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MARINES AT

MIDWAY

C.2.

HISTORICAL SECTION

DIVISION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS

11. S. MARINE CORPS

It. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr. u s M c

1948
Marine Corps Monographs

in This Series

The Defense of Wake

The Battle for Tarawa

Marines at Midway

331

THE COVER OF THIS NARRATIVE shows the obsolete fabric-covered SB2U-3 dive bombers

of Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 241 taking off to attack the Japanese fleet striking force on

the morning of 4 June 1942, during the battle of Midway.

II
MARINES AT MIDWAY

Foreword

The name Midway means much to Marines. At the very outset of war, when

Midway's sole garrison consisted of a Fleet Marine Force defense battalion stationed

there in advance of hostilities, the Japanese found that here, as at Wake, Marines

were ready. Subsequently, in the battle of Midway, the heroism of Marine fighter

and dive-bomber pilots, who attacked effectively and unhesitatingly against tremendous odds, demonstrated once again that courage and discipline are among the

high traditions of our Corps.

There is another lesson to be derived from the Marine story of Midway, however, and that is the unity of the Fleet Marine Force as a completely integrated

air-ground team. This, too, is traditional, but it has never been better demonstrated

than by the integration of Marine artillery and infantry ( who secured the base )

with Marine air which struck the first blow at the Japanese carriers from that base.

While Marine fighters were slashing at enemy air, Marine artillerymen were shooting the Japanese planes down, and Marine dive bombers were harrying the enemy

fleet.

This coordinated interaction by land and sea and air embodied the time-tried

and proven doctrines of the Marine Corps in one of its primary fields : that of the

defense of advanced bases. To all students of this subject, I commend the story of

Marines at Midway.

1,tzsL.)\.

C.B. CATES,

GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS,

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS.
MARINES AT MIDWAY

Preface

"Marines at Midway" is an account prepared by the Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, of the role played by Marines in the base-development and defense of Midway Atoll. It is the third of a series of narratives intended to provide both

student and casual reader with accurate and complete information on Marine Corps operations in

World War II. As a sufficient number of these monographs are brought to completion, these in turn

will be edited for final compilation into an operational history of the Corps during the past war.

This account is exactly what its title implies: the Marine story on Midway. Its scope is intentionally limited to Marine history, and no attempt is made to give full treatment of Navy or Army operations in this locale, except as these impinge upon activities of Marine units.

Acknowledgment for generous assistance must be made to the Historian of Naval Operations,

Capt. Samuel Eliot Morison, USNR, and to Lieut. Roger Pineau, USNR, of the Office of Naval

History. Commander E. John Long, USNR, of the Office of the Secretary of National Defense, provided much assistance in assembly of illustrations. Cartographic services were furnished by the

Reproduction Department, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va., and all photographs are United

States Marine Corps, Navy or Army official. All personnel are referred to herein by the rank held

at the time described in the narrative. Dates and times are West longitude and local zone time unless

otherwise indicated. Citations of United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS ) material, unless '

otherwise indicated, are from "Interrogations of Japanese Officials," Naval Analysis Division, USSBS,

1946, and are indicated briefly by the NAV-interrogation numbers found in that publication.

Finally, however, credit must be given to the officers who, having served on Midway, unstintingly

furnished much additional information of historical value by interview or in reply to Historical Section

questionnaires. It is strongly hoped that these and others with first-hand experience will make possible

further improvement of this narrative either by submitting comments or, when in Washington, by visiting the Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters Marine Corps, for interview

and discussion of the points involved.

W. E. RILEY,

BRIGADIER GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS,

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION.

IV
MARINES AT MIDWAY

Contents

BIRTH OF A BASE

PAGE

1

WAR COMES TO MIDWAY 11

GIRDING FOR BATTLE 16

THE BATTLE, 4-5 JUNE 1942 96
CHAPTER I

MARINES AT MIDWAY

Birth of a Base

* * * the Pacific strategy of 1941 contemplated

rendering our bases relatively secure against air

raids, hit-and-run surface attacks, or even minor landings.

* * * Within and about the struc- ture of such lightly-held but secure bases, the Pacific Fleet was expected to ply, awaiting the moment When

—"

battle could be joined with enemy naval forces to get at naval forces with naval forces,'

Admiral Kimmel put it—in decisive action for

control of the sea.

--United States Marine Corps historical mono- graph "The Defense of Wake."

Despite their entire disparity in outcome, MidWay and Wake, the two Central Pacific basedefense operations in which the Marine Corps

participated during 1941 and 1942, had much

In common. Even their differences, the very differences which spelled surrender for Wake and

victory at Midway, were those of degree and not

of quality.

.Each atoll was defended by a combination of

Fleet Marine Force base-defense artillery and

aviation. From the viewpoint of these defenders,

each action was conducted with much the same

type of materiel, and based upon identical tactical

concepts. Only in that Midway's fortification and

development had commenced sooner; that more

Planes, troops, and weapons were available earlier; that Midway was farther away from island

Tem)/ air bases; and, most important of all, that

tile Pacific Fleet of June 1942, had recovered to

some extent from the shock of December 1941—

(2;* 1 in these matters of degree did the two operations differ. Yet it was this question of degree—

especially in regard to Fleet support—which permitted the successful defense of Midway.

The strategic importance of Midway had long

been recognized. In 1938, the famous Hepburn

Report, dealing with United States requirements

for naval bases, had this to say:

From a strategic point of view, an air base at Midway Island is second in importance only to Pearl

Harbor.'

The Board, which derived its name from the

senior member, Rear Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn,

USN, accordingly recommended immediate development of Midway as a naval air and submarine base with facilities for two patrol-plane

squadrons; two divisions of submarines; and pier,

channel and turning basin within the lagoon for

large auxiliaries. In conclusion, the Board included Midway in a select group of projects "necessary of accomplishment at the earliest practicable date," 2 and recommended for Midway expenditures amounting to $13,040,000, which

would, by 1943, accomplish the desired development.'

Lying approximately 1,137 miles northwest of

Oahu, Midway, outer rampart of the Hawaiian

chain, had been recognized to be strategic as early

as 1867 when the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon

Welles, directed that Brooks Island, as it was then

known, be claimed and surveyed for the United

States. In 1869, Congress actually appropriated

$50,000 for dredging an entrance channel and

1 "Report on Need of Additional Naval Bases to Defend

the Coasts of the United States, Its Territories and Possessions," House Document No. 65, 76th Cong., 1st sess.,

27 December 1938, hereinafter cited as Hepburn Report.

par. 102.

'Ibid., par. 151 and "Summary of Recommendations."

Ibid., "Estimates of Obligations and Expenditures."

1
77,=

MIDWAY'S CABLE STATION in the days when there was nothing hut sand on Sand Island. This pictui c was taken in the early

1900's before Marines came to Midway.

clear anchorage within the lagoon.' On 29 April

1903, its importance was further enhanced by

establishment of the Commercial Pacific Cable

Co.'s station on Sand Island, where the station

still remains.

Shortly after surveys by the U. S. S. Wright in

February 1934, Pan American Airways, quick to

realize Midway's importance from the viewpoint

of Pacific air operations, commenced development of a commercial seaplane base, likewise on

Sand Island. Pan American's construction work

began on 15 April 1935, and on 6 June of the

same year, the first clipper landed at Midway.'

Although popularly known as Midway Island,

Midway is in fact a circular atoll, about 6 miles in

diameter, enclosing two islands, Sand and East-

'The 19th century history of Midway is colorful and

replete with adventure which runs from shipwreck to

murder and smuggling. See "The Wrecker," by Robert

Louis Stevenson, 1891.

Historical data from "Midway—the North Pacific's

Tiny Pet," Homer C. Votaw, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, pp. 1606-1607, hereinafter cited as Votaw.

The first airplane flight from Midway lagoon was carried

out by a Naval aircraft on 10 October 1920. Cable Station Diary that date, hereinafter cited as Cable Diary.

em. Both were originally sand patches covered by

sparse, tough shrub. On Eastern Island, guano

had accumulated. As a result of years of experiment, the cable company, aided by the United

States Department of Agriculture, discovered that

a type of wire grass found on the sand dunes near

San Francisco would bind the sands of Midway,

and, with this as a starter, it became possible to

plant ironwood trees from the Hawaiian Islands

and eucalyptus from Australia. As a result, bY

1934 Sand Island supported a grove of 40-foot

ironwoods, subsidiary growth including grass, and

truck gardens about the cable station. At the

northeast end of Eastern Island, stood three or

four scrub trees. Throughout both islands there

grew the scaevola bush '—locally described as a

dwarf magnolia because of its leaves—and on all

sides were to be encountered the ubiquitous

"gooney-birds," actually albatrosses, together

with several other species: flightless rails, moan-

" Pronounced by countless Marines as "skavoli."

There were two species, one black, and the other black

and white. The former is properly entitled the "Black'

footed Albatross"; the latter, the "Laysan Albatross,"

"Midway Islands," Fred C. Hadden, undated, hereinafter

cited as Hadden.
ing birds, gannets, frigate birds, terns, and boatswain birds, to name the most common.

Of the two islands, Eastern is the smaller and

lower, being one-and-one-quarter miles long and

but 12 feet above sea level at its highest point.

Sand Island, however, attains a height of 39 feet

and is almost two miles in length. Both islands

he in the south half of the lagoon, close aboard

the reef. Welles Harbor, the prewar roads, and

entrance to the lagoon is just west of Sand Island,

the western of the two islands, but a new entrance

to the lagoon, Brooks Channel, between Sand and

Eastern Island, was dredged in 1938, and is now

the only one in use.'

From 1935 to early 1940, Midway's development progressed smoothly, first under the aegis of

Pan American, and, from mid-1939 on, under the

Navy as a result of the Hepburn recommendations. By the end of 1939, heavy construction was

Data from "Sailing Directions for the Pacific Islands,

Volume H," H. a 166, U. S. Navy Hydrographic Office,

P451; Votaw,

Taxis. 

p 1607; and note by Lt. Col. Samuel G.

well started on Sand Island, and Brooks Channel

had been partially blasted and dredged open by

United States Army Engineers,. Eastern Island,

however, remained unchanged, occupied only by

two "retired" burros from the cable station.

In early 1939, the military history of the defense

of Midway might be said to have commenced

when Colonel Harry K. Pickett, assisted by Captain Alfred R. Pefley, was sent to the atoll—as

well as Wake and Johnston—to conduct a military reconnaissance and prepare tentative defense

plans for fortification of all three.' These plans,

which were completed almost a year later," were

approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold W. Stark, USN, who then directed,' on 20 December 1939, that the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, establish,

° Letter from Col. Alfred R. Pcfley to CMC, 13 January

1948.

1° Official report Of Col. Harry K. Pickett to MGC submitting defense plans for Midway, 14 October 1939, hereinafter cited as Pickett report.

" CNO serial 397, 20 December 1939.

MARINES CALLED "SKAVOLI"—the dwarf magnolia, or scaevoli bushes, which virtually cover the surface of Sand and

Eastern Islands.

3
SAND ISLAND IN 1935, when the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, FMF, held amphibious landing exercises at Midway. Note the

Marine camp on beach in right foreground.

when practicable, a Marine detachment as a

garrison on Midway."

With this very mission in prospect, the 3d Defense Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, commanded

by Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Pepper, was at

this time under orders for movement from the

East coast to the Hawaiian area; and the battalion arrived at Pearl Harbor in U. S. S. Chaumont after an uneventful voyage from Charleston, S. C., on 7 May 1940.

12 This was not, however, the first Marine detachment

to garrison Midway. To protect the cable station and prevent Japanese poachers from violating Midway's status as

a bird sanctuary, a detachment of one officer and 20 enlisted Marines served on Midway from 1904, through

1908, occupying a camp site an rising ground near the

center of Sand Island. Votaw, p. 1605; Annual Report of

the Commandant of the Marine Corps 1904. Fleet Marine

Force landing exercises—conducted by the 1st Battalion,

6th Marines—were also held at Midway in May 1935,

Cable Diary, that month.

4

Following the 3d Defense Battalion's establishment at Pearl Harbor, it became apparent that

facilities at Midway were not sufficiently advanced to permit garrisoning the atoll with any'

thing approaching the full strength of a defense

battalion, or even an appreciable cadre sufficient

in number to commence installation of weapon 

or construction of fortifications. Colonel Pepper

accordingly recommended on 23 May that Rear

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, USN, Commandant/

Fourteenth Naval District, authorize the sending

of an advance reconnaissance ,party to MidwaY•

This group, to consist of two officers and not more

than 16 enlisted Marines, would conduct detailed

reconnaissance of the ground, propose up-to-date

defensive plans and dispositions for a defense bat'

talion, execute the painstaking surveys required

for accurate artillery fire, and* would, in addition

be available to the Navy's resident officer io
charge of the Midway construction project 13 for

assistance should emergency arise among the

motley group of civilian contract laborers."

Admiral Bloch's reaction to this proposal was

immediate. Within a week, on 31 May, Captain

Samuel G. Taxis, then commanding the 5-inch

seacoast group of the 3d Defense Battalion, was

ordered to Midway with a reconnaissance party

(First Lieutenant James G. Bishop, eight enlisted

Marines and two Navy hospital corpsmen )i5 for

six weeks of preliminary work. He was to establish a small Marine camp, prepare tentative recommendations for the seacoast defense of Midway

by the three 5-inch batteries of his group ( as well

as certain antiaircraft recommendations), survey

the base lines required for accurate fire control,

and block out the tactical communication net

which would be needed by the defending battalion. Within six weeks, his instructions added, he could expect relief by a similar detachment

with further missions."

Shortly after, on 5 June, Admiral Bloch—as a

result of Colonel Pepper's further recommenda- tion—ordered Lieutenant Commander Julian

Love ( MC ) USN, the 3d Defense Battalion medical officer, to Midway to carry out a sanitary and

Medical survey. This officer sailed from Pearl

Harbor in the U. S. S. Sirius, reached Midway on

.;. 1 June, and completed his survey by 16 June.

&Awes report, an extremely thorough and detailed document, pointed out many aspects of life

°n Midway which would become characteristic

to future Marines in garrison.

Midway he found to be temperate to tropical

i.11 climate, with cool nights. He noted the brilliant, white sand, which resulted in intense ground

glare from the sun." Of the birds he stated :

Certain considerations should be made or continued for the preservation of these birds for they

'3 This was Lt. D. B. Ventres (CEC), USNR.

CO, 3d Defense Battalion, memorandum to Com14,

" MaY 1940.

Taxis, Samuel G , Lt. Col , official reply to Historical

Section questionnaire.regarding. Midway, hereinafter cited

as Taxis, p. 3.

" Commandant, 14th Naval District, letter of instruc-

`1°118 to Capt. Samuel G. Taxis, 31 May 1940.

Col. Kenneth W. Benner comments on this point:

" die tender-skinned boys were sunburned under their

chins because of reflected glare."

are a great source of amusement, and the cheerful

calls ( sic) 18 add much to the attractiveness of the

island and will in a latent way add to the morale of

personnel. * * *

There were cattle and poultry at the cable station,

and abundant fish in the lagoon. No significantly

dangerous sanitary or epidemiological factors existed, and, in conclusion, he opined :

This island is very pleasant and beautiful and

should offer a happy outlook to married personnel.

For single officers and men it will probably be better

to rotate duty between there and Pearl Harbor at

3 to 6 month intervals during peacetime to avoid

monotony and to give consideration to natural

desires of the men."

