skies flights

between Hungary and Romania. This could lead to early cooperative flights for flood

damage assessment, perhaps by nongovernmental organizations of both Koreas.

These and other potential transparency measures might be feasible in the early stages of

improving trust and confidence between the two Koreas. We also identify transparency measures

that might be useful in later stages, as actual arms control and arms reduction agreements become

possible. These measures would rely on a mixture of on-site inspection and sensors to verify

arms limitations and increase both countries’ early warning capabilities.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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40
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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Appendix: Key Considerations for Enhancing Military Transparency

on the Korean Peninsula

Thlere are ten key considerations in designing a strategy to enhance military transparency

in Korea. Only a strategy that takes the following into account will have both feasibility and

practicality: (1) possibilities of military reluctance, (2) asymmetries of the two Koreas’

information collection capabilities, (3) linkage of military and nonmilitary affairs, (4) “detour”

approach from nonmilitary to military affairs, (5) incremental and step-wise approach, (6) the

constructive role of a third party, (7) geographical and postural characteristics of the Korean

peninsula., (8) combination of technical and human elements, (9) tacit acceptance of national

technical means, (10) possible use of civilians instead of military personnel. In particular, we

draw upon comparisons with the Sinai experience in discussing these considerations.

1. Possibilities of Military Reluctance

Considering the sensitivities of the military issues and the hostilities between the two

Koreas’ armed forces, efforts to increase military transparency may encounter reluctance from

both sides’ military authorities.

The Korean People’s Army (lCPA) undoubtedly will want its interests and concerns to be

reflected in any policy affecting its operations and status. In order to persuade the North Korean

military to accept transparency measures, a variety of incentives may have to be provided in

political, diplomatic, and economic areas. Particularly, military incentives may become essential

to assure the KPA that transparency measures will not create military disadvantages. In South

Korea, too, military reluctance could become an impediment to a political decision tcl adopt

transparency measures. In order to encourage South Korean military to agree on transparency

measures, military incentives may be needed to compensate for the losses that might be incurred

by implementing the measures.

2. Asymmetries of the Two Koreas’ Information Collection Capabilities

There is limited open comparison of the information collection capabilities of North and

South Korea.53 However, for designing military transparency measures, it is not necessary to

have a complete understanding of each side’s information collection capabilities. It is enough to

find out one side’s comparative advantage over the other side in the major intelligence collection

areas.

Table 2 is a comparative analysis of North and South Korea’s capabilities in human,

surveillance images, and electronics/signals intelligence. We separately rank their strength in

53 For example, Desmond Ball, “Asia - Signals Intelligence in North Korea,” Jane’s Intelligence Reviev;, vol. 8.

no. 1 (January 1, 1996), p. 28; Joseph Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Intelligence Agencies and Infiltration

Operations,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 3, no. 6 (June 1, 1991), p. 269.

41
Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

analyzing the available information. 54 A “ 1” indicates a strong capability and a “3” indicates a

weak capability.

Table 2. Comparison of the Two Koreas’ Information Collection Capabilities

South Korea North Korea

Human 3 1

I Surveillance Images I 1 I 3 I

I Electronics/Signals (Technology) I 1 I

2 I

Electronics/Signals (Analysis) 2 1

North Korea has a significant edge over South Korea in the use of human agents. The

pluralistic and liberal system of South Korea makes it easy for North Korean agents to enter and

work in South Korea. South Korea depends on NTM to narrow the intelligence gap. South

Korea dominates in imagery, but mostly depends on U.S. assets; the South’s own capabilities are

limited. Considering this problem, the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) is planning to

develop its own reconnaissance satellites by the year 2005.55 In signals and electronics, South

Korea also has a comparative edge over North Korea in the technical areas. However, the North

seems to have an advantage over the South in terms of analysis expertise due to frequent

replacements of South Korean personnel.

In short, South Korea is superior in macro information based on its technical edge, while

North Korea is superior in micro information because of its human resources.

3. Linkage of Military and Nonmilitary Affairs

Military afiairs between the two Koreas are so tightly entangled with other bilateral or

international affairs in political, diplomatic, and economic areas that they can not be settled

with an exclusively military-centered approach.

