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THE ASSAULT ON

HISTORICAL DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS

U. S. MARINE CORPS

/nax;ne.,Corr.

PELELIU

])

769.369

U5- 111

Major Frank 0. Hough, USMCR

1950
Marine Corps Monographs

in This Series

a:■11•=1.

The Defense of Wake

The Battle for Tarawa

Marines at Midway

Bougainville and the Northern

Solomons

The Guadalcanal Campaign

Saipan: The Beginning of

the End

The Assault on Peleliu

1.)

7679. 6 - 69

THE COVER OF THIS NARRATIVE shows the assault waves approaching Peleliu's

smoke-covered beaches.

0010 8 0

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91,171 410 1 7

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Foreword

Many factors combined to make the assault on Peleliu one of

the least understood operations of World War II. Yet it was

one of the most vicious and stubbornly contested, and nowhere

was the fighting efficiency of the U. S. Marine more convincingly

demonstrated.

At Peleliu the enemy proved that he had profited from his

bitter experiences of earlier operations. He applied intelligently

the lessons we had taught him in the Solomons, Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas. At Peleliu the enemy made no suicidal

banzai charges to hasten the decision; he carefully concealed his

plans and dispositions. He nursed from his inferior strength the

last ounce of resistance and delay, to extract the maximum cost

from his conquerers. In these respects Peleliu differed significantly from previous campaigns and set the pattern for things

to come: Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

Because the operation protracted itself over a period of nearly

two and a half months, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that

the strategic objective was accomplished within the first week:

neutralization of the entire Palaus group, and with this, securing

of the Philippines approaches.

C. B. CATES,

GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS,

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS.
THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Preface

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU is the seventh in a series of operational monographs, based

on official sources and documented in detail, being prepared by the Historical Division,

Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. The purpose of these monographs is to afford the military student as well as the casual readers a factually accurate study of the sevetal Marine

Corps operations in World War II. Upon completion of the series, it is planned to edit the

individual pieces into a complete operational history of Marine campaigns in the Pacific.

As initially conceived, seizure of Peleliu would constitute only one phase of a manysided operation (designated STALEMATE) against the western Carolines, embracing at one

time or another capture of all the Palaus group, Yap and Ulithi. Subsequent revisions of

the original plan, however, raised Peleliu from a secondary target to the primary one, precipitating one of the most bitterly contested campaigns in the entire Pacific war, beside

which the concurrent seizures of Angaur and Ulithi were largely incidental. Because

Marine assault echelons were committed nowhere else, operations on Peleliu are discussed

in fine detail, whereas those elsewhere are merely summarized to round out the strategic

picture as a whole.

This manner of treatment is complicated somewhat by the participation of U. S. Army

elements, especially the 81st Infantry Division. Believing that Army agencies are better

qualified to deal with strictly Army operations, and would prefer doing so, we have described these herein only in sufficient detail to reveal their essential nature. An exception is made in those instance when Army units fought directly beside the Marines, attached

operationally under over-all Marine command, as was the case with Regimental Combat

Team 321 on Peleliu.

Many individuals and agencies contributed to the compilation of this monograph. To

the more than 100 participants in the actual operation who furnished comment, corrections and elaborations, grateful acknowledgment is made herewith. Special gratitude is extended to Office of Naval History, Naval Records and Library, and Office of the Chief of

Military History, Department of the Army: in particular Dr. Philip A. Crowl and Mr.

Robert R. Smith of the Pacific Section. Maps were prepared by Reproduction Department,

Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. Official U. S. Marine Corps photographs have

been used except as otherwise noted.

Iv

BRIGADIER GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS,

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY.
1

tt't

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Contents

BACKGROUND 

Strategic Situation, 1944, p. 1.

Concept at Top Level, p. 3.

Some Geography and History, p. 4.

PLANNING AND PREPARATIONHigher Level Plans, p. 10.

Planning on Division Level, p. 13.

Intelligence Phase, p. 14.

Operational Planning, p. 18.

Logistics, p. 20.

Preliminary Bombardment, p. 24.

Troop Training Program, p. 25.

Shortage of Equipment, p. 29.

Loading and Mounting Out, p. 34.

PAGE

1

- 10

D-DAY ON PELELIU

The Fight on the Left, p. 38.

In the Center, p. 41.

The Southern Zone, p. 45.

The Japanese Strike Back, p. 49.

The Command Situation, p. 54.

36

SECOND OPERATIONAL PHASE: D-PLUS 1-D-PLUS 7 59

Clean-up in the South, p. 62.

Advance of the 5th Marines, p. 67.

Difficulties of 1st Marines, p. 74.

Irresistable Force Versus

Immovable Object, p. 83.

,"A HORRIBLE PLACE" 

Supporting Arms and Auxiliary

Elements, p. 98.

Summary, p. 103.

PAGE

THIRD OPERATIONAL PHASE: D-PLUS 8-D-PLUS 15 104

The 81st Division on Angaur, p. 106.

Isolation of the Umurbrogol, p. 109.

Drive to the Northward, p. 116.

Ngesebus to Radar Hill, p. 123.

Further Operations of RCT 321,

p. 129.

Other Developments and First

Reliefs, p. 133.

THE UMURBROGOL POCKET: D-PLUS 14-D-PLUS 30 136

Operations of the 7th Marines, p. 143.

Final Drive of the 5th Marines,

p. 154.

Relief and Departure of 1st Marine

Division, p. 167.

THE WILDCATS TAKE OVER

CONCLUSION 

APPENDICES

A. Bibliography, p. 184.

B. STALEMATE II, and the

Philippines Campaign, p. 190.

C. Japanese Defensive Concept,

p. 192.

D. Japanese Caves, p. 194.

E. Aviation at Peleliu, p. 198.

F. The Mysterious Mission of

Murai, p. 200.

G. Marine Order of Battle for

Peleliu, p. 203.

H. Command and Staff, p. 205.

171

179

184

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TABLE OF DISTANCES FROM PELELIU

In Nautical Miles

Pearl Harbor 3990

Guadalcanal 1 589

Espiritu Santo 2067

Admiralty Islands 960

Hollandia 705

Morotai 430

Saipan 820

Yap 237

Ulithi 323

Truk 1030

Davao 540

Manila 920

Tokyo 1725
CHAPTER

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Background

Seizure of the southern Palaus, with resultant neutralization of this entire island

, group, was the most important concrete

achievement to stem from the elaborate

strategic plan designated OPERATION

STALEMATE (subsequently STALEMATE

II—see Chapter II). The campaign resulting in this seizure was an exceedingly difficult and costly one. The late General Roy

S. Geiger, whose judgment in such matters

can hardly be described as unsophisticated,

declared repeatedly that the battle for Peleliu was the toughest in the entire Pacific

war, an estimate corroborated by at least

one disinterested authority.1 Because benefits gained were not immediately perceptible, and because the operation itself was

largely overshadowed in the public mind by

events taking place elsewhere simultaneously or .shortly following, there has been

a widespread tendency to discount its importance, even to question the necessity for staging it at all.

In early 1944 the Palaus stood as one of

the key strongholds in Japan's second line

of defense: her first line, once New Guinea

and the Marshalls had been eliminated and

the central Carolines successfully by-passed;

and the most powerful and most strategically

1 Fletcher Pratt, The Marines' War (Sloane Associates, 1948), Chap. 20; "Peleliu: The Hardest

Battle."

placed stronghold remaining in that line following the fall of the Marianas. It lay

squarely on the flank of any attack aproaching the Philippines from the southeast, only

some 500 miles off Mindanao, and too distant from any U. S. bases, actual or potential, to make permanent neutralization by

air or sea attack practicable.

Whether General Douglas MacArthur

could have invaded the Philippines successfully with the Palaus still in Japanese control is a matter for speculation now. He

did not think so at the time, and neither

did Admiral Nimitz nor the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.2 Whatever might have been, the Marines hit the Peleliu beaches on 15 September 1944, and history records that nine days

after the assault phase was declared at an

end, MacArthur invaded Leyte. For better

or for worse, his flank had been secured, and

with the action which followed the Pacific

War entered a new and decisive phase.

STRATEGIC SITUATION, 1944

The South Pacific Theater had been

pinched out as an area of active operations

2 It is scarcely conceivable that the operation

would have been planned and carried through had

it been otherwise. The only high officer to go on

record against it in advance was Admiral W. F.

Halsey. See Appendix B.

1
by early 1944, following the invasion of the

northern Solomons and completion of air

facilities which insured the neutralization

of Rabaul. In the Central and Southwest Pacific Theaters the first tentative steps had

been taken on the twin drives to the westward which were to end the war, but not

on such a scale as to reveal their full significance. In other words, the handwriting

was already on the wall, but the Japanese

as yet had been unable to interpret it.

Both Central and Southwest Pacific were

under direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The latter was an Allied theater in that its

participants included Australian and Dutch 3

in addition to the greatly predominant U. S.

forces, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. Central Pacific was a U. S.

joint theater, one component (together with

the no longer active North and South Pacific)

of the vast expanse designated Pacific Ocean

Areas. Here Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

commanded as CinCPac-CinCP0A.4

Thrown on the strategic defensive after

Guadalcanal, Japan had reason to consider

her strategic position excellent. The war

was thousands of miles away from the homeland, and from her major conquests: the

Philippines, Netherlands Indies, Malaya,

Burma and Indo-China. Hopping from island to island following Guadalcanal, the

Americans had required a year merely to

secure the Solomons. MacArthur had slugged

his way along the coast of northeastern New

Guinea only as far as Finschhaf en at the beginning of 1944. Her outermost line of defense had been barely dented at Tarawa,

and even this loss could be viewed with corn3 As did Seventh Fleet, attached to this area command. Occasionally British naval units also operated here as well.

4 Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Areas. The former

title represented Nimitz's naval command, the latter

. his over-all command under the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. As his opposite number, MacArthur held

the title of CinCSoWesPac: Commander-in-Chief

Southwest Pacific Area, later shortened to

CinCSWPA. His official JCS title was actually

Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, but

this never was used in this area.

2

placency : if every fortified Japanese position in the Pacific had to be reduced at comparable cost, it was improbable that U. S.

troops, the U. S. Treasury or the U. S. public could or would stand the strain.

Her disillusionment was abrupt and startling. The day after Christmas, 1943, MacArthur hurled the 1st Marine Division

against the Japanese airfield and staging

area at Cape Gloucester, western New Britain, thereby closing in on Rabaul from the

south. With his flank thus secured, his forces

seized the important Admiralty Islands and

commenced a series of amphibious leapfrogging operations westward along the New

Guinea coast, by-passing enemy strongpoints

to isolate them or take them in flank or

rear: Madang, Wewak, Hollandia, Aitape.

In February Nimitz's forces struck in the

heart of the Marshalls—Kwajalein and subsequently Eniwetok—by-passing the strong- •

ly fortified islands of Mille, Jaluit, Wotje,

and Maloelap, thus gaining control of the

entire group at a stroke. And the Imperial

High Command awoke to the fact that the

Joint Chiefs of Staff had no intention of

fighting the war on Japan's terms. Supposedly powerful Truk, instead of being subjected to costly assault, had been successfully neutralized in fraction of the time,

and with an even smaller fraction of the

effort, which had been required to neutralize

Rabaul.

This situation had to be reassessed, and

quickly. In something like a frenzy, the

enemy high command began pouring weapons and fortification materials into the second line of defense and reinforcing the garrisons with veteran troops from the crack

Kwantung Army. There was a limit to the

time and means available, and the problem

was not simplified by the unfortunate proclivity of U. S. submarines for torpedoing

transports and supply ships. Thus, when

the Marines struck the Marianas, beginning

15 June, they found the fortifications in an

early stage of development and many of the

new weapons not even mounted.

Saipan fell with a crash that carried the

Tojo Cabinet down with it. Tinian and
Guam followed, and the Rota garrison and

airfield were neutralized. And with B-29's

operating from Marianas airfields, Tokyo

itself began to come under long range air

attack.

In the Southwest Pacific, MacArthur had

continued to parallel the advance in the Central Theater, reaching Cape Sansapor, at the

western end of New Guinea, on 31 July. By

now his supply line had been stretched so

far that logistics loomed as a major problem. So here he paused before mounting

his assault on the Philippines until sufficient

shipping should be available and Central Pacific forces could secure his right flank.

The turn of the western Carolines had

come.

CONCEPT AT TOP LEVEL

As viewed in relation to the strategic concept of the Pacific offensive as a whole, the

seizure of the western Carolines constituted

a more or less routine step in gaining control of the approaches to Japan proper:

bases from which further attacks, ever

closer in, could be mounted.

The direction of advance in the Pacific

had been discussed on the highest strategic

level as early as the Casablanca conferences

in January 1943. The two-pronged drive

through the Central and Southwestern Pacific Theaters previously described began

to assume definite form in the planners'

minds in November-December of that year.8

This occurred during a series of meetings of

the Combined Chiefs of Staff,8 in connection with the SEXTANT conference, held

in Cairo, Egypt, and attended by President

Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, together

"Over-all Plan for the defeat of Japan," CCS

417 and 417/1.

6 CCS comprised the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS) and British Combined Chiefs of Staff (or

their representatives) meeting together. American

representatives at this meeting were Admirals King

and Leahy, and Generals Marshall and Arnold.

British: General Brooke, Air Chief Marshall Portal, and Admiral Cunningham.

with their principal advisors. These consultations, of course, were concerned with matters on a global scale, many of which have

no pertinence to this narrative. So far as

the offensive westward across the Pacific

was concerned, the planners not only defined

the strategic concept, but set up a tentative

time schedule for its execution.

That time schedule, contained in a report

entitled "Specific Operations for the Defeat

of Japan," 7 makes odd reading today. It

must be remembered that in late 1943 progress of the war in the Pacific had not been

such as to give any very clear indication of

developments to come. Hence, the schedule

included a number of operations which were

never executed, for a variety of excellent reasons, and omitted some which were executed,

including the western Carolines. That no

one was inclined to over-optimism is indicated by the fact that the original date set

for attacking the Marianas was 1 October

1944.8

But there was no intention of laying down

anything resembling a hard and fast schedule. Rather, it was wished to set up a mark

to shoot at: a tentative program for planning purposes which would be kept flexible

for swift adaptation to drastic short cuts

should unforeseeable developments permit.

As envisioned at the time, the most important of these might be: •

a. Early defeat of the Japanese Fleet.

b. Sudden withdrawal of Japanese forces

from occupied areas.

c. Increase in our means such as by acceleration of the assault ship building program and by an earlier defeat of Germany

than by 1 October 1944.

d. The early collaboration of the U. S.

S.R. in the war against Japan.8

As has been seen, it was none of these

factors that provided the first swift accele7 Report to the President and Prime Minister,

CCS 426/1.

Admiral Nimitz's Campaign Plan GRANITE

based on the foregoing concept, set 15 November as

date securing the Marianas should be completed.

9 Enclosure to CCS 397 (revised).

3
ration of the Pacific offensive,10 but the surprising ease with which it proved practicable

to by-pass enemy strongholds both in the

Marshalls and along the coast of New

Guinea. Perhaps even more astonishing

was the revealed vulnerability of fabulous

Truk, which rumor and legend, and no doubt

self-delusion which the Japanese did nothing

to discourage, had built up in American

minds to something resembling a Pacific

Gibraltar. There could be no more striking

testimony to the flexibility of that tentative

schedule than the promptness with which it

was adapted in the light of these factors to

put U. S. troops in the Marianas three and

one-half months sooner than had been contemplated originally.

The first major revision designed to step

up the speed and scope of the Pacific offensive was issued on 12 March, largely as a

result of the swift success of operations in

the Marshalls. This document also contained

the first mention of the western Carolines

as a specific target with a directive to Admiral Nimitz. to: "Occupy the MarianasPalaus line." 11 The target date for the

Palaus phase of this mission was subsequently set for 8 September 1944.12

It was designated OPERATION STALEMATE.

SOME GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

The Carolines comprise the most extensive

island chain in the world, spanning 33 degrees of longitude just north of the Equator:

westward from the Gilberts and Marshalls

to within 500 miles , of the southern Philip10 Japanese forces withdrew only in the strategically unimportant Aleutians, Germany did not

surrender during this interval, and U.S.S.R. very

definitely failed to "collaborate." However, acceleration of the ship building program and subsequent

defeat of the Japanese Fleet in the Philippines Sea

(19 June) had important effects in the speeding up

of later operations.

11 JCS 713/4, 12 March 1944.

12 Campaign Plan GRANITE II, 3 June 1944.

Issuance of this document followed preliminary

planning steps by Admiral Nimitz which had already set this tentative target date. See Chapter II.

4

pines. An idea of the smallness of the individual islands (mostly coral atolls) is conveyed by comparative statistics: 13 although

eight times more numerous than the Marianas, the Carolines contain only slightly

more than two-thirds the land area of that

neighboring group, members of which, in

turn, are unimpressive as compared to

islands in Melanesia and Polynesia.

American strategic thinking in late 1943—

early 1944 divided the Carolines roughly

into three groups. Truk itself lay in the central group. Serving as outlying defenses for

that major base were three islands in the

eastern group, believed strongly held: Kusaie, Ponape, and Pingelap.

Each of these had been designated a target for U. S. attack during one phase or

another of the early planning, to be abandoned as such with the neutralization of

Truk itself.

The western Carolines contained three targets considered potentially profitable, their

geographical positions forming a rough arc

in southwesterly projection of the line

achieved with the securing of the Marianas.

From northeast to southwest these were:

Ulithi, a large atoll whose unusually deep

and extensive lagoon provided a fine fleet

anchorage; Yap, an air base made up of a

compact group of four small islands which

had long enjoyed some international importance as a center of the Pacific cable network; and the much larger group known as

the Palaus. Since the spotlight of immediate

history was to focus almost exclusively upon

the latter, they will be dealt with in greater

detail.

The Palaus (or Pelews) are the westernmost of the Caroline Islands, so far removed

from the main body of that chain that, until

the Japanese assumed jurisdiction, most

geographers regarded them as a separate

formation. The group includes 100 to 200

separate islands (depending on the definition of what constitutes an "island"), lying

on a generally northeast-southwest axis,

neatly bisected by the meridian 134° 30' East

13 Pacific Islands Handbook, 1944.
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Longitude. Latitude 7

0 North lies almost

midway across Peleliu, next to the most

southerly of the chain.

The nature of the islands varies from typical flat coral atolls in the north to the higher,

more rugged results of submarine volcanic

action in the central and southern Palaus.14

The formation of the group as a whole is unusual in that all the members, with the exception of Angaur, the southernmost, are

included within a complex of fringing and

barrier reefs to comprise, by a certain

stretching of that term, a single enormous

atoll.

The natives of these islands are more or

less typical Micronesians, or "Kanakas," as

they were called by the Japanese and others

before them to distinguish them from the

14 The terrain of the southern Palaus is described

in detail as it affected operations there. As the

northern islands never entered strategic or tactical

consideration, they are omitted from this discussion.

6

Chamorros of the Marianas: a blend of

Polynesian and Melanesian stock, with an

increasing infiltration of Malay blood to the

westward. This latter influence, stemming

from the comparative proximity of the

Netherlands Indies, was apparent also in

the speech of the Palau Islanders, a dialect

outlandish even to other Micronesians, with

the frequent occurrence of the characteristically Malay digraph "ng" at the beginning of many place names (Ngesebus, Ngarmoked, etc.) which baffled forthright Americans from places with such honest U. S.

names as Nacogdoches, Texas and Pottawatomie, Kansas.15

Their remoteness from the rest of Micronesia had a direct bearing on the history and

15 Most Americans came to pronounce the digraph

as though it were a syllable: "neg" ("Negesebus").

A closer, but not too close, approximation would be

"n'y": "N'yesebus," much in the manner of that

non-Malay city on Manhattan Island, known to its

natives as "N'York."
development of the Palaus. They were among

the last of the islands to be discovered by

white men. Although some authorities credit

their discovery to the Spanish explorer Villalobos in 1543, the first authenticated visit

occurred in 1712: by Spanish missionaries

who had long been established in the Marianas. And history contains no further reference to them until 1783.

Spain professed shadowy claims to possession of the Palaus, along with all the Carolines and Marfanas, but showed little interest in their development for more than a

century. By 1885 her jurisdiction had become so tenuous that colony-hungry Germans had no hesitation in hoisting their flag

on Yap and laying claim to the entire area

in •the name of the new German Empire.

Their claim was disallowed at that time.

However, in 1899, following disasters suffered in the Spanish-American War, Spain

determined to withdraw from the Pacific altogether and found in Germany a ready cash

customer 16 for all her remaining possessions

(Guam and the Philippines had been seized

by and ceded to the United States in 1898).

Vigorous German exploitation had made

substantial progress in developing the economic possibilities of the islands prior to

1914. With the outbreak of World War I,

however, Japan, ever the opportunist,

grasped the chance to join the nations

allied against the Central European powers

and set about seizing everything within

reach. That nation's title to all former German Pacific colonies north of the Equator

was legitimized, more or less, by League of

Nations Mandate in 1920. So far as the

Palaus were concerned, this title remained

undisputed, even after Japan withdrew from

the League in 1935, until a certain morning

in September 1944.

Japanese economic development followed

in general the lines begun by the Germans.

In the Palaus, where physical conditions prohibited agricultural development on any

16 The price was $4,000,000. Pacific Islands Handbook, 1944.

large scale,1-7 this took the form of exploitation of mineral resources. The Germans had

discovered rich phosphate deposits on Angaur and had already placed that industry

on a profitable basis prior to their ousting.

Their successors not only expanded operations there, but discovered additional deposits on neighboring Peleliu and built a

refinery on that island to exploit them. This

attempt was less successful, however, and

both mining and refining had been abandoned some time prior to the U. S. invasion."

But it was governmental rather than commercial activity that gave the Palaus their

greatest importance, especially in American

eyes.

Under the Japanese, administrative headquarters for all of the mandated territory,

including the Carolines, Marianas and Marshalls, was set up at Koror, a pleasant little

town situated on a small island of that name

in the central Palaus. This was, of course,

strictly a civilian agency, but with the Japa.

nese it was difficult to tell where civilian

functions left off and the military began—

if, indeed, there were any clear-cut line of

demarkation. Under the terms of the Mandate, they were specifically prohibited from

fortifying any of the territory entrusted to

them, but the extreme secrecy with which

the Japanese imediately cloaked all their

activities and the pointedness with which

they attempted to exclude all foreigners soon

gave rise to lively suspicions that they were

doing so, regardless. It was in an ambitious

one-man effort to penetrate this precursor

of the Iron Curtain that the Marine Corps'

somewhat fabulous Lieutenant Colonel Earl

H. Ellis lost his life in 1923.

17 Much of the surface of the larger islands is

rough and broken, the soil shallow and not very

fertile above coral limestone bedrock pushed up

from the floor of the ocean by the volcanic action

which had brought the islands themselves into being. In many places even the jungle failed to attain any great luxuriance.

18 Deposits of low-grade bauxite ore had recently

been discovered on Babelthuap, but no attempt to

exploit this had been started.

1
KOROR WAS A PLEASANT LITTLE TOWN before the war. Another early ONI photograph, undated.

Ellis died at Koror under circumstances

which are still shrouded in mystery. His

is an unusual and dramatic story," but it

is pertinent to this narrative only in that

he did not return 'alive to report what he

may have discovered. No one else attempted

the mission during the duration of the Mandate, and with Japan's withdrawal from

the League of Nations, in 1935, even theoretical higher control ceased to exist over

the territory she refused to relinquish. Thus,

when they first began to figure in U. S.

strategic deliberations, the Palaus, which

19 The most canplete extant account of Ellis' adventure, compiled entirely from official sources, appears in Saturday Evening Post, 23Nov46: "The

Marines' First Spy", by Major John L. Zimmerman,

USMCR, formerly a member of Historical Division,

U. S. Marine Corps. This has been substantiated

and somewhat supplemented by new material now

in possession of Marine Corps Historical Division.

8

had never previously been considered of

much importance to anybody, came very

close to being a complete enigma.

The only existing sources from which information could be derived were scattered

and fragmentary: old navigational charts, a

few reports made during the German occupation (all dating prior to 1914), and a

little very incomprehensive material which

had leaked out of Japan, supplemented by

some more or less random aerial observations made earlier in the war.2° What these

disclosed can be summarized briefly.

The principal island extends northward

from approximately the center of the group:

Babelthuap (sometimes called Palau Island)

a "limited land mass" in the military sense,

larger (roughly 20 miles by fiye miles) than

20 Compiled in Joint Army-Navy Intelligence

Study (JANIS) #103.
either Saipan or Tinian and second in size

only to Guam in all Micronesia. Surrounded

by wide fringing reef, its terrain rugged

and j tingled, Babelthuap was an ideal base

for ground troops in large numbers and

formidable defenses, but boasted only a

single, not very prepossessing air strip still

under construction.

Immediately to the south lay a complex of

small islands, including Koror, where there

were some sea plane facilities and AA defenses. A deep-water lagoon provided limited

anchorage facilities, but the approaches were

tortuous through a maze of reef channels.

A larger and more useful anchorage, Kossol

Passage,' 2 sheltered from the sea by islands

to the north of Babelthuap, constituted the

most important tactical feature from a naval

point of view.

The principal air installations were situated on Peleliu (described in detail subse21 Described as a "reef-and-land-protected anchorage of considerable size." Third Fleet Action Report Palaus, Ulithi, Morotai, 5, hereinafter cited

as 3d Flt AR. Kossol Passage proved to be swept

by a heavy swell during foul weather, which limited

its over-all value, though it was useful in many

ways during the immediate operation. Commander

Amphibious Group Five (CTF 32) Report of Amphibious Operation to Capture Peleliu and Angaur,

hereinafter cited as CTF 32 OpnRpt.

quently), the southern-most island within

the reef system: a two-strip, hard-surfaced

bomber-fighter field with complete servicing

facilities, on Peleliu proper, and an auxiliary

fighter strip building on the smaller island

of Ngesebus, off-lying to the north. And

seven miles still farther south lay Angaur,

center of the phosphate industry, a comparatively level island except for its northwest

quarter suitable for the development of additional air installations.

Earliest wartime intelligence indicated

that the Palaus were being used mainly as

a staging area and replacement center for

troops, aircraft and naval units destined for

the Netherlands Indies and New Guinea,

much in the capacity that Saipan served

Truk, Rabaul and their dependencies. And

as was subsequently proved, the Palaus garrison, prior to the frantic Japanese reinforcing activities which followed the fall of

the Marshalls, consisted mainly of the rear

echelons of units engaged in those areas.

These things, and not much more, were

known to U. S. strategists on the highest

level at the time the Western Carolines operation was determined upon and the responsibility for formulating definite plans

was passed along by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to the top echelon in the Central Pacific.

9
CHAPTER II

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Planning and Preparation

HIGHER LEVEL PLANS

Admiral Nimitz issued CinCP0A "Joint

Staff Study, Revised," for Operation

STALEMATE (seldom was a more appropriate code name applied to any operation)

under date 10 May. This designated Commander Third Fleet as over-all commander;

Commander III Amphibious Force as Joint

Expeditionary Forces Commander; and

Commanding General III Amphibious Corps

as Commanding General Joint Expeditionary Troops. Target date was set tentatively

as 15 September.

These echelons commenced preliminary

study at once, handicapped by the previously noted lack of reliable information.

The regular staff of III Amphibious Corps

was already committed to the Guam phase

of the Marianas operation, plans for which

had assumed virtually final form. Thus, it

was necessary to set up a separate provisional staff when, on 18 May, a dispatch arrived from ComSoPac directing Corps to

send a staff planning representatives to

Noumea, New Caledonia, to confer with

Commander Third Fleet.1

As a result of this conference, Commander

Third Fleet issued a Warning Order for the

1 At this time Admiral Halsey held both of these

titles as a dual command. VAdm J. H. Newton relieved him as ComSoPac on 15 June, and Halsey

removed headquarters, Commander Third Fleet, to

Pearl Harbor on the 17th.

10

operation on 26 May. The following day,

however, he was obliged to cancel this upon

notification by CinCP0A Dispatch that the

order was to be issued by that headquarters.

Thus, the staff representatives of III Amphibious Corps returned to Guadalcanal with

nothing definite accomplished, though much

miscellaneous information had been compiled and a tentative scheme of maneuver

worked out. In accordance with a CinCP0A

dispatch dated 23 May this planning group

was ordered to proceed to Pearl Harbor

upon departure of CG, IIIAC for the Marianas.2

The CinCP0A Warning Order, in favor of

which Halsey's had been cancelled, was

issued on 29 May. This envisioned seizure

of the entire Palau group in an operation

on a larger scale than either Saipan or

Guam, and nearly as large as the two combined, with 8 September designated as the

target date. Major General Geiger, CG,-

IIIAC, was designated also Commander Expeditionary Troops and Landing Force.

Four divisions, organized into two corps,

were to be employed. The IIIAC, consisting of the 1st Marine Division and 81st Infantry Division, was to assault the southern

islands of Peleliu and Angaur. Simultaneously, the XXIV Corps, U. S. Army, 7th and

77th Infantry Divisions, would assault the

2III Amphibious Corps Report on Palaus Operation, hereinafter cited as IIIAC OpnRpt; Enc. A, 1.
main island of Babelthuap, second largest

in all Micronesia. Still another Army division, the 27th, was designated to stand by

in reserve on New Caledonia.3

Once Third Fleet and MAC planning staff

arrived at Pearl Harbor,' the project began

to shape up in earnest. XXIV Corps was already in the area, so the several staffs could

work in close conjunction, and 1st Marine

Division sent a representative (Lieutenant

Colonel L. J. Fields, D-3) to join the conference on 1 July. Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Service (JANIS) prepared hydrographic-geographic surveys of the target

area. Aerial and submarine photographs

were made, and the providential capture on

Saipan of the Japanese order of battle for

the entire 31st Army area greatly simplified

the intelligence problem.

Yet the plan soon began to run into

trouble. The 27th Infantry Division, designated as general reserve, was removed from

the picture by being committed on Saipan.

Then came the long delay in the Guam operation,3 to which both IIIAC and the 77th

Infantry Division had been committed. Nor

was there any visible solution to the transportation problem, that perennial limiting

factor in all Pacific operations, especially

acute here because of the large commitments

of shipping in the Marianas.

Other factors were developing which tended to throw a different light upon the whole

3 Third Amphibious Force (CTF 31) Report on

STALEMATE 2 Operation, 1, 2, hereinafter cited

as CTF 31 Rpt.

4 This group was then headed by Col Dudley S.

Brown. It was detached from IIIAC on 30 May in

accordance with Corps Special Order #25-44 and

was operative at Pearl Harbor on 12 June. It was

subsequently designated X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps (see below) and still later Expeditionary Troops Third Fleet, under which title its

Report Palau Operation was isseud. Hereinafter

cited as ExpTrps OpnRpt. Source of above material is Enc B, 2, of this report.

5 Result of unexpected difficulties on Saipan and

sortie of the Japanese fleet, culminating in First

Battle of the Philippine Sea. Attack originally

scheduled for 18 June did not take place until 21

July, and Guam was not declared secure until 10

August.

892106° 50 2

Western Carolines operation as conceived in

the 30 May order.° Additional intelligence

cast serious doubt on the advisability of attacking Babelthuap at all. The big island

was known to be strongly garrisoned and

probably very powerfully fortified, whereas

the terrain was so rugged as to offer limited

possibilities for the development of air facilities. In contrast, Peleliu boasted a fine

airfield long in operation, with an auxiliary

strip building on the off-lying small island

of Ngesebus which, once in our possession,

would make neutralization of all forces and

facilities on the big island a simple matter.

As a result of these several factors, on 7

July CinCP0A issued a second warning order, cancelling the previous one and setting

forth a new concept under the designation

STALEMATE II. This substituted the 96th

Infantry Division for the 77th in the XXIV

Corps, and set the target date for the southern Palaus back to 15 September.

Major General Julian C. Smith was placed

at the head of the planning group which

had been detached from IIIAC and which

was now designated X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps, to exercise command over

the 1st Marine Division and 81st Infantry

Division. At this time General Smith was

Deputy Commander, FMFPac, and he continued to function in both capacities until

his appointment as Commander Expeditionary Troops and Landing Force for STALEMATE II, vice General Geiger, whose continued absence on the Guam operation had

left this important post unfilled.7

STALEMATE II split the over-all operation into two phases, to be carried out by

two separate attack forces. Plans for the

southern Palaus were retained intact, but

As early as 13 June a dispatch arrived from

the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting the views and

recommendations of top Pacific echelons on the

feasibility of by-passing the Western Carolines and

other intermediate targets in order to advance the

date for striking major objective closer to Japan,

notably Formosa. See Appendix B.

7 CTF 31 Rpt, 2, 3. IIIAC OpnRpt, Enc A, 2.

ExpTrps OpnRpt, 2, 3. Interview LtGen J. C.

Smith, 23Nov49, hereinafter cited as J. C. Smith

Interview.

11
the objectives of the XXIV Corps were

shifted from Babelthuap to Yap and Ulithi,

with target date tentatively set for 5 October.

Here is the command set-up as then designated:

THIRD FLEET—Admiral Halsey

CTF 31: Third Amphibious Force—VAdm Wilkinson.

CTF 36: Expeditionary Troops and Landing Force

MajGen Julian C. Smith.

PHASE I

CTF 32:

TG 32.1:

TG 32.2:

Western Attack Force—TG 36.1: Western

Landing Force (III AC). RAdm Fort.

Peleliu Attack Force—TU 36.1.1: Peleliu

Landing Group (1st MarDiv).

Angaur Attack Force—TU 36.1.2: Aneaur Landing Force (81st InfDiv).

PHASE II

CTF 33: Eastern Attack Force—TG 36.2: Eastern

Landing Force (XXIV Army Corps).

VAdm Wilkinson.

TU 36.2.1: 7th InfDiv.

TU 36.2.2: 96th InfDiv.

The 77th Infantry Division was designated

Floating Reserve, to be embarked at Guam,

while the newly arrived 5th Marine Division was to be held as General Reserve in

Hawaii.8

As far as concerned Phase I, this organization remained till D-Day, with only one

major change. Upon completion of the Guam

operation, General Geiger was ordered back

to Guadalcanal where, on 13 August, he and

his staff from IIIAC relieved General Julian

Smith in command of Western Landing

Forces (TG 36.1), X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps, as such was deactivated, but

most of the staff was retained by General

Smith who continued in command of the

higher echelon (CTF 36), now designated

Expeditionary Troops Third Fleet',

As had become standard practice long

since in amphibious assaults, over-all plans

paid due attention to all off-lying Japanese

bases and facilities which might conceivably

8 CTF 31 Rpt, 4.

9 ExpTrps OpnRpt, Enc B, 4.

12

interfere with the attack on the target islands. One part of Third Fleet's mission was

defined thus:

Seek out and destroy hostile air and naval forces

which threaten interference with STALMATE II

operations, in order to inflict maximum damage on

the enemy and to protect our own forces.10

Accordingly, the plan called for powerful

strikes against the Bonins (Iwo Jima and

Chichi Jima) on 31 August-2 September,

Yap on 7-8 September, and Mindanao 9-14

September. Because of the astonishing success of the initial attack against the latter

island, and the weakness of resistance encountered, the follow-up strikes originally

planned were hurriedly shifted from there

to the central Philippines, where the Visayas

were hit on 12 September with even more

devastating results.li

Because these unexpected developments

were destined to have a profound effect on

the operation immediately under discussion,

it may be well to step out of strict chronology here in order to discuss briefly what

actually happened in that connection.

• The Western Attack Force completed its

preparations on schedule and was en route

to the target when, on D-minus 1 (14 September) the command ship intercepted a

message from CinCSoWesPac to CinCP0A

carrying the rather startling implication that

abandonment of the attack on Yap was under serious consideration (see Appendix B) .

On the morning of 16 September, while

Marines of the 1st Division were fighting

desperately for Peleliu, Admiral Wilkinson

was alerted by commander Third Fleet to

be prepared to use the one regimental combat team which comprised the corps reserve

for the seizure of Ulithi. This was substantiated that evening by orders from the same

source to carry out this mission ". . . as early

as practicable . . . with resources at hand."

Then, as though to make all this official—

and explicable—Admiral Halsey arrived in

10 MI Commander Western Pacific Task Forces,

Operation Plan 14-44, 1Aug44.

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person the following day aboard his flagship,

USS New Jersey.12

In brief, the decision had been made to

cancel entirely the second phase of STALEMATE II as originally planned in favor of

a new and daring conception of the Philippines campaign." The Eastern Attack

Force, designated for the Western Carolines,

reached its advance staging area, Eniwetok,

only to be ordered immediately to report to

General MacArthur's command at Manus in

the Southwest Pacific. Thus, the XXIV

Corps sailed right out of the plan and out

of the theater; and IIIAC, at grips with the

enemy on Peleliu and Angaur, found the

only reserve on which it had been led to

think it could count committed to the seizure of Ulithi, hundreds of miles away—with

results discussed subsequently as they apply chronologically.

PLANNING ON DIVISION LEVEL 14

This planning by the higher echelons was

largely generalized in nature and concerned

mainly with top level strategic considerations. Because of the improvised nature of

the X-Ray staff and the absence of IIIAC

on the Guam operation, the actual detailed,

down-to-earth planning developed upon the

fighting echelons to a degree perhaps unprecedented since Guadalcanal: the 1st Marine Division and the 81st Infantry Division

as concerned the Western Phase (because

of its subsequent cancellation, discussion of

the Eastern Phase has no place in this nar12 CTF 31 Rpt, 8.

13 3d Flt AR, 4. For further detail regarding

this dramatic change in plans, and the thinking that

led up to it, see Appendix B, this monograph.

" Discussions of one phase or another of planning and preparation occur in reports of all the

higher levels of command previously cited. In accordance with the policy of this monograph of draw- •

ing on the echelon most directly concerned, this

account, except as otherwise noted, derives mainly

from 1st Marine Division Speciul Action Report,

Palau Operation, hereinafter cited as 1st MarDiv

SAR. This work is divided into two parts: Phase

I—Planning and Training (Annexes A to E inclusive) ; Phase IT—Operational Phase (Annexes A to

L inclusive).

rative). The 81st, based in the Hawaiian

area, was able to work in close conjunction

with the other echelons, but the isolated 1st

Marine Division was largely on its own.

This unit was in something less than the

best condition, physical and mental, of its

distinguished career. Following the long and

exhausting, if not especially bloody, Cape

Gloucester campaign, it had been removed

from New Britain early in May to Pavuvu,

in the Russell Islands, about sixty miles

northwest of Guadalcanal. The purpose of

this move was officially given out as "rest

and rehabilitation," terms whose implications became increasingly ironic as all hands

grew acquainted with the more salient attractions of that rat-infested mudhole.15

Also, more than two-thirds of the personnel

had been in the Pacific in excess of twenty- ,

four months, had served through two exhausting jungle campaigns, and had been led

to expect early relief under the new rotation

of service plan. To assure that ample replacements were received in plenty of time,

the division commander, Major General William H. Rupertus, and Colonel John T. Selden, chief of staff, obtained orders to proceed Stateside to place their needs before

Headquarters Marine Corps, and hence were

absent during the initial planning phases.

CinCP0A warning order of 29 May

reached the Division on 2 June. Brigadier

General Oliver P. Smith, Assistant Division

Commander, put the division staff to work

immediately, to such good effect that a complete study with two alternate schemes of

maneuver was ready for submission to the

commanding general upon his return on 21

June. The alternative determined upon then

became the division plan. Since the new conception of STALEMATE II (CinCP0A

warning order dated 7 July) did not affect •

the operations on either Peleliu or Angaur,

this same plan was approved in turn by

Commander Western Attack Force (CTF

15 A graphic and accurate description of life on

Pavuvu appears in 1st MarDiv unit history: The

Old Breed, by George McMillan (Infantry Journal

Press, 1949), Chap. 16. Hereinafter cited as The

Old Breed.

13
AKARAKORO POINT, northern tip of Peleliu, was separated from Ngesebus by reef in foreground and from the northeast

peninsula (background) by a reef-floored arm of the sea which tapered off into dense mangrove swamps. On shore at

right is phosphate plant before its destruction. Photo taken during carrier strike, 31 March 1944.

32—Rear Admiral George H. Fort), and by

CG, MAC upon General Geiger's return

from Guam to resume command on the corps

level 16 (TG 36.1—Western Landing Force)

on 13 August.

Description of this plan in essential detail

follows.

INTELLIGENCE PHASE

Earliest reports on Peleliu showed the

island to be about six miles long, shaped

roughly like the claw of a lobster, and surrounded by a fringing reef up to 1000 yards

in width. The southern portion where the

airfield lay, below what might be called the

16 As previously noted, General Julian Smith retained command of the next higher echelon: Expeditionary Troops Third Fleet, which included both

IIIAC and XXIV Corps until removal of the latter

from the area with cancellation of Phase II of

STALEMATE II.

14

hinge of the claw, achieved a maximum

width of about two miles. The whole was

described as "low and flat", a definition

which persisted throughout these surveys

although even the early charts showed estimated elevations up to 260 feet 17 (in contrast to "low, flat" Tarawa where maximum

elevation reaches perhaps 20 feet above high

tide).

First systematic aerial photographic coverage occurred during the devastating strike

of the Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 58)

against the Palaus on 30-31 March, 1944,

as one of the covering actions for the Hollandia operation in New Guinea. This attack

proved to be even more successful than its

perpetrators could appreciate at the time:

the Palaus were permanently crippled as a

naval base of real importance, and an esti17 JANIS #103.
mated 160 Japanese planes were destroyed

in the air or on the ground.18

Photographic coverage, however, was incomplete and generally unsatisfactory for

planning purposes. To supplement this material and keep it up to date, subsequent

sorties were flown at behest of X-Ray staff,

starting 2 July and continuing until late

August, by both Navy carrier planes and

New Guinea-based planes of the Army's

Fifth Air Force, taking both vertical and

oblique shots. Between 23 and 28 June the

submarine USS Seawolf lay off Peleliu and

photographed the profiles of all possible

landing beaches. From this material a workable and generally accurate 19 map was compiled by 64th Engineer Topographical Battalion, USAFICP, on scale 1 :20,000. This,

with a target area grid superimposed, was

the standard map used throughout the operation, special portions being blown up to

1 :10,000 and 1 :5000 for the benefit of unit

commanders operating ashore.2°

Complete as this photographic coverage

was, it fell short of entire adequacy. The

division aerial photographic interpreters

were able to spot many ground installations

—but not nearly so many as the size of the

garrison and length of enemy occupancy

would give reason to believe existed. And a

number of installations spotted could not be

identified.21

18Interrogations of Japanese Officials, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Vol II, 432.

19 Shortcomings of this map in one particularly

important small area led to criticisms which have

tended to obscure the fact that for the greater part

of the island it was excellent.

29 ExpTrps OpnRpt, Enc B, 5, 6.

21 To facilitate such identification in future operations, the chief API officer, Captain Jerome J.

Foley, set up two special teams whose mission after

landing was to photograph, sketch and describe

fully all enemy installations immediately after they

were captured. These teams were made up of

trained intelligence personnel, with photographers

specially attached from the Public Relations Section. The result was a remarkably complete coverage of enemy installations and weapons showing

them both as they appeared on the ground and as

they looked in the aerial photographs from which

The map as finally issued showed the

southern part of Peleliu to live up generally

to the JANIS description: "low and flat"

(though even this proved to be a considerable over-simplification). The same could

be said of the northeastern peninsula, or

shorter prong of the lobster's claw. Here in

a small village with the jaw-breaking name

of Ngardololok the Japanese had a radio direction finder, power plant and lesser utilitarian installations, all in the open and tastefully landscaped. Beyond this the terrain of

the peninsula deteriorated into a series of

smallish islands, separated from each other

and from the longer northwestern peninsula

by a complex of swamps and shoal coral,

some of it dry at low tide.

The airfield was an unusually good one,

with bomber and fighter strips of hardpacked coral, served by ample taxiways, dispersal areas and turning circles. Immediately to the north of it lay a sizeable area of

utilitarian rather than defensive installations: barracks, hangars, large water cisterns, machine shops, another power plant,

a radio station, a large two-story administration building of the type encountered

previously on well developed Japanese air

bases. Just beyond this area jungle masked

the details at what appeared to be the base

of rising ground. A dense mangrove swamp

bordered the airfield to the east, while to the

west and south lay scrub jungle liberally

interspersed with wild coconuts and occasional grass-grown clearings.

"There was never any question in the

minds of the 1st Division planners but that

the high ground north of the airfield was the

key terrain feature of the island," declared

the officer who headed those planners during

the early stages.22 By this, he referred to

the northwestern peninsula, or longer pincer

of the lobster claw. That this was high

ground had been noted in the early JANIS

studies. Profile photographs taken by the

identification must be made, issued under title

"Peleliu: Its Terrain and Defenses".

22 BrigGen 0. P. Smith in special Memorandum,

Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, dated 4 February

1947.

15
SOUTHERN NGESEBUS, with its air strip and causeway

connecting to Peleliu, as it appeared on 25 July, 1944.

submarine substantiated this, but without

providing reliable means of estimating how

high or how rugged it might be. Vegetation

cloaked the slopes; sparse, scraggly vegetation, as it turned out, but sufficient to mask

the contours from aerial observation. Not

a single defensive installation of any importance was spotted in this region, although

previous experience with the Japanese in

similar situations indicated that there were

doubtless many such.

As finally drawn up, the map indicated

the high ground to be a single more or less

continuous ridge system running about twothirds of the way up the peninsula, flanked

by a good road on either side. Here the

ground flattened out briefly, and the East

Road angled through a wide draw to converge with the main, or West Road, which

continued past another Japanese radio station to the phosphate refinery which had

constituted the island's principal industry.

Inland from these rose a narrower ridge and

several abrupt, more or less isolated hills,

one of them mounting a radar installation.

About 500 to 700 yards beyond the northwestern tip of the peninsula, and connected

with it by a wooden causeway across the

shallow reef, lay the semi-joined smaller

islands of Ngesebus and Kongauru where

the auxiliary airstrip was building.

With this somewhat speculative intelligence, the planners had to be content, since

16

it would be manifestly impossible to send

pre-invasion patrols ashore on a land mass

so small and so strongly held. For detailed

data concerning reef and beach conditions

they must wait on the operations of the underwater demolition teams on D-3, D-2 and

D-1.23

From the foregoing it may be seen that,

while the terrain of southern Peleliu might

possibly be compared with an atoll island

of the Tarawa type, there was a second

school of thought which uneasily sought

other comparisons for that northwestern

peninsula. The most immediate possibility

was Saipan,24 and officers from the division

were dispatched to interview anybody they

could find who had fought on that island. But

the two operations followed one another too

closely to permit compilation of a thorough

intelligence study of Saipan, and the little

information obtained came mostly from

men wounded there and evacuated to hospitals within reach.23

And there was another difference between

Tarawa and the Palaus. Betio had been

garrisoned by 4,836 Japanese, with no other

substantial enemy forces within reach. Even

the notably low early estimates placed 9,000

Japanese on Peleliu, and in estimating the

25 Work of the UDT's at Peleliu was especially

fine: reporting on reef conditions, destroying obstacles and mines, and scouting approaches to the

beaches themselves. IIIAC OpnRpt, Enc C, 2. An

earlier attempt had been made in mid-July by volunteer UDT men operating from a submarine, but

they were able to reconnoiter one beach only. In

a similar attempt at Yap three UDT men were

lost and subsequently discovered to have been captured by the Japanese. CTF 31 Rpt, Enc A, 1.

24 Actually a closer parallel was Biak (17 May 26-

Jul44), in the Southwest Pacific, where the 41st

Infantry Division had to cope with terrain problems

strikingly similar to those encountered on Peleliu.

That could not be foreseen in advance, however, and

there was insufficient time for thorough evaluation

of the lessons learned in that operation.

25 Oral statement to the author by MajGen 0. P.

Smith, 13Jan49. General Smith added, in effect,

that while he did not think that many responsible

officers of the division gave much weight to the

Tarawa comparison, certainly even fewer, himself

included, ever imagined that Marines would still be

fighting on Peleliu a month after the landing.
enemy's potential the Division Intelligence

Section was acutely aware that upward of

25,000 additional troops were posted on

islands within practicable reinforcing distance.

Our preliminary knowledge of the enemy's

strength resulted from one of those providential accidents of war which might be considered as bordering on the miraculous in

the case of any enemy other than the security-unconscious Japanese, with their predilection for keeping voluminous records and

then letting them lie around. Saipan had

been headquarters of the 31st Army, and

with its fall U. S forces captured a considerable part of that echelon's files,28 together with a Japanese intelligence officer

to help interpret it.

This remarkable combination of related

documents designated the units stationed in

the Palaus and listed the approximate

strength of each, but did not indicate definitely their disposition. There were sufficient clues, however, to provide competent

intelligence officers with the means for

shrewd analysis. X-Ray Intelligence handled

most of this work, passing its findings along

to the division, modified from time to time

as additional information became available.

These estimates proved remarkably accurate from the first in the case of Peleliu,

where a final check at the end of the operation disclosed discrepancies of only three

minor units not identified on the preliminary

estimates.27 The fact that more Japanese

were encountered on the island than the

estimates indicated resulted from their partially successful efforts to reinforce the garrison by barge from the large reservoir of

troops on Babelthuap.

The backbone of the force defending the

Palaus was the 14th Division, Imperial Japanese Army. This was one of the oldest and

20 ExpTrps OpnRpt, Enc B, 4.

27 These were a temporary mortar company, a

machine cannon company and some sort of a heavy

rocket unit about which nothing definite was ever

learned. All three are believed to have been improvised on the spot from personnel detached from

the infantry units.

best units in all of the enemy's armed forces,

with a history dating back to the Sino-Japanese War (-1894-95) and an outstanding

record in the Russo-Japanese War (1904—

05) . Formerly a part of the famed Kwantung Army, the division had been rushed to

the Pacific in the spring of 1944 when the

fall of the Marshalls had awakened Japan

tardily to the peril facing her second line of

defense. Its component infantry regiments

were the 2d, 15th and 59th. Also on hand

were the 53d Independent Mixed Brigade,

and the usual miscellany of smaller units

so dear to the Japanese military mind, together with sizeable contingents of naval

personel, both combatant and construction.

Commander of the Palaus Sector Group,

which included all the Palaus and the island

of Yap to the northeast, was Lieutenant

General Sadae Inoue, who was also commanding general of the 14th Division. His

headquarters were at the town of Koror, on

the small centrally located island of that

name, pre-war administrative capital of

western Micronesia. The greater portion of

the troops, estimated upward of 25,000, were

on the big island of Babelthuap, immediately

to the north. This force included the Sea

Transport Units of the 1st Amphibious Brigade, 1,349 men. Since many of the assault

elements were known to have received special training in counterlanding operations,

the potential of the enemy for reinforcing

the Peleliu garrison appeared very real indeed.

Early reports had Angaur, the southernmost island and objective of the 81st Infantry Division, garrisoned by some 4,000

Japanese. Subsequent intelligence scaled

this figure down to include only one reinforced battalion of the 59th Infantry, an independent AA artillery company and a few

smaller units: an estimated total of 1,400-

2,100 combat troops.28

28 The lower figure squares neatly with the final

estimate of the 81st Division, which reported 1,338

Japanese killed on Angaur, 59 taken prisoner. 81st

Infantry Division Operation Report, Phase I, 69;

hereinafter cited as 81st OpnRpt. •

11
Since this monograph is concerned mainly

with the action on Peleliu, presented herewith is a detailed breakdown of the final preinvasion intelligence estimate of the Japanese forces on that island and semi-joined

Ngesebus, which proved so accurate.29

Army

14th Div.

2d Inf Reg including 1 Arty Bn 3,283

One Bn 15th Inf 30 including one Arty

Bty (4x75mm) and one Mortar Co.

(10x81mm) 1,030

Tank Unit, less 1 Plt (12 tanks) 100

Sig Unit, 1 Radio Squad 10

Intendance Duty Unit 30

Fd Hosp 250

53d Ind Mixed Brig

One Ind Inf Bn 31 685

5,388

Navy, Combatant

45th Guard Force Det 200-400

114th and 126th AA Units 600

800-1,000

Navy, Labor

204th and 214th Const Bns 

Elements of 43d and 235th Const 2,000-2,200

Bns

Navy, Airbase Personnel

PELELIU 1,270

NGESEBUS 950

2,220

Recapitulation

Army, Combatant 5,300

Navy, Combatant 800-1,000

6,100-6,300 6,100-6,300

Navy, Labor 2,000-2,200

Navy, Airbase Personnel 2,220

10,320-10,700

29 Above tabulation transcribed literally from F-2

report dated 28Aug44. ExpTrps OpnRpt, Enc B,

Appendix 10, 1.

30 Further identified subsequently as 3d Bn, 15th

Infantry. 2d Bn same regiment also participated

in defense of Peleliu though not on the island on

D-Day. See Chap V.

31 Further identified subsequently as 346th Independent Infantry Battalion.

18

The Japanese over-all commander on Peleliu was reported to be Major General Kenjiro (or Gongiro) Murai. Precisely what

part this officer played in the campaign remains a mystery to this day. Not until after

his death was tangible evidence found that

he was even on the island (see Appendix

F). The one undisputable fact is that all important captured orders concerned with one

of the most stubborn defensive actions in

history were signed by Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, commanding officer of the 2d Infantry,

Imperial Japanese Army. And a dangerous

and resourceful opponent he proved to be.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

On Peleliu there was no dearth of wide

sand beaches suitable for landing operations.

The width of the fringing reef made it apparent that the landing technique developed

in the Marshalls and Marianas would have

to be adapted here, and this premise was

accepted in all studies concerned with working out the scheme of maneuver.

Four sets of beaches were taken into consideration.

(1) Beach Purple presented the greatest

natural advantages. The reef here was nowhere more than two hundred yards wide,

while at one short stretch it appeared practicable (with some improvements, this later

proved to be the case) to bring vessels as

large as LST's directly to the beach. However, these advantages were equally obvious

to the Japanese, and their strongest defense

system was set up here. The real clincher

in rejecting such a landing was the presence

a short distance inland of a dense mangrove

swamp which in two places narrowed ingress

to the main part of the island to a corridor

barely wide enough to accommodate a road:

a double bottleneck ideal for defense which

the Japanese could be depended upon to exploit to the limit.

(2) A projected landing on the Scarlet

Beaches, including and overlapping the

southern promontories, in conjunction with

a coordinated landing on the Orange Beaches

on the opposite (southwestern) shore was

discarded because of the tactical disadvant-
ages of assault elements converging on each

other, plus the fact that late photographs

showed the southern faces of the promontories to consist of coral ledges exposed to

the surf and the inlet between them to be

choked with concrete tetrahedrons.32

(3) Beach Amber lay along the northwestern peninsula where the reef is widest,

the northern flank enfiladed by the off-lying

island of Ngesebus, known to be strongly

held. Inland of the beach, a comparatively

level shelf was dominated by high ground at

ranges of 100-300 yards. A successful assault here would have the advantage of placing what was recognized as the key terrain

in the division's hands at the outset. But

failure of the initial momentum to carry the

ridge line would leave the troops on the constricted low ground without room to maneuver or to emplace artillery, with the enemy

"looking down their throats."

(4) A landing on the White and Orange

Beaches followed by a drive straight across

the island to seize the airfield and split the

defenders was the scheme of maneuver

ultimately determined.33

The soundness of this decision is best attested by hindsight. Officers who participated in the operation, reviewing it in the

light of much more thorough knowledge of

the island's terrain and defenders, are unanimous in the opinion that the course chosen

was the best one.34

32 This figured in the planning for some time,

nonetheless, and was to be the last alternative discarded. From enemy dispositions on D-Day, there

is reason to suspect that they may have got wind of

it: Whereas elsewhere on the island, Japanese sector defense units displayed a high degree of mobility, on southern Peleliu they allowed a strongly

reinforced battalion to be cut off and annihiliated.

MajGen 0. P. Smith, interviewed 4Apr50.

33 A detailed and scholarly analysis of the many

factors considered in the several alternatives was

prepared by BrigGen 0. P. Smith in a special

memorandum dated 4Feb47.

34 As evidenced by the following studied opinion:

"None of the remaining beaches which might permit

a landing in force would allow the rapid development of an adequate beachhead which is so essential

in a landing operation. . . . The correctness of the

decision to land on the White and Orange beaches

The plan as finally formulated called for

the landing of the division's three infantry

regimental colnbat teams abreast. The 1st

Marines (coded "Spitfire") would put ashore

one battalion in assault on each of the White

Beaches, with the remaining battalion in

regimental reserve. Their mission was to

drive inland through the barracks area to

a predetermined point, then wheel left and

attack the nose of the ridge which extended

up the northwestern peninsula.

The 5th Marines ("Lonewolf"), in the

center, would land in similar formation on

Beaches Orange 1 and 2, the battalion on the

left tying-in with the 1st Marines, the other

driving straight across to Peleliu's eastern

shore. The support battalion, landing at Hplus one hour, would move in between the

other two, attack across the lower end of

the airfield, and then participate in the turning movement to the northward. Following

securing of the airfield, the regiment's mission became seizure of the comparatively

flat northeastern peninsula and its outlying

islands.

The 7th Marines ("Mustang"), less one

reinforced battalion to be kept afloat as the

division reserve, would land in column of

battalions on Beach Orange 3, drive across

to the eastern shore on the flank of the 5th,

then wheel right and mop up the now isolated enemy contingents in. a drive to the

southern tip of the island.

The advantages of this scheme of maneuver were obvious; the disadvantages during

the planning phase, somewhat less so.

On the credit side, it would be possible to

land on a wide front, with a straight and

clear approach to the beaches across a nottoo-bad reef which attained a maximum

width of about 700 yards. The airfield and

comparatively open ground immediately to

the south of it was suitable for tank operations, and it was anticipated that the drive

across the island could be completed in short

order. This would not only provide elbow

is hardly open to question." Ltr BrigGen W. A.

Wachtler to CMC, 1Mar50, hereinafter cited as

Wachtler.

19
room for emplacing artillery, but should enable the 5th Marines to take Beach Purple

in the rear, potential typhoon conditions

making it imperative that beaches on both

shores be secured as soon as possible to facilitate the continuous flow of supplies.

The disadvantage of driving across open,

"flat" (more or less) terrain commanded

by the high ground to the north was clearly

—if perhaps not fully—realized. Although

the contours of this high ground were still

hidden by the vegetation, past experience

made it a foregone conclusion that the Japanese would have plenty of heavy weapons

emplaced there. It was understood, too, that

in having this high ground as its objective

the 1st Marines had drawn by far the toughest assignment. But it was anticipated that

the 7th would complete its initial mission

the first day and become available to regroup

in support of the 1st, so that the striking

power of two combat teams would be concentrated against the key terrain within a

short time. In the meanwhile, it was planned

to support the 1st Marines with a maximum

concentration of air, naval gunfire, artillery

and tanks.

And, according to the original over-all

plan, there was what appeared to be an

ample margin of safety: the 81st Infantry

Division was not to be committed on Angaur until the situation on Peleliu was well

in hand."

LOGISTICS

The problem of transporting the troops

to the target, putting them ashore across

coral reef, and supplying them while there

" The original plan drawn up by X-Ray staff

called for operational attachment of one regimental

combat team of the 81st Division to serve as division reserve, all three Marine regiments to land in

assault. From the first General Rupertus displayed

that marked reluctance to use Army troops which

was to color the first week of the operation. Accordingly, the division plan called for landing three

regiments abreast, less one BLT which would be

the sole division reserve. This was predicated on

20

followed the general pattern resulting from

the lessons learned at Tarawa and further

developed during operations in the Marshalls

and Marianas. This well known technique

need be reviewed here only as it applied particularly to the Palaus operation.

Every type of vessel which had proved its

value in such an operation was to be utilized,

and in the manner it had previously proved

most useful. As had become standing operating procedure by now, the foremost assault waves and the amphibian tractors

(LVT's) which were to carry them in across

the reef were loaded on LST's, as were the

armored amphibians (LVT (A) 's) which had

been designated to serve as an advance wave

and lead ashore the waves carrying assault

troops. Development of the new LVT (4)

with integral ramp astern (first used at

Saipan) made it possible to land 75mm pack

howitzers fully assembled and ready for action, and an adequate number of these vehicles were assigned to the artillery for

their initial mission. So were the Army amphibious trucks (DUKW's) equipped with

an A-frame unloading device capable of

handling a 105mm howitzer, a method developed by the 7th Infantry Division at

Kwajalein.

The tanks and their crews traveled aboard

LSD's, the big, seagoing, drydock vessels

originally designed to effect repairs on

smaller craft at sea but now adapted to assault purposes. The tanks would be preloaded in LCT's which would move under

their own power into the flooded drydock

compartment. This would then be pumped

dry for the run to the target area, there to

be flooded once more and the capacious maw

opened to emit its occupants in the transport

area. The LCT's would then run in to the

reef's edge and there discharge their tanks,

waterproofed for the purpose, to get the

rest of the way to the beach under their

the presumed availability of at least some part of

the 81st Division, one RCT of which had been designated corps reserve. J. C. Smith Interview.
BEACH WHITE I

BEACH WHITE 2

BEACH ORANGE I

BEACH ORANGE 2

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SCHEME OF MANEUVER

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MAP 4
PELELIU'S REEF, up to 700 yards wide in the landing areas, required that supplies be manhandled or carried in amphibian

vehicles until pontoon causeway was built.

own power, guided by specially assigned

LVT's.36

The remainder of the troops and their supplies would make the journey in the more

conventional types of assault transports:

36 This highly successful innovation was tried

first at Peleliu, as a result of tank casualties and

landing delays in the Marianas. An officer of the

1st Tank Bn explains it as follows: "An LVT was

placed on each LCT to lead the tanks ashore. These

LVT's were used to test the depth of the water,

and as long as they propelled themselves along the

- bottom the tanks would follow, but if the LVT's

became waterborne the tanks would stop until the

LVT's could reconnoiter a safe passage. . . . Fuel,

ammunition and maintenance supplies were loaded

APA's (personnel) and AKA's (cargo),

combat loaded as it should go without saying. Admiral Fort and Generals Geiger and

Julian Smith, with the staffs of the higher

echelons, would be embarked in USS Mount

McKinley, one of the specially designed command ships (AGC's) which had proved so

useful; General Rupertus and the bulk of

the division staff in USS DuPage, an APA

equipped (somewhat sketchily) to serve as

an auxiliary command ship; and General

on these LVT's which enabled the tank units to

have a mobile supply dump available to them upon

reaching the beach." Ltr Capt G. E. Jerue to

CMC, 2Mar50, hereinafter cited as Jerue.

21
SEABEES AND ENGINEERS, working under fire, had this

causeway fully operative by D-plus 6 to bridge the reef.

Angaur Island in background.

0. P. Smith and remainder in a similar vessel: USS Elmore. Two APH's (hospital

transports) armed and claiming no immunity

in combat, would be on hand to care for the

wounded, four regular hospital ships to

arrive as early as practicable.37

The formation of the assault was also conventional, following the general pattern set

in the Marshalls and Marianas. The LST's

would discharge leading echelons in their

launching area, from whence the vehicles

would proceed to the line of departure where

they would be formed into waves and advance successively to the beach. Troops from

the transports would move to the line of departure in landing craft (LCVP's and

LCM's) where the waves would be formed.

37 Each APA on the scene was also prepared to

care for a limited number of wounded (average 25)

who would be carried out direct from the beach

until adequate hospital facilities could be set up on

shore. See Chap. IV.

22

From here they would continue in formation to the transfer control line, just beyond

the reef's edge, to rendezvous with the returning LVT's and DUKW's which would

shuttle the men and cargo in across the

coral. Patrol craft and submarine chasers

were stationed along both the line of departure and transfer control line to coordinate boats and vehicles in the ship-to-shore

movement and to facilitate communications

from ship-to-shore and among the various

landing elements involved.

The methods of getting equipment and

supplies ashore in the wake of the troops

presented a few more or less novel aspects,

which were to prove satisfactory in varying

degrees. The amphibious trailer was used

in quantity at Peleliu for the first time.

Equipped with wheels and a metal cover

which could be bolted down to make it

water-tight all around, this vehicle was of

a size which could be handled conveniently

by a ship's crane. Hoisted from the hold

of a transport and lowered over the side,

it floated low in the water and could be towed

as far as the reef's edge by any powered

craft available, and lugged across the coral

and on shore by an amtrack or DUKW, or

even a tank or bulldozer.

Some 60 of these trailers were used. Apportioned among , the infantry battalions,

regimental headquarters, the artillery and

division headquarters units, they were loaded

with high expenditure rate items: mortar

and machine gun ammunition, flame-thrower

fuel, medical supplies, signal equipment and

other technical gear easily damaged. The

light artillery brought in their first unit

of fire in them. As a means of bridging the

gap in time between arrival of assault elements at the beach and establishment of the

shore party ashore, the amphibious trailer

proved its worth, for there were supplies

at hand, drawn into cover on the beach and

available if needed, with no shore party assistance required. True, the hitch provided

was valueless while waterborne, but this was

cured by a towing bridle of manila line that

could be passed readily from boat to trailer
and could be cut should the trailer be hit,

and such an arrangement did not affect the

amphib's maneuverability. While a one-shot

item of equipment, for re-loading at ship's

side proved impractical due to low freeboard,

the amphibian trailer did permit immediate

response to a unit's need for supplies.

The use of pallets was another Army innovation, tried first at Kwajalein. The pallet was simply a heavy sled, measuring four

by six feet, with wooden runners. Pallets

were to be loaded in the staging area not to

exceed limits of 3,000 pounds weight and

three feet in height, the load being lashed

down firmly with 11/4 inch steel strapping.

The division used some 2200 at Peleliu to

palletize a representative portion of all elements of the bulk cargo load. While results

were generally satisfactory, the conclusion

was reached that only barbed wire, screw

pickets, and heavy shell lifts, or items not

readily transportable in a cargo net, would

thereafter be palletized. The objection lay

in the requirement for a fork lift to handle

pallets in each hold where they were to be

ptowed aboard ship, unless square-of-thehatch space was used; and this space, generally, had to be held for high-priority vehicles and equipment.

The plan for handling supplies was based

on all bulk cargo moving from ship to dump

either in cargo nets or on pallets with cranes

' to be used at all points where the net or

pallet had to be loaded, transferred, or unloaded. Commodore Buchanan, the Transron

Commander, in one high-powered raid on the

Advance Base Construction Depot on Banika, procured 36 Trackson cranes and six

P&H five-ton crawler cranes for the division. At Guam crawler cranes had been

placed on the reef. There they presented

relatively stationary targets and some were

knocked out. The division's veteran pioneers

had used a crane mounted on a barge as

far back as Guadalcanal and found it good.

So why not mount cranes on self-propelled

barges to establish a cargo transfer line

1,000 yards or so off the reef? The barges

could move in or out depending on fire received from the beach; and so another shore

party technique was born.

Pontoon barges were seven cells long by

three wide, bolted together to form a single

unit powered by an outboard motor. They

were to be carried to target secured to the

sides of LST's, from which they could be

launched simply by cutting the lashings.

Under their own power, each was to proceed

to a designated ship to receive its crane.

Special hold-downs were prepared in advance, and the crane's boom was rigged as

the barge chugged to its appointed station.

A landing craft loaded with netted or palletized cargo came along one side, a DUKW or

LVT along the other, and the crane swung

the load from the boat to the vehicle which

carried it across the reef and to the dump

where the load was picked out by crane.

Nine barges were used at Peleliu with excellent results.

Six other LST's would arrive on the scene

with pontoon causeways attached, one to

each side. These were made up of 2x30 pontoon cells to a length of 175 feet. Once the

beach had become sufficiently secure, they

would be assembled to build a dry roadway

across the reef from the shore to deep water

where trucks could load direct from LST's.

Supplying water to the troops ashore constituted a particularly acute problem in the

case of this operation. Peleliu had no surface water, and the heat was known to be

peculiarly enervating. The Japanese used

large cisterns to collect the frequent rain,

but until the Marines should have facilities

for collecting or otherwise producing drinking water, it would be necessary to supply all

requirements from the ships. Five-gallon

combat cans were gathered in quantities to

be rushed ashore, and a reserve supply was

put into 55-gallon oil drums which had been

scoured out for that purpose. The latter expedient proved unsatisfactory; too often

the scouring was insufficient to make the

water palatable, and it was found that unless

the drums were filled entirely flush the inside would rust and pollute the water.

Fortunately, it was discovered soon after

landing that even shallow holes scooped in

•

23
PONTOON BARGES transshipping cargo from boats to amphibian vehicles near reef's edge.

the sand near the shore would yield drinkable water, and with the drilling of real wells

and setting up of distillation apparatus, the

problem passed the critical stage within a

few days.

PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT

Fast Carrier Task Forces had attacked

the Palaus as early as 30 March, and they

struck again in July and August. They were

also to participate in the pre-D-Day bombardment and to furnish close air support

for the landing. The Escort Carrier Groups,

whose initial mission was to protect the

transport convoys en route to the target,

were to join in the close support for the

24

landing. Once the assault troops were

ashore, all naval aircraft in the area were

to be available for special support missions

on call.

The pre-landing naval gunfire objectives

were the conventional ones: to soften up the

target by knocking out enemy aircraft and

artillery installations, and destroying as

many strong points as possible. Because of

the nearness of large enemy ground forces,

a third naval gunfire mission assumed unusual importance: to destroy all ships,

barges and sampans to be found among the

islands to the northward, and to be prepared

to intercept any attempts to reinforce the

garrison from that direction.
The original plan called for only two days

of pre-landing bombardment. Subsequent intelligence caused this to be revised upward

to three days. Not all of this was fired, however. Although events were to prove the

naval gunfire preparation at Peleliu the least

adequate for its purpose of any Pacific operation with the possible exception of

Tarawa, before the morning#of D-Day Admiral Oldendorf, Commander Western Gunfire Support Group (TG 32.5), was complaining that he had run out of profitable

targets.38

This view was justified to the extent that

gunfire had demolished most of the more

conspicuous aboveground installations: barracks, hangars, utility and administrative

buildings, larger guns in open emplacements

—most of which had already been damaged

to varying degrees by previous air strikes.