On 9 July, Captain Kenneth W. Benner, with

First Lieutenant Donald J. Decker, eight enlisted

Marines, and two Navy hospital corpsmen, was

ordered to Midway to relieve Captain Taxis and

his detail. Captain Benner's instructions were

substantially similar to those of Captain Taxis,

except that the former, who commanded the 3-

inch antiaircraft group of the defense battalion

was to devote his reconnaissance and survey to

that required for antiaircraft defense of the

islands."

Meanwhile, acting on Captain Taxis's initial

information and Colonel Pepper's urging, Admiral Bloch ordered the latter to establish on or

after 1 September what was provisionally designated the Midway Detachment, Fleet Marine

Force, consisting of nine officers, 168 enlisted, and

approximately one-third of the 3d Defense Battalion's materiel, including one 5-inch battery

(two guns) . This detachment was to act in turn

as an advance echelon of the whole battalion,

personnel being rotated between Pearl Harbor

and Midway on a four- to six-month basis.

Major Harold C. Roberts (to be killed in action

five years later while commanding the 22d Marines on Okinawa ) was in command of the Mid-

" On reviewing this passage, Lt. Col. Stuart M. Charlesworth, another Midway pioneer, commented: "The call of

the sooty tern is anything but cheerful * * *" and

Hadden, p. 5, says that the cry of the moaning bird

(Wedge-Tailed Shearwater) " * * * sounds as

though all the devils in hell are crying out in anguish."

" Love, Julian, Lt. Comdr. (MC) USN, report to

Com14, 21 June 1940.

" Commandant, 14th Naval District, letter of instructions to Capt. Kenneth W. Benner, 9 July 1940.

5
THE UBIQUITOUS GOONEY-BIRDS provided amusement for Marines and problems for aviators.

way Detachment when it sailed from Pearl Harbor on 23 September 1940, in three ships, the

U. S. S. Sirius, a World War I Hog Islander, and

two destroyer-minecraft made available for the

trip. Six days later, on 29 September, Major

Roberts landed his detachment via barges and

began the arduous task of making camp and installing the defenses of Midway."

The Roberts 22 detachment was quartered in

the temporary barracks of an Army Engineer unit

which had been working on Midway in connection with harbor improvements within the lagoon.

During the next six months, the Midway Marines'

duties would consist of the unceasing arduous

grind which perhaps above all other aspects characterized duty in the defense battalions of

1940-41. Heavy weapons and fire-control mate-

"Muster roll, 3d Defense Battalion, FMF, September

1940. These were not, however, the first defensive installations to be made on Midway. Volaw, p. 1605, states that

"two quick-firing cannon were installed" during the 1904-

08 garrisoning of Midway by Marines, but that a magazine explosion caused their use to be terminated.

" The Roberts detachment was partially relieved by a

similar group under Major Kenneth W. Benner in December 1940. This unit remained on Midway until the

full battalion arrived in 1941.

6

riel were gradually emplaced and magazines and,

shelters were dug—largely by hand tools, foll

engineering equipment was a scarce commodityl

in Marine units of those days. In addition to the-I

foregoing military duties, the Marines also—o0,1

order of the Fourteenth Naval District—were required to act as stevedores and longshoremen for

ships coming to Midway.

Highlights of life on Midway during this initial,'

period are described by one officer in the followinP

passage " :

Considerable effort was expended in filling and

manhandling sandbags from the beach areas to the

gun positions; this was necessary to preserve the I

limited camouflage furnished by the scaevola. Much!

sweat and ingenuity was required to install the

5-inch guns on top of the 20-foot sand dune fringing

Sand Island.

It was impossible to stand on one high point of

the * * * dune and recognize changes in de'

vation and direction of contours on Sand Island

with its covering of dense scaevola brush. To at' I

tempt to locate known points while walking throughl

the scaevola was also impossible due to the height [

and density of foliage. The final solution in locating

positions for magazine installations to be constructed

"Letter by Lt. Col. Stuart M. Charlesworth to CMU,

15 January 1948.
in accordance with future planning was to send out

a two-man team of officers on a TD-9 tractor to

press down trails along the inside of the fringing

dunes and to various points in the center of the

island. This was accomplished by one officer standing up on the back of the tractor in a position from

which he could look above the scaveola and give

general directions to the driver. It proved to be hot

work in the direct sun without benefit of breeze, and

* many * spills *

were taken from the pitching "cat."

The "gooney" birds were a considerable problem

within the position-areas because once they fell into

a gun pit they did not have the intelligence necessary to find their way out. Actually the birds created

quite a diversion for the men working on the guns; and if paint were hereditary, I imagine that many a

gu°rIeY" bird is still wearing the red-lead splotches

so delicately given his ancestcrs by the Midway

Detachment.

Recreation in the Midway Detachment consisted

generally of swimming, limited boating and fishing,

a small amount of beer on occasion, and a somewhat

11_ aphazard outdoor movie which came into being late in the tour. Actually the birds seemed to enjoy the movie as much as the men because the sooty tern and

mcianing bird would invariably flock around the sound box and emit their mournful wail.

During the laying season the island was literally col vered with eggs so that in certain areas it was

most impossible to walk without stepping on one.

_Mere probably wasn't a man in the detachment

didn't at one time or another sit down to a

canner of tern eggs, whether of necessity or for the

experience.

While the advance echelon of the 3d Defense

Battalion labored on Mitlway, the Chief of Naval

Operations, increasingly concerned over the international situation, directed, early in 1941, that

the entire battalion be established at Midway;

and that the 6th Defense Battalion, then in train-

,1ng at San Diego, but without its heavy materiel,

De transferred to Pearl Harbor for advanced tra i ;

and for service as a rotational pool of

repla

cements for Marine garrisons shortly to be

established at Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra."

F Tile orders had been anticipated, and, on 7

ebruary

1941, when CinCPac issued impleinenting instructions with regard to Midway, it

''vas a matter of only three days before the balance

°f the 3d Defense Battalion, approximately 28 of-

, 24 eNo serial 0638,17 January 1941. Marine garrisons,

'vont the 1st Defense Battalion, had been set up at John- ston °It- 24 July 1941, and Palmyra on 14 April 1941.

ficers and 565 enlisted Marines, with all heavy

organizational equipment loaded in U. S. S.

Antares, sailed from Pearl Harbor distributed

among the ships of Cruiser Division 8." The

movrment was executed without incident, and,

on 14 February, the battalion arrived and commenced disembarkation at Midway.

This, however, was by no means a simple dockside operation. A heavy sea was running, which

forced Task Force Three to lie off for 24 hours

before even attempting to get the Marines ashore,

which was done by ships' boats "running" Brooks

Channel from the open roadstead beyond the reef.

A number of the motor launches swamped due to

heavy seas, and, in one instance, a Marine was

washed overboard, only to be neatly retrieved by

the boat following. The whole flotilla was piloted

in by a Marine officer, Captain Taxis, who by

now was thoroughly familiar with Midway and

its waters."

Despite the hard work of the Marines in the

advance echelon, Midway was by no means

entirely ready or ideally suited to receive its full

garrison. Admiral Kimmel, then CinCPac, realized this as reports came back from the atoll, and

within two months actually proposed a reduction

of the Marine force, on the basis that the overcrowding at Midway imposed an undue strain on

supporting agencies and deterred progress of

work.27

But the march of events in 1941 could hardly

be reversed.

Only one day after Admiral Kimmel's recommendation, Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the

Fourteenth Naval District, had issued an operation, plan for defense of his outlying islands, premising the possible outbreak of hostilities, emphasizing the restricted status of the sea areas

about those bases, and ordering defense forces,

without parleying, to—

* *

* fire on suspicious and unidentified airThe new light cruisers Savannah, Philadelphia, Brooklyn, and N ashville . It is an indication of the increasing tension of the times that the movement—designated Task

Force Three—proceeded to Midway with ships darkened

and within a destroyer screen provided by DesDiv 11.

PacFlt Operation Order 3-41, 6 February 1941.

" Letter by Lt. Col. Samuel G. Taxis to CMC, 6 January 1948.

" CinCPac serial 0496 to CNO, 3 April 1941.

7
craft * * * stop unidentified and suspicious

vessels * * * if necessary by firing a shot

across the bow.

Submarine, surface or air raids prior to any declaration of hostilities were a possibility, he warned."

To CinCPac's proposal for even a temporary

and partial reduction of the Midway force, the

Chief of Naval Operations therefore replied with

a firm negative, rejoining that the international

situation was such that even further augmentation

of Midway's defenses was under consideration."

This augmentation contemplated the installation

at Midway of four 7-inch naval guns," together

with four 3-inch naval guns, all over and above

the defense battalion's normal quota of weapons.

These weapons were to become available for installation about 1 November.

During the summer of 1941, the grind continued unabated. In the words of Lt. Col. Erma

A. Wright, who comments on Midway as it then

was:

The morale of the troops, of course, was of major

importance since there were no USO shows to attend, nor beautiful Red Cross girls to serve coffee

and doughnuts. Actually there were only two imported morale-builders—movies and the arrival of

the Pan-American clipper twice weekly. To make

up the difference, Colonel Pepper insisted on hard

work and hard play seven days per week. This combination worked miracles. * * *

By midsummer, however, Colonel Pepper and

a group of 3d Defense Battalion personnel who

had been longest at Midway were relieved by a

" In compliance with these instructions (14th Naval

District Operation Plan 2-41, 4 April 1941), the 3d Defense Battalion designated a boarding officer, 1st Lt.

Charles J. Seibert, II. At about this time, likewise, a Japanese freighter appeared off Midway, just beyond gun range,

lay to, and then circled the atoll before proceeding. This

ship was challenged but gave no reply. Letter by Lt. Col.

Harry F. Noyes to CMC, 28 December 1947.

" CNO serial 047412, 6 May 1941.

" Major General Commandant, USMC, serial

434941-2, to Brig. Gen. Charles F. B. Price, 12 September

1941. The history of these and certain other 7-inch guns

likewise installed at outlying bases is a story which spans

both wars. The guns were originally mounted aboard predreadnaught battleships of the early 1900's; were dismounted during World War I to serve as medium artillery

ashore for the 10th Marines in France, and were finally

distributed between Samoa, Midway, Bora-Bora, and

Guantanamo Bay in 1941-42. Those emplaced at Midway

are now mounted in front of Iolani Barracks in Honolulu.

8

similar detachment under Lieutenant Colonel!

Bert A. Bone of the 1st Defense Battalion, which)

remained until arrival of the 6th Defense Battalion later in the year.

In August, two events of note took place. The

first was commissioning of the Naval Air Station,

Midway, on the first of the month, under prospective command of Commander Cyril T. Sim'

ard, USN, a veteran Naval aviator destined W

play a vital role in the defense of Midway. The

second was arrival of the advance detail of the

6th Defense Battalion, commanded by another

officer whose name would be linked in history

with that of Midway: Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. Shannon, battalion executive officer.

Bringing out his echelon (10 officers and 130

enlisted) in U. S. S. Chester and Nashville,

Colonel Shannon reached Midway on 11 August

and immediately set to preparing for the relief d

the 3d Defense Battalion. Throughout the month,

turn-over of vital information and key jobs was

progressively accomplished so that when, on ii

September, the main body of the 6th Defense

Battalion arrived, under command of Colonel

Raphael Griffin," the relief was rapidly con.

eluded."

Thus, one year after the original Midway De'

tachment, FMF, had been established, the 3d De'

fense Battalion could step aside for a well-earned

period of rest and rotation in the Hawaiian area.

A few weeks after the relief of the 3d Defense

Battalion, in late November, Midway received a

most important visitor " (the term "VIP" had not

yet come into general use) —none other than Mr.

Kurusu, Saburu, the last-minute "peace" envoy

of Japan, who was flying to the United States

from Tokyo via Pan American clipper. The fol-

" Colonel Griffin was shortly afterward relieved as car

manding officer of the battalion by Colonel Shannon,

routine change of command.

The 6th Defense Battalion, FMF (34 officers and 75°

enlisted) had reached Pearl Harbor in the U.S.S. Whartoe

on 22 July, and its main body sailed from Midway on

September. Muster rolls, 6th Defense Battalion; and lett

from Lt. Col. Ralph A. Collins, Jr., to CMC 12 Januarl

1948.

" Another "VIP" visitor whose arrival at Midway re'

ceived much publicity at this time was Mrs. Clare Booth :

Luce, then on a world flight. From her point of view, the

stop was eventful because of sudden seizure with a digesti/e

upset while on the atoll.
lowing account, by one of the officers then on

Midway, tells of the Marines' experience with Mr.

Kurusu:

We had advance notice of his arrival date and the ostensible nature of his mission, but did not ex- Pect him to remain the full three days that he did as a result of extremely bad weather. Colonel Shannon and Captain Simard ( sic) decided to arrange a re- ception calculated to impress him with the alertness and strength ( largely nonexistent) of the Midway

garrison. Elaborate plans involving precise timing

were drawn up so that when Mr. Kurusu disem- barked from the Pan American bowser barge ( he

was traveling in one of the old Pan Air flying boats

Which anchored out in the lagoon) onto Midway, the . first thing to meet his eyes would be an endless

line of Marines in light marching order filing past.

I?-1 addition, all available aviation strength, con- sisting of a squadron of PBY's, was drawn up on the

seaplane apron in full view of the dock.

The plans worked out perfectly. The head of the column, which was on the road between the dock and the Pan Air Hotel where Kurusu was to stay,

was started moving toward the hotel just before he

docked. The tail of the column of Marines, in file with about two yards between men, stretched back

toward the hangar as far as he could see. After be- ing greeted by Captain Simard and Colonel Shannc'n and given plenty of opportunity to see the

Planes, he was driven in the captain's car past the

c. ontinuous line of silently plodding Marines, carry- ing their rifles slung, with fixed bayonets. Their

presence along the road was explained nonchalantly

Y Colonel Shannon as a routine training maneuver of a small part of the command. Actually every

havailable man, including the cooks and mcssmen,

ad been scraped together to make a single line long

enough so that Kurusu could not see how pitifully few were the defenders of Midway. The captain went Pn to apologize for not rendering honors and

' F'Tlained that every minute was required for intens- ive training—he was sure Mr. Kurusu would under- stand.

That this statement was true must have been apparent to Kurusu during the next 3 days, and

entirely without premeditation on our part.

r. It JUst happened that Fox ( Silvey)'4 Battery was

„ig,Iii lo front of the Pan Air hotel, being separated

i:nlY by a coral road, and was due to fire a calibraOn shoot followed by some extensive trial fire and

rst-adjustment problelms for training. * * *

he colonel saw no reason for not going ahead with the firing; on the contrary we embellished it someAlthough subsequently known as Silvey Battery from the th. name Me of a future commanding officer, this unit was at

ls time actually commanded by Capt. Hoyt McMillan.

Letter from Lt. Col. Hoyt McMillan to CMC, 27 January

1948.

what. So for the duration of his enforced 3-day stopover, Mr. Kurusu listened to the slamming of the

3-inch AA guns outside his window from early

morning until sunset. The practice was culminated

with the firing by all guns of 15 rounds adjustment

at full firing rate on a burst target, which made

quite an impressive noise for our guest, as well as

giving our gun crews some badly needed loading

practice. He was not permitted to leave the hotel,

in accordance with established procedure for civilian Pan Air guests ( except for one night as the captain's and colonel's guest at our officers' mess and

movie) , so any impressions he may have gotten of

Midway were necessarily those of the "march-past,"

the planes, and the firing.