South Korea and the U.S. already have experienced this reality in dealing with North

Korea’s alleged nuclear weapon development program. The military issue of preventing the

DPRK from developing nuclear weapons has been resolved with a “package deal” involving

many issues in different areas. For example, the U.S. promised North Korea (1) not to interfere

with internal affairs, (2) to respect its sovereignty, (3) to improve diplomatic relations, (4) to

mitigate economic sanctions, (5) to provide two 1,000 MWe light-water reactors, and (6) to

guarantee not to use military forces, including nuclear weapons. Sticking to the same strategy of

linkage, North Korea has asked for rewards from the U.S. for cooperation in the location and

return of the remains of U.S. soldiers from the Korean War, freeze of North Korean missile

54 Interview with the ROK military oftlcials, October 29, 1998.

55 Remarks of the President of the Agency for Defense Development at the Defense Committee of the ROK

Parliament, ~oongangZlbo, November 4, 1998.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

A Comprehensive Approach

development, and inspection of the suspected underground nuclear site.56 It is important to note

that providing incentives to North Koreans can contribute to changing their negative perceptions

of the Seoul-Washington alliance.

Under the linkage situation, South Korea and its allies may have to meet North Koreans’

demands in various areas in order to induce them to accept military transparency measures. That

is, a cmnprehensive approach involving broad issues in various areas of politics, diplomacy,

economics, and military affairs is more plausible .57

4. “Detour” Approach from Nonmilitary to Military Affairs

Military confrontation for half a century can make it difficult for North and South Korea

to agree on and implement even modest military measures that look easy to outsiders.

Because little experience exists in militaiy cooperation, it maybe wise to take a “detour”

approach, At the beginning, it is better to focus on nonmilitary affairs where the two sides find

common interests, rather than try to resolve the sensitive military issues.

Fc,r instance, in the beginning of the transparency-enhancing process, North and South

Korea can increase their familiarity with monitoring technologies by first applying them to

nonmilitary affairs where both sides have common interests. NGOS or universities can be

utilized as alternative channels to government authorities. When the two sides become familiar

with using technologies for cooperative purposes, they can move on to the military areas.

5. Incremental and Step-wise Approach

The Sinai experience is a historic illustration where an incremental approach succeeded in

the peace building process, from military disengagement to peace treaty. Henry Kissinger’s

negotiation strategy of resolving differences in a step-wise way was a critical element.58 Egypt

and Israel agreed on and implemented the measures that were feasible at each point of time and,

based on the experiences and lessons of carrying out these measures, they moved forwa~d to a

next step. With this gradual approach, they overcame sequentially the risks and dangers that

arose at each stage.

In the hostile relationship between North and South Korea, an incremental approach in

military affairs is particularly important because any ambiguity or misunderstanding can easily

56 For example, North Koreans have argued that the U.S. should compensate for and withdraw economic sanctions

against them if Washington wants Pyongyang to stop exporting their missiles. Dana Priest and Sandra Sugawara,

“N. Korea Missile Threatens Nuclear Pact,” Washington Post, September 1, 1998, p. A15. During the third round of

missile talks, North Korea reportedly asked for $ 1,000M per year in the following 3-5 years in return for halting

missile exports. .loongarzg Zlbo, October 8, 1998. North Korea once demanded that the U.S. pay $300M for

inspecting the underground site under suspicion. Don Kirk, “U.S. Refuses to Buy North Korea Access,”

International Herald Tribune, November 20, 1998.

57 Leon Sigal expressed a sinilar view with an example of North Korean missile exports. Leon Sigal, “For Sale:

North Korea’s Missile Program,” NAPSNet Special Report, The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable

Development, November 11, 1998.

58Mohamed Abdel Ghani E1-Gamasy, The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshall E1-Gamasy of Egypt, p. 326.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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cause tension. An initial negotiating strategy would put more emphasis on “agreement and

implementation, ” rather than on “importance of the content” of the measures.

After implementing easy and convenient measures, North and South Korea could extend

the scope of cooperation and move forward to more important measures in the future. For

example, the effectiveness of the cooperative monitoring technologies can be demonstrated by a

third party in a neutral location and later, the two Koreas can gradually adopt the technologies in

Korea.

6. The Constructive Role of a Third Party

The Sinai experience illustrates that a third party can play an important role in managing

the peace-building process between hostile countries. Egypt and Israel regarded the presence and

monitoring activities of a reliable third party as a useful tool to reduce the possibility of another

war. It was important to find a third party that could play a constructive role. In the Sinai, the

U.S. gave Egypt and Israel technical, diplomatic, and financial assistance to establish an effective

cooperative monitoring regime. The two countries could expand the area of cooperation and

resolve difficult problems because they were sure of strong support from the U.S.