Also, it had sheared a large part of the

jungle from the northwestern ridges. But

the Japanese, with ample shell-proof cover

and operating according to a new#20tactical

concept designed to cope with#naval gunfire,

suffered negligible casualties. And the sad

truth is that the effect of this vast expenditure of ammunition was disappointing, insofar as disrupting Peleliu's basic defense system was concerned, (see Appendix C).

A more immediate#factor contributed to

this inadequacy. Unlike units which had been

operating in the Central Pacific, the 1st Marine Division had never#had to cope with

this peculiar problem before and had no

Naval Gunfire Officer organic to the organi88"I recall vividly the reaction of General Rupertus and LtCol Fields upon hearing CTG 32.5's plainlanguage voice transmission to the effect that he

had run out of targets. Their reaction was that

of incredulity." Ltr LtCol F. A. Ramsey,#20 Jr., to

CMC, 28Feb50, hereinafter cited as Ramsey. "The

dispatch sent by Adm Oldendorf was not only a

surprise but was not understood by any of us on the

Division Staff in view of the study and requirements

we had submitted, and the plans which had been so

carefully prepared and agreed to as essential."

Ltr LtCol L. J. Fields to CMC, 17Mar50, hereinafter cited as Fields. See also Chaps. III, IV, VIII,

this monograph.

zation.38 At the last moment Lieutenant

Marvin P. Morton, USN, was flown in from

Pearl Harbor to take over this function and

performed excellently once the troops were

ashore and liaison was all-important in controlling call fires. But the lack of an experienced officer in the post proved a severe

handicap during the planning and preparatory stages.

Essentially the schedule and control of

naval gunfire adhered to the pattern which

had become standard long since. Pre-landing fire on D-Day morning would be concentrated on the beaches, shifting inland,

then to the flanks, as the leading waves approached the shore. Special missions#20would

be fired on call once the troops were safely

landed. Eighteen LCI gunboats mounting

rocket launchers were to blanket the beaches

immediately ahead of the assault elements,

while four other LCI's mounting 4.2" mortars were#to concentrate on the rugged

ground on the left flank and inland of the

northern beaches from which trouble was

anticipated, beaching#on the reef if necessary to steady their aim.

TROOP TRAINING PROGRAM

Training of the 1st Division for the new

operation proceeded along conventional lines,

handicapped by certain complications which

were something less than conventional.

One of these had to do with personnel.

The division had withdrawn from Cape

Gloucester to Pavuvu in May following an

exhausting campaign which had protracted

itself throughout the entire inhospitable

northwest monsoon season on New Britain.

Now all hands found themselves dumped on

a rain-soaked, rat-infested hunk of real

estate where virtually nothing had been done

to prepare for their arrival." Thus, instead

39 1st MarDiv SAR, I, Annex K.

40 It was General Geiger's idea to base the division#in the Russells in order to avoid its having to

furnish large working details, as was the rule on

Guadalcanal (average of 1,000 men a day had been

the case with the 3d Division,#20which would inter25
of the "rest and rehabilitation" upon which

a vigorous training program should be predicated, all hands were obliged to turn to on

the construction of roads and camp facilities; and, as many men will never forget,

the disposal of mutiple tons of fallen coconuts and palm fronds which had accumulated in the long-neglected plantations 41—

and which would continue to fall, as many a

dented skull would testify.

The incidence of sickness shot upward,

while morale plummeted to the lowest point

it ever reached during the Pacific service of

this elite outfit. The food situation was only

one of several causes, but by no means the

least cogent. Rations had been bad throughout the protracted Cape Gloucester operation, as is to be expected in an active combat

area. At Pavuvu, the amply stocked 4th Base

Depot on neighboring Banika was only ten

minutes away by cub plane, the big base at

Guadalcanal only about 60 miles, yet any

change for the better was purely coincidenfere seriously with the training program. Reconnoitering for a suitable spot in the immediate area,

the general selected Pavuvu, where there was a battalion of Seabees to prepare facilities. Unfortunately, his reconnaissance was made by air and

failed to disclose the more serious terrain difficulties. And the Seabees, who were due for early

transfer Stateside, apparently misunderstood their

orders. They had commenced construction of an excellent steel pontoon pier and laid out a rudimentary road, but that was about all.—Oral statement,

BrigGen J. T. Selden, 4Mar49. This is corroborated

by Gen. 0. P. Smith who adds that when the true

situation became known, General Geiger offered to

have the division transferred to the 3d Division's

camp on Guadalcanal upon that unit's departure

for Guam. However, there was a dearth of shipping available to effect such a transfer, and#by that

time many of the difficulties on Pavuvu had been

overcome. Thus, it was felt that another move

would serve only further to retard the training program. BrigGen 0. P. Smith Personal Narrative,

hereinafter cited as 0. P. Smith PerNar.

41 The plantations had been abandoned for nearly

three years and many of the nuts were in advanced

stages of decay, pervading the island with a faint

odor of rot which is difficult to describe and equally

difficult to forget. Many a veteran of Pavuvu remains allergic to coconuts to this#day.

26

tal. Fresh meat was available for only one

meal a week on the average, fresh eggs twice

during this four-month stay.42

Casting about for indigenous sources of

fresh food led to the discovery of large herds

of cattle on this and neighboring islands

which had been used by the departed planters

to graze in the groves in order to keep the

ground at the base of the coconut palms free

of undergrowth. A call was sent out for all

men experienced as cowboys and butchers.

A roundup was held and a slaughterhouse

constructed at cost of considerable labor and

expense which was capable of supplying all

hands with fresh beef two days a week. But

just as this got into full production, as General Smith puts it in his Personal Narrative: "The Australians decided they did not

want to engage in that type of reverse lendlease operations and we were directed to

cease."

Efforts of enterprising individuals to supplement their diet with alligator steaks had

to be curtailed when the hunters lost direction in the dark (this was purely a nocturnal sport) and shots began falling in the

bivouac areas. Fishing the lagoons with hand

grenades and TNT was likewise forbidden

after several men had been severely injured.

The giant clam, captured in its prime, would

feed a dozen men, but its meat proved no

great improvement over the uninterrupted

diet of spam and dehydrated potatoes twice

a day, varied by powdered egg and an occasional can of C-Ration.

While the service troops on Banika and

Guadalcanal had a reasonably' adequate supply of beer with which to sustain their sagging spirits, there was none at all on Pavuvu

42"The men were not in very good physical condition. The purpose of the move to# the Russell

Islands was to rehabilitate the Division for future

operations. Authority was granted to increase the

ration twenty-five per cent. It was assumed that

fresh provisions in reasonable quantities would be

furnished. We built reefer boxes on the beach to

receive these stores but the reefer boxes were generally empty." 0. P. Smith Op. Cit.
during the first weeks." Even after a regular

ration was instituted, men considered themselves lucky to average three cans a week.

Motion pictures were limited mostly to the

poorest "B" films which troops in the rear

areas, who had some choice in the matter,

could not be bothered showing for themselves. The only USO show to reach this

miserable hole was not scheduled to come

at all; it arrived only by dint of the personal

efforts of Bob Hope and at considerable inconvenience to his troupe, who managed to

sandwich in a morning performance between

rear echelon engagements shortly before the

division shoved off for Peleliu.

Conditions were especially disheartening

to the 24-months men, who still comprised a

sizeable majority of the division, and who

had been led to hope for early relief under

the rotation plan, or at worst a return to

Australia. By the end of July, a total of

4,860 replacements'44 had arrived, making

it possible to relieve slightly more than half

the two-year veterans, which was very cheering to those actually returning to the U. S.,

but did little to raise the spirits of those left

behind, many of them key specialists for

whom competent replacements might never

be available. And the new men, fresh from

the amenities of Stateside life and requiring

intensive special training, were poorly conditioned for the wretched life into which they

had been so rudely pitchforked.

Yet, despite all the discouragements and

handicaps, such was the spirit and resiliency

43 There were a few exceptions where individual

officers were able to get over to the base depot and

persuade the powers there to let them buy out of

their own means enough to furnish all hands within

their own commands a token drink. This was the

first beer most of the men had tasted since their departure from Melbourne nearly nine months before.

44 As the division was finally shaken-down for the

Peleliu operation, approximately 30% of the men

had been in the Pacific in excess of 24 months and

served through two debilitating jungle campaigns;

another 30% had 12 months and one campaign under their belts, while the remainder were replacements in various stages of seasoning. As embarked,

the division was about 5% above T/O strength.

1st MarDiv SAR, I, Anx. A.

892106 o

of this veteran combat outfit, passed on by

the old-times to the infusion of new blood,

that morale -rebounded progressively as the

prospect of going into action again became

more imminent. Or perhaps, as many firmly

believed, all hands were simply so disgusted

with Pavuvu that they welcomed the opportunity to vent their resentment on the Japanese." Whatever the case, the number of

sick in hospital had been reduced to 150,

and the spirit of the division left little to

be desired in the matter of fighting edge

when the time came to embark for the operation.

A second factor hampering the training

program was terrain: both its nature and

extent.46

Except for fringing reef, Pavuvu shared

practically no features in common with Peleliu. From the time of arrival it had been

apparent that the island simply lacked the

area of suitable ground necessary for the

training of a unit the size of a reinforced

division, and the weeks spent in making the

place habitable (more or less) emphasized

this feature as well as cutting seriously into

actual training time. Units as small as battalions, maneuvering over terrain supposed

45 The theory is held in some military circles that

good treatment only softens first rate assault

troops; that the rougher they get it when not in

combat, the tougher they will be when they are in

combat. Thus, the belief prevailed among many of

the officers and men of the 1st Division that the

ubiquitous discomfort and privation which fell their

lot was the result of deliberate policy, rather than

neglect and/or callous indifference. It was certainly true that other Marine combat units had enjoyed comfortable base camps in such pleasant

places as New Zealand and the Hawaiian Islands,

and even the comparative civilization of New Caledonia and Guadalcanal; whereas the 1st Division,

except for the interlude of its happy sojourn in

Australia, never got out of the boondocks from the

beginning to the end of the war.

46"It took no great discernment to see, even from

the air, that the place was entirely unsuitable.

. . . With the exception of an overgrown and abandoned coconut grove, the island was a veritable

jungle in which a troop unit even as small as, a

platoon would have great difficulty maneuvering."

Wachtler.

21
PACK HOWITZERS, first artillery emplaced on D-Day, were landed and supplied by amphibious vehicles.

to simulate the target, found themselves

dodging among heads and mess halls and

tripping over the guy ropes of their own

tents. Conditioning hikes, so useful in hardening the men physically for the ordeal to

come, were possible only by marching the

troops monotonously around in constricted

circles, usually colliding with other units

doing the same thing. Weapons and combat

ranges were constructed which were adequate in themselves, but neither large enough

nor numerous enough to serve adequately

the number of men who had to use them.

If Pavuvu was inadequate for infantry

training, it was something worse than that

for the supporting arms with bulky equipment. Yet despite handicaps of space, the

28

1st Tank Battalion spent a full day with

each infantry battalion, during which time

each squad practiced coaching movement and

fire by tank-infantry telephone and visual

signals, an expedient which went far to foster mutual understanding, cooperation and

esteem.47 But the artillery "was reduced to

the pitiful expedient of firing into the water

with the observers out in a boat or

DUKW." 48

Altogether, the situation was one calling

for all the resourcefulness and ability at improvisation for which the Marine Corps is

47 litr LtCol A. J. Stuart to CMC, 25Apr50, hereinafter cited as Stuart.

48 Ltr LtCol L. F. Chapman, Jr. to CMC, 5Mar50.
noted. When large unit training proved unfeasible, the emphasis was placed on small

unit exercises- until transportation could be

obtained for rehearsals on more suitable terrain elsewhere (see below). Intensive

schooling was instituted for junior officers

and NCO's. Congestion of the ranges was

largely solved by adhering to an exceedingly

tight schedule calculated to wring out the

last ounce of usefulness from the limited facilities.

That a division containing 40% replacements should emerge even half trained under

the circumstances would have been a minor

wonder. That actually the ground training

of all hands proved something more than

merely adequate constitutes a high tribute

to the efficiency and cooperation of officers

and men of all units on all levels.

SHORTAGE OF EQUIPMENT

The amphibious phases of training, in

particular, were further handicaped by a

sad lack of practically everything necessary

to carrying them out; shortages which, constituting a mere retarding factor at the beginning, grew to be a matter of major concern as the time for action approached.

Between the jungle and the monsoon, the

four-months Cape Gloucester operation "

had been especially debilitating to the 1st

Marine Division's rolling stock, tracked vehicles and communications equipment; "

and many expendable items had been left on

New Britain under an exchange arrangement

49 This operation had lasted throughout the entire

season of the northwest monsoon, when rainfall up

to nine inches was recorded for a single 24-hour

period. In addition to vital combat equipment,

nearly everything the division owned had been

ruined, including canvas tentage, field kitchens and

clerical gear.

50 As a component of the VI Army, the division

had operated at Gloucester under Army communication plans and instructions. Not only were its officers wholly unfamiliar with the Central Pacific

Communications Plan prescribed for the Peleliu

operation, but because of the division's isolation

from its higher echelons there was a long delay in

obtaining copies of this plan for instructional purposes. Ramsey.

with the Army. This plan proved to be

something less than a boon to the division

since many of these items proved later to be

in short supply in Army depots at Guadalcanal. The demands of the long-drawn-out

Marianas campaign further delayed the acquisition of replacement equipment interminably, or so it seemed to the division's worried

officers.

Yet once more energy and resourcefulness

overcame all obstacles—or a good many of

them, anyhow. Few deficiencies in equipment or technique were apparent on D-Day

and the critical days that followed.

It should be remembered that up until

this time the 1st Marine Division had never

made an assault landing across a wide fringing reef. Although most of the veteran personnel were familiar with the various landing craft and vehicles employed in such an

operation, considerable training was required

in the specialized adaptation of these to this

particular problem: launching of amphibian

tractors and DUKW's from LST's at sea,

transfer of troops from landing craft to vehicles in deep water, advance in waves across

the coral, and quick formation of the land

assault once disembarked. Thus, the shortage of all this equipment presented a serious problem. Its solution involved a striking example of that improvising on which

the Marine Corps has had to depend so

often.

The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion was

still organic to the division 51 upon arrival

in the Russells, but it had few LVT's still

operative. To supplement these, IIIAC sent

over Army DUKW's. In mid-June 40

LCVP's arrived from Tulagi. These were

surveyed craft but adequate for their present jobs, however inadequate in numbers.

No LST's became available until August,

but with this skeleton set-up the division undertook a program of piecemeal training of

51 The 1st Division reorganized under the new

TIO while at Pavuvu. This decreed, among other

provisions, that amphibian tractor battalions should

be detached from the divisions and pass under corps

control.

29
all personnel in operations across reef.52 It

was while observing such a landing drill

that the commanding general fell from an

amtrack and sustained the severely fractured#20ankle which nearly caused him to be

left behind on the operation.53

Then, to complicate this makeshift set-up

even further, in early July the 1st Division

was directed to form two provisional amphibian tractor battalions within the organization: the 3d Armored Amphibian Battalion (Provisional) and 6th Amphibian

Tractor Battalion (Provisional) , "utilizing

personnel of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Bn.,

augmented by personnel from units of the

division." 54 ,

Here was a task of daunting magnitude.

The only trained LVT men available were

those of the single unit already in existence;

thus the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

was obliged to divide itself into thirds, so

to speak, in order to furnish each of the

new units with a cadre of experienced officers and men, and at the same time retain

a similar cadre for itself. Utilizing "personnel from units of the division" to build

the three battalions up to strength was easier

said than done: units preparing for combat

are not prone to part with any of their men

without a fight. And even when sufficient

personnel had been obtained for all three

battalions, it would be necessary to train

them in a number of vehicles grossly insufficient for a single battalion and already

working full time on the landing exercises

of the assault troops.

52 A further handicap here was that the DUKW

is by no means an adequate substitute for the

amtrack in reef crossing. It is easily stopped by

rugged coral and must pick its way ashore with

great care, thus breaking the wave formation and

falling more or less automatically into column.

53"General Geiger visited me at the CP during

the first rehearsal (27 August). He had not realized that General Rupertus was unable to make the

trip ashore and was somewhat concerned about him

going on the operation. I assured General Geiger

that in the two weeks remaining before the landing

I felt General Rupertus' ankle would mend sufficiently to permit him to carry on." Smith PerNar.

54 1st MarDiv SAR, I, 5.

30

Sufficient LVT's were obtained in time for

the operation, but competent personnel remained a problem throughout. Because of

the comparatively small size of the target,

it was not anticipated that transportation

on shore would constitute a major#problem;

hence only one company (Company A) of

the 1st Motor Transport Battalion was to

bring in its organic equipment, including

trucks and repair facilities. This made it

possible to detach Company C in toto and

assign its men to the 1st Amphibian Tractor

Battalion, in which• connection they served

throughout the operation.55 But even with

the addition of this manpower, the latter

unit was still so under strength that it proved

necessary to reduce the basic crew of each

vehicle from three men to two."

Thus, the new#amtrack crews were being

broken in at the same time that the infantrymen were being trained for beach assault,

and in the same vehicles. And such were the

demands on this overworked and insufficient

equipment that the artillery had a minimum

of time to practice their own new assault

technique: loading and unloading of their

75mm and 105mm howitzers in LVT-4's and

DUKW's, respectively; also, the loading and

unloading of radio jeeps in DUKW's, using

the A-frames.

The problem of organizing the armored

amphibian battalion multiplied these complexities. The LVT (A), or "amphibian

tank," was a newly developed vehicle which

had been used in combat heretofore only in

the Central Pacific. Few officers of the 1st

Marine Division had so much as laid eyes

on one.57 And at the outset none were avail55 Company B personnel served as stretcher bearers and relief drivers. Ur Maj R. B. McBroom to

CMC, 13Mar50. Ltr Maj G. J. DeBell to CMC,

20Mar50, hereinafter cited as DeBell.

56 Ltr Maj A. F. Reutlinger to CMC, 10Mar50,

hereinafter cited as Reutlinger. This letter contains a wealth of graphic detail regarding the problems encountered in this reorganization.

57"His (the CO's) only knowledge of the vehicle he was to fight was a picture seen in ONI

226." LtCol K. H. Boyer, monograph prepared at

Marine Corps Schools, March 1947, hereinafter cited

as Boyer Mono.
able here even for demonstration purposes.

Thus, not only must sufficient personnel be

obtained, but these must be trained initially

from blueprints in the operation of a vehicle they would be called upon to take into

battle.

The man appointed to this seemingly insuperable task was Lieutenant Colonel Kimber H. Boyer, until then commanding officer

of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion. For

the first ten days his entire officer complement consisted of one first lieutenant and

two warrant officers, and to initiate training

he had to borrow a weapons expert from

the 7th Marines.58 His personnel arrived in

driblets from various sources: rear echelons

of other armored amphibian battalions and

tank battalions, and men shipped out from

the Tracked Vehicle School in the United

States. Few had had any combat experience

at all; of the 36 officers and 800 enlisted

men who finally comprised the battalion, only

approximately 50 had ever fought an

LVT (A).

Intensive training began with delivery of

the first six vehicles: LVT (A) ( 1) 's. By the

first week in August the battalion had acquired 50 per cent of its machines and 60

per cent of its personnel, when disturbing

word arrived that its remaining quota of

vehicles would be of a different model:

LVT (A) (4)'s, mounting 75mm howitzers in

place of the 37's with which the men had

been trained up to this point, with embarkation only about three weeks away. That the

battalion should turn in an outstanding performance after such unpropitious beginnings might well rank as one of the minor

miracles of the campaign.°

59 This was Maj J. E. Buckley, CO Wpns Co, 7th

Marines. In a letter to CMC, 10Mar50, LtCol

Buckley (Ret.) wrote: "Kimber Boyer did one of

the greatest training jobs I ever saw or heard of."

59 Col Boyer himself viewed the "miracle" in a

somewhat different light: "It would be an insult to

the intelligence of a military minded reader to say

that the Battalion was sufficiently trained and indoctrinated to carry out its mission. It can be considered some sort of a miracle that the initial phase

of the Operation was not seriously disrupted."

Boyer Mono, 17.

Shortages of critical equipment were not

limited to heavy assault vehicles. They embraced everything from tank spare parts and

communications equipment to bazookas,

BAR's, and spare machine gun barrels, to

such a degree as not only to hamper training but to cause serious concern over the

forthcoming operation. This was notably

true in the case of the pack type flamethrowers which arrived too late to be distributed according to plan. Final allotments in many categories arrived barely in

time to be combat loaded, and a few had to

be crammed aboard the transports after the

troops had embarked.°

In general, it may be said that the only

items in which shortages did not exist were

the basic arms of the individual Marine. And

even here there was some minor difficulty:

the decision to replace carbines in infantry

units with rifles and submachine guns could

not be implemented immediately for lack of

the latter weapons.61

The equipment finally delivered was the

most up-to-date available, much of it improved over earlier models with which the

1st Division was familiar.° Only two en60 A full allowance of new dry cell batteries for

the vital TBX radios, issued at the last moment,

were discovered to be essentially all dead. Fortunately, 4th Base Depot was able to duplicate the

issue the same day. Ramsey. "Belts of machine

gun ammunition had rotted .. . . powder rings on

mortar ammunition were disintegrating and hourrelets rusted, shotgun shells swollen or if brass

corroded. All ammunition had to be unstowed, inspected and in large part replaced and restowed at

the last minute." Ltr LtCol S. S. Berger to CMC,

19Mar50, hereinafter cited as Berger.

61 "Carbines were retained generally by personnel assigned to crew-served weapons and others who

formerly carried a pistol. The attitude of the battalions was that the carbine without bayonet was

an adequate substitute for a pistol, but not for an

M-1 rifle with bayonet." 1st MarDiv SAR, I, 5.

"M-1's and TSMG's were substituted in 2/7 for

carbines. Machine gun squad leaders carried

T SM G's." Berger.

62 The 1st Tank Bn, for instance, which had begun the war with gas-engine light tanks and subsequently acquired one company of gas-engine mediums for the Cape Gloucester operation, now found

itself equipped entirely with diesel-engine mediums.

Stuart.

31
tireAy new items worthy of mention were

issued at this time.

Most notable was the Navy Mark I flamethrower, an experimental weapon developed

by the Seabees at Pearl Harbor, which was

capable of throwing a stream of blazing

Napalm up to 150 yards. The first three of

these were furnished the division in July,

together with four LVT-4's on which to

mount them. Their primary function was

thought to be immediate action against beach

pillboxes in support of the assault waves,

though actually they proved their greatest

usefulness in subsequent developments farther inland. The flame units were installed

on three of the LVT-4's as prescribed, the

fourth amtrack being adapted as a supply

carrier to service them in the field.

The second new weapon was the 60mm

shoulder mortar, a standard mortar adapted

to a light machine gun mount for direct, flattrajectory fire against caves and pillbox

openings. Some of its parts proved not

rugged enough for sustained use and had

to be replaced nearly as often as the poor

devils who were obliged to fire the contraption from their shoulders. Essentially its

functions duplicated those of the bazooka,

and its adoption resulted from the frequent

failure of bazooka rockets to detonate in the

soft mud of Cape Gloucester. However,#there

proved to be very little soft ground amid

LONG RANGE FLAME-THROWERS were first used at Peleliu. LVT mount was thereafter replaced by tank.

32
FINAL CRITIQUE, following last rehearsal at Guadalcanal. Assembled Marine and Navy Officers are here addressed by

First Division chief of staff. Front row: Generals 0. P. Smith and W. H. Rupertus, and Captain T. B. Brittan, USN,

commander of the transport group.

the coral of Peleliu and, although the shoulder mortar was used effectively, it came to

be considered less practical all around than

the weapon it had been designed to replace.°

The training program culminated in two

full-scale rehearsals, held on 27 and 29 August respectively, in cooperation with Task

Force 32.1 (Peleliu Attack Force). By this

63"As presently constructed, they (shoulder mortars) are too heavy and certain parts are too weak.

. . . After firing two to four rounds, it is necessary

to replace the gunner. Units feel that the shoulder

mortar as now constructed is not of sufficient value

to include it in the authorized weapons." 1st

MarDiv SAR, II, Annex A, 5.

time the assault troops were all embarked

on the vessels which were to carry them to

the target (see below) and standing by off

Guadalcanal, and the terrain selected for

these maneuvers was the Tassafaronga region of that island.

No coral reef exists here, but this was

readily simulated by setting up an arbitrary

transfer control line at the proper distance

from the beach where the landing craft

carrying the later waves halted to rendezvous

with the returning LVT's which shuttled the

men in from there. Once ashore, the assault

units moved out at once on a reasonably

accurate facsimile of their missions, and an

33
advance division command post was set up

to coordinate their movements.

The first of these exercises had been described as a "pre-dress rehearsal." 64 Naval

gunfire and air support units went through

their respective motions, but there was no

firing. Everything progressed with pleasing

smoothness up to the point where the division command post attempted to establish

communication with the regiments. This

was eventually achieved by field telephone

but the radio proved useless, the new equipment having arrived too late to be calibrated

accurately and set up in accordance with

the plan.65 This was quickly rectified, however, to such good effect that the second rehearsal, using token quantities of live ammunition, aerial bombs and rockets, came off

so well that a critique held the following

day at 'IIIAC headquarters produced little

that was constructive because "everyone was

pleased with everyone else." 66

A shore party exercise at Tetere Beach

on 3 September, mainly to perfect the setting up of communications, completed the

training phase. For better or for worse,

the 1st Marine Division and its reinforcing

troops were as ready for combat as they

would ever be.

LOADING AND MOUNTING OUT

Availability of shipping had always been

one of the critical controlling factors in the

U. S. Pacific offensive, involving as it did

such vast distances between base and target. Not since the early stages of the war,

when ships in sufficient numbers simply did

not exist, was the shortage felt so acutely

as just prior to the Peleliu operation. Again,

responsibility could be attributed to the long

delay in the Guam invasion. The sortie of

the Japanese Fleet into the Philippines Sea

might be rated as a major enemy disaster on

the strategic level, but as a means for pro64 0. P. Smith PerNar.

65 1st MarDiv SAR, I, Annex E. For amplification see Ramsey.

660. P. Smith, op.cit.

34

viding headaches for the 1st Marine Division it proved an unqualified success.

Nobody knew when the necessary shipping

would arrive, except that it became increasingly apparent that this was not going to be

until the last moment. The elaborate loading plans on which such an operation is

predicated were meticulously worked out on

the general level, but detailed planning was

impossible in advance owing to lack of

knowledge as to exactly which ships would

be available and the individual capacities

and peculiarities of each. And the inevitable

misunderstandings among the diverse elements in this highly complicated business

necessitated changes, compromises and improvisations up to the last minute.

The problem was not simplified by the

fact that loading operations had to be conducted at five widely separated points: Pa-.

vuvu, Banika, Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Espiritu Santo (New Hebrides), the last

named being the base of the Marine air

squadrons designated to operate from the

field on Peleliu once it had been secured.

Several of the ships, indeed, were scheduled

to pick up portions of their cargo at two

or more of these separated points. Careful

coordination was necessary to avoid wasted

effort and backtracking. Especially at Pavuvu and Banika, beaches, lighters and dockage facilities were insufficient to load more

than a few vessels at a time; thus, when

most of them appeared simultaneously with

little time to spare, they were obliged to

take their turns in accordance with an exceedingly tight schedule and keep out of

each other's way while doing so.

It was a step by step process, entailing

close coordination and prodigious labor. The

LST flotilla had to be assembled from several areas of the Central Pacific, and the

first units did not begin arriving until 15

August. The last ones appeared only on the

26th, by which time the troops had been embarked in preparation for their landing exercises. Despite this, all 30 LST's, in addition

to 17 transports and two LSD's, had been

combat loaded by the 31st.
Following the rehearsals, the convoy stood

by off Tetere Beach while the 81st Infantry

Division, which had assembled in the area

by 26 August, took over Tassafaronga for

its own final rehearsals for the assault on

Angaur. While awaiting completion of

these, the Marines were landed daily for

recreation and small unit exercises, and the

transports moved by turn over to Tulagi for

fueling.

With everything in readiness at last, the

slower moving tractor groups of the two divisions, aboard LST's (average speed, 7.7

knots), departed Guadalcanal with their respective screening forces early on the morning of 4 September. The faster transports

and LSD's (averaging 12.1 knots) left on

the 8th to rendezvous with them during the

early hours of D-Day off the target which

the fire support group would have been

softening up for three days by then. Their

course took them northwestward through

the Solomons, then across the Equator on

an approach generally parallel to the northern coast of New Guinea: a distance of approximately 2,100 miles. The sea was smooth

throughout, the run uneventful—and miserably uncomfortable for the men, as such

trips inevitably are in the tropics.

Previous to departure from Guadalcanal,

a sealed envelope had been issued to each

of the civilian news correspondents assigned

to cover the expedition, and to the troop

commanders aboard several of the ships,

marked with explicit instructions that it was

not to be opened until D-minus 1, at which

time the contents was to be broadcast to all

hands. On the morning of 14 September,

therefore, the seals were broken and the

recipients learned, to the considerable astonishment of many of them,67 that the division's commanding general expected the operation to be very tough but very short,

comparable to Tarawa, and that Peleliu

should be secured within four days: perhaps the most striking manifestation of that

preoccupation with speedy conquest at the

highest division level which was to color

tactical thinking ashore for a month to follow.68

67"I doubt that anyone with the possible exception of the Chief of Staff was consulted before the

letter was written and distributed. . . . I was given

a complete rough draft of the letter and merely

supervised its reproduction." Ltr LtCol W. E.

Benedict (D-1) to CMC, 27Feb50, hereinafter cited

as Benedict.

68 Most officers believed this unusual document intended in the nature of a "pep talk." This was not

its effect on the news correspondents, however:

many of the 36 accredited to the division did not

come ashore at all, and only six (one of whom was

killed) chose to stay through the critical early

phases. Hence, news coverage of the operation was

sketchy, often misleading, and, when quick conquest failed to materialize, tinged with biting criticism.

35
CHAPTER Ill

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

0-Day on Peleliu

Beginning with its first amphibious assault, the 1st Marine Division had built up

a tradition of extraordinary good luck in

making its initial landings against the

enemy. At Guadalcanal a low overcast had

covered the approach of the convoy, tactical

surprise had been complete, and landing conditions perfect. At Cap 'e Gloucester, again

tactical surprise was achieved in the selection of the beaches, and D-Day provided

virtually the only clear, calm morning which

occurred during the entire monsoon season.

The sea was placid at Peleliu, too, and the

temperature the least debilitating that would

be encountered in weeks to come. But beyond this point, any resemblance to the

"landing luck" of Guadalcanal and Cape

Gloucester was purely coincidental.

Everything that was, or appeared, practicable had been done in preparation. Naval

gunfire and air strikes had, presumably, softened up the defenders for the past three

days. The underwater demolition teams had

cleared the approaches and scouted the reef

as well as conditions would permit—and

done a satisfactory job, as things turned

out. At 0800 direct supporting fire was commenced with high explosive to knock out

beach defenses and white phosphorous

smoke shell farther inland to screen the approach by blacking-out observation from the

high ground north of the airfield. Under

this cover the personnel assault waves moved

toward the shore behind the "amphibian

36

tanks" of the newly improvised provisional

3d Armored Amphibian Battalion, the naval

gunfire moving forward and toward# the

flanks#according to schedule as they drew

nearer, and carrier-borne planes#coming in

to strafe and dive-bomb directly to their

front.

All this was as had been planned and rehearsed; a school problem. But presently the

Japanese began revising "The Book."

As the leading waves entered the zone between the transfer line and the reef's edge,

shells began to fall among the vehicles,

throwing geysers of water#skyward.# This

did not appear to be aimed fire, but rather

a protective curtain of some intensity which

moved shoreward with the approach of the

vehicles.'

The smoke screen drifted seaward to obscure the beach and its approaches, dissipating languidly in the windless air. And

when at last visibility was possible again,

watchers still aboard the ships off-shore were

appalled to discern smoke of another sort:

burning amtracks and DUKW's littered

across the length and breadth of the reef.2

1 1st Marines Regimental Narrative, hereinafter

cited as 1st MarNar.

2 LtCol H. C. Tschirgi, D-4, viewed this scene

from the deck of a transport. "I'd never seen combat before," he recalled later, "and the first thing

that struck me was that this was a hell#of a way

to treat $40,000 equipment." Interview with Col

Tschirgi, 26Jan49.
Taking their losses in stride, the assault

waves pressed on. The LVT (A)'s in the

lead, hit the beach at approximately 0830,3

heaved themselves up out of the water and

led the inland advance of the infantry

through a mounting volume of artillery and

mortar fire, picking a gingerly way among

the mines thickly seeded on the beach and

for an average depth of a hundred yards

inland.4 Only scattered enemy infantry had

remained in the beach positions throughout

the heavy shelling, but resistance developed

rapidly as the advance progressed.

Sherman medium tanks began to arrive

simultaneously with the fourth wave to take

over from the much more vulnerable amphibians. This was much earlier than in any

previous Marine operation, as a result of

well worked planning. Thanks to excellent

water-proofing and the efforts of the underwater demolition teams in clearing away the

worst of the obstacles, they were guided

across the reef without major physical difficulties. However, so slowly did they have to

pick their way and so intense was the enemy

fire, that all but one of the 18 machines assigned to support the 1st Marines were

struck by high explosive shells before reaching shore.3 Only three were knocked out of

action, fortunately, some explosions occurring below the surface where the depth of

the water prevented serious damage.

8 Exact time of first landing recorded as 0832. 1st

MarDiv SAR, II, 2.

4 Many mines were improvised from aerial bombs

buried up to the nose in the sand, to supplement

land mines of the conventional type and horned

anti-invasion mines. Many of the latter were not

armed and failed to detonate. It is believed that

most of them were set out hurriedly during the

night, as the UDT's did not spot them in large

numbers the previous day, which would help to explain an otherwise almost incomprehensible piece

of carelessness on the enemy's part.

5 This unit was Co. A, 1st Tank Bn. Six mare

of its machines were knocked out by enemy action

during the next few hours, and by the end of the

second day it had only five machines operative.

1st Mar Nar. Of the division's total of 30 tanks

"over half. . . received from one to four hits during

the 10 minutes reef crossing." 1st MarDiv SAR,

Anex J.

MARINES going into battle.

The tractor-borne waves continued to push

in on schedule, taking their losses grimly,

and thus the initial momentum was sustained. But subsequent elements were delayed increasingly at the transfer control

line as the mounting shortage of LVT's

made itself felt.6 The destruction was comparatively light in the center where only

artillery and mortar fire was encountered.

The flanks, however, were enfiladed by high

velocity weapons: emplaced on Peleliu's

southwestern promontory and a small unnamed island offshore a few hundred yards

below Beach Orange 3; and to the north on

a point of high ground projecting about 25

6 Only 26 LVT's were reported actually destroyed

on D-Day. Ibid., Annex F. Yet an air observer

on one occasion reported 38 burning simultaneously

and unofficial estimates by assault unit commanders bring the total knocked out at least temporarily

in excess of 60. Partly accounting for the apparent

discrepancy might be "the extreme reluctance, short

of complete demolition or submersion in over 10

fathoms, of any crew chief to regard his vehicle as

destroyed"; also, DUKW'S and LVT(A)'s were

being hit and were not readily distinguishable from

the air. Reutlinger. Contributing perhaps even

more, to the growing shortage was the necessity for

repair and refueling, and the practice of evacuating

the more seriously wounded all the way to the

transport area in the slow-moving amtracks.

31
LVT(A)'S LED THE ADVANCE across the beach. Wrecked LVT (left background) is one of many knocked out in the first

onslaught.

yards to seaward just beyond the ultimate

boundary of White 1.7

As has been noted, the scheme of maneuver assigned a particular mission to each of

the regimental combat teams. Because these

missions varied, and encountered varying

fortunes, they are best discussed individually,

THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT 8

The 1st Marines had as its target the

White Beaches, and the assault waves hit

7 That positions of such obvious tactical importance had not been demolished by naval gunfire

and close air support was the subject of much bitter

comment by the troops who had to put them out of

action after being obliged to land through their fire.

But most of these installations were proof against

anything short of a direct hit and so well camouflaged that their precise positions could not be

spotted; and "The idea . . . of just firing at an

island is an inexcusable waste of ammunition." Ltr

RAdm G. H. Fort to BrigGen C. C. Jerome,

20Mar50, hereinafter cited as Fort. "My surprise

and chagrin when concealed batteries opened up on

the LVT's can be imagined." Ltr Adm. J. S. 01-

dendorf to BrigGen C. C. Jerome, 25Mar50, hereinafter cited as Oldendorf.

38

these approximately on schedule: 2d Battalion on the right, 3d on the left, with the

1st Battalion to come in behind them at

about 0945 as regimental reserve, prepared

to participate in the left turn to the north

by attacking through the center of the regiment and seizing the high ground to the

north of 0-2.9

On White 2, the 2d Battalion drove inland against resistance described as "moderate".10 Utilizing all organic regimental

weapons and supported by the surviving

armored amphibians until the Sherman

8 Wherever possible, this monograph's accounts

of regimental actions are drawn from reports submitted at regimental or battalion level, supplemented

as practicable by higher echelon reports, personal

consultations, letters and private memoirs. Basic

sources on 1st Marines are: History of 1st Marine

Regiment, 1st Marines Regimental Narrative (context of these two works almost identical, latter being a later rewrite of material prepared during and

immediately following the operation), 1st Battalion

Unit History, and 3d Battalion Record of Events.

Ltr LtCol R. G. Davis to LtCol G. D. Gayle,

4Nov49; hereinafter cited as Davis.

10 1st Mar Noir.
BEACH WHITE I

BEACH WHITE 2

BEACH ORANGE I .1

1

NGESEBUS I.

KONGAURU I.

phosphats'"'

Refinery

APIA/WV.I.;

- )3.4

i.nolt."1

Akarokoro Pt

O

Radio Stork, Amiangal Mt 4,,,yhtt4P"'

2

rf.Umun

Ti

BEACH ORANGE 2 1

BEACH ORANGE 3

ne 71.3

JNNAME

S E Promontory

S W Promontory

NGARMOKED I.

BEACH PURPLE

JAPANESE#DEFENSIVE PLAN

Direction#20of planned counterattack

AT Direction of fire, anti-tank, anti -boat guns

Direction of fire, machine guns

K-51 Tanks

1000 500 0 1000 2000 Yds

MAP 5
MEN OF 1st MARINES advance around unexpected coral ridge inland from White Beaches.

tanks should come up, this unit reached the

0-1 phase line—approximately 350 yards

through heavy woods—by 0930: an excellent achievement, though not without cost.

Here, facing the airfield and building area

from the far side of the woods, the battalion

tied in with the 5th Marines on its right;

and, perforce, was ordered halted and held

up pending solution of the problem facing

the 3d Battalion.

By this time the 3d Battalion was in very

serious trouble indeed. From the moment of

landing this unit had run into opposition of

the most stubborn and violent kind from

strongly emplaced Japanese who added small

arms and automatic weapons fire to the

brutal artillery and mortar shelling which

was blanketing the whole area. What was

worse, the leading elements had not advanced

a hundred yards inland before they found

themselves confronted by a most formidable

natural obstacle which showed on none of

the advance maps or intelligence reports:

a long, rugged coral ridge about 30 feet in

elevation,#its precipitous face honeycombed

with caves and dug-in positions. All initial

assaults were repulsed, even after the tanks

had been brought up. Troops attempting to

storm the northern portion stumbled into a

wide, deep anti-tank trench, dominated by

the ridge itself and cleverly enfiladed, where

many of them remained pinned down for

hours.

39
Company A of the reserve battalion was

committed early in the day in support of

the 3d Battalion and Company B late in

the afternoon, but their most determined

efforts failed to close the gap which had occurred over toward the left (see below) . Late

in the afternoon the securing of a precarious

foothold on the southern sector of the ridge

top improved the position somewhat but

gave cause for little optimism.11

More than eight hours of some of the

fiercest and most confused fighting in the

Pacific war had produced two major gaps

in the line so serious as to imperil the position of the entire division. All the men in

reach who could possibly be spared, including headquarters personnel and 100 men

from the 1st Engineer Battalion," were

brought up to form a defense in depth

against the threat of a counterattack in force

along the corridor between the ridge and

the sea which might well roll up the line

and sweep down the landing beaches, now

congested with gear and supplies owing to

the shallowness of the inland penetration.

Fortunately, this particular attack did not

materialize. No doubt, the tactical situation

was as obscure to the Japanese as it was

to the invaders, for their communications

system must have been badly battered. Furthermore, the unusually elaborate plans for

the defense of Peleliu, as was later discovered, did not envision a major counterattack

in this particular sector. Never overgifted

with the resourcefulness to regroup quickly

in order to capitalize a fluid tactical situation, the Japanese were in no position to do

so now. Grimly they went ahead with their

preconceived plans and, as happens so often

in the confusion of battle, the golden opportunity slipped through their fingers.

11 Five LVT's carrying the 1st Marines' command

group had been badly hit while crossing the reef

with the resultant loss of most of its communications equipment and expert operators. Not until

much later did the division command have any accurate conception of the precariousness of the 1st

Regiment's position. 0. P. Smith PerNar.

12 1st Mar Nar.

40

To complete the 3d Battalion picture, Captain George P. Hunt's Company K was writing an epic of small unit combat on the extreme left; an action which, owing to the

course of events, became in effect a solo

performance."

Company K's position was on the extreme

left of the 3d Battalion, thus responsible for

securing the flank of the entire division. The

most important objective in this zone was

the point just to the north, previously mentioned, from which destructive enfilading

fire was being poured the length of the White

Beaches. The threat this position presented

to the entire landing operation was selfevident. Its formidability is best described

in Captain Hunt's own words:

The Point, rising thirty feet above the water's

edge, was of solid, jagged coral, a rocky mass of

sharp pinnacles, deep crevasses, tremendous boulders. Pillboxes, reinforced with steel and concrete,

had been dug or blasted in the base of the perpendicular drop to the beach. Others, with coral and

concrete piled six feet on top were constructed

above, and spider holes were blasted around them

for protecting infantry. It surpassed by far anything we had conceived of when we studied the

aerial photographs.14

There was no evidence that naval gunfire

had had any effect whatever on these installations.

The point was unassailable from the beach.

The rifle platoon assigned to deal with it

was obliged to fight inland, then execute a

turning movement to take it from the landward side. In so doing this platoon lost contact with the other assault platoon which, as

it turned out later, had lost its leader, killed,

and had been caught in the tank trap where

it was pinned down for some time.

Resistance was fierce and stubborn, and

Captain Hunt was obliged to commit his

support platoon. The ensuing fire fight lasted

nearly two hours. During this time most of

13 Captain Hunt, a professional writer in civilian

life, has described this action fully in an excellent

small book: Coral Comes High, Harper, 1946, from

which many of the substantiated details of this account have been drawn.

14 Hunt op.cit., 58.
the enemy infantry protecting the installations were killed, and at 1015 what was left

of the two platoons stormed the point, driving off the remainder and annihilated the

pillboxesn by taking advantage of their blind

spots.

The principal installation proved to be a

powerful reinforced concrete casemate built

into the coral near the base of the cliff and

mounting the 47mm antitank-antiboat gun

which had been playing such havoc by enfilading the beach all morning. This was

taken by creeping down on it from above.

Lieutenant William L. Willis, the surviving

platoon leader, managed to drop a smoke

grenade just outside the embrasure to cover

the approach, whereupon Corporal Anderson

launched a rifle grenade into the firing aperture. This struck the gun barrel, knocking

the weapon out of action, and ignited

"something inflammable".16 There was a

big explosion, and the whole interior of the

casemate was swept by flame. Screaming

Japanese, the ammunition in their belts exploding like firecrackers from the intense

heat, fled out the rear exit where they were

mowed down by a squad of Marines placed

there for that express purpose.

So Captain Hunt was on the point with

the 30-odd men of the two platoons who had

survived the assault. And there he remained isolated for thirty hours as the Japanese, discovering the gap in Company K's

lines, moved into the area in force. Repeated

efforts by elements of the reserve battalion

failed to close the gap, and at nightfall it

was necessary to establish a second line of

defense to protect the division flank, leaving

Hunt and his men to hold the point as best

1:1 There were five billboxes altogether, four

mounting heavy machine guns, the fifth the 47mm.

The spider trenches were manned by riflemen and

light machine gunners. 3d Bn, 1st Mar Record of

Events, hereinafter cited as 3/1 RofE.

16 Lt. Willis quoted by Hunt, op. cit., 65. A subsequent intelligence report attributed the knocking

out of this casemate to the use of a flame thrower,

a weapon which the platoon did not have available

at that particular time, though the end effect was

very similar. What the grenade set off was probably stacked up 47mm ammunition.

they could against the series of sharp counter-attacks which developed.

Later it proved possible to send in water,

food and ammunition, and to evacuate the

wounded, by amtrack. But it was such a

narrow thing that at one stage during the

first night Hunt was holding the point with

18 men and leaning heavily on a captured

Japanese machine gun to stave off annihilation.17

IN THE CENTER 's

The 5th Marines, in the center, fared

somewhat better. The deadly antiboat fire

which played such havoc with the landing

vehicles operating against the flank beaches

was less effective (though not wholly ineffective) in this regiment's zone, with the

result that the assault waves suffered comparatively smaller losses, mainly from artillery and mortar fire in crossing the reef.

Nor was the ground to the front so strongly

defended.

This regiment also landed two battalions

in assault: the 1st on Beach Orange 1, the

3d on Orange 2. They met only scattered

resistance on the beaches and not much more

immediately inland. The terrain here was

favorable for maneuver, coconut groves providing cover with little obstruction, and contained no such natural obstacles as the

formidable coral ridge which was causing

the 1st Marines so much trouble. Thus, the

1st. Battalion drove through without undue

difficulty to the 0-1 phase line and there

tied-in firmly with 2/1 19 on the left. And,

17 History of 1st Marine Regiment, 7; hereinafter

cited as Hist 1st Mar.

18 Except as otherwise cited, this monograph's

accounts of all operations of 5th Marines derive

from the following basic documentary sources pertaining to that regiment: Regimental Narrative,

War Diary, R-2 Reports, 1st Battalion Bn-3 Journal, 2c1 Battalion Journal, 3d Battalion Record of

Operations, 5th Regiment Unit Reports.

19 This short form designates 2d Battalion, 1st

Marines: the battalion numeral preceding that of

the regiment. Such abbreviations appear in most

contemporary reports of the period under discussion, though occasionally appearing in hyphenated

form (3-1), and are used throughout this mono41
1st LIEUTENANT CARLTON R. ROUH received the Medal of

Honor for placing his body between a Japanese grenade

and two comrades to absorb the full force of the explosion himself.

as with that battalion, here the companies

were obliged to remain, owing partly to the

inability of the 1st Marines to advance on

the extreme left and partly to the murderous

artillery and mortar fire from the high

ground to the north which now swept the

open airfield to their front.

graph. Companies are sometimes similarly designated: E/5 (Company E, 5th Marines). It should

be understood as standing for a reinforced infantry

unit, but the terms BLT (battalion landing team)

and RCT (regimental combat team) had not come

into general use in the Marine Corps at this time

and occur with comparative infrequency.

42

The story of the 3d Battalion on the right

developed differently, however. This unit

was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. C.

Shofner, who had previously distinguished

himself by escaping from a Japanese prison

camp where he had been confined following

the fall of Corregidor. His executive officer,

Major Robert M. Ash, was killed within a

few moments of hitting the beach, and the

LVT carrying most of the battalion's field

telephone equipment and personnel was destroyed on the reef,2° thereby complicating

a control problem which was difficult enough

to begin With.21

According to plan, Company I landed on

the left, Company K on the right, with Company L coming in immediately behind the

assault waveg. On the left all went well, or

as well as can be reasonably expected in battle: Company I made contact with the 1st

Battalion and, advancing abreast, reached

0-1 simultaneously with that unit, at about

0930.

Company K, however, ran into trouble

at once owing to circumstances which caused

many assault elements of the 7th Marines

to be landed on the southern zone of Beach

Orange 2 rather than on Orange 3 as prescribed. (See following sub-chapter.) This

not only caused confusion on the beach but

also delayed the company's advance while

its unexpected guests were trying to extricate themselves and make their way to their

own designated sector. Further hampered

by an enemy mortar barrage, Company K

20 Ltr LtCol A. C. Shofner to CMC, 9Mar50, hereinafter cited as Shofner.

21 Considerable confusion exists as to what really

happened to 3/5 during D-Day. Only extant official reports from 5th Marines bearing on the subject are Regimental War Diary and 3/5 Record of

Operations, which do not agree on all points and

frequently conflict with reports of 7th Marines (see

sub-chapter following). This account supplements

these basic sources with carefully screened material recently obtained frorn surviving officers who

were on the scene. In view of the fallibility of the

human memory five years after the event, allowance must be made for a certain amount of conjecture.
did not draw abreast of Company I until

about 1000.22

But if the situation in the 3d Battalion

zone could be said to be fairly stabilized at

this point, it was not destined#to remain so

for long. Company K's line of advance lay

through dense scrub jungle which, while

slowing progress somewhat, provided concealment from the heavy shelling which was

holding up those elements facing the open

airfield. Thus, no sooner had the eastward

push been resumed (at 1030) than contact

was broken with Company I on the left,

which had the responsibility for remaining

tied-in with the 1st Battalion.

Company L was committed in an effort

to close this gap, but the line remained dangerously extended. Fortunately, the 5th Marines Operations Plan called for Major Gordon D. Gayle's 2d Battalion, in regimental

reserve, to come in close on the heels of the

assault waves and be committed on the right

of the 1st Battalion. Advance elements of

this unit began landing at 0935, and the

battalion as a whole was in position on the

0-1 line by 1130.23 Here it relieved Company

I, which was ordered to pass around the

right of Company L and tie in between that

unit and the left of Company K which reported its position as along a trail about

halfway across the island.

The 2d Battalion now began a strong drive

eastward, described subsequently, preparatory to a turning movement toward the

north. Because contact had to be maintained

with the 1st#Battalion, still on the 0-1 line,

the completion of this maneuver found 2/5

deployed completely across the southern edge

of the airfield.24 Company L, keeping pace,

succeeded in reaching Peleliu's eastern shore,

thus cutting the island into two parts in accordance with the operations plan, but in

22 This is hour given by 5th Marines War Diary

hereinafter cited as 5th Mar WD.

23Ibid.

24 A subsequent northward surge carried 2/5

nearly to the center of the airfield for the day's

most substantial gain. See sub-chapter "The Japanese Strike Back".

8921060-50-4

accomplishing this eventually lost contact

with the rest of its own 3d Battalion.23

Shortly after noon, strong resistance from

a nest of pillboxes# halted the advance of

Companies I and K. By the time this was

overcome with the aid of tanks, it was discovered that contact had been lost with 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines, on the right,26

Radio communication was established between the two#20battalions, and 3/5 gave the

location of its right flank as along a diagonal

north-south trail in Target Square 125—P.

Taking stock of its own situation, 3/7 reported its left on a similar trail approximately 200 yards farther forward.27 Thereupon, Shofner's battalion pressed on to the

designated spot and, when unable to make

contact there, continued the advance to the

main north-south road. Here, at about 1600,

a subsequent radio message was received

from 3/7, stating that the previous location

given for that battalion's position was incorrect and that its left actually lay on the

trail in "the lower corner of target square

125—P".28

This unfortunate miscalculation is indicative of the difficulties of operating in unfamiliar, sketchily mapped terrain cloaked

with scrub jungle and infested with the

enemy. The two trails in question ran generally parallel and were difficult of positive

identification. So far as it is possible to re25 Exactly when this break occurred is not noted

in the contemporary official reports. Shofner records that all three companies were tied-in#20during

the early afternoon. The undisputable fact is that

Co. L was no longer in contact with any elements

of 3/5 at dusk.

26 5th Mar WD gives 1400 as the approximate

hour this opposition was overcome. Shofner records

that the strong point was encountered "about 1230".

See also 3/7 War Diary and ltr Maj. C. A. Brooks

to CMC, 8Feb50, hereinafter cited as Brooks.

27 3 / 5 Record of Operations. Shofner. Brooks.

28 Shofner. There is an apparent discrepancy

here, as TX 125—P lay entirely in 3/5 zone of action.

Official reports make no specific mention of this

message, but 5th Mar WD records: "At 1600 it was

discovered that elements of the 3d Bn. had pushed

some 300 to 400 yards ahead of the 7th Marines on

our right and that the 7th was firing on our

troops."

43
construct the situation from extant evidence,

it would appear that when the first messages

were exchanged the flanks of the two battalions were actually on the same trail,

which curved sharply about 100 yards to

the east within the zone of 3/7. Thus, while

3/5 pushed ahead to where 3/7 was believed

to be, the latter battalion stood fast thinking the former would come abreast of it.

Immediate steps were taken to rectify the

situation. In the 3/5 zone, Company K was

ordered to bend its right flank back, and all

available personnel from Headquarters Company were thrown in to extend the line in

this direction in an effort to tie-in with 3/7

which was supposed to be moving its left

forward simultaneously.29 But no contact

had been made by the time darkness fell.

It was evidently this effort which caused

Company K to become separated from Company I, on its left, which in turn had lost

contact with Company L sometime during

the course of events.80

Then, as about 1700,31 a well placed enemy

mortar barrage struck the command post,

23 3/7 had been held up for some time before a

formidable enemy position and was unable to make

any appreciable advance in this area, as described

in sub-chapter following.

30"Company I had no contact with battalion headquarters. Radio batteries, which ,had been in use

throughout the day were dead and replacements had

been lost during the landing. . . . As darkness was

setting in and adjoining units could not be located I

gave orders for the company to dig in for the

night. Even as we were digging in we were still

attempting to locate companies, or at least friendly

units on the left and right flanks. We were unable

to do so." Ltr Maj J. A. Crown to CMC, 13Feb50,

hereinafter cited as Crown.

31 5th Mar WD. There is some question as to

the exact hour. 3/5 Bo f0 gives it as "shortly before nightfall"; Brooks as "about 1830"; Shofner

says merely that it occurred while the attempt was

being made to close the gap on the right. Killed

by the same barrage was the regimental communications officer, Capt. R. F. Kehoe, Jr., who had just

arrived at the CP. Because his body was not

readily recognizable, it was first identified as that

of Col. Shofner, who was initially reported killed

in action. Brooks.

44

wounding Colonel Shofner. By the time the

commanding officer could be evacuated and

the general disruption straightened out, control of the 3d Battalion as a unit had virtually ceased to exist.

Obviously, strong measures were called

for. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt,

executive officer of the 5th Marines, assumed

command of the scattered 3d Battalion following the evacuation of Colonel Shofner,

but it was after dark before he was able to

locate even one of his companies. Inasmuch

as what Colonel Walt did to retrieve the situation was largely a one-man operation and

is covered in no official report, the account

which follows is drawn from his own narration of events," except as otherwise cited.

The regimental command had made no

radio contact with any elements of the 3d

battalion, including the command post, since

1700. The first unit to be located was Company L, less one platoon," at approximately

1830, on the right flank of the 2d Battalion.

The 2d Platoon was tied-in with that battalion, the rest of the company in the jungle

approximately 100 yards south of the airfield and 200 yards short of Peleliu's eastern

shore where, out of contact with friendly

troops, the men were digging-in an all

around defense for the night. These were

ordered back to the edge of the airfield, there

to set up a lineal defense facing south, tiedin on the left with the 2d Platoon which, in

turn, remained tied-in with 2/5, facing east

along the shoreline. In this new deployment,

Company L's front extended about 200 yards

inland.

Walt next located the left flank of the 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines. This had been extended by degrees all the way to the southern

edge of the airfield at a point about 400

yards in from the western shore where its

32 Contained in statement by LtCol Walt to Historical Div., USMC, 10Nov49, hereinafter cited as

Walt.

83 This platoon had been detached to serve as

special security guard to the battalion CP whose

position was open to the south because of the unclosed gap. Brooks.
left flank element was digging in on a defensive line facing east."

Accompanied by his runner, Walt then

moved out deeper into the dark jungle forward of the 3/7 line where, about 2100, he

came upon Company I, some 200 yards south

of the airfield and 300 yards short of the

eastern shore. This unit, as noted, also

had lost contact with friendly troops and was

setting up a perimeter defense. It, too, was

ordered to the airfield; to take up a position

on the right of Company L, with the object

of extending the south-facing line eastward

to cover the 2d Battalion from attack from

its rear."

Company K was found 100 yards southwest of where Company I had been located

and was ordered to the edge of the airfield

to complete the new line: to tie-in with the

left of 3/7 and the right of the new position

of Company I. Then at last (about 2230)

radio contact was made with the battalion

command post, a short distance behind Company K, which also reached the new area by

2300.

But a gap still existed in the center of the

new south-facing line, owing to the inability

of Company I, groping in the darkness and

jungle, to locate its designated position between Companies L and K.36 This was not

so serious as might appear, however, as the

final deployment of the missing unit was

immediately in front of this gap. In the

words of its Commanding officer: "Company

I spent the night with its left flank on the

edge of the airfield and its right flank in

34 This was Co. L, 7th Mar. How it came to be

so deep in the 5th Marines zone of action and so far

in the rear of the units of both regiments is explained in sub-chapter following.

39 Pending the regrouping of 3/5, Major Gayle,

at Colonel Walt's request, deployed the reserve company of the 2d Battalion (Co. F), facing southward, in the rear of the 2/5 line. As will be noted,

at this time 2/5 was deployed across the near center of the airfield, facing northward.

96"I Company was to connect with L Company

right flank and K Company left flank, but was unable to locate either company in the darkness and

did not get into position." 3/5 Rof0. This statement substantiated by Brooks.

the air in the scrub woods. Our backs were

to the field. No Japanese counterattack as

such ever hit our lines, which was, of course,

fortunate." 37

The front of the 5th Marines, as it was

finally set up for the night of D-Day, presents a rather odd appearance on the operational overlay: the three battalions facing

in as many different directions (east, north

and south), with 2d and 3d Battalions virtually back to back (see Map Number 6). Yet

these lines were well enough integrated to

stand firm throughout the hours of darkness.

THE SOUTHERN ZONE 38

On the extreme right of the division front,

the 7th Marines planned to land two battalions in column on Beach Orange 3, the remaining battalion (2/7) being kept afloat as

division reserve. The scheme of maneuver

called for the leading unit, the 3d Battalion,

to drive across to the eastern shore in conjunction with the 5th Marines in order to

split the island's defenders. The 1st Battalion, landing immediately behind, was to

wheel to the right in line and commence the

drive against the Japanese thus isolated in

the southern pocket, 3/7 wheeling to move

abreast once the island had been crossed."

37 Crown.

39 Basic documentary sources for this narrative

of operations of 7th Marines are the following:

Regimental Narrative, R-2 Journal, 1st Battalion

Historical Report, 1st Battalion Bn-2, Bn-3 Journal,

2d Battalion War Diary, 2d Battalion Unit Journal,

3d Battalion War Diary, 3d Battalion Bn-2 Journal,

3d Battalion Operation Reports. These are supplemented herein from other sources as specifically

cited.

39 A somewhat unusual command set-up prevailed

in the 7th Marines at this time, described as follows by CO, 1/7: "During the landing and initial

operations ashore, Company A was attached to 3/7;

to revert to control of CO 1/7 upon his landing.

Company A had the mission of advancing south in

the left half of 1/7 zone of action. This maneuver

was to provide initial flank protection for 3/7 as

it was advancing eastward. The support company

of 3/7 was attached to CO 1/7 for the landing and

reverted to CO 3/7 upon landing." Ltr LtCol J. J.

Gormley to CMC, 3Nov49, hereinafter cited as

Gormley.

45
JAPANESE ANTITANK DITCH provides cover for 7th Marines

The 3d Battalion encountered serious difficulties from the outset. The reef in this

area was so cluttered with both natural and

man-made obstacles that the amtracks were

often obliged to pick their way shoreward

in column. This slowed down the whole approach and made the vehicles prime targets for the fire which now poured into them

from the machine guns and antiboat guns

on the southwestern promontory (sometimes

called Ngarmoked Island) and the small unnamed island offshore beyond their right

flank, as well as the ubiquitous artillery and

mortars. Perhaps worse from a tactical

point of view, the enfilading fire caused many

of the LVT drivers to bear farther to the

left, thus landing some elements on Orange 2

46

Command Post on D-Day.

where they became intermixed with elements

of 3/5, as previously noted."

The inevitable delay attendant upon reorganizing in the designated zone of action was

further compounded by a combination of

mined beaches, barbed wire entanglements

and stiff but spotty resistance from a system of mutually supporting trenches and re40 This fire, combined with the obstacles mentioned, served to split the landing wave approximately in the center. Maj. Hurst, Bn CO, with

about half the CP and half the troops landed on

Orange 2. Maj. V. H. Streit, Bn Ex0, landed with

the other half on the southern extremity of Orange

3, where for a time this group constituted the right

flank element of the division front, though out of

physical contact with other elements. Oral statement LtCol Hunter Hurst, interviewed 9Mar50.
inforced pillboxes dug into, or blasted out

of, the coral. Furthermore, naval gunfire,

if it had accomplished little else#in this sector, had blasted away enough of the jungle

growth and inconspicuous terrain features

to give the region a much different appearance from that shown in the advance intelligence, making orientation difficult."

There was one man-made feature, however, which proved extremely useful in a

way its makers certainly had not planned.

This was a large Japanese antitank trench

a short distance inland from Orange 3. Its

existence had not been known prior to the

assault, but one of the support aircraft

spotted it in time to flash a report just in

advance of the first wave. As the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion describes the

situation:

Once officers were able#20to orient themselves it

(the antitank ditch) proved an excellent artery for

moving troops into the proper position for deployment and advance inland since it crossed the entire

width of our zone of action approximately parallel

to the beach. With respect to the battalion CP, I

am convinced that it enabled us to join the two principal echelons of CP personnel and commence functioning as a complete unit at least an hour earlier

than would otherwise have been#possible. I landed

with my half# of the CP personnel, opposite the

southwest turning circle of the airfield near the

right flank of the CT-5 zone of action. Major

Streit landed, with the other half of the CP personnel, equally as far from our intended position

in the opposite direction to the southward. After

announcing our early locations to each other, it was

simply a question of jumping in the ditch, meeting

in the middle, and jumping out again to displace

farther inland.42

The advance was finally resumed with two

companies in assault and made good progress for a while. By 1045 Company K, on

the right, had advanced 500 yards, capturing an enemy radio direction finder in the

process. But at about 1300 Company I,

which had been experiencing increasing difficulties in retaining contact with 3/5 on

41 Oral statement by Major Victor H. Streit, interviewed 14Feb49.

42 LtCol E. H. Hurst in written statement to Historical Div., USMC, dated 23Nov49, hereinafter

cited as Hurst.

the left, was halted before a strong nest of

Japanese defenses. This well organized position was "built around a large blockhouse,

the concrete ruins of a barracks area, several

pillboxes, concrete gun emplacements and

mutually supporting gun positions." 43 This

opposition had been expected, as the position showed clearly on the operational map.

So, in order to minimize the casualties which

would result from unsupported infantry assault, it was decided to await the arrival of

the tank platoon which was an organic part

of the landing team and had been briefed

in advance for this particular mission.

Here a new and unexpected element appeared to contribute to the confusion: one

of those small details which so often escape

notice in advance. The flank battalion of

each of the two regiments supposed to tie-in

was the 3d Battalion (3/5 and 3/7 respectively), containing identically lettered companies (I, K and L) . In this particular case,

the tanks moving up in support of 3/7 were

obliged to skirt the southern edge of the airfield in order to avoid the antitank ditch

previously mentioned. Here they came upon

a body of troops working forward and paused

to inquire the location of "Company I." Informed that this unit was "Company I," they

attached themselves and operated with it for

some time before discovering that it was

Company I, 5th Marines, instead of Company I, 7th Marines, which had#been held up

all this while awaiting them.

This delay completed the break in the already tenuous contact between the two regiments. Pausing to take stock, 3/7 was able

to find no elements whatsoever on its left

flank. Actually, Company K,#5th Marines,

had pushed ahead, as has been seen. But

there was no way of knowing that, for the

jungle growth limited visibility in every direction. To protect the open flank in order

that the attack might be continued, Company

L was placed in position immediately behind

Company I and echeloned to the left rear.

In an effort to reestablish contact, Company L worked patrols farther and farther

43 3/7 War Diary, 5; hereinafter cited as 3/7 WD.

47
to the left. Still groping, without success,

the foremost patrol emerged at length on the

southern edge of the airfield, entirely out

of its regimental zone of action and several

hundred yards directly in the rear of the

unit with which it was attempting to tiei11.44

The command post of 3/7, had been in

intermittent radio communication with that

of 3/5 throughout the afternoon, with the

resultant misunderstanding as to locations

44 Ibid., 6, states: "Patrols from 'L' Company had

established visual contact with LT 3-5 on the airstrip and physical contact was established after

dark." However, to judge by the relative positions

of the units at this time, it was probably 2/5 with

which visual contact was established, 3/5 being far

ahead and not on the airfield. The physical contact established after dark was with K/5, as noted

in previous sub-chapter, which Col. Walt had

placed in position here.

previously noted. It was not until Lieutenant Colonel Walt arrived on the scene that

it proved possible to orient the units in relation to each other and eventually effect the

redeployment described in previous subchapter.

In the meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines, had come in behind 3/7 as planned,

landing on Orange 3 at 1030. By this time

some of the early confusion on the beaches

had been resolved, but the 1st Battalion encountered many of the difficulties that had

plagued the 3d and a portion of its personnel likewise landed on Orange 2. Resistance

was described as "light, except for heavy

mortar fire" 45 until about 1200. But as the

45 1/7 Historical Report, 1; hereinafter cited as

117 HistRpt. Gormley states that the battalion

"was subjected to antiboat, machine gun, and particularly heavy mortar fire from the southwest proBLOCKHOUSE encountered by 3/7 late on D-Day was reduced following morning.

48
battalion began wheeling southward in accordance with its mission, enemy resistance

stiffened notably and the terrain became increasingly difficult. It was discovered that a

dense swamp, which#did not appear on the

operational map, blocked a large portion of

the right half of the battalion's zone of action. The single trail skirting its west

fringe, in Company C's area, was strongly

defended by enemy pillboxes and bunkers.

Company A, groping around the swamp

to the east, eventually extended itself some

250 yards into the 3d Battalion's zone. Company B was employed to tie-in the flanks of

Companies C and A, but not until 1520 was

Colonel Gormley able to announce the seizure of the intermediate phase line designated

0—A. During the night the Japanese staged

a strong counterattack from the swamp,

necessitating the alerting of shore party

personnel to serve as a mobile reserve in

case of necessity. Fifty of the enemy were

killed in this action."

When reports from shore indicated that

the two battalions committed in the south

would almogt certainly fall short of the ambitious objective planned for the first day,

General Rupertus, still aboard USS Dupage,

became seriously concerned over this apparent loss of forward momentum. Shortly before noon he ordered the Division Reconnaissance Company 47 ashore as a reinforcement, and a little later, after some rather

montory (Ngarmoked Island) and the small unnamed island off the west coast just prior to landing."

46 Gormley. One platoon of ReconCo had been

moved up earlier to fill a 40-yard gap in the line

and sustained strong fire attacks during the night.

Ltr Lt R. J. Powell, Jr. to CMC, March 1950, hereinafter cited as Powell.

47"This company was thrown in on the right with

the 1st Battalion and suffered heavy casualties.

This was an improper use of the Reconnaissance

Company, as there later developed several opportunities for employment of this company in the

manner for which it had been trained." 0. P.

Smith PerNar. See also Fields.

ambiguous communication with officers on

the scene, attempted to commit the division

reserve for -the same purpose."

The order to dig in for the night reached

the front line units in the southern zone

about 1700.49

Gains, in relation to the optimistic predictions, were disappointing. The 1st Battalion

was on the 0—A line, as was the right of the

3d Battalion (Company K) ; but Company

I, still held up before the strongpoint to its

front because of the delay in the tanks coming up, was 400 yards short of the intermediate objective. And the still-open gap in

the middle of 3/5 on the left constituted a

potent threat to the entire southward-facing

line.

However, the tactical situation was more

propitious than it appeared to the minds of

those in the division command post, still

afloat, and little genuine concern was felt by

the officers commanding ashorer'° Local

counterattacks, hampered by extensive illuminations by naval star shells and harassing

fire by the 11th Marines, were beaten off

during the night without undue difficulty,

and the coming of daylight saw a quick rectification of the worst difficulties.

THE JAPANESE STRIKE BACK

As had been anticipated, the Japanese

reacted violently as soon as they were able

to recover their balance. The first and most

vigorous manifestation began at approxi48 This unit was 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, reinforced. For further detail regarding the circumstances of its being ordered ashore, and its failure

to get there, see second sub-chapter following.

40 3/7 WD. 117 HistRpt gives the hour as 1715.

0. P. Smith op.cit., says that he issued the order

to dig-in at 1600 after ". . . I was satisfied that the

three regiments were in contact."

50"The enemy was groggy, disorganized, and devoid of communications, although bitterly defending

every step of the way. At no time did we feel him

capable of organizing a successful counterattack.

. . . We at no time requested reinforcement, and, in

fact, recommended against it since the beachhead

was already overcrowded." Hurst.

49
mately 1650: a tank-infantry sortie in force

across the northern portion of the airfield.51

This was not a banzai charge in the usual

sense of that term, unless the peculiar conduct of some of the tank operators could be

so construed, though the end result proved

suicidal enough to satisfy the most discriminating devotee of Bushido. The attack was

well planned and well organized; had it been

better timed and better integrated, once under way, its chances of success might have

been excellent. As it was, the Japanese

waited too long, giving the invaders ample

time to consolidate their positions. And the

route of approach, while employing wliat was

doubtless the terrain best suited to tank operations, led straight to the sector of the

Marine front perhaps best prepared to cope

with precisely such an assault.

There was nothing coincidental about the

latter fact. The main point of contact lay

within the zone of the 1st Battalion, 5th

Marines, a short distance below where the

flanks of the 1st and 5th Regiments tied-in.