In the Marine Corps concept of defense of

advanced bases, the artillery, both seacoast and

antiaircraft, represented only part of the rounded

whole, and local aviation was realized to be essential for balanced defense of a base such as Midway. Therefore, as soon as development of the

airfield on Eastern Island warranted, it was

determined that Fleet aviation, to be drawn from

Marine Air Group 21, then based at Ewa Mooring Mast, T. H., would be assigned to Midway,

where, in fact, the air field was already in partial

use as a ferry point for Army B-1 7's then being

flown to the Far East. To support this latter

activity, a detachment of one officer and four

enlisted radiOmen of the Army Signal Corps had

been established with appropriate radio equipment on Midway in October, and, on 19 November 1941, a Marine aviation advance detail consisting of one officer ( Second Lieutenant Loren

D. Everton) and 60 enlisted was sent forward,

to prepare the field for use by Marine Scout

Bombing Squadron 231 ( VMSB-231 ) which

would remain at Ewa until Midway could receive them."

Progress of Everton's detachment on Eastern

Island was such that, immediately after the

U. S. S. Enterprise had delivered Marine Fighting

Squadron 211 to Wake for a similar role, the

U. S. S. Lexington embarked VMSB-231 for

Midway on 5 December, with the intention of

flying off the squadron on the morning of 7

December."

"Larkin, Claude A., Col., letter to CinCpac, 5 April

1943, p. 2.

" Larkin, Claude A., Col., personal letter, 18 December

1941.

9
On I December 1941, meanwhile, as Marines

of the 6th Defense Battalion and the ground

echelon of V MSB-231 were putting final touches

on their respective construction programs, two

1,800-ton Japanese destroyers, comprising DE

stroyer Division 7, Akebono and Ushio, under

command of Captain Konishi, Kaname, sailed

from Tokyo Bay with orders to proceed via carefully planned routing to Midway. A fleet tanker,

Shiriya, would fuel them and act as their train.

A small task unit of the larger fleet which had

sailed from Hitokappu Bay against Pearl Harbor

four days earlier, on 26 November, the destroyer

division and its tanker was provisionally desig10

nated as Midway Neutralization Unit, their niiS

sion being to neutralize the Naval Air Station at

that place.37

Unknowing of all this, however, the forces ofl

Midway spent the week of 1 December much as

they had spent past weeks; that is, in improving

gun emplacements, and unloading a cargo ship;

and to them Sunday, 7 December, was merely

the day on which the airplanes of VMSB-231

were scheduled to fly in to Eastern Island.

. ,

" "Campaigns of the Pacific War," U. S. Strategici

Bombing Survey, 1946, pp. 13 and 20-21, hereinafter cited 

as Campaigns.
CHAPTER II

MARINES AT MIDWAY

War Comes to Midway

On the morning of 7 December, Midway's

patrol planes were out early and on schedule.

Five of VP-21's PBY's were dronning along prescribed routine searches, and two more patrol

bombers, enroute for ultimate delivery to the

Netherlands East Indies, had taken off for Wake

at first light. On the Sand Island seaplane ramp,

two PBY's warmed up to rendezvous with and

guide in the expected Marine dive-bombing

squadron, VMSB-231.1

At 0630 (0900 Pearl Harbor time), a Navy

radio operator's "Z"-signal from Oahu broke through

to Midway with an inkling of the disaster at Pearl Harbor; a few minutes later, just

as. the Army Signal Corps detachment was receiving the same word from Hickam Field, an

official despatch from the Commandant, Fourte_enth Naval District, confirmed the news and

directed that current war plans be placed in

effect.

f After recalling the Dutch PBY's ( which were

r

s

thwith commandeered for VP-21 ) and estab-

!lung additional patrol sectors for the remain- ing aircraft, the island Commander at 0918

directed that the 6th Defense Battalion—which

had at 0900 already acted in anticipation of such

Orders—go to general quarters.

The remainder of the day was spent in much he 

sante type of activity as was frantically go- ing ahead on other outlying United States

f lands: preparations for blackout, issue of addl.- -1 (3“.". ammunition, digging of foxholes, and

ber

These and subsequent details as to the day of 7 Decem-

" Midway are taken from War Diary, NAS, Midway, for that date, hereinafter cited as NAS Diary.

785018-48 2

check of communications. All lights and navigational aids were extinguished.

By nightfall, with defenses still manned, Midway—which now was not to receive VMSB-231,

due to the Lexington's diversion to an attempt to

locate the Japanese Pearl Harbor striking force—

was buttoned up, and all search planes had returned with negative reports.

At 1842, however, just after evening twilight,

a Marine lookout observed a flashing light some

distance to the southwest of Sand Island. Although this soon disappeared, it was, undoubtedly, a visual signal among the Japanese ships of

the Midway Neutralization Unit. Although lights

were not again seen, the one operational radar

on Sand Island began picking up what seemed to

be surface targets southwest of Sand Island about

2130. At almost the same time, observers in two

searchlight positions, which were equipped with

powerful 8X56 night glasses, reported "shapes" to

seaward in the same area as the radar contacts

just mentioned. The commanding officer of the

searchlight battery ( Battery G, First Lieutenant

Alfred L. Booth) immediately requested permission to illuminate, but this was refused on the

ground that it might disclose our positions prematurely. Further, at this time it was erroneously

believed that friendly ships were in the vicinity,

and this doubt had resulted in issuance of strict

orders against any firirig or illumination except on

specific orders from the battalion commander.'

Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Alfred L. Booth to

CMC, 27 January 1948, hereinafter cited as Booth; and

letter from Lieutenant Colonel Loren S. Fraser to CMC,

hereinafter cited as Fraser.

11
JAPANESE DESTROYER, USHIO, which shelled Midway on the night of 7 December 1941, rides at her last anchorage, after the

end of the war. Of all the enemy vessels which participated in the Pearl Harbor attack, this lone destroyer was the onlY

one afloat on VJ-day.

Akebono and Ushio, the two enemy destroyers

whose mission was to bombard Midway, made

their landfall about 2130, having left the tanker,

Shiriya, at a rendezvous some 15 miles to southwestward. Within a few minutes they were on

station southwest of Sand Island for the first firing

run, and their twin 5-inch mounts were already

trained toward Midway.

At 2135, the first salvo cracked out, and war

had come to Midway.

During the first part of his run, Captain Konishi's shells landed short: just between Sand

Island's west beach and the reef. Then, as the

Japanese destroyers steamed slowly northeastward, closing the range somewhat, the salvos

walked onto target, first hitting near Battery A,

the 5-inch seacoast unit at the south end of Sand

12

Island, and then bracketing the Sand Island

power plant, a reinforced-concrete structure als°

in use as a command post by one platoon of

Battery H (.50 caliber antiaircraft machine gun).

At this juncture, not having yet received retunl

fire, and seemingly not having inflicted damage,1

Captain Konishi ceased firing while his shi95

closed the range and took station for a second

ruII.

Ashore, meanwhile, Condition One had been

immediately resumed by the defense battalion,r

and the telephone lines leading to and frail

Colonel Shannon's headquarters were jammed

with excited reports.

Although the Japanese commander did not

realize it, his initial shelling had put a round

through an air port into the reinforced concrete
Power plant just mentioned. This station was

manned by First Lieutenant George H. Cannon

and three enlisted assistants, all of whom were

either wounded or stunned. Cannon himself was

mortally injured; his communication chief, Corporal Harold R. Hazelwood, sustained a fractured

leg; and Platoon Sergeant William A. Barbour had an ankle smashed. Despite his own wound,

a crushed pelvis accompanied by profuse bleeding, Cannon remained conscious and refused evacuation, directing reestablishment of communications and the evacuation of others from the structure, the interior of which had been scarred and raked by blast and fragments. Finally, after Hazelwood,

despite his own wound, had managed to get the

damaged switchboard back into operation, Cann°r1 was removed forcibly from his post, to die

a few minutes later at the battalion aid station.'

At 2148, as Konishi's destroyers reopened fire

at closer range, Commander Simard gave Colonel

Shannon permission to engage enemy targets as

isclosed. The Japanese ships were now steaming northeast, firing up the long axis of Sand

,Island. Although they were being tracked visually

Dy the crews of Lieutenant Booth's searchlights, the

the latter 

of communications still prevented

tne latter from gaining permission to illuminate.'

Already, Japanese shells had hit the new Sand

.Island seaplane hangar, the roof of which burst

into flame while the Marine antiaircraft machine

,gnrmers thereon concentrated, despite the enemy

lire, on lowering their weapons and ammunition to the

ground before the flames could consume them. With the blazing hangar as a beacon, the

Japanese shifted fire to other structures on the

Island; including the Pan Air radio beacon, the

aundrY, and adjacent shops.'

At 2153, orders finally reached the searchlights to illuminate enemy ships. By now, only Search- light 2, on the south end of Sand Island, would bear, , and this promptly flashed on, silhouetting the Akebono approximately 2,500 yards south of

1 Letter from Col. Lewis A. Hohn to CMC, 30 January 248, hereinafter cited as Hohn. For this devotion to duty,

,2eutenant Cannon was posthumously awarded the Consressional Medal of Honor, being the first Marine to be so

honored 

the m in World War II. Corporal Hazelwood received

Navy Cross.

4 &)oth.

'Hohn, p. 2.

1 STLT. GEORGE H. CANNON, posthumously awarded the

Medal of Honor for his heroic refusal to be evacuated from

his post, despite mortal wounds, until his unit's communications had been re-established during the Japanese bombardment of 7 December 1941.

the position. A moment later, an enemy salvo

fell within a few yards, and concussion knocked

the light's feed mechanism out of position, thus

extinguishing the beam. Acting in a split second,

one of the crewmen, trained for just such an

emergency, readjusted the delicate ( and redhot) mechanism in the dark, and the light was

back in action and on target.'

A few minutes earlier, just at the instant when

word was being passed to commence firing, an

enemy shell hit and burst within 18 inches of the

plotting room of the 5-inch battery (A) on the

south end of Sand Island, and severed all telephone lines of the battery's interior and exterior

communications. This was particularly unfortunate since Battery A was the unit under whose

guns the enemy destroyers were about to be illuminated, and the loss of interior communication

prevented firing data or any fire commands from

reaching the guns themselves.'

° Ibid.

Fraser.

13
Only one battery could now bear effectively.

This was a 3-inch antiaircraft unit (Battery D,

Captain Jean H. Buckner) on the southeast shore

of Sand Island, from which Buckner could even

discern the large Japanese battle-flag flying from

the Akebono's foremast.

As soon as the enemy target had been illuminated, Buckner ordered his battery into action,

taking care, howeN cr, to direct gun captains to

make sure that their fire would not endanger

adjacent sections. Each gun captain checked his

line of fire, and then, in Buckner's words,

Sergeant Lefert on Gun 2 loaded his gun but

upon checking for safety * * * discovered

that it was pointed directly at the pit occupied by

Gunnery Sergeant Pulliman and me. He informed

Pulliman of this fact over the gun control phone

and wisely held his fire. * * *

Battery D's other guns, however, commenced firing as Buckner and his fire controlmen prepared

to spot when the splashes appeared. None could

be made out, however, despite the excellent illumination, which seemed to indicate that the shells

were either passing through the superstructure 0

into the hull.

Meanwhile, Battery B, a 5-inch unit on East

em Island ( First Lieutenant Rodney M. Hand'

ley), made preparations to open fire, and .50

caliber antiaircraft, machine guns, well within

range, peppered the enemy ships, arching solid

tracer streams toward their targets.

At 2158, five minutes after Searchlight 2 had

struck arc, just as it appeared to observers that

Handley's opening salvos had hulled the Ushio,

now visible astern of Akebono, the Japanese suc.

ceeded in shooting out the searchlight. Smoke op'

peared to be "pouring" from Ushio, and the

enemy ships ceased fire, retiring to the southwest

into their own smoke.'

What damage had actually been sustained b

the Japanese ships remains a moot question

Battery D had fired 13 rounds of 3-inch, and

Some observers on Midway believed that this was a'

smoke screen and not the result of our fire. For a detailed

account of Battery D's duel with Akebono, see appendix

IV.

11'4111 110111111111

011111111 01110

SAND ISLAND SEAPLANE HANGAR, A TWO-TIME LOSER under the enemy attacks of 7 December 1941 and 4 June 1942, smoulders as a result of its status as the most conspicuous target on Sand Island.

14
COL. HAROLD D. SHANNON, senior Marine officer at Midway ;41.1ring the battle, and commanding officer of the 6th Dense Battalion during the atoll's most critical period.

Battery B, nine rounds of 5-inch. Enemy records

arid logs are neither fully available nor specific

with regard to this engagement. Midway observers agree that the 3-inch battery secured at least

three hits, yet it is equally certain that both ships

returned to Japan under their own power as

Planned.' Some light, however, is shed upon this

question by the report of Capt. J. H. Hamilton,

Pilot of the Pan American aircraft, Philippine

CliPPer, which was in flight at this time from

Wake to Midway.

The Philippine Clipper, flying at 10,000 feet

itl bright moonlight, saw below it an intense fire

on the surface of the sea, by the light of which

Campaigns, p. 20.

could also be discerned the wakes of two ships,

apparently cruisers." Their position was 35 miles

west by south of Midway, and their apparent

course was 240° magnetic, reported Hamilton. It

seems at least probable that these were Akebono

and Ushio, and, if so, that one of them was then

on fire, which would indicate that the Marine

batteries had left their mark upon the enemy."

On Midway, meanwhile, all action centered

on damage control, care for the casualties, and a

not altogether successful attempt to send out

PBY's to locate and attack the hostile force, a

project further confused by a profusion of dubious

radar reports which came in throughout the night.

Several buildings had been hit or partially destroyed, and a considerable quantity of Navy

stores lost, mainly incident to the burning of the

hangar.

In casualties, the raid had cost the 6th Defense

Battalion two killed and 10 wounded, while the

Naval Air Station had lost two killed."

" In common with the defenders of Wake, Midway's

men, unfamiliar with enemy vessels, mistook destroyers for

cruisers. Further, in the confusion of the initial attack,

Colonel Shannon believed that the enemy force had probably totaled four ships instead of two, as was actually the

case. In this connection, Colonel Hohn comments:

"It is perhaps understandable why the report was made

of four enemy ships made a firing run heading in general in

a northerly direction, after which there was silence and

darkness for some minutes; then two ships started a firing

run from a position much further south. It was discussed

and realized at the time by a number of people * * *

that it Was probable that the same two ships had made

both runs, but it is seldom that conservatism wins out in

reports of action against the enemy."

Interview of Capt. J. H. Hamilton by Assistant DIO,

14th Naval District, 8 December 1941, p. 2, hereinafter

cited at Hamilton.

" Statistics from Casualty Division, Marine Corps Headquarters, and Bureau of Naval Personnel.

15
CHAPTER III

MARINES AT MIDWAY

After the somewhat shaking events of 7 December, Midway, no less than Pearl Harbor, prepared for the worst with full anticipation that it

would come. Wake, it was known from scant despatches and by rumor, was undergoing continuous attack; Johnston and Palmyra had been

shelled; VP-21, with all combat aircraft then on

Midway, had been withdrawn; and it was believed that, with the Fleet in its crippled status,

little could be attempted to assist Midway should

that atoll become the next target. In this frame

of mind, and on short rations,' the 6th Defense

Battalion worked grimly to make every possible

improvement in existing defense installations.

On 17 December, however, the first reinforcements arrived. These were 17 SB2U-3's of

Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 231 (VMSB231 ) which the Lexington had originally set out

to deliver 10 days earlier, on 7 December, when

diverted after the attack. Led by the squadron

commander, Maj. Clarence J. Chappell, Jr. ( and

assisted in overwater navigation by a PBY of

Patrol Wing 1) the obsolescent Vindicators, as

they were styled, had successfully completed between 0630 and 1550 the 1,137-mile hop from

Hickam Field, Oahu. This was then the longest

single-engine landplane massed flight of record,

and had been carried out with no surface rescue

'Instituted originally as an economy against possible

isolation during the first days of the war, this custom carried over for reasons of convenience and conformity to

the daily routine which subsequently prevailed. (See p.