A third party can also play a constructive role when North and South Korea negotiate on

improving military transparency. However, if a third party is not an international institution but a

single country, there may be a problem: The government authorities of the two Koreas might be

criticized for allowing too much involvement of a third country into their bilateral security

affairs. As an alternative to a single country, a multilateral organization similar to the Korean

Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) might be formed. In Section 5 we offer

suggestions for potential roles for a Korea Peninsula Transparency Enhancement Organization

(KTEO) that could act as a multilateral third party.

7. Geographical and Postural Characteristics of the Korean Peninsula

Some geographical and postural characteristics in Korea need to be taken into account

when developing military transparency measures, as follows:

. The Korean peninsula, especially the border area, is mostly mountainous with heavy

vegetation and many animals. It also has rivers and many streams. Highly humid, the

weather fluctuates over the four seasons. These conditions can create difficulties in

monitoring activities (both technical monitoring and human inspections).

● A relatively stable mechanism exists to manage the armistice situation between North and

South Korea. The 155-mile border is tightly fenced and guarded by troops at all times. They

are equipped with modest visual aids such as binoculars (visible day and night).

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●

●

●

8.

Cooperatively Enhancing Militaty Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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The Korean peninsula buffer zone is only 4 km wide, which makes it very important to

secure early warning capabilities .59

Ten major corridors exist across the Korean DMZ,@ which means that significant resources

are necessary for covering the corridors.

In Korea, defense against a small-scale infiltration is as important as defense against a

massive invasion. This is because the narrow buffer zone makes it easy to penetrate into each

other’s strategic areas once passing through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).61 Geographic

and weather conditions give the two sides added difficulties to detect small-scale inilltration.

This situation partly explains why the two sides tightly control the entire border area with

fences and troops.

Combination of Technical and Human Elements

In the Sinai peninsula, technical assets were combined with human resources to enhance

transparency.b2 The combination of technical and human elements in the Sinai had synergistic

merits. IFirst, the use of various technical equipment minimized the concerns abcut the

possibilities of infringing on sovereignty or espionage. President Sadat insisted that any foreign

presence in the Sinai had to be temporary and politically unobtrusive.b3 Henry Kissinger had

reservations about the presence of Americans in the Sinai and the U.S. Congress was also

cautious about stationing U.S. forces on foreign soil in the aftermath of Vietnam War.b4 Using

technology helped limit the size of the foreign contingent, thereby minimizing the appearance of

intrusiveness and political risks.

On the other hand, the presence of personnel from the third parties helped keep the buffer

zone stable and implement the disengagement agreements successfully. Moreover, use of human

resources allowed the parties to have visual confirmation of the anomalies found by technical

assets and prevent the development of disputes. The human factor had substantial contributions

of practically enhancing transparency, not to mention its symbolic and political significance.

59 The distance from the capital to the border is 140 km for North Korea and 42.5 km for South Korea.

bo There are four strategic corridors in the eastern part (road numbers 5, 7, 31, 43), three in the central part (road

numbers 1, 3, 352) and three in the western part (road numbers 1, 51, 52). Michael Vannoni, et al., Confidence

Building on the Korean Peninsula: A Conceptual Development for the Cooperative Monitoring of Limited-Force

Deploymeru Zones, SAND97-0583 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Sandia National Laboratories, April 1997),

pp. 26-27 and Appendix E.

‘* For example, in North Korea, Kaesung is 7.5km from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and Pyongyang is

140 km. In South Korea, Tongduchon is 18.5km from the MDL and Seoul is 42.5km.

62 A study Ionthe Sinai experience defiied the transparency regime in the Sinai Peninsula as a technology-intensive

system. Brian Mandell, The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification ond Risk

Management, p. 29. But this view neglects the political impoflance of the presence of the third parties’ personnel in

the region. It is true that various monitoring technologies were extensively used in the Sinai. However, the political

importance of the human presence prohibits concluding that the transparency regime was exclusively technological.

‘Brian Mandell, The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multirnethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management.

29.