Little surprise was achieved: Japanese tank

strength was well known, and every regimental and battalion commander had been

looking for something of the kind for the

past eight hours. Knowing that the 5th Marines in particular would be facing flat, open

ground once the advance passed through the

woods, the regimental commander had ordered both assault battalions to land their

37mm guns and heavy machine guns in the

assault waves and emplace them in forward

51 After study extending over a period of months,

the author is convinced that no satisfactory account

of this Japanese attack will ever be written. Official contemporary reports are fragmentary and

often conflicting. Consultation with scores of eyewitnesses five years after the event has served only

to compound the confusion. It would appear that

every Marine who participated, or even viewed

the attack from a safe distance, has a personal and

very positive version of exactly what happened, and

it is virtually impossible to reconcile many of these

on any particular points. The following narrative

is frankly conjectural. The only undisputed fact.

and the one most important historically, is that

Japanese tank strength on Peleliu had ceased to

exist, to all practical purposes, by the end of D-Day.

50

positions as soon as the 0-1 line had been

secured.52 When further advance from there

had proved impracticable, Lieutenant Colonel

Robert W. Boyd, commanding officer of the

1st Battalion, had parked his three supporting tanks in partial defilade where they

would enjoy a maximum of protection and

at the same time be able to place fire to the

front of the infantry."

A marked increase in the intensity of

enemy mortar and artillery fire brought the

first intimation that the long expected was

finally brewing. Soon thereafter a Japanese

infantry formation of estimated company

strength was observed advancing across the

airfield. This was no tightly bunched knot of

screaming, sword-waving fanatics. These

men moved with the cool determination of

the veterans they were: keeping well dispersed, taking advantage of the scanty cover

of shell holes and ground folds, opening fire

as they came within effective range.

In the meanwhile, an air observer spotted

enemy tanks forming in defilade east of the

ridges a short distance above the airfield, and

presently the ground troops sighted these

debouching on the open ground, more infantry clustered atop them wherever a handhold could be had. They passed through their

advancing foot soldiers about 400 yards f orward of the Marine positions, and for a

moment the attack assumed aspects of genuine formidability.

But only for a moment. Instead of coordinating their movement to that of the infantry, the enemy tank drivers opened their

throttles wide and lit out for the American

lines like so many of the proverbial bats;

too fast to support their assault troops or

for those troops to support them.54

52 Walt. Script notes and related interviews with

Col. H. D. Harris by Historical Division, USMC,

28-310et49, hereinafter cited as Harris.

53 Monograph by LtCol R. W. Boyd, Marine Corps

Schools, March 1949, hereinafter cited as Boyd

Mono.

54"Had they advanced at the rate of their infantry, the tankettes (actually only light reconnaissance vehicles) would . . . never have even gotten to the middle of the airfield." Stuart.
At this point the attack assumed more the

aspects of an old fashioned cavalry charge

than anything in modern scientific warfare:

very dashing and gallant according to the

standards of the 19th Century. Only this

happened to be the 20th Century. And these

flimsy Japanese obsolete model "tankettes"

(not comparable even to U. S. light tanks)

were little less vulnerable to modern armorpiercing weapons than horse cavalry had

been to the magazine rifles, Gatling guns and

shrapnel which made that branch obsolete.55

Most contemporary accounts agree that 13

tanks were involved in this attack." Beyond this point, however, there are nearly

as many versions of what happened next as

there were witnesses.

The tank drivers apparently made some

effort to take advantage of such scanty cover

as there was, keeping as close as possible

to the edge of the jungle north of the airfield as long as they could. Thus, when they

cut southwestward over the open ground,

their course took them diagonally across the

front of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, where

they were subjected to devastating fire into

their flank.57 Two of the tanks veered into

the lines of this battalion, hurtled over a

coral embankment and crashed into a swamp

55"These vehicles . . . with only Vt" to %" armor

. . . were never intended for frontal action against

heavy weapons of major units and . . . their easy

destruction is no grounds for smugness in regard

to our antitank prowess. Had the Japanese possessed modern tanks . . . and attacked in greater

numbers the situation would have been critical."

Stuart.

56 Even on this point there was some subsequent

disagreement. A later check-up when it was possible to study the ground carefully indicated that

there may have been as many as 19 tanks. Walt.

The possible discrepancy stemmed from the highly

confused nature of the action itself which made any

count unreliable, and the fact that when it was

over many of the tanks had been so thoroughly

demolished that it was impossible to tell which parts

had belonged originally to which tanks.

57 Written statement by LtCol R. E. Honsowetz

to Historical Division, USMC, 15Nov49, hereinafter

cited as Honsowetz. Most other individuals consulted on this point were under the impression that

the Japanese tanks made a beeline across the airfield from the ridge nose to the point of contact.

just behind the front where their crews, attempting to escape, were disposed of by the

infantry." --

Meanwhile the men of 1/5 had opened

with everything they had: 37mm guns, bazookas, AT grenades; all organic infantry

weapons plus the 75's of the tanks which

Colonel Boyd had posted in support. A Navy

dive bomber, happening upon the scene, came

in low and dropped a large bomb into what

appeared to be the midst of the on-swarming

enemy. In the face of all this fire, the tankriding infantry, so many sitting ducks,

simply seemed to disintegrate into thin air.

Tanks began exploding and burning, but

the survivors kept coming. They struck the

1st Battalion lines in the narrow sector held

by the left platoon of Company B.59 And

overran them.

The remarkable aspect here was that,

while the enemy tanks overran the lines and

penetrated 150 yards beyond—one of them

nearly reached the beach before being liquidated—nowhere did they cause a break in

the front. If any Marines felt an urge to

quit their positions, they scarcely had time,

so rapidly did these events take place. Two

men were caught in the path of one of these

onrushing machines and crushed to death.

A few others were burned or wounded by

flying fragments as tanks were destroyed

in their midst. The rest dodged by one means

or another and kept on fighting, for the Japanese assault infantry was still coming—or

so they thought.

• What happened to these enemy troops is

one of the several features of this action

which will never be known with any certainty—except that they did not close with

the Marines. Perhaps they were annihilated

by the fire poured into them before they

were able to close." Or perhaps they were

58Ibid.

58 Boyd Mono gives six as the number of tanks

getting through to the lines. No other report states

any specific number, but all agree that several did.

60 It should be noted that one battery (Battery

E) of 2d Bn., 11th Marines, had brought its 75mm

pack howitzers to bear on both enemy tanks and

infantry. 2/11 Action Report. See also Walt description of U. S. tank sortie, quoted below.

51
JAPANESE TANK-INFANTRY counterattack, afternoon of D-Day,

so disgusted by the spectacle of their supposed armored support intent on encompassing its own destruction that they simply went

away from there. In any event, when the

smoke and dust dissipated, a few dead on

the scene were all that remained. The fight

was over.

Exactly who knocked out what—and where

and when—is another matter shrouded in

mystery. If two of the enemy tanks escaped,

as reported,°' that would mean that only 11

(or 17, depending on conflicting reports)

were destroyed. Yet one officer with a flair

for figures calculated later that if every individual claim of a tank knocked out were

to be accepted at face value, there would

have had to be 1791/2 of them. The fact ap61 5th Mar WD. 1/5 Bn-3 Journal. Walt. Other

pertinent reports simply list all 13 as being destroyed on the scene.

52

disintegrated in face of Marine fire-power.

pears to be that every tank was hit so many

times by so many different weapons that in

all probability no single hit could be held

responsible for its destruction.°2

The exact part played by U. S. tanks in

the repulse of this attack is another point

upon which there has been some disagreement, another example of the platitude that

no single man on the ground can see more

than a very small segment of any battle,

even such a spectacular one fought almost

62 An immobilized tank presents an especially

tempting target which few troops can resist taking

a crack at. Notably, on the occasion of the big

enemy tank attack on Saipan on the night of

16Jun44, U. S. tanks and half-tracks, arriving at

dawn, began firing into, and claiming destruction of,

tanks which the infantry on the scene declared they

had knocked out several hours before. Saipan: The

Beginning of the End, monograph by Maj. C. W.

Hoffman, published by Historical Division, USMC.
entirely on flat, open terrain. The three

tanks attached to 1/5, as has been noted,

were immobilized and played only a static

defensive role. And as luck would have it,

all but one of the Shermans supporting 2/1

had returned to the beach to rearm at this

particular time."

However, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,

was operating in the woods across the southern end of the airfield, with its leading element (Company E) and the advance command post near the eastern shore: about

1200 yards away, diagonally across the open

ground. The advance of the enemy was

plainly visible from there, and Major Gayle

immediately dispatched the tanks acting in

support of his unit to the secene of the attack. What followed is described by the

executive officer of that regiment, who witnessed the action from a vantage point on

the right of 1/5:

At the time the enemy tanks were approximately

half way across the airfield, four Sherman tanks

came onto the field in the 2/5 zone of action on

the south end of the airfield and opened fire immediately on the enemy tanks. These four tanks

played an important role in stopping the enemy

tanks and also stopping the supporting infantry,

the majority of which started beating a hasty retreat when these Shermans came charging down

from the south. They fought a running battle and

ended up in the midst of the enemy tanks.64

But regardless of exactly who did what,

the important thing is that the attack was

completely frustrated, a fact which was to

63 Honsowetz. "Tanks were in the process of rearming but were able to engage the Japanese tanks

by moving only a few yards out of the brush; a

distance of approximately 50 yards from our rearming area. At least eight (8) of the tanks . . .

engaged the Japanese tanks." Ltr Capt R. E. Brant

to CMC, 9Feb50, hereinafter cited as Brant.

64 Walt. "It is not believed that any of our tanks

engaged in what is stated as a 'running battle.'"

Brant. "The comment of LtCol Walt appears to

be most accurate." Jerue. "Enemy tanks were

taken under fire by . . . our three tanks in defilade."

Boyd Mono. "Tanks of the 2d platoon moved out

on the airstrip . . . as soon as the first Jap tank

touched the other side of the airport." Ltr Maj

J. R. Mundy to CMC, 13Mar50.

have a significant effect on the enemy's subsequent conduct of the campaign.

Not that there was no more counteraction

on the part of the Japanese. Actually they

attacked again and again throughout the

rest of the afternoon, short, sharp thrusts

against various sectors of the Marine line,

and infiltration attempts continued throughout the night. But none achieved the proportions and determination of that first thrust

which, in the tactical conception of Peleliu's

defenders, was evidently intended to be climactic.

The most notable began about 1730: infantry supported by two tanks (perhaps the

two reported to have escaped destruction

previously) moving west across the airfield's

northern taxiway. This thrust was aimed

at the junction of the 1st and 5th Marines,

the brunt being borne this time by the

former unit. Both tanks were destroyed, and

the enemy foot soldiers failed to reach the

lines. There was another flurry a half hour

later near the center of the 5th Marines

where the 1st and 2d Battalions tied in on

the 0-1 line, but this was quickly over. And

before daylight the following morning, 1/5

was hit again by still another two tanks and

infantry, without notable results.

The precariously positioned left of the 1st

Marines was subjected to unremitting pressure, and Captain Hunt's men passed a

nerve-racked night isolated on the point they

had captured. But the attack in force along

the shore line which might have rolled up

the division left flank failed to materialize

until the situation there had been rectified

(see Chapter IV), evidently because the

careful preinvasion plans of the Japanese

had not envisaged a major effort from this

direction and they were not prepared to regroup in time to make one which had any

chance of success.

On the south, too, the situation was one

to cause some concern, but not nearly so

much. There were many infiltration attempts

in this area. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,

withstood one counterattack of no very

formidable proportions shortly after dark,

53
and 3/5 beat off two others during the early

morning hours. In all zones, harassing artillery fire discouraged the enemy, and illumination shells were used liberally to forestall surprise throughout the night.

The order to prepare positions for the

night found the units of the division, with

one exception, pretty well immobilized: more

intent on rectifying their own situations than

in making further advances. On the 0-1

line, 2/1 and 1/5 were firmly tied-in and

well sited along the edge of the woods, facing the airfield, but unable to move owing

to the precariousness of the extreme left. In

the south, the two battalions of the 7th Marines were well enough off, but too occupied

with trying to tie-in with the as yet unlocated

elements of 3/5 to be much interested in

anything else.

The one exception was the 2d Battalion,

5th Marines. This unit had fought its way

across the southern edge of the airfield

nearly to the eastern shore, where it was

in contact with the lone platoon of Company

L which faced eastward along the shore line.

Quick to take advantage of the enemy being

off balance, the battalion drove northward

close in the wake of the repulse of the main

tank counterattack and succeeded in reaching nearly the center of the airfield against

minor resistance before halting for the night.

This was the most substantial advance scored

al day, and significant in that it greatly increased the area of depth necessary for the

emplacing of artillery.

THE COMMAND SITUATION

The division command post did not land

on D-Day, but at about 1130 the assistant

division commander, Brigadier General 0. P.

Smith, came ashore with a skeleton staff and

set up an advance command post in an overrun antitank ditch a short distance inland

from Beach Orange 2. His communications

men were able to cut in on the Shore Party

telephone line, putting him in touch with the

command posts of the 5th and 7th Marines.

Radio contact was soon established with

54

General Rupertus still afloat,66 but the line

to the 1st Marines zone had been broken,

and radio efforts elicited no response from

that quarter. As noted earlier in this chapter, five LVT's 66 carrying the regiment's

headquarters personnel and communications

equipment had been hit crossing the reef, a

serious loss further compounded later when

a Japanese shell struck the regimental CP

just after Colonel Lewis D. Puller had moved

out to set up farther forward."

For whatever combination of reasons, the

division command had no very clear picture

of the 1st Marines' situation during most of

the day. A liaison officer was sent in from

the regiment about noon, but at that hour

there was still no definite indication of

how matters might develop. A runner got

through during the afternoon, but en route

he became involved in the Japanese tank

attack and arrived too scared to be very coherent. Toward evening a fragmentary radio

message conveyed a disquieting hint with a

urgent request for corpsmen and communicators. But when the field telephone line

was finally spliced and General Smith put

in direct touch, Colonel Puller made no mention of heavy losses, of gaps in his front, nor

of needing any help, but reported that the

regiment was firmly established on the beach

65 For maintaining communications on D-Day,

the advance CP relied largely on a curious experimental LVT (A) especially equipped to serve as a

mobile radio station (facetiously dubbed "USS

Fubar"). This performed valuable service in this

emergency but developed too many weaknesses to

be considered wholly successful. Establishment of

the initial wire network presented almost insurmountable difficulties owing to heavy fire, lack of

natural growth for raising it aboveground, and the

congestion of the beachhead area which caused the

wires to be chewed up by vehicles when laid on the

ground. Ramsey. See also 1st MarDiv SAR, II, Annex E.

66 2/1 Bn. executive officer states that these were

DUKS's rather than LVT's, traveling in sixth

wave. Ltr Maj. C. H. Brush to CMC, undated, hereinafter cited as Brush.

67 0. P. Smith PerNar. 1st MarNar, 3. Hist 18t

Mar, 5.
"SOMETIMES WE GOES where the roads are, but mostly we goes where they ain't." Kipling's verse applied aptly to the

tanks on Peleliu.

and held approximately the objective line

0-1.68

General Rupertus had planned to seize the

0-2 phase line by nightfall, this embracing

all of the island below the foot of the northern ridges which commenced a short distance

above the airfield. As the day wore on with

forward movement halted along most of the

front, he became increasingly concerned over

what seemed to him the loss of initial mo88 0. P. Smith PerNar. Same source adds: "He

(Puller) had as yet no very definite idea as to

the number of casualties he had suffered." Hist

istMar covering this period states: "Casualties

from the day's fighting were estimated at 500."

mentum by the assault elements.° But his

eye turned not to the north, where the precarious flank situation was holding up the

69 Personal interviews with Generals 0. P. Smith

and John T. Selden, February, 1949. As had been

seen, Smith was commanding on shore at this time,

while Selden, as chief of staff, was still at General

Rupertus' side aboard the command ship. Because

of their wide separation, the opinions of these officers do not agree fully on all points, but they are

unanimous in the belief that it was worry over

losing momentum which was mainly responsible for

the CG's subsequent actions. General Selden adds

that an early dispatch which exaggerated losses

sustained by 1/7 in crossing the reef contributed

greatly to general mounting anxiety. Substantiated

by Fields.

55
Advance of the left and most of the center,

but toward the south, where the 0-1 line included the entire zone of action of the 7th

Marines.

Accordingly, the commanding general ordered the Division Reconnaissance Company

in to Orange 3 to reinforce the 7th Marines,70 and shortly thereafter commenced

querying the commander on shore in regard

to committing the entire division reserve:

2d Battalion, 7th Marines.71 His persistence

rather puzzled General Smith, whose knowledge of conditions in the area led him to believe that additional troops, far from sustaining momentum, would only further

crowd the constricted beachhead then existing. A call to Colonel Herman J. Hanneken

confirmed this belief, but the colonel added

that, should the commanding general insist

on sending the unit ashore, he (Hanneken)

would find an assembly area for it where it

would not be in anybody's way. This somewhat ambiguous word was relayed to the

command ship, and the last reserve under

division control was ordered to land.72

70"When he committed the Reconnaissance Company it was not, in the CG's mind (in my opinion)

that it was a unit but that it was a group of individual infantry replacements." Fields. 1st

MarDiv SAR, II, 2, lists 1227 as hour orders were

issued. 2/7 Unit Journal says orders were received

at 1100, debarkation commenced at 1145 and all

Recon Co. personnel off the ship at 1300.

71 This unit, as in the case of all units similarly

designated herein, was a battalion landing team

(BLT) : an infantry battalion reinforced with attached elements of engineers, JASCO, artillery

liaison, special weapons, etc., commanded by LtCol

Spencer S. Berger. The ReconCo was also one of

the original components but was detached at the

time it was ordered to land. 2/7 WD.

72"At 1505 LT 2/7 received orders to be prepared to land in any boats available." Ibid. 1st

MarDiv SAR, II, 2, gives 1600 as hour actual landing order was issued. Foregoing version of events

leading up to this order derives from interviews

with General Smith previously cited, in part elaborated by 0. P. Smith PerNar. General Selden, on

the command ship, received the impression that the

CG committed the reserve with great reluctance,

only after the command ashore had specifically re56

General Rupertus was also becoming concerned over remaining on the command ship

while obscure but obviously heavy fighting

was developing on shore, and began importuning General Smith to inform him when

it would be feasible for him to bring in the

command post. Smith, who had been less

sanguine from the first over the possibilities

of a quick conquest, saw little in current

developments to inspire optimism. He returned negative replies until, aware of the

Commanding General's mounting anxiety,

late in the afternoon, against my better judgment, I radioed him that the situation appeared favorable enough for the CP

to move ashore." "

Aboard the command ship, however, Colonel Selden was unalterably opposed to this

idea. The chief of staff pointed out that one

command group was already ashore and doing all that reasonably could be expected in

a situation which he could visualize only too

clearly; that to bring the entire staff into a

shallow beachhead across a reef which was

still under heavy shellfire would be to risk

the annihilation of the division's whole top

echelon to no useful purpose. In the ensuing debate a compromise was reached. Colonel Selden agreed to take in the bulk of the

staff while the commanding general would

forego his determination to land until the

following morning.

Accordingly the chief of staff ordered his

people, who had been standing by all day

for such a move, into two LCVP's and set

out for shore. Arriving at the transfer control line, he discovered elements of the division reserve standing by in their landing

craft for lack of amtracks to ferry them in

across the reef. The colonel thereupon

quested it. This opinion is corroborated by Fields,

but hurriedly compiled 1st MarDiv D-3 Journal

logs no such request prior to issuance of landing

order. While 2/7 was last reserve under division

control, the entire 81st Infantry Division was still

available in corps reserve in case of emergency (See

Chap. VI.)

73 0. P. Smith, PerNar.
D— DAY

( After Rectifying 3/5)

,

- -

- -- - 

-1

, .... -- - .- -$

RD 7163

Front Lines

Regimental Boundaries

Phase Lines

Main Counterattack

Secondary Counterattacks

or Strong Pressure

MAP 6
boarded the nearest control craft to use its

superior communications equipment in an

effort to clarify the situation.

Everything he could learn strengthened

his own conviction that the need ashore was

for combat troops rather than additional

staff personnel, and that there appeared

small likelihood of sufficient amphibian tractors arriving to accommodate both. Finally,

with darkness closing in and enemy high

velocity guns beginning to range in on the

control craft, he radioed General Rupertus

to this effect and announced that he was

bringing his group back to the command ship

in order to give landing priority to the reserve battalion.74

As events decided, sufficient amtracks

never did appear that night. Therefore,

shortly after the return of the staff the reserve battalion was likewise ordered back

to its transports,75 a development which was

to prove a piece of good fortune in disguise

(see Chap. IV).

So General Smith remained in command

on shore throughout that critical night. His

troops held a beachhead 3,000 yards in

length and averaging 500 yards in depth,

with one maximum penetration of about

1,500 yards.76 The artillery had one and

74"He (the CG) didn't like what I had done at

the time and while he did not come out flat-footedly

and say so, it was quite evident to all of his staff

who were present when we returned aboard." Ltr

BrigGen J. T. Selden to author, 260ct49. The

foregoing description of this rather curious incident derives from a series of interviews with Gen.

Selden during winter and spring, 1949. Details are

corroborated by various staff members present at

the time, including this writer.

75"This (return to ships) was never fully accomplished. Portions of the Battalion landed on

Peleliu that evening and night." Ltr LtCol E. D.

Graves, .to CMC, 14Mar50, hereinafter •cited as

Graves. "Due to the darkness and fact that transports upped anchor and moved out, it was daylight

the next morning before the Battalion was gathered

together again." Berger.

76 1st MarDiv SAR, II, 2. While essentially accurate, the yardage figures convey no true picture

one-half battalions of 75mm pack howitzers

and one and one-third battalions of 105mm

howitzers in —position and registered. These

gains, so disappointing when viewed beside

preliminary predictions, had cost the division

210 dead (killed in action, died of wounds,

missing presumed dead), and 901 wounded

in action: total casualties of 1,111, not including combat fatigue and heat prostration

cases.77

The enemy's impression of what goes on

in battle is always interesting, even though,

particularly in the case of the Japanese,

their reports are sometimes a bit difficult to

reconcile with reality. For instance, the several thousand Marines engaged on shore at

the time would no doubt be mystified to

learn that, according to Colonel Nakagawa's

report, their "daring" attempt to land had

been completely frustrated: "By 1000 hours

our forces successfully put the enemy to

route." Then: "At 1420 hours, the enemy

again attempted to make the perilous landing on the southwestern part of our coastline. The unit in that sector repulsed the

daring counterattack and put the enemy to

route once more.. However, in another sector of the coastline near Ayame (Orange 3)

of the situation, since military values cannot be

assessed in averages. No allowance is made for

the critical condition on the extreme left, where the

most advanced troops were still far short of the

0-1 line, with one element entirely cut off. A

synthesis of the several unit situation maps shows

the penetration nowhere deeper than about 300

yards north of Orange 2, while south of Orange 3

more than two days of hard fighting remained to

complete the occupation of 0-1.

77 Figures certified and released by USMC Personnel Accounting System, 18Apr50. 1st MarDiv

SAR, II, 2, citing reports turned in at the time,

lists 92 killed, 1,148 wounded, and 58 missing in action, for a total of 1,298. Such discrepancies are

characteristic of statistics compiled under the chaotic

conditions of battle," when medical personnel are

less interested in working out meticulous records

than in getting the wounded treated and evacuated.

Figures on cases initially reported as missing in

action are especially deceptive. See discussion of

medical activities, Chapter V.

51
the enemy with the aid of several tanks were

successful in landing, although they were

encountering heavy losses inflicted by our

forces." 78

78 Central Pacific Area Operational Record, Vol

II, compiled under the auspices of 1st Demobolization Bureau, Sep46. The Peleliu Garrison command

was in communication with Hq Palaus Sector Group

throughout the operation. This record of messages

received was drawn up by Col Tokechi Tada, IJA,

58

All of which indicates that optimism was

not confined exclusively to the Marines at

this stage.

former chief of staff of the higher echelon, assisted

by Col Kiyoshi Nakagawa, IJA (not to be confused

with Kunio Nakagawa, commanding on Peleliu), a

former member of the same staff. Except as otherwise noted, all Japanese material referred to herein

derives from this work, hereinafter cited as Tada

Record. See also Appendix F.
"At4.111t1, Iff4gkr

Pik ,

$V,Vtlear-ik

,741"

CHAPTER IV

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Second Operational Phase: 0-plus 1 -0-plus 7

(16-22 September)

The events of D-Day revealed to a great

extent the pattern of the Japanese defense

of Peleliu, which subsequent developments

would substantiate. In the main, this conformed to that of previous island defenses,

with certain variations and refinements

which showed that not all of the lessons of

previous disasters had been lost upon the

enemy.1

They still displayed that fundamental inability, stemming from lack of coordination

among their scattered observation posts, to

mass the fires of their heavy weapons. On

Peleliu, terror of Ti. S. air observers provided a further inhibition. Discovering early

that spotting of their positions invariably

brought down a deluge of heavy gunfire and

bombing, they resorted to the practice of

keeping their artillery and mortars concealed

in caves and other emplacements, running

them out to let off a few rounds, then pulling them back to cover in all haste. This

weakness was not readily discernable to the

amtracks crossing the reef nor to the infantry operating on the open airfield; only after

the division discovered how much heavy ordnance the Japanese actually had available

1 For further detail on the military thinking underlying the Japanese defensive concept on Peleliu,

see Appendix C.

8921060-50--5

did it come apparent how infinitely worse

the destruction might have been.2

As always, they displayed their childlike

faith in the tactic of infiltration, though their

aptness here exceeded anything they had

shown previously. Enemy soldiers knew

their own sectors thoroughly, and individuals

and small groups moved with certainty toward definite objectives over familiar terrain. Their main purpose was to reoccupy

emplacements already overrun from which

to harass the Marines' rear areas from concealment. That three of them penetrated into

the heart of General Smith's command post

on the night of D-Day indicates some measure of their success.3 Similar instances occurred throughout the operation, always

with disquieting effect; but infiltration it

still remained, with negligible influence on

the ultimate outcome.

There had been no banzai charges on DDay, and there were to be none during the

entire operation. The counterattacks had

been well planned, if poorly timed, and so

they continued to the end: usually short,

sharp thrusts with limited objectives. Both

2IIIAC OpnRpt, 2-4. This report gives a particularlir cogent and lucid analysis on Japanese

tactics on Peleliu.

30. P. Smith PerNarr.

59
RUINED JAPANESE INSTALLATIONS in vicinity of Administration Building. Above ground targets such as these were

pulverized by naval gunfire which left many hidden positions untouched.

the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations would

follow this pattern, but because Peleliu set

the precedent the seeming phenomenon puzzled many people at the time. Throughout

the campaign Marines continued to watch

hopefully for some crack in morale to produce that peculiarly Japanese manifestation

which had so greatly simplified the mop-up

of other islands. But the troops here included some of the finest Japan ever put in

the field, under officers who had learned the

futility of pitting Bushido against fire power

and steadfastly refused- to play into their

enemy's hands.

The Japanese plan consisted basically of

an organized and carefully integrated de60

fense in depth, but it possessed far greater

strength and flexibility than anything yet

encountered in the Pacific.

This increased strength resulted from

skillful utilization of naturally difficult terrain, combined with time and materials for

developing defensive positions of maximum

effectiveness. As noted in Chapter I, the

fall of the Gilberts and Marshalls had confronted the Japanese with the problem of

strengthening hurriedly their second line of

defense. Miscalculating our initial objective,

they had given first priority to the Palaus at

the expense of the Marianas. Thus, Marines attacking Saipan, Tinian and Guam

had found the defenses incompletely de-
veloped, with quantities of heavy weapons

and fortification materials lying around for

lack of time to put them to use.4 The Japanese on Peleliu not only received the wherewithal first, but an added three months grace

in which to make the most of it. They did.

The flexibility stemmed from a system of

zone defense which combined features of

the mobility necessary on a land mass the

size of Saipan, and the dug-in defense-tothe-death characteristic of the much smaller

islands of Tarawa and the Marshalls. Uncertain exactly where our landing would be

attempted, Colonel Nakagawa set up his defenses in four zones (see Map 5), each assigned to one reinforced battalion, with the

remaining battalion held in general reserve

in the ridges of the northwestern peninsula.

Operating on interior lines, troops occupying

the unaffected zones were in a position to

move swiftly to the reinforcement of whichever zone was attacked once our intentions

became known.5

However, the successful drive across the

island on the afternoon of D-Day effectively

isolated the battalion defending the southern zone, members of which were thenceforth fated to fight to the death in their

holes in the conventional Japanese manner,

unable to furnish direct support to their compatriots elsewhere. This circumstance, combined with the failure of the major D-Day

counterattacks, determined Colonel Nakagawa to shift his strategy to a last ditch

stand in the most formidable terrain available. As events soon proved, troops originally posted to defend the eastern zone

abandoned some of the most formidable installations on the island (Beach Purple) and

retired to the ridges, where they redeployed

in conjunction with the troops already in

that area. Into these same ridges came other

Japanese, falling back before Marine pres4 Hoffman op.cit., incompleteness of Japanese defense installations in the Marianas is noted in action reports of most U. S. units participating.

5 It is believed that many of the troops used in

the Japanese counterattacks against the 5th Marines on D-plus 1 were drawn from the Beach Purple Area. Harris.

sure, there to make the conquest of the island

as costly as possible.

In this, no doubt, they were influenced to

some extent by their advance intelligence.

This was somewhat better than in many instances: the garrison was alerted as to the

probable time and place of the coming attack

as early as 3 September, and just prior to

D-Day General Julian Smith was identified

in command, though placed in the wrong

area (Morotai) . Within five days the landing force had been correctly estimated as

"probably a division." However, the same

entry (20 September) reveals a serious misapprehension regarding the invaders' intentions which colored Japanese tactical and

strategic conceptions for some time to come:

It seems as if they (U. S. forces) had been planning on taking up their positions in Koror and

Palau Island (Babelthuap) following the main

forces' occupation of Peleliu. However, the enemy

was unable to withdraw its main forces from

Peleliu, because they had received heavy losses

there. Also, they were constantly harassed by the

danger of being attacked by our aggressive artillery

from Angaur, and by counterlanding on Peleliu

which may be staged by our Angaur forces. Because of these facts the enemy were compelled to

change their plan and land their reserve forces on

Angaur.6

These developments in enemy thinking

could not be known to the invaders on DDay, nor for some days to come. Hence,

throughout the second operational phase the

attack continued in accordance with the

original plan, even while gains actually

achieved fell further and further behind that

optimistic schedule.

The commanding general and his staff

landed at about 0950 on D-plus 1 and took

over direction of the operation, occupying

the advance command post which General

Smith had set up the previous day. As described in Chapter III, this was located in

an overrun Japanese antitank trench a short

6 Tada Record. This persistent belief that the

action on Peleliu served to thwart a planned attack

on islands to the northward may have been wishful thinking, but it appears to have had a real effect

on attempts to reinforce and supply the beleaguered

garrison. See Appendix F.

61
SOUTHERN PELELIU, thoroughly fortified and defended by a reinforced battalion, fell to the 7th Marines by the afternoon

of D-plus 3.

distance inland of Beach Orange 2. By digging into the reverse bank of this sharp declivity, the division's nerve center achieved

excellent protection from the ubiquitous

enemy shells which continued to come snarling and screeching into the area in slowly

diminishing numbers for the next week.

These blew up a couple of small ammunition

dumps nearby and knocked out a 105mm

howitzer, but only a single shell scored on

the command post proper, landing in the

message center and killing one man.7

7 There were repeated hits and casualties in adjoining areas, however, one of these within 50 yards

of the CP proper. Ramsey. The Japanese appeared

to have certain weapons registered on primary

beaten zones in the vicinity of the beach, for "The

Division CP and 2-11 CP operated with relative impunity for several days immediately adjacent to

an area approximately 50 x 150 yards in size that

received, by actual count, over 200 major caliber

shells in a two hour period." Ltr LtCol N. P. Wood

to CMC, 14Mar50, hereinafter cited as Wood.

62

Orders called for the assault to jump off at

0800 on D-plus 1 on all fronts, following an

intensive preparation by naval gunfire, air

strikes, and the massed fires of the artillery

emplaced on shore. On this day, and increasingly throughout the phase under discussion,

the operation broke down into three distinct

patterns in accordance with the missions of

the respective combat teams, which will be

dealt with in turn as they fitted into the

picture as a whole.

CLEAN-UP IN THE SOUTH 8

Final dispositions on the night of D-Day

had seen two battalions of the 7th Marines

in line, facing generally eastward and southeastward. On the right, the flank of the 1st

Battalion was anchored firmly on the western

8 This account synthesized from basic reports of

7th Marines previously cited, except as otherwise

noted.
shore well below the extremity of Beach Orange 3, and extending inland along the 0–A

line. But the 3d Battalion was still well short

of the eastern shore where Company I remained held up by that blockhouse strong

point which it had been unable to reduce

before dark, and where Company L had been

echeloned to the left rear in order to tie in

with 3/5.

Early on the morning of 16 September

(D-plus 1), tank support and heavy preparatory fire enabled Company I, attacking eastward, to seize the supporting positions to

its front—three concrete dual-purpose gun

positions and a barracks area—with no great

difficulty, but the blockhouse itself proved

to be a very tough nut indeed. Upon its

eventual capture, its walls were found to

be of reinforced concrete more than five feet

thick on all sides. This withstood direct hits

by all infantry weapons, and 75mm tank

guns merely bounced off it. Flame-throwers,

unaided, could make no impression, as the

two entrances were below ground level and,

like the fire ports, protected by one-inch

armor plate.9

This fortification was finally reduced by

demolition teams working under the concealment of smoke placed to blanket all of its

apertures, and Company I reached the eastern shore just beyond at 0925.10 While this

unit consolidated the beach positions against

enemy counterlandings or attacks through

the mangrove swamp a short distance above,

Company K attacked southward in line on

the left of the 1st Battalion, with Company

L in support.

The terrain over which this drive moved

might possibly answer the loose description

of "low and flat", which persistent intelligence reports had applied to the entire

island, but only in comparisdn with some

vastly worse terrain which the invaders

93/7 WD, 6. This source contains a detailed description of this formidable structure.

10Ibid. This maneuver had the effect of pinching

out most of the elements of 3/5. For their subsequent disposition, see sub-chapter following.

would encounter a little later. Scrub jungle

overgrew most of it, hampering even infantry maneuver and greatly complicating the

bringing up of support weapons.

And the Japanese had improved on nature. They had reason to believe that U. S.

troops might attempt an initial landing in

this area, as indeed the planners had seriously considered, and from shore to shore

the region was honeycombed with strongly

reinforced and cleverly camouflaged defensive installations with cleared interlocking

fields of fire: pillboxes, easemates, bunkers,

rifle pits, and trenches. These had been

blasted out of coral bedrock so adamant as

to make digging-in virtually impossible for

troops in assault; once off the sand beaches,

the men could take cover only behind natural features or by piling up improvised

breastworks of such loose rocks and blasted

tree trunks as came to hand.ii This characteristic would operate to the attackers' disadvantage throughout all phases of the campaign. To an extent not equalled in any

other Pacific operation, natural features

pitted the unprotected Marine in the open

against the hidden Japanese in a thoroughly

fortified position.

The fighting in the south continued grim

and deadly, but unspectacular. It boiled

down to overpowering, in turn, individual

positions more often than not mutually supporting. There was a redeeming feature in

this connection, however. Because they had

been prepared in anticipation of an amphibious landing, these installations presented

their strongest faces seaward, so that the

Marines advancing from the north caught

them, to a greater or lesser degree, in the

flank and rear. But, from whatever direction approached,' their occupants had no intention of surrendering. Assigned to the

defense of this area was the 3d Battalion,

11 A minor classic of descriptive understatement

was contributed by a young lieutenant of the 5th

Marines. Surveying the terrain with increasing

disapproval, he turned to his battalion commander

and observed, in a voice out of deepest Texas:

"Majah, this sho' is po' land."

63
15th Infantry,12 reinforced, one of the elite

units of the Imperial Japanese Army, and

its members fought to the death with all the

skill which their situation permitted.

After reduction of that massive blockhouse, the 3d Battalion had the easier going

during the drive southward. Company K,

advancing in line on the left of the 1st Battalion, blasted and burned out successive

enemy installations in its path to such good

effect that by 1025 the leading elements came

within sight of their final objective, the

southeastern promontory, its approaches

now defended on the landward side by only

two pillboxes. By 1200, both of these had

been reduced.

However, the combined strain of protracted fighting and debilitating heat (to be

described subsequently) were now exacting

their toll. The men were desperately in need

of water 13 before they would be in shape to

assault again, so here the advance was

halted. When it became clear that the supplies could not be delivered until late afternoon, the company was ordered to "dig-in"

behind piled up coral rocks for the night.

The remaining hours of the day were turned

to good advantage by bringing up tanks to

fire directly into enemy defense installations

on the promontory and at the same time

cover details of engineers clearing out the

mines found to be liberally sown across the

open sand spit which provided the only approach by land.

In its somewhat wider zone of action, the

1st Battalion advanced with Companies C

and A in line (right to left), Company B in

reserve. Progress was facilitated, as was

that of the 3d Battalion, by strong support

by heavy weapons: not only landbased artillery, but naval gunfire, called air strikes,

and LCI rocket concentrations. But the area

was defended in exceptional strength. In

12 The defending unit was identified definitely as

early as 1222 on D-plus 1. 7th Mar R-2 Journal,

Sheet #21.

13 Some indication of the men's conditions is provided by a terse dispatch, CO 3/7 to CO-7, logged

at 1324: "Out of water. Troops having dry

heaves." Ibid., Sheet #22.

64

addition to the conventional pillboxes, bunkers and casemates, the battalion had to knock

out four 5-inch guns and three lighter dualpurpose antiaircraft weapons before the

morning was over. Nevertheless, 1/7 gained

the southern end of the island proper only

a short time after Company K. And there,

for the same reason, a halt was called until

the men could be in some measure rehabilitated; a halt which was to last through the

night, while similar preparations were made

for the following day's assault on the southwestern promonotory, or Ngarmoked Island.

Throughout D-Day the 1st Battalion had

been harassed by fire from the small unnamed island lying just north of Ngarmoked

which naval gunfire and air strikes had been

unable to silence. The main gun position

there was subsequently spotted from the

beach and knocked out by tank fire, with

such good effect that a patrol sent across

the reef at low tide found no more live Japanese there. However, during the night of

D-plus 1 the enemy made several attempts

to reoccupy it, evidently with the object of

getting once more on the flank and rear of

the attackers. Illuminating shells revealed

large numbers in the act of wading across

from the southwest promontory, making

them excellent targets for machine gun and

rifle fire. No further trouble was experienced from that direction.14

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, unable to

come ashore on the evening of D-Day for

lack of transportation, landed on Orange 3

during the morning of D-plus 1, still in division reserve. The tentative intention of the

division command had been to commit it in

support of the southward drive of its parent regiment, and Company G and 81mm

mortar platoon actually moved forward for

that purpose. However, the precarious situation in the 1st Marines zone on the division's

left was at last becoming apparent, in contrast to the comparatively satisfactory progress in the south, and shortly after noon

the reassembled battalion displaced to Beach

14 Gormley.
White 2.15 There it was attached operationally to the 1st Marines, in which capacity it

served throughout the remainder of this

phase of the fighting.16

In the 3d Battalion zone, the plan for Dplus 2 called for Company L, in reserve the

previous day and hence comparatively fresh,

to pass through Company K and assault the

southeastern promontory. The attack was

originally scheduled to jump off at 0800, and

a preparatory air strike was delivered accordingly. However, the engineers, working

farther forward, discovered another enemy

minefield laid across the sand spit. The

jump-off was postponed until 1000 in order

to give them an opportunity to clear this

out, which dangerous work the engineers acComplished without casualties under heavy

covering fire delivered by the tanks and infantry.

This precaution paid off. Assaulting in the

wake of a mortar and artillery barrage, one

platoon of Company L, supported by three

tanks, gained a foothold on the promontory

at 1026 and occupied enemy installations

knocked out by tank fire the previous afternoon. With the approach thus cleared, the

remainder of the company was rushed

across the spit in amtracks against only

scattered rifle fire. The southern portion of

the promontory was seized first in order to

obtain positions from which fire could be

placed across the lagoon on the opposite

(Ngarmoked) promontory to support the attack of the 1st Battalion. The drive then

turned northward across not too difficult terrain, overrunning a series of enemy positions. The entire promontory was declared

secure at 1320, although, as is always the

case in areas prepared for defense by the

15 2/7 War Diary, 3, gives 1010 as the hour Co G

returned to battalion control, 1245 when Bn CO reported to 1st Marines. The 81mm mortar platoon

was not released by 7th Marines at this time and

did not rejoin the battalion until 1730 the following

day, 2/7 Unit Journal.

16 7th Mar R-2 Journal, Sheet #20. 1st MarDiv

SAR, II, 4. Subsequent activities of 2/7 are treated

herein in sub-chapter dealing with operations of

1st Marines.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS ARTHUR J. JACKSON, 3d Battalion,

7th Marines, won the Medal of Honor and subsequent

promotion to 2d Lieutenant for his courageous and

effective assault on several Japanese pillboxes during the

fighting on southern Peleliu.

Japanese, mopping-up proved difficult and

arduous. The last twenty-odd enemy survivors were driven into the water, where

they were picked off by riflemen while attempting to escape northward across the

reef.

No such quick victory awaited the 1st Battalion. The southwestern (Ngarmoked)

promontory was much the larger of the two,

its terrain higher and more rugged, its defenses more numerous and formidable.17

17 As in the case of the southeastern promontory,

a narrow sand spit provided the only dry approach.

Under cover of darkness on D-plus 1 a demolition

crew disarmed the numerous mines sown across it,

making possible the use of tanks and half-tracks in

the subsequent attack. Gormley.
Here the attack moved out according to

the original schedule. Again, the comparatively fresh company which had been in reserve the previous day was committed to the

assault, and initial momentum carried one

platoon of Company B with one tank across

the spit. At 0835 these encountered the

enemy main line of resistance and were

stopped cold without being able to gain a

foothold. The company requested permission to withdraw these elements in order to

give heavy supporting weapons an opportunity to work over the ground further.

Permission was not granted until 0935,

when the withdrawal was effected with some

difficulty under galling crossfire from the

not yet secured southeastern promontory."

By this time, Company B had been roughly

treated and was passed once more into battalion reserve.

While artillery and mortars poured concentrations into the target, the 1st Battalion

pulled itself together for another try. All

available tanks and LVT (A) 's were moved

into the area, and half-tracks and 37mm guns

from the Weapons Company were brought

laboriously forward. The early success of

the 3d Battalion on the opposite promontory

released many of the supporting weapons

attached to that unit, as well as substituting

friendly supporting fire for the enemy's

flanking fire.

Company A attacked at 1430, preceded

by a 10-minute air strike and supported by

three tanks. This time the Japanese first

line of defense was carried. The company

gained the high ground and commenced the

grim business of slugging its way southward, while artillery and mortar concentrations blasted enemy positions to its front.

At 1530, Company I was moved over from

the 3d Battalion as a special reserve, and

four minutes later Company C, thus released,

was corhmitted on the promontory to develop the right flank, here greatly lengthened

by the bulge of the western shore. An hour

18"The heroic action of stretcher teams, evacuating wounded across the narrow sand spit under intense enemy fire, merited particular praise."—/bid.

46

later, Company B was ordered across the

spit to positions immediately behind the

two assault companies, and thus the entire

1st Battalion was in the fight.

Resistance was stubborn all along the

line. Company C progressed to the western

shore, in the process reducing the heavy enfilading weapons which had been playing

such havoc with the Orange Beaches. But

when the company attempted to advance

southward, it soon came upon a sizeable

swamp which threatened to break off its

contact with Company A on the left. The

defensive line as set up for the night was in

the shape of an inverted U, with a shallow

penetration in the middle where the swamp

intervened, but a substantial hold on the

shore on either flank. Four tanks, four

armored amphibians, and two half-tracks

were on the scene; Company B was in close

support, ready to be committed wherever

needed, and Company I in reserve just across

the spit.

With the end plainly in sight, the 1st Battalion was in no hurry to resume the attack the following morning (D-plus 3 18

September). While preparatory fires pounded the terrain to the front, dispositions were

made with the utmost care. When, at 1000,

the advance finally began, all of the armor

which had been brought up during the previous afternoon and night was in position

to move forward in support.

The plan for this day's fighting called for

Companies C and A to circle the impeding

swamp, on the right and left respectively,

tie in their flanks to the south of it, and

drive in line to the end of the promontory.

Company B was committed on the extreme

left to pinch out the eastward bulge of land

which widened the front a short distance

ahead of the jump-off line.

Experience of both battalions on the preceding day had indicated that some Japanese were bound to be overrun in the course

of such a drive, hiding out either in their

dug-in positions or in _the numerous caves

in this region of jumbled coral high ground.

All units in assault were directed to ignore

these and press on toward their objectives,
leaving mopping-up to demolition teams supported by reserve elements specially detailed

for the purpose.

This soon proved to be far more of a problem than anyone had expected up until now.

Company C detached 15 men to cover suspected openings of caves and pillboxes in

its rear, only to have these pinned down in

short order by Japanese swarming out from

the underground in numbers which, at this

early stage of the operation, seemed astonishing." Eventually it became necessary to

commit most of the special battalion reserve

(Company I) and the Division Reconnaissance Company, which had been attached to

the 1st Battalion since • D-Day afternoon, to

bring the situation in the rear under control.

The attack developed according to plan,

but slowly in the face of last-ditch resistance

in every sector. By 1048 Company B, now

deployed on a line running north and south,

had pinched out the eastern bulge of the

promontory. With its flank thus covered,

Company A, reached the southern shore in

its zone of action at. 1224, Company C completing its mission on the right at 1344.

It was now becoming apparent that Company B had drawn the most difficult assignment. The defense system in its area had

been strategically designed to cover the entrance to the nearly circular lagoon, or cove,

lying between the promontories against an

anticipated U. S. landing. The shore approaches were heavily mined, and enemy

prepared positions crowded thickly in upon

one another. At 1354 the company estimated

that it had killed 350 Japanese, and resistance had been constricted to a single hard

core only about 50 square yards in area.

However, by this time the tanks supporting

the infantry had withdrawn to rearm, and

the half-tracks had bogged down. Thus, the

19 Although they did not comprehend its full significance at the time, the Marines were encountering the Japanese tactic of "passive infiltration,"

which was to assume the proportions of a major

problem during later phases of the Peleliu operation. See Chapters VII and VIII.

attack had to wait until a bulldozer could be

brought forward to extricate the latter.

As the company waited, significant sounds

to its front indicated that at last the Japanese had decided to cooperate—by blowing

out their own brains.20 Many others leaped

into the sea. When the final position was

taken shortly afterward, 15 or 16 of these

last die-hards were found to have been officers.

So far as the southern part of the island

was concerned, the fighting was over, save

for the inevitable mopping-up. A fine Japanese reinforced infantry battalion, in strongly fortified positions, had been sent to join

its ancestors. As the two Marine assault

battalions straightened themselves out and

squared away for a little well earned rest,

the regimental command notified Division

Headquarters optimistically: "At 1520, 0-1

was taken. The Seventh Marines Mission on

Peleliu is completed." 21

ADVANCE OF THE 5th MARINES 22

By far the most substantial gain in the

actual ground secured during the Second

Operational Phase was to be achieved by the

5th Marines. But there was small indication that this would be the case on the morning of D-plus 1.

The regiment began this day with a nearcatastrophe when one Japanese shell struck

the field telephone switchboard, wiping out

a good portion of the wire section, while a

second shell scored a direct hit on the regimental command post. This was located in

a section of captured enemy trench 23 near

the edge of the airfield, and the shell struck

29 7th Mar R-2 Journal, Sheet #43.'

21 Ibid., Sheet #44.

22 Derived from basic reports of 5th Marines

previously cited. Supplementary sources specially

noted.

23 A zig-zag communication trench, without revetments. A map .captured later indicated that it

served as a registration area for a Japanese battery. This was the third time since its establishment that it had come under heavy fire. On this

particular occasion, 15 to 20 rounds were received,

the two noted doing the most damage. Ltr Capt

L. T. Burcham to CMC, 7Mar50.

61
OPEN MRFIELD area favored tank operations, but dominating ridges to the north demanded fast action.

the parapet, knocking out the 11-1, R-3,

and a newly arrived replacement major, as

well as the naval gunfire liaison officer. The

commanding officer, Colonel Harold D.

Harris, was almost completely buried by the

explosion; miraculously, he escaped being

wounded but sustained a severely wrenched

knee which kept him partially incapacitated

and in great pain for several days.

How seriously this blow impaired the

command situation can be understood more

clearly when it is remembered that the

executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis

W. Walt, had been detached from the staff

the previous evening in order to take over

the disorganized 3d Battalion. Replacements were brought up hurriedly from the

division command post,24 with the result

that the attack jumped off on time. Later

in the day Colonel Walt returned to his regu24 The R-1 replacement was Captain Paul H.

Douglas, division adjutant, who thereupon entered

a colorful and distinguished phase of his military

career which has gone down in the traditions of the

1st Marine Division. He was wounded in turn during a later stage of the operation and again, more

68

lar post which had become of added importance because of Colonel Harris' injury.

The 5th Marines, it Will be remembered,

had for its initial mission capture of the airfield. The 1st Battalion, on the left, had

spent the night in the woods at the edge of

the open ground, along the 0-1 phase line,

where it had halted of necessity in order to

maintain contact with the stalled 1st Marines. On the extreme right 3/5, on the

eastern shore and along the southern edge

of the airfield, also enjoyed some cover. But

the 2d Battalion, which had advanced rapidly

in the wake of the repulsed tank attack late

the previous afternoon, now lay in line

nearly midway across the open airfield. All

three units beat off short, sharp counterattacks during the night, and with the coming

of dawn became subjected to intensive and

effective shell fire.

The terrain here, even more than to the

south, might be compared to that of the atoll

seriously, on Okinawa. A former Professor of

Economics at the University of Chicago, LtCol

Douglas at this writing (April 1950) is serving as

U. S. Senator from Illinois.
FIRESWEPT AIRFIELD, here being crossed by 5th Marines,

islands of the Gilberts and Marshalls. But

with a difference: the airfields on Betio,

Roi and Engebi were not dominated by concentrations of heavy weapons posted on high

ground and directed from observation posts

at elevations as high as 300 feet from which

the enemy could "look down the throats" of

the attackers. There was little actual ground

resistance on the airfield itself, but deadly

fire poured from the ridges and from installations in the woods, or scrub jungle, on

the north and east which made a terrain

compartment of the entire area. While these

woods might provide covered approaches

to the heights, there were no covered approaches to the woods; they had to be taken

by determined tank-infantry attack, supported by naval gunfire, air strikes, and all

the artillery and mortars which could be

spared from other sectors.

was naked of cover.

The advance on this day took the form of

a wide turning movement toward the northeast, pivoting on the extreme left of the 1st

Marines. In the 5th Marines zone of action,

the most substantial gains were achieved by

the 1st Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Boyd

had Companies A and B in line (left to

right), with Company C echeloned 200 yards

rearward behind Company A. In this formation, the battalion swept the entire northern portion of the airfield. In a little more

than an hour, advance elements reached the

main service apron and hangar area. Here

they found the Japanese installed in strength

in a large antitank trench and several stone

revetments and ousted them only by dint of

some heavy fighting. This position was consolidated, and during the afternoon the battalion pushed forward to the 0-2 line. There

was no possibility of digging-in here., how69
ever, so a withdrawal was made to the antitank trench for the night.

Throughout the day the 1st Battalion experienced contact difficulties on both flanks.

On the left, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,

was meeting a somewhat different tactical

situation (see sub-chapter following) and

had troubles of its own. Colonel Boyd succeeded in tying-in firmly with Company F

of that regiment, only to discover a little

later that this unit was out of touch with the

rest of the 1st Marines. The gap there, estimated as 200-250 yards, was covered by

bringing up Company I from 3/5 (see below) , but F/1 remained attached to 1/5

throughout most of the day. However, because of the excellent visual contact and the

open nature of the ground, physical tie-in

was not considered essential.

The 2d Battalion made slower progress.

Major Gayle's unit had to cope not only

with the shell fire that lashed the open

ground, but with the woods that bounded the

airfield on the east, giving way along an illdefined shore line to dense mangrove swamp.

These woods were in actuality a nearly impenetrable tangle of scrub jungle, difficult

to travel 'in itself and infested with Japanese who had to be eliminated by the costly

hand-to-hand process, supported where possible by tanks operating on the open ground.

By nightfall the 2d Battalion had closed up

on the flank of the 1st and enjoyed some

surcease from the galling fire from the ridges

under cover of the captured woods. But

with the coming of darkness, the battalion

found it expedient to fall back a short distance on the open airfield in order to obtain

clear fields of fire to its front.

The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, played a

comparatively minor role in this day's fighting. The simultaneous pushes of its own

regiment northward and the 7th Marines

first to the east 25 and then to the south,

each with a flank on the eastern shore, had

25 3/7 did not start sweeping southward until

completely across the island in its zone of action;

hence, its initial attack crossed the front of the

position organized by 3/5 on D-Day night. Walt.

10

the effect of pinching out 3/5 for practical

purposes. During the morning, the battalion

expanded its hold along the shore line behind the advance of the assault units, elements of Company L assisting the flank of

the 2d Battalion, Company K cooperating

with 3/7. But with the two drives proceeding in opposite directions with all possible

speed, both companies were soon over-extended. Company I was ordered to fill the

gap which was developing between them, but

before this move could be effected, about

1200, new orders arrived sending Company

I to the north of the airfield to reinforce

the battered 1st Battalion.

Because of the urgent need for Lieutenant Colonel Walt in his regular post as regimental executive officer, he was relieved in

his temporary command of 3/5 at 1500 that

afternoon. Major John H. Gustafson was

designated to command the battalion, with

Major Hierome L. Opie moving in to take

over as Executive Officer. These officers received word of this new assignment only at

dusk and had little time to learn the true

condition of the unit and its equipment before the battalion was moved up to relieve

1/5 in its forward positions the following

morning.26

D-plus 2 (17 September) was a significant

date in the story of the operation, as this

day brought the invaders squarely up against

what was to prove the major terrain feature of the island's defense: the ridge system which began just above the Japanese

barracks area and followed the axis of Peleliu's northwestern peninsula, harboring the

hard core of enemy resistance. As this lay

entirely within the zone of action of the

1st Marines, the fighting there will be discussed in detail in connection with the operations of that regiment (see following subchapter).

The line of advance of the 5th Marines

lay across the low ground to the east of the

26 Ltr Maj J. H. Gustafson to LtCol G. D. Gayle,

8Nov49, hereinafter cited as Gustafson. Up to this

time, Major Gustafson had been Executive Officer

of the 2d Battalion, Major Opie Bn-3 of the 1st

Battalion.
ridges. Thus, every forward movement

brought the elements of that regiment under

increasingly heavy flanking fire from the

enemy's commanding positions on the left.

This, combined with the necessarily slow

progress of the 1st Marines, was to be a

controlling factor in this area as long as

the regiment operated there—and for some

time after that.

The situation was especially acute in the

zone most adjacent to the high ground where

open terrain provided virtually no concealment and little cover. Attacking early on

the 17th behind adequate fire preparation,

the 1st Battalion reached the 0-2 phase line

once more by mid-morning against light

ground resistance but heavy mortar and artillery fire from elevated emplacements on

the left. This time the position was secured,

and there 1/5 was relieved by the 3d Battalion which had been alerted for this mission the previous evening.27 But when the

latter unit attempted to move forward again

in the afternoon, it was pinned down so effectively by that flanking fire that gains on

the left were negligible.

On the right, the 2d Battalion had the advantage of excellent concealment in the

woods; and its concomitant disadvantage:

so excellent was the concealment that the

jungle was all but impenetrable. Thus, the

men were relatively free from that galling

fire from the left, though Japanese observers

in the hills promptly called down concentrations whenever any personnel showed themselves in the open. This was particularly

the case during the morning when a tank

attempted to cooperate along the jungle's

edge; it drew such volume of fire as to cause

more harm than it could do good and had

to be withdrawn.

27 This relief was commenced in mid-morning and

effected with great difficulty as 1/5 was receiving

heavy fire from the left flank and suffering many

cases of heat prostration. Relief was completed

about 1230. Gustaf son. 5th Mar WD. 1/5 Bn-3

Journal gives hour of completion as 1410. The 1st

Bn. passed into regimental reserve where it remained throughout this phase of the operation.

Resistance on the ground was limited to

the sporadic fire of a few scattered snipers.

However, after the experience of the previous day in similar territory, this could not

be foreseen, and the troops combed through

the area in a skirmish line, hacking their

individual ways as best they could. The

brutal heat which now gripped the island

was beginning to exact its toll. Heat prostration cases mounted, and it was necessary

to call frequent halts to rest the men. Supply difficulties, especially getting water forward, did nothing to help.

Nevertheless, the 2d Battalion's advance

passed well beyond the 0-2 line for a gain

of 600-700 yards. Company E, on the left,

dug in in contact with the 3d Battalion where

Company K, having found some woods in

its own area, had pushed forward to the

edge of a coconut grove near the point designated "Omaok" on the map: a native village at one time but now an area of demolished Japanese barracks and utility

buildings. Company F anchored the battalion's right flank on the edge of the mangrove swamp with Company G, in reserve,

extending southward along the shore from

there, facing that dismal morass from which

nobody knew what to expect.

Progress continued slow on the left of the

5th Marines throughout 18 September (Dplus 3). The regimental ,zone of action in

this area was bounded by a tactically important thoroughfare which became known

as the East Road, which here began skirting the base of that hill system identified on

the maps as Umurbrogol Mountain.28 The

1st Marines had gained a foothold on the

most adjacent ridge late the previous afternoon (see sub-chapter following), but fire

from innumerable other elevations farther

to the west and north continued to hamper

the advance of troops traversing the open

ground. This, combined with the necessity

for keeping tied-in with the adjoining regiment, now heavily engaged with both the

28 For further description of the tactical parts

played by both the East Road and the Umurbrogol,

see Chapters VI and VII.

71
enemy and the terrain, halted the forward

movement of the 3d Battalion around midday.

Conditions on the right, however, were

very different, and soon changed the entire

nature of the 5th Marines' mission.

Jumping off at 0700, the 2d Battalion

continued to hack its way through the concealing jungle, relatively immune to enemy

shellfire and encountering only scattered

ground resistance. This advance was aided

greatly by a half hour's concentration of

artillery time shell' (air burst) fire on the

woods and mangrove swamp to the front and

flank by 2/11. Within two hours advance

elements of Company F reached an improved

road leading eastward to the Ngardololok

area,29 beyond which lay Purple Beach and

the ill-defined shore contours and semiislands which constituted the northeastern

peninsula, or shorter prong of the Peleliu

"lobster claw", seizure of which constituted

an important part of the regiment's mission.

A short distance to the east of where the

Marines first reached it, the Ngardololok

Road was so closely bordered by swamps as

to become in effect an open causeway: a

perilous bottleneck which threatened to

check any advance in force beyond this point.

Aerial observation had revealed major Japanese installations both in the RDF area

and the vicinity of Purple Beach, but the

nature of the resistance encountered during

the past two days indicated that the enemy

might have withdrawn. To test this possibility, at 1040 the commanding officer of

Company F was ordered to take a patrol

across the causeway and see what happened.

The patrol accomplished its mission by 1120

without drawing any fire whatever, whereupon an air strike on Ngardololok was

called for to prepare the way for. a crossing

in force to set up a bridgehead.

29 A Japanese radio direction finder was located

here, leading the region to be labeled on the maps,

and frequently referred to in reports, as the "RDF

Area".

12

Now began a series of misadventures

which, alone, hampered the progress of the

2d Battalion on this day. The air strike,

staged at 1245, missed the target altogether.

To make up for this, an artillery barrage

was placed on the area, and at 1335 Company F, reinforced by elements of Company

G, commenced the perilous crossing of the

causeway. Before this could be accomplished, a second and wholly unexpected air

strike 3° came diving down to strafe the advancing troops. The bridgehead was set up,

nevertheless, but Company E and the battalion command post, moving forward in

support, were caught in the open approaches

to the causeway by a misplaced artillery concentration, and a little later on the causeway

itself by friendly mortar fire.

Even before the crossing of the causeway, a new tactical factor had arisen to

change the nature of the 5th Marines' mission. The long, shallow arm of the sea which

separated the island's northwestern and

northeastern peninsulas had been reached

which, in effect, split the regimental zone of

action well over toward the left. All that

remained on the west was the strip of

ground between the East Road and the deep

swamp that fringed the inlet, a front which

could be maintained adequately by a single

company rather than requiring an entire

battalion. Company L, therefore, was left

here to tie-in with, and protect the flank

of, the 1st Marines, while the rest of 3/5

was hurried eastward across the causeway

to aid in exploiting the gains of the 2d Battalion. At 1700 that evening Companies I

and K dug in on the right (south) of 2/5,

which had expanded its initial bridgehead

to the north and east: holding all of the

shore line in its area and facing the

main Ngardololok installations across open

ground.

39 The second air strike was ordered by regimental command, but word failed to reach the Battalion

CP which was then in the process of displacing forward. Harris. Nearly all of the 34 casualties sustained by the 2d Battalion during this day resulted

from friendly fire.
It will be remembered that this was the

day (D-plus 3) when the 7th Marines secured all of the remainder of southern Peleliu. This accomplishment released additional

personnel of that regiment, .with the result

that 3/7 took over most of the swamp line

still held by the reserve battalion of the

5th Marines, enabling 1/5 to move up in

closer supoprt of its parent regiment in

preparation for the drive to come.

In the positions they occupied that night,

the 2d and 3d Battalions were poised for

the completion of the regimental mission,

which proceeded systematically and uneventfully from this point on. An air strike

paved the way for the 2d Battalion to secure the remainder of the RDF area during the morning of 19 September. Opposition was limited to a scattering of Japanese,

evidently stragglers, who lurked among the

demolished installations. They inflicted a

few casualties but for the most part showed

a greater disposition to hide than to fight,

lending weight to the earlier supposition that

the first class enemy troops originally assigned to this area had been withdrawn.

Subsequent operations of this day substantiated the supposition beyond further

doubt. The 3d Battalion, pushing southward

through tangled jungle following artillery

and mortar concentrations, killed a handful

of Japanese with virtually no resistance.

Company I reached the ill-defined shore line

across the mangrove swamp from the airfield area where the 2d Battalion had encountered so much trouble two days earlier,

and Company K pushed a strong patrol to

the east coast just below Purple Beach.

Later that afternoon, Company G occupied

the southern end of the beach, and commenced vigorous patrolling to the northeast.

The abandoned defenses of Purple Beach

proved to be very formidable indeed as they

faced seaward, confirming further the wisdom of the planners in deciding early against

attempting a landing there. The beach itself

was heavily mined and obstructed with tank

traps and barricades which slowed progress

much more than mopping up the few scattered enemy remnants. Nevertheless, by late

afternoon of the following day (20 September) Comp-any G had secured the northern

tip of the northeastern peninsula proper

and sent a patrol to the off-lying island

(designated "Island A" in current reports)

which was found to be unoccupied.31

Simultaneously, a patrol from Company I

moved southwestward along the narrow projection below the beach. Like the 2d Battalion elements, this patrol employed war

dogs, one of which was credited with alerting the troops to an enemy ambush 32 during the late afternoon. A sustained fire

fight failed to prove decisive by nightfall,

and the men of Company I dug in short of

their goal. Night infiltration attempts weakened the Japanese defenders, however, and

the objective was secured the next morning

with no great difficulty.

The remainder of the 5th Marines story

for this phase is quickly told. The 2d Battalion continued its northward push, hampered only by natural obstacles. On the morning of 21 September, Company B seized

Island A which the previous day's patrol had

found unoccupied. Company F then passed

forward and secured the larger adjacent

island of Ngabad, again without opposition.

The battalion command post kept pace with

the advance, and Company E, in reserve,

moved up in the rear to help in organizing

the newly occupied territory. On 23 September, Company G's seizure of the small unnamed—and undefended—island due north

of Ngabad and midway across the opening

of the Peleliu "lobster claw" completed the

regiment's mission in this zone of action, iso31 5th Mar R-2 Reports states that this patrol

"encountered no resistance," but adds that it "killed

three enemy." The patrol returned to the main

island for the night at 1730. 5th Mar WD. (2/5

Journal gives hour of return as 1615).

32 5th Mar WD, confirmed in detail by Walt. The

extensive jungle and swamp patrolling during this

phase of the operation provided the dogs with almost their only chance to prove their usefulness on

Peleliu. Mistaken attempts to employ them elsewhere led to their virtual annihilation. The Action

Reports of the 4th and 5th War Dog Platoons make

pitiful reading.

73
lating all enemy resistance on the northwestern peninsula.

Behind the rapid advance, the 3d Battalion (less Company L) completed mopping-up and set about organizing Purple

Beach for defense against anticipated counterlandings by Japanese troops from the central Palaus. On 21 September the 1st Battalion, which had been in regimental reserve

farther south, moved up to Ngardololok and

undertook similar work thereabouts. From

then until the end of the Peleliu operation,

the entire region was designated a defense

area and was occupied in turn by various

assault units relieved from the lines for a

brief rest.

During this far-reaching expansion, Company L had remained tied-in with the 1st

Marines to the west of the inlet which divided the 5th Marines' zone of action, and

its movements during this period were governed by those of that regiment. The position held by Company L on 18 September,

the day that the rest of the 3d Battalion

crossed the causeway, described a rough arc

from the East Road across to the southern

end of the swamp which fringed the inlet,

facing northward. On 19 September, a forward surge by the right of the 1st Marines

carried to the summit of the dominating elevation in that area,33 and Company L tiedin with the advance by pivoting on its right

flank to form a north-south line along the

edge of the swamp.

The 1st Marines, however, failed to hold

the ground thus gained, and with the retirement of the survivors the following

morning, Company L fell back to the position previously occupied. There it remained

without participating in any further movements of importance until, with commitment

of the 5th Marines in the Third Operational

Phase of the campaign, it rejoined its par33 Subsequently designated Walt Ridge (see Chapter VII). The attack which reached its summit on

19 September was that by Captain Everett P. Pope's

Co C, 1st Marines, described in sub-chapter following.

14

ent regiment and played its part in the operations to the northward, as narrated in

Chapter VI.

DIFFICULTIES OF 1st MARINES"

The over-all scheme of maneuver had anticipated that the 1st Marines would encounter the most difficult opposition. This

forecast had been more than substantiated

on D-Day, and the appalling extent to which

it was true became increasingly evident.

As previously recounted, the regiment's

situation on the evening of D-Day left a

good deal to be desired: with most of the

left flank company isolated and a gap in

what should have been the beachhead line

where the Japanese still held the northern

half of that formidable coral ridge which

barred progress inland. Jumping off to the

attack on the morning of D-plus 1, Lieutenant Colonel Honsowetz's 2d Battalion, on

the right, made excellent progress, crossing

the west turning circle of the airfield within

half an hour. But on the left of the 3d Battalion zone, the line was unable to advance

at all."

Tactically, this immobility was not serious in itself, for the over-all plan called for

the northward drive to pivot on the left

flank. But the fact that the immobility was

enforced, with, in effect, an enemy salient

driven into the line, called for cogent measures. The regimental reserve (1st Battalion) attacked strongly in the early afternoon with Company C, the last fresh element, in assault and one platoon of Company B in reserve. Two tanks had been

brought up, and with their support the infantry succeeded in capturing a 500-yard

segment of the ridge." With this high

ground as a lever to pry the left of the line,

the remainder of Company B was able to

advance and gain contact with Captain

34 Synthesized from basic 1st Marines sources

previously cited except as otherwise noted.

35 1st Mar Nar.

36 Davis.
CLOSE INFANTRY ACTION through the rubble of building area north of airfield.

Hunt's command on the point which by then

had been cut off for thirty hours.

A brief digression here to complete the

saga of Company K. With the sea at their

backs and Japanese in every other direction,

the survivors of the two platoons had withstood sharp counterattacks throughout the

night of D-Day. An amtrack operating

across the reef carried out their wounded

and brought in supplies and ammunition, and

eventually the platoon which had been pinned

down in the tank trap. The enemy were determined to recapture that bitterly contested

point, but they were unable to muster forces

for a major attack until about 2200 on the

night of D-plus 1.

This took the form of a frontal assault

against the high ground by an estimated 350

Japanese, together with a secondary, or diversionary, attack along the narrow flat at

the shore line. At one stage during the

previous night, Captain Hunt had been down

to 18 men and must surely have been over8921060-50-6

whelmed. Now most of Company B 37 was

in position, as well as what remained of his

own command; he was tied-in with the battalion line, and had telephone communication with the mortar platoons of both companies, which were already registered on

the ground to his front.

Thus, the Japanese faced all the disadvantages attendant upon assaulting adequately manned prepared positions, covered

by well placed defensive fire. What developed was a shambles, and by 0200 on 17

September a great tranquillity lay upon the

area.

When the advance jumped off on the morning of D-plus 2, Company I passed through

37"At this point the 1st Battalion was tied-in

in the middle of the 3d Battalion with Company K

on our left and Company I on our right. . . . I had

just finished a final check of our tie-in when the

counterattack came. Hunt bore the brunt of the

attack, but flanking fire from Companies B and C

plus all our mortars no doubt aided him in beating

it off." Ibid.

75
"A JOB FOR THE INFANTRY." Typical terrain in Peleliu's coral limestone ridges.

the position and Company K was ordered

into reserve. Of Captain Hunt's complement of 235 men who had landed two days

previously, 78 were left.38

Elsewhere in the 1st Marines zone, progress during the second day was the most

satisfactory the regiment was destined to

experience during its operations on Peleliu.

The arbitrary line demarking this zone from

that of the 5th Marines was so drawn that

the two regiments, closely tied-in as they

were, encountered essentially different terrain problems. Whereas the 5th Marines

advanced almost entirely across open ground,

the 1st, after cutting across one corner of

the airfield, entered the building area to the

88 Hunt, op.cit., 139.

16

north. Many of the structures here had

been made of reinforced concrete, now blasted to rubble by the heavy naval gunfire.

These ruins provided at least some cover

from the brutal shelling pouring from the

high ground. Of course, they also provided

cover for the defending Japanese infantry,

with the result that the area became the

scene for some savage close-in fighting.