18.)

16

Girding for Battle

craft available.' As one of the defense battalion

officers (First Lieutenant David W. Silvey ) re'

ported:

The men stood on top of their gun emplacemeot

and cheered when the planes droned overhead'

They represented a real Christmas present.

Within less than two days, ground reinforce'

ments, hardly less needed than VMSB-231, had

been embarked at Pearl in the U. S. S. Wright and

on 19 December were underway for MidwaY.

These were Batteries A and C, 4th Defense Bat'

talion, FMF (both 5-inch seacoast batteries, un'

der command of Capt. Custis Burton, Jr.) bring.

ing with them, in addition to miscellaneous sur

plies of all types, the Navy 7-inch and 3-inch

guns, with necessary materiel, which had ball

shipped to Pearl Harbor for Midway prior to the

outset of war. On Christmas Eve the reinforce.

ments arrived, and Colonel Shannon lost no time

in turning over to Captain Burton with one bat'

tery (A) the mission of installing, organizing, and

manning the 7-inch and the 3-inch batteries to be

emplaced on Eastern Island. To First Lieutenant

Lewis A. Jones, who commanded Battery C of

this group, the assignment was to carry out 3

CO, MAG-21 serial 1173, to MGC, 19 December 1941'

The reason for this flight's take-off from the Army field)

Hickam, was that Ewa's runways were too short to perralt

such heavily loaded planes to get off with entire safetY,

One additional pilot, 2d Lt. Richard L. Blain, madc

the same flight 10 days later, in order to bring the squad'

ron to full complement of 18 planes. Blain accompanied a I

PBY, and, due to headwinds, required 12 hours to cora'

plete the trip.
similar role with regard to the Navy 3-inch battery planned for Sand Island.'

This reinforcement, amounting to approximately 100 officers and men, was followed, next

day, by a welcome Christmas gift in the form of

14 Brewster F2A-3 Marine fighters, composing

the air echelon of Marine Fighting Squadron 221

(VMF-221), which flew in from the U. S. S.

Saratoga, then near Midway, retiring after the

abortive attempt to relieve Wake. VMF-221,

c°1tirnanded by Major Verne J. McCaul, had

originally been slated to reinforce Wake's depleted

V1VIF-211, and Midway was the next most important destination. Without delay, the fighter

squadron (the first such to garrison Midway) ,

commenced its daily routine of airsearch and

patrolling.'

On 26 December Midway received its final

major reinforcement of the month; the arrival of

rti* S. S. Tangier, the seaplane tender also originally despatched to Wake bearing a relieving

r

rce of Marines and much defensive materiel.

clii the Tangier the 6th Defense Battalion rewed Battery B, 4th Defense Battalion (First

Lieutenant Frank G. Umstead) ; additional mame gunners and 12 antiaircraft machine guns

in the Special Weapons Group of that same

oattaiion; an aviation contingent of three officers

valid 110 enlisted Marines (the ground echelon of

10-221 ) ; aviation supplies; additional radar;

ci much-needed base-defense artillery materiel.

L.leutenant Umstead's 5-inch battery (B) was

lven the assignment of installing and manning

the other 7-inch battery to be located south of

the radio station on Sand Island.'

As of New Year's Day, 1942, therefore, Midway was already garrisoned by a Marine force

consisting of a strongly reinforced defense bat-

'Historical Section interview with Lt. Col. Custis BurJr., 26 September 1947, hereinafter cited as Burton.

two Eastern Island batteries assigned to Captain BurWere located side by side on the south shore of the

INS and, near the western tip, and the Sand Island 3-inch

avY battery was to be set up hard by the Cable Station, al battery

the north shore of Sand Island. (See map 1.)

"History of Marine Fighting Squadron 221," undated

ahrid without indication of authorship, p. 5 (believed to

ire been initialed by Second Lt. Francis P. McCarthy).

e6teinafter cited as VMF-221 History.

Ibid, P. 5, and Burton, p. 1.

talion, one fighting and one scout-bomber squadron.

The build-up on Eastern Island had been, and

would continue particularly impressive as a major

air base took shape. A report submitted early in

January 1942, by Lt. Col. William J. Wallace,

who on 9 January had been ordered out as commanding officer of the entire Marine Aviation

Detachment, tells of the erection of individual

aircraft bunkers and underground personnel

shelters, of emergency and stand-by fueling expedients being devised, of radar calibrations so

that inexperienced operators could learn something of the then-mysterious -instruments. To assist during this phase, Colonel Wallace was fortunate in having with him Major Walter L. J. Bayler, the Marine aviation officer who had been sent

back from Wake with that atoll's last reports.'

That the zeal and vigor with which defensive

preparations and training were being prosecuted

on Midway were not wasted, was shortly to be

demonstrated.

On 25 January, at 1748, during twilight general quarters ( an element of Midway's daily

routine which would pay off on subsequent occasions as well) a Japanese submarine, the 1-173,

surfaced abruptly, due south of the mouth of

Brooks Channel (between Sand and Eastern

Islands), and opened fire on Sand Island. Although the sun had set more than 20 minutes

previously, the enemy ship was distinctly visible

in the afterglow as she cruised slowly westward,

apparently trying to knock out the radio station,

the masts of which afforded a conspicuous directfire target. Within less than one minute, Battery

D (3-inch) had a two-gun salvo on the way; followed by another, both on local control; thereafter, as the battery's director picked up the problem and electric power went on, the entire fourgun unit went into action. A bracket was quickly

obtained, followed by a reported water-line hit,

after which the submarine crash-dived at 1751.

In the brisk three minutes of action, Sand Island

and the adjacent lagoon had received 10 to 15

indiscriminate hits, and Captain Buckner's BatWallace, William J., Lt. Col., personal letter to Col.

Claude A. Larkin, 18 January 1942.

11
tery D had expended 24 rounds, with what effect

no one on Midway could say.'

Less than 36 hours later, however, the officers

and men of the U. S. S. Gudgeon, a submarine on

war patrol northwest of Midway, found themselves able to close the books on 1-173.

In a position some 240 miles west by north of

Midway on the morning of 27 January, the

Gudgeon, cruising partially submerged, came

upon the 1-173 underway on the surface, proceeding at approximately 16 knots. It was the

matter of a moment to maneuver into position

for a shot; a spread of three torpedoes was fired;

and within two minutes the unmistakable concussion of torpedo hits announced destruction of the

enemy submarine which had shelled Midway.'

To weeks later, almost to the minute, at 1805,

8 February, under identical conditions, another

enemy submarine appeared due south of Sand

Island, less than 1,000 yards offshore, and again

opened fire on the radio towers. This time it was

a 5-inch battery ( A ) Captain Loren S. Fraser

which spotted the bombarding enemy by her

initial gun-flash. Before three Japanese shells had

hit, Battery A had returned two rounds, and the

submarine ceased firing and submerged. Damage

ashore had actually been sustained, although

serious only in potentiality—a concrete magazine

had been hit; fortunately the small-arms ammunition within was not detonated.'

Probably it was the same Japanese submarine

which reappeared two days later at 1758 on 10

February. This time—unfortunately for the Japanese—when the ship surfaced at much the same

position as the first marauder (south of the entrance to Brooks Channel), a section of two

Marine fighters—flying the sunset antisubmarine

patrol established as a result of the two previous

bombardments—was almost directly overhead at

1,500 feet. The submarine had time to get off two

rounds, both of which hit in the lagoon, before

First Lieutenant John F. Carey, pilot of one of the

aircraft, observed the ship, notified his wingman

'GO, 6th Defense Battalion Report to Commandant

14th Naval District, 26 January 1942.

8 JANEC, p. 19, appendix of submarine sinkings; and

report of Gudgeon's first war patrol.

' I CO, 6th Defense Battalion report to CO, Marine

Forces, 14th Naval District, 8 February 1942, and NAS

Diary, that date.

18

( Second Lieutenant Philip R. White) and pulled

up into a brief climb in order to arm bombs and

gain altitude for a diving attack. Both pilots re

leased bombs, secured gratifying close near misses

and strafed as the submarine began to submerge,

just at the moment when the 6th Defense Battalion's batteries were going into action, and this

was the last time for many months that Midwg

was troubled by enemy submarines."

By this date the pattern of wartime life 011

Midway had been well established. Since—except

on Johnston Island, where similar routine prevailed—this pattern was unique in the Marine

experience of the Pacific war, its description ill

the following passage by Lieutenant Colonel Me'

Glashan" is of particular interest:

of particular interest:

Since Midway was, to my knowledge, the onl)'

place (sic ) in our armed forces where underground

living prevailed, except while in contact with the

enemy or under attack, brief comment on our levg

of life is in order. Breakfast, supper, and a midnight

snack with hot coffee were served to all positions

from the central galley in food containers by trucb,

Since we stood a morning and evening stand-b'

there was not time to serve a noon meal during the

day, as the process of distributing food to the widelY

dispersed gun positions by food container and getting them returned and cleaned for the next meal

was a lengthy one. All food was prepared at the

main galley in the newly completed barracks where

the men would also go during the day in incre'

ments to bathe. The lack of a noon meal was quite

disconcerting to new arrivals but they soon became I

accustomed to it and actually were in much better'

health. When conditions permitted, movies were

held in a blacked-out warehouse during the day and

men off watch could go. But the high point of each

day was the noon libation of two beers at the

CO, VMF-221 report of submarine contact to CO)

MAG-21, 11 February 1942, and CO 6th Defense Bat'

talion report to CG, Marine Forces, 14th Naval District,

10 February 1942. Despite the pilots' aggressive and

prompt attack, however, there is no record of the loss of

any enemy submarine in this area or about this time,

JANEC, p. 1. A Japanese sandal, washed ashore shortly

afterward, led to speculation as to whether the gun crew

might not have been abandoned when this submarine

crash-dived.

" McGlashan, Robert C., Lt. Col., official reply to His'

torical Section questionnaire, 12 August 1947, pp. 16-18,

hereinafter cited as McGlashan. Colonel McGlashall

-served as operations officer (Bn-3) of the 6th Defense

Battalion throughout this period, and is one of the m

ost

important surviving sources.
MIDWAY ISLANDS

JUNE ,19 42

é — Gun 3" or larger

— Command Post

— Radar

— Overgrown area

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3"NAVY BTRY CABLE STATION*

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STAY 0(3")

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PACIFIC OCEAN

785018 0-1948 (Face p. 18)
LTCOL. IRA L. KIMES, Marine air commander during the

battle of Midway, stands in front of his camouflaged underground command post on Eastern Island.

PX * * * Swimming was allowed in certain

areas but helmets and side arms had to be worn to

the beach and at all other times. (Colonel Shannon's insistence on the wearing of the helmet and

carrying of rifles at all times was the subject of an

xcelleii, cartoon, which the colonel hugely enjoyed.

depicted a Marine, naked save for a helmet,

cartridl,..-belt and rifle, dipping a toe in the water

prior to diving in.)

All activities away from battle stations had to be

carried on during the day, and after the evening

stand-by everyone went underground for the night

93ccept for the men on watch above ground. SleepIng underground has its good points as it is quiet,

there is no early sun to bother one after a night on

Watch, and there is a great feeling of security from

surprise submarine attack. It is true that the dugouts

Were often hot in the summer months and cold in

nter and at first were much too crowded and

lacked proper ventilation, but by and large it was a

verY pleasant existence.

Colonel Shannon "slept" in a small room off the

Inialn CP operations center and heard nearly every

Poone call or report that came in. One thing that

could never be said of the old man, was that he

lacked energy or attention to duty. He would end a

25-coffee-cup day with three or four cups of hot

black coffee at midnight and then turn in and fall

asleep instantly. If anything happened he was immediately awake and he never slept later than 0500,

being awakened about a half-hour before morning

twilight. The staff officer on watch would have to

furnish him with a report of conditions obtained

from the lighthouse tower lookout immediately upon

awakening him. The report would include: radar

reports, weather (wind, clouds, height of breakers

on reef, visibility, tide, moon, events of the night,

and status of communications) . And woe to the officer who didn't know every one of those things accurately and in the specified terminology. After the

report was properly rendered, the colonel would

relax and start his coffee marathon with the cup

that was always hot and ready for his awakening.

As the winter wore on, Midway's Marine aviation component began to feel the effects of the

general expansion of Marine Corps aviation as a

whole. The two squadrons and their small provisional headquarters were formed on 1 March into

what they in fact already were, an air group:

MAG-22. At the same time, each squadron was

split in two and brought again to strength by new

personnel. As a result—for the time being—

MAG-22 consisted of VMF-221 and VMF-222;

and of VMSB-241 and VSMB-242."

On 20 April, Lieutenant Colonel Wallace, who

had seen MAG-22 through its teething stage, was

relieved in command by Major Ira L. Kimes. At

the same time, Major Chappell (VMSB-241 )

was replaced by Major Lofton R. Henderson.

This was a busy time for MAG-22, which was

then engaged in converting Eastern Island from a

small advanced air base to a major installation

capable of handling as many squadrons and types

as could physically be accommodated and protected. A detailed account of the Marine Air

Group's labors and tribulations during this period

are contained in appendix V.

" VMF-222 and VSMB-242 were transferred (personnel only) from Midway on 12 April 1942 and play no

further role in this history, the ultimate net effect of the

reorganizations being that Midway's Marine aviation was

now organized into MAG-22 composed of VMF-221 and

VSMB-241, with the same complement of aircraft as

previously. VSMB-231, in name only, was transferred on

paper to MAG-23, in the Hawaiian area, but the squadron's personnel remained at Midway under the new designation. VMF-22I History, p. 16.

19
On 10 March, shortly after this reorganization,

the Marine fighter squadrons got their first opportunity against enemy aircraft. Radar contact

was made that morning at 1030 on what developed to be a Japanese four-engined "Mavis"

(Kawanishi 97, probably from Wake) approximately 45 miles west of Midway (which, in the

argot of its fighter-director officers, was codenamed "Alcatraz" ) . Twelve fighters, under Capt.

Robert M. Haynes, were vectored out, of which

a four-plane division commanded by Captain

James L. Neefus made contact with the enemy

flying boat at 10,000 feet. Following this, in the

words of the Squadron's historian:

Captain Neefus made the first pass, drew smoke

from one engine, and the target dove for a cloud

bank at 3,000 feet. Lieutenants McCarthy and

Somers made modified overhead passes (one each)

before the patrol bomber reached the cloud bank

Marine Gunner Dickey made a tail approach and

received a wound in his left shoulder and sevol

bullet holes in his plane. * * * Captain

Neefus was able to return and make a second pass.

Dropping below the clouds, scattered, burning

debris was observed on the surface of the water.

This was the first enemy plane to be shot down by

Group 22. The officers that participated in the fight

received a bottle of bourbon and congratulations

from Lieutenant Colonel Wallace and his staff."

" VMF-221 History, p. 17. In addition to the bourbon,

these individuals subsequently were decorated by Admiral

Nimitz. Full names and ranks of the other pilots participating were 1st Lts. Francis P. McCarthy and Charles

W. Somers, Jr., and Marine Gunner Robert L. Dickey.

PEARL AND HERMES REEF

„6" KURE

MIDWAY

LAYSAN

LISIANSK

MAUI

MOLOKAI

szr OAHU

NIIHAU

HAWAII

ANAI

KAUAI

or NECKER

FRENCH FRIGATE SHOALS

"MIDWAY ACTS AS A SENTRY FOR HAWAII," said the Japanese high command in planning their thrust to capture the atoll. This view, looking southeastward down the chain of shoals and islets, shows Midway's strategic position directly astride the

enemy's line of thrust toward Oahu.