Michael Vannoni, Sensors in the Sinai: A Precedent for Regional Cooperative Monitoring, pp. 28-29,35.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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In Korea, possibilities exist for either side to accuse the other of infringing on its

sovereignty in the transparency process. Especially, North Korea could regard cooperative

monitoring technologies as tools for espionage. One way to persuade the North to accept

technical monitoring is to apply strict reciprocity in using the technologies. A third party could

play a positive role in this aspect. In case of 0S1, both Koreas would be worried about the

possible infringement of its sovereignty and too much revelation of information. Nevertheless,

ROK military has strong preference for 0S1.65 Therefore, managed access provisions, as in the

CWC, would be essential to Korean 0S1.

The absence of experience in applying cooperative monitoring technologies for military

purposes and the use of massive forces of troops to defend the border would make the human

factor important if the two Koreas negotiate on transparency measures.

9. Tacit Acceptance of National Technical Means

The Sinai experience is an excellent example where the hostile countries accepted the

mutual use of NTM. The information obtained by the NTM helped make correct judgment

regarding each other’s intentions and behaviors. It was also used to demand challenge

inspections and to resolve compliance disputes.GG In the Sinai peninsula, Israel had NTM

capabilities that were superior to those of Egypt;G7 a similar asymmetry exists between South and

North Korea.

Egypt and Israel had realistic views on cooperative monitoring (CM) measures and had

modest expectations for them.G8 Both sides recognized the technical limits of CM and

understood that CM measures supplemented, but did not substitute for NTM measures. In terms

of guaranteeing their national security, Egypt and Israel relied more heavily on their own forces

and intelligence capabilities than on the cooperative monitoring measures.G9 To Israel, the CM

was a “safety margin” to obtain public and parliamentary support for the disengagement

agreements. To Egypt, it was for face-saving and another tool to deter Israeli forces .70

Since mutual acceptance of NTM can have positive effects on increasing knowledge

levels, it maybe better for the two Koreas to mutually accept (even if only tacitly) certain NTM

measures. However, technical asymmetry between the two Koreas may make it difficult for the

North to accept the role of NTM. The South would be reluctant to compromise its technical

superiority too.

65 Interview with the ROK military ofllcials, October 30, 1998.

66 Itshak Lederman, “The Arab-Israeli Experience in Verification and Its Relevance to Conventional Arms Control

in Europe,” Occasional Paper 2, Center for Intemationat Security Studies, University of Maryland College Park,

1989, p. 17.

b’ Interview with Israeli army colonel Gidion Netzer at the CMC, November 3, 1998.

68 Brian Mandell, The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management,

p. 25-26.

69Itshak Lederman, Verification of Conventional Arms Control Agreements in Europe, Ph.D. Thesis, University of

Maryland College Park, 1991, p. 222.

70Ibid.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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Therefore, North and South Korea are more likely to agree that, as in the Sinai,

Pyongyang is given technical and financial support for unilateral monitoring (UM) while Seoul

maintains its technical UM capabilities.

10. Possible Use of Civilians Instead of Military Personnel

In the Sinai, by letting ground-based sensors and 0S1 be managed by civilians (e.g., SFM

personnel and inspectors at the MFO), political problems that could be caused by the military

forces of a third party were avoided. When implementing transparency measures in Korea,

civilians could carry out many important and positive roles.

The use of civilians could reduce tensions that could arise when military personnel carry

out sensitive duties like 0S1. Negative images like mutual surveillance and scrutiny could be

minimized. In case of conflict during an inspection, confrontation between the two militaries

could be avoided and thus, the possibility of peaceful resolution of the situation could be

increased. Some may argue that it is difficult to distinguish military personnel from civilians.

However, when inspectors wear civilian clothes and do not carry weapons, there would be, at

least, fewer possibilities of problems. Personnel of the proposed KTEO, which would be a

multilateral organization for enhancing military transparency in Korea, could also consist of

civilians from the member states.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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7. About the Author

Dr. Seongwhun Cheon is a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National

Unification. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Waterloo (Canada) in 1989 for his

dissertation on Verification of Arms Control: Mathematical, Political, and Economic

Perspectives. Dr. Cheon has considerable research experience and has published extensively on

security and unification issues between North and South Korea and also on regional security

matters in Northeast Asia. His most recent publications include A Study on Increasing lnterKorean Cooperation under the KEDO Regime with Emphasis on Cooperation Theory and

Regional Nuclear Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Based on the Experiences of ABACC and

EURATOM.

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Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:

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Distribution

350 MS 1373 CMC Library, 5341

1 MS 9018 Central Tech Files, 8940-2

2 MS 0899 Technical Library, 4916

1 MS 0619 Review & Approval Desk, 15102 for DOE/OSTI

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