The center of the regimental front, comprising the right company of the 3d Battalion and the left elements of the 2d, broke

through and pushed on to gain control of a

valuable stretch of road running east-west.

On the right, however, the Japanese stubbornly defended the junction of the main

road which circled the base of the ridge be-
yond the airfield headquarters, then angled

off to run the whole length of the northwestern peninsula.

This road, marking the 0-2 phase line,

was still 200-300 yards beyond reach when

the time came to set up positions for the

night. The extreme left, not having moved

beyond the point where Hunt's men had been

fighting for two days, was still more than

100 yards short of the 0-1 line.

All the trials which the 1st Marines had

suffered up to this point were compounded

by the protracted hell which commenced for

the regiment on D-plus 2. For this was the

day its personnel made the acquaintance of

the Peleliu ridges at first hand. Preliminary

aerial photography had done scant justice

to this outlandish formation. At that time

scrub jungle cloaked the high ground, blurring the outlines and softening contours, so

that it might have passed for pleasantly undulating country of hills and dales. Now

naval gunfire, if it had accomplished little

else of great importance, had sheared away

vegetation like a giant scythe, and the true

features of the ridges stood revealed in all

their stark horror—or so they appeared to

the eyes of military men ordered to attack

them.

First Marines Regimental Narrative (pp.

7, 8) describes the terrain thus:

The ground of Peleliu's western peninsula was

the worst ever encountered by the regiment in three

Pacific campaigns. Along its center, the rocky

spine was heaved up in a contorted mass of decayed coral, strewn with rubble, crags, ridges and

gulches thrown together in a confusing maze.

There were no roads, scarcely any trails. The

pock-marked surface offered no secure footing even

in the few level places. It was impossible to dig in:

the best the men could do was pile a little coral or

wood debris around their positions. The jagged

rock slashed their shoes and clothes, and tore their

bodies every time they hit the deck for safety.

Casualties were higher for the simple reason it was

impossible to get under the ground away from the

Japanese mortar barrages. Each blast hurled

chunks of coral in all directions, multiplying many

times the fragmentation effect of every shell. Into

this the enemy dug and tunnelled like moles; and

there they stayed to fight to the death.

General 0. P. Smith (Personal Narrative)

adds:

Ravines, which on the map and photographs appeared to be steep-sided, actually had sheer cliffs

for sides, some Of them 50 to 100 feet high. With

nothing else on your mind but to cover the distance

between two points, walking was difficult. . . . There

were dozens of caves and pillboxes worked into the

noses of the ridges and up the ravines. It was very

difficult to find blind spots as the caves and pillboxes were mutually supporting. . . . These caves

and pillboxes housed riflemen, machine gunners,

mortars, rockets, and field-pieces. The Japanese

technique was to run the piece out of the cave, fire,

then run the piece back in the cave before we could

react.89

Even before encountering the ridges, the

1st Marines received reinforcements. The

inability of the division reserve (2d Battalion, 7th Marines) to land late on D-Day

for commitment in the southern area made

it available for the more critical northern

zone, and this unit was moved to the White

Beaches on the morning of D-plus 1 and attached operationally to the 1st Marines, as

described in previous sub-chapter. Initially

the battalion was held in special reserve,40

but it was destined to play its active part

all too soon.

Before the attack could jump off on the

morning of D-plus 2, some reorganization

was necessary. The regiment's casualties

now exceeded 1,000, and the units were so

depleted that it was necessary to use all

three battalions in line. Owing to the difficulties on the left, the 1st Battalion had

been committed in the middle of what had

been originally designated the 3d Battalion

zone. Now 1/1 was ordered to move into

the center of the regimental line at dawn,

while 3/1 tied-in in its own sector. The 2d

39 For a more particularized description, see Chapter VII of this monograph; also Appendix D.

40 At this stage 2/7 was earmarked for the shoreto-shore operation to seize the off-lying island of

Ngesebus, to the North. According to the Commanding General's optimistic time schedule, the

ground should have been prepared for this move

within two or three days; hence, it was desired to

keep the battalion intact. The fight in the ridges,

however, necessitated a hurried revision of the entire Ngesebus plan.

17
Battalion retained its position on the right,

in contact with the 5th Marines, and one

company of the newly arrived reserve battalion (Company E, 7th Marines) was moved

up in close support.

The 2d Battalion was the first to meet the

ridges. Pushing forward in the wake of the

artillery and naval gunfire preparation, the

assault companies quickly overran the important road that marked the 0-2 phase

line and captured the enemy position at the

vital road junction which had held up the

advance on the previous afternoon. This

placed the battalion astride the island's second main traffic artery: the East Road,

which ran from the administrative area

through the village of Asias and along the

narrow flat between the swamps and the

eastern base of the high ground, then angled

across the peninsula to join the West Road

near the northern radio station (Road Junction 15—see Map 3).

The foremost units had progressed along

the road for about 150 yards when they were

stopped abruptly by a combination of brief

loss of contact with the 5th Marines on their

right, and the intensity of fire from the

rugged coral ridge which now loomed menacingly on their left.

This ridge attained an elevation of 200

feet (henceforth known as Hill 200) and

paralleled the East Road, thus thrusting a

formidable salient ever deeper into the zone

of action of the 2d Battalion as that unit

advanced. Its flanks were steep, precipitous

in places (much worse would be encountered) and honeycombed with caves which

held observation posts, from which fire on

the airfield area was directed, and many of

the weapons which delivered this fire.

The battalion wheeled left Wand took the

ridge under attack, scaling the steep slopes

in the face of withering small arms fire and

point-blank salvos from mountain guns and

dual-purpose pieces which were run in and

out of cover. At such close range this fire

was extraordinarily accurate. Casualties

among the assault troops mounted, and tanks

and LVT (A) 's moving up in support were

18

knocked out right and left. By nightfall

virtually all of the crest had been taken.

The men dug in 41 as best they could against

the fire that now poured on them from elevations farther forward and from a second,

slightly higher ridge (Hill 210) which paralleled Hill 200 on the west. The narrow,

steepsided ravine separating the two teemed

with Japanese who effectively prevented further assault in that direction.

According to the Japanese version, as set

forth in Tada Record, 18 September: "At

1300, under protection of heavy naval gunfire, an enemy unit composed of two tanks

and approximately two companies of infantry successfully advanced up to a high spot

on the east side of Nakayama" (Japanese

designation of Hill 200). Such apparent discrepancies in date appear frequently and

might be accounted for either by faulty communications or the commander's natural reluctance to report a reverse until convinced

that it was irremediable. At this time Nakagawa's CP was farther north in the same

ridge, and the success of the Marines in gaining a foothold on the crest may have been

the determining factor in causing him to

displace later that day to the cave in the

heart of the enemy final pocket of resistance

which he occupied henceforth.

The capture of this strategic height had

two immediately important effects. First, it

greatly reduced the flanking fire which had

been so hampering the 5th Marines, enabling

that regiment to proceed with its main mission. Second, it exactly reversed the previous situation: instead of confronting a deep

salient thrust into its own lines, the battalion now held an equally formidable salient

driven into the Japanese defensive stronghold.

In the meanwhile, the other elements of

the 1st Marines had commenced the day

with an equally swift advance, a pace they

41 The impossibility of "digging in" in any accepted sense of that term cannot be over-emphasized

if a true picture of the fighting on Peleliu is to

be given. Repeatedly it was the controlling factor

in nullifying costly gains.
SCENE OF SOME OF 1st MARINES HEAVIEST ACTION on D-plus 2, 3. Troops on Hill 200 (left) exchanged fires across

gulch with Japanese still holding Hill 210 (right).

were able to sustain considerably longer. In

the center, 1/1 had to cope with an obstacle

which, according to its officers' not unreasonable reckoning, should not have been

there. This was a formidable blockhouse,

with reinforced concrete walls four feet

thick and protected by twelve pillboxes, all

connected by a maze of tunnels. Unlike the

hidden installations in the hills and jungles,

this building showed clearly on the prelanding aerial photographs and was pinpointed on the map issued to all ground

troops; yet although Admiral Oldendorf had

reported before D-Day that the fire support

ships had run out of profitable targets, the

blockhouse had not been so much as nicked,

much less reduced.42

This omission was quickly rectified, however. The old battleship USS Mississippi

had been assigned in direct suport of the

42 This blockhouse was not identified as such on

the map, showing merely as a large building. The

difficulties under which the admiral labored at this

time go far toward explaining what appeared a

serious oversight: "At the time, in spite of all my

previous recommendations. . . . I had only a cruiser

division operating staff, consisting of four officers.

. . . During the preliminary bombardment and until

several days after the landing, my entire staff were

on the sick list, only my flag lieutenant remaining

on his feet." Oldendorf.

19
SOUTHERN RIDGES; air view from southeast. Long razorback at left is Hill 200, with Hill 210 just behind it. Five Sisters

in center, Walt Ridge right foreground.

battalion, and very shortly after the shore

fire control party was able to adjust her 14-

inch guns, the blockhouse began disintegrating. The big armor piercing and high capacity shells crumbled the walls, and their

terrific concussion killed those Japanese

missed by fragmentation. Smaller naval

guns, tanks and infantry support weapons

concentrated on the protecting pillboxes, and

presently the advance overran the position

and rolled on into dense jungle to the 0-1

line."

During this action the front had become

over-expanded, necessitating the forward

movement of two platoons of the reserve in

order to protect the flanks, and here the battalion paused to regroup.

By now the 1st Battalion, too, was face

to face with the ridges. The arbitrary phase

line 0-2 had been laid along the main road,

here running northwest-southeast parallel

to the battalion's front. Just across the road

began that irregular, unpredictable rising

of the land which was such a familiar f ea43 Activity in this blockhouse had been reported

late the previous day, and the naval gunfire mission was delivered prior to the jump-off on D-plus 2.

Major Davis had his CP in what was left of the

blockhouse by 0930, "mingled with about 20 freshly

dead Japanese." Davis.

80

ture of the landscape of Peleliu's northwestern peninsula. No sooner had 1/1 halted to

reorganize than the line was assailed by a

fury of fire from the high ground, and casualties began to mount alarmingly.

As quickly as it could be managed, reorganization was completed and the men

surged forward again, slugging their way

upward much in the manner the 2d Battalion was storming Hill 200. There was

no other way: clawing up and over razorback crests, shinnying coral pinnacles, plunging down into sheer-sided gullies and ravines, dodging behind boulders. By evening

they had gained the forward slope of the

first series of hills and were firmly, if uncomfortably, established." One significant

feature of this advance was that in the

course of it the infantrymen were obliged

to knock out 35 separate Japanese-manned

caves, existence of which had not been noted

in their advance intelligence.45

44 Hist 1st Mar, 10. The Japanese, however, appeared to disagree: "The enemy began to attack

our lines along the hills of Tenzan (southwestern

ridges) . . . but were repulsed by our timely firing."

Tada Record, 18Sept44.

45 Experience in the Marianas campaign had convinced intelligence officers that there were doubtless

many caves in the Peleliu ridges, so the division
Writing of this mission long after the

event, Lieutenant Colonel Davis, in his letter

previously cited, described it as "the most

difficult assignment I have ever seen. . . .

Company A depleted itself on the bare ridge

on the right as Company C became seriously

over-extended on the left and was faltering.

Everything was thrown in to exploit Company C's success. Remnants of Companies A

and B, Engineer and Pioneer units were committed to fill the gaps as darkness came.

Headquarters personnel were formed into a

meager reserve. . . . Company C had moved

800 yards during the day, and we had been

able to hold on although the cost was extremely heavy."

On the 1st Marines' left the story was

somewhat happier. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen V. Sabol's 3d Battalion, which had

had the most difficult going up to now,

was destined to have the easiest henceforth.

For its course lay along the coastal flat (or

comparative flat), with the high ground to

its right. Slow to get started, the battalion

rolled on against minor resistance for an

average advance for the day of 700 yards,

and all that stopped it then was the danger

of over-extending its front through the

necessity of keeping tied-in on the right. As

with the fighting in the ridges, this condition was to set the pattern of the regiment's

advance for several days to come.

The varying fortunes of the different units

resulted in an odd-appearing and far from

reassuring contour to the front line on the

evening of 17 September. Because of the inability of the 2d Battalion to secure Hill

210, the right of the 1st Marines' zone somewhat resembled a constricted letter "W".

And there were two ominous features. While

the Marines held a deep salient in enemy

territory along the crest of Hill 200, this

was not wholly unprepared. But nothing in this

or any other war gave any hint of the magnitude of

the problem which developed here. These caves and

the methods developed for reducing them are dealt

with in detail in later chapters and in Appendix D.

For the time being suffice it to quote Time, 160ct44,

which characterized them, without being accused of

overstatement, as "the incarnate evil of this war."

was precarious in the extreme. For in Japanese hands, the parallel ridge to the west

formed an equally deep salient in U. S. territory.

Furthermore, in adjusting the lines in this

area after dusk, a gap was created between

the flanks of the 2d and 1st Battalions. This

the night-prowling enemy soon discovered

and commenced to infiltrate in force. To cope

with this situation, it was necessary to commit Company F, 7th Marines, and that unit

was obliged to fight its way into position before the gap could be closed. Pressure on

Hill 200 was so sustained and heavy throughout the night that at 0200 on the morning

of 18 September, the 2d Battalion was

obliged to bring up Company G, 7th Marines,46 to bolster the position there. However, any overwhelming counterattack which

might have made the situation something

worse than precarious was effectively interdicted by concentrations of well placed artillery and naval gunfire on the approaches.

This brings the narrative of the 1st Marines to the morning of D-plus 3 (18 September). That day, as has been noted, was

when the 7th Marines completed the securing of southern Peleliu, and the 5th Marines, leaving only Company L to maintain

contact, set off on its quick overrunning of

the eastern and northeastern portions of the

island. But no such decisive results were

in store for the hard-fighting 1st Marines,

that day or ever during this campaign.

Casualties had been heavy, especially

among the front line units, as was to be expected. For example: of 473 total effectives remaining in the 3d Battalion, 200

were headquarters personnel. Total losses

for the regiment ran 1,236. Yet there appeared to be grounds for satisfaction with

the progress made. A good foothold had

been gained in the high ground, and the

stiffest resistance the Japanese had been

able to offer (so far) had been overcome.

In any case, Colonel Puller reported to the

46 217 Unit Journal. 1st Mar Nor erroneously

identifies this as Co E. One platoon was virtually

wiped out while fighting with 2/1. Berger.

81
PERILOUS APPROACH. Japanese emplaced in precipitous Hill 200 (background) poured flanking fire into troops attempting

to assault the Five Sisters (right, partially hidden by tree).

division command post with an optimism

which was contagious. The general feeling

seemed to be that a break-through was imminent, whereat enemy resistance would collapse, or at worst disintegrate, as had happened on Saipan, Tinian and Guam after

a certain point had been passed.

The trouble with this reasoning was that

on the other islands the collapse had occurred upon U. S. troops reaching favorable

terrain and had been heralded by at least

one suicidal banzai charge. But there had

been no banzais on Peleliu, and the terrain

was becoming worse instead of better.

Optimistically, necessary regroupings were

ordered, preparatory to resuming the at82

tack on the morning of 18 September.

Unit commanders put every available man

in the lines, including headquarters personnel not absolutely indispensible elsewhere.

Company D, 1st Pioneer Battalion, sent .up

115 replacements who were divided among

the assault units. At 0600 the reserve battalion (2/7) took over the center from 1/1

which was relieved for a brief spell in regimental reserve (very brief indeed in the

case of Company B) , and the assault jumped

off at 0700 behind a 30-minute preparation

by planes, artillery and naval gunfire.

D-plus 3 combined the worst features of

D-plus 2 with a lot of new ones, and the

best that can be said for the day's progress
was that in general the alignment of the

front was rectified. The enemy salient on

Hill 210 was finally pinched out by dint of

savage and costly fighting on the part of 2/1

and 2/7. The Japanese, in turn, concentrated a murderous fire on 2d Battalion elements on the forward nose of Hill 200. Following up with powerful counterattacks,

they made the position untenable and forced

a short withdrawal from the ground so painfully won the previous afternoon.

At 1400 Lieutenant Colonel Honsowetz

reported the 2d Battalion situation as desperate and requested immediately reinforcements and smoke barrage to screen the position. Company B was ordered up from the

1st Battalion's reserve area, attached to the

2d Battalion, and thrown in assault against

Hill 205, slightly forward and to the right

of the ridge to which it was hoped to gain

direct access by this means. Somewhat to

the surprise of all hands, they secured the

hill With comparatively light casualties by

1630. However, it proved to be isolated

from the main ridge system, hence of value

only as an observation point and for relieving some of the pressure. Pushing on from

there, Company B was decisively thrown

back before the most formidable terrain obstacle yet encountered: an incredible complex of up-ended peaks and palisades which

was to gain evil fame under the name of the

Five Sisters.47

Progress was somewhat better on both

flanks. In the 3d Battalion's zone on the left,

the advance, as on the previous day, .met

only minor opposition, but the assault elements were obliged to halt after moving only

a few hundred yards in order to maintain

47 This was the original "Bloody Nose" ridge, so

christened by the troops who first came up against

it. The designation immediately became popular,

however, and from reports which have come in it

would appear that virtually every battalion in the

division had a different conception of exactly what

terrain feature "Bloody Nose" applied to. Communiques and news dispatches of this period usually

referred to "Umurbrogol Mountain", a name appearing on the early maps but applying generally to

the peninsula's entire southern ridge system. See

subsequent notes on Peleliu place names.

contact with 2/7, which was operating with

great difficulty in the high ground. Those

elements of-2/1 on the extreme right, moved

across the comparatively level flat below

Hill 200 to what had been the village of

Asias, tying in there with the left company

of the 5th Marines,48 the rest of whose zone

would now be separated from that of the

1st Marines by swamps and a long indenting

arm of the sea. Thus at dusk the regimental

front as a whole formed a shallow "U", a

situation sounder tactically than the constricted "W" of the previous evening. But

in the center the day's gains looked something less than imposing on the map, and on

Hill 200 there was actual retrogression.

It should be borne in mind that position

lines shown on the operations maps during

this phase of the fighting are intended only

as approximations. Owing to the inadequacy of the maps in this particular region

and the incredibly broken nature of the terrain, exact orientation was all but impossible, and many misunderstandings resulted.

As a participating battalion commander puts

it:

There was no such thing as a continuous attacking line. Elements of the same company, even platoon, were attacking in every direction of the compass, with large gaps in between. When companies

were asked for front lines they were apt to give

points where the Company Commander knew or

thought he knew he had some men. . . . There were

countless little salients and countersalients existing.49

IRRESISTABLE FORCE VERSUS IMMOVABLE

OBJECT

After surviving a night of constant harassing artillery and mortar fire, what was

48 This was Company L. As described in the

previous sub-chapter, D-plus 3 was the day when

the main strength of the 5th Marines began the

long stride which resulted in securing all of eastern

and northeastern Peleliu.

49 Berger. In this connection it may be significant

that a study of 2/7 War Diary indicates that some

of the target areas on which preparatory fires were

ordered on the morning of 19Sept lay behind or

squarely upon positions shown on some unit overlays as having been occupied the previous day.

83
left of the 1st Marines (plus 2/7) resumed

the attack on 19 September (D-plus 4) . Artillery and mortars opened preparatory fires

at 0620, naval gunfire at 0645, and the assault jumped off at 0700. Again, the 3d

Battalion found comparatively easy going

across the coastal flat on the left and advanced about 400 yards before being obliged

to halt in order to maintain contact.

But in the 2/7 zone of action in the center: "Progress was extremely slow and

costly. The terrain was rugged, visibility

extremely poor, there were only poor fields

of fire and it was extremely difficult for the

companies to use their mortars and automatic weapons to full advantage." 5° Here

the advance moved in a direction varying

from northeast to almost due east as the

Japanese core of resistance hardened in the

higher ridges.

On the right 2/1 slugged its way forward

under generally similar conditions until

about noon, when it was brought up short

by the same obstacle which had repulsed

Company B's abortive effort the previous

afternoon: the Five Sisters. Although there

was no way of knowing it then, these elements had reached the southern face of

what was to prove the final pocket of Japanese resistance on Peleliu.

This curious formation, in contrast to

most of the ridge topography, was oriented

generally transverse of the island. Thus, in

effect, it formed a wall barring passage

northward, its southern face almost sheer.

Even if the 'summit could be reached, working along it from peak to peak would be

next to impossible owing to the precipitous

drops between them. The Sisters were not

destined to be permanently secured until

November, after most of their supporting

positions had been knocked out. However,

at this period the Tables of Organization

did not provide for any crystal-gazers at

regimental level; so, once the advance positions had been consolidated, the battalion optimistically set about mounting another assault.

" 2/ 7 WD.

84

All ground weapons were brought into

play where possible including tanks, bazookas and flame-throwers, both portable and

self-propelled, and mortars and machine

guns blanketed the targets. Losses were terrible, and the attack against the main objective got nowhere. However, on the open

low ground on the extreme right, 2/1, with

Company C and the Division Reconnaissance

Company attached, succeeded in pushing

some distance forward past the eastern flank

of the ridges, though at such cost that Companies F and G had to be combined with a

squad from the 4th War Dog Platoon to

make up a single skeleton company. But the

day's operations resulted in the deepest penetaration to be achieved by the 1st Marines in

this zone, seizing ground which, following

a subsequent withdrawal, was not destined

to be regained for nearly two weeks.

Company C began this action with 90 men.

About noon, Captain Everett P. Pope, its

commanding officer, was ordered to seize

Hill 100,51 a steep, seemingly isolated elevation which dominated the East Road and

the swampy low ground to the battalion's

right front. Company C approached through

the swamp and reached the road at the base

of the hill, where two strong pillboxes were

discovered. The men were in the process of

assaulting these when they were suddenly

pinned down by machine-gun fire at a range

of about 50 yards from across a small pool

on their right. Unable to get at these assailants, the captain obtained permission to

withdraw the way he had come, pass to the

left of the main lagoon and attack up the

road with the support of tanks.

51 To differentiate this tactically impottant elevation from several others also known as Hill 100,

it will be referred to hereinafter as Walt Ridge, the

name by which it came to be designated on a subsequent map. Lack of indigenous place names on

Peleliu necessitated some hurried improvisations

in order to orient terrain features, and some titles

selected gave rise to much disgruntlement. In the

interests of simplicity, this monograph will use the

names, however unjustly applied, by which they

came to be known most generally. See Chapter

VII.
HORSESHOE CAUSEWAY, where two tanks came to grief supporting Company C, 1st Marines, on D-plus 4.

The road at this point angled sharply to

the east, traversing the main lagoon, or sink

hole, on a causeway across the mouth of a

wide draw which was to gain an evil reputation under the name of Horseshoe Valley,

or just "the Horseshoe." Beyond that, it

skirted the base of the objective hill past

the positions where the company had previously been pinned down, then angled to the

northeastward.

The withdrawal was effected successfully,

but it was late afternoon before the new

advance began. The first tank to attempt

the causeway slipped over one side and became immobilized. A second tank, in an

effort to extricate it, slipped off the other

side,52 thus blocking the narrow approach

to further supporting arms. Nevertheless,

52 The Japanese apparently believed that they

had knocked out these tanks, for they wasted no

more fire on them. Both were subsequently retrieved undamaged.

Company C crossed it in squad rushes,

paused momentarily at the foot of the hill,

then assaulted with only mortar and machine-gun support. The men's rush carried

to the summit, where they were disconcerted

to discover that, instead of having seized the

crest of an isolated hill, they had merely

gained the nose of a long ridge where their

own position was dominated by a higher

knoll only some 50 yards to the front.53

The Japanese reacted with promptitude

and vigor. On that open ridge crest, the

men of Company C were exposed not only

to fire from the commanding ground to their

front, but crossfire from the parallel ridge

that rimmed the Horseshoe on the west: the

Five Brothers (see Chapter VII). Counterattacks were incessant throughout the night

53 Unit reports deal with this action only in general terms. Detail herein derives from Ltr Maj

E. P. Pope to CMC, 8Mar50, hereinafter cited as

Pope.

85
CAPTAIN EVERETT P. POPE, who was given the Medal of

Honor in recognition of his valorous conduct in the

abortive seizure of Walt Ridge on D-plus 4.

and produced some savage close-in fighting

that degenerated into a matter of fists and

rocks and throwing the enemy bodily over

the cliffs. But at dawn, with only 15 men

and one officer left, Captain Pope was ordered to withdraw to the main line, a movement again effected successfully through the

swamp."

It had not been Colonel Honsowetz's intention to send Company C on this mission

alone, and the Reconnaissance Company had

been ordered to support it on the right.

However, Captain Pope had already carried

54"Only ,seconds after we had abandoned the

summit, the enemy had moved in, putting in action

LMG." Pope. Capt Pope was the only company

commander in the 1st Battalion to retain his post

through the operation. He was awarded the Medal

of Honor for this desperate fight, and four of his

officers and men received the Navy Cross.

86

the summit before the 2d Platoon of the

latter unit, supposed to tie in here, could

get into position to assault, and "There is

some doubt as to whether Captain Pope

realized this platoon was supporting him

during the entire night to follow." 55 With

no flank contact with the troops atop the

ridge, the platoon also received some rough

treatment throughout the night, and at dawn

fell back to the cover of the swamp's edge

before an attack in force. For some reason,

the Reconnaissance Company did not receive the withdrawal order until half an

hour after the retirement of Company C and

came under additional fire from the reoccupied positions on the ridge crest. Falling

back at last via the swamp route, the survivors reached the main line safely, where

soon afterward the depleted unit was relieved.

Concurrently with the action in the eastern zone, 2/7, tying in on the left of 2/1,

slugged its way through the jumbled high

ground in an effort to draw abreast of the

western flank of the Five Sisters. Some

progress was made, but as a flanking movement the attempt was fruitless in that Japanese resistance kept the assailants from

reaching any commanding ground from

which to bring supporting fires to the assistance of 2/1's attack. Company A, 1st

Marines, passed through elements of 2/7

in a turning movement from the west with

56 men in assault. These gained a little

ground along a ridgetop which was swept

by machine-gun fire, only to find themselves

suddenly stopped by a sheer drop of 150

feet. Only six of the Marines who participated in this fight were still unwounded

when they finally got back to 2/7 lines.

The attack on the morning of 0-plus 5

(20 September) had for its main objective

the recapture of Walt Ridge. Once more 2/1

assaulted with the 1st Battalion (less Company A) and the Division Reconnaissance

55 Ltr 1stLt R. J. Powell, Jr., to CMC (undated)

received 21Mar50. As no reports of the Recon Co

are extant, this document provides the only source

for details of the action described.
FORWARD POSITION of 1st Marines in lee of Horseshoe causeway. Southern nose of Walt Ridge in background.

Company attached. Every resource under

the regiment's control was employed. Every

officer and man who could be spared from

regimental and battalion headquarters was

attached to the companies.56 Additional

tanks, LVT (A) 's, half-tracks, 37mm guns,

and mortars were brought forward as far

as possible. Deadly Japanese crossfire

knocked out many, and those remaining

proved inadequate to support the infantry

successfully against the combination of cruel

terrain and devilishly prepared positions.

56 Indicative of conditions in the assault units is

the following entry for this day in 1/1 Unit History

(p. 28) : "The Battalion 2 Section, cooks, jeep

drivers and men from general duty of Hq. Company were organized into machine gun platoons under Lt. Stanfield, the Battalion Adjutant."

This was an all-out effort; there was

nothing in reserve. Its result is described

as well by the Japanese as in any Marine

reports, and a great deal more succinctly:

Since dawn the enemy has been concentrating

their forces, vainly trying to approach Higashiyama (Walt Ridge) and Kansokuyama (Hill 300,

at this time considered by Marines as part of the

Five Sisters formation) with 14 tanks and one

infantry battalion under powerful aid of air and

artillery fire. However, they were again put to

rout, receiving heavy losses.57

Although some advance was made, the

low ground proved untenable, and the exhausted survivors fell back to a position

where they could cover, at a respectful dis57 Tada Record, 20Sept44.

81
tance, the mouth of the Horseshoe. After

six terrible days, it had to be admitted that

the 1st Marines had been definitely stopped.

More days were to elapse before graves

registration men could get to the dead at the

points of fartherest penetration.°

In the center 2/7 advanced slowly almost

due east, battling sheer cliffs as well as

heavy fire, and by mid-afternoon Company

F, on the right, succeeded in gaining the

crest of a ridge (then designated Hill 260)

facing the Five Sisters from the west across

the mouth of narrow, steep-sided declivity."

The battalion front had been narrowed and

shifted farther to the right by having 3/1,

on the western coastal flat, extend its front

across the road to the foot of the rising

ground, which movement once more held up

the advance of the latter battalion.

First Marines casualties reported on 21

September totalled 1749. That the preponderance of these were among the front line

units further served to lower combat efficiency far beyond the danger point." Although the 3d Battalion continued in its zone

under regimental control for two days

longer, pushing patrols as far forward as

the coastal village of Garekoru, the 1st Marines, as an assault unit on the regimental

level, had ceased temporarily to exist. In

accomplishing its mission to this point, it

had killed an estimated 3,942 Japanese and

had reduced the following major enemy positions and installations: 10 defended coral

ridges, 3 large blockhouses, 22 pillboxes, 13

antitank guns, and 144 defended caves.

Defensive positions on southern Peleliu

were taken over by artillery elements, and

the 7th Marines (less 2d Battalion), after

due reconnaissance of its new positions, corn58 The bodies of Captain Pope's dead atop Walt

Ridge were not recovered until the final securing

of that elevation on 3 October.

59"Death Valley" (see below).

60 Over-all regimental casualties after the last

elements had been relieved came to 56%: 71% in 1st

Bn., 56% in 2d Bn., 55% in 3d Bn., 32% in Regimental Headquarters and Weapons Company. Of

the nine rifle platoons in the three companies of

the 1st Battalion, 74 men—and no original platoon

leaders—remained. 1st Mar Nar, 12.

88

pleted the relief of 2/1, 1/1 and 2/7 61 at

1820 on the afternoon of 20 September. The

battered remnants of the regiment came

down out of the ridges at last, to recuperate

as well as conditions permitted in the more

or less static eastern defense zone (RDF

area, Purple Beach, and the northeastern

islands) which had been set up by the 5th

Marines, whom they relieved.

But the arrival of comparatively fresh

troops at the main scene of action had no

immediate effect on either the tactical plan 62

or the results achieved.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, took over

the zone on the right from 1/1 and 2/1, and

the 3d Battalion relieved 2/7 in the center,

with 3/1 and the 1st Marines command post

remaining in position on the left for the

time being. The 1st Battalion resumed the

attack promptly in the morning of 21 September, in the same direction as the final assault the previous day, and with the same

objective: recapture of Walt Ridge. The

jump-off was postponed until 0800 owing to

delay in the arrival of the supporting tanks,

giving artillery concentrations and an air

strike plenty of time to work over the target.

The plan- called for an advance up the

East Road. Because of the narrowness of

this approach, only one company was placed

in assault: Company C, with 'Company A

following close to provide infantry support

for the tanks and be in ready position to

pass through should the situation demand.°

Smoke shell concentrations from the battalion's 81mm mortars helped to screen the

approach, and initial opposition was described as light. The tanks were unable to

61 In three days and nights of steady fighting with

the 1st Marines, 2/7 had sustained more than 300

casualties while achieving a maximum gain of 800

yards. Berger. The battalion reverted to control

of its parent regiment upon relief.

62 For discussion of the tactical decision confronting the Comamnding General at this time, see Chapter VI.

63 1/7 Historical Report, supplemented by 7th

Mar R-2 Journal. These two documents provide

the only official sources currently available on this

particular action.
negotiate the still blocked causeway across

the mouth of the Horseshoe, but they succeeded in circling the swamp, or sink hole,

to the northward, thus entering that illfamed valley itself, and rejoined Company C

on the road beyond, where it skirted the

base of Walt Ridge.

The flat here was narrow, hemmed in on

the east by that fringing swamp which comprised a major terrain feature along most

of this flank of the northwestern peninsula.

No enemy resistance was encountered from

there, but fire from the ridge intensified as

the troops moved abreast of it. And as the

advance elements wheeled to the left and

commenced the steep ascent, they were

caught in a vicious mortar barrage that

blanketed the entire eastern face, supplemented by grenades and small arms fire from

caves higher up the slope itself.

WHERE THE NORTHWARD DRIVE WAS HALTED. East Road skirts base of Walt Ridge, which faces Five Brothers across

floor of the Horseshoe. Five Sisters and Hill 300 on left, with weird contours of China Wall barely discernable at upper

left. Swamp in foreground channeled assault approaches.

89
csme/tAA1/.01,,,

Patrol D+7

4:Farthest Advanc

of 1st Marines

06e (D+4 + D+5)

ittl\

cl,t‘c

0+3

/i•

D+2

D I

D+6

D+1

D+2

,•1

D+3

RD 7163

4

D+ 2

D + 4

D + 4

PELELIU

SECOND OPERATIONAL

PHASE ( D+ I- D+8)

MAP 7
Mounting losses made further advance impossible, and the ground gained quickly became untenable. To commit Company A at

this juncture would have been fruitless, and

by mid-morning both companies had rejoined Company B which had remained on

the defensive line from which the attack

had originated. There the 1st Battalion was

relieved in position by the Regimental Weapons Company at 1800.64

On this same morning (D-plus 6) the 3d

Battalion attacked from its new positions

deeper in the ridges on the left of 1/7 behind naval gunfire, air, artillery and mortar

preparations. Three medium tanks and an

LVT flame-thrower were in support but could

be of little use because of the broken nature of the ground. Companies I and K in

assault (left to right) reported a gain of

about 100 yards at 0918, but "the advance

for the rest of the 41ay was slow and tedious

and measured in yards." 65 The battalion's

left tied in with the flank of 3/1, the last

element of the 1st Marines remaining committed, on the western slope of the ridge

system, but a gap began to develop between

3/7 and 1/7 on the right. It was now apparent that the only substantial gains were likely

to be achieved on the western coastal flat,

and the 3d Battalion's front was accordingly

narrowed in order to make some of its elements available for support in that zone.66

This was accomplished by ordering the 2d

Battalion, which had reverted to parent control at the time of its relief the previous day,

back into the center of the line to maintain

contact.

The 7th Marines attacked again on 22

September. On its narrowed front, the 3d

Battalion moved out in column of companies,

64 With a few offensive sorties to lend variety, the

Weapons Company was destined to occupy this containing position for the next two weeks, until the

jutting jaw of Major Joseph E. Buckley, its CO,

became as familiar a terrain feature as Walt Ridge.

65 3/7 WD, 10.

66 At this time it was contemplated that the 5th

Marines would be employed to exploit the soft spot

on the left, and FO #2-44 dated 21Sep44 was

issued accordingly. This plan was revised the following day in FO #3-44. 1st MarDiv SAR, II, 5.

90

Company L passing through Company I to

take the lead (Company K had been pinched

out the previous evening and gone into battalion reserve). The terrain became rapidly

worse; mortar and machine-gun fire pinned

the troops down repeatedly. The maximum

gain for the day was recorded as only 80

yards, with even less on both flanks."

This retarded advance limited, in turn,

the progress of the .3d Battalion, 1st Marines, on the extreme left. The right flank

of this unit was now also operating in the

high ground, where it was having troubles

of its own. Not until late afternoon did

Company L, by dint of hard fighting all day,

succeed in seizing a crucial elevation as an

anchor for a tenable defensive line for the

night. By that time 3/1 was so depleted

and exhausted that it was necessary to bolster the line with elements of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, which, reorganized into

two abbreviated companies, had been moved

up in reserve."

In the afternoon still another head-on assault was launched against the southern face

of what it was becoming apparent was the

enemy main line of resistance. At 1530 the

1st Battalion, 7th Marines, which had spent

the night in bivouac north of the airfield,

moved forward to the left of the defensive

line sector held by the Weapons Company in

an effort to seize the Five Sisters. Company

B, in reserve throughout the battalion's

fruitless attempt on Walt Ridge the previous

day, was now in assault, to be supported as

necessary by Companies A and C. Company

E, tying in the right of the 2d Battalion's

defensive line with the flank of the Weapons

Company was also made available in case of

need.

Artillery concentrations by 75's and 105's

prepared the way, and a platoon of tanks

67 3/7 WD, 10.

68 1st Mar Nar, 12. 3/1 patrols operating forward of the battalion position worked more than

1000 yards up the coast to the village of Garekoru

on this day or the one following. Ibid., and. 7th

Mar R-2 Journal disagree on the date, and 3/1

Record of Events makes no mention of the movement.
DEATH VALLEY was first entered by 7th Marines on D-plus 7,

from Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, advanced with the infantry. The Weapons

Company contributed a fire feint against the

objective of the day before: Walt Ridge and

the lower end of the Horseshoe. Mortars

placed so effective a smoke screen that the

assault company advanced 250 yards over

ground so rocky that it slowed the tanks to

a crawl without encountering anything worse

than "moderate" sniper fire.

In short, what should have been adequate

conventional fire support for such an attack had been provided; yet at this point

Company B began to receive machine-gun

fire from its front and the ridge on the

892106° -50-7

in an attempt to seize Five Sisters (right) from southWest.

left,"" which became progressively worse as

the advance continued. A few minutes later,

1/7 Historical Report records the time as

1630, the troops reached the mouth of a

narrow draw, on the left lip of which elements of the 2d Battalion were in position.

Go This was the northerly extension of Hill 200,

called "Nakayama" by the Japanese. Although

friendly troops occupied the crest, they were unable to get at the enemy still emplaced in strength

in caves along the precipitous slope. The relative

positions as of 24 Sept are clearly indicated on a

Japanese sketch map captured subsequently. This

route of attack remained in peril from the flank

until the final wiping out of the holed-in enemy on

3 Oct.

91
RIDGES WHERE 1st AND 7th MARINES FOUGHT D-plus 2—D-plus 7. Approximate front held at end of phase sketched in.

The tanks fired pointblank into the cave

openings which pocked the steep walls. A

platoon of Company A moved up to reinforce Company B, now suffering severe casualties. But the assault had not moved far

before discovering that the draw was walled

in on the north by a high, steep coral formation. The depleted units found themselves in a topographical funnel, with sheer

sides from which mutually supporting dug-in

enemy positions covered the low ground with

fire from every angle,7° and which were impervious themselves to infantry assault.

70 This declivity was christened "Death Valley",

at that time (D-plus 7) and continued to be so

designated throughout the operation. They could

not know it then, of course, but the Marines had

92

Once more, an untenable position had nullified a day's substantial gains. At 1749

Company B commenced its tortuous withdrawal. The canyon was again blanketed

with smoke, and the tanks and Company A

closed up to help in covering the extrication. By 1830 what was left of the 1st Battalion, which had begun this action with only

60% effective strength, was safely back in

its bivouac area behind the lines. Only there

was not much left.

Again, the Japanese version of the action

is terse and to the point: "This afternoon

penetrated within 100 yards of Colonel Nakagawa's

CP, the nerve center of Japanese resistance and

the last strong point on the entire island to be secured. See Chapters VII and VIII.
the enemy attempted to demolish our positions around Kansokuyam,a and Higashiyama. Attempt unsuccessful, and only a

part of the enemy advanced to a hill west

of Kansokuyama." 71 The last allusion is

not wholly clear, as the Marines claimed no

advance. It may possibly refer to the seizure the previous day of the northern extension of Hill 200 where it bounds the western mouth of Death Valley, news of which

might have been delayed in reaching the Japanese command post.

The Japanese estimates of their own accomplishments up to this point contain a

few interesting items, but perhaps are not

much more out of line, at that, than Marine

estimates of 6,880 Japanese killed.72

Enemy's total losses (except for those during landing operations) :

Casualties to personnel at least over 5,000

Tanks including alligators over 120

Artillery guns approx. 15 75

Marine reports of the same date listed

personnel casualties of 3,946 (including

landing operations) and one 105mm how71 Record, 22Sept44.

72 1st MarDiv SAR, II, 7.

75 Tada Record, 22Sept44.

itzer lost to enemy action (three others lost

when DUKW's carrying them sank en route

back to ship) ; 19 out of 30 tanks were operative, only six being total losses during

the entire period of 1st Tank Battalion's

participation in the operation.74

Repeated Japanese use of the term "alligator" evidently stems from one of their

early intelligence bulletins which identified

and described the LVT (1) (now obsolete)

which was designated by that title. It is

not clear whether Nakagawa was lumping

all tracked vehicles with the tanks, or including only LVT (A) 's where the comparison is reasonably apt, but his figure is rather

startling in any case. No accurate reports

are available regarding total amtrack losses

up to this date, but only 22 LVT (A) 's were

permanently knocked out during the entire

operation.75

With this day's action, a definite phase of

the Peleliu operation came to an end. The

immovable object had stopped the irresistable force—for the time being. But there

was another day coming up; many other

days, in fact.

74 All figures from 1st MarDiv SAR, II, 7; Anx

H; Anx J.

75 Boyer Monograph.

93
CHAPTER V

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

"A Horrible Place"

Among the few civilian news correspondents who chose to share the fate of the Marines on shore was Robert ("Pepper") Martin, of Time, who furnished the following

description of what it was like there:

Peleliu is a horrible place. The heat is stifling

and rain falls intermittently—the muggy rain that

brings no relief, only greater misery. The coral

rocks soak up the heat during the day and it is

only slightly cooler at night. Marines are in the

finest possible physical condition, but they wilted

on Peleliu. By the fourth day there were as many

casualties from heat prostration as from wounds.

Peleliu is incomparably worse than Guam in its

bloodiness, terror, climate and the incomprehensible

tenacity of the Japs. For sheer brutality and fatigue, I think it surpasses anything yet seen in the

Pacific, certainly from the standpoint of numbers

of troops involved and the time taken to make the

island secure.1

On the second day, the temperature

reached 105° in the shade—and there was

very little shade in most places where the

fighting was going on, and no breeze at all

anywhere. It lingered around that level as

the days dragged by (temperatures as high

as 115° were noted). Water supply presented a serious problem from the outset.

This had been anticipated (see Chapter II),

and in actual fact the solution proved less

difficult than expected; the engineers soon

discovered that productive wells could be

drilled almost anywhere on • the compara1 Time, 160d44, 38.

94

tively low ground, and personnel semi-permanently stationed near the beach found that

even shallow holes dug in the sand would

yield an only mildly repulsive liquid which

could be purified for drinking with halizone

tablets. But it continued necessary to supply the assault troops by means of the

scoured-out oil drums and 5-gallon field cans

previously mentioned.

This presented a problem even in the case

of troops operating on comparatively level

and open ground. Once the fighting entered

the ridges, terrain difficult merely to traverse without having to fight, the debility

rate shot upward so alarmingly that an

emergency call was sent to all the ships offshore to requisition every available salt

tablet for issue to the 1st Marines.

The statement that heat prostrations

equalled wound casualties is apt to be misleading.2 Most of those evacuated .were returned to duty after a day or two of rest

and rehabilitation; hence, did not permanently impair the combat efficiency of their

units. But such cases did occur in sufficient

profusion as to add a severe strain on the

already overburdened Medical Corps elements.

2The literal truth of this statement is impossible

of proof, as no adequate records are available.

Many prostration cases were never evacuated beyond the bivouac areas of their own units, hence

were not recorded at all.
BUNKER, OR PILLBOX, of the type that infested Peleliu's low

Japanese often sought to reoccupy these by infiltration.

A high initial casualty rate had been anticipated and provided for. Wounded were

to be evacuated from the island with all facility to the first available transports which

indicated, by flying signal flags, that they

still had capacity for handling them. So

efficiently did this system work on D-Day

that the nearer ships had begun receiving

casualties within an hour of the time the

assault waves hit the beach.3

What had not been fully anticipated was

the continuing high casualty rate and the

slow inland progress of the attack. The

3 As mentioned in Chap II, diversion of many

LVT's to this humane work had much to do with

the delay of later waves in getting across the reef.

ground. After assault troops had overrun such positions,

original plan called for the attachment of

Companies A, B and C of the 1st Medical

Battalion to the 1st, 5th and 7th Marines

respectively. But such were conditions

ashore during the early stages that none of

these units was able to set up adequate hospital facilities until D-plus 5.4 In the meantime, their personnel was used to aid in

collecting the wounded and as replacements

• 4 Company A ("A-Med") was the first Medical

Battalion unit to set up, as such, near the White

Beaches. Even after they were all established, the

hospitals in the more forward positions were repeatedly harassed by infiltrating Japanese, and on

several occasions special defensive and mopping-up

details had to be provided for their protection. 1st

Mar Div SAR, II, Anex D, 4.

95
CAMP RISES amid ruins at base of Umurbrogal. Administration Building, center, served as 1st Division CP, within

easy rifle range of Japanese still in the ridges.

for Medical personnel organic to the regiments and battalions, who were themselves

becoming casualties at an alarming rate;

also the Shore Party Casualty Evacuation

Sections which continued to handle evacuation and emergency treatment on the beaches

under sustained heavy shell fire. As the

limited capacities of the transports became

filled, the problem became increasingly

acute.

The number of Hospital Corpsmen assigned each infantry battalion had been increased from 32 to 40. Ninety-six stretcher

bearers were assigned to each combat team,

likewise an increase over the allowance used

in the Cape Gloucester operation. These men

were given instruction in first aid and actual practice in the handling of litter cases

at the staging area. They provided a sizeable nucleus of trained personnel, but before the campaign had progressed far their

numbers proved inadequate to their task.

96

To supplement them, Negro Marines from

the 16th Field Depot were assigned as

stretcher bearers and "were most proficient

in this type of activity." 5

Another element which contributed to

making Peleliu a "horrible place" was the

insect life, combating of which also came

under the auspices of medical personnel.

As in all campaigns fought in the tropics,

flies abounded; especially that odious creature known as the blowfly, which thrived

and multiplied on dead bodies, waste food

and rotting enemy supply dumps. Mosquitoes bred lustily in the extensive swamps

which fringed much of the shore line and

5Ibid, 3. This report adds: "All unit commanders praised their efficiency, zeal and cheerfulness in

performing their duties. They are considered ideal

for this type of duty." During later phases of the

operation when non-assault troops were used to

contain the enemy (see Chap VI), many of these

men served in the lines as volunteers.
GETTING THE WOUNDED OUT of the high ground was difficult, dangerous and painful.

were dotted liberally across the island's surface, areas far too extensive and too tangled

to make effective control possible.

In this respect, Peleliu was at once worse

and better than most similar combat areas.

The mosquitoes proved a source of major

discomfort to already miserable men, but

they were entirely of the pest variety and

included none of the sinister species which

carry malaria and yellow fever. At its

height, the fly population probably exceeded

any encountered by U. S. troops until Okinawa, its growth not in the least retarded by

inadequate troop sanitation, all but impossible of enforcement in terrain of this nature

during a campaign so violent and so bloody.

Yet the Peleliu operation was unique in that:

"For the first time in the history of military operations, there has been practically

no illness that could be attributed to flies or

mosquitoes." 6

Elaborate steps were taken to exploit

thoroughly the virtues of that newly developed insecticide, DDT, then still in the

experimental stage. At Peleliu it received

what must stand as its most extensive single

testing as an implement of war. Mixed with

Diesel oil, DDT was sprayed liberally on all

insect breeding and feeding places. Combined with lighter kerosene, it was similarly

Ibid, 4. This literal quotation has been widely

challenged on the basis of the frequent incidence

of dysentery, references to which occur in several

unit reports.

97
applied to nets, jungle hammocks and, when

such became available, both exteriors and

interiors of tents and other personnel shelters.

The methods devised for handling it were

varied. Perhaps the most novel, and ingenious, was the equipping of three 15-man sanitary squads with knapsack sprayers These

squads landed on D-Day, each attached to

one combat team, and followed close in the

wake of the assault units, spraying dead

bodies, scattered food, straddle trenches, latrines and pools. A large power sprayer was

mounted on a truck for more wholesale operations;and a special device was improvised

which would enable planes to spread DDT in

clouds across the whole area. Owing to combat conditions, however, the two last named

appliances were unable to operate until Dplus 12.

That this work was successful on the most

essential score is witnessed by the somewhat

broad statement, quoted above, regarding

insect-borne disease. But the technique had

yet to be perfected in all details; for it was

found that, while DDT was deadly to adult

flies, it was almost wholly ineffective on

their larvae. Consequently, during the

earlier stages the flies bred more rapidly

than they could be destroyed, reaching peak

numbers about the second week in October.

By then, the strenuous methods employed

by truck, plane and ground crews began to

bear fruit, and a gradual decline set in. The

problem, obviously, was still far short of

complete solution, but a far-reaching advance had been achieved.

SUPPORTING ARMS AND AUXILIARY ELEMENTS

During the early phases of the opergtion,

the basic tactical unit on Peleliu was the

regimental combat team. Thus, the story

of most of the auxiliary elements is the

story of the particular infantry regiment

with which each was designated to operate.7

7 The term "regimental combat team" (RCT) was

official in the Marine Corps as well as the Army,

but the common practice of referring to them by

regimental designation still persisted at this period.

For detail of task organization, see Appendix H.

98

Subsequent alterations in the tactical situation led to some plain and fancy improvisation on the part of many elements, but this

could not be foreseen during the first two

weeks.

The Artillery Group, commanded by Colonel William H. Harrison, comprised the 11th

Marines, the 1st Marine Division's organic

regiment, plus two battalions of III Amphibious Corps artillery: the 3d 155mm Howitzer

Battalion, and the 8th 155mm Gun Battalion.

The original operation plan assigned the 1st

Battalion, 11th Marines (75mm pack howitzers) to suport of the 1st Marines,8 and the

2d Battalion (also 75's) to the 5th Marines,

with the 3d and 4th Battalions (105mm

howitzers), together with the Corps Artillery, in general support. Development of

the situation soon caused assignment of 3/11

to support of the 7th Marines. Although all

battalions reverted to regimental command

shortly after landing, the three mentioned

continued to operate primarily in immediate

support of • their designated combat teams '

throughout the crucial phases of the campaign.

Despite the difficult landing conditions,

most of the division artillery was ashore and

registered by dark on D-Day. Only 2/11,

however, came in on schedule and took position according to plan. Because of the shallow penetration inland of the White Beaches,

1/11, after some delay, finally came in on

Orange 1. The two 105mm howitzer battalions landed to discover that their designated firing positions were still in the hands

of the Japanese. The 4th Battalion went into

makeshift positions near the southern end

of Orange 3, and the 3,41 Battalion finally

managed to get one battery set up on Orange

1 to fire to the south.8

8 Owing to the tactical situation ashore on D-Day,

1/11 actually landed attached to the 7th Marines.

This did not affect its basic mission, however: from

the outset it acted in support of the 1st Marines

and subsequently (see Chap VI) the 321st Infantry.

9 Because of heavy enemy fire and their inability

to find suitable operating positions, the two remaining batteries of the 3d Bn were ordered to reembark on LST's for the night. Three of the DUKW's
There was no room ashore for the Corps

Artillery during the first day and night, but

the 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion began

landing on D-plus 1 and had all batteries in

position and firing the following day. This

unit's initial assignment was a dual one:

deep support missions to the north, and what

often amounted to point-blank fire (starting at ranges of 200 yards) against enemy

installations to the southward in support of

the 7th Marines. With completion of that

regiment's mission in this area (on D-plus

3) , all batteries were faced northward and

continued to supply fires in that direction

as long as it was practicable to do so.

The 8th 155mm Gun Battalion landed on

D-plus 2 and went into position near the 3d

Battalion on the newly secured southern zone

of Peleliu. This unit's initial mission was

an unusual one: support of the assault on

Angaur by the 81st Infantry Division (see

Chapter VI). Its fire was not called for in

this connection, however, and the battalion

reverted to 1st Marine Division control on

D-plus 4. In turn, it faced about to the

northward and assumed its part in support

of operations on Peleliu.

During the entire first two weeks, artillery

was employed in the conventional manner

prescribed by "The Book," and with such

businesslike efficiency as to make its work

appear unspectacular.1° Preparatory, harassing and interdicting fires were furnished as

the occasion demanded. Three aerial observers were maintained on station during

daylight hours, and each battalion had its

own forward observers with the combat

had been so seriously damaged during this double

reef crossing that they sank upon reaching deep

water, taking the guns and other gear with them.

What remained of the two batteries came in again

the following day, but another of the 105's was

knocked out by enemy fire that evening. The eight -

guns remaining performed their mission satisfactorily from that point on. Wood, MCS Monograph.

10"The 11th Marines were employed in supporting the attack in accordance with the accepted doctrines and principles for the employment of field

artillery; it was well handled and rendered timely

and effective support throughout the normal attack

phase of the operation." Wood, op.cit.

team it had been assigned to suport. These

called down special fire missions on designated targets as desired, and since all the

artillery on the island remained under 11th

Marines control following the initial landing, there was little difficulty in supplementing such missions with additional fire from

the elements in general suport.

Perhaps the best example of this flexible

system at work was provided on the morning of 28 September (D-plus 13) when all

battalions, with the exception of 1/11, concentrated intensive fires on Ngesebus (see

Chapter VI) in preparation for the shore-toshore assault on that island, and continued

throughout the day to furnish what amounted to a rolling barrage to the front after the

infantry had landed.

However, with the capture of Ngesebus

and the securing of all of northern Peleliu on

the following day, Japanese resistance was

constricted within a pocket too small to permit further employment of massed fires

without danger to friendly troops, and the

function of the artillery in any conventional

sense came to an abrupt end. The two 75mm

pack howitzer battalions (1/11 and 2/11)

were ordered evacuated 11 with the first echelon of the division to leave Peleliu. A few

of the 105's and 155's of the battalions remaining were adapted to some unique direct

fire missions improvised for special occasions, and personnel not thus employed, reverting to the Marine's basic function as infantryman, manned a 1,000 yard sector of

the containing lines west of the enemy

pocket for more than two weeks until relieved by elements of the 81st Infantry Division on 16 October.

Participating elements of the 1st Tank

Battalion were likewise attached initially to

the combat teams: Company A (15 tanks)

to the 1st Marines; Company B (9 tanks) to

5th Marines; Company C (6 tanks) to 7th

Marines. Although all companies reverted

11 By what proved great good fortune, a heavy

storm prevented loading of these units' howitzers,

several of which subsequently performed valuable

service in a new role. See Chap VII.

99
"INFANTRYMAN'S ARTILLERY," the bazooka was the heaviest

weapon portable to much of the high ground. Every

opening and crevice might harbor stubborn Japanese.

to battalion control on D-plus 1, in general

they continued to operate in close-up support of their designated units for the duration of their stay on Peleliu.

However, a greater flexibility was displayed in the employment of the tanks than

was the case with perhaps any other reinforcing arm. This was necessitated by the

fact that there were too few tanks to begin

with, and during the early stages when the

terrain was excellently adapted to tank operations, their services were at a premium.

Furthermore, heavy enemy fire and the

liberal distribution of mine fields called for

some heroic maintenance measures to keep

even those there in action.12 Units and parts

of units were constantly shifted from one

regiment or battalion to another in order

12 Forty major tank casualties were sustained by

the battalion, of which only nine proved total losses.

Of the 30 tanks landed, never were there less than

18 operational at one time, and the average was 20.

1st MarDiv SAR, Annex J, 10.

100

to concentrate maximum tank strength

where it was most urgently needed.

The shortage of tanks traced back to that

perennial problem which had so complicated

the final aspects of the planning phase for

the operation: shortage of shipping. Only

two LSD's were made available for lifting

1st Marine Division tanks to Peleliu. These

provided space for only 30 machines, necessitating leaving 16 behind with the rear

echelon." This situation gave rise to some

pointed criticism of the over-all planning

which provided the same number of LSD's

for the assault On Angaur, where much of

the terrain made tank operations impossible

and which was defended by approximately

one-tenth the garrison strength of Peleliu.14

In no operation anywhere did tanks and

infantry work in closer mutual support,

more as a team. This happy cooperation

had its genesis as far back as when the division was training in Australia following the

Guadalcanal campaign, and tank elements

began working on a semi-permanent basis

with the assault units they would suport

in combat, each becoming acquainted with

the other's personnel and problems. This

policy had paid dividends at Cape Gloucester

and reached full fruition at Peleliu—and

again, later, at Okinawa.

Peleliu was essentially an infantryman's

battle, and the tanks went in with the infantrymen wherever it was physically possible

to do so—and a great many places where

few would have believed it possible. Their

guns and armored protection staved off innumerable casualties, and the men on foot

were grateful. Says the 1st Tank Battalion's

report: "Throughout the operation our infantry rendered most faithful close-in protection to tanks regardless of frequently

heavy casualties. This saved many badly

needed tanks from destruction. Tank crews

13 The personnel to man these tanks were brought

along, however, and proved valuable as replacements, battalion casualties running high during the

opening phases of the operation. Ibid, 12.

14 Ibid, 7, 8. See also Chapter VI, this monograph.
reciprocated by fighting tanks unbuttoned

when necessitated by rain or other causes in

an effort to match the indomitable spirit and

sacrifice of the infantry." 15

At the end of 16 days of heavy fighting,

both men and machines of the 1st Tank

Battalion were badly depleted and debilitated. Furthermore, the fighting had become

localized in regions which did not appear

practicable for armored operations on any

extensive scale (see Chapter VII) . For these

reasons, the battalion was relieved as a

unit by the 710th Tank Battalion, U. S.

Army," and departed the Peleliu scene with

the first echelon on 1 October, a move which

some believed at the time, and many more

subsequently, to be premature.

Amphibian tractor personnel, like the artillerymen, became gradually pinched out as

their primary missions were progressively

accomplished. Their function as troop carriers on any major scale came to an end

with the Ngesebus landing (see Chapter

VI). With the construction of a pontoon

causeway across the reef on the western

shore 17 and the development of an LST

beaching area on eastern Purple Beach, their

usefulness as water-borne and reef-borne

cargo carriers diminished. And on shore,

once a satisfactory road network had been

constructed, they were displaced by the more

efficient DUKW's and conventional wheeled

transport." A few machines and their crews

15 Ibid, 7.

'"Company A, 710th Tank Battalion, arrived on

Peleliu with RCT 321 (see Chap. VI) and was attached operationally to the 1st Tank Battalion. Following relief of the latter unit, Col Stuart and several of his staff remained on the island to assist and

advise the 710th, whose previous training in tankinfantry tactics was considered rather sketchy.

17 This causeway ran seaward from the lower end

of Orange 3, and was in full operation by 21 Sept.

1st MarDiv SAR, II, 6.

18 Although the 1st Motor Transport Bn brought

in the trucks of only one company, many other units

were permitted to land some of their organic vehicles. All these were supposed to be pooled under

control of 1st MT Bn, but owing to the diverse interests involved, such control was difficult to exercise and the system proved less than satisfactory.

De Bell.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JOHN D. NEW, Medal of Honor winner, unhesitatingly flung himself upon an enemy grenade

to save the lives of two forward observers.

continued to be used for specialized missions,

but the rest of the personnel reverted to the

Marine's basic function of combat infantryman. Like the de-gunned artillerymen, they

were used to man the containing lines during the closing phases of the operation.

So were most of the personnel from the

Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion. On

land the LVT (A) was too vulnerable to substitute satisfactorily for the Sherman tank,

though a number of them did pinch-hit in

this capacity in emergencies. After their

excellent performance during the first assault phase, they were employed mainly for

reef patrol to the northward against Japanese counter-landings and for special direct

fire missions against targets which could be

reached only from offshore. The number and

importance of these missions, too, gradually

decreased.

The several assault elements of the 1st

Engineer Battalion remained attached to

their respective combat teams much longer:

101
Company A and H&S Company (less Heavy

Equipment Section) to 1st Marines, Company B to 5th Marines, and Company C to

7th Marines. These units did not revert to

parent control until D-plus 10, and even

after that were held in close contact with

the combat teams to be available for special

missions on call.

Their functions were, to a greater or lesser

degree, the conventional ones of combat

engineers. Especially in the case of demolitions work, a major factor throughout the

Peleliu campaign, they operated directly

with, or even in advance of, the assault infantry, and heavy casualties were suffered

among highly trained specialists. Infantry

officers were unanimous in praising the work

of the engineers in the highest terms, but

the engineer command echelon took a somewhat more restrained view of the infantry's

methods of employing them.19

Road building, airfield repair and maintenance, beach development, water supply,

etc., were handled by the Engineer Group,

consisting of Heavy Equipment Section of

H&S Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, and

the 33d and 73d Naval Construction Battalions.20 All of these operations were carried through promptly and efficiently. Enemy

shelling and delay in getting heavy equipment ashore slowed somewhat the repair

of the airfield, but the target date was met.

On the other hand, water supply proved a

less serious problem than anticipated, and

because of the short duration of the operation building construction was never more

than a minor factor.

Existing roads built by the Japanese

proved capable of handling the increased load

temporarily following the landing, so priority was given to the construction of new

19"Infantry demolitionists were not employed as

such, and engineer troops were called on for all

(sic) major and minor demolition tasks." 1st

MarDiv SAR, Annex I, 4.

20 Approximately 550 men from the attached

naval construction battalions ("Seabees") operated

with the Shore Party during the first ten days on

the beaches, after which time responsibility for unloading passed to garrison elements.

102

roads to the additional unloading points so

urgently needed. The first such artery ran

to Scarlet Beach, following the securing of

southern Peleliu. Then engineers worked

closely behind the 5th Marines on that regiment's drive to Purple Beach on the eastern

shore. The natural advantages existing at

this spot were developed by the construction

of LST landing ramps and pontoon causeways, and with completion of the vehiclular

highway, Purple Beach became the most important unloading point on the island.

Other construction projects included an

airfield perimeter road and the improvement

and maintenance of trails to facilitate supply of advancing infantry units. A main

road along the west coast, in southward

extension of the existing West Road, was

begun but, owing to higher priorities elsewhere, had not been completed at the time

engineering functions passed to the Island

Command.

The primary function of the 1st Pioneer

Battalion was to provide the nucelus for the

Division Shore Party. The comanding officer of the Pioneers became the Division

Shore Party commander and was responsible for the organization and training of the

Shore Party, and for effectively carrying out

the functions of organizing the beaches, unloading supplies and equipment of the division, evacuating casualties from the beach,

and defending his assigned beach area. The

percentage of Shore Party casualties on Peleliu was nearly double that of any previous

operation, and there were many other factors to retard unloading, including mined

beaches. Yet "no noticeable decrease in the

unloading rate occurred." 21

The 1st Marine Division early recognized

that Shore Party operations were a Division

affair. Consequently regimental shore parties were attached to regiments for transportation to target only and passed to divi21 1st MarDiv SAR, II, Annex C, 3. One favorable factor was the short haul once ashore to effect

distribution: "Amtracks and DUKW's could move

directly from the water to the Regimental dumps in

most cases." Ltr Col John Kaluf to CMC, 7Mar50,

hereinafter cited as Kaluf.
sion control upon establishment of the Division Shore Party Commander ashore,

though still in support of the regiment they

had accompanied. Some 500 replacements

for the division had been turned over to the

shore party, and these were organized, for

administrative purposes, into Companies D

and E of the 1st Pioneer Battalion. These

companies were relinquished to division commencing about D-plus 3, and the entire Pioneer Battalion was relieved on D-plus 10 by

garrison unloading elements which had been

functioning from the beginning as part of

the Division Shore Party.

Upon being relieved, most of the battalion's heavy equipment was shipped back

to the division's base camp in the Russell

Islands. So was Company A, which had seen

rigorous service in support of the battered

1st Marines and had been reattached to that

unit upon its evacuation (see Chapter VI).

Companies B and C were ordered up to

front line defensive positions in the western

ridge zone on 27 and 28 September, where

they relieved units of the 7th Marines for

further offensive operations. Here they remained in occupancy throughout the remainder of Marine participation in the Peleliu campaign until relieved by elements of

the 321st Infantry on 17 October 22 (see

Chapter VII) .

22 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex C, 5.

SUMMARY

A solid week of hard fighting had achieved

tactical results of great importance. As

sumed up by General 0. P. Smith:

Seven days after landing, all of the southern end

of Peleliu was in our possession, as well as the high

ground immediately dominating the airfield. All

the beaches that were ever used were in use. There

was room for the proper deploymnt of all the artillery, including the Corps Artillery. Unloading

was unhampered except by the weather and hydrographic conditions. The airfield was available and

essential base development work was underway.23

Furthermore, the Japanese potential for

effective counteraction on a major scale had

been destroyed with the elimination of an

estimated two-thirds of effective enemy

strength. This achievement had cost a total

of 3,946 Marine casualties: 24 the virtual

elimination of one infantry regiment, as

such, and the serious depletion of two others.

In that all of Peleliu that possessed any

strategic value liad been secured, the commanding general's early prediction of quick

conquest had not fallen so far short of literal

realization.

Organized resistance, clearly, was far

from at an end. But even at this stage, no

one not gifted with clairvoyance would have

predicted that two more months were destined to elapse before it would be.

23 Smith, op. cit.

24 1st MarDiv SAR, II, 7.

103
CHAPTER VI

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Third Operational Phase: 0-plus 8-0-plus 15

(23-30 September)

The drive to seize northern Peleliu was

motivated by two main tactical considerations. (1) It was desired to by-pass and

isloate the pocket of resistance which had

stopped both the 1st and 7th Marines, and

thus gain less 'formidable approaches from

which to assault it. (2) All of northern

Peleliu should be seized in order that suitable ground be obtained from which to stage

a shore-to-shore attack on the off-lying

island of Ngesebus, whose unfinished fighter

strip constituted one of the original objectives of the entire campaign.

And a third consideration had arisen suddenly to give point and urgency to the other

two. At dawn on 23 September, the disconcerting discovery was made that, despite

all vigilance by naval patrols, the Japanese

were reinforcing their Peleliu garrison from

the strongly held islands to the north.

Owing to darkness and distance, what actually happened is difficult to reconstruct.

According to U. S. reports, several barges

were detected approaching some distance

north of Akarakoro point and promptly

brought under fire by naval vessels and land

based artillery, which claimed destruction

of seven. At 0245 on the 24th another group

was taken under fire; 8 were observed to

explode, and 10 wrecks were observed on the

104

reefs after daybreak. According to a captured survivor, the convoy included 13 barges

and a motor sampan, all of which were believed destroyed. It was conceded that a

few stragglers might have reached shore

across the reef, though probably without

equipment and certainly without supplies.1

The Japanese version, however, differs

substantially. No mention is made of any

losses during the first landing: "The advance detachment, part of the 2d Battalion,

15th Infantry Regiment, made a succesful

landing at 0520, under command of 1st Lieutenant Murahori." As for early morning,

24 September: "The main body of the garrison reinforcement left Palau proper

[Babelthuap] on the night of the 23d. Nine

barges arrived safely, but six were shelled

and burned while taking the wrong landing

route. Most of the personnel of these were

able to land by walking through the shallows." 2 So far as Colonel Nakagawa was

concerned, the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry,

had arrived, accepting losses inevitable to

1 CTF 32 OpnRpt, 57, 61. There were as many

different versions of these incidents as there were

echelons reporting. Because the action was essentially naval in nature, Adm Fort's version is accepted here.

2 Tada Record, 23 Sept, 24Sept44.
SOME DID NOT MAKE IT: LVT(A) patrol investigating Japanese landing craft.

such an operation; a fact partially borne out

by subsequent intelligence which indicated

that 300 to 600 men of that unit were fighting on Peleliu.3

To prevent any further recurrence of such

incidents, LVT (A) 's were detailed to patrol the northern reefs, inaccessible to naval

vessels, and air searches were instituted to

find and destroy all possible barges and

other craft in the Central Palaus. But the

surest preventative, obviously, was to seize

all of northern Peleliu itself and thus deny

the enemy a practicable landing place, which

would be one of the many benefits resulting

from successful execution of the tactical plan

activated by Field Order No. 3-44.

Ever since D-plus 2 the division commander had been facing a difficult tactical

3It is quite possible, of course, that Nakagawa

deliberately concealed his losses when reporting in

order to encourage General Inoue to send him further reinforcements by this means. See Appendix F.

decision. From the time the Marines first

came up against the ridges on the northwestern peninsula, it had been increasingly clear

that the enemy's weakness lay to the west

where 3/1, advancing against light resistance along the comparative flat ground, was

obliged repeatedly to halt in order to maintain contact with the slow-moving elements

in-the ridges on its right. The question, then,

was whether to exploit this soft spot and

greatly extend the front in what might prove

a highly complicated maneuver, or to keep

hammering at the rugged high ground in

the expectation that a decisive breakthrough here would end organized resistaance at a stroke. By the time it became

unmistakably evident that no quick breakthrough was possible here, the combat efficiency of the 1st Marines had been so reduced

by casualties and exhaustion that that regiment was in no condition to exploit anything.

105
Clearly, reinforcements were needed. The

most readily available unit of appropriate

strength was the Army's 321st Regimental

Combat Team, a component of the 81st Infantry Division, which had completed its

mission on nearby Angaur on 20 September. General Rupertus' reluctance to employ Army troops had become increasingly

apparent from the outset,4 and sentiment

throughout the division would have preferred a Marine unit had any such been

available. However, it happened that RCT

321 was especially well conditioned for that

particular mission at this moment, for reasons which will require a brief digression.

THE 81st DIVISION ON ANGAUR 5

The 81st Infantry Division, commanded

at this time by Major General Paul J. Mueller, USA, had received exceptionally thorough training. Nicknamed the Wildcat Division and wearing a reproduction of this

febrile feline as a shoulder patch, it had

been in existence for two years and three

months at the time it was committed in Operation STALEMATE IT. During this period

the Wildcats had participated in extensive

4"General Geiger and I proceeded to the Division

CP. . . . During the course of the discussion General

Geiger stated that he thought that the 1st Marines

should be relieved and that he was considering

moving an Army RCT over to replace them. At

this, General Rupertus became greatly alarmed and

requested that no such action be taken, stating that

he was sure he could secure the island in another

day or two. . . . The upshot of it was that General

Geiger directed the Division Commander to prepare

plans for embarkation of the 1st Marines for

evacuation and . . . further stated that he would

immediately take steps to attach an RCT of the

81st Division to the 1st Marine Division." Ltr Col

W. F. Coleman to CMC, undated, hereinafter cited

as Coleman.