20
"•-• .

ADMIRAL NIMITZ FINDS OUT FOR HIMSELF that Midway's defenders are ready to meet the forthcoming Japanese attack.

h

he Pacific commander in chief is just emerging from one of the hundreds of Marine dugouts and defensive positions which

e personally inspected during his dramatic pre-battle visit to Midway.

During the month of April 1942, although

Marines on Midway did not know this, the Japanese Combined Fleet was commencing carrier

aPerational training and rehearsals for an opera4°71 against Midway, in the plans for which the

Japanese high command rightly stated, "Midway

acts as a sentry for Hawaii."

In order to reach the Hawaiian prize which

had been so nearly in their grasp during December 1941, it would be necessary to obtain Mid-

)ay, reasoned the enemy." When, on 18 April

1942, Army planes launched from the U. S. S.

hornet, raided Tokyo, it was believed by the

Japanese that these had come from Midway, an

""The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway," The

()NI Review May 1947, P. 5, hereinafter cited as ONI

Review.

estimate which further whetted Japanese eagerness to obtain control of the atoll."

Set in a background of strategic diversionary

operations, the enemy plan against Midway called

for three days of attack and prelanding softening

by a powerful carrier task force variously entitled

the First Air Fleet, First Attack Force, Mobile

Force, or Striking Force; this force (and a supporting surface force) was also to await favorable

opportunity for surface action against whatever

strength the still-weakened United States Pacific

Fleet could muster. Proceeding toward Midway

via a different route would be the Occupation

Force, a heavily escorted slower group of am-

" USSBS, Interrogation Nay No. 13, Captain Watanabe,

Y., IJN, 15 October 1945, p. 66; hereinafter cited as

Watanabe.

21
phi bious shipping bearing landing force and basedevelopment elements which were also to establish a seaplane base at Kure Island, Midway's

nearest neighbor, approximately 55 miles west by

north.

The actual landing on Midway was to be accomplished by approximately 1,500 Special Naval

Landing Force troops who would storm Sand

Island; and by 1,000 Army troops of the Ikki

Detachment, to land" on Eastern Island. Summarizing the enemy landing plan, Captain

Toyama stated:

We were going to approach the south side (of

Midway), sending out landing boats as far as the

reef. We had many different kinds of landing boats

but did not think that many would be able to pass

over the reefs. If they got stuck the personnel were

supposed to transfer to rubber landing boats. We

had plenty of equipment for a three months' occupation without help, but were not sure of our

boats.17

Assault elements in the landing would be backed

up by the 11th and 12th Construction Battalions

plus miscellaneous base-development detachments. "The Navy," added an operation plan for

the Ikki Detachment, "plans to destroy the sortieing enemy fleet.""

By late April, it was suspected strongly by the

United States Pacific High Command that the

enemy plans just described were well along toward

consummation, and, although Admiral King in

Washington still included Oahu as a possible target, Admiral Nimitz placed Midway as most

probable.

To Marines on the atoll, the first inkling of all

this was betrayed on 2 May by the unexpected

arrival via PBY-5A of Admiral Nimitz himself.

Accompanied by a considerable staff group, the

" USSBS Interrogation Nay. No. 60, Capt. Toyama,

Yasumi, IJN, 1 October 1945, p. 250; hereinafter cited as

Toyama. Further details as to the plan and the Ikki Detachment are from "Japanese Land Forces No. 2," 20 October 1942, a translation by JICPOA, hereinafter cited as

Ikki Report. The Ikki Detachment mentioned here is the

same one which was destined to be annihilated by Marines

at the Battle of the Tenaru, 21 August 1942, on Guadalcanal. The unit is sometimes referred to as the Ichiki Detachment because the Japanese characters for "ikki" and

"ichiki" are identical.

" Ibid.

" Ibid.

22

Commander-in-Chief inspected every installation

on Midway with the greatest thoroughness, and,

at the conclusion of a hard day's climbing, duck'

ing, and keen observing, the admiral asked Colo,

nel Shannon to enumerate the major items he

would require to hold Midway against a largescale attack. After Shannon had stated his re'

quirements—which were necessarily consider'

able—Admiral Nimitz asked, "If I get you ail

these things you say you need, then can you hold

Midway against a major amphibious assault?"

"Yes, sir"; replied Colonel Shannon.

Smiling and appearing to relax, the admiral

then ordered the Marine commander to submit

direct to CinCPac a detailed list of all supplies

and equipment required for a decisive defense of

Midway. If available, he promised, these would

be obtained immediately.' On 7 May, Colonel

Shannon had compiled his list, and this was then

duly submitted by the naval commandant of the

atoll, Commander Simard.

Within less than a week, in fulfillment of M'

miral Nimitz's promise, Marines and materiel

were being embarked in the Hawaiian area to reinforce Midway, which, the Fleet command was

now certain, was the intended enemy target.

Three more 3-inch antiaircraft batteries (12

guns in all) a 37-mm. antiaircraft battery ( eight

guns) and a 20-mm. antiaircraft battery (18

guns), were to be attached temporarily from the

3d Defense Battalion, then at Pearl Harbor.2° Two

rifle companies of the 2d Marine Raider Bat'

talion, together with a platoon of five light tanks,

would augment the small infantry reserve alreaclY

at Midway; 21 and, for MAG-22, which was still

flying its Brewster fighters and Vought Vindicator dive bombers ("Wind Indicators" or "Vibrators," some pilots called them), there would be

provided some 16 SBD-2 dive bombers and

" McGlashan, p. 19. Captain McGlashan was an cYc"

witness to this conversation.

20 CG, Maripe Garrison Forces 14th Naval District man°

to Com14, 20 May 1942.

"McGlashan, p. 30 and Enclosure (M). The infantrY

units already there were the 22d and 23d Provisional M'3

rine Companies, which provided interior security, beach

patrols by night and a small mobile reserve. Each compaill

included a weapons platoon armed with 81-mm. and 60'

mm. mortars, light machine guns and old-type 37-ra01'

guns.
Is

2

It

11

If

seven of the relatively new Grumman F4F-3

fighters."

Shortly after his return to Pearl Harbor, Ad-

'rural Nimitz addressed a joint personal letter to

Captain Simard and Colonel Shannon, in which,

after congratulating them on the fine work which

had been done at Midway and on the "spot" proMotions to captain and colonel which he had just

secured for them, he described in detail the prospect of hostile attack in store. After listing the

'enemY units which were soon to approach Midday, he enumerated the steps being taken to reinforce the atoll, and assured both officers of his

complete confidence in the Marines' ability to

-hold Midway. D-day, he predicted at this time,

Would be about 28 May."

Among his own staff officers, Admiral Nimitz

forecast, as far as the enemy were concerned, that

The Midway operations will be an enlarged

Wake attack. A study of events at Wake will be

valuable and may indicate procedure which the

JaPs will follow." 24 Early offensive action against

the enemy carriers, the CinCPac staff reasoned,

was the only means by which victory could be

assured. Midway planes must thus make the CV's

their objective, rather than attempting any local

defense of the atoll. On the other hand, however,

reinforcement of Midway's antiaircraft defenses

Was realized to be of crucial importance. As Capt.

Arthur C. Davis, USN, stated to Admiral Nimitz,

There cannot be too many antiaircraft defenses

for Eastern Island." 25

To summarize all, Admiral Nimitz rejoined,

Balsa's air force must be employed to inflict

prrompt and early damage to Jap carrier flight decks

ii!'ecurring attacks are to be stopped. Our objectives

be first—their flight decks rather than attemptto fight off the initial attacks on Balsa. * * *

if this is correct, Balsa air force * * * should

ge all out for the carriers * * * leaving to

13a/sa's guns the first defense of the field.26

22 War Diary, MAG-22, May 1942, p. 5, hereinafter

Cited as WD, MAG-22.

23

McGlashan, pp. 21-22. This letter was shown, within

the Marine ground forces, only to Captain McGlashan, on

an "eyes-only" basis, inasmuch as his planning responsi- bilities required that he possess this knowledge.

' 2 Admiral Nimitz's memorandum to Captain Milo F.

1)Taemel, USN, 23 May 1942.

Captain Davis's memorandum to Admiral Nimitz, 26

May 1949.

Upon receipt of the Nimitz letter at Midway,

Simard and Shannon spent the day in conference,

to coordinate and determine final plans for the

defense.

That evening, Colonel Shannon assembled his

key subordinates and warned them in general

terms of the impending enemy attack. Additional

defensive measures and priorities of final efforts

were outlined, including special measures of advance reconnaissance and preliminary preparations to enable the 3d Defense Battalion's forthcoming batteries to occupy positions in minimum

time. All recreational activities within the Marine

force were suspended, and 25 May was set as the

deadline for completion of the measures ordered."

To insure maximum effort by all hands, this information was disseminated in general terms to

all Maripies in the garrison.

On the 25th, however, two welcome changes

took place. The first took the form of further information from Admiral Nimitz to the effect that

the estimated target date would now probably fall

in the period 3-5 June, almost a week later. The

second was arrival, partially via the light cruiser,

St. Louis, of the first reinforcements: The 3d Defense Battalion's 37-mm. antiaircraft battery

( Captain Ronald K. Miller ) , together with Companies C and D, 2d Raider Battalion ( Captain

Donald H. Hastie and First Lieutenant John

Apergis) . The 37-mm. guns were promptly emplaced, four on each island, while one raider company (C) went into bivouac in the woods on

Sand Island, and the other ( D ) was sent to Eastern Island."

The next day, 26 May, will long be remembered by those responsible for the defense of Midway because of the anxiously awaited arrival of

the U. S. S. Kittyhawk, an aircraft tender bear-

"Admiral Nimitz's memorandum to Captain Davis, undated. Balsa was the current code-name for Midway.

" Ibid., p. 23.

" Loc. cit., pp. 26-27. The author adds this note in connection with the 37-mm. guns:

"It was felt necessary to use these guns as dual-purpose

guns. Since the pointer and trainer seats were high on

either side, well above the gun barrel, the result of emplacing the guns high on the dune line for surface firing was

that the crews were silhouetted on the sky line like sitting

ducks. It is fortunate that no landing attempt was made—

at least for the 37-mm. gunners."

23
ing not only the 3-inch antiaircraft group of the

3d Defense Battalion (Major Chandler W. Johnson)" and the light tank platoon so urgently

needed for the mobile reserve; but, most important, 16 new (to Midway, that is) SBD-2 Douglas dive bombers, and seven F4F-3's. "The

planes," an eye-witness reported, "* * * were

unloaded, wheeled over to the short seaplane

apron, fueled, and flown off to Eastern Island

with a simplicity and rapidity that was so characteristic of those superbly led and well trained Marine air units of the early war days." "

The week which followed 27 May was, for

Midway, a period of the most intense activity.

Army and Navy aircraft arrived at Eastern

Island until it seemed that the field could accommodate no more." One aviation report seriously

complained that even the numerous birds overhead were being crowded out of the air by the

concentration of traffic.

For the ground defense forces ( as well as the

group of key civilian workers who voluntarily

had remained at Midway to assist in final fortification work) the week was equally busy. Not only

" Major Johnson was subsequently to be killed in action

on Iwo Jima, where men of his battalion raised the U. S.

Colors on Suribachi Yama. Lt. Col. Charles J. Seibert II,

then a member of Major Johnson's command at Midway,

notes the following regarding one battery:

"The 3-inch Antiaircraft Group included Battery L

(Captain Seibert), a provisional organization equipped

with that curious hybrid known as 'the dual 20.' Due to

uneven production * * * there was an excess of 40-

mm. mounts and 20-mm guns, and a corresponding shortage of 40-mm. guns and 20-mm. mounts. The rules of addition to the contrary, two 20-mm. guns * * * a

40-nlm. mount did not produce the equivalent of a 40-mm.

gun, and the 'dual 20' soon became extinct."

" Ibid., p. 28, and WD, MAG-22, p. 5.

" As of 31 May, the daily aviation gasoline consumption

of planes based on Eastern Island was 65,000 gallons, and

the following numbers of planes were based there: U. S.

Army: four B-26's and 17 B-17's; U. S. Navy: 16 PBY5A's and six TBF's; U. S. Marine Corps: 19 SBD-2's, 17

SB2U-3's, 21 F2A-3's and seven F4F-3's. It was no

wonder that the Army Air Force liaison officer on Midway,

Maj. J. K. Warner, AUS, wrote in his official report (of the

performance of Colonel Kimes, Major McCaul, and Captain Burns, the operating staff of MAG-22) :

"These three officers never stopped from the day I

arrived. They actually did the work of a Wing Staff * * *5,

For the comments of Colonel Kimes on Major Warner,

see appendix V.

24

were the reinforcing weapons installed, tan

tested in the sand, and all defensive concentr

tions shot in, but the extremely extensive s

tem of obstacles, mines, and demolitions pr

jected by Colonel Shannon was brought to fin

completion.

By now Sand Island was surrounded with tw

double-apron tactical wire barriers, and all

stallations on both islands were in turn ringed 131

protective wire. Antiboat mines made of scaled

sewer pipe, and obstacles fashioned from coal'

certina-ed reinforcing-steel lay offshore. Th

beaches were sown with home-made mines con

sisting of ammunition boxes filled with dynamit

and 20-penny nails; although electric detonatio

was planned, every such mine also had a •bull's

eye painted on an exposed landward side, so that

it could be set off locally by rifle fire. Cigar-bolt

antitank mines were filled with dynamite to be

fired on pressure by current from flashlight bat'

teries, and whiskey-bottle molotov cocktails of

high-octane gasoline and fuel oil stood ready at

every position. A decoy mockup airplane

dubbed a JFU ("Jap fouler-upper" )

prominently placed on the seaplane aproo.

Finally, all the underground fuel storage on Sand

Island was prepared for demolition by the ad'

jacent planting of large charges of dynamite.

Inevitably, after the extensive system of demob'

tions for fuel supply and other vital installations

had been installed (by Marine Gunner Dorn f•

Arnold, the defense battalion's munitions of'

ficer ), on 22 May, a Naval Air Station sailor, at

work on the fuel storage firing circuits, pulled the

wrong switch, thus causing a major explosion

which destroyed a substantial quantity of fuel

and further damaged the distribution systena.

This resulted in an enforced curtailment of avgas

consumption so that the new pilots who had

reached Midway in the Kittyhawk were deprived

of any proper opportunity to check out in the

newly received SBD-2 dive bombers. It als°

forced the already hard-worked Marines .of

MAG-22 to conduct all refueling operations (11'1

eluding those for Army B-17's) by hand, front

55-gallon drums. Marine Gunner Arnold, hoW'

ever, had the last word, after being exonerated oo

the spot of any responsibility for the mishap:

CHAPTER IV

MARINES AT MIDWAY

The Battle, 4-5, June 1942

At 0300 4 June, when reveille sounded on Midway, the Japanese Fleet was approaching its objective in two main forces, the Striking Force,

commanded by Admiral Nagumo, Chuichi,

IJN; and the Occupation Force, under over-all

command of Vice Admiral Kondo, Nobutake,

IJN. The former unit, as we have seen, was composed of four carriers, plus an escort of battleships

and smaller combatant ships; and the latter included a substantial portion of the Second Fleet:

Battleships, cruisers, and the amphibious shipping necessary to mount the projected landing

operation against Midway, the objective now

designated by the Japanese code term as "AF."

At this time the striking force was approximately 250 miles northwest of the atoll, engaged

in making final preparations to launch planes

which were intended to wipe out Midway as an

effective air base' and pave the way for its assault and occupation. The occupation fori.e,

which had been attacked from the air without

appreciable damage during the day and night

previous, was almost due west of Midway, approximately 450 miles away.'