5 On many earlier maps the name of this island

is spelled with the last two vowels transposed:

"Anguar." Spelling of Pacific native place names

is necessarily phonetic, and not necessarily uniform.

That used herein appears in all reports of the 81st

Infantry Division which, having taken the place by

force of arms, certainly earned the right to designate what it should be called. It has come to the

writer's attention that what some of the doughboys

called it was not always printable.

106

maneuvers in Alabama and Tennessee, and

in the California and Arizona deserts. Upon

being designated for island operations in the

Pacific, they had been taken in hand by the

Amphibious Training Command, Pacific

Fleet, the resultant specialized training being topped off by landing rehearsals in the

Hawaiians and on Guadalcanal in preparation for the first specific combat mission

assigned them.°

The STALEMATE II operations plan

called for the entire 81st Division to remain

afloat, prepared to act as corps reserve as

might prove necessary, then to assault Angaur with two regimental combat teams

(RCT's) 7 on F-Day, the date of which was

to be determined by developments on Peleliu.

Accordingly, the convoy carrying the Wildcats steamed northward on D-Day and

staged a feint landing off the big central

island of Babelthuap. When, on the afternoon of 16 September, it became apparent

that the Marines had the current situation

adequately in hand on Peleliu, F-Day was

set for the following morning, and the ships

moved to their assigned transport areas.

Angaur is a smaller and more compact

island than Peleliu: roughly 5,000 yards

long and nearly 4,000 yards maximum width,

an estimated area of. 2,000 acres. The terrain is generally more flat, hence not so naturally defensible. At the time of the attack

the garrison had been reduced to one battalion (1st Battalion, 59th Infantry), plus

6 See Chapter II, this monograph. Except .as

otherwise cited, material used herein on this division derives from its own basic sources: the official

81st Infantry Division Operation Report, hereinafter cited as 81st OpnRpt (Phase I, Angaur;

Phase II, Peleliu); and the unit history, The 81st

Wildcat Division in World War II (Infantry Journal Press, 1948), hereinafter cited as 81st Unit

Hist.

7 In an effort to adhere to the terminology most

common to its basic sources, this monograph will

use the designation RCT in connection with the reinforced infantry regiments of the 81st Division,

as it appeared generally in the reports of that unit.

Most Marine reports, on the other hand, clung to

the old regimental designations, as did references

to such Marine units in 81st Division reports.
some miscellaneous reinforcing elements,

with a total strength of approximately 1400.8

To make things even more difficult for the

Japanese commander, Major Goto, this small

force had to be widely dispersed in order

to man the prepared defenses covering Angaur's several excellent landing beaches:

on the western, southern and southeastern

shores.

None of these was chosen for the landing,

however. Instead, RTC 321 came in on Blue

Beach, about midway along the eastern

shore, and RCT 322 on Red Beach, on the

northeastern shore. That they encountered

no organized beach defenses and only light,

scattered small arms fire plus a few mortar

shells testifies to the degree of tactical surprise achieved.

The landings received the full preparatory treatment: naval gunfire, LCI rocket

barrages, and strafing and bombing from the

air. To furnish additional support, the 8th

155mm gun Battalion was placed in position on southern Peleliu and registered on

Angaur.8 No fringing reef impeded the approach to either beach, so that the landing

craft carrying the support waves were able

to come all the way in right behind the amtracks—and even the bulky LST's not far

behind them. But the Wildcats were not

long in discovering why Major Goto had seen

fit to concentrate his strongest beach defenses elsewhere. Driving inland from the

beach, the advance elements of both RCT's

found themselves snarled up in rain forest

jungle so dense and tangled as to constitute

a far more impenetrable barrier than anything the Japanese could have devised.

And there were Japanese posted in it;

not in any great force, but sufficient to constitute an added nuisance and genuine menace. Snipers fought with their customary

stubborness, concealed in the foliage of tropi--

The Japanese suffered total casualties: estimated 1,338 killed and 69 taken prisoner. 81st

OpnRpt, I, 69.

91st MarDiv SAR, II, Annex H. However, 81st

Division did not call on this fire support, and the

battalion reverted to 1st MarDiv control on D-plus

4. Harrison.

8921000-50--8

cal trees and the luxuriant jungle beneath

them. Machine guns stuttered from improvised bunkers which the enemy had always

proved so skillful in constructing and camouflaging- quickly in country like this. Between

the jungle and the Japanese, the first hundred yards advance cost the Wildcats an

hour of backbreaking labor and their first

battle casualties of the war.

RCT 322 had the easier going that day,

and the next, and by nightfall succeeded in

occupying the northern half of the 0-2 phase

line in its sector. The 321st dug in beyond

the 0-1 line at several points, but a pocket

of enemy riflemen still occupied the intervening space so that the two units, approximately 1,500 yards apart when they landed,

were unable to tie in their flanks. Accordingly, each formed its own perimeter defense, anchored on the beach.

That night was a nerve-racking experience for all hands, as first nights in enemy

territory invariably are. Like all troops

green to combat, the men were "trigger

happy": firing at moving shadows, unfamiliar sounds 18—and rain forest jungle is always alive with movement and sound. Both

RCT's withstood counterattacks during the

hours of darkness, the most severe striking

the southern flank of the 321st shortly before dawn: at about 0510 on 18 September.

This sector was held by the 1st Battalion

the brunt being borne by Company B which

was eventually obliged to withdraw approximately 50 yards.

With the coming of daylight, rocket attacks and strafing interdicted further enemy

effort in this area, and the Japanese withdrew. Because of casualties sustained, Company B was withdrawn to regimental reserve, replaced in position by Company G.

But new counterattacks struck this zone at

0905 and 0935, necessitating a withdrawal

of the extreme left to the southern edge of

the landing beach in order to allow direct

support planes on station to saturate the

area with bombs, rockets and machine-gun

fire. An LCI gunboat closed in to help, and

10 81st Unit Hist, 78.

101
mortar concentrations contributed their

share. No further Japanese offensive thrusts

developed here.11

Division artillery emplaced on shore contributed to the three hour fire preparation

for the second day's attack. RCT 322, advancing westward across the island's greatest

breadth, soon reached the outer edge of the

jumbled high ground which was to prove

the most formidable terrain on the island.

Stiffening resistance slowed down forward

movement of the center and right, but the

left of the regiment succeeded in driving a

deep salient which included the large phosphate plant within easy striking distance of

the western shore.

On the right of the 321st zone that regiment's 2d Battalion established physical contact with the 322d on the 0-2 line, isolating

the enemy elements which had prevented

this junction the previous day and leaving

them to the mopping-up attentions of the

Reconnaissance Troop. The center also made

good progress westward and began a turning movement toward the south. The 1st

Battalion, however, driving in a southwesterly direction on the heels of new counterattacks, soon came up against the first organized prepared positions yet encountered

on Angaur.

A complicated system of mutually supporting pillboxes,12 rifle pits and intercommunicating trenches, this strong point had been

constructed for the principal purpose of preventing a landing on Green Beaches 1 and 2.

Hence, its greatest strength faced seaward.

But such advantages as accrued to the Wildcats from taking the position on the flank

and rear were mitigated to a great extent by

11 81st OpnRpt, 33, 35.

12"Pillbox" has come to be a loosely used terra.

It is applied to the Green Beach installations by

81st OpnRpt and Unit Hist, but photographs and

detailed descriptions in the latter would appear to

indicate that most of these works were what strict

definition would call "bunkers": i.e., field fortifications contrived from the natural materials at hand

(coconut logs, sand, coral, etc.), without benefit of

such man-made reinforcing as steel and/or concrete.

108

the fact that approaches from the north lay

through the dense jungle, and from inland

through a swamp as well. The task of bringing up tanks and other supporting weapons

through this tangle was time-consuming and

backbreaking.

The fighting on the third day (19 September) saw the island cut in two on a wide

front, the enemy remnants isolated in three

scattered pockets of resistance: the Green

Beach positions and the southern tip, both in

RCT 321's zone, and the much larger pocket

embracing all the rugged high ground in

the northwestern corner. With the liquidation of the two former the following morning, Angaur was declared secure at 1034 on

20 September.

This did not imply that all fighting was

over on the island; 13 simply, that the enemy

were now considered incapable of further

offensive operations of a nature calculated to

jeopardize the U. S. grip. A sizeable pocket

of resistance remained, isolated in the northwest corner. The terrain here was generally reminiscent of Peleliu's ridges, but

fortunately neither so extensive nor so formidable. This lay within the zone of action

of RCT 322, which was destined to continue

mopping up here until mid-October. But

the area was too constricted for the employment of more than one regimental combat

team, freeing the rest of the division for new

missions.

RCT 323, which had been kept afloat as

corps reserve, was now committed for the

seizure of Ulithi, the mission for which it

had been designated at the time of the final

revision of the STALEMATE II plan. The

regiment departed early the following day

(21 September) and secured the target with18 Following the break of communications between Angaur and Peleliu, Col Nakagawa continued

to report the heroic deeds of his compatriots on the

former island long after the men of RCT 322 had

been able to forego fighting in favor of baseball

and the movies, and were speculating hopefully on

the possibility of an imminent visit by the USO.

By mid-November, however, he had the grace to

concede that this was just "my guess." Tada Record, passim.
Ramuldo

Hill

Palomas Hill

Phosphate Plant

Saipan Town

ANGAUR ISLAND

Four—Day Campaign By SIst INFANTRY DIVISION

RD 7163

Progress 17 Sept

Progress 18 Sept

Progress 19 Sept

0 500

1=1■1=iimi

Scale In Yards

MAP 8

Progress 20 Sept

Mop-Up By 321st Infantry

Enemy Cove Pocket Upon

Departure Of 321st Infantry
out opposition, but was wholly absent from

the Palaus area for a month. (See Chapter

VIII.)

That same afternoon the corps commander, taking matters into his own hands,14

queried the commanding general, 81st Division, regarding the possibility of obtaining

a regimental combat team for immediate

employment on Peleliu. General Mueller replied promptly that the 321st would be available as soon as it could be reorganized,

whereupon Generals Geiger and Julian

Smith and Admiral Fort proceeded at once

to his headquarters to expedite arrangements for the unit's transfer to the other

island and operational attachment to the 1st

Marine Division.

The three-day fight on Angaur had provided just what was necessary to convert a

well trained, fundamentally sound regimental combat team into a genuine combat unit.

The Wildcats of the 321st had met the enemy

and overcome him. They had seen their own

dead and wounded, and now that they knew

what Japanese fire sounded like, their original trigger-happiness had notably diminished.

The strain had not been so long, nor the

casualties so severe, as to impair the unit's

strength, while morale grew through the

regiment's newly confirmed confidence in

itself and in its leaders. In short, officers

and men were ready, willing and able.15

RCT 321 was commanded by Colonel Robert F. Dark, USA. At the time it was attached operationally to the 1st Marine Division on Peleliu it was composed of the following elements: 10

14"The Corps Commander was disinclined to impose any particular line of action upon the [1st]

Division' Commander although more than once he

had felt the urge to do so. Just what induced this

reluctance on the part of General Rupertus was

never understood by Corps." Wachtler.

15"These were now battle tested veterans, sure

of their abilities and anxious to demonstrate the

prowess of combat infantrymen to the Marines."

81st Unit Hist, 138.

15 81st OpnRpt, II, 13.

321st Infantry Regiment

Company A, 306th Engineer Combat Battalion plus

Detachment, Headquarters and Service Company

Company A (plus Company D less two platoons)

and Detachment of Headquarters, 306th Medical

Battalion

Detachment, 781st Ordnance Light Maintenance

Company

154th Engineer Combat Battalion (less one company) plus Detachment, Headquarters and Service Company, 1138th Engineer Combat Group

Detachment, 592d Joint Assault Signal Company

Detachment, 481st Amphibian Truck Company

Company B, 726th Amphibian Tractor Battalion,

plus Detachment, Headquarters and Service Company

Company A, plus Provisional Mortar Platoon, 710th

Tank Battalion

Detachment, Provisional Graves Registration Company

Detachment, Translator-Interpreter Team "A",

Headquarters Company, Central Pacific Area.

Brigadier General Marcus B. Bell, USA,

assistant division commander of the 81st,

was designated liaison representative to

Headquarters IIIAC to coordinate details of

the movement from Angaur to Peleliu, supply, and attachment of RCT 321 to the 1st

Marine Division, and took over in this capacity on 22 September (D-plus 7). On the

same day Colonel Dark reported for instructions, first to commanding general, IIIAC,

then to commanding general, 1st Marine Division. An advance echelon of the 321st

was dispatched to Peleliu to complete arrangements, and the remainder of the unit

began debarking on Orange Beach at 1200

the following day.

ISOLATION OF THE UMURBROGOL

Of the two tactical objectives previously

listed, that of isolating the pocket of enemy

resistance in the region labeled on the map

"Umurbrogol Mountain" was assigned to

RCT 321, with cooperation of the 7th Marines.

The latter regiment, it will be recalled,

had relieved two battalions of the 1st Marines and held the line directly below the

formidable terrain which had halted the

northward drive through the ridges. It now

became the task of the 1st and 2d Battalions

109
WILDCATS ARRIVE. Men of RCT 321 land on Peleliu via pontoon causeway built across the reef.

to contain the Japanese under pressure on

the south (swamps contained them effectively on the east) . The 3d Battalion was to

extend the containing line northward along

the ridges following behind and in contact

with the Army regiment, whose advance lay

through a zone of action extending from the

western shore to the crest of the nearest high

ground. That unit's mission was to by-pass

the pocket for as far as might prove necessary, probing meanwhile for a soft spot in

the enemy defenses which might be exploited

successfully for a drive across the high

ground to the eastern shore of the peninsula.

Immediately upon landing (on 23 September), the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry,

moved up the west shore and relieved the 1st

Marines 17 in position at 1500. The 3d Battalion followed, prepared to act in immediate

17 81st •OpnRpt, II, 15, reports erroneously that

2/321 took over positions occupied by the "entire

First Marine Regiment." It is true that this was

known as the 1st Marines sector, but at this time

110

support, while the 1st Battalion was designated as regimental reserve and bivouacked

around the newly established command post.

Although patrols from 3/1 had already

penetrated as far as the village of Garekoru,

some 1,200 yards forward, Colonel Dark,

quite understandably, wished a first-hand

reconnaissance and immediately sent out a

patrol from his own unit over the same

ground. Like the previous patrols, this one

encountered negligible resistance and sighted

only a few indifferent defense works. This

led to the belief that the enemy had withdrawn; so upon receipt of Colonel Dark's

report, the division command ordered a general advance in an effort to reach the 0-4

line, a short distance beyond Garekoru, before nightfall.

Now the inadequacy of this and previous

reports became quickly apparent. The pait was held by only the remains of the battered 3d

Battalion, the rest of the regiment having been

relieved three days earlier. 1st MarDiv SAR, II, 7.
trols had all operated close to the shore, west

of a low coral ridge which partially masked

their movements from observation by the

enemy in the main ridge system. The company moving over the same ground now advanced a hundred yards with no more difficulty than had the patrols. But the elements on the open flat to the right of the

road were in plain view of the Japanese

observation posts and were promptly pinned

down by heavy plunging fire from the high

ground. By then the hour was past 1730,

so the left was withdrawn to rectify the line

and defenses for the night were prepared.

The following morning (24 September)

2/321 moved out again in the wake of an

hour of naval and air preparation and 15

minutes of intensive artillery fire. This time

the battalion formed with its main strength

in partial defilade to the west of the road

where excellent progress was possible. However, elements on top of the ridge encountered such heavy fire that the 3d Battalion,

7th Marines, was unable to detect any appreciable advance as late as 0950,18 hence

could not advance itself.

The tactical situation at this stage and the

developments which followed are described

in the words of the then commanding officer,

3d Battalion, 7th Marines:

The ridge in question parallels the West Road

and completely dominates the road at that point,

being only approximately 50 yards away. For this

reason, the ridge was made inclusive to the 321st's

zone of action as further evidence of the recognition

that it had to be controlled to insure the safety of

the movement northward along the road. It was

perfectly obvious to anyone who stood on that ridge

that its control by the Japs would have been disastrous to the whole effort. We had been ordered

to maintain contact with them (RCT 321) by trailing their right flank in column along the crest of

the ridge from the point where we had earlier tied

in with 3/1. They moved forward along the ridge

for a few yards until they encountered the first

enemy positions, then gave it up as a bad idea, and

bore sharply to their left front to the coastal road

below.19

18 7th Mar R-2 Journal, Sheet #80.

12 Hurst, 4, 5. 3/7 WD, 11, describes this incident as follows: "In order to speed up the advance

This withdrawal from the high ground

created a gap on the right of RCT 321, and

complaint by that unit caused one platoon of

Company K to be committed down the slope

on the left of 3/7. A second platoon was

similarly committed at 1007 upon receipt

of an order from commanding officer, 7th

Marines, for the 3d Battalion to "extend

their left flank to relieve and assist 321st." 20

Meanwhile, Company G, leading the advance of 2/321, moved rapidly along the

shore. The coastal flat widened gradually as

the troops moved northward, scrub jungle

giving way to coconut groves and the high

ground receding to the eastward. At about

1200 the forward elements came to a point,

some 300 yards short of Garekoru village,

where a well defined trail angled eastward

from the main road across a patch of swamp

into the ridges. The tactical potentialities

of this were quickly recognized and steps

taken to seize it.

The junction was defended by a few prepared positions, but these proved to be held

in no great strength. In overcoming them,

the Wildcats captured one antitank gun,

three machine guns, and a partially emplaced naval gun. Leaving more rearward

elements to exploit this acquisition, Company G rolled on through Garekoru and

reached the 0-4 line at 1535.21 This being

the objective ordered for that day, the advance halted here and commenced preparing positions to secure what would be the

regiment's left flank when the planned

movement had been completed.

This rapid pace had placed the 2d Bat-.

talion well ahead of 3/7. The 3d Battalion,

321st, followed in column, and it was this

unit with which Company K, 7th Marines,

tied-in by sending two platoons down from

the high ground to the open area on the right

the 321st Infantry later pulled its right flank off

the ridge to the coastal road where the going was

easier."

20 7th Mar, R-2 Journal, Sheet #80. The order

quoted originated with division operations officer

(D-3) and was transmitted to the battalioit t)y

regimental executive officer.

21 81st OpnRpt, II, 17.

111
of the road,22 sustaining several casualties

in the process. What happened next, in accordance with the original tactical plan, is

described in 81stDiv OpnRep.:

The 3d Bn 321 Jul advanced along the left of the

road. The movement was partially defiladed by

the low-lying ridge which paralleled West Road.

Its leading elements soon outdistanced those of the

Marine battalion on the right and began probing

the ridge 23 to the east to find a weakly defended

route over which an advance could be made to outflank from the north enemy forces in the Umurbrogol Mt. area. This effort brought troops out into

the open ground where they too suffered the well

aimed fire from the enemy held ridge.24

Failure of the Wildcats to regain, the

vacated positions on the, ridge crest, along

which it was 3/7's mission to follow them,

was causing Major Hurst increasing concern for the success of the northward movement, since this high ground dominated the

narrow line of communication.25 Accordingly, he committed Company I on the left

of Company K, and in a dispatch logged at

1310 informed his regimental commander:

". . 3 Bn. 321 has withdrawn from the hills

toward the road leaving a gap on the left

flank of 3/7 undefended. The Japs reoccupied the hills and 3/7 is fighting to retake

them." 26

The commanding officer of Company I was

killed in the ensuing action, which led to a

22Ibid., 17.

23 The high ground in this area was not a well

defined ridge system, although reports of all participating units so refer to it. Rather it resembles

a natural coral formation pushed up from the ocean

floor: a jagged jumble of unexpected heights and

depressions extremely difficult to traverse, let alone

assault.

24 Ibid.

26"It was certainly not our mission to maintain

the contact on the flat coastal road and turn the

ridge over to the Japs. . . . I watched the young

major commanding make several gallant efforts to

get his men back on the crest before finally becoming convinced that if friendly troops were going

to control the ridge that night it would have to be

our Company I." Hurst.

26 7th Mar R-2 Journal, Sheet #83. Also 3/7

WD, 11. No mention of this incident is made at

division level in the reports of either 81st Div or

1st MarDiv.

112

certain amount of bitterness among the officers and men of the 3d Battalion, who, not

fully understanding the 321st's mission, expected that unit to hold the ground, making

this particular fight unnecessary.

Contact was reported reestablished at

1450, with the left of Company I echeloned

down from the high ground to within 30

yards of the West Road. This position was

reported as unchanged at 1620,27 but a subsequent attack by 3/321 gained a foothold

on the ridge farther to the north, and this

time the Wildcats stayed there. (See below.) However, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, dug in that night on a front of 400

yards, facing eastward toward the heart of

enemy pocket with the left flank deeply refused. Company I, which had borne the

brunt of the day's fighting, was relieved on

the left by Company L and passed into battalion reserve.28

If operations in this area proved somewhat confused and indecisive, the achievements of the 2d Battalion, 321st, appeared

very promising indeed. With Company G

, at work consolidating defensive positions

along the 0-4 line, a strong combat patrol

supported by both Army and Marine tanks

and Navy LVT-mounted flame-throwers was

dispatched forward along the coastal flat to

ascertain the strength and disposition of

enemy defenses in that area. This force proceeded some 2,000 yards farther northward,

to within sight of the large Japanese radio

station, without encountering any notable opposition. A number of pillboxes, caves, and

27 7th Mar R-2 Journal, Sheet #86. Same entry

mentions impending attack by 321st.

28 3/7 WA 11, is authority for 400-yard front.

There are many discrepancies in reports of situation

evening of the 24th. 321st uses sketch map not

easily oriented with Marine operations maps. This

shows a continuous line along ridges, though other

allusions indicate many elements still on road, and

subsequent Marine overlays show no troops in positions indicated. Mar R-2 Journal, Sheet #87, carries entry dated 2025 that two Army platoons were

on 3/7 left but that there was a gap of 100-150

yards between them and rest of their line. This

writer has been unable to locate any 1st MarDiv

overlays for this period.
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DIGGING IN beyond the beaches was

entrenchments were observed, however, and

their locations noted down for future reference.29 This success strengthened the

growing conviction that the enemy were determined to concentrate their strength in

the high ground and would be unlikely to

interfere seriously with troop movements

elsewhere.

While this reconnaissance was taking

place, Company E turned eastward along the

trail which had been discovered earlier in

the afternoon, now named in honor of the

regiment: 321st Infantry Trail. This traversed a wide stretch of swampy land before

beginning the climb of the ubiquitous coral

29 81st OpnRpt, II, 17.

an important aspect of Peleliu fighting.

ridges. It was narrow and primitive in

spots, but appeared readily convertible into

a practicable communications route, which

any sustained drive in this direction would

sorely need.

Just as the coastal flat widened in this

region, so did the ridge system become narrower and somewhat lower. The elevation

which most directly dominated the trail, Hill

100, marked the northern extremity of that

weird formation known as Umurbrogol

Mountain, in which it was becoming increasingly evident that the main center of Japanese resistance was located. The tactical importance of Hill 100 was immediately apparent, and Company E, attacking with

great determination, succeeded in seizing it

113
before nightfall. Bulldozers of Company A,

306 Engineer (C) Battalion, commenced

work on the 321st Infantry Trail at once.

Company I, foremost element of the 3d

Battalion, attacked in conjunction with Company E, gained a foothold on the western

rim of the ridge running south from Hill

100, and tied in with the latter unit's right.

In the meanwhile, Company F had moved

into position between Company E and Company G, thus completing the defense perimeter along the northern flank.

Thus, the tactical picture presented on the

evening of 24 September was radically different from that of the morning. What had

begun as a column advancing northward

over the low ground was now a line facing

eastward along the ridges, except for Company G anchored on the shore on the extreme left, and Company F whose front

curved up from the flat to tie in with Company E on Hill 100.

The Japanese finally pulled themselves together and at about 1700 mounted a strong

counterattack against the left (northern)

flank of the new line. Advance elements of

Companies G and F were forced back some

200 yards. However, the enemy failed to

break through at any point, and the situation was soon rectified.3° A second counterattack, discovered in process of organization

at 1813, was dealt with effectively by artillery concentrations and never materialized.

This abortive gesture signalized the final success of the day's operations.

The following day (25 September) saw

some hard but inconclusive fighting on the

part of RCT 321. To make all possible Army

" Available sources leave some doubt as to the

exact situation on the left during the night of the

24th. 81st OpnRpt is authority for the 200-yard

withdrawal, and adds: "The ground was promptly

retaken." A message from CO 321 to CG, logged

at 1700, states: "We have been driven back 50

yards. We have consolidated our positions." 7th

Mar R-2 Journal, Sheet #86. Positions of 321st

reported the following morning show a sizeable retrogression on the left (Ibid, Sheet #88) as compared to those defined the previous afternoon (1st

MarDiv D-3 Journal, entry logged at 1630, 24 Sep).

114

troops available to exploit the previous day's

gains, 3/7 moved Company I from battalion

reserve up on the left of Company L, extending the battalion's ridge-holding line an additional 250 yards northward. And the 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines, was brought up the

West Road for the purpose of supporting the

eastward drive of 3/321, then to drive southward when opportunity afforded.'3

On top of Hill 100, Company E, 321st Infantry, held what was obviously a key position. This assured control of that vital artery, the 321st Infantry Trail, and also

looked down on the East Road which here

passed through a saddle bounded on the east

by a slightly higher and more formidable

eminance detached from the main ridge system and known as Hill B. Because this

dominated the road and abutted the swamplined eastern shore, its capture was clearly

necessary if the peninsula were to be cut

in two at this point.

Company E, moving out in assault,

reached the East Road by 1030 against

moderate resistance by rifle and machinegun fire. However, it was now apparent that

the enemy held Hill B in force, with well

prepared defenses, and the company halted

until such time as the 3d Battalion should

arrive in position to make a coordinated

assault possible.

But the 3d Battalion, attacking farther

to the south, was getting nowhere against

a combination of outlandish terrain and

powerful Japanese resistance.

Strong enemy fire was encountered from a series

of pillboxes and emplacements built on promontories

and protected by steep walls and sheer cliffs. In an

attempt to outflank these defenses, a gap developed

between Co. I and Co. L which was filled later in

the afternoon by Co. G. Gains for the day were

unappreciable.32

31 1/7 HistRpt.

32 81st OpnRpt, II, 21. As nearly as it is possible to orient this action on the later sketch map,

this area would appear to be that including what

were subsequently known as Wattie Ridge and

Baldy Ridge, where the 5th Marines came upon

the bodies of a missing Wildcat patrol. See Chap.

VII, footnote p. 160.

In contrast to the frustration encountered by the attempted break-through, developments to the northward were most

encouraging. First thing in the morning,

a strong combat patrol consisting of infantry, tanks and LVT flame-throwers was sent

up the West Road to destroy the installations discovered by the reconnaissance of

the previous day. This unit advanced 1,200

yards into what was technically enemy territory, wiping out four pillboxes and two

supply dumps, but killing only 30 Japanese

in the process. The weak nature of this

resistance provided further substantiating

evidence regarding the Japanese concentrations and intentions, and at 1530 advance

elements of the 5th Marines began passing

through the 321st's Garekoru positions in

the initial step of the northward offensive,

to be treated in detail in the next subchapter.

This new advance in force complicated a

problem which had been difficult enough already. The West Road was now serving as

the only and ever-lengthening supply and

evacuation route for two regiments and part

of another. Although this was the best thoroughfare found on Peleliu, it had been narrow to begin with and had been roughly

handled by shell fire and a volume of traffic

such as it had not been designed to accommodate. Again, the Army combat engineers of the 306th Battalion performed

prodigies of widening, grading and surfacing, often obliged to resort to armored bulldozers on stretches still under fire from unsecured sections of the ridge. So the road

sufficed; it had to.

Once off the highway and the 321st Infantry Trail, however, supply conditions

were indescribable. Everything had to be

manhandled from rock to rock, up and down

the precipitous slopes: food and amunition

up, the wounded down, often to their acute

misery. It was this situation nearly as much

as the tenacious resistance of the Japanese

which so thoroughly bogged down the offensive of the 3d Battalion Wildcats.

The tempo of the fighting mounted on 26

September to what was to prove a successful

crescendo, but the day began as inauspiciously as had, the previous one.

Some new troop dispositions were made

preparatory to launching the attack. The

2d Battalion, 7th Marines, was directed to

extend its line to take over the sector held

by Company K on the right of the 3d Battalion, K to move around the battalion's

left, relieving the Army unit tying in there

for the assault. Company B, 7th Marines,

took over the sector of L/321 for the same

purpose, while the rest of 1/7 prepared to

advance in immediate suport of the offensive.

The plan of RCT 321 called for the 3d

Battalion to attack on a narrower front, supported by fire from the 2d Battalion from

its positions on and around Hill 100, still

with the object of breaking through to the

East Road in order to assault Hill B from

the south and west. Jumping off at 0700,

the advance elements gained a foothold on

the first ridge, but progress was described

as "slow and costly".33 The 1st Battalion,

7th Marines, was to follow the advance at

200 yards," prepared to exploit any breakthrough the Wildcats might achieve.

There was none. Company I, on the left,

was stopped by rifle and automatic weapons

fire. Company L, coming up on the right,

was pinned down in turn by a concentration

of mortar shells and eventually withdrew to

allow its own mortars to bear. At 1244,

after some hours of this fruitless struggle,

a change of procedure was obviously in order.35

RCT 321 was now satisfied that there were

no soft spots south of Hill 100, and plans

were hurridely revised to effect a breakthrough at this point. The first attempt

had failed, so: "When it became apparent

that the 3d Bn would be unable to reach

33Ibid., 23.

34 Because of the inability of 3/321 to advance

that far, 1/7 was not committed in this action and

put in its time reconnoitering and filling gaps in

the line caused by the alternate advance and recession of elements of 3/321. 1/7 HistRpt. Gormley.

35 Dispatch CO 1/7, 7th Mar R-2 Journal, Sheet

#98.

115
Hill B, the 2d Battalion was assigned the

mission of seizing it." 36

The change in plan was not effected quite

that simply, however. To make 2/321 available for this new mission, the RCT's 1st Battalion, hitherto in reserve near the regimental command post, was brought forward to

take over the extreme left flank in case the

Japanese should take advantage of the action across the peninsula to stage a counterattack of their own in this zone. And to

support the 2d Battalion's attack from the

west and south, a strong combat patrol was

sent out by a round-about route in order to

come down on Hill B from the north.

This interesting unit, designated the Neal

Task Force," consisted of seven medium

tanks, six LVT's, one LVT flame-thrower,

and 45 riflemen (from Company F). It

moved northward on the West Road to Road

Junction 15, where the disputed East Road,

after angling across the low land above the

central (Kamilianlul) ridge system, joined

the main road a short distance below the

radio station. This region had already been

secured by the previously mentioned advance of the 5th Marines (dealt with in detail in next sub-chapter). The Neal Force

reached the junction without incident, turned

south on the East Road, and at 1500 had

approached within 150 yards of its objective

before the. first feeble attempt was made to

stop it: by a group of 15 Japanese, all of

whom were killed.

Heavy artillery and mortar fires were

massed on the objective preparatory to the

final assault, and white phosphorus shells

blanketed Hill B with smoke. The concerted attack jumped off at 1600. Resistance was stubborn on every front, but the

advance was sustained and inexorable. At

1647 elements of Companies E and F

reached the summit and set about the dirty

job of making it tenable. As usual, the Jap36 81st OpnRpt, II, 23.

37 So named for the group's commanding officer:

Captain (later Major) George C. Neal. 81st Unit

History.

116

anese defenders fought to the death,38 but

20 Korean laborers were only too happy to

surrender when given the opportunity.

By nightfall the positions on and around

Hill B had been thoroughly consolidated.

This achievement of the desired breakthrough greatly simplified the over-all tactical problem. The enemy pocket at the

base of the peninsula was isolated, though

its points of strongest resistance had yet

to be defined. What lay in the region north

of the break-through, the 5th Marines was

then in the process of finding out. Orders

were issued to RCT 321 to begin expanding its grip in both directions the following

morning: one component pushing southward to compress the Umurbrogol Pocket,

the other moving northward to cooperate

with the 5th Marines. Study of the operations of these two units will be dealt with in

detail in the second sub-chapter following.

DRIVE TO THE NORTHWARD

As has been noted briefly, the 5th Marines passed through the Garekoru lines of

RCT 321 on the afternoon of D-plus 10

(25 September) and attacked toward the

tip of the northwestern peninsula. Thus

simply stated, this might appear a simple

troop movement; actually, the promp assembly and displacement of this regiment

was a remarkable and noteworthy accomplishment.39

38 81st OpnRpt, II, 25, states succinctly and without equivocation: "All Japanese defenders were

killed." Yet when elements of 1/7 took over the

position three days later, they were obliged to call

in a special demolitions team to dispose of numerous

lurking snipers who had deliberately allowed themselves to be overrun. 7th Mar R-2 Journal, Sheets

#113, 115; 1/7 Hist Rep, entry dated 30 September.

The Wildcats were to have similar experience in

taking over positions from the Marines. See second sub-chapter following.

39 Col Nakagawa did not appear greatly impressed

by these goings on. Of RCT 321's struggle for

Hill B, he reported: "On Suifuzan (a term evidently designating all of the Umurbrogol north of

the Horseshoe) a small battle took place," Of

the 5th Marines' advance: "Two infantry corn-
,,O\Pg01(

\`‘

et. Route of

(4' Neal T.F.

r4ko\''

‘4.rt e 3

Radio

Station

RJ 15

Ill

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te,

6+11

Hill

100

Hill B

• •

--

1 as I

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I

WPN

NM NM IIIN

■IF1117

•

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ISOLATION OF UMURBROGOL

26,27 SEPT

Umurbrogol Front, 26 Sept

-■(-- Route of Task Force

Direction of Attack,27 Sept

MAP 10

RD 7163
DRIVE TO THE NORTH: 5th Marines move up West Road.

At the time the new plan was determined

upon, the several elements of the 5th Marines were widely deployed across the region of eastern Peleliu which they had secured in performing their initial mission

and organized against counterlandings : 1st

Battalion in the Ngardololok RDF area, 3d

Battalion (less Company L which was still

tied-in with the 7th Marines east of the

ridges) along Purple Beach, and 2d Battalion on the islands above the northeastern peninsula. The division order 40 covering the movement was not issued until 1030,

the regimental order at 1100, yet so rapidly and smoothly was the new deployment

effected that the 1st Battalion was in position to launch its attack at 1300. The 3d

Battalion followed closely, and even the 2d

Battalion, obliged to wade several hundred

panies (sic), tanks and alligators advanced to the

northern area along the seaside road. Tada Record,

25Sept44.

40 Field Order No. 3a-44.

yards of reef from the islands to Ngardololok, was tied-in with the rest of the regiment shortly after dark.

Resistance was stubborn where encountered, but it was discontinuous. Furthermore, the widening palm-grown flat now

being traversed was admirably suited to the

employment of tanks and LVT flame-throwers. Thus, the advance moved so swiftly

that the forward elements had secured the

northern Japanese radio station by dusk.

The 2d Battalion, bringing up the rear,

reached a point approximately 600 yards

north of Garekoru. Colonel Harris wished

neither to over-extend his lines nor to relinquish the afternoon's gains; therefore,

he boldly broke off contact with the 321st

and set up his own perimeter defense for

the night, with both flanks resting on the

beach.

The terrain in this region was comparatively low, forming a broad saddle that separated the central and northern ridge sys117
tems.41 The 3d Battalion, occupying the

center of the regiment's present formation,

pushed inland against minor resistance and

set up its perimeter athwart the East Road 42

which here angled across the saddle to join

the main West Road at Road Junction 15,

previously mentioned in connection with the

321st's operations of the following day.

Thus, the 5th Marines' beachhead achieved

considerable depth and tactical importance.

The night was quiet for all elements save

the 1st Battalion. This unit's forward position lay only 300 yards from commanding

high ground from which two enemy 70mm

guns and numerous mortars poured in heavy

harassing fire." It had also come within

range of mortars and 37mm guns mounted

in caves on off-lying Ngesebus Island which

exacted further toll. Small-arms fire converged upon the position from three sides,

under cover of which three strong counterattacks were launched. These were beaten

off without loss of ground, and at 0200 one

platoon of Company C staged a night coun41 The high ground of Peleliu's northwestern peninsula broke down conveniently into three components, each labeled on the map by its native

name. Southernmost and most formidable was

Umurbrogol Mountain ("mountain" is a misnomer

in each case). Adjoining this about midway along

the peninsula was Kamilianlul Mountain, a continuation of the same formation, but lower, narrower, and less rugged. The broad saddle separated

this from Amiangal Mountain, the northernmost

formation.

42 Testimony to the swiftness and efficiency of the

regiment's advance was furnished by a group of

Japanese who strolled noisily down the road into

the midst of a group of Marines without suspecting

their presence. Crown.

43 There was serious concern over the feasibility

of holding the exposed forward position under such

a volume of fire. In an effort to reduce it, Marine

artillery employed a somewhat unusual technique.

"One battery fired on map or photo selected positions from which enemy fire could be originating.

If reduced enemy fire resulted, continuous fire, at a

slow, irregular rate, was employed on the target

throughout the night. By repeating the process,

and by utilizing the fire power of all field artillery

battalions except 1/11, enemy fire was greatly

reduced and the forward positions maintained."

Ltr Maj D. R. Griffin to CMC, 13Mar50.

118

terattack of its own and destroyed two especially troublesome Japanese machine guns.

The attack was resumed by the cent6r

at 0600 the following morning, the 2d Battalion holding fast on the right. By 0830

the 3d Battalion had secured the high ground

to its front, an elevation known as Hill 80,

and reached the peninsula's eastern shore

just beyond it, here indented by a deep

swamp. Thus the northern tip of Peleliu

was sealed off on the same day (D-plus 11-

26 September) that the capture of Hill B by

the 321st isolated the Umurbrogol Pocket.

The 1st Battalion, attacking at 0900, ran

into a situation considerably tougher. To

understand what happened, some description of this terrain is necessary.

Peleliu's northernmost hill system, Amiangal "Mountain," is roughly L-shaped. Begining at the shore just below Akarakoro

Point, the island's northern tip, a series of

narrow ridges follows the axis of the peninsula to the southwest for a distance of

nearly 1,000 yards. Here it changes direction at nearly right angles and runs crosswise nearly the entire width of the peninsula in an uncharacteristic formation to

which the 321st Infantry, on which the final

mopping-up devolved, applied the apt descriptive name, "Hill Row." This consisted

of a line of four high, steep-sided, semiseparated knobs, called for convenience

Hills 1, 2, 3 and Radar Hill," the last named

rising sheer and round-topped from the

low flat close to the eastern shore. Highest

of the four, wholly detached, and site of

the enemy's radar installations, it constituted one of the most prominent features

of the Peleliu profile as viewed from the sea.

Driving northward, Boyd's battalion very

soon came under heavy fire from enemy positions on, and in, Hill 1: 75mm and 37mm

fire, as well as mortars and automatic weapons. Although tanks and LVT flame44 Nomenclature was not uniform at the time, and

most contemporary reports identify these hills by

the target squares in which they are located: #1-

156 H & I; #2-156 N; #3-156 T; Radar Hill156 Y.
NORTH PELELIU ei NGESEBUS

NORTHWARD ATTACK 5th MARINES

D+10

Ii'i'''( Front Night 25 Sept

Direction of Advance

MAP II

Radio Station

Phosphate Refinery

RD 7163
throwers were available, that stubborn, 140-

foot, cave-pocked elevation refused to succumb to frontal assault, and forward movement came to a halt.

On the right (east) Company B enjoyed

better success against Hill 2, securing this

less formidable height by 1400. This provided a position on the flank of Hill 1. Before the day was over, the Marines had

succeeded in knocking out one 75mm and

two 37mm guns, but Company C, which

had got part way onto Hill 1 before dusk,

had to be withdrawn in order to set up tenable night defensive positions.

While this fighting was going on, the 2d

Battalion had remained uncommitted on the

southern flank of the perimeter throughout

the morning and early afternoon. At 1600,

with the advance otherwise stymied, it was

ordered forward, passed through the left Of

the 1st Battalion, bypassed Hill 1 on the

west, and continued northward. The going

was not easy. There were strong emplacements on the low ground, and plunging fire

lashed at the troops from the ridge line to

their right, a formation that angled closer

and closer to the shore as the advance progressed. And as though they did not have

enough troubles already, they came under

increasing fire from Ngesebus, on their left.

Concentrations of artillery fire proved effective in reducing the volume of this, but

the battalion was in far from a happy state.

The regimental front as it was defined

that night presents an odd appearance on

the situation overlay. Owing to its forward

progress and the intervention of that pestiferous Hill 1, the 2d Battalion was out of

contact with the 1st, and Major Gayle set

up a little perimeter of his own with both

flanks on the beach. The 1st Battalion lay

partly athwart Hill Row and was tied-in._

with the 3d Battalion on the right, but had

only a refused flank to the northward where

its left looped around the summit of Hill 2.

The situation appeared somewhat less than

reassuring, and the 3d Battalion, posting

Company I to hold the high ground captured early in the morning, was assembled

in position to move to the support of either

or both of the other battalions.

What was not fully appreciated at the

outset was that these ridges and hills of

northern Peleliu contained some of the most

elaborate caves on the entire island. Not

that there were not hints aplenty: as the

5th Marines Regimental Narrative puts it,

in a tone of some frustration, ". . . tank

guns, firing point-blank directly into caves

and tunnels, did not even temporarily cause

the enemy therein to cease fire." Repeatedly in daily entries in various unit reports

certain caves are listed as having been reduced, only to have those identical caves

reappear in subsequent days' entries as having to be reduced all over again. Indeed,

one of these frequently "reduced" caves was

not finally liquidated until the following February: by the Island Command, months after the assault troops had departed Peleliu.

(See Appendix D.)

The truth, as subsequently discovered,

was that what were taken to be individual

caves more frequently than not were multiple entrances leading to tortuous passageways within a single enormous tunnel system where the occupants could find any number of safe refuges. For this zone had been

designated originally for defense by Japanese naval contingents, which included the

214th Naval Construction Battalion, made

up of miners and mining engineers who had

given it the full treatment. Wherever practicable, caves were prepared not only with

numerous mouths but on two or more staggered levels. Thus, Marines victoriously

ensconced on a hard-won summit would often be irritated by the smell of cooking rice

and fish wafted up to their nostrils from

three or even four layers of Japanese resting comfortably underneath them and ready

to sally forth in a counterattack when someone among them thought that might be a

good idea. Here was a "defense in depth"

in a more literal sense than that term is

usually applied.

However, the hill system in this region

lacked the lateral depth which was to make

119
TANK-DOZER SUPPORTING 1/5 attack on Hill Row.

the Umurbrogol Pocket, with its multiple

mutually supporting positions, so appalling.

Furthermore, some of the defenders here

appeared to lack the fighting tenacity of

their brethren to the southward, and they

lacked entirely the firm direction of the

stout Colonel Nakagawa. Thus, it took a

single regiment only four days to seize the

entire area, as contrasted with the weeks

stretching into months which it would take

five regiments working in relays to secure

the Umurbrogol.

D-plus 12 (27 September) was a day of

crisis for the 2d Battalion. This unit had

advanced painfully along a narrowing open

flat under sustained fire from Japanese caves

in the face of a steep ridge on the right, to

120

have its progress halted the previous evening at a large antitank ditch. This had

been constructed to bar the approach to a

defense installation of formidable proportions: the reinforced concrete foundation

of the demolished phosphate plant, which

the enemy had converted into a reasonably

accurate facsimile of a blockhouse. With the

fire from this work combined with plunging fire from hidden caves in the high

ground, the position was obviously unassailable by infantry without armored support.

While a tank-dozer (i.e., a medium tank

equipped with a bulldozer blade) 45 labored

45 Of three tank-dozers originally landed with

the 1st Tank Bn, this was the only one remaining
cA'Y e

POSITIONS OF

5th MARINES

NIGHT OF 26 SEPT (D+II)

MAP 12

RD 7163
PRIVATE FIRST CLASS WESLEY PHELPS, posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, rolled on an enemy grenade in

order that his companion's life might be spared.

to fill in the deep trap that prevented Marine armor from closing, Company E, the

rearmost element, sent patrols probing into

the high ground to the east. The crest of

this proved to be defended in no great

strength, and the entire ridge top in this

sector was soon occupied, although Japanese out of reach in the precipitous slope

remained troublesome for some time to

come.

The armored dozer completed its work

about 0830, and the tanks got across. Under

cover of the fire of their 75's and the weapons of the supporting infantry, an LVT

flame-thrower closed to effective firing range

and worked the improvised blockhouse over

with leisure and efficiency. More than 60.

Japanese dead were counted in the ruins,

and the advance rolled on to northward,

operative at this stage. Its work here was made

extremely difficult by accurate and well controlled

enemy fire, which knocked out its periscope once

and pinned down the officer directing its labors

from the outside. Brant.

both along the road and atop the ridge line

which here closely abutted it. -

Company F, in the lead, found progress

anything but easy. From the outset all

elements of the battalion had been harassed

by heavy mortar and artilrery fire, some

coming from beyond the ridges on the right,

some from Ngesebus 46 across the water on

the left. Now they found the low ground

infested with bunkers and pillboxes, plus

cave positions in the base of the hills, here

pressing ever closer against the road and _

the shore, from which small arms and automatic weapons poured a galling fire. The

tank-dozer could have rendered yeoman service in dealing with these, but that useful

machine had been sent back to the 1st Battalion which needed its approaches cleared

before being able to attack. So the 2d

Battalion was obliged to spend the rest of

the morning at the slow, dangerous work

of destroying the enemy installations individually by hand.

Then, about 1200, all forward movement

was rudely halted when the advance came

up against what was subsequently discovered to be perhaps the largest and most

elaborate cave on all of Peleliu, garrisoned

at one time by more than 1,000 Japanese.47

This extraordinary example of the mining engineer's art occupied the entire nose

of Peleliu's nothernmost ridge. Its seaward

tip loomed directly above the road, here so

cramped between the hill and the shore line

as to be barely wide.enough for the passage

of a single tank, and dominated completely

46 Both aircraft and Marine artillery tried repeatedly to silence the fire from Ngesebus but without permanent success. After the island's capture,

the weapons were found to be emplaced in caves in

the low ridge west of the fighter strip. Walt.

47 This is the cave described, and its main level

diagrammed, in Appendix D. Because the intricacy

of its construction exceeded anything they could

imagine, the Marines at first fell into the error of

mistaking its multiple entrances for the mouths of

individual caves and were repeatedly bewildered by

the refusal of these to remain knocked out. After

its true nature was recognized, many men on the

scene believed it to be a disused phosphate mine,

and it is so designated in some reports.

121
by the cave mouth which faced in this direction. The first tank to attempt getting

around the nose was promptly hit, and

though it was not knocked out, indications

were that a worse fate might await any

others so rash as to attempt the passage

until some remedial steps could be taken.

The problem of what steps to take was a

poser. Under the existing situation, no

heavy weapons were in position to deliver

direct fire where it was needed most, and

manifestly anything short of direct fire

would be valueless. Infantry attempting to

operate against the position from the low

ground not only came under fire from the

many cave mouths themselves, but were

clear targets for those enemy weapons on

Ngesebus and Kongauru which had been inflicting increasing casualties on the battalion

for the past two days. Those elements

which had advanced along the ridge crest,

and taken some severe losses doing so, were

able to get on top of the nose, directly above

the cave system itself. But this served

mainly to place them in the way of friendly

supporting fires without giving them any

advantageous means of getting at the Japanese holed in below them.

Yet it was tactically essential to the operation planned for the following day (28

September) that the low ground be secured

and the cave (or caves) at least partially

neutralized. Faced with this urgency, the

regimental command of the 5th Marines

worked out a method -Which has been cited

since as an outstanding example of the ingenious and skillful employment of a combination of weapons and resources. Fifth

Marines Unit Reports describes how it was

done as follows:

Artillery laid a continuous barrage on Ngesebus.

Naval gunfire was laid on Kongauru. Nine medium

tanks pulled up to 158 X [along the shore below

the phosphate plant] and fired smoke shells on the

beach of Ngesebus. . . . Every fourth artillery shell

was smoke on Ngesebus. 5 LVT (A)'s (75mm)

then pushed out in the channel and reached a point

159 G [on the reef about 300 yards due north of

the ridge nose]. From here they poured shells into

the mouth of the cave. The tanks then moved up

the road supported by G Co. and got by the cave.

122

An LVT flame-thrower was used on the cave. The

lines of the 2d Bn consolidated this gain and dug-in

for the night.48

The 1st Battalion spent most of this day

(27 September) securing Hill 1, which

proved to be a maze of caves and tunnels.

Owing to the difficult terrain of the approaches, the attack had to be delayed until the tank-dozer which was operating with

the 2d Battalion should be released for service in this sector.

During this wait, a patrol from Company

C was sent southeastward along a secondary

road, or trail, which ran parallel to the base

of Hill Row. This unit encountered no resistance but found a number of Japanese

dead, evidently the result of the artillery

concentrations which had been poured into

the area in an effort to check the persistent

mortar fire which had been harassing the

advance farther to the west from the defilade of the hills. The road was discovered

to be heavily mined, and early in the afternoon a squad of engineers went out to clear

the way for further operations in this direction which were planned for the following

day.

With the tank-dozer available at last, the

assault on Hill 1 jumped off at 0930 with

Companies B and C closing in from two directions. Progress was exasperatingly slow.

Without the support of direct fire of heavy

weapons, the advancing infantry was extremely vulnerable and could make little decisive impression on Japanese positions so

strongly armed and well concealed. And

clearing approaches for the tanks was a

laborious process. It was accomplished,

48 5th Mar War Dian describes this incident in

similar terms with only minor changes in wording,

and Regimental Narrative presents the same essentials in summary form. The wording above

would indicate that the impression still prevailed

that the Marines were contending with one or

more small caves with individual mouths instead

of a single enormous one with nine entrances. According to Walt, three of these were discovered to

be facing seaward, and all had to be temporarily

neutralized by the LVT (A)'s to allow the tanks

to pass.
however, and the men on foot moved in for

the bloody business of reducing individual

installations in turn. Four 75mm and a like

number of 37mm guns were destroyed during this action in addition to an oversize

quota of automatic weapons. At 1700,

while Company C was consolidating night

positions on top of the hill, engineer demolitions teams set about a systematic program

of sealing every opening they could find

which bore the most remote resemblance to

a cave mouth.49

The 3d Battalion played no part in this

day's fighting. Instead, the units still re-.

main ing on the line were relieved by elements of the 321st Infantry (see sub-chapter following), and the whole battalion was

assentbled near Road Junction 15 (West and

East Roads) to await further orders. There:

"Late=,in the afternoon word came that the

battalion would land on Ngesebus Island at

0900 the following 4norning." 10'

The overlay as of nightfall of 27 Semberg.shows a somewhat healthier situation

thin' had been the case the previous` evening, but still something short of ideal. From

the seemingly precarious left flank, anchged

on Peleliu's northern shore beyond the ridge

nose, the 2d Battalion's line followed the

axis of the' high ground in a southwesterly

direction. Its' right, however, had only remote visual contact with the left of the 1st

Battalion atop Hill 2, owing to the intervention of a jumbled, steep-sided ravine

which cut through between the ridge and

the hill at this point.' 5 From athwart the

center of Hill Row, the 1st Battalion's line

followed favorable terrain contours to where

Company A tied in on the right with the

newly arrived 321st Infantry which, in turn,

had its right anchored on the swamps that

49 5th Mar WD.

50 3/5 Record of Events.

51 1/5 Bn-3 Journal states: "C Company on the

left flank tied into the beach at 156 C." This information does not appear on the regimental situation overlay. The then CO of Co. C states that his

flank was atop Hill 2 that night. Ltr Maj J. H.

McLaughlin to CMC, 8Mar50, hereinafter cited as

McLaughlin.

8921060-50-9

fringe the peninsula's eastern shore. Thus,

the enemy on northern Peleliu were compressed within _a pocket slightly more than

2,000 yards in length and consisting almost

entirely of low, flat land save for the two

still uncaptured elevations which comprised

the southern half of Hill Row, and the slopes

of the northern ridges whose crests were

occupied by the Marines.

NGESEBUS TO RADAR HILL

D-plus 13 (28 September) saw several

notable developments which cleared the way

, for the final mopping up of northern Peleliu.

Of these, the most spectacular was the assault and seizure of Ngesebus Island, 500

to 700 yards away across shallow reef. This

attack was planned as a simple, straightforward shore-to-L.110re operation, utilizing all

available supporting arms. Becpuse it

promised to ptovfde a good show, ilia officers from the various elements, including

the transports, command ships and fire support vessels, *ere invited to view it from

a vantage point which provided safety and

even a certain amount of comfort.52 They

were not disappointed.

Because the executive officer of the 5th'

Marines was closely associated with the operation and an eyewitness to much of..it,

what took place may well be described in

his own words.53

The Division Commander issued a verbal order

to the Regimental Executive Officer at 1600 [on 27

September] at the Regimental CP [CO was away

from CP on reconnaissance] to attack Ngesebus at

0900 the following morning with 3/5 in assault and

1/7 54 in reserve. A warning order was immediately issued to these battalions. Also, in direct sup52"After the third day (28 September) the Regimental CP was almost constantly filled with at

least a general or an admiral." Ltr Maj D. A. Peppard to LtCol G. D. Gayle, 13Nov49, hereinafter

cited as Peppard.

53 Walt, 7-10.

54 This battalion was assembled and stood by in

reserve but was not employed. Subsequently the

reserve function passed to Company E, 5th Marines, which committed one platoon on the island

during the mopping-up phase. 3/5 Record of

Events.

123
NORTHERN RIDGES, showing blasted entrance to one of the huge artificial caves constructed by Japanese naval personnel.

port of the operation was one :battleship, one cruiser,

two destroyers, division and corps artillery, one

company of tanks,55 one company of LVTA's and

one company of LVT's. Representatives of all units

were assembled at the 5th • Marines CP, and the attack order was issued orally at 1700.

The general plan of the attack was as follows:

One hour of naval gunfire, air and artillery preparation commencing at 0800; the last 200 yards advance of the assault wave to the beach to be covered

by continuous strafing by Marine Corps fighter

planes 56 parallel to and directly on the landing

55 The 1st Tank Battalion had 19 Shermans operative at this time. Three of these continued with

the 5th Marines elements still fighting on Peleliu,

and three others drowned out during the reef crossing (see below). Thus, a total of 13 actually participated in the securing of Ngesebus.

56 From VMF 114, which had based on the Peleliu

airfield only two days previously. Their presence

124

beach; the landing force to be led by the Sherman

tanks, flanked on either side by LVTA's and followed by LVT's loaded with the troops of the assault wave; the entire battalion to be loaded in

LVT's and the waves to land successively at two

minute intervals.

The attack took place on schedule . . . except that

the three leading Sherman tanks swamped 57 and

was a source of great satisfaction to all hands not

only because of the magnificent performance they

turned in, but because this was the first instance in

the war where air support for a Marine landing

was furnished exclusively by Marine Corps planes.

It was not the first instance of such planes participating in such an operation, however, as erroneously stated in 1st MarDiv SAR and widely quoted

elsewhere.

57 This possibility had been foreseen and H-Hour

set to coincide with the lowest ebb of the tide in

order to minimize the danger. At this time the
the tank company commander was forced to reconnoiter a route across, which took some time. The

LVTA's led the attack and attempted to carry out

the tank mission of furnishing supporting fires into

the beach to cover the landing as well as their own

mission of placing supporting fire on the flanks of

the beach.

The landing wad highly successful. Some 50 of

the enemy were killed or captured in the pill boxes

on the beach without having so much as a chance

to fire a shot at our approaching waves. The fighter

planes did a remarkable job of strafing the beach

up to the time our leading wave was 30 yards from

the water line. A Japanese officer captured in the

beach positions stated that the strafing was the

most terrifying experience he had been through and

that they had been allowed no opportunity to defend the beach. . . .

The 3d Battalion had no casualties in the landing but lost a total of 28 men during the remainder

of the operation. Perhaps the low casualty figure

and the short period involved caused higher headquarters to belittle this operation. From my own

personal survey of the battle ground the following

day I felt 3/5 had done a remarkable job and that

a less capably handled force would have taken from

two to three days and probably would have lost

better than a hundred men.

In the paragraph above Colonel Walt reveals a difference in viewpoint existing between regimental and higher levels: between the men who were on the scene and

those who formed their judgments at a distance or through hearsay. Reports of higher

echelons 58 abound in such terms as "light",

"slight", and "meagre" in describing the

opposition encountered on Ngesebus. This

reflects the view obtaining at the division

command post at the time and filtered upward from• that point and which has thereby been perpetuated. Actually, 3/5 accounted for 463 59 (23 prisoners) fighting Japatanks could be only partially water-proofed, the

fording kits used for the initial landing on D-Day

having been damaged beyond further usefulness.

Stuart.

58 1st MarDiv S AR, II, 11. CTF 32 OpnRpt, 72.

TF 36 OpnRpt, Enc A,,PerRpt #8, 2.

" Nor were these all of the Japanese on the

island. While conducting final mopping up after

relieving 3/5, the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, reported a "considerable number" still holding out on

30 September, and noted killing ten more on 2

October. 81st OpnRpt, II, 35, 37.

nese on Ngesebus, nearly all of them in caves

and strongly prepared positions: hardly

"light" opposition for a single infantry battalion already badly depleted. The truth is

that a skillful adaptation of tactics and

weapons to terrain, plus unusually fine teamwork, caused a potentially difficult operation

to be carried through so quickly and effectively as to appear easy.6°

The scheme of maneuver called for landing Company K on the left, Company I on

the right and Company L in reserve. The

assault wave jumped off at 0905 61 and

crossed the reef in six minutes. By 0930

all tanks, troop carriers and LVT (A) 's were

ashore, and from that point on infantry

and armor performed with a ruthless efficiency unequalled in any previous Pacific

operation.

The only terrain with any claims to

formidability lay in the zone of Company K:

a cave-pocked ridge along the island's western shore which provided a small-scale replica of conditions in the high ground on Peleliu. As the advance swept northward, one

platoon of Company L, supported by two

tanks and three LVT (A)'s, wheeled to the

east and secured the semi-connected island of

Kongauru and the unnamed islet beyond it.

60 "Major Gustafson and the officers under his

command used excellent tactics and made maximum

use of supporting arms." Walt. "It should be

emphasized that with the terrain most suitable for

an infantry-tank attack, with both elements coordinating perfectly, the operation was made to appear easy. . . . The tanks should get a great deal

of credit. On the other hand, the tank commanders

later said that they had never experienced such

coordination from infantry." Gustaf son.

81 At this point a hitch in the plans occurred.

The command ashore had planned the assault in

the manner of land warfare, with H-Hour designating the time of crossing the line of departure.

But naval and air elements, thinking in terms of

an amphibious operation where H-Hour is time of

landing, lifted supporting fires at the moment the

LVT's were beginning the perilous reef crossing.

No serious consequences ensued, however, as the

aircraft, in plain view of the situation, quickly resumed their support in advance of the leading

waves. TF 36 OpnRpt, Enc A, Perltpt #8, 2. Coleman.

125

V
By 1700 all of Ngesebus had been overrun

except for an area a few hundred yards in

extent at the extreme northern end, though

a few caves in the ridge remained to be demolished.

The 3d Battalion completed the seizure the

following day (29 September—D-plus 14) .

In the process tanks knocked out a large

naval gun and a 75mm artillery piece which

had opened point-blank on the approaching

infantry. Ngesebus was declared secure 62

at 1500, and an hour later the 2d Battalion,

321st Infantry, in accordance with orders

issued the previous day, commenced relief 63

of the assault troops for the final moppingup. That night 3/5 was safely bivouacked

in the Ngardololok RDF area with an excellently performed job to its credit.

One aspect of the operation proved disappointing, however. The Japanese fighter

airstrip, capture.of which had been originally the main objective of this little foray,

proved to be surfaced with sand so soft as

to render it useless. Thus, the most substantial achievements were the elimination,

once and for all, of that harassing fire into

the rear of troops operating on northern

Peleliu, and denying the Japanese further

use of what could have been a valuable staging point for reinforcements moving down

from the central Palaus.

Simultaneously with the Ngesebus landing, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, continued its slow, stubborn operations against

Hill Row. The primary objective was Hill

3, which could now be approached from two

directions: north from captured Hill 2 and

west from the parallel trail seized the previous day. Both approaches were naturally

difficult, and Japanese, firmly entrenched in

the honeycomb cave system, made them hazardous as well. Bazooka men and demolition

62 As in the case of Angaur, losing contact with

his troops in the north did not deter Col Nakagawa

from reporting to Koror as "my guess" that heavy

fighting continued there. The Marines and Wildcats organized Ngesebus as the closest equivalent

to a rest area possible on Peleliu.

63 1st MarDiv SAR, II, 13; 81st OpnRpt, II, 33;

3/5 RofE.

126

teams crept forward under cover of infantry fire. A Sherman tank got into the area

and made some valuable contributions, but

it had to be maneuvered backward into a

depression and thus canted at an angle in

order to gain the necessary elevation to

bring direct fire to bear on caves higher up

the slope.

An attempt by the enemy to reinforce the

position was broken up by mortar fire in

the early afternoon, and the securing of the

hill, at 1600, had the tactically invaluable

effect of isolating its intrinsically more

formidable but detached neighbor: Radar

Hill, immediately to the south.

In the 2d Battalion area Company G,

which had rounded the northern ridge nose

with such difficulty and spent a perilous and

uncomfortable night exposed to attack from

practically every direction, now began reaping the reward for the previous day's tribulations. Attacking at 0630 with the support

of three tanks, the forward elements quickly

secured the whole northern tip of the peninsula and deployed for a drive southward

against the flank of Hill Row, the opposite

flank of which was under attack by the 1st

Battalion.

The terrain on this side of the ridges was

a widening flat and more or less open: coconut groves giving way to a strip of swamp

along the eastern base of the high ground.

The area was infested with the Japanese,

many of them in prepared positions where

they fought to the death. But, somewhat

surprisingly, few of them fought with the

skill and determination which the Marines

had learned to expect from Japanese combat infantrymen of the 14th Division."

While a few surrendered,°5 the majority

64 Subsequent intelligence indicates that most of

the Japanese killed here were personnel from the

naval construction battalions. However, in a contemporary report to Koror, Col Nakawaga estimated army strength in northern Peleliu at about

one battalion, over and above the naval complement. Tada Record, 28Sept44.

66 The 5th Marines captured 45 POW's (23 on

Ngesebus) on this day, as contrasted to a total of

8 taken by the regiment during the 13 days preceding. 5th Mar War Diary.
simply hid, abjectly awaiting death with

little effort either to defend themselves or

to injure their attackers, a point which the

Marines were nothing loath to appreciate.

Company G swept on southward across the

flat until reaching a point where Radar Hill

could be brought under fire by infantry

weapons, and here a perimeter defense was

set up for the night.

While this advance was in progress, Company F, occupying the line of the ridgetop,

and those elements of Company E not committed on Ngesebus, busied themselves at

the slow, exasperating work of sealing up

the innumerable cave openings in both faces

of the ridge. In the afternoon a platoon of

the latter company moved onto the flat to

mop-up behind Company G. During the

process, one detail flushed a group of 70-odd

Japanese who attempted to make a break

across the reef. Three LVT's carrying personnel of Company F easily overtook them,

and those of the now helpless enemy who

refused to surrender were adequately disposed of.

The 1st Battalion spent 29 September

working on Radar Hill with flame-throwers,

bazookas and demolition charges. The capture of Hill 3 had isolated the strategic elevation, but so intricate and strongly manned

was its cave system that reducing it proved

an all-day job, plus. While the rest of the

battalion was thus engaged, Company B

sent out patrols through the wooded flat to

the northward in an effort to make contact

with Company G, known to be moving in

this direction. When no contact had been

achieved by late afternoon, the 1st Battalion

withdraw to its previous position for the

night.67

In the 2d Battalion area east of the ridges,

Company G continued mopping-up operations, harassed now by fire from caves high

up in the precipitious slopes above the phosphate plant, with which the Marines were

66 Ibid.

67 1/5 Bn-3 Journal. 5th Mar War Diary states

that the 1st Battalion seized Radar Hill on this

day.

unable to close because of the intervening

swamp. Tanks posted in the coconut grove

placed direct 75mm fire in the most troublesome cave mouth, without perceptible effect.

Company F, working on the ridgetop against

caves on both slopes, succeeded in sealing up

four openings, only to have the Japanese inside blast them open again in a short time

and resume their harassing operations.

The men of Company G encountered further tribulations when the enemy suddenly

began firing into their rear from positions

near the northern tip of the peninsula which

had been thoroughly worked over the previous day. Once again a mopping-up platoon

of Company E moved into the area, and with

the same result: the positions were reduced

and their occupants chased out on the reef,

where armored amtracks made short work

of them. No doubt this combination of divertisements was largely responsible for the

failure of Company G to make contact with

the 1st Battalion patrols, although the company reached its assigned objective line.

D-plus 15 (30 September) saw all of

northern Peleliu secured, organized resistance "s declared at an end. Both the 1st and

2d Battalions had been alerted to expect

relief that morning by elements of RCT

321, to which final mopping-up had been assigned, and bright and early they set about

putting the area in order.

Patrols from the 1st Battalion scaled

Radar Hill and operated on its summit without opposition, although it was known that

live Japanese still occupied a large cave beneath them.6" Pushing northward through

scrub jungle and coconuts, other patrols

99 Another instance where the term "organized

resistance" is apt to be deceptive. By the time

they finished mopping-up this area, relieving elements of RCT 321 were convinced that they had

been through a major battle. See 81st OpnRpt;

also sub-chapter following.

69 LtCol R. W. Boyd, CO of 1/5, interviewed

2Mar50, described the cave mouth as protected by

a large stone and log revetment. Unable to attack this frontally, the Marines scaled the hill and

sealed the cave entrance from above by using shaped

charges to create a sizeable landslide. The Japanese, however, dug their way out during the night.

121
RADAR HILL looms above dense mangrave swamp. Remainder of Hill Row at left.

soon made contact with elements of Company G which had been working toward

them, mopping-up as they came. Only scattered sniper fire was encountered, and this

had been silenced by the time, about 1000,

when both units were ordered to withdraw

to the vicinity of the radio station preparatory to their relief.

Second Battalion elements on the ridgetop

were drawn back from their positions in

order to get out of the line of fire of a

155mm gun which had been brought forward

to bear directly on particularly troublesome

cave openings above the phosphate plant

which had been inflicting casualties along

the West Road for the past two days with

apparent impunity. By now it had become

something more than a suspicion that the

presence of so many openings on both flanks

of this same ridge was not mere coincidence;

that the survival of their occupants after repeated direct hits and the tender attentions

of flame-throwers was no accident. Therefore, on the theory that this position comprised a single enormous cave rather than

a collection of small individual ones, Com128

pany E placed a detail armed with machine

and submachine guns safely in defilade from

friendly fire to cover the eastern face of the

ridge under attack.

Sure enough, no sooner did the big 155mm

shells begin exploding inside the wester,n

cave mouth than Japanese began scurrying

out through half a dozen openings on the

east, where the Marines were waiting for

them. After this had gone on for a while,

sealing the entire ridge proved a comparatively simple matter, though how many survivors were sealed inside of it, and how permanently, could never be determined with

any conclusiveness.

This novel and ingenious employment of a

large artillery piece for direct fire is worthy

of some elaboration, if for no other reason

than that it represented the first of several

similar cases of effective adaptation of weapons to missions which must have been far

from their designers' minds. Weapon and

crew were from the 8th 155mm Gun Battalion and were commanded by Major

George V. Hanna, Jr. It was set up on

the beach under heavy small arms and ma-

(
155mm GUN IN POSITION to place direct fire into caves in northern ridges.

chine-gun fire that killed two and wounded

three of the gunners before they could get

it emplaced and the position sandbagged.

The range was so short—less than 200

yards—that the crew had to take cover from

the fragmentation of their own bursts.7° As

one eyewitness has described the action:

Nips could be seen trying to crawl out through

the rubble knocked down by the shell bursts. One

round set off a munitions cache inside the cave system which blew out through the principal cave

mouth in three successive blasts, the last with a

large smoke ring. Ammunition was mixed, with

WP, delay, superquick and AP used.71

Although the latest available intelligence

indicated an estimated 500 Japanese in the

northern ridges on 27 September,72 the 5th

Marines and their supporting elements had

70 Harrison.

71 MS. Corrections and Comments, Col E. L. Lyman, Mar50.

72 Prisoner of War Interrogation #15.

eliminated a total of 1,172 73 during the three

succeeding days (28-30 September inclusive). Not without reason could the 1st

and 2d Battalions believe that they were

leaving northern Peleliu secure, as trucks

and DUKW's and amtracks hauled the

weary men to rejoin the previously relieved

3d Battalion for a "rest" in the Ngardololok

defense area.

FURTHER OPERATIONS OF RCT 321

In order to deal with the securing of

northern Peleliu, this narrative left RCT

321 posted athwart the ridge and firmly ensconced on Hill B, capture of which on the

afternoon of 26 September (D-plus 11) had

sealed off the enemy's Umurbrogol Pocket.

Beginning the following morning, this combat team was assigned a dual mission: (1)

73 This figure includes casualties on Ngesebus. It

breaks down to 1,070 killed (estimated) and 72

prisoners of war. 5th Mar War Diary.

129
To compress the Pocket further by driving

southward to a new phase line, O—X, laid

arbitrarily across the entire width of the

peninsula; (2) To sweep northward through

the central ridge system (Kamilianlul Mountain on the maps) which had been by-passed

by the 5th Marines on that regiment's swift

advance to the end of the island.

The first phase was assigned to the 2d

Battalion, to which Company K was operationally attached. Companies G and E remained on Hill 100 and Hill B respectively

from which supporting fire could be placed

on objectives to the south, and the remainder of the 3d Battalion held fast to the western rim of the ridge system to cope with

any enemy attempts to reinforce their defensive zone in front of the 2d Battalion.

D-plus 12 was a day of sustained hard

fighting for the units on the offensive in this

area. Company K jumped off at 0700 and

commenced its tortuous southward advance

down the parallel lines of ridges: rugged,

broken, up-ended terrain where the holedup enemy had every advantage. Progress

was slow, and the heavy casualties sustained

included the company commander.

Company F, supported by the Neal Task

Force, advanced along the East• Road,

plagued by heavy fire from the ridge and

from caves cut into the face of the cliff wall

that dominated the open low ground. The

terrain here made possible the employment

of tanks and flame-throwers, and these

knocked out many enemy positions. Many

others, however, proved wholly inaccessible.

At 1200 the column was still 200 yards short

of O—X, and further advance appeared inadvisable.

Because of the impossibility of digging

in securely in the hard coral-limestone, a

withdrawal for the night was ordered. Company F and the Neal group fell back to the

protection of Hill B and formed defensive

positions at its base. Company K withdrew

to the westward and entered the perimeter

sector occupied by Company I. The following day, because of the severe casualties

which this unit had suffered, Company K

130

was removed to the comparative safety of

Hill B where it relieved Company E.

For the next day's attack (28 September)

Colonel Dark threw together a composite

battalion under command of CO, 3/321.

Company I took over the central ridge sector, while Company E moved down from

Hill B and resumed the advance along the

East Road, supported by Company A, 710th

Tank Battalion, with Company F in battalion reserve.

The fighting on D-plus 13 in general repeated the pattern of the previous day:

hard, sustained and unspectacular. Company L contributed its bit by swinging

southward from its position on the western

ridge line and tying in with the right of

Company I. This time the forward momenturn carried successfully to the O—X line by

nightfall. And there was no withdrawal:

the composite battalion was still holding

firm to its well consolidated position the

following morning when it was relieved by

the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

In the meanwhile, the 1st Battalion had

been carrying out the northward sweep

which comprised the second phase of the

regiment's current mission. The battalion

advanced at 0700 on 27 September with two

companies abreast, one in reserve. Company

C, on the left, moved athwart and along both

flanks of the Kamilianlul Mountain ridges.

Company A followed the East Road with

Company B immediately behind it.

The high ground in this region was less

formidable than either the Umurbrogol or

that to the extreme north, and it soon became apparent that the Japanese had given

priority to defense of those other sectors.

The advance was unopposed.74 However,

to describe any Peleliu terrain as "less

formidable" is to use a purely comparative

term. The ridges in the center and swampy

ground on the right made progress slow and

difficult. It was 1700 by the time Company

A passed beyond the northern extremity of

the ridge where it came under heavy fire

from a pillbox at a point where the road

74 81st OpnRpt, II, 27. See footnote p. 132.
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SECURING THE NORTH

11111111 Lines 27 Sept

TTTTTT Lines 28 Sept

Attack 28 Sept

Final Drives, 29 Sept

MAP 13

RD 7163
looped sharply to the west. Lateness of the

hour dictated a halt to set up night defenses.

This occurred on D-plus 12 (27 September), the day that the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, was withdrawn from that regiment's

perimeter in preparation for the Ngesebus

assault. As early as 1235 orders had been

received for 1/321 to move elements as far

as Road Junction 15 (East-West Roads) in

order to fill the gap thus created. No sooner

had Company A been halted by the fire of

the pillbox at the road loop than Company B,

hitherto in reserve, began its swift march

around the left flank of Company C and

forward to the designated spot, a movement

accomplished successfully before nightfall.

At this point certain elements of confusion enter the picture as it emerges from

the action reports of the two regiments. The

pillbox in front of Company A lay some distance below where 3/5 had reached the eastern shore the previous morning, but long

before Company B reached Road Junction

15 it entered territory over which Marine

units had been operating for the past two

days. Of this fact the officers of the 321st

appear to have been unaware. Thus, henceforth until the end of operations in northern

Peleliu, that regiment's reports contain frequent allusions to the "capture" of positions

which the 5th Marines had already seized

and moved beyond, perhaps without mopping-up thoroughly, as is often the case

with troops in assault.

A case in point is that of the elevation

known as Hill 80, located in the saddle between the northern and central ridge systems. Fifth Marines Unit Reports, entry

for 26 September, has this to say: "At 0830

L Co secured hill in square 152 A, F & K."

The following is quoted verbatim from 81st

Division Operation Report for 28 September: "In the center of the line Co B captured the hill in TX 152 F, G and organized

it for defense." As a glance at the target

square map will show, the latter designation represents a segment of the identical

hill the 5th Marines had reported as "secured" two days before.75 The operational

overlay for the 5th Marines on 28 September shows the front line in that sector as

lying along Hill Row, nearly 1,000 yards in

advance of the "captured" position.

The obvious inference is that 1/321 was

engaged in large scale mopping-up rather

than actual assault, as its officers seem to

have believed—and not without some reason. That they should have been wholly

ignorant of Marine operations a thousand

yards to their front might appear extraordinary by the standards of "The Book"—

but not to anyone who had to cope with the

problems presented by the terrain of Peleliu: not only the broken nature of the high

ground to the north, but in this particular

case a large, deep swamp imposed between

the Marine and Army positions.76

While Company B was mopping-up Hill

80, Company A succeeded in liquidating that

troublesome pillbox, and by 1600 the 1st

Battalion, 321st, controlled the northern

stretch of the East Road save for one small

pocket which was eliminated the following

day. Early the next morning (29 September) the two battalions which had been

working against the Umurbrogol pocket

were relieved of responsibility for central

Peleliu and ordered to make the necessary

dispositions for relieving all elements of the

5th Marines in the north, an operation for

which RCT 321 had been. alerted on the

evening of the 27th.

75 Company I, 5th Marines, had occupied this position, abutting the east shore swamp, for two days

as right flank anchor of the regimental perimeter,

prior to its withdrawal the previous evening preparatory to the Ngesebus operation. Quite possibly

infiltrating Japanese moved back in during the brief

period it was unoccupied.

76 The foregoing elaboration has been propounded

in an effort to explain an apparent conflict in what

must necessarily be considered the primary historical sources for the campaign. This should be accepted as inference and deduction on the part of

the author, based on some personal knowledge of

the terrain and problems involved, and partially

substantiated by interviews with officers who took

part.

131
"A NEW HIGH IN TANK-INFANTRY COORDINATION was achieved," as one authoritative witness stated.

The 2d Battalion, as previously noted, concentrated at Garekoru preparatory to relieving 3/5 on Ngesebus. Orders to effect

this move were received at 1410 following

word that the smaller island had been secured, and 2/321 departed at once, taking

along a platoon of tanks to assist in the final

mopping-up.

The 3d Battalion advanced northward

over the same ground traversed by 1/321

two days previously, combing the area for

any Japanese who might have been missed

by its predecessors. A number of such were

found and put out of the way.77 Proceeding with that systematic thoroughness characteristic of all 81st Division units on Peleliu, the battalion paused to blow in every

cave the men were able to discover, as a

precautionary measure against reoccupation

77 81st OpnRpt, H, 31. Here is another example

of Japanese allowing themselves to be overrun in

order to get in American rear, since the 1st Battalion had traversed this same ground two days

earlier without encountering any of the enemy.

Ibid, 27.

132

by infiltrating Japanese. This slowed progress notably. The 3d Battalion had moved

only about 200 yards beyond the 321st Infantry Trail by nightfall and was to continue engaged in this work for the next

three days.

The 1st Battalion received orders on the

morning of 29 September to effect the relief

of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Marines,

the following day. These units, as previously related, had closed in on Hill Row

from the west and north and seized the

high ground by dint of some hard fighting.

Radar Hill, deprived of its mutually supporting positions, had fallen comparatively

easy prey to 1/5. All of its defense installations were reported knocked out with

the exception of one large cave,78 and Marines had occupied its summit without encountering any further resistance.

By noon of the 30th (D-plus 15) 1/321

had completed reconnaissance of the ground

it was to take over However, the remain78 1st MarDiv SAR, II, 13.
ing cave on Radar Hill was huge and well

populated. No sooner had the unfortunate

members of Company B 79 begun moving

into position than, as the 81st Division Operation Report (p. 39) puts it: "Japanese

swarmed from Radar Hill to attack our

troops ascending the slope. A major skirmish ensued in which tanks and mortar fire

had to be employed to drive the Japanese

back into their cave. The company was unable to take the hill before dark and organized a perimeter defense for the night on

the low ground at its base." 8°

Here, then, was another example of the

difficulty of thorough mopping-up in terrain

of this nature. Nor was this the only one.

Company A encountered a similar situation

in the ridge just east of the West Road

arid secured the position that evening only

after hard fighting. Company C, operating

in the extreme north, killed 40 Japanese who

had evidently infiltrated to reoccupy captured caves and emplacements which it had

not appeared necessary to destroy the previous day, and disposed of another 40 under

similar circumstances the following morning.

Company B assaulted Radar Hill again on

1 October, and the area of main enemy resistance was localized. At 1600 a rifle platoon and an engineer demolition squad attempted to storm this, but a Japanese counterattack again drove them from the hill.

7° This force was a single platoon. It was en

route to the position when it encountered Co C, 5th

Mar, which had just left the hill. The CO of the

latter unit was dubious of the ability of so small

a force to hold the position should the Japanese

be able to dig out of their blasted cave and volunteered to carry word to that effect to the platoon

leader's battalion operations officer. By the time

this could be done, however, the platoon had already run into trouble. McLaughlin.

80"Before the Regimental CP (5th Marines) had

moved out of the area, the 321st had been forced

to evacuate Radar Hill and had brought up their

M-10 tank destroyers which were working over that

area. They were also verbally working over the

Marines." Pep pard.

The unexpected difficulties being encountered on northern Peleliu led to a call for

reinforcements. Company G of the 2d Battalion, then completing the mop-up of Ngesebus, was brought over to the main island

on the morning of 2 October to support the

attack on Radar Hill. Company B assaulted

again from the south and west at 1000.

Using flame-throwers and heavy demolition

charges, the attack was successful this time.

All resistance had ceased, on the hill and

throughout the entire zone, by 1700. Examination of the main cave area revealed

approximately 100 dead Japanese therein.

With the completion of mopping-up on

the northern peninsula, the 321st assumed

what was to be mainly a passive role for

the next two weeks: organizing defensive

areas against possible landing attempts by

Japanese from the central Palaus, and clearing up the debris left in the wake of battle.

During this period the regiment was also

called upon to undertake several secondary

offensive operations, which will be dealt with

elsewhere, before resuming a major part in

the final conquest of Peleliu.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND FIRST RELIEFS

On 24 September (D-plus 9) the 1st Marine Division Command Post displaced forward and set up in what was left of the

former Japanese administration building, a

short distance north of the airfield. The

signs of crumbling enemy resistance everywhere except in the thoroughly isolated

Umurbrogol Pocket were now unmistakable, and the U. S. flag was raised here with

simple ceremonies at 0800 on D-plus 12.

To most witnesses this event appeared to

signalize the beginning of the end, as indeed

it did. It was perhaps fortunate for such optimism as remained in the division that none

could foresee the tortuous road which remained to be traveled before this end would

be achieved.

Although portions of the Umurbrogol

Pocket remained within mortar range of

the airfield, and the enemy occupied lofty

133
observation posts 81 affording a clear view

of all southern Peleliu, they made no serious efforts to interfere by this means with

operations there. (Nice he had determined

on a last ditch defense, Colonel Nakagawa

apparently saw no point in revealing his

well concealed positions in what could be

nothing more than a futile gesture and conserved his ammunition for more immediate

targets. He did send out suicide squads of

varying size heavily laden with demolition

materials in attempts to infiltrate to the

field and do as much damage as possible.

But none of these managed to get through,

so work on the strips progressed rapidly and

satisfactorily.

As early as D-plus 3 a Navy TBF plane

was able to make an emergency landing and

take off successfully the following day. On

81 This was believed at the time and subsequently

proved to be true. As an indication of how narrowly

distance was contracted in this area, during the

first air strike against the pocket by land-based

planes, fragments of a 1,000 pound bomb striking

in the enemy-held ridges carried all the way back

to the airfield from which the plane that dropped

it had taken off.

D-plus 4 two artillery observation planes

from VMO 3 landed ashore, and from 20

September on the entire squadron operated

from the field. With the fighter strip serviceable for 3800 feet,82 ample dispersal areas

available, and everything made ready for

them by their ground crews, the first Marine fighter planes flew in to base on the

field on 24 September: an advance echelon

of four night fighters (F6F's) from

VMF (N) 541, the remainder of the squadron arriving on 1 October. VMF 114, flying Corsairs (F4U's), followed intact on

the 26th and supported the Ngesebus landing as previously narrated. This new

strength made it possible to dispense with

further naval air support as of 1800 that

day. Arrival of VMF 122 (F4U's), also

on 1 October, filled the complement of MAG

11 assigned to Peleliu.

82 With repairs and extension of the bomber

strip completed on 5 October, the field was capable

of accommodating any plane short of a B-29. As

early as 23 Sep a PB4Y (Navy version of the B-24)

was able to land on two dead motors, effect repairs and take off. CTF 32 OpnRpt, 8. For further detail regarding aviation activities on Peleliu,

see Appendix E.

MARINE CORSAIRS on Peleliu Airfield, equipped with belly tanks for a napalm strike against Japanese-held ridges.

134
With land-based air support well established, the danger of counter-invasion from

the north was greatly reduced. Thus, it

became possible to take steps toward evacuating the 1st Marines to the division base in

the Russell Islands, and Movement Order

No. 3-44 was issued on 28 September to

effect this. As noted previously, this regiment had been occupying Purple Beach and

the northeastern defensive zone after excessive casualties had necessitated its withdrawal from the lines. With completion of

the northern operations, elements of the

5th Marines relieved the 1st in position, and

the latter commenced loading on 29 September.

The weather hampered this work, as it

now hampered all operations on the island.

Rain had been falling more or less steadily

for the past two days. At first this had been

welcomed as a break in the oppressive tropical heat which had persisted since D-Day,83

but as the rains continued, borne in on winds

of increasing velocity, serious problems began to arise. As events were to prove, this

storm was actually the edge of a major

typhoon which piled LST's on the reef,

wrecked the pontoon causeway running seaward from Orange 3, and rendered the western beaches unusable for several days. Even

on Beach Purple, on the lee side of the island,

unloading operations were so hampered that

it was necessary to put the troops ashore

on two meals a day. Before the emergency

was over, vital supplies had to be brought

in by air 84 owing to the continuance of high

seas even after the wind had died down

and the weather cleared.

Most of the 1st Marines were safely embarked by the evening of 30 September,

but complications resulting from the weather

83 The holed-up Japanese, who had been running

seriously short of drinking water, welcomed these

torrential rains even more eagerly, if for a different

reason.

84 Approximately 75 C-46 and C-47 aircraft were

employed for this purpose during the height of the

emergency. Benedict. -

delayed departure of the convoy until 2 October. With the regiment went various of

the reinforcing elements which comprised

the combat team, and a sizeable detachment from division headquarters." The

constriction of the enemy-held area eliminated massed artillery fires as dangerous

to friendly troops, so it was considered expedient to relieve the two pack howitzers

battalions of the 11th Marines (1/11 and

2/11). The exhausted platoons of the 1st

Tank Battalion were also shipped back at

this time. Both the men and machines of

this unit had seen much rough and strenuous service and the nature of the terrain in

the remaining enemy pocket made it appear that tanks would be of little use henceforth. This proved to be an unfortunate

misapprehension."

Thus, the end of September saw all of

Peleliu conquered save for a single pocket

of rough, hilly terrain. This conquest had

cost the reinforced division 843 killed, 3,845

wounded, and 356 missing: total casualties

of 5,044.87 On.the credit side of the ledger,

an estimated total of 9,076 Japanese had

been killed and 180, mostly Koreans and

Okinawans rather than first line troops,

taken prisoner.

85 Including 1st Plat., 1st MP Co. "With it went

any hope of successfully performing our assigned

tasks of traffic control, security watches, guarding

POW's and maintaining a straggler line." Ltr

Maj F. H. Scantling to CMC, 11Mar50, hereinafter

cited as Scantling. See discussion of souvenir hunters and death of Col Hankins, Chap. VII.

86 0. P. Smith PerNar. During their remaining

operations on Peleliu, the Marines were dependent

for tank support on the 710th Tank Battalion, attached to the 81st Division. These men and machines turned in an outstanding job of supporting

the Marines and, especially later when they were

working with their own troops, their contribution

to the final subjugation of the Japanese on Peleliu

would be difficult to overestimate.

87 1st MarDiv SAR, II, 13. Like mid-operation

casualty figures previously quoted; these were compiled amid the confusion of battle and without

complete returns. Figures on men missing in action are especially misleading.
--Jaxu.vs Imottzslr. /7N

al*

#.0

IIPM7

CHAPTER VII

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

The Umurbrogol Pocket: D-plus 14-0-plus 30

(29 September-1 5 October)

In the minds of the men who fought there,

the exotic-sounding name "Umurbrogol

Mountain" became associated with some of

the most unpleasantly exotic terrain on the

face of creation. Marines had been fighting

in this outlandish high ground since D-plus

2, and some attempt has been made to describe it. But words are inadequate, photographs not much better. One has to see it

fully to believe it.

The generally accepted geological explanation is that Peleliu was once a part of the

ocean floor which, thickly encased in coral

growth, had been forced above the surface

by subterranean volcanic action. Many

areas of the island still retain a semblance

of the natural submerged coral formations

to be seen on any tropical reef. But where

the pressure had been strongest, the ground

had buckled and cracked to form a maze of

ridges and defiles, the whole littered with

jagged boulders and rubble which had been

torn adrift by the violent action. This pressure accounts for the elevations attaining no

great height before splitting apart. It also

accounts for the broken nature of the terrain

and the extreme steepness of most of the

slopes, many of them sheer cliffs. The thin

topsoil above this bedrock had bee±i capable

of sustaining scrub jungle just dense

enough to screen the contours from aerial

136

photography, thereby rendering the preliminary maps of this particular region so

egregiously inaccurate in detail.

The same pressure which caused these

weird surface contortions had created innumerable underground faults in the coral

limestone; cracks and fissures in the solid

rock, many of which had been further enlarged by erosion into natural caves, cluttered with the stalactities and stalagmites

characteristic of caverns in all varieties of

limestone. Since rock faults seldom follow

any traceable patterns, these natural caves

occurred in all shapes and sizes, and at every

conceivable level from the floors of valleys,

up the faces of sheer cliffs to the tips of

craggy pinnacles. It was the Japanese exploitation of these natural features which

caused the fighting in the Umurbrogol

Pocket to develop as it did.

The terrain within the Pocket, as defined

at the end of the third operational phase

(1 October), differed only in degree from

that in the Kamilianlul and Amiangal systems to the northward: the ridges were

higher, longer, and packed more closely, together in greater depth. The highest elevation achieved an altitude of only about

300 feet, but that was almost straight up.

No caves here were as large and elaborate

as some of the engineering feats encountered
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MAP 14
STALACTITE FORMATION in natural cave "improved" by the Japanese and "revised" by the Americans.

in the northernmost ridges—but there were

a lot more of them.'

Natural caves, of course, did not always

occur in positions of tactical importance,

and a number of them were taken without

great difficulty or abandoned by the enemy.

A case in point was Colonel Nakagawa's

original command post, located in a "balcony" 2 cave well to the south of the final

Pocket. This boasted most of the comforts

and conveniences of permanent quarters:

1 See Appendix D for further description of caves

and their utilization.

2 A type of natural hillside cave with an extremely

wide horizontal mouth, partially obstructed by stalactites and stalagmites, which it was all but impossible to seal. On the other hand, such an openwooden decks, electric lighting, communication facilities, a well equipped galley, partitioned quarters with built-in bunks. Yet

because he rightly judged its approaches to

be indefensible, the colonel evacuated it on

D-plus 2 and retired without haste to that

inaccessible position which was destined to

be the last hard core of organized resistance

on Peleliu.

However, where a natural cave did possess tactical importance, especially if it were

adaptable to the emplacing of heavy weaping provides far less cover than a small one. Many

caves of this type are extremely large, this one

extending, with some improvement on nature, entirely through the ridge and out the other side on

a different level. Japanese Military Caves on

Peleliu. .CinCPac-CinCP0A Bulletin 173-45, 27-33.

137
ons, the Japanese went topreat lengths to

improve it. Blast walls, or revetments, of

logs, coral-filled oil drums and reinforced

concrete were placed to protect the ehtrance,

or entranced; from direct fire or the force

of nearby explosions. A few were even

equipped with doors of steel armor plate

which could be swung open in order to run

out artillery pieces, mortars or automatic

cannon, then closed again to provide cover

and concealment after a few rounds had

been fired. Elaborate communication equipment was subsequently discovered in several of these.

All approaches were protected with great

shrewdness by the construction of artificial,

or semi-artificial, caves so placed as to bring

mutually supporting and interlocking fires

to bear against the flanks or rear of attackers. In this respect there were limiting factors in the amount of work required

and shortage of labor personne1.3 As a

result, many such were so small and simple

as to prove death traps once the Marines

were able to get to them.

But many others proved quite the opposite. They assumed a number of shapes and

sizes, depending on local conditions. Wherever possible, bays and ells were blasted or

chiseled in which the occupants could take

refuge from direct fire through the cave's

mouth. The ultimate desideratum was another entrance, or entrances, on the opposite

side of the ridge or out of view of the attackers around a shoulder, through which

the defenders could duck out for a safe cigarette or two during such time as the Marines were earnestly blasting and burning

their empty refuge. In that region of jumbled razorback ridges, construction of multiple entrances proved practicable in a surprising number of cases. Thus, during the

earlier stages of the operation, there were

repeated instances of caves being declared

3Japanese Navy elements on Peleliu used artificial

caves almost exclusively and had what amounted

to a monopoly on the skilled labor available. See

Appendix D. Army people did not find their sister

service's ideas of cooperation especially amusing.

See Appendix F.

138

secure in all good faith, whereas in actuality they were reoccupied by their unharmed defenders within minutes of the

time the attack ceased, and the whole business would have to be done all over again.

But if the Marines learned the hard way,

at least they did learn. As the fighting

developed in the Umurbrogol, it became

standard procedure to search out and seal

every opening bearing the remotest resemblance to a cave mouth, regardless of

whether there was reason to believe it occupied. No doubt much energy and high

explosive were wasted in this manner, but

by the time a systematic job had been completed, attacks proceeded much more smoothly. There was simply no easy, inexpensive

way.

The impossibility of judging the nature

of a cave or the number of its defenders

from the outside doubtless led to some exaggerated estimates of enemy casualties. But

sometimes this had the opposite effect. There

is one authenticated case of eight Japanese

being reported killed defending the mouth

of what appeared a smallish cave, which

on subsequent investigation proved to be an

enormous cavern containing the bodies of 80.

Greatly enhancing mutual support of

enemy positions was the generally parallel

orientation of the ridges. Following the

peninsula's northeast-southwest axis, they

faced one another, often at very close range,

across a succession of gullies, draws, box

canyons and miscellaneous declivities; steepsided, fissured and strewn with those ubiquitous boulders and coral outcrop. Thus,

Marines on one narrow, open ridge crest

were vulnerable to fire from concealed Japanese in the faces of the flanking ridges,

even though there might be friendly troops

atop those ridges, too, prevented by the

steepness of the slope from getting at the

enemy below them. There were numerous

instances of such troops lowering explosives

over the cliffs on ropes in an effort to explode them in the cave mouths below—and

of the Japanese reaching out and cutting the

ropes.
From the infantryman's point of view,

perhaps the greatest curse of this evil

ground was the limitations it imposed on

the effectiveness of supporting arms. Flat

trajectory naval gunfire had proved valueless against invisible targets impervious to

anything short of a direct hit, and most of

them in defilade, anyhow. Massed artillery

fires were useful in keeping the enemy holed

up when that suited the attackers' purpose,

but any permanent effect it had was wholly

matter of luck.4 And with constriction

f the Pocket, massed fires had to be abanoned to avoid danger to friendly troops.

Direct fire by individual heavy weapons

could be extremely effective,5 but all too often no amount of labor or ingenuity sufficed to get such weapons into the desired

positions. Tanks were invaluable wherever they were able to operate; but in such

up-ended terrain, this excluded many of the

most critical areas. The same applied to

the LVT-mounted flame-throwers, and prodigious time and labor were expended bulldozing routes for both types of machine into

some highly improbable territory. But in

the end the business of reduction usually

resolved itself into the infantryman struggling in across all but impassable ground

with such weapons as he could carry on his

back.

The air arm helped, or tried to. Five

hundred and 1000-pound bombs made an impressive display and doubtless rattled the

teeth of many underground Japanese, but

caused no visible slackening in enemy re4"From the light artillery standpoint, the most

emphatic lesson of Peleliu was that 75's fired

futilely at Jap caves. 1/11 fired 20,000 rounds at

one two hundred yard area in front of the 1st Marines without disturbing appreciably anything below the foliage and topsoil." Ltr Maj J. R. Chaisson to CMC, 8Mar50.

5 Employment of a 155mm gun against the northern ridges was described in Chapter VI. This gun

was later emplaced to angle direct fire in through

the mouth of the Horseshoe. There was one somewhat bizarre incident, well authenticated, of its

gunner sighting in on an individual Japanese and

picking him off at 300 yards like a clay pipe in a

shooting gallery.

8921060-50-10

sistance. Napalm fire bombs were tried.

Later, in order to minimize danger to friendly troops in the constricted Pocket, unfused

belly tanks filled with napalm were dropped

to saturate a chosen target area which was

then ignited by lobbing in white phosphorus

mortar shells. There is at least one substantiated report of the intense heat driving a small group of Japanese into the open

where they could be destroyed. But perhaps

the most useful purpose served by napalm

was burning away what vegetation remained, thereby depriving the enemy of concealment and occasionally revealing positions heretofore unsuspected.6

The Umurbrogol Pocket, as defined at the

time responsibility for its reduction passed

to the 7th Marines (29 September), has

been described as roughly 900 yards long by

400 yards wide.7 Certain of its southern

features have been touched upon in passing

in Chapter IV, but may be reviewed briefly

in connection with the accompanying maps

and photographs.

The valley known as the Horseshoe 8 offered what appeared the most practical avenue of ingress into the heart of the Pocket

from the .southeast. This was bounded outboard by the elevation which came to be

called Walt Ridge, which formed the Pocket's eastern wall in this area; inboard by a

generally parallel formation: the Five

Brothers. Ringing it to. the north, three

other major elevations frowned down into

the valley at various angles: Hill 140, Ridge

Three and Boyd Ridge, the latter also part

of the eastern wall and separated from Walt

6"The enemy plan seems to be to burn down the

central hills post to ashes by dropping gasolinc

from airplanes." Tada Record, 70ct44.

7 Exact distances in this region cannot be gauged

accurately as the three different maps used at one

time or another are not in scale with each other.

Insofar as it is possible to orient terrain features

on the standard 1:20,000 map, length of the Pocket

at this time would appear to be closer to 1,200

yards.

Appearing in reports of the 81st Division as

"Mortimer Valley." Place names used herein, unless otherwise noted, are the ones applying at the

close of Marine action at Peleliu.

139
UMURBROGOL POCKET from the southeast, Walt Ridge center foreground, Boyd Ridge to its right north of draw. Smoke

rises from western face of Five Brothers, north of which lie Hill 140 and Ridge 120. Five Sisters at left, abutting China

Wall in background. Swamp-surrounded inlet in foreground prevented approach from eastern peninsula.

Ridge by a steep-sided draw. The East

Road, approaching from the south parallel

to the extension of Hill 200 (see Chapter

IV), angled sharply eastward near the base

of towering Hill 300 and crossed the swamp

at the mouth of the Horseshoe on the causeway previously described, just beyond which

a secondary road branched off to a dead

end inside the valley.

West of the Horseshoe and separated from

it by the Five Brothers lay a generally similar valley at a somewhat higher elevation

subsequently christened "Wildcat Bowl." 9

Bounding this on the west, in turn, was the

towering, butteressed China Wa11,9 a doublecrested ridge extending northward from the

Five Sisters. The latter formation, together

with Hill 300, partially closed the Bowl to

the south, while an unnamed transverse

ridge closed it completely on the north. The

narrow, rough defile known as Death Valley

skirted the western base of the China Wall,

separating it from the serried high ground

9 Both of these names were applied by the 81st

("Wildcat") Division and constitute exceptions to

the rule cited in previous footnote. They are used

herein in the interests of easier orientation, inasmuch as Marine reports have no standardized terms

for them. A few units referred to the Bowl as

"Peleliu Pocket." Aviators, to whom terrain appears much different than it does to ground troops,

called it the "Little Slot," as differentiated from

the "Big Slot," their name for the Horseshoe.

140

of jumbled coral formations which reached

almost to, and dominated, the West Road.

North of the Horseshoe the ridges were

piled closer to one another, and the defiles

were narrower: Wattie Ridge, Baldy, Baldy

Ridge, Ridge 120, the Three Knobs (see Map

14). Here was concentrated some of the

heaviest and utlimately most successful Marine action."

When Colonel Nakagawa chose to fight a

defense to the death in prepared positions

in the Umurbrogol, he automatically sacrificed anything resembling mass mobility for

his force." Thereafter the Japanese potential for jeopardizing island security on

any considerable scale ceased to exist. The

sole object became to make the conquest as

costly and time-consuming as possible: to

kill for the mere sake of killing, and to pin

down U. S. troops against their employment

elsewhere.

10 This would appear to be the area lumped together in Japanese reports under the inclusive

designation "Suifuyama", or "Suifuzan" (suffixes

yama and zan are interchangeable, both meaning

"mountain").

11 In a report. just prior to the period under discussion, Nakagawa estimated Japanese strength in

the Umurbrogol as "about 21/2 battalions put together," with "the main body of 2d Bn, 2d Infantry

and part of 2d Bn, 15th Infantry, not yet under our

control." Tada Record, 28Sept44.
;

THE HORSESHOE as it appeared during the later stages. Five Brothers (left), Walt Ridge (right), Hill 140 (center background).

To this end, the defenders followed the

general policy of obliging the Marines and

soldiers to come to them, often exercising

an extraordinary degree of fire discipline

to avoid giving away their positions. One

could stand at the Horseshoe's mouth in

broad daylight and study at leisure the precipitious slopes and sheer cliffs that wall

it in, almost physically aware of the weightless impact of scores of hostile eyes. Yet

there would be no sign of the enemy: no

movement, no shots; only a lonely silence.

Occasional small patrols operated there, and

in similar spots elsewhere, with impunity.

But let an important position be approached,

or a sufficient force be committed to furnish

a profitable target, and a fury of fire of all

varieties would be angled in from every

direction and every altitude the hills provided.

Nights were something else again. Infiltrating Japanese, as in all Pacific operations,

constituted a continuous nuisance and minor

menace. Mass mobility might be no longer

possible, but small-scale activity and limited

counterattacks were the rule throughout the

Pocket. Lurking in concealment by day,

with the coming of darkness the little men

swarmed out of their holes like so many

gophers, bent on raising hell. No doubt,

some of their actions were dictated by the

whims of individuals, but there was ample

141
evidence that many parties were acting under orders in carrying out predetermined

missions.

As always, the infiltrators' object was to

cause all possible damage and confusion in

the Americans' rear areas. They went about

this in two principal ways.

Individuals and small groups sought to

reoccupy positions previously taken, as was

noted previously in connection with earlier

phases of the operation. Owing to their

complete familiarity with the region, they

usually knew exactly where they wanted

to go, the best route for getting there, and

the nature of the particular installation

they wished to use. Moving under cover

of darkness, through weirdly jumbled terrain of the ridges, they often reached their

destinations despite all efforts to intercept

them. Once ensconced in their chosen hideouts, they would snipe at targets of opportunity until their inevitable destruction, often manging the business so shrewdly that

they remained undetected for days.12 Conversely, of course, the more cautiously they

operated, the less damage they managed to

do. It is an ironic commentary on the effectiveness of infiltration as a tactic that

most of their few victims were noncombatant souvenir hunters who were turning out

in such hordes as to constitute nearly as

great a nuisance as the Japanese infiltrators.

The presence of so many of these gentry

was largely the result of the inability of the

military police company to maintain an effective straggler line through having been

weakened by evacuation of one of its pla12 This writer had the experience of coming under fire from a cave in the nose of a ridge which

had been secured and thoroughly explored more than

a week previously. The incident occurred just at

dusk, at a range of approximately 300 yards, making it all but impossible to determine the exact

source of the shots. Although the sniper had betrayed his general location, most of the next day

was required to find and destroy him. Had he

chosen a nearer target or an hour of better visibility, he would have been located with little difficulty, but might have done more damage.

142

toons with the 1st Marines. While a few

1st Division Marines no doubt were guilty

of this practice, mostly it was confined to

aviation ground personnel, sailors ashore

from the transports, and miscellaneous service troops with nothing better to do." Disgusted front line Marines did not much

care whether these people got themselves

hurt or not. The trouble was that every

time one was wounded, good men had to

expose themselves to the same peril in order

to rescue him.

In justice, however, it should be recorded

that not all of the men who had no business

being forward were motivated solely by

souvenir hunger or morbid curiosity. As

the struggle dragged on and casualties

mounted, a feeling of unrest and insufficiency developed among troops in the rear

areas. Many such who could get away from

their assigned duties came forward with no

other object than to lend a hand to their

embattled comrades: bringing up supplies,

serving as stretcher bearers, helping man

the containing' lines. Writes the battalioncommander of 2/7: "I believe that . . . the

unknown officers and men from the Marine

air units who slipped away from the field

and plagued me daily to let them participate

'in any way' should be mentioned." 14

The second objective of Japanese infiltration was potentially more serious. Groups

laden with demolition charges repeatedly

attempted to penetrate the lines, evidently

with the intention of getting through to the

airfield and destroying planes and installations there; or, failing that, to blow up any

artillery, tanks or other vehicles encountered

along the way. Although they did some

trifling damage, none ever reached the air13"These souvenir hunters and the morbidly curious were mostly service troops and aviation personnel on their first operation and had apparently been

given a thorough 'snow job' in some rear area to

the effect that all Japs died with a jeweled sword in

hand. . . . An effective straggler line would have

saved many lives." Scantling.

14 Berger.
field.15 Most such parties were stopped

short of the lines, many being blown to

kingdom come by their own explosives.

While this kept U. S. nerves on edge, it was

certainly an easier method of destruction

than mining them out of the ridges and

canyons.

Reduction of the Pocket evoked a high degree of the proverbial Yankee ingenuity and

brought into play, at one time or another,

every weapon at the Marines' disposal, plus

a few improvised for the occasion. And

when the job devolved on the 81st Division,

the Wildcats not only improved on some of

their predecessors' techniques but dreamed

up a few new ones of their own. Many of

the lessons learned here would be found

useful in subsequent operations; but if Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa proved anything

at all, it was that there is no single over-all

tactical solution to Japanese cave fighting:

no easy way.

The story of the Umurbrogol comprises

the sum of the stories of the units which

operated there, and will be developed here

in connection with each of these in turn.

To understand the nature of the fighting,

it will be well to note at the outset that it

was conducted for the most part by small

units: "With the exception of a very few

cases, most of the objectives were taken by

platoons or squads of men, for as a whole

the fronts were small and the terrain too

irregular for company operation and maneuver." 16 Note, too, that by now the toll of

casualties had reduced the Marine units far

below T/O strength: the terms squad, platoon, company, battalion did not designate

the same number of men they had two weeks

earlier.

15 At least, none of which U. S. troops were ever

aware. However, by dint of what must be construed as wishful thinking, Colonel Nakagawa was

able to inform his superiors: "One part of our

unit infiltrated into the air base on the night of

the 5th and threw the enemy into confusion and

at the same time they set fire to the air base between 0030 and 0250 on the 6th." Tada Record,

60ct44.

16 Ltr Maj A. J. Doherty to CMC, 15Feb50.

HILL 200: Marines on top were unable to get at holed-up

Japanese in the precipitous slopes below. Airfield in

background.

OPERATIONS OF THE 7th MARINES

As recorded in Chapter IV, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, relieved those elements

of RCT 321 facing the northern perimeter

of the Pocket on 29 September, at which

time responsibility for operations throughout the Umurbrogol passed to 7th Marines

command.

This date found the depleted regiment deployed thinly to encircle the Pocket on three

sides, the dense swamp containing it on the

east as effectively as any number of troops

could have done. The western ridges were

lower and less well defined than those surrounding the Horseshoe and Wildcat Bowl.

In many places they could scarcely be called

true ridges, being rather coral high ground,

pitted, creased, broken into a score of crazy

cross-compartments, box canyons, sump

holes and low but sharp precipices. It was

recognized from the first as the most im143
practical terrain in the entire region over

which to attack, and the line established

here was pushed inland just far enough to

safeguard the West Road against enemy fire.

Thereafter until almost the end of Marine

participation action here was purely defensive, and the line remained largely static.

It may be noted in passing that this particular line was by no means so sharply defined as the maps might indicate. Some

sectors were manned in strength only at

night. At one time or another, for various

reasons, portions of it came down out of

the hills altogether and were positioned

along the West Road. Mapped locations

are intended to be only approximate, or indicative.

On 29 September the greater part of this

line was held by the 3d Battalion where it

had extended the front up the peninsula

behind the advance of the 321st. But, as

will be seen, within a few days this area

was turned over to detachments from various supporting arms in order to make all

possible assault infantry available for offensive operations.17

The mission of containing the Pocket to

the south had been assigned to the Regimental Weapons Company, which also acted in

support of the several offensive drives from

this direction. This unit took up a position

facing the mouth of the Horseshoe across

the swamp, its left extending in front of the

bases of Hill 300 and the Five Sisters, at a

respectful distance. This area was the

scene of the enemy's strongest and most

persistent infiltration attempts, both because

its terrain was adapted to such tactics and

because it provided the most direct route

17 Characteristic of the Corps tradition which

considers every Marine basically an infantryman,

secondarily a specialist, and trains him accordingly.

LVT personnel became increasingly available as

landing facilities were• developed, artillerymen as

constriction of the Pocket precluded massed fires,

pioneers on relief from shore party duties. Engineers subsequently assumed some of this duty, but

operated mostly with the combat teams to which

they were attached. Before the end, details were

drawn from every Marine ground unit on the island,

including Division Hq Bn and 16th Field Depot.

144

to the airfield, the infiltrators' main objective. To cope with this, personnel from

Regimental Headquarters and Service Company, detachments from other units, and

individual volunteers were brought up to

reinforce the line at night.18

The 2d Battalion was atop the ridge on

the Weapons Company's left, a northerly

extension of Hill 200, in which the Japanese were still holed up in some. strength

and expended much time and energy attempting to infiltrate. The line followed

this crest to a point where Colonel Berger's

command post faced the Five Sisters and

China Wall at a range of 25 to 40 yards

across the mouth of Death Valley. Beyond

here it angled off across the coral badlands

toward the West Road to tie in with the

right of the 3d Battalion. The 2d Battalion

had occupied this position since 21 September, playing what was intended as a relatively inactive role; yet some indication of

the peril prevailing in this area is conveyed

by the fact that in the nine days preceding

its relief, 2/7 sustained 149 battle casualties.19

The initial offensive plan of the 7th Marines for reduction of the Pocket called for

the 1st Battalion to drive southward along

the East Road and the ridges immediately

adjacent to it, with elements of the 3d Battalion cooperating on the right. To make

this last possible, it was necessary to stretch

the containing line still thinner (the battalion front covered 1150 yards at this time)

and for a short period to divide 3/7 into

two separate task forces: one to defend,

facing east; the other to attack southward.

18 Major Joseph E. Buckley, CO of the Weapons

Company, had his own method for obtaining "volunteers." As previously noted, souvenir hunters

had become a wholesale nuisance. Any men found

in Buckley's area without good reason for being

there were promptly seized, handed weapons and

placed in the line, where they were held by force

if necessary. If they behaved themselves, he notified

their unit commanders of their whereabouts and

employment; otherwise he did not bother, and they

were carried as AWOL for as long as Buckley chose

to hold them.

19 33 killed, 116 wounded. Berger.
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UMURBROGOL POCKET

30 SEPT-1OCT

40••••= Initial Advance,7th Marines

7th Marines Line, I Oct

-rTTT Containing Lines

MAP 15
In the 1st Battalion Zone, Company B

jumped off on schedule at 0800 on the morning of 30 September, and by 1025 had accomplished its mission: seizure of a high

ridge west of the road. Here it was in position to support an attack down the road by

Company A, which was to leapfrog at this

point in order to secure the next ridge to

the south.

However, heavy rain and low-lying fog

made visibility so poor that the second phase

of the attack was delayed until 1245. The

intervening time was utilized by an engineer demolition team in sealing all caves in

the overrun territory. As soon as visibility

permitted, a mortar barrage was laid on the

second objective, and Company A, supported

by a tank and an LVT flame-thrower, attacked down the East Road to such good

effect that an advance of 300 yards to the

south and 150 yards inland was achieved.

Company C moved in to help hold the captured territory, and a platoon of engineers

was sent forward to aid in preparing it for

defense.

A side light on this action offers ground

for interesting conjecture regarding the

enemy's plans and motives.

During this advance [of Company A] enemy

troops were observed running down the southernmost valley . . . in small units of four to eight men.

. . . Subsequent knowledge of the general situation

as of D+15 indicates that our forces had reached

the northern outposts of the enemy final defensive

area. The attempted movement of enemy troops

north during A-1-7's attack was probably from

a central reserve, portions of which were committed

to counter our encroachment anywhere on their

perimeter.20

The attack group of the 3d Battalion had

been extending eastward throughout the

morning in order to narrow the front of the

1st Battalion for the latter's attack. But

the same atrocious weather conditions which

delayed 1/7 had the effect of causing the

two units to lose physical contact. Company L sent one patrol groping through the

rainy fog in an effort to tie in once more.

Another, moving forward farther to the

20 Ltr Maj D. P. Wyckoff to CMC, 13Mar50.

west, came face to face with a formidable

obstacle, christened descriptively "Baldy

Hill": a rocky_ eminence rising like a high

wart on the northern nose of a long, narrow

ridge. As they explored possible approaches

for an attack, members of the patrol sighted

a number of Japanese on the hill and shortly

thereafter were brought under heavy mortar fire. With failing visibility and the lateness of the hour dictating an end to the

day's operations, both patrols were withdrawn for the night.

There was no notable advance the following day (1 October). The 3d Battalion

group, with Company L in assault, moved

out bright and early (0720) with the aim

of rectifying the lines prior to an attack

on Baldy. But the forward movement had

progressed no more than 75 yards before

the men came under such a heavy volume of

rifle and machine gun fire from that formidable hill as to indicate the inadvisability of

frontal assault. A supporting 155mm barrage had to be called off because of fragmentation falling in the lines.

Nor did it prove possible to establish

physical contact between the battalions. As

one observer noted: "The terrain in the gap

was very rocky with numerous sheer cliffs

and difficult draws." 21 Visual contact was

reported at 1034, and that had to suffice.

On its own part, the 1st Battalion was in

no shape to be of much help. A check-up

showed only 90 riflemen remaining fit for

duty.22 These held a front extending into

the swamp on the left, across the road and

approximately 150 yards inland over the

southern nose of the unnamed ridge immediately north of Boyd Ridge and separated

from it by a deep draw. Clearly incapable

of further offensive action, the battalion

was overdue for relief, and steps were taken

• to effect this the next day.

The fact is that the entire 7th Regiment

was in deplorable condition, with casualties

21 1/7 HistRpt.

22 ,,At this time diarrhea was prevalent; many

men could barely walk as a result of this malady."

Gormley.

145
approaching the ruinous percentage which

had necessitated evacuating the 1st Marines

from the island. Even Major Hurst's 3d

Battalion, which had suffered least to date,

reported combat efficiency below 50 percent

for the first time during the campaign.

Lieutenant Colonel Berger reported his 2d

Battalion's combat efficiency at 30 percent,

adding gloomily, "The men are very

tired." 23 Yet these weary, battered remainders gathered themselves for one last

all-out effort which provided the 7th Marines' greatest contribution to the pinching

out of the Umurbrogol Pocket.

In order to make "fresh"—if you could

call them that—assault troops available,

some extensive regrouping was necessary.

Detachments of artillerymen—"Infantillery", they liked to call themselves—took

over those sectors of the containing lines

held by 3/7. This latter unit was reinforced

for the occasion by a platoon of the Weapons

Company, Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion, and 52 men of the 1st Amphibian

Tractor Battalion, and relieved 1/7 on the

latter's newly acquired front. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, now available after

completing the mop-up of Ngesebus three

days before, was attached operationally to

the 7th Marines and relieved 2/7, which

moved to a bivouac area south of the Weapons Company sector for a night's rest preparatory to the coming attack.

The plan for 3 October called for a series

of coordinated efforts aimed at one main

objective: seizure of the remaining enemycontrolled stretch of the East Road and the

ridges which dominated it, in order to gain

staging points from which flank attacks

could be launched against the strongholds

which had checked the drives from the north

and south.

23"By juggling men from Headquarters Company

and from E Company, some balance had been

achieved and rifle company strengths read as follows: E Company 67, F Company 60, G Company

82. . . . These figures . . . (were) much lower than

Regiment had reported to Division . . . and I am

afraid the result did not exactly endear me to

Regiment." Berger.

146

Furthermore, the fighting on the northern

perimeter had given the East Road a new

importance. So long as the enemy controlled this lower stretch, all supplies

brought into that sector and all wounded

evacuated from it had to travel north on

the West Road as far as Road Junction 15,

then turn southward along the upper portion of the East Road where it angled across

the peninsula: a trip of several miles to

cover a distance which could be measured

in hundreds of yards.

The main effort called for a converging

attack to seize the remaining ridges which

dominated the road. The 2d Battalion

would attack from the south with Walt

Ridge as its objective, the 3d Battalion from

the north to capture Boyd Ridge.24 Once

the crest lines had been occupied and the

units had made contact, they would face

westward along the newly established front

against the heart of the pocket. To avoid

the danger of colliding head-on since the

two forces would be moving straight toward each other, the attacks were to be successive rather than simultaneous: 3/7

would not jump off until 2/7 had achieved

maximum penetration and could mark its

flank with smoke.

In coordination with these movements,

3/5 was to attack the Five Sisters and extend eastward in order to strengthen the

line on the south, and the Weapons Company, in conjunction with Army tanks,

would support the attacks by moving both

into the Horseshoe and up the East Road.

To make this unit available for these missions, its static defensive line was taken

over by the weary 1st Battalion.

The attack from the south jumped off at

0703 in the wake of an intensive barrage

by 155's and the concentrated 81mm mortars of five battalions, the latter throwing

24 It should be remembered that these particular

place names had not been applied at this time.

In the 2/7 Journal (but nowhere else) "Walt" is

referred to as "Hill X", and definitely located by

listing of the target squares in which it lay. "Boyd"

is unnamed in any reports of this particular action and designated only by its target squares.
SEVENTH MARINES HALF-TRACKS advancing toward Horseshoe. Japanese in Hill 300 (right background) were not ousted

until 2 November.

smoke during the closing stages in order to

screen the advance. From his position so

long held atop the flanking ridge, the commanding officer of 2/7 had been a distressed

witness to the bloody repulses suffered by

2/1 and 1/7 before this same objective. Now

that his own battalion's turn had come, he

had made his preparations with great care,

using both air and ground reconnaissance.

The approach route selected followed the trail

through the swamp 25 over which Captain

Pope had withdrawn nearly two weeks before. Resistance was light, and so rapid was

progress that the leading platoon of Company G, in assault, reached the top of Walt

25 Berger.

Ridge at 0730, the rearward elements following closely. Up to this point the battalion had suffered no casualties,26 but all

hands knew from bitter experience that

this happy condition would not obtain for

long. Sure enough, as the company carried out its mission by expanding its gains,

the men came under a savage cross fire

from the Five Brothers, facing them across

the Horseshoe, and from the heights to the

northward. And the regimental command

26 The bodies of many dead Marines were found

scattered about the ridgetop, however, sad reminders

of Captain Pope's gallant stand there throughout

the night of D-plus 4 (see Chapter IV)—Oral statement of Capt. F. T. Farrell, 20Apr49.

141
post began to receive increasingly urgent

calls to send up stretchers.27

Tanks and halftracks from the Weapons

Company moved into the Horseshoe to cope

with enemy installations which were harassing the sweep of Company G along the axis

of the ridge's military crest. Also, mortar

fire was called down on the fourth of the

Five Brothers which was proving especially objectionable.

In the meanwhile, elements of Company

G, on top of the ridge, were obliged to face

in two directions: west, to cope with the

flanking fire pouring in from that direction,

while the drive endeavored to move northward along the crest. Company E was ordered up with the mission of passing through

Company G's right and continuing the attack to the north. At 0900, however, progress was halted by "a slight saddle at this

point which was covered by a murderous

cross fire [from the Five Brothers]. Two

out of every four men attempting to get

across were hit." 29 It was necessary to

wait until ropes and ladders could be

brought up, and until the engineers could

blast a covered approach along the east

face of the ridge at the top of a 90-foot

vertical cliff.

While Company E waited for ropes and

the tanks for ammunition, Company F

moved up the road to assault the ridge still

farther along. The leading elements had

progressed part way up the slope when

they were ordered to halt, then to withdraw in order to be available for a subsequent mission. With no way of telling

when the advance could be resumed, 2d

Battalion elements along the ridge crest

were directed to consolidate their positions

and mark the northernmost flank with purple smoke as a signal for the 3d Battalion

to begin its attack southward.

The 3d Battalion sighted Company G's

smoke and jumped off at 1020. All went

well until the advance elements reached the

draw separating the unnamed ridge which

27 2/7 Journal.

28 2/7 WD.

148

they occupied from the objective ridge

(Boyd). The foremost squad of Company

K 29 got past this, perhaps because the

enemy were not yet aware of attackers'

intention. But the remainder of the platoon was promptly pinned down by fire

funneled through the draw from the high

ground farther inland,, thereby holding up

the rest of the company. Tanks which had

been supporting the stalled attack of the

2d Battalion 39 moved forward to help

beat down the volume of fire. In this they

were not wholly successful, and a new means

was sought for placing Company K on its

objective.

Company K got the remainder of its personnel to the summit 81 of Boyd Ridge by

the expedient, of detouring the draw through

the swamp which lay just east of the road.

This provided excellent concealment and

some defilade, but the dense growth and wet

underfooting made for slow progress. It

was not until nearly 1530 that the mission

was accomplished. However, so practical

had this resort proved that steps were taken

29 This squad consisted of nine men commanded

by Lieutenant Charles R. Hickox, Jr., one of the

company's platoon leaders. The presence of this

small force on the north face of the objective

proved far more valuable than an otherwise discouraging situation would indicate. Lt. Hickox was

in continuous radio contact with the battalion commander and was able to place his men in position —

to be of great assistance to the subsequent attack.

Hurst.

30 Two tanks and an LVT flame-thrower had been

detailed to support 3/7 that morning, and had to

travel up and down three-quarters of the peninsula

to reach the battalion. This subsequent reinforcement from the south stands out as the first successful attempt to use the direct line of communication

along the East Road. 3/7 WD.

31 The terms "summit" and "top" as they appear

in the reports are apt to be deceptive. Boyd Ridge

is a narrow razorback, its topographical crest bare

and untenable by troops. The rifle units of Company K carried it in one rush, without artillery

preparation but covered by machine-gun fire. With

seizure of the objective, the company was deployed

across the eastern slope with leading elements on

the military crest where they remained "for two

days and two nights, swapping hand grenades with

the Japs on the western slope." Hurst.
at once to pass Company I over the same

route, and around the next draw in an effort to tie in with the 2d Battalion to the

south.

During this time 2/7 had continued its

efforts to expand its hold on Walt Ridge.

At 1550, Company E finally got over the

covered trail blasted by the engineers. Now

Company F, previously withdrawn, was

committed to close the gap between the two

battalions by making contact with Company I. Patrols of these two units, moving

toward each other, met in the swamp facing the draw between the two ridges shortly

after 1600.

This patrol contact, of course, was merely

preliminary to closing a solid front. In

order to achieve this final step, Company F

pushed its left up the slope , of Walt Ridge

to tie in with the right of Company E,

which move was reported accomplished at

1750.32 Simultaneously Company F extended its own right northward while tanks attempted to neutralize the draw with covering fire. Company I acted in a similar manner in the 3d Battalion zone, and was reported tied-in with F at 1730.33 However,

subsequently it proved necessary to break

this physical contact in order to remain

tied-in with Company K on Boyd Ridge,

and Company I refused its left flank, maintaining only visual contact with F.34

In the meanwhile, the weary men of Company G had been relieved on top of Walt

Ridge by Company B and passed into battalion reserve. Thus, the regimental position as defined that evening shows Companies B, E, and F in line (left to right)

along the crest of Walt Ridge, with the latter

echeloned down the slope where it tied-in, to

all practical purposes, with the 3d Battalion

left. On its part, the 3d Battalion had Com32 2/7 Journal.

33 3/7 Journal.

34 3 / 7 WD. Company F also refused a flank to

the edge of the swamp. Since the draw was not

much more than 50 yards wide, actual physical contact was not considered essential. Hurst.

panies I and K in line (1 to r) , curving

back from where the former, facing generally south, had visual contact with Company

F, up Boyd Ridge where K faced west along

the ridge's military crest. Company L, uncommitted that day, remained in 3/7 reserve.

Colonel Nakagawa evidently got out his

rose-colored glasses to view this particular

action. According to the version received at

Koror: "At 0730, 110 tanks 33 and about

two infantry battalions began to attack the

central hills from north and south. Our

garrison units repelled them and withdrew.

. . . In this district about 100 enemy troops

infiltrated our front line secretly but were

exterminated during the evening." 36 An

interesting sidelight on these unequivocal

statements occurs in an entry dated eight

days later: "Higashiyama [Walt Ridge]

is still in enemy hands."

While these events were taking place on

the eastern perimeter, the 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines, attacked the Pocket strongly from

the south. This thrust was mainly supporting in nature, designed to distract the

enemy's attention from the operations of

the 7th Marines, deter any attempts to reinforce the eastern perimeter, and if possible gain positions from which the main

attack could be supported by direct fire.

The battalion's objective was the Five Sisters, that gaunt palisade which had checked

all northward advance since the 1st Marines

had come up against it two weeks earlier.

The approach was exceedingly difficult,

paralleling the ridge on the left in which

33 The Japanese were capable of some amusing

deviations from the hard facts of life, but this extraordinary figure would appear the result of inaccurate translation.

36 Tada Record, 30ct44. This report concludes

with an interesting example of Japanese intelligence work: "Judging from the enemy's organization, equipment, tactics and action, units . . . were

believed to be Marines with one part of the Australian Army. Their strength was estimated at about

five infantry battalions."

149
many Japanese were still holed up.37 With

Company L mopping-up behind it, Company

K pushed forward and reached the base of

the objective about noon. Here Company L

moved up abreast, passing over the mopping-up job to Company I, and the two companies in assault ascended Sisters Number

1, 3, 4 and 5 (numbering from west to

east). On the extreme left, one platoon of

Company K, supported by a tank, moved

into the ravine known as Death Valley, in

an effort to get at Sister Number 2, which

lay slightly to the north of the others.

A combination of difficult terrain and

enemy resistance prevented the latter unit

from making any important penetration,

but the main assault carried to the jagged

summits. No doubt, this success could be

attributed in part to the steady attrition of

the past two weeks which had knocked out

supporting positions and installations in the

Sisters themselves one by one. However,

later in the afternoon the men of 3/5 began to come under an increasing volume of

effective small arms fire from positions

which they were unable to locate. Actually,

this could have, and probably did, come from

every direction save their immediate rear.

The narrow crest was wholly devoid of cover

save for occasional accidents of terrain, and

the adamant coral, as everywhere inland of

the beaches, defied efforts to dig in. Discreetly the battalion withdrew and set up a

defense line for the night only a hundred

yards or so in advance of the line from

which it had jumped off that morning."

While many enemy installations had

doubtless been liquidated, the Japanese in

37 This ridge was the northerly extension of Hill

200, on top of which 2/7 had been posted for so

long without being able effectively to get at the

Japanese below. Flanking fire from these positions

had played an important part in the repulSe of all

previous attacks moving in this direction. The

thorough job of cave sealing performed by 3/5 on

this day nullified fire from this particular ridge

as a major tactical factor henceforth. Berger.

38"The enemy unit that attacked Kansokuyama,

our main post in the southeast central hills, was its

best picked company. However, more than half

of them were killed." Tada Record, 30ct44.

150

the area were still capable of reacting with

such determination that the bodies of 21

would-be infiltrators were found, mostly

within the forward lines, at dawn next day.

The Weapons Company, 7th Marines, having accomplished its support mission, withdrew from the Horseshoe according to plan.

Thus, night of 3 October found the containing lines in just about the same position they had been that morning, save for

the significant gains accomplished by the

7th Marines atop Boyd and Walt Ridges

along the eastern perimeter.

On this same day (3 October) the division was saddened by the death of Colonel

Joseph F. Hankins, one of its best liked

officers and the highest ranking casualty

sustained on Peleliu: an event especially

tragic in that some surviving accounts made

it appear unnecessary.

Hankins, a battalion commander in the

1st Marines at Cape Gloucester, had been

appointed provost marshal and commander '

of the big, unwieldy Division Headquarters

Battalion upon his promotion to full colonel.

In the former capacity he was responsible,

among many other things, for the security

of the West Road. During the day or two

preceding, this vital artery had been brought

under particularly troublesome fire from a

Japanese sniper, or snipers, posted in the

high ground dominating a stretch of evil

repute known as "Dead Man's Curve." The

Military Police Company, in its attenuated

form, was unable to cope with the situation; so, at about 1600 on the afternoon in

question, Colonel Hankins, a member of several famous Marine Corps rifle teams, armed

himself with an M-1 and a pair of binoculars and announced that he was going to

do a little countersniping."

Whatever the colonel's plans on setting

out, the situation discovered on the scene

quickly changed them. The following account by an officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion represents the correlated versions of several eyewitnesses:

39 0. P. Smith PerNar. "The Old Breed", 337.
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SEIZURE OF EASTERN RIDGES

Direction Enemy Fire Concentrations

11111111 7th Marines Lines, Evening 3 October

<===iii Infantry Assaults

Armored Sorties (Tank a Half tracks)

MAP 16
Colonel Hankins appeared at the curve in the

road where the Military Police were regulating the

one-way traffic. An LVT had become immobilized

across the road directly in the open and two or three

trucks were jammed up in the near proximity of

this LVT. The men, under the heavy fire of small

arms from the nearby cliff had deserted their vehicles and taken refuge on the reverse slope of the

road. Colonel Hankins proceeded to the middle of

the road in order to restore traffic to normal condition and had actually gotten the crews back on

the vehicles when he was struck by a sniper's

bullet and killed instantly.40

To avenge Colonel Hankins and eliminate

the danger once and for all, the commanding

general ordered up a company from 2/5,

then in division reserve. After a study of

the situation the battalion commander sent

Company E into the general area of the

high ground dominating Dead Man's Curve.

Though it could not be known at the time,

this grotesque jumble of broken coral formations constituted one of the approaches

to Colonel Nakagawa's command post and

in consequence was held in some strength.

In the fighting that ensued, the company

pushed about 75 yards inland to secure the

military crest, and 150 to 200 yards northward to occupy all of the area from which

it had been determined that the fire on the

road had originated. Holding detachments

from the 11th Marines followed the assault

troops to organize the new positions, and

Company E was relieved upon completion

of its mission.41 From then onward the

West Road was free of sniper fire during

the remaining time the 1st Marine Division

operated on Peleliu.42

The day following Colonel Hankins' death

(4 October) , saw the last offensive efforts of

the 7th Marines, as a regiment. For the

3d Battalion, it brought unmitigated tragedy.

The two tactically important ridges which

bounded the Pocket on the east were now

securely in the Marines' grip, and the day

was spent in expanding and consolidating

the positions there. However, the East

40 DeBell.

41 5th Mar WD, 40ct44.

42 0. P. Smith op.cit.

Road remained a perilous passageway so

long as the Japanese continued able to interdict it with fire funnelled through three

major gaps: The Horseshoe, the draw separating Walt and Boyd Ridges, and the narrower draw between Boyd and the unnamed

ridge to the north of it.43 Clean-up of the

two latter was the chore which fell to the

3d battalion, and a bloody business it turned

out to be.

Company I undertook mop-up of the

southern draw, that between Walt and Boyd

Ridges, with collaboration of Company F,

on the right of the 2d Battalion. Here tanks

could be employed with some effect, but the

job proved tedious, nerve-racking and costly. However, it was done to such effect that

the two battalions were able to tie in

physically that night, though some fire continued to be received from the high ground

inland.44 Two officers were killed in the

process, and Company. I emerged from the

action with only one officer and 31 men fit

for duty.45

Although what befell Company L rates

only as a small unit action, it will be related

here in some detail as exemplifying a number of characteristic aspects of the fighting

in the Umurbrogol.

As the accompanying sketch shows, the

high ground from which the Japanese could

fire most directly down the northern draw

included three semi-isolated hills or knobs.

These were steep and rugged, varying in

height from 60 to 90 feet, and rose just

43 By now the lower East Road was being used

successfully for supply and evacuation. Fire coming through the draw was partially thwarted by

interposing moving tanks as shields for the traffic:

supply and ammunition vehicles coming up, and

stretcher parties evacuating the wounded.

44 Later, after the 81st Infantry Division had

taken over the final mopping-up of the Pocket, engineers bulldozed a tank route through this draw to

provide ingress to .the Horseshoe from the north.

This proved of great value, as the Japanese were

discovered subsequently to have both a 75mm field

piece and a 47mm antitank gun bearing on the

mouth of the valley from excellent concealed positions in caves.

45 7th Mar R-2 Journal.

151
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MAP 17

200 Yds

ACTION OF COMPANY I; 7th MARINES, on 4 October 1944.

north and northeast of Ridge 120, a steepsided razorback running parallel to Boyd

Ridge from which it was separated by a

gorgelike valley. On the west of Ridge 120

and dominating it lay the height known as

Baldy, which had frustrated attacks from

the north for the past several days. So

closely packed-in were all tactical features

of the Peleliu landscape that the nearest

knob was a scant hundred yards from the

road, while the ridge was less than 150

yards in.

It should be borne in mind, too, that, while

Company K was firmly ensconced on Boyd

Ridge and had mopped-up its eastern slope

in order to control the road, no effort had

152

been made by infantry to enter the valley

beyond, though tanks operating in the vicinity of the knobs had pounded Japanese installations in the ridge's western face which

Marines on the summit were unable to reach.

Company L was ordered into the draw

at 1430 with the mission of seizing the

three knobs. This was accomplished by

1515 without loss and in the face of resistance so light as to astonish all hands. There,

according to the original plan, the day's

work would have ended. But Major Hunter

Hurst had reason to feel that he had gained

a great advantage. Just ahead lay Ridge

120, an ideal jumping off place for an attack against the flank and rear of that
troublesome Baldy.46 Moving in Company

C, 1st Engineer Battalion, to hold the captured knobs, he ordered the attack continued.

Again resistance was surprisingly light.

By 1605 an entire platoon had mounted the

northern nose of Ridge 120. Here several

enemy positions were destroyed, and the

men began a slow, systematic movement

south along the ridge's axis, parallel to the

front of Company K, facing them less than

a hundred yards away across the narrow

gorge.

At 1645 47 the platoon on the ridge began

receiving fire from Baldy. There were several casualties, and the men moved quickly

into defilade on the eastern military crest.

This brought them into a clear line of fire

of the enemy still holed up, with automatic

weapons, in the lower slopes of Boyd Ridge,

who proceeded to cut loose with everything

they had.

Only then did the whole brutal truth become evident. Maintaining their excellent

fire discipline, the Japanese had refrained

from showing their hand until the maximum

of U. S. troops had been irrevocably committed. Now, for the men caught in this

savage cross fire, that coverless ridge crest

became a death trap.

And there were other Japanese emplaced

in the lower slopes of Ridge 120 and the

captured knobs, covering the only possible

line of retreat: down the cliffs and out

through the draw.

What followed had the aspects of a protracted nightmare." The enemy were now

using everything that the constricted space

permitted, and from every angle: small

46 As will be seen, this was essentially the tactic

used subsequently for the successful capture of

Baldy and the ridge leading south from it, of which

Ridge 120 was actually a spur.

47 This is the hour recorded by 3/7 War Diary,

15.

48 many details of this action, subsequently verified, derive from an account by T/Sgt. Jeremiah A.

O'Leary, a Marine Corps Combat Correspondent,

written shortly after the event and published in

True Magazine, October, 1945.

arms, automatic weapons, 20mm machine

cannon, mortars. The senior non-commissioned officer-- on the scene, Gunnery Sergeant Ralph Phillips, was one of the first

hit, shot dead by a machine gun burst. Two

others were killed in a matter of minutes,

and there were wounded all over the place.

The three Navy corpsmen who had accompanied the platoon performed prodigies in

caring for these, but two of them were

killed before it was over.

One of the worst features was that the

steepness of the slope made evacuation of

helpless men nearly impossible. The platoon leader, Second Lieutenant James E.

Dunn, was hit while lowering himself over

the cliffside in an effort to lead his men to

comparative safety and fell to his death on

the jagged coral of the ravine floor.

The men on the ridge fought desperately.

But so well concealed and so strong were

the Japanese positions that the Marines

were seldom able to see their enemies or to

inflict serious damage when they did. On

the floor of the draw Captain James V.

Shanley, commander of Company L, viewed

their predicament with increasing dismay.

He ordered a tank up the narrow defile. The

jumbled terrain checked it before it could

reach a position where its guns would bear

effectively, but at least it was far enough

forward to provide cover of a sort for the

command post and a rallying point behind

which the wounded could be carried, once

they could be got out. Then he called for

smoke, and the battalion commander ordered

Company K to blanket the area accordingly

to screen the evacuation.

Frustrated heretofore in their efforts to

furnish substantial aid to their comrades

on the opposite ridge, the men of Company

K responded energetically, hurling white

phosphorus grenades down into the gulch.

Fortunately, the wind was just right, and

eddying smoke commenced to blot out the

scene. Under its cover the few remaining

able-bodied men began the backbreaking,

heartbreaking job of getting the wounded

down the precipitous slopes and to the cover

of the tank. Although the Japanese were

153
now firing blindly most of the time, men

continued to be hit.

Nearly all of those still .alive had made it,

when Captain Shanley, peering out through

the thinning smoke, saw two wounded Marines staggering toward him, clinging to

each other for mutual support while bullets

kicked up spurts of powdered coral about

them. Some 30 yards away their strength

gave out, and both fell. Springing forward,

crouched low, the captain ran to them. He

carried the first man to safety in the lee

of the tank, and returned for the other. A

mortar shell burst immediately behind him,

and he went down mortally wounded." The

acting company executive officer, Second

Lieutenant 50 Harold J. Collis, charged into

the smoke to help him, only to fall at his

side, killed instantly by a Japanese antitank gun.

It was over by 1820. All of the wounded

who had survived to get as far as the tank

had been safely evacuated. But of the 48

Marines who attempted to seize Ridge 120,

only five emerged from the draw unscathed.

With Company L reduced to the strength

of a single platoon and Company I down to

31 men and one officer, the ad Battalion was

now about on a par with the other two as

regards combat efficiency.

In the other sectors 4 October was uneventful by comparison. The 3d Battalion,

5th Marines, repeated its moves of the previous day against the Five Sisters and Death

Valley, with almost identical results: some

notable advances made which it proved impracticable to hold. The 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines, attempted to move men and tanks

up the East Road across the mouth of the

Horseshoe, only to have two tanks knocked

out and the men pinned down by a rejuvenated volume of enemy fire pouring from

49 Captain Shanley had been awarded the Navy

Cross during the Cape Gloucester operation. For

his action on this day he received, posthumously,

a gold star in lieu of a second Navy Cross. He

died that evening.

59 Collis's promotion to First Lieutenant had been

received at regimental headquarters that morning,

but he never learned about it.

154

that dangerous defile; so devoted most of

the day to consolidating positions along the

crest of Walt's Ridge. Elements of the 3d

Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion reported as reinforcements to 1/7, and some

elements of that unit retired to a bivouac

area behind the lines.

The 7th Marines was now through as an

assault unit on the regimental level, and

its relief by the 5th Marines began the following day (5 October). The 1st Battalion and Regimental Weapons Company

went out first. The battered 3d Battalion

continued its efforts to mop-up the draws

to the north and south of the Boyd Ridge

position. During the afternoon it was

thought advisable to withdraw depleted

Company I, so Company F took over this

sector, extending the line of 2/7 from Walt

up onto Boyd Ridge, which was held through

the night.

The final relief was completed on 6 October, with both of these battalions departing to join the other elements of the 7th

Marines in bivouac in the Ngardololok area.

Aside from a few limited combat missions

(to be discussed hereinafter), they were

destined to remain in general reserve, saddled with no more onerous duties than static

beach defense.

The regiment had richly earned this rest.

FINAL DRIVE OF THE 5th MARINES

Bearing in mind that the 5th Marines

had been fighting almost continuously for

nearly a month under some of the worst

combat conditions encountered anywhere in

the Pacific, an apt foreword to any account

of the last major effort of the 1st Marine

Division on Peleliu is contained in a letter

from an officer who was present:

I don't think that there can be any true picture

of that final drive without some description of the

great weariness of the Marines who participated

in it. The Division had optimistically said that the

5th would be one of the first outfits to leave Peleliu,

yet after securing the northern end of the island

everyone knew that we would be committed again.

Now the 1st and 7th Regiments were for the most

part gone, but the 5th was back at it again. The

men and officers were superb during this last phase
"MEN AND OFFICERS were superb during this last phase but very, very tired."

but very, very tired. . . . I have never forgotten

Major Gayle's answer, when questioned as to how

the fighting men were doing, as it typified the character and ability of all those who remained of the

5th: "Every Marine fighting in those hills is an

expert. If he wasn't, he wouldn't be alive." 51

As related in the previous section of this

chapter, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, operationally attached to the 7th Marines,

had been engaged in the Umurbrogol since

2 October and had already made two assaults on the Five Sisters. This unit reverted to parent control on the morning of

6 October when the 5th Marines, as a regiment, completed relief of the 7th in the

drive to reduce the Pocket.