Two United States carrier task forces, including, altogether, three carriers, together with covering cruisers and destroyers, were in the area

250 miles northeast by north of Midway. The first

ONI Review, pp. 3, 6, and 41: and Toyama, p. 249.

ONI Review, p. 39.

Battle of Midway, p. 10.

26

of these, Task Force Sugar, Enterprise and Hornet, was under command of Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN; the second, Task Force

Fox, built around the Yorktown, came under

Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, USN. Stationed about Midway, on radii of 200 miles and

less, patrolled some 25 submarines of the Pacific

Fleet,'

At 0430, only 15 minutes after an early dawn

search group of 11 PBY's had been sent out frool

Midway to locate his Striking Force, Admiral

Nagumo headed carriers upwind and launched

the Midway Attack Force, composed as follows.

First wave; 36 carrier attack planes.

Second wave: 36 carrier bombers.

Third wave: 36 fighters.

These 108 planes were commanded by the air

officer of the Hiryu, whose name has not sin'

vived.'

Meanwhile, after the PBY's had gone out, Midway devoted itself to final preparations for battle. i

Marines of the ground defense force were at gen'

eral quarters, manning every weapon and warning device; the pilots and ground crews of MAG

22, which already had fighters aloft to cover the

sortie of the PBY's, were standing by for orders.

The latter were not long in coming.

At 0545, a PBY made what Admiral Nimiti

Battle of Midway, frontispiece chart and pp. 3-5.

ONI Review, p. 7.
30*

— 30'

—29°

—30

30'

CV AKAGI

0755

VMSB -241

(Capt Tyler)

CA MOGAM1

0805 44 44 -14 emus. ..■••• 4■1. vIEN. •■•• ams■ arm. ■■•■ =wow a.

<2> gle• "■••• ••••••• 

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5 SB2U- 3's 4000 f est—

c> CA MIKUMA -14

Japanese Striking Force

138 HARUNA

4---% 0820

•

VMSB-24.14• '2 \\

(Maj Henderson) ..).C,XJ"`

•

EVENTS OF 4 JUNE

EVENTS OF 5 JUNE

STRIKE BY VMSB-241

ON DAMAGED CRUISERS

6 SBD-2's 10000 feet

Xdilv V MSB- 241

(Maj Norris)

/6,

<90

se; \

.9

178* 177'

STRIKES BY MARINE AIR GROUP 22

BATTLE OF MIDWAY, 4-5 JUNE ,I942

C■'.2, Ship attacked and hit by divebombing.

NOTES: (I) Ships and aircraft not to scale.

(2) Formations schematic only.

11Q. 2,0 3,Q 4p 5

P

NAUTICAL MILES

RD 6139

\

• \

5( \

_5( 5( \

50000(5( \

Midway Attack Force 5( 5( \

(KAGA , AKAG I , SORYU, I5( 5(

HIRYU CV Air Groups) 50e 5005( )(

5e

MARINE AIR OPERATIONS

MORNING OF 4 JUNE

VMF-22I interc•pts

Midway Attack Force

I' 1

10616 /

\ 4

\ (Maj Porks)

7t°

VMF-22I

(Copt Armistead) yv■Iik

VMF-22I

28° 30

VMSB -241

(Capt Fleming)

179° 30' 178°

MIDWAY

29*—

30°--

\ 0605

VMSB-241

_.)Rendezvous Area

177' Ze•

785018 0-1948 (Face p. 26)
afterward characterized as "the most important

contact of the battle." 0 Its pilot had sighted

Planes of the enemy's Midway attack force, 150

miles out from the objective.

At 0552, moreover, after apparently trying to

get this vital message through for almost a quarter of an hour (see footnote 6), a PBY reported vis- ual contact with two enemy carriers and the balance of the Japanese main body, some 180 miles from midway, bearing 320°.7

Three minutes later, at 0555, the 6th Defense

Battalion logged a radar report, "Many planes,

89 miles, 320°." s Almost simultaneously, the

Naval Air Station noted substantially the same

contact. In a matter of scconds, the air-raid sirens

were sounding, Condition One was set, and the Pilots of MAG-22 were manning their planes.'

Within less than 10 minutes, both squadrons of the Marine Air Group 10 were in the air and being vectored toward their respective targets.

VMF-221 was to intercept the massed carrier air

of the Midway attack force, and VMSB-241

would rendezvous 20 miles east of Midway, at

which point further instructions would be issued.

, Commanded by Major Floyd B. Parks, VMF- 221 

was, as we have seen, a squadron of mixed

° CinCPac action report to ComInch on Battle of Midway,P. 7, hereinafter cited as CinCPac Report. Other re- Ports indicate that Midway had warning of the approach of 

enemy planes prior to this time. The first of these is the

a 

chronological log included in 6DB Report, which contains

radar report of unidentified planes on bearing 320, dis- tant 100 miles, at 0528. The second is the statement in

CO, MAG-22'5 

Way, preliminary report on the Battle of Mid8 June 1942 (cited as MAG-22 Report), that the

Petrol plane contact under discussion was made, not at

545, but at 0525. Third, it is recorded in 6DB Report,

P. 1, that, at 0537, the commanding officer of the Naval Air Station, Midway, informed Colonel Shannon's head- 13uarter5 

that an enemy carrier had been sighted on beariirig 3300, 150 miles distant. Lieutenant Colonel McGlash, an, who, as operations officer, was present in the defense

battalion command post at this time, adds the following

note: "I am sure that the first contact was about 0525, not 0545, as Admiral Nimitz * * * stated."

CinCPac Report, p. 7. 6DB Report, p. 1. M4G-22 Report, p. 2.

verbal orders had likewise been delivered by Captain

t

, urns for the six Navy TBF's and the four torpedo-carry- irig Army 13-26'5 to take off and seek the enemy carriers.

"*"`4

C-22 Report, p. 2.

785018-48 3

composition, being equipped mainly with Brewster F2A-3's, augmented by a few F4F-3's of the

type which had already drawn blood at Wake.

On this morning, 26 airplanes were operational

out of the squadron's 28." Organized largely by

performance and type into five unequal divisions,

the fighter squadron was sent out in twa major

groups, one (Major Parks, eight F2A-3's and five

F4F-3's ) being vectored directly tow aid the incoming Japanese force, still on bearing 320° from

Midway; and the other ( Captain Kirk Armistead, 12 F2A-3's and one F4F-3 ) was, for the

time being, vectored slightly westward on bearing

310°, to be withheld temporarily against the contingency of a second enemy strike from another

direction. Within a few minutes, however, Major

Park's group had made contact, and Armistead's

was immediately committed in support of the

former."

At 0616, approximately 30 miles from Midway, from an altitude of 14,000 feet, the pilots

with Major Parks saw 2,000-feet below them a

large formation of Aichi Type 99 (Val) dive

bombers screened by several divisions of Zero

fighters. Captain John F. Carey, leading one of

Park's divisions in an F4F-3, gave "Tally-ho,"

and pushed over into a dive to attack the bombers,

followed by his wingmen, Captain Marion E. Carl

and Second Lieutenant Clayton M. Canfield. As

Carey and Canfield commenced high-side runs

on the bombers, Carl and other pilots of the

squadron mixed it with a swarm of Zero fighters

which, they noted, climbed astoundingly even in

comparison to the Grummans, let alone the

F2A's.

" What seems to be insoluble contradiction prevents

positive knowledge of how many fighters VMF-221 had

operational and took off on the morning of 4 June. VMF221 Report, evidently written in haste after combat, contains internal contradictions which cannnot be resolved,

and further cross-check of available casualty figures

against reported plane losses produces yet more conflict.

Twenty-six aircraft at take-off seems to be the figure supported by the weight of evidence, but Maj. Marion E. Carl,

one of the surviving pilots, leans to 25, which may possibly be due to the fact that one F2A-3 suffered engine

trouble after take-off and was forced to return to base

prior to making contact with the enemy, as reported in

CO, VMF-221 report to CO, MAG-22, 6 June 1946,

herein cited as VMF-221 Report.

"MAG-22 Report, p. 2.

21
"TALLY-HO" FOR THE MARINE FIGHTERS. An official Navy photo-model concept of the first contact between Marine Fightil

Squadron 221 and incoming Japanese fighters and bombers of the Midway Attack Force. Twenty-five Marine fighters tackle'

108 enemy aircraft.

Inasmuch as only three of the original 12 Marine pilots of Major Parks's group" survived this

unequal encounter, it is impossible to reconstruct

details of the melee, but survivors' accounts, together with evident results observed subsequently,

indicate that the first attack took a formidable toll

of the enemy bombers and even a few of the 36

covering Zeroes. To the three who survived, the

duel was a brief moment of surprise for the enemy,

followed by desperate dogfights to keep off the

incessant Zeroes, its the few remaining Marine

pilots attempted to reform.

" Survivors were Captains Carey (wounded in action)

and Carl; and Lieutenant Canfield. The squadron commander was lost in the first part of the flight. VMF-221

Report, end. (A).

28

Approximately 10 minutes after Major Park's

gallant attack, Captain Armistead's 13 fighters'

all old F2A's but one—launched the second Ma'

rine strike against the enemy air groups, still dis'

posed in two waves which Armistead counted t°

include 40 bombers each."

Perhaps the best account of this second ell'

counter is contained in Armistead's personal re'

port, which is as follows:

At about 0620, I heard Capt. Carey transnlit

"Tally-ho" followed by "Hawks at angels 14, suP;

ported by fighters." I then started climbing, an'

sighted the enemy at approximately 14,000 feet at 9

"VFM-221 Report, p. 1. These were actually the re'

spective attack and bombing formations, 36 planes eaelb

of the Midway attack force.
distance of 5 to 7 miles out, and approximately 2

miles to my right. I immediately turned to a heading of about 700 and continued to climb. I was endeavoring to get a position above and ahead of the

enemy and come down out of the sun. However, I

was unable to reach this point in time. I was at

17,000 feet when I started my attack. The target

consisted of 5 divisions of from 5 to 9 planes each,

flying in division V's. I figured this group to consist of from 30 to 40 dive bombers of the Aichi Type

99. I was followed in column by 5 F2A-3 fighters and 1 F4F-3 fighter, pilot unknown. I made a

head-on approach from above at a steep angle and

at yen' high speed on .the fourth enemy division

Which consisted of 5 planes. I saw my incendiary

bullets travel from a point in front of the leader, up

through , his plane and back through the planes on

,tne left wing of the V. I continued in my dive, and

looking back, saw two or three of those planes

falling in flames. Some of the planes in my division

centered their attack on the fifth enemy division.

After my pull-out, I zoomed back to an altitude of

14,000 feet; at this time I noticed another group of

the same type bombers following along in their path.

looked back over my shoulder and about 2,000

feet below and behind me I saw 3 fighters in column,

climbing up toward me, which I assumed to be

Planes of my division. However, they climbed at a

very high rate, and a very steep path. When the

nearest plane was about 500 feet below and behind

me I realized that it was a Japanese Zero fighter. I

kicked over in a violent split S and received three

20-mm. shells, one in the right wing gun, one in the

right wing root tank, and one in the top left side

of the engine cowling. I also received about twenty

7.7-mm. rounds in the left aileron, which mangled

the tab on the aileron, and sawed off a portion of

the aileron. I continued in a vertical dive at full

throttle

'

corkscrewing to the left, due to the effect

of the damaged aileron. At about 3,000 feet, I

started to pull out, and managed to hold the plane

level at an altitude of 500 feet.

Needless to say, at this juncture Armistead

headed for base.

In terms of Marine casualties, the results of this

second attack were somewhat better. Perhaps the

outstanding factor in these two courageous onslaughts by VMF-221 was the almost incredible

disparity between the outnumbering enemy

Zeroes—new airplanes of performance then quite

extraordinary—and the old Marine F2A's. This

comparison seemed keenly evident to the pilots of

VMF-221, one of whom stated in his action report:

I saw two Brewsters trying to fight the Zeroes.

One was shot down, and the other was saved by

ground fire covering his tail. Both looked like they

(SLEEK BUT SLOW, the obsolescent F2A-3 fighter of the type shown here was all that the Marine pilots of VMF-221 had

\except a token group of Wildcat F4F-3's) to pit against the Zeroes and Nakajimas of Admiral Nagumo's Air Attack Force.

29
were tied to a string while the Zeroes made passes at

at them. I believe that our men with planes even

half as good as the Zeroes would have stopped the

raid completely.

For better or for worse, however, the fighter

defense of Midway had been expended. The problem now passed to the defense battalion's antiaircraft gunners on the ground.

Ever since the Marine fighters had gone out,

Midway had been on the qui vive. At '0619, its

visual observation post had seen two aircraft falling in flames, some 25 miles away, as VMF-221

slashed at the Japanese. With all guns manned,

and fire controlmen steadily tracking in the enemy formation, the Marines awaited only the correct moment to commence firing. At 0629, the

Midway attack force was but eight miles away,

and at 0630 Colonel Shannon gave his orders

"Open fire when targets are in range."

One minute later, at 0631, every antiaircraft

battery on Midway had commenced firing.

Of this instant, wrote an officer then in. the 3c1

Defense Battalion: "

The entire island was deathly silent after the buzz

of the planes taking off. It was a beautiful sunnY

morning. The men all strained for a first glimpse,

and I had to sharply remind the lookouts to keep

the other sectors covered against surprise. Then we

saw the Japs, and the tension snapped. A moment

later we were in action.

Delivering a horizontal attack, the first wave,

" This was Major James S. O'Halloran, who conlmanded Battery E, one of the 3d Defense Battalion's 3-inch

units.

BURNING DIESEL-OIL TANKS on the north end of Sand Island after aircraft from the enemy carrier, Kaga, had plastered the

area with 500-pound bombs.

30
Which had originally numbered 36 bombers from

the Kaga and Akagi,16 now was counted by 3d

and 6th Defense Battalion observers to contain

only 22 aircraft," two of which were promptly shot

down at extreme range before they could release

bombs. Evidently VMF-221 had drawn blood.

The next wave, which struck just as the first sticks

of bombs began to hit all along the north shores of

Sand and Eastern Island, was composed of Aichi

99 dive-bombers, which had also started out 36

strong. According to witnesses on the ground, they

did not now exceed 18."

The Kaga group in the first wave, whose mis16 ONI Review, p. 7.

17 Maj. William S. McCormick, an experienced antiaircraft officer, counted 22, and so reported to CMC on 5

January 1948.

" VMF-221 Report, p. 1. Capt. Marshall A. Tyler, a

v MSB-241 pilot with a grounded plane, made the count.

sion was to attack the patrol-plane facilities on

Sand Island, dropped nine 242-kg." bombs on

and about the seaplane hangars, setting them afire

and starting a large oil fire in the fuel-oil tanks 500

yards to Ihe north. The Akagi group plastered the

north shore of Eastern Island, destroying the

Marine mess hall, galley, and post exchange,

which the returning enemy pilots described as

hangars.'

Battery D (3-inch antiaircraft ) , 6th Defense

Battalion, located midway along the southeast

coast of Sand Island, was one of the principal

targets of the Soryu's group of Val dive bombers,

which duly reported that the battery had been

silenced. Actually it had sustained a damaged

" One kilogram equal approximately 2.2 pounds.

" This and subsequent information as to the enemy air

'strike is derived from ONI Review, pp. 45-48. Unless

otherwise noted, all information on the ground defense is

from 6DB Report, pp. 1-8.

lie FIRES ON EAST SHORE OF SAND ISLAND resulted after Val dive bombers attacked the 3-inch battery located nearby.