51 Peppard.

s921050_50____11

The tactical concept with which this regiment approached its new assignment is best

explained in the words of its commander,

Colonel Harris: "The 5th Marines, after

careful air and ground reconnaissance, reversed the direction of all prior attacks and

made the main drive down from the north.52

The methodical reduction of enemy positions

was possible in driving southward due to

-the compartmentation of the terrain. It

was this slow but steady eating away of the

Jap defenses that gave the real payoff. Too

52 It may be noted that both RCT 321 and the

7th Marines had attacked from the north. However,

in both cases the main efforts were concentrated

against the enemy's eastern perimeter with the

aim of gaining control of the East Road.

155
much credit cannot be given for the splendid

support furnished by our artillery, tanks,

engineer company, and LVT flame-throwers." 53

According to orders, the 1st Battalion

relieved 2/7 and the 2d Battalion took over

the positions held by 3/7. The commanding

officers of these two units had reconnoitered

the ground the previous afternoon. However, the regimental overlay for the first day

shows a situation somewhat different from

that existing on disastrous 4 October. Following the debacle of Company L, Major

Hurst had found it expedient to evacuate

the not readily tenable summits of the three

53 Harris comments on preliminary script.

captured knobs and further to shorten his

line by withdrawal of badly battered Company I. Thus, the front taken over by 1/5

included both Walt and Boyd Ridges, and

the already depleted battalion was spread

thinly over some 1200 yards.

On the north, 2/5 faced Baldy Hill and

its supporting network of ridges and knolls

from a respectful distance. On the south,

3/5 had been withdrawn to a bivouac area

following its second attack on the Five Sisters, preparatory to new offensive efforts

from this direction.

The containing line on the west remained

essentially unchanged, manned by supporting troops. In its northern sector Major

POCKET viewed from northeast. Boyd Ridge at jog in East Road (foreground). Paralleling it (right to left) are Ridge

120, Ridge Three and Hill 140. Immediately to right of 120 lies Baldy, with Wattie Ridge beyond it.

156
Harold T. A. Richmond, executive officer

of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded

a group made up mostly of detachments

from the 1st Pioneer Battalion. On his

right lay Lieutenant Colonel Richard A.

Evans' group of "Infantillery" : detachments from the corps artillery and 11th

Marines, stiffened by volunteers from miscellaneous units. Closing the cordon sanitaire at the south were men of the amphibian

tractor battalions. As these sectors were

destined to continue static for several days

longer, immediate interest focuses elsewhere.

The 2d Battalion immediately encountered

the same contact problem that had plagued

the 7th Marines when operating in the same

area the previous week. On the left, Company E, occupying the ridge paralleling the

East Road north of Boyd Ridge (now actually occupied by Lieutenant Colonel Boyd's

command), found itself separated by a

long, steep canyon from Company G on

the high ground to the westward, facing

Baldy. For the first few days Company F

in battalion reserve, was used to patrol this

gap, setting up a defensive line at night to

prevent infiltration. Otherwise the action

in this zone was wholly aggressive.

Company E attacked within half an hour

of arriving in position: at 0900 on 6 October. The direction of the push was westward, into the badlands where Captain

Shanley's company had met disaster two

days earlier. Two of the previously abandoned knobs were recaptured, but again

the troops came under heavy and accurate

fire from many of the same positions which

had frustrated their predecessors. Not only

was further advance impossible, but the

men risked having their heads blown off

if they so much as raised them above the

knobs' crests. But their rear was secure

for the moment, so there they stayed. Company E was destined to spend four days

making this area sanitary, while bulldozers

cut a track for tanks and flame-throwers toward hitherto inaccessible points still farther in, in preparation for the crucial drive

southward.

Meanwhile Company G staged a frontal

assault on Baldy. The line of advance lay

through the same terrain where 3/7 had

been turned back on 30 September and 1

October, and the attack was ordered only

under pressure and with considerable reluctance." However, even though lacking

strong fire suport, a unit of approximately

platoon strength reached the summit. This

could not be reinforced for the simple reason that the occupied position would accommodate no more; nor was it possible to bring

up there any weapon larger than a BAR.

Baldy was considered untenable, and with

the approach of night the assault platoon

withdrew to the original jumping-off place.55

The offensive effort of 7 October was delivered from the southeast by the 3d Battaloin, supported by tanks—or vice versa.

Following two and a half hours of intensive

artillery preparation, six army tanks advanced to the mouth of the Horseshoe at

0900 and commenced firing into all enemy

positions which could be located on either

flank: the lower slopes of Walt Ridge on

the right, and the Five Brothers on the left.

Those elements of the 1st Battalion in position atop the former moved over the crest

in order to bring their firepower to bear in

support. Several of the tanks were hit by

Japanese heavy weapons, but none was seriously damaged. Much encouraged, they

withdrew at 1045 to replenish their fuel and

ammunition, determined to return and give

the Horseshoe the full treatment.

54 Harris Interview. Officers from all infantry

units who have been consulted speak of the constant

pressure from above to speed up the action and get

the operation over with.

55 Authority for last statement is 5th Mar War

Diary. The battalion commander (interviewed 28

June 1949) states succinctly of this position: "It

didn't have any future." It was his contention that

lines drawn on a situation overlay are meaningless,

per se: that the only position worth risking men's

lives to hold is one capable of emplacing weapons

with which to support a further advance. Since

this one obviously was not, he preferred to withdraw and probe elsewhere in hopes of finding a better one.

151
The second attack jumped off at 1215

with a fire team of Marines protecting each

tank, supported by two LVT flame-throwers

and a platoon of the 1st Engineer Battalion

for demolitions work and mine removal.

Again heavy fire was received from the

dominating terrain. Company L, on the

left, attempted to drive into the declivity,

later known as Wildcat Bow1,56 which angles

westward a short distance within the mouth

of the Horseshoe through a narrow pass between the Brothers and the Sisters, bounded

on the west by the as yet untested buttressed ridge later christened the China

Wall. This combination was simply too

much, and the attackers were stopped before

being able to make any significant penetration.

Company I, attacking up the main valley,

did somewhat better, advancing as far as

the terrain permitted tanks to travel at this

time: about 200 yards. Men and machines

attacked numerous caves with every means

available and killed many Japanese. Altogether, this was the largest single dose of

destruction the Horseshoe defenders had

received to date. But, again, once the tanks

had run out of ammunition, the position

became untenable for the infantry.57 And

so naturally powerful were the enemy positions that it was another ten days before

U. S. troops and tanks attempted again to

operate in those confines; nearly the end

of October before the Horseshoe could be

called anything approximating secured.

56 This declivity could be classed as possibly the

worst death trap on the island. Not until more

than six weeks later, after the Sisters, the Brothers,

and the Horseshoe had all been secured, were 81st

Division units, which had relieved the Marines,

able to operate effectively within the Bowl. Colonel

Nakagawa's CP was located in a deep dual cave

in the China Wall near the northwestern end of

the gulch. (See Chapter VIII.)

57 This sortie was made for the sole purpose of

knocking out caves suspected of containing the

heavy weapons which were firing on the airfield and

southern perimeter lines. In this it was entirely

successful, as no further fire of this nature was

received. There was no intention of retaining a

foothold within the Horseshoe at this time. Harris

Interview.

158

The 2d Battalion spent this day (7 October) paving the way for events to come:

locating the enemy's strongest positions and

taking the preliminary steps toward destroying them. The success of Company

G's patrol the previous day indicated that

Baldy Hill served the Japanese mainly as

as observation post. The same did not apply, however, to the ridge extending southward from it. The crest and flanks of this

were still wooded, and Marines attempting

to advance anywhere within range invariably drew heavy fire from hidden positions

somewhere along its axis:

Much the same could be said of other

spurs of the ridge system. It was determined, therefore, to destroy this cover systematically in order to reveal the enemy

positions before launching an infantry attack. Once LVT flame-throwers could be

bulldozed within range, the vegetation could

be burned off with comparative ease. While

engineers labored toward this end, mortars

were set up wherever they could be brought

to bear. A single 60mm mortar on the ridge

north of Boyd, for instance, fired 3,000

rounds during this phase.

Patrols from Company E came down

from the knobs and operated with bazookas

against a number of caves which had been

located in that area: in the lower slopes of

the ridges and of the knobs themselves. In

the Company G sector, small patrols moved

to the front, probing for a soft spot to the

west which would provide access to the high

ground and make possible an attack on

Baldy Ridge from the rear. This was the

same basic objective, it will be recalled,

that had motivated Captain Shanley's illfated effort from the east three days earlier.

These activities continued for the next

two days, as a trail was worked farther

and farther up the gorge in order to bring

tank guns to bear on both Ridge 120 and

the western face of Boyd Ridge. There was

no hurry now. The tactical situation 58 called

58 The containing lines had rendered the Japanese so ineffectual outside of the Pocket that there

was pseudo-serious talk of simply setting up barbed
for thoroughness rather than haste, and

Colonel Harris resisted all pressure 59 to

speed things up at the cost of unnecessary

losses.

There was no activity in the other sectors so far as the infantry was concerned.

The 3d Battalion remained in reserve in its

bivouac area to the south, and along the

eastern ridges the 1st Battalion contented

itself with countersniper fire. Pressure

against the Pocket was maintained by artillery fire from both north and south, and on

8 October Marine Corsairs delivered two

air strikes against the Five Sisters, Five

Brothers, and the ridges beyond, using 1,000-

pound bombs and napalm.

Near the 2d Battalion command post, then

located hard by the West Road about on a

line with the Japanese northern perimeter,

heavy weapons were being positioned to

support this unit's impending attack. Fired

point-blank into the sheer cliff that barred

approach from this angle, the powerful

shells pulverized the coral until the face of

• what had been a precipice began to assume

the aspect of a steeply inclined ramp, greatly

simplifying the problem of gaining access

to the high ground."

Attacking on the morning of 9 October,

a platoon of Company G, commanded by

Second Lieutenant ,Robert T. Wattie, scaled

wire around the whole area, classifying it as a

prisoner of war enclosure and ceasing all further

assault operations.

"Sometimes, if a pressure is not exerted, a

battle may be allowed to deteriorate into a stalemate simply because of the peculiarities of mass

inertia. On the other hand, unreasonable goading

. . . may breed a resentment which . . . may result

in an effect just the opposite of the one desired.

. . . This sensitiveness on the part of the commander is the mark of a great commander as distinguished from one who is merely good. In this particular instance . . . I am certain that no pressure

was received by Corps from Commander Expeditionary Troops and Landing Force and that none was

upon the Division by the Corps Commander."

Wachtler.

60 Subsequently the engineers improved this and

constructed two additional ramps of a similar nature which gave ingress to LVT flame-throwers into

the western ridges. Harris Interview.

TANK-INFANTRY SORTIE attacks Japanese positions in

Five Brothers.

the

this new approach and succeeded in reaching the top of the narrow ridge which forms

the western spur of Baldy. This was a

position of tactical importance for two ma- ,

sons : (1) It commanded a clear field of

fire to the West Road and constituted a

potential danger so long as it remained in

enemy hands; (2) About midway of its

length it connected with Baldy Ridge, thereby providing direct access to that primary

objective. It was promptly named in honor

of the platoon leader who had captured it

and appears as "Wattie Ridge" on subsequent maps and reports.

• Lieutenant Wattie led his men southward

along the crest for about 100 yards, knocking out several Japanese positions. But at

this point the platoon came under heavy

fire from the ridge to the east and from a

large cave situated at the head of the deadend gulch that separated the two, and he

withdrew his men to more tenable ground

to the northward to give supporting weapons a chance to work over the enemy positions.

159
By this time the LVT flame-throwers had

been bulldozed within range and had ample

time to burn off the concealing vegetation

from the crest of Baldy Ridge and the jumble of razorbacks to the east of it. An attempt was made to subdue that troublesome

cave in the gulch by air attack, but it proved

so located as to make a bombing strike dangerous to friendly troops nearby. The direet

fires of the supporting artillery were then

concentrated on the area. A lucky shot, or

shots, precipitated a most satisfactory landslide, with such good results that wary

infantrymen approaching to finish the job

next morning found the cave entrance

scaled as effectively as they could have done

it with demolition charges applied by hand."

A battery of 105mm howitzers, an Army

M-10 mounting a 76mm, and a 37mm were

now available to support the 2d battalion's

attack. On the morning of 10 October (Dplus 25) the southward push jumped off in

earnest, with Companies G and E both in

assault.

In the former unit's zone Lieutenant

Wattie led his men back over the ground

they had relinquished the previous day, proceeded beyond, and commenced to move over

to Baldy Ridge. Here they ran head-on into

some Japanese who had different ideas. A

sharp skirmish ensued, with both sides using

small arms and hand grenades in considerable quantities. Then the Marines gathered

themselves together and carried the enemy

position with a rush. From this point they

swept northward along the crest against

only scattered opposition, burning out or

blasting every installation encountered. By

noon they had secured the entire ridge and

the formidable heights of Baldy itself from

the rear, in accordance with the original

plan.

61 Patrols operating in this gulch came across

the decomposing bodies of 12 U. S. soldiers, grisly

reminders of the 321st Infantry's grim efforts to

find a practicable route of attack across the peninsula in order to isolate the Umurbrogol Pocket,

more than two weeks before.

160

Seizure of this dominating terrain secured

Company E's right flank against the deadly

cross fire that had previously trapped Captain Shanley's company. This unit's own

operations of the past three days, plus the

advent of tanks and LVT flame-throwers in

the draw, had already secured its left. Thus,

Company E, launching its assault at 1215,

was able to secure the full length of Ridge

120 with comparative ease.

In conjunction, other elements of Company G secured Ridge 3, a semi-detached

razorback south and slightly to the east of

Baldy Ridge. When the 2d Battalion halted

to consoidate the new positions, the situation overlay showed the line pushed well

forward on the left over some of the most

difficult and stubbornly contested terrain in

the entire Umurbrogol Pocket. The two

companies were tied-in only by fire, however, owing to a steep gulch 'between them,

and one platoon of Company F was moved

forward and attached to Company G as a

special reserve to cope with this situation.

Next morning (11 October) the 2d Battalion resumed its drive on what had been

selected as its final objective: Hill 140, a

position of the utmost tactical importance,

situated just north of the Five Brothers,

from which it was separated by a sheer,

narrow declivity. A heavy weapon emplaced here would be capable of placing

direct fire not only into the nearest of the

Brothers and part of the Horseshoe, but

down the draw between Walt and Boyd

Ridges, dominating this and quite possibly

converting what had been a potent peril to

the East Road into a practical route of

entry into the very heart of the Pocket.

The battalion commander was convinced

that Hill 140 would provide a fine position

for at least one such weapon for the support

of future operations. Major George E.

Bowdoin, executive officer of the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, had been considering

the possibility of getting artillery pieces into

the hills to provide direct fire. He believed

that the 75mm pack howitzer would prove

wholly practicable for this purpose and al-
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DRIVE FROM THE NORTH

•••••• Positions 6-8 Oct

Attack 9 Oct

Attack 10 Oct

Attack 11 Oct

Positions 2/5 Night 11 Oct

MAP 18
ready had taken steps to see that several

such were made available.62

Company G continued southward along

Baldy Ridge, and progressed satisfactorily

until reaching the ravine which separated

the southern end of that elevation from Hill

140. Company E attacked on a parallel line

on the left, sweeping along the eastern slope

of Ridge 3 until stopped short of the objective by a heavy volume of small arms fire

from the front and right; i.e., the northern

face of Hill 140 and the slope of Baldy

Ridge. Elements of Company G moved

down from their vantage point on the high

ground to help eliminate fire from the latter

position, while forward elements of both

companies endeavored to neutralize the

enemy to the front with their own fire. At

this point Company F, the remainder of

which had been brought forward in close

reserve at the beginning of the attack,

passed through Company E, moved up the

ravine, and carried the objective positions

by assault from farther to the west."

Hill 140 was announced secure at 1500.

The remainder of the afternoon was spent

in consolidating the new position and mopping-up enemy caves which had been overrun in the advance or which lay within

reach in other directions. In the course of

this work an LVT flame-thrower which had

managed to work its way up the draw within

range detonated a 12-inch naval shell in one

of the occupied caves, with a resultant blast

that blew away a large bite of the hillside.

Fortunately, this unlooked-for event caused

only one Marine casualty. Altogether, so

thorough had been the preparation and so

62 The two pack howitzer battalions of the 11th

Marines had been evacuated several days before,

but fortunately the heavy seas raised by the neartyphoon had prevented loading of their guns aboard

ship.

63 Verbal statement of Lieutenant Colonel Gayle

interviewed June 1949. 5th Mar War Diary states

that Company G's attack carried to the objective

and "secured Hill 140". No hour is given, but

farther on the same account states: "By 1500 F

Co had secured Hill 140."

well executed the attack, capture of one of

the most important single positions in the

whole Umurbrogol had cost the 2d Battalion only two killed and ten wounded.

Apparently the significance of this fighting was not immediately apparent to the

Japanese. On 10 October Nakagawa reported: "There were no large battles during the day and no changes in the front

lines." And again on the 11th: "All

through the day there were no heavy engagements," adding, "Areas which are secured by our garrison are Oyama, Suifuzan,

Kansokuyama, the main districts in the central hills," though conceding at last the loss

Higashiyama; 64 a definition of position

which squared quite accurately with that

shown on Marine situation overlays of the

period.

On the 12th, however, a note of concern

crept in. Evidently dealing with events of

the previous day and night, the colonel informed headquarters: "The enemy seems

to have made Suifuzan their main objective.

They attacked Suifuzan and the west hill

of Suifuzan [translation not entirely clear]

with flame-throwers. The enemy penetrated

our front lines but were repelled by night

attack." 65

The Japanese did indeed stage a counterattack on Hill 140 that night. But the position was admirably suited to defense, and

2/5, unaware that it was in the process of

being "repulsed," beat off the enemy without undue difficulty. None penetrated the

line, and their final dispersal marked the

64 Tada Record. Exact orientation of these Japanese place names is difficult, as the sketch map

showing them is completely out of scale with any

U. S. maps. "Oyama" is the area of Nakagawa's

CP and would appear to include both the China

Wall and Five Brothers, together with immediate

approaches from north and west. "Suifuzan" is an

inclusive term embracing all of the Umurbrogol

system north of Oyama, most of which was in

U. S. hands by this time. "Kansokuyama" is Hill

300, possibly including the Five Sisters. "Higashiyama" is Walt Ridge, perhaps Boyd Ridge as

well. See Map 14.

65 Ibid.

161
TACTICAL CONFERENCE. Strain of the protracted campaign stamped on their faces, three Marine commanders

study situation map. Left to right: General Geiger,

Colonel Harris, General Rupertus.

end of the 2d Battalion's active participation in the Peleliu campaign. At 0930 on

12 October, relief of the weary men was

begun by the only slightly less weary 3d

Battalion, and they came down out of the

hills for a well-earned rest.

There was little activity in the other sectors during the 2d Battalion's drive. The

1st Battalion's mission had been simply to

hold its line along the eastern ridge, countering random enemy fire and sealing up

such undestroyed caves as could be found

in its area. Colonel Boyd improved this

time by tightening the containing cordon on

the south: moving the line facing the Horseshoe's mouth from the far side of the swamp

to the lee of the causeway, tying in on the

right at the. base of Walt Ridge. On the

morning of 10 October 1/5 had been relieved by the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, and

moved into a bivouac area to the south. As

the latter unit had previously occupied the

same line, officers and men were entirely

familiar with the positions, and the relief

162

was completed without casualties or notable

incidents. Thus, 2/7 had been on the left

of 2/5 throughout the two final days of the

latter's attack, but had been no more active there than had its predecessors.66

Following its sortie into the Horseshoe

on 7 October, the 3d Battalion had been in

regimental reserve near the command post.

On 10 October Company K had been sent

up into the hills to eliminate some enemy

snipers who had become unexpectedly active

in caves located in an area far behind the

present front lines which the 1st Marines

had overrun and believed secured as early

as D-plus 3.

Whether these Japanese had lurked undiscovered in these supposedly cleaned out

caves all this time, or had infiltrated from

the Pocket to reoccupy them, was anybody's

guess. But they were there, firing down a

draw at troops passing along the main road

and generally making a nuisance of themselves. And so craftily did they play their

little game that the men of Company K

never did find them, though they received

some rifle fire and five mortar shells in the

process of trying. They blasted shut every

cave opening they could find and returned

the next day to finish the job. They were

successful in that somewhere along their

methodical course they put an end to the

sniping, but in all of their two days work

there they glimpsed not a single live Japanese.

Any resemblance between the uneventful

relief of the 1st Battalion and that of the

2d, two days later, was purely coincidental.

Instead of moving into a comparatively

quiet sector already familiar to the relieving unit, the 3d Battalion was taking over a

front which had been seized only the previous afternoon and with which even the

troops being relieved had had small chance

to become acquainted. And it was anything

but "quiet", comparatively or otherwise. Before the day's doings were over, 22 Marines

66 The depleted battalion suffered 31 additional

battle casualties during this period, however, and

its total strength was down to 277 on 14 October.
of the two battalions had become casualties.

The line 67 held by the 2d Battalion on the

morning of 12 October was in the form of a

deep salient, nowhere achieving any great

width. At the apex Company F, facing

southward, had no friendly troops on its

immediate left, where the side of Hill 140

fell away in a sheer cliff into the northern

end of the Horseshoe. Company E was

echeloned rearward along the eastern slopes

of Ridge 3 and Baldy Ridge, in visual contact with elements of 2/7 on Boyd Ridge

across the narrow canyon. On the right,

Company G was bent back almost as sharply

along the opposite slope of Baldy and over

onto Wattie Ridge.

According to the 3d Battalion plan, Company L relieved Company F on Hill 140.

Since the narrow canyon in Company E's

sector could he controlled by patrols operating from Boyd Ridge, there was no need to

continue this front in any force, so the

remaining two companies of 3/5 were placed

in position on the right preparatory to

straightening out the front by a push southward pivoting on Hill 140: Company K

tying in with Company L, and Company I

extending the flank westward across Wattle

Ridge.

There was trouble in all sectors. The commanding officer of Company K found the

troops he was to relieve so thoroughly pinned

down by enemy fire that the machine gunners were sighting along the under side of

their weapon's barrel. A stranger in some

of the strangest territory in the world, he

raised his head in an attempt to orient himself—and was killed instantly by a Japanese

bullet.

Over to the westward things were just

as bad. Late the previous day, in an effort

to rectify the line, a reserve platoon of Company F had pushed forward into the high

ground above the West Road. Heretofore

67 It should be understood that this was not a

"line" in any strict military sense; rather, a series

of positions, held in no great strength and often

in only visual contact with one another.

this region had been kept under control,

more or less, by concentrations of interdicting artillerk and mortar fire. With friendly

troops in actual occupancy, this fire had to

be called off. The Japanese, reacting

promptly, reoccupied the area in some force.

Exercising their excellent fire discipline,

they kept their presence hidden until a platoon of Company I moved in; then, taking

advantage of the inevitable confusion attendant on performing front line relief,

they cut loose with heavy rifle and machine

gun fire from positions enfilading both platoons.• This was a situation calling for discretion, and the troops were drawn back

under smoke grenade concealment to allow

new concentrations of mortar fire to work

over the area again.

This day, 12 October (D-plus 27), saw

two other significant developments.

First, was issuance of a new map which

at last undertook to show the terrain of the

Pocket as it actually was rather than as it

had appeared in preliminary aerial surveys

when overgrown with vegetation. This was

a hurried sketch job prepared by the Intelligence Section of the 5th Marines: inaccurate as regards relative elevations and

with contour lines deceptive. However, it

was reasonably • accurate on the horizontal

plane, and certainly a vast improvement

over anything existing heretofore. With its

advent, some uniformity in nomenclature began to appear in unit reports."

• The second event of importance was the

emplacing of artillery in the high ground.

68 As has been noted earlier, place names were

improvised hurriedly and without due consideration

as to whom should be so honored. Thus, when the

mapping party found LtCol R. W. Boyd occupying the elevation seized a week earlier by Maj

Hunter Hurst's 3d Bn., 7th Marines, it was tagged

on the map "Boyd Ridge". Similarly, when LtCol

L. W. Walt, executive officer, 5th Marines, was

discovered inspecting positions on the ridge immediately to the south, where Capt E. T. Pope had

won the Medal of Honor on D-plus 4, and which had

been secured on 3 October by LtCol S. S. Berger's

2/7, it became "Walt Ridge" henceforth. A number of people were most unhappy about this—and

still are.

163
PACK-HOWITZERS were hauled to high ground to fire point-blank across canyons.

It has been noted that the 2d Battalion

especially wanted Hill 140 for this purpose,

and even though this unit was in the process

of being relieved, no time was lost in carrying through the plan. Tackle was rigged

to swing a disassembled 7,5mm pack howitzer to the summit of Wattie Ridge, from

which point it was manhandled to the forward position, reassembled, and set up behind sandbags to fire into the Horseshoe

and the western base of Walt Ridge. A

second one was similarly installed in the

sector of the containing line held by the artillery-infantrymen, now commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Edson A. Lyman, 11th

Marines, who had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Evans, IIIAC Artillery, on

9 October.

This latter gun was destined to have a

brief but colorful career. Colonel Lyman

emplaced it on the western rim of Death

Valley to bear on the Five Sisters and China

Wall. The point directly across from it was

believed to be Colonel Nakagawa's observation post from the fact that what were apparently high ranking Japanese officers,

164

wearing white gloves, had been seen there

on occasion studying the terrain through

binoculars; a supposition which the violence of enemy reaction seemed to bear out.

The first rounds "routed out a covey of

Nips," and shortly thereafter the crew was

brought under heavy small arms fire at the

deadly range of about 75 yards. By the

time 40 rounds had been fired, one man was

hit and "it was deemed expedient to secure."

Two more were killed at daybreak by a

hornet's nest of hidden enemy, and the position was considered too perilous for further

artillery operations."

Exactly who should be credited with

carrying the first sandbag 70 into the Peleliu

69 Lyman.

79 Sandbags were ordered used by the 5th Marines in the attack on the northern end of Peleliu.

First use was made in emplacing the 155mm gun

in that area and subsequently on the 155mm and

105mm positions placed to angle fire into the mouth

of the Horseshoe. At the time of the events here

related, the positions atop Walt and Boyd Ridges

were fortified with both sandbags and armor plate

taken from' disabled LVT (A)'s. The latter, how-
ridges has never been clearly established, but

he started something which was to become

increasingly important as the grim campaign

of attrition rolled on its inexorable course.

The lack of cover and impossibility of digging-in had repeatedly obliged attacking

troops to relinquish hard-won gains as untenable. Obviously, the sandbag provided

an answer of a sort, and many were in use

at this time in more or less permanent positions, such as the gun emplacement on Hill

140 was intended to be.

But so long as the operation remained essentially one of movement, the problem of

sandbagging successive positions on any

large scale presented formidable difficulties.

Nowhere was there any sand inland of the

beaches, which meant that the heavy bags

had to be carried into position already filled,

no small undertaking in that crazily upended country. It remained for the 81st

Division, following relief of the Marines, to

develop a technique with such ingenious

refinements as to make the sandbag into

something closely resembling an offensive

weapon, in which capacity it played a crucial part in the final reduction of the Pocket.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, remained

inactive in its bivouac area throughout the

day of 12 October, but at 1900 one element

moved out in a novel attempt at counterinfiltration by placing Marines in concealed

positions on the Five Sisters. The force

was a small combat patrol from Company

C, led by First Lieutenant Roy 0. Larsen,

Assistant R-2, and its approach was covered

by a diversionary shelling within the Horseshoe. As the Regimental War Diary records: "The plan was to get on top of these

hills and dig in during the remainder of the

night." The men managed to climb to the

saddle between Sisters number 1 and 2,

where they encountered a group of about 35

Japanese who dropped a grenade in their

midst, scattering them so that "full control was never regained." The War Diary

ever, proved too heavy and too awkwardly shaped

to be adaptable on any wide scale. Harris Interview.

account adds, somewhat picturesquely:

"There were a great many more Japs in

these hills as they could be heard talking and

sliding around in the coral." Larsen discreetly withdrew.

Morning of 13 October found the 3d Battalion the only unit of the 5th Marines still

on the lines, and the only unit of any regiment with immediate orders for resuming

the offensive. Hereafter its main efforts

would be concentrated to the westward, with

the dual purpose of straightening out the

salient formed by Hill 140, and providing

greater security for the West Road by constricting the Pocket further from this direction.

It will be recalled that the terrain here

was considered impractical for attack by

either party, and by a sort of tacit mutual

consent had been a quiet sector ever since

the Pocket had been isolated. The containing lines against sporadic Japanese infiltration, fully manned only at night, followed

the most defensible contours, in some places

being withdrawn altogether from the high

ground during the day to the low ridge just

seaward of the West Road. Now 3/5 began

probing southward into the flank of the

ground in front of the containing lines.

Under cover of artillery and mortar barrages, a patrol from Company K pushed

forward 75 yards into the jumbled terrain

without encountering any resistance, destroying some Japanese rifles and ammunition discovered during the process. On its

right, a similar patrol from Company I

penetrated 150 yards, also without resistance, and preparations were made for a serious advance the following day.

At 0600 a napalm strike by aircraft

against the region into which it was proposed to attack ushered in the morning of

14 October. Two hours later Company I

jumped off in the wake of a heavy mortar

preparation. This time resistance was encountered, described in the Regimental War

Diary as "severe enemy sniper fire." The

methodical advance continued nevertheless,

and when the men halted at 1630 to prepare

165
positions for the night, they had made a

gain of approximately 250 yards.71

Simultaneous with this advance by Company I, what was left of the 1st Battalion,

7th Marines, which had been brought up

from a rest area for the purpose, attacked

northward from the southern perimeter in

a converging movement, gaining 125 yards

before being halted by enemy fire. A further advance of 150 yards during the next

two days completed the job.72 Since both

of these operations had been moving across

the front of the old containing lines, these

had only to displace forward in order to

consolidate the territory thus gained. When

this had been done, the new lines were as

much as 200 yards deeper into the high

ground and something like 400 yards shorter

from north to south than they had been nine

days earlier.73 The West Road was not subjected to sniper fire again during the time

the Marines remained in occupancy.

By now, even Japanese optimism was

wearing a bit thin. Describing an attack

71 The inadequacy of such maps as are available

of the Pocket area makes exact orientation of positions exceedingly difficult. Those indicated on

the accompanying maps are intended to be no more

than approximate. According to 3/5 Record of

Events, Company I's advance carried to Target

Square 140—T. This would appear to place it

abreast of the Five Brothers and 150-200 yards

west of the China Wall. Although the Regimental War Diary refers to an overlay, none concerning this movement can be found in the records. It

would be inconclusive in any event since the China

Wall, as such, is not definitely located on the map

it was designed to overlie.

72 The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was attached

operationally to the 5th Marines for this action.

The route of its first day's attack took it past the

western flank of the Five Sisters. On the second

day the battalion attempted to penetrate Death

Valley but was able to gain only about 50 yards.

The mission was completed on the third day by

advancing up the next draw to the westward. 1/7

Historical Report.

73 It was estimated that these several operations

reduced the area of the Pocket by 30% to 40%.

It now measured roughly 400 yards x 500 yards.

0. P. Smith, Personal Narrative. Here again distance is impossible to scale accurately owing to

map variations.

166

on "the western districts of Suifuzan yesterday," Nakagawa for once refrained from

making claims of victory: "A powerful unit

of our garrison force in a daring night attack attacked the enemy in this area. At

present a fierce combat and severe artillery

fire is taking place, with results unknown."

And on the next day: "A unit of the enemy

penetrated into Suituzan and western part

of Higashiyama.74 Our units holding the

southern part of Suifuzan together with

another strong raiding unit are repulsing

the enemy. . . . The enemy intercepted our

movements in the western part of Higashiyama with a mortar attack which lasted

all through the night. They also attacked

with flame-throwers attached to tanks." 75

And with that last somewhat puzzling statement ended Japanese cognizance of Marine

operations on Peleliu.

The other two companies of 3/5 confined

their 14 October activities to improving

their positions, sealing caves, patrolling.

Company L brought up additional sandbags

to Hill 140 and laid concertina wire around

the position beyond grenade range which

was instrumental in thwarting a Japanese

infiltration attempt later that very night.

And that was the last gasp of the Peleliu

campaign so far as these units were concerned. By 1100 the following morning

(15 October), their relief by elements of the

321st Infantry had been completed and they

were on their way to a rest in the northern

defense zone. The positions which they

turned over, and from which the Army regiment commenced its attritional operations

against the Pocket, are indicated (approximately) on Map 19.

As early as 27 September, the U. S. flag

had been raised at the 1st Marine Division

command post to symbolize that Peleliu

was secured—as indeed it was to all practical purposes, though it could not be so

74 These allusions to Higashiyama are not clear,

as the Japanese had conceded its loss several days

previously and made no claims to having retaken it.

75 Tada Record, 14, 150ct44.
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1

FINAL MARINE ACTION

Old Containing Line

Line Of Departure,3/5

Attacks 12-14 Oct

Advance Of Containing Line

Line Held On Relief 1st Mar Div(16 Oct )

MAP 19
termed officially. On 12 October,7° as 3/5

was beginning its final push, the "Assault

Phase" of the operation was declared at

an end.

This perhaps unfortunate phrase was

used at the time and occurs in the official

reports of IIIAC (p. 11), 1st Marines Division (II, p. 18), and 81st Infantry Division

(II, p. 47). It gave rise to some pungent

comment among the Marines still very much

in assault in the Umurbrogol ridges, and the

81st Division Wildcats, for whom six weeks

of hard fighting rerriained.

Actually the term had technical significance in that it signalized a transfer of command functions from the assault forces to

the Central Pacific administrative echelons:

Forward Area (Vice Admiral J. H. Hoover),

Western Carolines Sub Area (Rear Admiral

J. W. Reeves, Jr.), and Island Command

(Brigadier General H. D. Campbell) .77 Admiral Fort in his report used the term "Attack and Occupation Phase" 78 and explains

further:

I was directed by Admiral Halsey to turn over

command of the Palaus to Vice Admiral Hoover,

who was in command of the Forward Area, when

the Attack and Occupation Phase terminated. This

was when the islands had been occupied and when

Base Development had been initiated and could

proceed without enemy interference, and when the

Assault Troops could be relieved by the Garrison

Forces. This phase was completed on 13 October

1944, and I transferred command to CTF .57, Vice

Admiral Hoover, at 1200 on 14 October, 1944.79

So at long last a turning point had arrived, and it was possible to initiate steps

for evacuating the rest of the 1st Marine

Division to the doubtful charms of its "re78 Coincidentally, IIIAC command post was set

up on shore at 0800 on this date. IIIAC OpnRpt,

Enc B, 11.

77 Mission of the Island Command as defined in

Western Carolines Sub Area Order #2-44, 2Nov44:

"Maintenance of an air base for offensive and defensive use; defense of the Command." This group

assumed responsibility for unloading and construction on 28Sept, prisoners of war on 210ct, and air

defense on 10Dec. It did not assume responsibility

for ground defense until 13Jan45.

78 CTS 32 OpnRpt, 95.

79 Fort.

habilitation" base. But even Pavuvu would

look good now.

RELIEF AND DEPARTURE OF 1st MARINE

DIVISION

The operation which the commanding general had predicted would be over within

four days had now lasted a month—and was

still going on. It has been seen how the 1st

Marines had been evacuated after that regiment's over-all strength had been cut by

58 per cent in a week of what was possibly

the most savage fighting the campaign produced. Succeeding weeks had whittled away

the 7th and 5th Marines in turn until their

casualties began to approximate that ruinous figure. Furthermore, these two regiments had had a far more protracted dose

of war in Peleliu's debilitating heat, soggy

rains and backbreaking terrain, and their

assault potentials had been as seriously impaired. The troops stood in great need of

rest and rehabilitation, and now, at last,

their turn was coming.

The permanent relief of the 1st Marine

Division by the 81st Infantry Division began

on the morning of 15 October when the 2d

Battalion, 321st Infantry, took over the area

held by 3/5 across the northern end of the

Pocket: the Hill 140 salient and the line

extending westward from it. The following

day the infantry regiment's 1st Battalion

relieved 1/5 80 atop Walt and Boyd Ridges

and facing the mouth of the Horseshoe. At

about the same time elements of the 323d

Infantry, newly arrived from the successful

seizure of Ulithi, completed taking over the

southern and western containing lines, and

at 1245 on 16 October command of operations in the Umurbrogol passed officially to

the commanding officer, 321st Infantry.81

89 This battalion had relieved 2/7 in these positions on 14 October but had remained on the defensive during these two days.

81 To which the 1st Bn., 323d, was attached operationally at this stage. It should be noted, however, that over-all command of the attack remained

in the hands of the 1st Marine Division for another

four days, pending the arrival and establishment

of the 81st Division CP on 20 Oct.

161
BATTLE WEARY MARINES could be relieved at last.

This completed relief of the 5th Marines,

the 2d Battalion having moved out four

days earlier. But the regiment was destined

to spend two more weeks at Peleliu in the

capacity of general reserve, occupying positions designed to defend against possible

Japanse counterlanding : the 2d Battalion

on Ngesebus, Kongauru, and Garekayo ; 82

the 1st Battalion along the northern extremities of the long peninsula; and the 3d Bat-.

talion deployed along the East Road, facing

seaward. This defensive conception was a

bit euphemistic, as everyone was pretty well

convinced that the danger of counterlandings was long since past; 83 so, although they

82 A smaller island lying northeast of Ngesebus.

For its seizure on 9 October see Chap. VIII.

83 Further evidence of the futility of relying on

reason when fighting the Japanese was furnished

during the dark morning hours of 18Jan45, when

the enemy actually did stage a counterlanding on

168

went through a few perfunctory military

motions, the troops managed to rest.

The 7th Marines remained committed

longer but got away from the island more

quickly. Movement Order No. 4-44, dated

16 October, directed embarkation of the regiment for return to base in the Russells as

soon as this could be managed, and elements

commenced moving to Purple Beach to commence loading operations.

At the time that command passed to the

321st Infantry, 1/7 was still engaged in its

northward drive to make possible advancement of the containing lines from the west,

and its immediate relief was not thought exPeleliu. By that time most of the 81st Division,

in turn, had left the island. With the coming of

dawn those elements remaining combined with units

of the Island Command to hunt out the intruders

with no great difficulty, killing 71 and capturing

two. 81st Unit Hist, 200.
pedient. Upon completion of its mission

later that afternoon, however, the unit was

relieved in position by Company B, 323d

Infantry, and returned to its bivouac area

where it reverted to parent control at 0800

on 17 October. Shortly thereafter the battalion moved in turn to Purple Beach and

was embarked in the transport Sea Sturgeon.

The 3d Battalion had been ordered into

division reserve on 14 October and remained

in that capacity for five days without actually being employed in the lines. Company K was attached to the 1st Battalion

on the 15th and supported that unit's push,

but reverted to parent control before sundown. Then, on the 17th and 18th, the

battalion attained the dubious distinction of

being the last 1st Division unit to see action

on Peleliu.

This was directed against a group of Japanese infiltrators who had reoccupied caves

in the area of Company E, 1st Medical Battalion, a short distance south of the Pocket,

where they indulged in some lively sniping.

The action began at 1840 on 17 October.

Company I moved up and engaged the enemy

in a short, sharp fire fight but was unable

to reduce the positions before dark. The

following morning Company L relieved Company I and resumed the attack, only to discover the Japanese present in considerably

greater strength than previously estimated.

A tank came forward in support but had the

misfortune to strike a large land mine and

was very thoroughly blown up. The company commander 84 had been directing the

tank's lire and was killed, together with three

crew members, two others being wounded.

Resistance still existed in the area at nightfall, but 81st Division elements relieved

Company L the next morning, and the weary

battalion reverted to regimental control.

84 Captain H. W. Jones, formerly CO of the Battalion Headquarters Company, had taken over this

command only a short time before, following the

death of Captain Shanley. The 3d Battalion was

especially hard on rifle company commanders: of

four who served in that capacity during the Peleliu

operation, three were killed in action and one

wounded. Hurst.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS RICHARD E. KRAUS earned the Medal

of Honor when he intentionally smothered an exploding

grenade with his own body thus saving the lives of three

men.

Company K had been sent to the beach

the previous day to lend a hand at loading

ship, and on the morning of the 20th the

rest of the battalion arrived at the same

destination, where by 1730 all hands had

joined the 1st Battalion aboard Sea Sturgeon. Loading was completed the following day, and the ship shoved off on 22 October, arriving at Pavuvu on the 30th.

The 2d Battalion, which had been engaged

in some patrolling in the northeastern islands, did not commence loading until 26

October. The men thereupon ran into unexpected complications of a somewhat bizarre nature, which the battalion commander

describes as follows:

The Sloterdyke was a Dutch merchantman (under

a Dutch captain with a polyglot crew) leased by

the Army with an Army TQM and a Navy armed

guard aboard and was carrying a skeleton Marine

169
infantry battalion and a Marine artillery battalion

• (4/11). By dint of the Marines manning the

winches and booms, we were able to load and depart on the 30th.85

The good ship Sloterdyke (or Sloterdyck,

or Sloterdyk—sources vary as to the spelling) with her colorful complement arrived

"home" at Pavuvu on 7 November in the

convoy bearing the 5th Marines and its reinforcing elements.

This combat team had been organized as

a task force under Brigadier General 0. P.

Smith, assistant division commander, attached operationally to the 81st Division.

The force was not employed in the active

fighting, however, the several battalion units

remaining in the defensive positions previously described, except for a few minor

changes, until 26 October. On that date

81st Division Field Order No. 23 directed

their relief by Army elements, which was

accomplished by 1200. On the 27th trucks

became available and began shuttling the

85 Berger.

110

troops from northern Peleliu to Purple

Beach.

Lack of suitable shipping delayed embarkation. No regular personnel transports were

available, and most of the freighters which

were used as resupply ships lacked both

accommodations for troops and the loading

devices necessary to handle some of the

heavy equipment. Even after an adequate

ship had been found (transport Sea Runner) ,86 loading out was seriously complicated

by rough seas. In the end it proved necessary to leave some of the equipment behind

with a detail of men to take care of it.87

Not until 30 October did the weary Marines

see the last of that island for which they

had fought so long and so bloodily.

Some sour punster dubbed it "Nothing

Atoll".

88 Most 5th Marines personnel were embarked. in

Sea Runner, but at least two other vessels took part

in this movement. • Benedict.

87 A detail of 13 men with 15 vehicles of 1st MT

Bn. They left on or about 13Nov44. Ltr lstLt J. B.

Darnell to CMC, 13Mar50.
CHAPTER VIII

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

The Wildcats Take Over

(15 October-27 November)

Except for personnel and machines of the

710th Tank Battalion acting in support of

the Marines in the Umurbrogol, RCT 321

had taken little active part in the Peleliu

fighting since completion of its mission in

the north on 2 October. Yet the men kept

busy at useful tasks: building defense installations against possible counterlanding,

burying enemy dead, clearing up the inevitable debris of battle. And, lest their

part appear wholly passive, in one four-day

period (4-8 October) they managed to kill

171 Japanese.'

On 7 October, the 2d Battalion, stationed

on Ngesebus and Kongauru, began a series

of minor amphibious operations along Peleliu's northern approaches. A number of

small islands lay in this region, leading like

stepping stones into the central Palaus, with

the enemy quite possibly in occupancy. With

the idea of finding out, Company F, reinforced, boarded LVT's on the early morning

of 9 October and crossed the few thousand

1 81st OpnRpt, II, 45. Many of these had been

lurking in caves which had been overrun, but others,

discovered on the beaches evidently trying to escape

from the island, were believed to have infiltrated

from the pocket. Such would-be deserters turned

up in increasing numbers as the long grind wore

on, their occurrence probably symptomatic of the

deterioration of Japanese morale under the remorseless pressure.

892106 ° 50 12

yards of reef to Garakayo, the nearest and

largest. The troops encountered some machine-gun fire from a ridge overlooking the

southern beach and from the neighboring

island of Cordoray, but succeeded in securing it by 1500. Five Japanese were killed

in the process and five more during the following night.

On the 10th Company G replaced F and

set about platoon reconnaissance of the

other nearby islands named with such characteristic Palaus tongue-twisters an Ngemelis, Arimasuku and Garyo. Whenever they

were so fortunate as to find an island not

already named, the soldiers happily christened it after one of themselves, with the

result that their special map shows Murphy,

Galligan and Turner among all the Ngargersiuls and Gorokottans. They found no more

Japanese, however.

As preparations progressed for evacuation of the 7th Marines, the 321st occupied

that regiment's defense sector as well as its

own, and on 13 October the assault battalions were ordered to relieve the 5th Marines in the Umurbrogol on the 15th and

16th. All these dispositions threatened to

spread the regiment rather thin, but this

was somewhat compensated for by arrival

and attachment of the 1st Battalion, RCT

323, from Ulithi, with the other two battalions scheduled to follow shortly.

111
"KANSOKUYAMA," the Japanese called this height. They had an observation post on the summit, reached by ladders

leading upward through the interior cave system. Marines knew it as "Hill 300," the Wildcats as "Old Baldy."

With completion of the relief and assumption of command, the assault units of the

321st were deployed around the Pocket as

follows: 3/321 held the eastern perimeter

with positions along the crests of Walt and

Boyd Ridges and extended below the mouth

of the Horseshoe; 2/321 was atop Hill 140

and extending west from there, with the 1st

Battalion on its right to the southward;

1/323 held the south-southwestern zone,

facing the Five Sisters and Death Valley.

For two days (16 and 17 October) elements of the 2d Battalion tried vainly to get

from Hill 140 to the top of No. 1 of the

Five Brothers. The ravine between was too

172

narrow, the ascent too steep, cover too scarce

in view of the heavy and accurate fire from

the enemy's commanding positions. On the

battalion's right, 1/321 made an advance

of 200 yards on the 17th but was stopped

cold on the following day and commenced

to sandbag its position and bring up pack

howitzers.

The tactical importance of gaining a foothold on the summit of the Five Brothers

was self-evident to all hands; and RCT 321

was especially anxious to have such an

achievement to its credit by the time the

81st Division assumed command. Authority

was therefore obtained from the 1st Ma-
TANK-INFANTRY ACTION inside the Horseshoe.

rine Division (which, as has been noted,

retained over-all command until 20 October)

to stage an all-out effort on the 18th.2

To support this assault, tanks and LVT

flame-throwers entered the Horseshoe over

a track which had been bull-dozed through

the draw north of Walt Ridge where they

could bear directly on many of the Japanese

positions capable of angling fire against the

narrow, exposed crest of the Brothers: from

the lower slopes of Walt Ridge, Hill 300 and

the Five Sisters. Then heavy concentrations

of 81mm and 4.2 inch mortar fire were placed

on the Brothers themselves.

2a P. Smith PerNar.

Under cover of this Company E succeeded

in scaling Brother No. 1 at 1100, and 45

minutes later took No. 2. In an effort to

exploit these gains while the enemy was still

off balance, Company F passed through Company E and was established on the summit

of No. 3 by 1315.

At this point, however, success came to

an end. On that narrow crest the men were

frightfully exposed, with Japanese on three

sides of them and no time for the laborious

process of bringing up sandbags. Before

Company F could consolidate its position,

the men found themselves pinned down by

a vicious cross-fire from enemy emplacements which the tanks in the Horseshoe

113
'11

were unable to get at. Under cover of this,

the Japanese staged a strong counterattack

from the two southernmost Brothers and

by 1700 succeeded in driving the men of the

2d Battalion from all three of the seized

crests.3

With establishment of the 81st Division

command post on 20 October, the top Marine echelons departed at once by air: General Geiger and the corps staff that morning, General Rupertus and the division staff

at 2300. In parting, CG, 1st Marine Division, paid tribute to the Army unit which

had fought with him so long and so well in

the following terms:

"The performance of duty of the officers and men

of Regimental Combat Team 321, throughout the

assault phase on Peleliu, Ngesebus and the northern outpost islands warrants the highest praise.

It was a pleasure to have this unit serve as part

of my command during this extremely difficult operation, and I express the sentiments of every officer

and man of the 1st Marine Division in wishing

them good luck in future operations against the

enemy. In the eyes of the entire 1st Marine Division they have earned a 'Well Done.'"

With his assumption of command, Major

General Paul J. Mueller announced that he

proposed undertaking a major seige operation, and that was precisely what he did.

During the initial phases of an amphibious

operation, time is so all-important that often

heavy losses must be sustained in order to

capitalize it. But this period was long since

past on Peleliu. From now on there would

be no more ambitious but premature assaults such as that on the Five Brothers.

Reduction became a step-by-step business;

grim, methodical, inexorable; characterized

more by hard work than hard fighting. Not

a life would be lost that could possibly be

spared.

3 The narrowness of these razorback crests made

it impossible either to fight effectively or to withdraw in an orderly manner. BrigGen 0. P. Smith

witnessed this action through glasses from below

and records: "All of the men did not withdraw

north up the ridge, but many of them slid down

the steep slopes of the Brothers into Horseshoe

Valley below." Smith PerNar.

174

The number of Japanese remaining in the

Pocket was unknown, of course, and estimates varied widely. Asked by the 81st

Division for a tentative figure, the 1st Division staff guessed roughly 500, raised by

other guessers to a maximum of 1200, "a

figure which was subsequently ascertained

to be underestimated." 4 At the end of the

operation the 81st reported: "Over 1500

Japanese were known to have been killed

and fifty-eight captured",3 an estimate which

would appear to disregard the possibility

that a few of these might have been disposed

of by the Marines during the month they

had fought over this terrain. But three

days after the Wildcats took over, Colonel

Nakagawa, whose reports were seldom exactly pessimistic, informed his superiors on

Koror : "Our total garrison units number

about 700 soldiers, including the slightly

wounded;" and six days later: "Garrison

units number about 500 still able to fight." 6

Whatever their numbers, fight they did,

and in the best Japanese tradition.

Although many Marines 7 remained on the

island following termination of Marine

Corps command, their part was minor. After 20 October the story of Peleliu is the

Army's story. Army agencies have told it

elsewhere and told it well. It will be only

summarized here in order to round out the

picture.

The 81st Division employed only two of

its regimental combat teams on Peleliu. The

322d Infantry remained mopping up and

in garrison on Angaur, though as matters

straightened out on that island most of its

reinforcing elements were detached and

transferred to the scene of the main fighting. All elements of RCT 323, less a small

detachment left to garrison Ulithi, had arrived by 26 October, on which date they

4 81st OpnRpt, II, 6.

5 81st UnitHist, 200.

6 Tadct Record, 230et, 260ct44.

7 Notably the aviation units operating from the

airfield, service troops attached to the Island Command, two battalions of artillery (4/11 and 3d

155mm Howitzer Bn.) and crews of the LVT flamethrowers.
relieved the weary 321st, less 3d Battalion

which remained on the now comparatively

inactive eastern perimeter.

Thereafter these four battalions carried

on the Pocket battle to the bitter end a

month later, though 81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop participated in two more

island seizures to the north: Gorokottan

on 11 November and Ngeregong on the 15th.

The latter island had been seized previously

by personnel from the LCI gunboats operating in the region, but these had been chased

out by an enemy counterlanding. The Reconnaissance Troop went in prepared for any

contingency, with artillery and air preparation and LVT (A) 's and LCI's for direct

support. But only three Japanese were

found, all of them dead.

Back in the Pocket the methodical attrition continued. No one was in any hurry,

and the Wildcats' caution was exceeded only

by the thoroughness with which they did the

job. Mortar concentrations and napalm air

strikes prepared the way for each major

attack, and extraordinary labor was undertaken to bulldoze routes for tanks and LVT

flame-throwers to inaccessible enemy strong

points. At times a satisfactory day's advance measured ten to fifty yards, and there

were cases of men crawling ahead on their

bellies pushing sandbags in front of them

with poles. If any one implement could be

said to have done more than any other to

seal the fate of the Japanese in the Umurbrogol, it would be the humble sandbag.

The Marines' idea of emplacing heavy

weapons in strategic high ground for direct

fire support was elaborated and ramified by

the 81st. There seemed no limit to the Wildcats' ingenuity, especially that of the engineers. When no amount of labor would suffice to get LVT's into one particularly..

troublesome area, they rigged up what must

stand as one of the most unique flamethrowers in anybody's war: a 300-yard pipe

line leading to the target from a fuel truck

parked on the West Road, complete with

booster pumps to insure pressure and

equipped with a nozzle which enabled the

.1_

TWIN VALLEYS THAT WERE DEATH TRAPS: Horseshoe (left)

and Wildcat Bowl, walled in by Walt Ridge, Five Brothers

and China Wall. Japanese command post near northern

end of the latter.

operator to play flame on the Japanese positions like water from a hose.

A battery of flood lights was mounted so

as to focus on the pond within the Horseshoe which served as the enemy's only stable

water source. And near the end the 306th

Engineer Battalion built a coral ramp that

enabled tanks to get from the floor of Wildcat Bowl to the summit of the rugged China

Wall. Some of the conveyor systems developed to get supplies up into the ridges

and to evacuate the wounded looked like pure

Rube Goldberg.

The seige developed according to a traceable design but seldom exactly according to

plan. The first heavy pressure was applied

from the north and northwest. Elements of

2/321 got back to the top of Brother No. 1

three days after they had been thrown off:

on 21 October. This time they had seen

to it that ample sandbags were readily available; these were passed to the crest hand-tohand via human chain, and the position was

175
1!

secured. The following day No. 2 was taken

and sandbagged in turn, and on 23 October

Nos. 3 and 4 got the same treatment. No.

5, lower in elevation, was dominated by

strong positions still enemy held and hence

let alone for the time being.

On 22 October elements of 3/321 came

down from Walt Ridge and sandbagged a

line of defense on the floor of the Horseshoe from which they were never driven,

thereby shortening the perimeter considerably on the east. But with the attack stalled

in the west and northwest by a combination

of terrible terrain and strong resistance, interest next shifted to the south.

Rain and poor visibility stopped offensive

operations for the first few days after RCT

323 took over, but on 2 November that regiment's 2d Battalion, attacking in the wake

of napalm and mortar preparation, seized

the Five Sisters and Hill 300 8 with comparative ease, sandbagged them and hauled

up pack howitzers. But an attempt to move

a tank-infantry patrol up Death Valley was

repulsed the following day.

Attrition continued to gnaw away, hampered by the weather 9 as well as the Japanese. Armored bulldozers concentrated on

the approaches to the two main declivities,

and on 13 November tanks and an LVT

flame-thrower, supported by infantry, made

the first successful sortie into Wildcat Bowl.

8 Here that bugaboo of variant place names arises

again. The Marines thus called this elevation and

considered it a part of the Five Sisters formation

though it was separated from the others by a fairly

wide saddle. The Wildcats called it "Old Baldy",

and it so appears on all their maps, which gives

rise to confusion with the Marines' "Baldy Hill"

nearly 1,000 yards to the north. Other names applied by the 81st were Wildcat Bowl, China Wall

and Grinlinton Pond, none of which had been named

previously. They also renamed the Horeshoe Mortimer Valley in honor of Captain Joseph F. Mortimer

of the 323d Infantry who was killed in action

there. But where the Marines had operated before

the new names were applied, this account will continue to adhere to their terminology.

Rain accompanied by the edge of a typhoon

halted offensive action altogether 4 to 9 November,

and repeated spells of foul weather constituted a

minor nuisance until the end of the campaign.

116

This was part of an all-out push from every

direction and succeeded so well as a diversion that Company G was able to get from

the Sisters onto the southern end of the

China Wall against light opposition. This

curious formation was really a double ridge,

the serried pinnacles along either flank separated by a narrow, jumbled gulch which required something approximating alpine tactics merely to negotiate. By the time the

men had toiled and scrambled 75 yards along

this, they came under heavy fire from positions farther northward, and the invaluable

sandbags were brought up.

A similar gain was made by Company B,

attacking from the west, but the advance

of the 3d Battalion from the north could be

measured in feet, when it could be measured

at all. The terrain here was very bad, but

certainly no worse than atop the China Wall,

and the opposition determined. The reason

was surmised at the time and later yen -

fled: nearby lay the hard core of all Japanese resistance, the CP of the doughty Nakagawa, who was not a man to neglect defense

of his approaches.

The rest of the story is one of unceasing

pressure from the north, south and west,

with the resulting gradual attrition. Units

in assault were relieved at short intervals,

and the sandbags continued creeping forward. The action was grinding and monotonous, with few highlights.

By 17 November, tanks had worked onto

the southern portion of Death Valley with

the aid of armored bulldozers, and by dint

of great exertion commenced slugging their

way northward from there. Tank-infantry

patrols operated virtually at will within

Wildcat Bowl, with results that must have

been highly discouraging to the enemy. By

21 November it became apparent that the

Japanese, moving under cover of darkness,

had withdrawn altogether from their remaining caves in the western flanks of the

Brothers to concentrate for a last stand in

the seemingly impenetrable China Wall.

By taking quick advantage of this development, the Wildcats achieved their most sig-
nificant gain of the past two weeks. With

advance of the 3d Battalion from the north

still held up by impossible terrain and desperate resistance, Company F, supported by

tanks and LVT flame-throwers, commenced

a sortie up the length of the Bowl at 0700

on 22 November. Forty-five minutes later

the foremost elements reached the northern

extremity and commenced the precarious ascent of the China Wall itself. By the time

the Japanese discovered what was up and

were able to react, the company was consolidating a tactically important position on

the high ground immediately south of the

3d Battalion lines, trapping those enemy remaining in the area between the two units

and imperiling those holding up the drive

from the west: above and beyond Death

Valley.

Simultaneously with this action, Company

H attacked through Company G in the 2d

Battalion's position atop the China Wall to

the south and sandbagged a 75 yard gain

from this direction. And then, as though

to prove the validity of the new development, Company I secured the last of the

Five Brothers without encountering any opposition. This permitted the containing

line to close across the saddle between the

Brothers and Sisters, greatly reducing its

length.

At last the pattern of Victory was taking

shape for the final kill. With a foothold

secured at the northern end of the China

Wall, Company A, 306th Engineer Battalion,

commenced construction of that remarkable

coral ramp from the floor of the Bowl to

the crest of the double-pinnacled ridge as a

means for bringing flame and armor against

the enemy's last and heretofore inaccessible

strong points.

During that night (24-25 November) 45

Japanese,1° including two officers, were

killed in what proved to be the dying convulsion of organized resistance on Peleliu.

The story was obtained from a prisoner cap10 There were doubtless a few isolated individuals

still holding out in the region, but the garrison commander reported only 56 men under a Capt Nemoto

as of 1700 on 24Nov. Tada Record.

tured at about 1100 the following morning.

According to his account, Colonel Nakagawa

and Major General Kenjiro Mural n had

ordered this last attack in an effort to break

through the beseiging cordon and conduct

guerilla warfare against the rear areas.

They had then notified headquarters to the

effect that the end had come, burned the

regimental colors,12 and ceremoniously shot

themselves.

Although no other witnesses remained to

verify the suicides, the rest of this characteristically Japanese scene is substantiated

by the opening phrases of the last message

received from the Peleliu garrison: "Our

defense units were on the verge of being

completely annihilated; therefore, the unit

destroyed the 2d Infantry Regiment flag

which they had in their possession. . . . All

documents were burned." 13

Throughout the day of the 25th the circling lines continued their inexorable closing,

moving slowly, searching the jumbled

ground with infinite care to insure that not

a single enemy be overlooked. The 1st Battalion, advancing from the west, flushed 30

Japanese and captured the prisoner referred

to above. Twenty-one more were killed during the night in what appeared to be individual attempts to escape rather than concerted action.

The 306th Engineers' ramp was completed late that afternoon, and first thing the

11 This was the only intelligence obtained during

the entire operation which placed General Murai

on Peleliu. The Japanese CP occupied a deep, twochambered cave 40 feet down a vertical shaft near

the northern end of the China Wall, but this was

not fully explored until the bodies it contained had

decomposed beyond positive identification. For further elaboration on this minor mystery, see Appendix F.

12 In Japanese military tradition, the burning

of any unit's colors signified that that unit had

ceased to exist and should be stricken from the

Army lists.

13 Tada Record, 24Nov44. Text of the message as

eventually relayed to Tokyo read: "The splitting

of the men into 17 teams was completed at 1700

hours. Following the commander's wishes, we will

attack the enemy everywhere. This will be the

last message we will be able to send or receive."

111
NAPALM STRIKES, such as this against the Five Sisters, were spectacular, but, as the Japanese commander reported,

"Since perfecting our defenses against fire, we suffered no losses."

following morning tanks and an LVT flamethrower began the tricky negotiation of this

route to the ridge's summit. Otherwise action on 26 November was a repetition of the

previous day's, with the strongest resistance

still encountered in the area at the head of

Death Valley.

No fireworks, literal or metaphorical,

signalized the end of one of the most stubbornly contested campaigns in the history

of this or any other war. The units in assault jumped off in all zones at 0700 on 27

November. As the 81st Division Operation

Report puts it succinctly: "Resistance to

this multisided attack seemed to disintegrate

completely." At 1030 elements of the 2d

118

Battalion, moving northward along the

China Wall, came face to face with their

comrades of the 3d Battalion, working southward. Across the few yards intervening,

they could see men of the 1st Battalion

perched on the rim of Death Valley. For

long moments the weary Wildcats looked at

one another in an uncanny silence, trying

to realize that this was all there was; there

wasn't any more.

At 1100 Colonel Arthur P. Watson, commanding RCT 323, reported officially to

General Mueller that the Peleliu operation

was over. "The enemy had fulfilled his

determination to fight to the death." 14

14 81st OpnRpt, 97.
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MAP 20
CHAPTER IX

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Conclusion

The Peleliu operation closely resembled

no other in the Pacific war in which Marines

participated; yet in no respect was it wholly

unique. In a sense it was a repeat performance of Tarawa and the Marshalls, with

overtones of Saipan and Guam; and it

presaged the pattern of things to come on

under-tunnelled Iwo Jima and, perhaps more

particularly, in the high ground of Okinawa.

Although many of its aspects were dramatic and spectacular in themselves, the operation produced no important features

which were entirely novel when the war is

viewed in perspective. Several, however,

are of interest to the student of warfare.

Perhaps the most significant of these on

the historical level was the unequivocal

demonstration of the value of sea power 1

in effecting economy of manpower. The

forces defending the Palaus were notably

superior in numbers to the land forces attacking; yet because the latter were able to

concentrate their full striking power against

the vital objective while the U. S. Navy

denied the Japanese the sea lanes necessary

to pour in substantial reinforcements, effective control of the entire island group was

achieved by commitment of a fraction of the

1 Including naval aviation. Because the enemy's

air potential had already been destroyed, U. S.

air power, as such, played a purely supporting role

during the assault phase of the operation.

assault troops which would have been required had command of the sea been less

absolute.

That doubt should be cast on the strategic

importance of this seizure 2 is unfortunate

to the memory of the men who fought and

died there. And that is a matter on which

no definite conclusion can be reached: because the conquest was a fait accompli prior

to the invasion of the Philippines, no one

can state with full certainty what would

have happened had it not taken place. What

is known is that Peleliu, together with air

facilities subsequently developed on Angaur,

proved exceedingly useful as a support and

staging point for the Philippines throughout

that lengthy campaign. Equally important,

the Japanese were denied the whole Palaus

chain as a base and staging area for attacks

on U. S. naval shipping and lines of communication supporting the Philippines invasion.

On the tactical level, Peleliu was notable

as a complete vindication of the essential

amphibious doctrines developed by the Ma2 This doubt, together with the misapprehension

regarding the nature and probable duration of the

operation which was implanted in the minds of

newspaper representatives, and by them transmitted

to the U. S. public, resulted in the Peleliu operation

being among the least known and least understood

in the entire war.

179
CORPORAL LEWIS K. BAUSELL won the Medal of Honor on

D-Day for his heroism in smothering a greneade's explosion with his own body.

rine Corps through two decades of peacetime study and perfected in the crucible of

combat on the long road from Guadalcanal

to the fringes of the Japanese Empire. This

was demonstrated by the quick and efficient

securing of a beachhead against the heaviest

kind of resistance by an assault force considerably smaller proportionately than prescribed by doctrine to insure success in a

landing of this nature. That subsequently

the operation proved long-drawn-out and

costly is attributable to factors extraneous

to the purely amphibious aspects: the nature

of the terrain, and the determination and

resourcefulness of the enemy.

For Peleliu was also notable in demonstrating that the Japanese, too, had learned

by experience. One thing they had learned

was to minimize their losses from naval

gunfire.3 And they had gained security

consciousness. In marked contrast to recent

goings-on in the Marianas, U. S. troops

noted a dearth of captured operational maps,

3 See Appendix C.

180

orders and miscellaneous documents packed

with useful information, a dearth astonishing to intelligence officers whom long experience had taught •to take such sources

for granted. As had been noted in passing,

there were no frantic, futile banzai charges

to simplify the attackers' problem; for the

first time in the Marines' experience in the

Pacific, the Japanese made good their tactic

of exacting a maximum toll of their enemies

in fighting to the death. Though it could

not be foreseen at the time, these seeming

phenomena were to characterize enemy procedure from this time onward.

Two new Japanese weapons made their appearance, which were also destined to be

encountered again.4 One was a highly effective 150mm mortar, resembling a kingsize.81mm, with a tube more than six feet

long and a base plate so heavy as to render

it primarily a static rather than a mobile

weapon. The second was a homemade

rocket, improvised by attaching a propellant

charge to the base of a 200mm naval shell.

This detonated with a terrific concussion—

when it detonated at all. What little information was gleaned concerning this came

from examination of the several duds which

fell within the lines, for no launching device was ever found, nor was any prisoner

taken who would admit knowing anything

about it. Evidently it could not be aimed

but was simply launched in the general direction of American-held territory. Lacking

stabilizing fins, it usually made its descent

as described by one eyewitness, "end over

end, like a badly punted football." Ineffective as this was on Peleliu, it was to prove

but the crude forerunner of the infinite variety of self-propelled missles which were

destined to lend variety, if little feeling of

security, to life on Iwo Jima a few months

later.

On the U. S. side, the most important

new weapon to make its initial apearance

4 Also found were several 200mm permanent

mount naval guns with sawed-off barrels, the exact

purpose of which was never determined a,s those

captured were incompletely mounted and inoperative.
was the long-range flame-thrower. This

performed yeoman service, yet the vulnerability of the LVT as a carrier for a purely

offensive weapon proved a limiting factor

throughout the operation. This came as

no great surprise; the amtrack was simply

the most practical vehicle to which this new

device could be adapted in the short time

available. With development of a mount

suitable to the Sherman tank, the long-range

flame-thrower went on to play its highly useful part in subsequent operations.

That naval gunfire preparation proved

inadequate for its mission has been touched

upon in passing. The fact is that local conditions made this mission impossible of

anything resembling complete fulfillment

by any techniques then in practice.° And

there was an additional limiting factor: the

protracted bombardment of Guam had

caused a shortage of ammunition which

could not be fully replenished in the short

interval between the two operations.°

There is no place in a monograph of such

limited scope for debate on the pros and

cons, potentialities and limitations, of naval

gunfire as a supporting arm. At corps and

division levels, the essential fact was that,

for whatever reasons, enemy installations

enfilading both flanks of the landing beaches

were still operative when the assault waves

went in and inflicted casualties to personnel

and materiel so severe as to hamper seriously the first day's operations. Nor had

any effective plans been made to utilize

naval gunfire to preclude or interdict attack

by Japanese tanks known to be on the

island.7

5"The caves encountered on both islands presented

a problem that so far has not been successfully

solved by any supporting arm." IIIAC OpnRpt,

Encl. G, 4.

Fort. Oldendorf. Owing to the defeat of the

Japanese fleet in the Philippines Sea and the delay

in the Guam invasion, it was possible to subject that

island to 13 days of pre-landing bombardment, with

exceptionally good results.

7"Peleliu indicated that tanks could survive a

preparatory bombardment, and that NGF and air

were at that time of little effectiveness in preventNEW JAPANESE WEAPON. This king-size 150mm mortar

made its first appearance at Peleliu. Projectile lies on

base plate.

On the credit side, however, the volume

of fire actually delivered did achieve two

highly useful results: it sheared away much

of the covering vegetation, thereby revealing the true contours at last and reducing

the enemy's concealment; and it partially

neutralized the high ground during the initial landing to the extent that the shelling

encountered by assault troops crossing the

reef, bad as that was, proved less severe

than what was to be encountered in some

later phases. And once the Marines were

ashore and able to pin-point profitable targets, fire missions delivered on call were

nearly always accurate and effective.

To a greater extent than any other Pacific

operation, Peleliu pitted U. S. troops in the

open against a devilishly concealed and fortified enemy. That bedrock of adamant coral

limestone underlying the island's thin soil

made digging in impossible with the means

available to troops in assault, whereas the

Japanese had had time to drill and blast

out their defensive positions. During the

early phases, the attack moved mainly across

open terrain dominated by high ground;

later the high ground itself proved a maze

ing hostile tanks from closing on the landing force."

Stuart.

181
DEDICATING PELELIU CEMETERY. General Rupertus near center with cane; Colonel Puller on his right. Group on extreme

right: General 0. P. Smith, Colonel Harrison, Colonel Harris.

of fire-swept razorback ridges and barren

declivities devoid of natural cover.

Here, if ever, was essentially an infantry battle, with all supporting arms and

troops concerted to help the man on foot

in their several ways and with varying degrees of effectiveness, again mainly as dictated by terrain conditions.

During the initial phases, their parts were

, the conventional ones they had been trained

to perform. But once the fighting entered

the ridges, more particularly after resistance was localized within a constricted

pocket, the battle became one of improvisation: traditional Yankee ingenuity and the

will to live pitted against Japanese preparation and the fanatic will to die; with each

offensive thrust, often each individual cave,

presenting problems peculiar to itself.

This this feature, perhaps more than any

other, which characterizes the Peleliu operation in the minds of those who partici182

pated or who have studied it. To the combat engineers, this meant greatly increased

burdens and responsibilities; to the artillery,

an early end to massed fires and the adaptation of individual weapons to direct fire

missions. To the air arm, it meant a greatly

curtailed field of usefulness and, because of

the nature and location of enemy defenses,

greatly reduced effectiveness despite the

daring and ingenuity displayed. The tanks

and LVT flame-throwers played their valuable parts to the bitter end, under difficulties never anticipated and rarely encountered

elsewhere. But in the final analysis it was

the man on foot with a weapon in his hand

who took that evil ground and held it.

Because the fighting dragged on to such

seemingly interminable length, it is easy

to lose sight of the important fact that the

basic mission of the entire operation was

accomplished within a week. The airfield

had been secured and was becoming fully
operational, all the beaches necessary for the

landing of supplies were in use, and base

development was in full swing. Two months

before the last wretched Japanese combatant

was exterminated in the Peleliu ridges, capture of the Palaus in the strategic sense had

become an accomplished fact, with upward

of 25,000 enemy troops to the northward

left to wither on the vine, as useless to the

defense of the Empire as though they were

stationed at the South Pole rather than within 500 miles of the Philippines.

With capture of the high ground immediately dominating the airfield, the campaign

degenerated into what was in effect guerrila

warfare of a type peculiar to no people other

than the Japanese. The defenders' potential for tactical action on any effective scale

had been destroyed, and they were cut off

from support and reinforcement. From

that point onward, they killed solely for the

sake of killing, without hope and without

higher purpose.

The operation was a costly one by any

standards. Latest available check up 8 gives

total Marine Corps casualty figures of 6,526,

of whom 1,252 are listed as dead (killed in

action, died of,wounds and missing presumed

dead). An indication of how heavy a share

was borne by the assault infantry appears

in a report shortly following the action

which breaks down total regimental casualFigures certified and released by USMC Personnel Accounting System, 1Jun50.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS CHARLES H. ROAN was awarded the

Medal of Honor for throwing his body upon an enemy

grenade, thereby saving the lives of four men.

ties as follows: 1st Marines-1,749; 5th

Marines-1,378; 7th Marines-1,497.°

In addition, the 81st Infantry Division,

Reinforced, lost 1,393 officers and men on

Peleliu, 208 killed in action, plus 1,676 (196

killed in action) on Angaur.1°

Victory over dug-in Japanese never did

come cheap.

91st MarDiv SAR, II, Annex G, 2. These figures

should be taken as approximate and indicative

rather than accurate in detail. Owing to a change

in the methods of casualty accounting, no up-todate breakdown by units is available at this writing.

10 Figures from 81st Unit Hist, 1948.

183
APPENDIX A

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Bibliography

Primary sources used in compiling this

monograph are the official reports, by whatever title, submitted by units which participated in the Palaus operation. Necessarily,

these vary widely in completeness and reliability, necessitating painstaking evaluation

in each individual case. This has required

a good deal of flexibility in the handling.

In only one particular has a hard and fast

policy been followed: Wherever practicable,

reports of the echelon most immediately concerned with the events discussed have been

guided on in cases where evidence appeared

to conflict.

Thus, as the operation broke down increasingly into actions by smaller and smaller

units, battalion reports, perhaps scribbled

in pencil on soiled paper, are cited in preference to the often voluminous and nicely

bound studies turned in by division, corps

or task force; this on the principle that there

can be no More "basic" source on any particular fight than the men who did the fighting. In combat, reports seep upward, losing

detail and reality in the process. The higher

the echelon, the farther removed it was from

the scene of action. It has been this writer's

experience that reports on those levels, besides having fundamentally different interests, tend to perpetuate rather than screen

out the inevitable inaccuracies which sometimes occur.

To supplement the basic sources, preliminary drafts of this monograph were dis184

tributed to individual participants who occupied key positions during the campaign,

soliciting comments, corrections and elaborations. Notes and interview transcripts

resulting are now on file in the records of

the Historical Division, U. S. Marine Corps.

Such material cited in the text has been

carefully checked against the official reports

and any discrepancies noted. In this manner much additional detail has been gained,

and it has been possible to elaborate many

necessarily terse official entries. Only in

a very few instances not adequately covered

in any extant reports have statements of individuals been accepted as primary source

material, simply because otherwise these

facets of the operation would have been

impossible of any treatment whatsoever.

Recognizing the fallibility of the human

memory five years after the event, the reader

is asked to accept such passages as what

they purport to be: informed conjecture, or

studied surmise.

Documents consulted in the preparation

of this work, though not all of them are

cited therein, are listed below, progressing

downward by successive echelons, except in

the case of battalion reports which are

grouped under the respective regimental

heads. Unless otherwise noted, these are

on file in the records of the Historical Division, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps.
DOCUMENTS

Combined Chiefs of Staff. Specific Operations for

the Defeat of Japan. Serial CCS 397 (Revised) ;

SEXTANT Conference, 137th meeting, 1st and 2d

Plenary meetings. Office of Naval Records and

Library.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Directive to CinCP0A and

CinCSoWesPac. Serial JCS 713/4, dtd 12Mar44.

Office of Naval Records and Library.

CNO (F-111). STALEMATE. Chronological

Resume of Operations. File contains dispatches

(incoming and outgoing), maps, and a daily estimate of the situation.

CNO (Air Intelligence Group). Air Group 16

(USS Lexington) action report, 30, 31 March and

1 April, 1944. Serial Op-16-V-E-MEM; dtd

2Jun44.

CNO (Air Intelligence Group). Excerpts from USS

Bancroft action report. 30 March 1944 to 1 April

1944. Serial 16-V-E-LSM; dtd 19Jun44.

CNO (Air Intelligence Group). Excerpts from CTU

58.2.2 action report for 29-31 March 1944. Serial

Op-16-V-E-MEM; dtd 18May 44.

CNO (Air Intelligence Group). Excerpts from Task

Group 58.2 action report for 30 March-1 April

1944. Serial OP-16-V-E-ITZ; dtd 5Jun 44.

CNO (Air Intelligence Group). Excerpts from narrative of action of USS Petrof Bay and USS

Savo Island, 12-30 September 1944. Serial Op16-V-E/JSA/1WEM over 276; dtd 14Nov44.

CNO (Air Intelligence Group). Excerpts from action report of CTU• 32.7.2. Serial Op-16-V-E/-

AMG/MEM over 302; dtd 6Dec44.

CNO (Air Intelligence Group). Material Excerpts

From Action report of CTU 32.7.1. Serial Op16-V-E-AMG/bjn over 305; dtd 25Nov44.

CNO (Air Intelligence Group). Navy Department

Comments on action report of Commander, Air

Group 13. Serial Op-16-V-E/EW/MEM over

307; dtd 25Nov44.

CINCPAC (OpInfoSec). Report of Operations

USS Bunker Hill, 30-31 March and 1 April 1944.

Serial EWM/dmt; dtd 19May44.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA. Photographic Intelligence

Reports. Serials vary with each document; dates

are date of report. Cover period 16Apr-8Aug44.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA. Translations of Captured

Japanese Documents. Serials vary with each

document; dates are date of translation and publication. Cover period 15Aug-5Sep44.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA. GRANITE Campaign Plan.

No serial; dtd 27Dec43. Office of Naval Records

and Library.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA. Outline Campaign Plan,

GRANITE II (with nine appendices). Serial

Pac-132-asc over A16/GC over 00071; dtd

3Jun44.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA. Bulletin Number 114-44.

"Tables: Tides, Currents, and Daylight and Dark

(Marianas, Western Carolines and certain of

Philippines)."

CINCPAC-CINCPOA. Bulletin Number 120-44.

"Anchorages and Harbor Facilities for Carolines,

Luzon, Formosa, Pescadores and China Coast."

CINCPAC-CINCPOA. Bulletin Number 124-44.

"Southern Palau Information Bulletin." No

serial; dtd 15Aug44. Supercedes JICPOA Bulletin Number 87-44.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA. Bulletin Number 129-44.

"Palau Gazetteer."

CINCPAC-CINCPOA. Bulletin Number 136-44.

"Northern Palau-Information Bulletin."

CINCPAC-CINCPOA. Bulletin Number 173-45.

"Japanese Military Caves on Peleliu-Know Your

Enemy!" No serial; dtd 23Jul45. A reprint and

expansion of Peleliu IsCom study prepared by Lt.

W. C. Phelan, USNR.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA. Item Number 11,190, translation of Japanese training order for Palau Sector forces. Serial 0680 (4th MarDiv) ; dtd

7Nov44.

JICPOA. Bulletin Number 17-44. "Palau Information Bulletin."

JICPOA. Bulletin Number 17A-44. "Palau Air

Target Folder."

JICPOA. Bulletin Number 31-44. "Tables-Carolines and Marianas (Tides, Daylight and Dark)".

JICPOA. Bulletin Number 87-44. "Palau Information Bulletin."

JICPOA. Bulletin Number 87T-44. "Palau-Target

Analysis."

JICPOA. Change and Addition Bulletin Number

87A-44. "Palau-Babelthaup and Koror-Air

Target Folder." With supplements.

JICPOA. Change and Addition Bulletin Number

87B-44. "Palau-Peleliu and Angaur-Air Target Folder." With supplements.

Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet. Anti-Invasion

Mines on Peleliu (enclosing report of UDT Number 6). Serial CAF/S76 over 001011; dtd

5Nov44.

Third Fleet. Action Report (with three enclosures).

Serial A16-3/ (16) 0090; dtd 14Nov44.

Third Fleet. Comments on Operation Report of III

Amphibious Corps. Serial A16-3/ (02) over

00174 dtd 28Dec44.

FMFPac. First endorsement on 3d Amphibious

Force Operation Report (Enclosed III PhibCorps

2d endorsement to basic document). Serial 1870

over 0253/210 over 001081; dtd 3Nov44.

Third Amphibious Force. Report on STALEMATE

II Operation (with ten enclosures). Serial FE25/-

A16-3(3) over 00314; dtd 11Nov44.

Western Pacific Task Forces. Operation Plan No.

14-44. Serial A16-31(16) over 0030; dtd 1Aug44.

Task Force 32. STALEMATE II Operation Plan

A501-44. Serial Gr5A/A4-3 over 00026; dtd

2Sep44.

185
Task Force 32. STALEMATE II Movement Order

No. A503-44. Serial Gr5A/A4-3 over 00018; dtd

24Aug44.

Task Group 32.1. STALEMATE II 'training Order

No. A504-44. Serial Gr5A/A4-3 over 00010; no

date.

Task Group 32.1. STALEMATE II Attack Order

No. A502-44 (with 2 enclosures). Serial Gr5A/-

A4-3 over 00019; dtd 23Aug44.

Task Force 33. STALEMATE II Attack Plan

A303-44. Serial FE25/A16-3 (1) ; dtd 25Aug44.

Task Force 34. Operation Order Coml3atPac No.

10-44. Serial FF12-2A16-3(5) over 0064; dtd

26Aug44.

Task Force 57. Operation Plan CmFwdArea No.

6-44. Serial A4-3(1) /FF12 /25-dch ; dtd 18Aug44.

Amphibious Group 5 (Task Force 32). Amphibious

Operation-To capture Peleliu and Angaur (with

twelve enclosures). Serial Gr5A/A9-8 over 0054;

dtd 160ct44.

Task Group 32.19. Training Order ComLSTFlot 13

No. 3-44. Serial A16-3/A4-3-m; dtd 24Aug44.

Western Landing Force Task Group 36.1. Operation

Plan 1-44, STALEMATE II. Serial 14-DWFjfm; dtd 31Jul44.

Western Landing Force Task Group 36.1. Administrative Order 1-44 to accompany Operation

Plan 1-44 STALEMATE II. No serial; dtd

27Jul44.

Task Group 38.3. Operation Order, ComCarDiv 1

No. 1-44. Serial FB2-1/A16-3/dp; dtd 25Aug44.

Battleship Division Seven. Operation Order CornBatDiv 7 No. 2-44. Serial A16-3/FB 1-7 over

0001; dtd 29Aug44.

Transport Division 6, Amphibious Forces, USPac

Fleet. Operation Report of Assault and Occupation of Peleliu. Serial CTD6 over A16-3/A9-8

over 0116; dtd 20ct44.

Transport Division 26. Action Report-Assault

landing on Angaur (with 1 enclosure). Serial

FB7-26/A16-3 over 0129; dtd 1Oct44.

LST Flotilla 13. Attack Order ComLSTFlot 13 No.

8-44. Serial A16-3/A4-3 over 0009-44; dtd

30Aug44.

UM Centaurus. Action Report, 14 August-10 October 1944. No serial, dtd 25July45.

USS Du Page. Operation Memorandum 9-44. No

serial; dtd 10Sep44.

USS Fayette. Action and Operation Report 15-20

September 1944. Serial APA 43/416-3/A9-8/hj

over 049; dtd 21Sep44.

USS Harris. Action Report 15-25 September 1944

(with two enclosures). Serial APA2/A16-3 over

036; dtd 80ct44.

USS Leedstown. Action Report on Occupation of

Peleliu Island, 15-20 September 1944 (with 3 enclosures). Serial APA56/A16-3(Cy) over 0112;

dtd 22Sep44.

186

USS Sumter. Action Report, Landing on Angaur

Island, 17-23 September 1944 (with 4 enclosures).

Serial APA52/A9-8; dtd 24Sep44.

USS LCI(G) 452. Action Report, 4 September-5

October 1944. No serial; dtd 23Feb45.

Task Unit 10.15.3, Island Command, Peleliu. War

Diary, September 1944. No serial or date.

Task Unit 57.14.1, Island Command, Peleliu. War

Diary, October 1944. No serial or date.

Island Command, Peleliu. Jap military caves on

Peleliu (a photographic study prepared by Lt.

• W. C. Phelan, USNR). Serial 3252 over G-2:

WCP-rtd; dtd 20May45. Later reprinted and expanded in CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin Number

173-45.

Island Command Peleliu. Operation Plan No. 1-45.

No serial; dtd 5Mar45.

Island Command. Operation Plan, ComMarianas

No. 6-45. Serial 03643; dtd 14Nov45.

Island Command. Operation Memorandum No. 3-45,

Standing Operating Procedure for Defense of

Southern Palaus. Serial 3252; dtd 13Jan45.

V Amphibious Corps. War Diary, October 1944

(with 8 enclosures). Serial 1975-50 over 0129/-

192 over 000122; dtd 7Nov44.

Expeditionary Troops, Third Fleet. Special Action

Report (with ten enclosures). Serial 00155; dtd

120ct44; Palau Island A1-2.

Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 36). Operation

Plan 1-44, STALEMATE II. Serial JOB/jfm;

dtd 2Sep44.

Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 36). Administrative Order 1-44 to accompany Operation Plan

- 1-44, STALEMATE II. No serial; dtd 22Jul44.

III Amphibious Corps. Operation Report, Palau Operation (with thirteen enclosures) Serial 5/187-

whf over 00883-1; dtd 240ct44.

III Amphibious Corps. C-2 Reports 15 September19 October 1944. 35 Reports. No serial; dates

are date of individual reports.

81st Infantry Division. Operation on Peleliu Island,

23 September-27 November 1944 (in three phases

with a pictorial supplement). Serial RS-3-1538;

dtd c. 9Feb45.

81st Infantry Division. The Capture of Angaur

Island, 17 September-22 October 1944 (in three

phases). Serial RS-1-109; dtd 26Dec44.

81st Infantry Division. Operation Reports. No

serial; dtd 21Sep44-4Jan45.

4th AAA Battalion. War Diary, October 1944.

Serial RTG/efp over (051); dtd 20Nov44.

7th AAA Battalion. War Diaries for September

and October 1944. Serial B15044 and B15944

respectively; dtd 10ct44 and 1Nov44 respectively.

7th AAA Battalion. War Diary, September 1944

(with 3 enclosures). Serial HRP/rm over

B15144; dtd 1Oct44.

7th AAA Battalion. War Diary, October 1944 (with

3 enclosures). Serial B15044; dtd 1Nov44.
7th AAA Battalion. Report of Operations (with

forwarding endorsements). Serial HRP/bfs over

B15644; dtd 270ct44.

7th AAA Battalion. Report of Operation. Serial

2295-10 over 0212/220 over 001053; dtd 18Nov44.

7th AAA Battalion. Combat Reports (accounts of

three antiaircraft actions forwarded under two

separate letters). Serial HRP/wts dtd 70ct44.

7th AAA Battalion. Operation Plan 1-44. Serial

HJI/gcc; dtd 26Aug44.

12th AAA Battalion. War Diary, September 1944.

Serial 2385-15 over JRH/eks; dtd 1Oct44.

12th AAA Battalion. War Diary, October 1944.

Serial 2385-15/HHM/eks; dtd 1Nov44.

3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion. War Diary, October

1944. No serial; dtd 12Dec44.

8th 155mm Gun Battalion. War Diary, 1 September-10 December 1944. Serial 2295/GVH-ww1;

dtd 18Jan45.

8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, III Amphibious

Corps. Report of Operation. Serial 471/380;

dtd 27Sep44.

4th War Dog Platoon, III Amphibious Corps. Combat Report. Serial 3/000 over 13/237-wha over

001165-1; dtd 9Dec44.

5th War Dog Platoon, III Amphibious Corps. Combat Report. Serial 30,000-05 over 13/237-lac over

001142-1; dtd 24Nov44.

1st Marine Division. Special Action Report, Palau

Operation (in two phases with 17 annexes and

additional maps and overlays enclosed; endorsements of III PhibCorps and FMFPac, attached).

Serial 01019; dtd 16Nov44.

1st Marine Division. War Diary, September 1944

(with 1 enclosure, 5 annexes). Serial 458/390

over 1990-5-80 over AE0003; no date.

1st Marine Division. War Diary, October 1944

(with 13 annexes). Serial 0779 over 1990-5-80

over 458/396; no date.

1st Marine Division. Operation Plan 1-44 (with

14 annexes and three addenda). Serial 0003 over

1990-5-80 over 458/332; dtd 15Aug44.

1st Marine Division. Administrative Order 1-44.

Serial 1990-25 over 106/286 over 0003; dtd

7Aug44.

1st Marine Division. Special Action Report. Serial

0775 over 1990-5-80; dtd 13Sep44.

1st Marine Division. Intelligence Journal of Peleliu

Operation (with one enclosure). Serial 00062

over 475/397; dtd 22Feb45.

1st Marine Division, Intelligence Section. Peleliu,

Its Terrain and Defenses. Serial 00161 over 475/-

355; dtd 14Dec44. A collection of photographs

of terrain features and specific defenses. Pictures were taken on the ground during the operation, and are printed in conjunction with excerpts from aerial photos taken before the operation.

892106°

1st Marine Division. Preliminary Interrogation Reports. No serial; dates are date of individual reports. Includes 53 reports covering period 16

September-16 October 1944.

1st Marine Division. D-2 Periodic Reports. No

serial; dates are date of individual reports. Includes 29 reports covering period 18 September19 October 1944.

1st Marine Division. Compilation of captured Japanese documents (translated and assembled in a

single jacket). Undated; no serials. Japanese

or translation dates apply.

1st Marine Division. Miscellaneous intelligence correspondence (many originals) received by 1st

MarDiv from Third Fleet and X-Ray Corps.

Covers period 17 July to 14 August 1944.

1st Marine Division. D-3 Journal. No serial; dates

are date of individual report. Covers period

26 August-7 November 1944.

1st Marine Division. Field Order No. 5-44. Serial

1990-5-80 over 458/332; dtd 50ct44.

Rear Echelon, 1st Marine Division. Movement Order No. 1-44. Serial 410/388; dtd 230ct44.

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Activities of

Navy Flamethrower Detachment. Serial 1975-50;

dtd 18Dec44.

1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Relief Mapping Unit Operation Report-Peleliu

(with photographs of relief maps). No serial;

undated, but prepared prior to 12Dec44.

1st Engineer Battalion. C-4 Periodic Report, Supply and Evacuation. No serial; dates are date

of individual report. Includes 10 reports covering period 13-18 October 1944.

1st Marines. History of 1st Marine Regiment, 26

August-10 October 1944. No serial; (120ct44).

1st Marines (Intelligence Section). Intelligence

Action Report. No serial; dtd 270ct44.

1st Marines (Intelligence Section). Recommendations concerning regimental and battalion intelligence sections. No serial; dtd 11Nov44.

1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Unit History. No

serial; dtd 23Nov44.

3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Record of Events, 26

August to 10 October 1944. No serial; dates

are date of individual entry.

5th Marines. Field Order No. 1-44. Serial AE00122

over 1990-5-80 over 434/283; dtd 50ct44.

5th Marines. Movement order No. 1-44. No serial;

dtd 240ct44.

5th Marines. Casualty Reports. No serial or dates.

Includes three reports covering period 15 September-25 October 1944.

5th Marines. Unit Reports (covering period 23

September to 25 October 1944). No serial; dates

are date of individual reports.

5th Marines. R-2 Reports (covering period 16 September to 17 October 1944). No serial; dates are

date of individual report.

181
5th Marines. R-3 Daily Log, 23 August to 5 November 1944. No serial (a handwritten notebook) ; dates are date of entry.

1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Bn-3 Journal (covering period 15 September to 16 October 1944).

No serial; dates are date of individual entry.

2d Battalion, 5th Marines. Journal (covering period 15 September 1944 to 19 January 1945;

entries not continuous). Handwritten. No serial;

dates are date of individual entry.

3d Battalion, 5th Marines. Record of Operations

(covering period 26 August to 7 November 1944).

No serial; dates are date of individual entry.

7th Marines. Administrative and Warning Orders

for Peleliu (with annexes, addenda, and modifications). Various serials and dates.

7th Marines. R-2 Journal of Peleliu Operations

(covering period 15 September to 19 October

1944). No serial; dates are dates of individual

reports.

1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Historical Report (actually a journal covering period 15 September

to 30 October 1944). No serial; dates are chronological arrangement of entries.

1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Bn-2 and Bn-3 Journal

(covering period 15 September to 18 October

1944). No serial; dates are dates of individual

entries.

2d Battalion, 7th Marines. War Diary (covering

period 25 August to 26 October 1944). No serial;

dates are date of each entry.

2d Battalion, 7th Marines. Unit reports (with overlays attached covering period 21 September to 5

October 1944). No serial; dates are dates appearing on the four reports.

2d Battalion, 7th Marines. Unit Journal (covering

period 25 August 1944 to 4 February 1945). No

serial; dates are dates of individual entries.

3d Battalion, 7th Marines. War Diary for Peleliu

Operation (covers period 24 August to 30 October 1944). No serial; dtd 18Nov44.

3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Unit Journal (covering

period 23 August to 30 October 1944). No serial;

dates are date of each entry.

3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Operation reports (with

two enclosures). No serial; dtd 110ct44.

3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Estimate of the Situation. No serial or file; dtd 21Aug44.

3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Operation Plan 1-44.

Serial 0001/44; dtd 21Aug44.

11th Marines. Operation Report. No serial; dtd

10Nov44.

2d Battalion, 11th Marines. Special Action Report.

No serial; dtd (unknown).

4th Battalion, 11th Marines. War Diary for period

25 August to 7 November 1944. Serial 1975; dtd

188

10Nov44. This document has unit journal sheets

appended for the period 22-27 October 1944.

4th Battalion, 11th Marines. Unit Journal (covering period 15 September to 22 October 1944). No

serial; dates are dates of individual entries.

MAG-11. Report on Palau Operations (with 4th

MAW comments thereon and forwarding endorsements). Serial KV11/A16-3/ (jrw) over

(0012); dtd 22Dec44.

MAG-11. War Diary, 1-30 September 1944. No

serial or date.

MAG-11. War Diary. 1-31 October 1944. No serial

or date.

Service Squadron, MAG-11. War Diary, 1-30 September 1944. No serial; dtd 260ct44.

VMF-114. Revised War Diaries, August, September and October, 1944. Serial A9-4/RFS/jwb

over (28-45) ; dtd 17Jan45.

VMF-121. War Diary, 1-30 September 1944. No

serial; dtd 3Nov44.

VMF-121. War Diary, 1-31 October 1944. No

serial; dtd 4Nov44.

VMF-122. War Diary, 1-30 September 1944. No

serial or date.

VMF-122. War Diary, 1-31 October 1944. No

serial or date.

VMF(N)-541. War Diary, 1-30 September 1944.

No serial or date.

VMF(N)-541. War Diary, 1-31 October 1944. No

serial or date.

VMTB-134. War Diary, 1-30 September 1944. No

serial; dtd 1Oct44.

VMTB-134. War Diary, 1-31 October 1944. No

serial; dtd 1Nov44.

VMR-952. War Diary, 1-31 October 1944. No

serial or date.

VMR-952. War Diary, 1-CO September 1944. No

serial or date.

PRIMARY SOURCES

King, Admiral Ernest J. U. S. Navy at War,

1941-1945; Official Reports to the Secretary of

Navy. Washington: United States Navy Department, 1946.

Marshall, General George C. The Winning of the

War in Europe and the Pacific; Biennial Report

of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army,

July 1, 1943 to June 80, 1945, to the Secretary of

War. New York: Simon and Schuster (for the

War Department), 1945.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The

Campaigns of the Pacific War. Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1946.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Interrogations of Japanese Officials. 2 volumes, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946.
SECONDARY SOURCES

Boyd, Lt. Col. Robert W. "1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division in the Palau Operations. A summary of Offensive Action." Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Schools, Amphibious

Warfare School, Senior Course, 1948-49. A historical tactical study, with 36pp typed, and four

photostatic maps.

Boyer, Lt. Col. Kimber H. "The 3d Armored Amphibian Battalion, Palau Operation-15 September to 20 October 1944." Quantico, Va.: Marine

Corps Schools, Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course, 1948-49. A historical tactical study

of 18pp typed.

Halsey, Fleet Admiral William F. and Lieutenant

Commander J. Bryan, HI. Admiral Halsey's

Story. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,

Inc., 1947.

Hoffman, Carl W. Saipan: The Beginning of the

End. Washington: Government Printing Office,

1950.

Hunt, George P. Coral Comes High. New York:

Harper and Brothers, 1946.

McMillian, George. The Old Breed: A History of

the First Marine Division In World Waif II.

Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949.

Mueller, Major General Paul J., Chairman, 81st

Wildcat Division Historical Committee, et al.

The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division in World

War II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

1948.

Pratt, Fletcher. The Marines War-An Account of

the Struggle for the Pacific from Both American

and Japanese Sources. New York: William

Sloan Associates, Inc., 1948.

Robson, R. W. The Pacific Islands Handbook, 1944.

New York: The MacMillan Company, 1945.

SCAP (First Demobilization Bureau). Central Pacific Operational Record, Volume II, ins. Field in

WDSS Historical Division. This record was

drawn up by the former Chief of Staff of the

14th Division (IJA), Colonel Tada, with the assistance of former staff officer, Colonel Nakagawa.

Diaries and memoranda of both officers plus other

materials were used as references for the drafting of this record. The translations are not final

and are subject to change. Cited in this monograph as Tacla Record.

Smith, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. "Personal Narrative."

An original typed copy of General Smith's personal journal. Inclusive dates: 28Jan44-1Nov44.

Covers New Britain, Russells and Peleliu. 215pp.

Wood, Lt. Col. Noah P. "Field Artillery Support

of the First Marine Division, Peleliu, 15 September to 20 October 1944. A study of Artillery

Support of a Marine Division in an Amphibious

Attack." Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Schools,

Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course, 1948-

49. A historical tactical study, with bibliography,

one appendix and one photostatic map. Typed.

PERIODICALS

Army and Navy Register, 30 September 1944. "Cave

Fighting on Peleliu."

Leatherneck, August 1945. "Peleliu Today" by Sgt.

Duane Decker.

Leatherneck, May 1945. "Tough Going for Easy

Company" by Sgt. Joseph P. Donahue.

Marine Corps Chevron, 22 July 1944. "Islands in

the News."

Marine Corps Chevron, 16 September 1944. "Palau

Hit by Marines."

Marine Corps Chevron, 23 September 1944. "Toughest Terrain."

Marine Corps Chevron, 30 September 1944. "Peleliu

Cleared up by Battling First INvision."

Marine Corps Chevron, 7 October 1944. "Writer

Describes Battle for Toehold on Beach."

Marine Corps Chevron, 7 October 1944. "The First

Two Days of Hell on Peleliu."

Marine Corps Chevron, 14 October 1945. "Amtracs

Assigned Most Varied Tasks Yet in Peleliu Battle."

Marine Corps Chevron, 14 October 1944. "Flame

Throwers Attacking Mt. Umurbrogol."

Marine Corps Chevron, 28 October 1944. "Japs Still

Holding Out in Peleliu."

Marine Corps Chevron, 4 November 1944. "Tokyo

Radio Claims Japs Landing on Peleliu."

Marine Corps Chevron, 18 November 1944. "75's

Moved Piece by Piece up Cliff's Side."

Marine Corps Chevron, 25 November 1944. "The

Battle of Suicide Ridge."

Marine Corps Chevron, 2 December -1944. "Marines

Use Fists and Rocks in All-Night Fight for

Hill."

Marine Corps Chevron, 16 December 1944. "Fighter

Plane Strike Scatters Japs."

Marine Corps Gazette, December 1944. "Battle for

Peleliu" by Maj. David M. Schmuck.

Marine Corps Gazette, December 1944. "Battle for

Peleliu." A staff prepared map.

Marine Corps Gazette, January 1945. "Infantillery

on Peleliu" by LtCol R. A. Evans.

Marine Corps Gazette, January 1945. "Point Secured" by Capt George P. Hunt.

Marine Corps Gazette, February 1945. "Marine

Aviation at Peleliu" by Capt Donald A. Stauffer.

Marine Corps Gazette, September 1946. "The Closer

the Better" by Lt Col Lewis W. Walt.

Time, 16 October 1944. News report by Robert Martin.

True Magazine, October 1945. "Hell in the Umurbrogol" by Jeremiah A. O'Leary.

189
APPENDIX B

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Stalemate II and

the Philippines Campaign

As he relates in his book Admiral Halsey's

Story, the Commander III Fleet had inclined

toward a dim view of the whole Western

Carolines project from the time it was first

broached to him in early May at a conference with Admirals King and Nimitz in

San Francisco. Thus, when the Joint Chiefs

of Staff queried the feasibility of by-passing

certain of these objectives, he favored striking directly at the Philippines and by-passing all of them with the possible exception

of Ulithi, which offered a fine anchorage

and was believed garrisoned lightly, if at

all. Yap, he contended, could be of use only

as a minor staging point for aircraft. The

Palaus constituted a threat to the New

Guinea-Philippines route and possessed

valuable air and anchorage facilities, but he

believed that the cost of taking them would

be excessive in relation to the advantages

gained. He was alone in this opinion, however, and the final conception of STALEMATE II emerged as something of a compromise.

The need for a large land mass on which

to mount an all-out assault on the Japanese

home islands was recognized by all, but

there was little unanimity of opinion on

what this should be. Admiral King favored

190

Formosa, Admiral Spruance and others

various areas along the coasts of China and

Korea. Admirals Nimitz and Carney agreed

with Halsey that it should be the Philippines, which General MacArthur was determined to take for sentimental and political

as well as strategic reasons.

Admiral Halsey had long held the belief

that at some point in the war Japanese resistance would begin a swift collapse, and

that when this occurred every advantage

should be pressed vigorously. The unexpectedly weak opposition he encountered

when striking at enemy air bases in the

Philippines as part of the covering action

for STALEMATE II convinced him that

this time had come. Accordingly, on 13

September he dispatched to CinCP0A the

following drastic recommendations: (1)

That STALEMATE be cancelled immediately; (2) that the ground troops already

mounted for that operation be turned over

to General MacArthur; (3) that MacArthur

revise his own plans in order to invade the

Philippines at the earliest possible moment.

Admiral Nimitz replied that with commitments already made, Phase I must go

through as planned, but that Phase II would

be submitted to immediate review.
MacArthur's plans, as then set up, called

for an invasion of Mindanao, the big southern island, on 15 November, to be followed

by an assault on Leyte, in the central Philippines, on 20 December. On the day that

the Marines hit the Peleliu beaches, a dispatch in his name 1 expressed willigness and

1 But without his knowledge. As General George

C. Kenney describes the situation at the time this

dramatic decision was made: "MacArthur was on

a cruiser off Morotai, with radio, silence being preserved. There was no way of getting in touch with

him, but a decision had to be made and an answer

sent to the Joint Chiefs immediately." George C.

Kenney, General Kenney Reports, New York, 1949.

ability to shift the sequence of these operations and to strike at Leyte as early as 20

October, provided the immediate services

of the XXIV Corps could be obtained.

Word to this effect was immediately relayed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then in

Quebec with President Roosevelt for the

OCTAGON conference. So impressed were

they by this dramatic agreement between

the top Pacific Theater commanders that

ninety minutes after the dispatch was received they were able to flash their approval.

Thus the XXIV Corps departed the Central

Pacific to play its important part in the

dramatic "liberation" campaign.

191
APPENDIX C

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Japanese Defensive Concept

A clue as to why the Japanese defenders

of Peleliu behaved so differently in some respects than had their compatriots in previous island operations is furnished by a captured document entitled: "Palau Sector

Group Training for Victory." 1 This was

issued at Group Headquarters on 11 July

1944, over the signature of Lieutenant General Sadai Inoue, over-all commander, but

internal evidence, substantiated by post-war

interrogations, indicates that it was mainly

if not entirely the work of Inoue's chief of

staff, Colonel Tokechi Tada, generally regarded as one of the most capable staff officers of the Imperial Army.

This document is of special interest in

revealing certain departures from previous

Japanese military thinking and as the first

tangible intelligent effort to profit by past

experience. The portion dealing with basic

tactics and initial defense is quoted here,

omitting extraneous matter and the inevitable bombast which Japanese officers appear to consider necessary for inspiring

their troops.

. . . Victory depends on the officers and men of

the entire army concentrating . . . on our thorough

application of recent battle lessons, especially those

of Saipan.

The ultimate goal of this training is to minimize

our losses in the severe enemy pre-landing naval

1 For reference purposes translation of this document is listed as CinCPac-CinCP0A Item #11,190.

192

and aerial bombardment and, on the very night of

the enemy landing, to take advantage of the fact

that their equipment is not yet fully consolidated,

to destroy their bridgehead in one blow. . . .

Compared with our "short sword" the Americans

have a "long spear" with which to do battle. . . .

We must first resolutely penetrate to the enemy

and then we shall display our short swords and

slash to the very marrow of his bones. . . .

We must recognize the limits of naval and aerial

bombardment. Every soldier and civilian employee

. . . will remain unmoved by this, must strengthen

his spirits even while advancing by utilizing lulls

in enemy bombardment and taking advantage of

the terrain according to necessity—without incurring damage or exposing other areas too quickly

or thoughtlessely. . . .

We are ready to die honorably. . . . (But) even

if we die delivering our territories into the hands

of the enemy it will not necessarily contribute to

the opening of a new (and favorable) phase of

the war and how can we carry out our mission?

(TN: That is, mere dying is not enough). . . .

We must preserve personnel and ordnance—

psychological and material strength. . . . We must

detect the opportunity for opening up accurate fire

and recognize that it is unavoidable for the enemy

either to increase his range or move his target, as

his landing craft approach. . . .

It is most advantageous to be able to repel groups

of landing craft before their arrival at the beach

by means of strongly prepared beach positions but

we cannot expect to accomplish this completely.

. . . Moreover it is most urgent, in addition to attempting to destroy and confuse enemy ,landing

craft by means of these strong points, to lead the

enemy to confusion and destruction by concentrating

rapidly disappearing fire power from our strong

points remaining in his midst, even though par-
tially trampled under foot by landings,2 and to carry

out strong counter-attacks from previously planned

and prepared positions in order to destroy the

enemy that has landed, by dawn of the next day.

In order to do this it will be necessary to carry

out this counter-attack with men who have been

withdrawn from non-active fronts or else to use as

a nucleus well-selected reservists who have been

previously withdrawn. . . .

Small sector unit COs and sector unit COs, if

they are able to judge the enemy landing front

with certainty, should seize the opportunity to

move reserve troops to this front. . . .

In view of the tendency of the enemy . . . by

means of an overwhelmingly superior naval and

aerial bombardment to intercept and control our

reinforcements . . . it is absolutely necessary that

the movements of those aforementioned reserve units

and troops drawn from other sectors should make

practical use of terrain, natural objects, lulls in

enemy fire, weather, atmospheric phenomena

(especially squalls, clouds, mist, and smoke) in selecting their routes and, in addition that they plan

2 This passage describes the tactic of "passive

infiltration" (i.e., hiding out in overrun positions

in order to be in the rear of U. S. troops) which

played such a prominent part in the operation.

and prepare before hand all necessary equipment

and works. There will be no rapid exhaustion of

battle strength if we' pay careful attention to these

details. . . .

Without concerning ourselves with the great explosive bursts or the strong local effect of naval

firing, the destructive power wrought upon personnel is not very great. Especially when we consider

that originally the object of naval guns was to

sink ships and that their shells possess the special

quality of falling low, their physical power is not

very great against men who are advancing at a

crawl, utilizing terrain, natural objects, and shell

holes.

Aerial bombardment is almost identical. . . . By

observing very carefully the activity of enemy

planes and the bombs while they are falling, avoiding thereby instantaneous explosions, and by taking

advantage of gaps in bombardment in order to advance, it can cause no great damage. The only

fearful thing next to great physical power is the

psychological effect upon ignorant and inexperienced personnel. . . .

It is certain that if we repay the Americans (who

rely solely upon material power) with material

power it will shock them beyond imagination. . . .

Heavenly aid on the road to victory falls only

to those commanders who have a thorough control

of command. . . .

193
APPENDIX

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Japanese Caves

How many caves existed on Peleliu, and

how many of these were utilized by the Japanese defenders, will never be known. After the conclusion •of the land fighting, the

Island Command undertook a comprehensive correlation of all intelligence on the

subject, together with a painstaking on-thescene survey of all caves still recognizable

as such, which counted more than 500.1

An interesting aspect revealed by this

study is the fundamentally different approach to cave utilization by Japanese Army

and Navy elements. Perhaps characteristically, the Army's principal interest was

adaptation of terrain to defensive combat.

In contrast, the Navy, at least until shortly

before the landings, appeared to regard caves

mainly as shelters against attack by sea or

air, their defensive possibilities purely incidental.

Thus, the Army made use of all the many

natural caves in Peleliu's coralline limestone

formations which possessed tactical value,

improved on nature as necessary, and constructed their artificial caves as covering or

mutually supporting positions. The latter

occurred in a variety of forms, depending

I Japanese Military Caves on Peleliu, "Know Your

Enemy!" CinCPac-CinCP0A Bulletin 173-45. This

detailed and elaborately illustrated work provides

the basis for most of the material incorporated

herein.

194

on local terrain conditions and tactical situations. Most of them were small, owing to

limiting factors of time and labor available,

so the larger natural caves were mainly

adapted, often with great ingenuity, for the

emplacement of heavier weapons.

Naval troops, on the other hand, almost

entirely ignored natural caves, preferring

to construct their own. In this, progress

was facilitated by the presence of the 214th

Naval Construction Battalion, a tunnel construction unit (Suidotai), made up of personnel who had been miners and tunnel

workers in civilian life, commanded by civilian engineers. Their handiwork was characterized by professional competence. Passageways were of ample size and free of

the cluttering stalactites and stalagmites inevitable to natural limestone erosion, with

cross-tunnels and excavations opening off

both sides for the convenience and protection of the occupants.

Most of the Navy caves were located near

the northern end of the northwestern peninsula, though a few had been constructed

adjacent to Army installations for liaison

purposes. Although they were not designed

primarily for combat, defensive tactics

could be improvised readily, particularly in

the larger ones which provided a high degree of interior security owing to the complex of passageways and bays. This was
Diagram of cave system (lower level only) in northern ridge (TS I59Q)

PELELIU ISLAND

demonstrated by the trouble encountered by

the 5th Marines in northern Peleliu. But

the failure to integrate these positions into

a system of mutually supporting defenses accounts for the comparatively quick securing

of the Amiangal ridges in contrast to the

8921060-50 14

long-drawn-out process of attrition which

took place in the Umurbrogol.

The accompanying sketch shows the floor

plan of the largest and most elaborate Navy

tunnel system discovered on Peleliu; so

elaborate that many Marines believed it to

195
be the mine which supplied the raw material

for the phosphate refinery, located nearby.2

It is a cave (or caves) of what is defined as

the "adjoining H's type," with multiple

entrances facing in three directions from

the nose of the northernmost ridge on the

entire island. Dominating the West Road

and the reef approaches to Ngesebus, it

could be by-passed only by use of the extraordinary concentration • of supporting

weapons described in Chapter VI. Viewing

its complex interior, one can understand

more readily the plaint voiced in 5th Marines Regimental Narrative that: "Tank

guns, firing point-blank directly into the

caves and tunnels, did not even temporarily

cause the enemy therein to cease fire."

How the enemy utilized this striking example of the miner's art has been reconstructed in some detail from the description

furnished by a prisoner taken in February

1945: one of five living Japanese still lurking there three months after the last fighting had faltered out in the Umurbrogo1.3

On 3 September when the prisoner first entered

the caves there were over a thousand men in them.

. . On 28 September 1944, (D-plus 13) all the military personnel were organized for an attack on the

American forces who were holding the hill directly

over the caves. They poured forth from all nine

tunnels and attacked. He claims they drove the

Americans off the hill but suffered many losses.4

When they reassembled in the caves there were

only about 50 military men left. . . .

2 Actually the abandoned phosphate diggings lay

some distance to the south, in the vicinity of Asias

village, where mining was by the open-pit rather

than the tunneling method. JANIS No. 103 Vol. I,

p. VIII, 4.

3 Peleliu Island Command POW Interrogation

Report #6.

4 No mention of this counterattack appears in

any Marine operation reports at regimental or

higher levels, and the participating battalion (2/5)

turned in no written report of such counterattack.,

The CO of this unit recalls heavy fighting and

casualties that night, but the Marines atop the

hill (elements of Company F) most certainly were

not driven off. Oral statement by LtCol Gordon D.

Gayle, interviewed 17Feb50.

196

The survivors moved the wounded into tunnels

9, 10, and 11, the workers into tunnels 4, 5, 6, and

8, and the military personnel into tunnels, 1, 2, and

3. On the morning of 29 September our forces

assaulted the entrance to tunnel #1 with a tank,

machine guns and flame-throwers. The Japanese

military personnel attacked through tunnel #1

and all the military were killed except the prisoner

who remained behind an improvised barricade at

"A" in tunnel #2, and six others who were in

lower passages. The flame-thrower used by our

forces penetrated to where he was and burned his

left arm and leg. He claims the flame-thrower was

our most effective weapon in this attack and that

it reached point "A" where he was standing and

points "B", "C" and "D" killing some of the workmen who were located in these areas. The tank and

machine gun fire was only effective in the immediate

tunnel it was firing into.

Later, tanks and flame-throwers were used on

most of the entrances and when our forces withdrew there were only 30 remaining alive. The

wounded in tunnels 9, 10 and 11 were all killed

by our flame-throwers which penetrated the entire

length of tunnel 7-8 and to points "F" in tunnel 9

and "G" in tunnel #6. Our flame-throwers also

penetrated the entire length of tunnel #3 and tunnels #4 and 5 and around to points "N" in tunnel

#6 and "H" in tunnel #1. Tunnel #2 was not

subjected to the flame-thrower and most of those

men who survived had taken refuge in it.

Our forces then closed all entrances and the

, Japs moved into tunnel #2 which was the most

completely closed. They posted men at points "I"

in tunnel #5, "J" in tunnel #8 and "K" in tunnel #11. These men were able to pick off a number of "Foolish Yankees" who wandered into the entrances of tunnels #10, 7 and 4 during November

and December (TN: During this period American

personnel were killed and wounded in and around

this cave). According to the prisoner as soon as

they fired at anyone they would withdraw into

tunnel #2 and as many times as flame-throwers or

demolitions were used on the various tunnels they

were always safe because the entrance to this tunnel was completely covered and unrecognizable

from the outside.

Prisoner states that about 1 January 1945, after

they shot an American in tunnel #8, very large

explosive charges were set off in all the entrances

except tunnel #2 and that the force of these explosions was much more penetrative than the flamethrowers. They reached to every part of the cave

and shocked those they did not kill. If charges had

been put in tunnel #2 all would have been killed.

However, 19 of the remaining 30 were killed and

three more were badly injured. On 24 January
1945 American "Seabees" who were excavating in

that area stumbled on two of the Japs at "A" in

tunnel #2. The prisoner states that they then

moved the three wounded into tunnel #6, left two

men at "A" in tunnel #2 as guards, and the others

went to tunnel #11, passing point "L" in tunnel

#9 where our demolitions had caused the tunnel to

partially collapse. The flame-thrower used on tunnel #2 at this time killed the two guards. (TN:

Probably gasoline that was used by our forces in

an attempt to burn out this cave at that time).

The prisoner claims that on the night of 1 February 1945 the five Japs who were in good physical

condition dug their way out of tunnel #8.

197
APPENDIX E

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Aviation at Peleliu

Japanese air power in the Palaus had been

very thoroughly knocked out long before the

assault took place, and with the prompt

capture of the main airfield at Peleliu whatever capacity the enemy might have had for

sending in aerial replacements was effectively disposed of. Wreckage of 127 planes

was found on Peleliu, most of it probably

dating back to the powerful carrier strike

of 30 March-1 April, when 168 Japanese

planes were claimed destroyed either in the

air or on the ground. Thereafter the task

of keeping the secondary field on Babelthuap

neutralized was a simple matter. Enemy

air activity during the operation was confined to a few minor nuisance raids by individuals, believed to be float planes from

Koror, which resulted in no reported casualties or damage.

U. S. air power proved effective in its

basic mission of keeping the enemy neutralized. That it produced no more far-reaching results on the tactical level should be

attributed to natural conditions rather than

lack of skill or effort.

Air support prior to and for two weeks

following the landing was furnished by the

Navy: the carriers of Task Force 38 and

Task Group 32.7 from D-minus 8 to Dminus 1; escort carriers of TG 32.7 augmented by units of TG's 38.4 and 38.2 from

D-Day through D-plus 3; and by the escort

198

carriers exclusively from that date until

D-plus 13. Altogether more than 300 missions, planned and called, were flown during this period, dropping a total of 620 tons

of bombs of all types, including Napalm.1

During the early phases of the assault,

especially prior to setting up of artillery,

air was used almost exclusively as a close

support weapon. Here, where the terrain

was more or less open and level, "In General, the regimental commanders expressed

themselves as being well pleased with the

air missions." There was much criticism,

however, of the inefficiency of the strafing

attacks owing to the pilots' practice of

pulling out of their runs at an altitude of

about 1,800 feet.2

Also notable at this time was the effect on

the enemy of the ubiquitous aerial observers.

So promptly were weapons positions spotted

and brought under attack that the Japanese

exposed themselves as little as possible, thereby reducing their volume of fire during a

crucial stage of the operation.

Beginning with D-plus 2, however, the

practice was to call close air missions only

on targets denied the artillery, generally in

defilade or on reverse slopes, and after Dplus 6, the Navy air arm was used almost

1 1st MarDiv SAR, II, Annex L, 1.

2Ibid, 4, 5.
exclusively as a deep support weapon. It

will be noted that by this time the fighting

had progressed well into the ridges: jumbled, jungled terrain where spotting friendly

front lines was next to impossible and where

coaching fliers onto specific targets was exceedingly dangerous owing to the inaccuracy

of the operational maps. Since the location and nature of the great majority of

Japanese installations on the northwestern

peninsula rendered them impervious to effective air attack, even had it been possible

to pin-point them, the tactical value of aviation approached negligibility.

The 1st Division's own observation planes

(VMO-3) began operating from the Peleliu

airfield on D-plus 4 and continued skillful

direction of artillery fire until the enemyheld pocket became so constricted as to bar

massed fires as dangerous to friendly

troops.3 Then, on 28 September Marine

air units of MAG 11 based on the island assumed the support function, and the carriers

were released for other missions. Striking

changes in employment and methods became

noticeable immediately.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of

Marine aviation's participation in the PeleEu campaign was the opportunity afforded

for perfecting the practice and techniques

of that Corps specialty, close air support,

which had been relegated to a secondary

role owing to the protracted employment of

the air arm in neutralization missions in

the Solomons, Bismarcks and Marshalls.

The splendid close support which made

the shore-to-shore assault on Ngesebus one

of the most effective operations of its kind

in the whole Pacific has been dealt with in

passing. Dive bombing with pin-point precision, strafing at treetop level the pilots of

VMF 114 so stunned the defenders that Japanese in well manned, well prepared beach

installations were incapable of opposing the

landing. Throughout all the subsequent

fighting on Peleliu, the Marine fliers of all

the squadrons continued to display great

daring, ingenuity, professional skill and an

eagerness to cooperate that raised the

morale of the ground troops immeasurably: 4

not only the Marines, who were happy to

be working with their own people, but the

81st Division Wildcats as well, who seldom

made an attack without called air preparation.

Yet it would be difficult to substantiate a

report that all of this fine work, with the

conspicuous exception of Ngesebus, had any

important tactical effect on the outcome of

the campaign or the duration of the fighting. It was through no fault of the fliers

that the underground enemy were simply

proof against any methods of air attack yet

developed.

3 1st MarDiv SAR, II, 4. 4 MAG 11 Report on Palaus Operation.

199
APPENDIX F

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

The Mysterious Mission of Murai

Was Major General Kenjiro Murai on

Peleliu during the U. S. assault? If so, why

and in what capacity?

The Marines had no reason to suspect his

presence during their participation in the

operation. Nor did the 81st Division until

the last enemy resistance had virtually

flickered out: with the capture of the Japanese prisoner who described the general's

suicide, as related in Chapter VIII. Subsequently a body, decomposed beyond recognition, was identified by the prisoner as

that of Murai from personal effects found

on it. When the 81st was in occupation in

Japan, intelligence officers sought out Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue, commander of

the Palaus Sector Group, who certified

Murai's presence in the capacity of "tactical

adviser." 1

Many aspects of Japanese military procedure served to mystify American officers

during the course of the war, the curious

chain of command implied above not being

the least of them. As noted previously,

captured orders and prisoner of war interrogations indicated that the • de facto commander was Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, 2d

Infantry, IJA. Does it make good sense,

militarily speaking, for a major general to

act in a mere advisory capacity to an officer

1 Ltr MajGen P. J. Mueller, USA, to BrigGen C.

C. Jerome. 14Apr50.

200

two grades his junior, especially when the

size of the Japanese force on Peleliu raised

it far above the level of a regimental command?

An effort to throw more light on the subject, on the basis of a preliminary draft of

this monograph, was made in March 1950,

by a Marine officer stationed on Guam:

Lieutenant Colonel Waite W. Worden, who

had served as executive officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, on Peleliu. At that

time General Inoue was still confined in

U. S. Naval Prison, Guam, awaiting result

of an appeal from a death sentence for war

crimes. Evidence brought out through extensive interviewing by Colonel Worden

tends to confirm Murai's presence in detail.2

Following his talks with General Inoue,

Colonel Worden made a personal visit to

the Palaus (Peleliu, Koror and Babelthuap)

where he interviewed a number of natives

who had been there before and during the

operation. Excerpts from his report are

presented herewith for such intrinsic inter2 Further confirmed by report received by CMC

from Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated

15Apr50. This states that Japanese Army official

records carry both Murai and Nakagawa as killed

in action on Peleliu 31D ec44, evidently the date the

fact of their deaths was accepted, and adds that

each was raised to the grade of lieutenant general

by special promotion order the same day.
est as they may contain, both in the case of

General Murai and as showing some of the

bizarre aspects of the Japanese militarynaval establishments.3

Although Inoue has been confined for about six

years, his memory is indeed very clear and accurate. He has recalled events and dates exactly as

they have been recorded in your monograph. As a

result, I have a high regard for the accuracy of

his memory and will quote him freely. . . .4

Regarding the Jap 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry,

General Inoue states that he himself sent it to

Peleliu on the fifth night after the landing. . . . His

reason for sending this battalion was "for the sake

of the garrison at Peleliu and to bolster the morale

of the troops there." . . . Inoue thinks they got

ashore without loss . .. but perhaps the Peleliu commander chose not to tell Inoue of his losses. . . .

Inoue's belief that we would attack Koror and

Babelthuap (when we had finished with Peleliu)

kept him from attempting large scale reinforcements. It also kept him from attempting to supply

his Peleliu forces with more ammunition. Had Inoue

believed otherwise we might have had a much more

difficult time on Peleliu.

Major General Murai was on Peleliu, stated

Inoue, "to see that Colonel Nakagawa didn't make

any mistakes." Asked if he considered Nakagawa

to be a capable officer, Inoue stated that he was

one of the best in the entire Japanese Army. . . .

He also considered Murai to be a very capable officer. I stated to Inoue that to put a major general

over such a capable colonel, without giving the

major general the over-all command indicated that

he either (1) didn't have full confidence in the

colonel or (2) that he didn't have complete confidence in the major general. This amused him, and

with the self-satisfaction of a practical joker who

has had the last laugh, he said that he had put

Murai there for two reasons: (1) as insurance,

because he considered Peleliu to be so important to

the military defense of Japan, and (2) because the

Peleliu Navy garrison was commanded by a flag

officer, Vice Admiral Itou, and Murai was to give

the Army sufficient rank to cope with that of the

3 Ltr LtCol W. W. Worden to CMC, 8Apr50, with

enclosures. This document, now in records of Historical Division, USMC, also contains new evidence

regarding the death of LtCol A. E. Ellis, at Koror

in 1923, which is not considered pertinent to this

monograph.

4 A Marine officer who was active in the arrest

and interrogation of General Inoue has described

him as an elderly man verging on senility whose

real military brains belonged to his unusually capable chief of staff, Colonel Tokechi Tada. Oral

statement. by Maj J. A. Moriarty, 15Mar50.

Navy. . . . The Jap Army and Navy on Peleliu were

at bitter odds and treated each other with little

respect and with no cooperation, in many instances. . . .

Nakawaga arrived on Peleliu in April 1944,

states Inoue. This is confirmed by Peleliu natives.

Peleliu natives also state that the Jap army worked

furiously in the preparation of defenses. . . . Inoue

stated that the Jap Navy had all the native labor

tied up, and operated labor pools, from which it

was practically impossible for the Army to get any

labor. . . .

There were practically no caves developed for

defensive installations. From April, therefore, until

the Marine landing in September, the Jap soldiers

and some civilians were driven hard to develop

natural caves and to construct other emplacements,

which they did by hand and by dynamite. Inoue

stated that the Navy had some caves, but not very

many . . . (and) the Navy refused to allow the

Army to use the Navy caves, and the Navy tied up

almost all the civilian labor. . . . (Inoue) sent his

next senior officer, Major General Murai, to get

the Navy off Nakagawa's back so he could do his

job. Inoue stated that the Palaus had been a naval

base for so long, and had been considered as Navy

territory for so many years, that the sudden arrival

of an Army division with a lieutenant general in

command senior to all naval personnel was too much

for the Navy to take lying down. . . . To the Navy

it was an insult. . . .

It is apparent from the above that Inoue had

only six months in which to prepare his defenses,

and he stated that he fully believed that if he had

had one year instead of six months, he could have

completely repulsed us. . . . He further stated that

he was really prepared for us in Koror and Babelthuap, and was positive he could have defeated us

there. . . .

Inoue had telephone communication with Murai

over a sub-oceanic cable. This cable has been seen

by several of the Peleliu natives to whom I have

talked. Inoue stated that they had no radio communication at that time. The telephone call sign

used over this cable, both for Peleliu and Koror,

was "SAKURA," the name of a city (Sakura,

Ibaraki, Keng) in Japan. This name was used as

we might use "Texas" or "Denver" as a switchboard designation. While the Peleliu operator, on

25 November, was calling "Sakura . . . Sakura . . .

Sakura . . . Sak " his voice suddenly

ceased and General Inoue on Koror heard no more

from his Peleliu command. This interruption led

Inoue to believe that the American Marines had

blown up the Jap Peleliu command post, and also

led him to believe that General Murai, Colonel

Nakagawa, and his men (which he thought then

numbered 150-200) had been wiped out by enemy

action, and not by suicide. However, when I told

201
him about the report we received from a Jap prisoner . . . of the burning the regimental flag and

the suicides, he then stated, "I am sure that was

done."

Asked how Toyko had received the [final Peleliu]

message, General Inoue said "I reported it to Tokyo

myself by radio from Koror."

It is possible that this monograph has

done a grave injustice to the memory of

202

General Murai in attributing the skillful

Japanese defense of Peleliu entirely to Colonel Nakagawa. But, accepting the heavy

weight of evidence that Murai actually lived

and died there, the part he played remains

obscure. And the only men who could bear

authorative witness at this late date died

in the Umurbrogol.
APPENDIX G

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Marine Order of Battle for Peleliu

■11111■

Over-all ground command of the STALEMATE II operation was vested in Major

General Julian C. Smith, Commander, Expeditionary Troops, Third Fleet. Direct

command of Western Task Force (Southern

Palaus) was exercised by III Amphibious

Corps (Major General Roy S. Geiger),

major components of which were 1st Marine Division (Peleliu) and 81st Infantry

Division (Angaur). Corps troops committed, including garrison units in assault,

were operationally attached to the 1st Marine Division and distributed throughout

the various task units as indicated below.

The addition of 10,994 Corps to the 17,490

organic to the 1st Division brought the

total in assault on Peleliu to 28,484.

Task Organization—lst Marine Division

MajGen William H. Rupertus, Commanding

Combat Team 1 ("Spitfire")—Col Lewis B.

Puller

1st Marines

Co A 1st Tk Bn

Co A 1st Engr Bn

Co A 1st Pion Bn

1st Plat 1st MP Co

Co A 1st Med Bn

1st Plat Ord Co 1st Serv Bn

Det S&S Co 1st Serv Bn

Det 4th JASCO

Combat Team 5 ("Lone Wolf")—Col Harold

D. Harris

5th Marines

Co B 1st Tk Bn (less 1st & 4th Plats)

Co B 1st Engr Bn

Co B 1st Pion Bn

2d Plat 1st MP Co

Co B 1st Med Bn

2d Plat Ord Co 1st Serv Bn

Det S&S Co 1st Serv Bn

Det 4th JASCO

Combat Team 7 ("Mustang")—Col Herman

H. Hanneken

7th Marines (less 2d Bn)

1st & 4th Plats Co B 1st Tk Bn

Co C 1st Engr Bn (less 2d Plat)

Co C 1st Pion Bn

3d Plat 1st MP Co

Co C 1st Med Bn

Det 4th JASCO

Armd Amph Trac Group—LtCol Kimber H.

Boyer

3d Armd Amph Trac Bn (Prov)

Amph Trans Group—Maj Albert F. Reutlinger

1st Amph Trac Bn

6th Amph Trac Bn (Prov)

454th Dukw Co (U.S.Army)

454th Dukw Co (U.S.Army)

8th Amph Trac Bn (less Dets)

Arty Group—Col William H. Harrison

11th Marines

3d Bn III PhibCorps Arty (155mm How)

8th Bn III PhibCorps Arty (155mm Gun)

(less Btry G)

AA Group—LtCol Merlyn D. Holmes

12th AAA Bn

203
Engr Group—Col Francis I. Fenton

1st Engr Bn (less Cos A, B, & C)

33d Nay Const Bn

73d Nay Const Bn

Shore Party Group—LtCol Robert G. Ballance

1st Pion Bn (less Cos A, B, & C)

Garrison Beach Party

1st MT Bn (less Dets)

Serv Group—Col John Kaluf

1st Serv Bn (less Dets)

16th Fld Depot

204

Corps Air Del Sect

Det 1st MT Bn

Res Group—LtCol Spencer S. Berger

2d Bn 7th Mar

1st Tk Bn (less Cos A, B, and tanks of

Co C)

Reconn Co Div Hq Bn

4th JASCO (less Dets)

2d Plat Co C 1st Engr Bn

Det Co D 1st Med Bn

Med Group—Comdr (MC) Emil E. Napp

1st Md Bn (less Cos A, B, C, & Det Co D)
APPENDIX H

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU

Command and Staff

EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS

Commanding General Maj. Gen. Julian C.

Smith

Chief of Staff Col. Dudley S. Brown

F-1 Col. Harry E. Dunkelberger

F-2 Lt. Col. Edmund J.

Buckley

F-3 Col. Robert 0. Bare

F-4 Lt. Col. Jessee S.

Cook, Jr.

7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion 1

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Henry R.

Paige

Executive Officer Lt. Col. Elmer C.

Woods

Bn-3 Capt. Hugh J. Irish

III AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

Commanding General Maj. Gen. Roy S.

Geiger

Chief of Staff Col. Merwin H.

Silverthorn

C-1 Lt. Col. Peter A.

McDonald

C-2 Col. William F. Coleman

1 This was a VAC unit which landed on Angaur

on 21 Sept and remained as part of the garrison. duty.

C-3 Col. Walter A.

Wachtler

C-4 Col. Francis B.

Loomis, Jr.

CORPS TROOPS

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Commanding Officer_ Maj. Albert F. Reutlinger

(To 21 September)

Capt. Arthur J.

Noonan

(From 22 September)

Executive Officer Capt. Thomas H.

Boler

(From 23 September)

Bn-3 1st Lt. Norman H.

Bryant

6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Commanding Officer Capt. John I. Fitzgerald, Jr.

Executive Officer 1st Lt. Whitley A.

Cummings, Jr.2

2 Lt Cummings served also as Bn-3 as additional

205
8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Commanding Officer_ Lt. Col. Charles B.

Nerren

Executive Officer __ _ Maj. Bedford Williams

Bn-3 1st Lt. John R. Tull

3d Armored Amphibian Battalion

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Kimber H.

Boyer

Executive Officer Maj. Arthur M. Parker, Jr.

Bn-3 1st Lt. Marvin E.

Mitchell

12th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

Commanding Officer _ Lt. Col. Merlyn D.

Holmes

Executive Officer Lt. Col. Edwin A.

Law

(To 18 October)

Lt. Col. Kenneth A.

King

(From 19 October)

Bn-3 Maj. Joseph R. Jacyno

(To 10 October)

Capt. Whitman S.

Bartley

(11-25 October)

Capt. Henry H. McUmber, Jr.

(From 28 October)

3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion

Commanding Officer_ Lt. Col. Richard A.

Evans

Executive Officer Maj. Lewis A. Jones

(To 25 October)

Maj. Hunter C.

Phelan, Jr.

(From 26 October)

Bn-3 Maj. Daniel S. Preg,

nall

8th 155mm Gun Battalion

Commanding Officer__ Maj. George V.

Hanna, Jr.

Executive Officer Maj. Robert F. Meldrun

206

Bn-3 Maj. Hunter C. Phelan, Jr.

(To 25 October)

1st MARINE DIVISION

Commanding General Maj. Gen. William H.

Rupertus

Assistant Division

Commander Brig. Gen. Oliver P.

Smith

Chief of Staff Col. John T. Selden

D-1 Maj. William E.

Benedict

(To 23 September)

Lt. Col. Harold 0.

Deakin

(From 24 September)

D-2 Lt. Col. John W.

Scott, Jr.

D-3 Lt. Col. Lewis J.

Fields

D-4 Lt. Col. Harvey C.

Tschirgi

Division Headquarters Battalion

Commanding Officer. Col. Joseph F. Hankins 3

(To 3 October)

Lt. Col. Austin C.

Shofner

(From 3 October)

1st Tank Battalion

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Arthur J.

Stuart

Executive Officer _ Maj. Donald J. Robinson

Bn-3 1st Lt. Ernest A.

Hayden, Jr.

1st Service Battalion

Commanding Officer Col. John Kaluf

Executive Officer Maj. Charles F.

Rider

3 Col Hankins was killed in action on date indicated. He served concurrently as Division Provost Marshall, as did his successor.
1st Motor Transport Battalion

Commanding Officer__

Executive Officer

Bn-3 

Capt. Robert B.

McBroom

Capt. George G.

DeBell

1st Lt. Walter M.

Greenspan

1st Pioneer Battalion

Commanding Officer

Executive Officer

Bn-3 

1st Engine

Commanding Officer__

Executive Officer

Bn-3 

Lt. Col. Robert G.

Ballance

Maj. Nathaniel Morgenthal

Capt. Warren S. Sivertsen

er Battalion

Lt. Col. Levi W.

Smith, Jr.

Maj. Theodore E.

Drummond

Maj. Eugene T. Schoenfelder

1st Medical Battalion

Commanding Officer Comdr. (MC) Emil

E. Napp

1st Marines

Commanding Officer Col. Lewis B. Puller

Executive Officer Lt. Col. Richard P.

Ross, Jr.

1st Lt. Frank C. Sheppard

Capt. James W.

Horton

Maj. Bernard T.

Kelly

Maj. Francis T.

Eagan

R-1 

R-2 

R-3 ___

R-4 

1st Bn, 1st Marines

Commanding Officer

Executive Officer

Bn-3 

Maj. Raymond G

Davis

Maj. Nikolai S.

Stevenson

Capt. James M.

Rogers

2d Bn, 1st Marines

Commanding Officer__ Lt. Col. Russell E.

Honsowetz

Executive Officer Maj. Charles H.

Brush, Jr.

Bn-3 Capt. Robert W. Bur

nette

(To 18 September)

1st Lt. Bernard J.

Baker

(From 19 September)

3d Bn, 1st Marines

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Stephen V.

Sabol

Executive Officer Maj. William McNulty

Bn-3 Maj. Jonas M. Platt

5th Marines

Commanding Officer__ Col. Harold D. Harris

Executive Officer Lt. Col. Lewis W.

Walt

R-1 Capt. Alan F. Dill

(To 16 September)

Capt. Paul H. Douglas

(From 16 September)

Capt. Levi T. Burcham

Maj. Walter S. McIlhenny

(To 16 September)

Capt. Donald A. Peppard

(From 17 September)

R-4 Maj. Joseph S.

Skoczylas

(To 30 September)

R-2 

R-3 

1st Bn, 5th Marines

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Robert W.

Boyd

Executive Officer Maj. Harold T. A.

Richmond

Bn-3 Maj. Hierome L.

Opie, Jr.

(To 15 September)

201
2d Bn,

Commanding Officer _

Executive Officer

Capt. Edwin B. Glass

(From 16 September)

5th Marines

Bn-3

3d Bn,

Maj. Gordon D. Gayle

Maj. John H. Gustafson

(To 15 September)

Maj. Richard T.

Washburn

(From 16 September)

Maj. Richard T.

Washburn

(To 15 September)

Capt. James H. Flagg

(From 16 September)

5th Marines

Commanding Officer__ Lt. Col. Austin C.

Shofner

(To 15 September)

Lt. Col. Lewis W.

Walt

(Night 15/16 September)

Maj. John H. Gustafson

(From 16 September)

Executive Officer Maj. Robert M. Ash

(To 15 September)

Maj. Hierome L.

Opie

(From 16 September)

Bn-3 Maj. Clyde A. Brooks

7th Marines

Commanding Officer__ Col. Herman H. Hanneken

Executive Officer Lt. Col. Norman

Hussa

R-1 2d Lt. Richard F.

Spindler

R-2 Capt. Francis T. Farrell

208

R-3 Maj. Walter Holomon

R-4 Maj. Hector R.

Migneault

1st Bn, 7th Marines

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. John J. Gormely

Executive Officer Maj. Waite W. Worden

Bn-3 Maj. Lloyd W. Martin

2d Bn, 7th Marines

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Spencer S.

Berger

Executive Officer Maj. Elbert D. Graves

(To 20 September)

Maj. John F. Weber

(From 21 September)

Bn-3 Maj. John F. Weber

(To 20 September)

Capt. Lee W. Langham

(From 21 September)

3d Bn, 7th Marines

Commanding Officer Maj. E. Hunter

Hurst

Executive Officer Maj. Victor H. Streit

Bn-3 Maj. William J. King

11th Marines

Commanding Officer Col. William H. Harrison

Executive Officer Lt. Col. Edson L.

Lyman

R-1 1st Lt. Robert M.

Alderson

R-2 Capt. Richard W.

Payne

(To 24 September)

2d Lt. Ralph W.

Smith

(From 25 September)

R-3 Lt. Col. Leonard F.

Chapman, Jr.

R-4 Capt. Lewis F. Treleaven
1st Bn, 11th Marines

Commanding Officer_ Lt. Col. Richard W.

Wallace

Executive Officer Maj. James H.

Moffatt, Jr.

Bn-3 Maj. John R. Chaisson

2d Bn, 11th Marines

Commanding Officer__ Lt. Col. Noah P.

Wood, Jr.

Executive Officer Maj. Floyd C. Maner

(To 15 September)

Maj. John P. McAlinn

(From 16 September)

Bn-3 Capt. David R. Griffin

3d Bn, 11th Marines

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Charles M.

Nees

Executive Officer Maj. William J.

Hannan

Bn-3 Capt. William R.

Miller

4th Bn, 11th Marines

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Louis C.

Reinberg

Executive Officer__ _ Maj. George E. Bowdoin

Bn-3 Maj. Elliott Wilson

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: I950-892106

209

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting

the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

FIRST MARINE 'DIVISION (REINFORCED)

consisting of FIRST Marine Division; First Amphibian Tractor

Battalion, FMF; U.S. Navy Flame Thrower Unit Attached; Sixth

Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Provisional), FMF; Third Armored

Amphibian Battalion (Provisional), FMF; Detachment Eighth Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF; 454th Amphibian Truck Company,

U.S. Army; 456th Amphibian Truck Company, U.S. Army; Fourth

Joint Assault Signal Company, FMF; Fifth Separate Wire Platoon,

FMF; Sixth Separate Wire Platoon, FMF,

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces at Pelelivand Ngesebus from September 15 to 29, 1944.

Landing over a treacherous coral reef against hostile mortar and

artillery fire, the FIRST Marine Division, Reinforced, seized a

narrow, heavily mined beachhead and advanced foot by foot in the

face of relentless enfilade fire through rain-forests and mangrove

swamps toward the air strip, the key to the enemy defenses of the

southern Palaus. Opposed all the way by thoroughly disciplined,

veteran Japanese troops heavily entrenched in caves and in reinforced concrete pillboxes which honeycombed the high ground

throughout the island, the officers and men of the Division fought

with undiminished spirit and courage despite heavy losses, exhausting heat and difficult terrain, seizing and holding a highly strategic

air and land base for future operations in the Western,Pacific. By

their individual acts of heroism, their aggressiveness and their

fortitude, the men of the FIRST Marine Dilrision, Reinforced, upheld the highest traditions of the United states Naval Service."

For the President,

Secre the Navy