31
heightfinder. Other targets of the dive bombers

included the already burning fuel storage at the

north end of Sand Island, the Sand Island dispensary, and the Eastern Island powerhouse,

which suffered direct hits from two 805-kg.

bombs, destroying virtually the entire plant. At

the very end of the strike, the 6th Defense Battalion's Eastern Island command post received a

direct hit which killed the Marine sector-commander, Major William W. Benson, and wounded

several other personnel. As the dive bombers

completed their runs, Zero and Nakajima 97

fighters from the Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu

made numerous strafing passes at targets on both

islands.

It should be understood, however, that all this

enemy air activity had not been carried on without cost. All six Marine 3-inch antiaircraft batteries fired continuously, and every low-flying

enemy attack was made through curtains of 37-

mm., 20-mm., and .50 caliber antiaircraft fire.

Admiral Nagumo, in his official action report,

confirmed this by his mention of the Marines

"vicious AA fire." " Admiral Nimitz, praising the

antiaircraft shooting, credited our batteries with

10 enemy planes, a total which may well have

been exceeded since returning pilots reported

seeing many damaged enemy aircraft down in the

water and falling out of formation."

At 0648, the enemy planes had expended their

ammunition and were enroute back to the carriers. Twelve minutes later, the air officer of the

Hiryu ( who had'been in command of the strike)

radioed back to Admiral Nagumo : "There is

need for a second attack wave."

This less than optimistic report, however, was

to some extent canceled by a second message, sent

" ONI Review, p. 72.

" CinCPac Report, p. 8.

BOMBED-OUT EASTERN ISLAND COMMAND POST of the 6th Defense Battalion, where Maj. William W. Benson was killed by

direct hit from a Japanese dive bomber.

32
at 0707, by one of the subordinate enemy avia- tion leaders, the air officer of the Kaga, who reported in a typically Japanese fashion: "Sand

Island bombed and great results attained." 23

Save for the brief appearance, at 0701, of one

or two Zeroes just south of Sand Island, when

these were fired on by Batteries D and E for about

20 second; Midway had received its final air at- tack of the war." At 0715, the "all clear"

sounded, and, in the words of Colonel Kirnes,"

c

ommanding officer of MAG-22: * * *

a message was broadcast, "Fighters land, refuel by divisions, 5th Division first." No an- swer was received although the message was broad- cast repeatedly, so a message, "All fighters land and reservice" was broadcast several times. A pitifully few 

it fighters returned in answer to this message, and was 

to strongly suspected that there were no more land.

Of VMF-221's fighters which had participated

" This and preceding details from ONI Review, P. 17. 246DB Report, P. 4.

MAG-22 Report, p. 3.

in the battle, only 10 returned, of which in turn

but two were still in condition for combat flight.

Thirteen F2A-3's and two F4F-3's were missing."

Meanwhile, almost an hour earlier, at 0605

Colonel Kimes, acting on the 0552 visual contact

of the enemy carriers, had broadcast the following orders to his dive bombers in VMSB-241 :

Attack enemy carriers bearing 320° distant 180

miles course 135° speed 20 knots.

No acknowledgment of this vital message could

be picked up, and it was feared that, for unknown

reasons, the dive bombers had not received their

orders, and that the strike on the enemy carriers

would never materialize." Needless to say, the

" Ibid., P. 3.

" Ibid., P. 2. According to Capt. Marshall A. Tyler, the

senior surviving officer of the Marine dive-bombing squadron, the message was promptly received and acknowledged

by both Majors Henderson and Norris, the respective unit

commanders of VMSB-241 as it was divided. Report of

CO, VMSB-241, 7 June 1942, hereinafter cited as VMSB241 Report.

"SAND ISLAND after looking BOMBED AND GREAT RESULTS ATTAINED," reported a Japanese flight leader by radio to Admiral Nagumo,

over a view similar to this one, which shows fires burning on Midway just after the enemy strike.

33
message was retransmitted periodically from 0605

on, and was, in fact, picked up not only by

VMSB-241 but by several fighter pilots of VMF221, some of whom actually set course for the

enemy fleet, despite their damages and dwindling

fuel and ammunition.

VMSB-241, was, like the fighter squadron,

divided into two striking-units, the first composed

of 16 SBD-2's under Major Lofton R. Henderson, the squadron commander; and the second,

of 11 SB2U-3's, led by Major Benjamin 'W.

Norris. The division of the squadron accorded

with its mixed composition, inasmuch as the

obsolescent SB2U-3's were far outmatched 14

the Douglas SBD's."

" These and subsequent details regarding VMSB-241's

attack are, unless otherwise noted, from VMBS-241

port, pp. 1-2.

THE CARRIER "AKAGI," UNDER ATTACK on the morning of 4 June 1942, attempts evasive action from the 20,000-foot bomb'

ing of Army B-1 7's. This is the only known photograph of this ship taken during the action, and is of particular interest

because it was this carrier which VMSB-241 shortly afterward bombed and set afire in the day's first successful action against

the enemy carriers.

34
Divided into two bomber boxes, Major Henderson's group of SBD's climbed to 9,000-foot altitude and set out to locate the enemy carriers,

Which were even then coming under the gallant

but unsuccessful " attack of the six Navy TBF's

and four Army B-26's which had been sent out

previously.

At 0755, through broken cloud formations be- low them, the Marine pilots sighted their target,

Admiral Nagumo's striking force, four carriers,

battleships, and numerous smaller combatant ships. Just below was the 26,900-ton Akagi,

and it was this ship which Major Henderson

determined to attack.

Because of the relative unfamiliarity of most of his pilots with the SBD-2 ( a result of the curtailed fuel allowances during the week before ) ,

Henderson planned on a glide- rather than a divebombing run, and commenced a let-down to

4,000 feet, from which he intended to launch his

attack. As the SBD's spiralled down, they began

receiving violent fighter attacks from Nakajima

97's and Zeroes, which were momentarily reinforced by more fighters from the carriers below.

Aboard the Akagi, their target, Marine pilots could see three fighters take off. Heavy antiaircraft fire began to thicken the air, and, below, the Akagi commenced evasive maneuvers at flank

Speed.

The balance of the attack can best be described in the words of Capt. Elmer G. Glidden, leader of the second division in Major Henderson's group:

The first (enemy fighter) attacks were directed at the s

of quadron leader in an attempt to put him out action. After about two passes, one of the enemy Put several shots through the plane of Major Hen- derson, and his plane started to burn. From the ac- tions of the leader it was apparent that he was hit and out of action. I was leader of the second box immediately behind the Major. As soon as it was ap- parent that the Major was out of action I took over the lead and continued the attack. Fighter attacks were heavy so I led the squadron down through a

Protecting

tack. layer of clouds and gave the signal to atOn emerging from the cloud-bank (sic) the

enemy carrier was directly below the squadron, and all planes made their runs. The diving interval was about 5 seconds. I

tion mmediately of after coming out from the protecthe clouds the squadron was attacked again

29 

ONI Review, p. 17.

by fighter planes and heavy AA. After making my

run I kept heading on for the water, and I headed

on an approximate bearing home. Looking back I

saw two hits and one miss that was right alongside

the bow. The carrier was starting to smoke.3°

Captain Glidden's observation of the two bomb

hits (each by a 500-pound bomb) is confirmed by

the commanding officer of the Akagi, who was interrogated after the war, as well as by other enemy sources. Until the end of hostilities, there had

been some question as to which of the enemy carriers VMSB-241 had actually hit, but the Akagi's

records, together with Admiral Nagumo's report

of the battle, jibe quite accurately with the reports

of the Marine squadron.

According to the Nagumo report, at 0800 the

Akagi sighted "16 enemy planes bearing 85°, elevation 7°, distant 17,000 meters." At 0805, further, she launched three fighters, which were evidently those noticed taking off by the Marine pilots. Prior to 0810, reports of other ships in the

task force indicated that Akagi had received bomb

hits." Under interrogation, her Captain stated

that his ship's first damage had occurred by fire as

a result of—

* * * two bombs by dive bombing, about 2

hours after sunrise ( one started fire at after elevator) . Planes were loaded up with bombs inside the

hangar and caught fire."

Since sunrise that day took place prior to 0600,

it could only have been the 16 Marine divebombers which drew first blood from the enemy

carriers.

The SBD-2s' retirement was executed at masthead level or lower, in order to stave off incessant

fighter attacks " which followed them clear of the

enemy fleet, but only eight of the original group

made the trip back to Midway. All of these, of

course, had sustained battle damage of varying

degree, mostly extensive, and one SBD (Bureau

No. 2106, flown by First Lieutenant Daniel Iverson, Jr.) received 259 counted hits, but neverthe-

" Statement of Capt. Elmer G. Glidden, 7 June 1942,

p. 1, hereinafter cited as Glidden.

"ONI Review, p. 18.

" USSBS Interrogation Nay No. 4, Capt. Aoki, Taijiro,

IJN, 9 October 1945; hereinafter cited as Aoki.

"The rear gunners of this strike group are credited with

having shot down four enemy fighters plus two additional

probables. Battle of Midway, p. 18.

35
less succeeded in getting back for a one-wheel,

no-flap landing."

While Major Henderson's SBD-2's were pressing home their attack against the enemy carriers,

Major Norris's aging SB2U-3's were approaching

the enemy fleet at 13,000 feet, and B-17's from

Midway were about to deliver a 20,000-foot

bombing attack which, according to Admiral

Nagumo's report, resulted only in a number of

distant misses."

" Information from photo caption submitted with accompanying photographs by CO, MAG-22 to CMC, 29

June 1942. Iverson, whose throat microphone was shot off

his neck during the action, dismissed the subject in his report, dated 7 June 1942, with the statement: "My plane

was hit several times." A brother officer commented afterward, "Without doubt, he was one of the most unperturbed

war pilots who ever flew an airplane."

ONI Review, p. 19.

At 0820, approximately 165 miles from Midway, the Norris group sighted the enemy fleet

through an almost solid cloud cover. Before the)

could even commence their let-down, however,

the SB2U-3's were hit by three Zero fighters on

combat air patrol, one of which was promptly

shot down by the combined fire of four Marine

rear-gunners.' More fighters pressed in, however,

and the group began to find itself seriously elm

barrassed. At this juncture, the Marine pilots

crowded every knot of speed out of their old airplanes and then went into column for a standard

glide-bombing let-down. As the Zeroes slashed in,

Major Norris led the formation to shelter within

the clouds, emerging at only 2,000 feet, almost on

"Statement of Capt. Leon M. Williamson, 7 June 1942,

hereinafter cited as Williamson. The author was second

in command of Major Norris's group, and senior surviving pilot at the close of the battle.

"MY PLANE WAS HIT SEVERAL TIMES," summarized 1st Lt. Daniel Iverson, Jr., in describing the attack by Marine SBD'

on the carrier, Akagi. Iverson's dive bomber, shown here, sustained more than 259 counted hits, including one which shot

his throat microphone off the pilot's neck.

36
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fp ISLAND 

of HANGAR BURNING AGAIN as a Navy fire and damage-control party plays a stream-over the charred rafters and the structure during the Battle of Midway.

31
top of the Japanese battleship Haruna,' which

was in company with a sister, Kirishima.

The position in which Norris now found himself called for an instant decision. Should he—or

could he—attempt from this altitude to seek out

the carriers, flying through the now intense flak

of an entire fleet, or should he attack the target at

hand? Reasoning " that his unit might readily

be destroyed between fighters and flak, and that

the carriers had been forewarned, Major Norris

therefore elected to take advantage of surprise

and hit the battleship. This he did in a gliding

attack, described by one of the pilots, Second Lieutenant George Lumpkin, as follows:

Major Norris started his dive immediately from

13,500 feet. It was a fairly shallow dive with my air

speed about 240 knots. We dove through the overcast, I was flying No. 2 on Major Norris and came

out in the clear on the port side of a large battleship,

Major Norris immediately peeled off to the right in

a fairly steep dive, Lieutenant Campion, who was

No. 3 man, followed him, and I dove third. Antiaircraft fire from the Jap battleship was very close.

In fact the air was so rough from the fire it was

practically impossible to hold the ship in a true dive.

The Jap battleship zigzagged frantically. I tried to

release my bomb but the mechanism did not work.

I pulled out of my dive and headed slightly south to

keep from coming too close to a Japanese transport

following the battleship. They were still shooting at

me with antiaircraft, probably 3-inch shells.

Another pilot, Second Lieutenant Daniel L.

Cummings, tells, in a similar action report, what

happened to the Marine pilots as they completed

their runs:

* * * because I was then well surrounded by

Jap Zero fighters I did not see the results of my

bomb. For the next 15 minutes I had nothing to do

except try to get away from five fighters that were

concentrating on me. In the hit and run dogfighting,

ONI Review, p. 19, which reported in Admiral Nagumo's chronological log, "0830: 10 enemy planes dive

on the Haruna * * * Friendly fighters engaged in

air combat with the enemy." This was the Japanese battleship previously reported sunk by Army Air Force B-17's

in the first days of Japan's invasion of the Philippines.

"MAG-22 Report, p. 2; and 1948 comments by Maj.

Leon Williamson and Capt. Jack Cosley. Although Major

Norris survived this attack, he was missing in action after

another strike to be described shortly, and, while no written statement by him is known to exist, he was, of course,

interviewed by Colonel Kimes upon his return, and information is thus available as to his reasoning at this juncture.

38

which was my initiation to real war, my old, obsole

SB2U-3 was almost shot out from under me. 1

nally made my escape in the clouds. I flew back

Midway using full right rudder, right aileron afl

my elevator controls were frozen, and my instil'.

ments shot away. About 5 miles from Midway 11')

gasoline gave out and I made a crash landing in th'

water.

As may be divined, the attack had hardly bed

launched under optimum conditions, what wid

the alertness of the enemy combat air patrol and

the high quality of his antiaircraft. The results)

therefore, despite claimed hits.on the Haruna,

appear from reliable enemy reports to have bee"

negligible. The Kirishima actually did sustanl

minor damage from a very near miss off her stern)

which drenched the after portion of the ship With

water, but the Haruna was not hit."

Three SB2U-3's were shot down, and the Nor'

ris group is credited officially with having de;

stroyed two enemy fighters, plus two probables.

By 1000, all surviving Marine aircraft had

made their way back to Eastern Island, guided,'

some instances by the soaring clouds of black

smoke from the oil fires still raging.

Hardly had the survivors gotten in to land)

however, when, at 1100, the air-raid sirens

sounded again, as an unidentified flight of 0

dive bombers appeared off Midway and jettisoned

bombs in the water, an action which ( although

intended to be friendly, inasmuch as the flight ac'

tually consisted of Navy SBD's from the U. S. S.

Hornet) hardly reassured the Marines on shore

Batteries prepared to reopen fire, and one pet"

forated fighter plane from VMF-221 actuallY

took the air for an interception before the visitors

could identify themselves."

Both islands were now the scene of considerable

damage and resultant activity. Due to bomb damage, which had ruptured fuel lines, over two-

"ONI Review, p. 19, and USSBS Interrogation Nay N°'

2, Capt. Kawaguchi, Susumu, IJN, 10 October 1945,

Thus the Haruna survived another battle. She was finallY

sunk in Japanese waters by Navy carrier planes on 28 Job'

1945. JANBC, p. 27.

"Battle of Midway, p. 19. Although this account states

that only two SB2U-3's were lost, VMSB-24I Report, '°

conjunction with MAG-22 Report, agree on a figure of

three SB2U-3's.

" Letter from Maj. Thomas F. Moore to CMC, 31 JO'

uary 1948.
SALVAGENote PARTIES ON EASTERN ISLAND remove valuable supplies and provisions from gutted storehouses of the aviation-base.

presence of volunteer civilian workers, some of whom elected to await battle beside the Marines.

thirds of the available avgas supply was, for the time being, inaccessible. Resort had to be made to use of drums, to hand pumping, and a refueling barge sent over from Sand Island, a most cum- bersome means of fueling airplanes. Labor for these operations, which were to continue around the clock for some 48 hours, was provided by Marine working parties from MAG-22, the de- fense battalions, and Company D, 2d Raider Bat- talion, the infantry reserve on that island.' On the ground, the Marine defense forces had sustained 24 casualties, and four ordnancemen of

VMF-221 had the misfortune to receive a direct hit from a 242-kg. bomb which lit squarely in their rearming pit.

At 1700, a burning enemy carrier was reported 200 miles 

At northwest of Midway on bearing 338°. this time, VMSB-241 had six operational

S131)-2'5 and five SB2U-3's." It was the judg- ment of Major Norris, now squadron comman- der, 

home 

that a more successful attack could be pressed by this small number of planes after dark When enemy fighter opposition would be absent,

4.:McGlashan, p. 27. VM -241 

Report, p. 2 and Battle of Midway, p. 34.

and take-off was accordingly delayed until darkness." Divided by type into two units ( SBD-2's

under Capt. Marshall A. Tyler, and SB2U-3's

again under Major Norris) , the squadron took

off at 1900, but could not intercept. Major Norris, however, unfortunately failed to return, although his more fortunate comrades were able to

home in by the light of the oil fires and AA searchlights turned on as beacons."

During the night, which was moonless and

squally, the Japanese submarine, 1-168, approached the south shores of Midway, to execute

a mission of night harassing." At 2154, she surfaced cautiously about 4,500 yards east of Battery B, on the eastern tip of Eastern Island, was

observed, tracked but not fired on," and coasted

slowly offshore until 2221, when trackers were

unable to follow her.

" MAG-22 Report, p. 4.

"VMSB-241 Report, p. 3, and Booth.

"USSBS Interrogation Nay No. 108, Commander Fujimori, Yasuo, IJN, 23 November 1945, p. 466,.

" Information as to enemy capabilities was not yet at

hand on Midway, and it was feared that firing on this submarine might disclose active battery positions to a subsequent pre-landing bombardment in the event of an

enemy landing. McGlashan II, p. 28.

39
Information is not available as to 1-168's further movements until 0120, now 5 June. At this

hour, gun-flashes were seen to the southeast of

Sand Island, from the 6th Defense Battalion's

observation post. Three minutes later, the 3-inch

Antiaircraft Group of the battalion reported that

a submarine was visible on bearing 1100, shelling

the island. Within one minute, at 0124, searchlight No. 102 had picked up and illuminated the

1-168, and Battery Chad fired a 5-inch star-shell;

by 0125, two 3-inch batteries (D and E, 6th Defense Battalion) and one 5-inch battery (B) were

firing, with shell splashes going up close aboard

the ship.

After firing eight rounds ( all of which hit in the

lagoon), the submarine submerged at 0128, having been the target of some 42 rounds of 3-inch

and three of 5-inch. Although observers at the

searchlight position claimed to have seen three

hits registered by Battery E, it is definite that the

target was not sunk," especially as she in te

survived next day to deliver the torpedo coup ch

grace to U. S. S. Yorktown.

Inasmuch as "The Battle of Midway was de'

cided on June 4th with the destruction of tilt

enemy's air power," " operations on 5 June as

sumed the nature of pursuit and mopping up,

the course of which VMSB-241 struck the

Marine blow of the battle.

At 0700, the dive-bombers squadron, now cony

posed of six SBD-2's ( Captain Tyler) and 0

SB2U-3's ( Captain Richard E. Fleming), Wt

ordered out to intercept and attack two su?

posedly damaged battleships retiring almost due

west of Midway, 170 miles away."

" All information on this attack from 6DB Report, PP,

8-9, and from Booth. The 1-168 was finally sunk north di,

the New Hebrides by United States surface craft ou •

September 1943. JANEC, p. 7.

"Battle of Midway, p. 35.

" This and subsequent information as to this strike alc

from VSMB-241 Report, p. 3, unless otherwise indicated

GUTTED JAPANESE CRUISER, probably the Mzkuma, after Marine and Navy dive bombers had plastered her on the morn 115,

of 5 June. Encircled wreckage atop after turret may well be the remains of the Marine SB2U-3 which Captain Flenlo*

deliberately dived in after sustaining mortal hits.

40
After approximately 45 minutes in the air, the

Marine pilots picked up a wide oil-slick trail,

evidently the wake of a wounded ship, and pressing the pursuit down this track, VMSB-241 made

contact with the enemy force 20 minutes later at

0805, when they saw below them two major combatant ships, both in damaged condition, escorted by two destroyers. These were not, however, battleships, as had been surmised, but were in fact

the two powerful and new heavy cruisers, Mogami

and Mikuma, which had sustained their injuries in a collision six hours before, taking evasive ac- tion while under attack by a United States submarine." Now lagging behind the other retreating

ships of their unit, Cruiser Division Seven, they

were alone except for the destroyers.

Captain Tyler's plan of attack envisaged a divebombing attack by the SBD-2's from 10,000 feet,

" USSBS Interrogation Nay No. 83, Rear Adm. Soji, Akira, IJN, 13-14 November 1945, p. 363. Admiral Soji had command of the Mogami during the Battle of Midway.

CAPT. 

Medal RICHARD E. FLEMING, posthumously awarded the of Honor for divin

g

the after his obsolescent bomber onto

been turret of the enemy cruiser, Milkuma, after he had wounded by enemy flak.

and a glide-bombing run by the SB2U-3's from

4,000 feet. As Tyler led his division out of the sun

from astern of the cruisers, with the Mogami as

his target, intense antiaircraft fire commenced

and continued throughout the balance of the

descent. The attack was resolutely pushed home,

however, and the Mogami was bracketed by six

very near misses which caused extensive topside

damage."

Meanwhile, Fleming's glide-bombing run had

taken the Japanese by surprise," although their

antiaircraft fire was prompt and heavy once the

attack was disclosed. As Fleming dove, his airplane was hit forward and smoke began pouring

out of his engine. Notwithstanding this, he continued the run without faltering, retaining the

lead in his division, and dropped his bomb. Just

at the moment of pull-out, his plane burst into

flames, and, in the words of Admiral Soji:

I saw a dive bomber dive into the last turret (of

the Mikuma) and start fires. He was very brave.

In this manner, Captain Fleming insured, at the

cost of his life, that VMSB-241's final attack on

the Japanese fleet achieved its utmost?'

This was the last Marine Corps action in the

Battle of Midway. Other successful and important results were still to be attained by Navy and

Army units, but to describe them is beyond the

scope of this narrative.

The contribution of Marines to the defense of

Midway, however, had been considerable, from

the inception of base development to this moment.

Not only had the 3d and 6th Defense Battalions

contributed their share of backbreaking labor, unremitting vigilance and highly effective flak, but

the aviation personnel of Marine Air Group 22, at

a cost rarely surpassed in the history of United

States Naval Aviation, had unhesitatingly faced

an enemy superior in numbers and aircraft, and

exacted more than a full return for their sacrifice.

At a cost of 49 Marines killed and 53

52 Ibid. p. 363. One bomb missed the ship by "only 10

meters."

" Ibid.

" For this feat, Captain Fleming was posthumously

awarded the Medal of Honor, being the first Marine Corps

aviator of this war to be so honored.

41
MARINES BURY THEIR DEAD. After the battle, Midway's dead are placed on board PT boats under an honor guard of the

6th Defense Battalion, to be buried at sea, off the reef.

wounded,' Midway had been defended successfully. MAG-22 had destroyed some 43 enemy

aircraft ( 25 Val dive bombers and 18 Zekes ), and

the 6th Defense Battalion had shot down at least

" Break-down of Marine casualties in the defense of

Midway (including the action of 7 December 1941) is as

follows:

Marine Air Group 22

Officers

Enlisted Total

Killed in action 1 6 7

Missing, presumed dead 23 12 35

Wounded in action 13 12 25

6th Defense Bn. (Reinf.)

Killed in action 3 4 7

Wounded in action 1 27 28

Total Marine casualties_ 102

42

10 more. On no occasion after 7 December 1941,

was the defending garrison ever taken by surprise,

and on no occasion did an attacker ever fail t°

draw prompt fire from Midway's defenses.

Again at Midway, just as at Wake, these re'

sults had been attained not by air, and not 1g

ground, but by the Marine Corps amalgam of the

two. Ground Marines had established the base

and rendered it secure against direct attack jO

order that, on a subsequent day of battle, 2

Marine air group might shield the base in combat

beyond the horizon.

Although directed solely to the Marine aviation

units at Midway, Admiral Nimitz's despatch composed after the victory, could well apply in spirit

to all Marines at Midway, and, as paraphrased,

it is therefore quoted:

Please accept my sympathy for the losses sustained by your

-gallant aviation personnel based at Midway. Their sacrifice was

not in vain. When the great emergency came, they were ready.

7 hey met unflinchingly the attack of vastly superior numbers and

made the attack ineffective. They struck the first blow at the

enemy carriers. They were the spearhead of our great victory.

They have written a new and shining page in the annals of the

Marine 'Corps. 
IC

APPENDIX I

MARINES AT MIDWAY

Documentation and Bibliography

For the convenience of those who may wish to give further study to the role of Marines in de- fense of Midway, a bibliography of the most important source-material available in the archives of United States Marine Corps Headquarters, is listed below. In this connection, however, two

considerations must be emphasized: First, that this bibliography does not essay to cover the entire

Battle of Midway any more than did this narrative, which has confined itself closely to Marine

Corps matters; second, that the sources listed below do not entirely exhaust even the Marine

Corps field. For example, in addition to the categorical items set forth, Marine Corps Headquarters holds more than a hundred detailed comments (by officers who served at Midway in 1941 and 1942) on this monograph itself; many of

these are so highly informative as almost to constitute important original sources in themselves. All of this Midway material, however, subject always to security regulations, is available for study and inspection at this Headquarters, and consists of the following major items:

1. "The War Reports of General Marshall, General

The 

Arnold, and Admiral King," Lippincott, 1947.

3. by Battle of Midway," combat narrative prepared the Office of Naval Intelligence, 13 March 1943. The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway," Office 4. of Naval Intelligence, June 1947. ‘-■02 6th Defense Battalion, FMF, official report to G„. 0, Naval Air Station, Midway, on action of 4-5

0 

R. ...,J

war 

tirle.3 dated 13 June 1942.

War 

Diary, 6th Defense Battalion FMF, May 1942. Diary

'

6th Defense Battalion, FMF, June 1942.

Cominandant, Fourteenth Naval District, letter to Major General Commandant, with CinCPac endorsement, regarding deficiencies of defensive 8. p equipment at Midway, 22 March 1942. ourteenth Naval District Intelligence Officer's mem- orandum report of interview with PAA Capt. J. H. Hamilton, 1

pilot of Philippine clipper, 8 December 941.

783018-48-4

9. CG, Marine Garrison Forces, Fourteenth Naval District, letter commending Midway Defense Forces,

17 August 1942.

10. CinCPac serial 0841 to CNO regarding the movement

of the 6th Defense Battalion, FMF, to Pearl Harbor, 28 May 1941.

11. 3d Defense Battalion, FMF, Special Order 10-1941,

regarding movement to Midway, 8 February 1941.

12. "The Campaigns of the Pacific War," USSBS, 1946.

13. Pacific Fleet Operation Order 3-41, regarding movement of 3d Defense Battalion, FMF, to Midway, 6

February 1941.

14. CinCPac serial 0214 to Commandant, Fourteenth

Naval District, regarding transfer of 3d Defense

Battalion, FMF, to Midway, 7 February 1941.

15. CinCPac serial 0215 to Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet, directing the availability of U. S. S.

Antares for Midway movement, 7 February 1941.

16. CO, 3d Defense Battalion, FMF, letter to Bureau of

Ships requesting purchase of motor sampans for

Midway boat-pool, 23 August 1940.

17. Commandant Fourteenth Naval District serial 310 to

CO, 3d Defense Battalion, FMF, directing establishment of Midway Detachment, Fleet Marine

Force, 19 July 1940.

18. Commandant Fourteenth Naval District letter of instructions to Capt. Kenneth W. Benner, 9 July 1940.

19. Love, Julian, Lt. Comdr. (MC) USN, medical and

sanitary survey of Midway, 21 July 1940.

20. Commandant Fourteenth Naval District letter of instructions to Capt. Samuel G. Taxis, 31 May 1940.

21. Notes compiled from enemy interviews, dates unknown.

22. CO, 3d Defense Battalion, FMF, memorandum to

Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, recommending advance reconnaissance of Midway, 23

May 1940.

23. CinCPac Mailgram, 7 October 1941.

24. CinCPac serial 0496 to CNO regarding establishment

of permanent Marine defense force at Midway, 3

April 1941.

25. CNO serial 047412 to CinCPac disapproving reduction of Midway garrison, 6 May 1941.

26. Fourteenth Naval District Operation Plan 2-41, 4

April 1941.

27. CNO serial 0638 to CinCPac directing establishment

of entire 3d Defense Battalion, FMF, on Midway,

17 January 1941.

28. Muster Rolls, United States Marine Corps.

29. CinCPac serial 0130W to Commander South Pacific

Force, regarding#20 lessons learned at Battle of Midway, 20 June 1942.

30. CO Naval Air Station, Midway, paraphrased despatch

regarding battle-damage, Midway 9 December 1941.

43
31. CinCPac serial 01849, to ComInch, action report on

the Battle of Midway.

32. "History of Marine Fighting Squadron Two Twenty

One," undated, author not given (but see footnote

4,p. 17).

33. War Diary, Marine Air Group 22, May 1942.

34. CO, VMF-221, letter-report of submarine contact,

11 February 1942.

35. CO, Marine Air Group 21, serial 1173 to the Major

General Commandant regarding flight of VMSB231 from Ewa to Midway, 19 December 1941.

36. Larkin, Claude A., Col., letter to CinCPac regarding

record of MAG-21, 5 April 1943.

37. Wallace, William J., Lt. Col., personal letter to Col.

Claude A. Larkin, 18 January 1942.

38. Bayler, Walter L. J., Maj., undated memorandum

relative to communication installations, Eastern

Island air-field, Midway (probably January 1942).

39. Larkin, Claude A., Col., personal letter to unknown

addressee, regarding status of MAG-21, 18 December 1941.

40. "Report on Need of Additional Naval Bases to Defend the Coasts of the United States, Its Territories

and Possessions," House Document No. 65, 76th

Congress, 1st Session 27 December 1938 (so-called

Hepburn Report).

41. USSBS Interrogation Nav-13, Capt. Watanabe, Y.,

IJN, 15 October 1945.

42. USSBS Interrogation Nav-60, Capt. Toyama, Yasumi,

IJN, 1 November 1945.

43. "Japanese Naval and Merchant Ship Losses During

World War II By All Causes," Joint Army-Navy

Assessment Committee (JANEC), Nav-EXOS

P-468, February 1947.

44. CO, Marine Forces Fourteenth Naval District, serial

09 to Major General Commandant, on reorganization of defense forces Fourteenth Naval District, 5

January 1942.

45. Pickett, Harry K., Col., report to the Major General

Commandant on plans for defense of Midway, 14

October 1939.

46. Major General Commandant serial 434941-2 to Brig.

Gen. Charles F. B. Price, regarding inspection of

Pacific units, 12 September 1941.

47. United States Marine Corps Tables of Organization

D-133 through D-155-D (defense battalion tables

of organization), 27 February 1941.

48. Pfeiffer, Omar T., Col., undated memorandum (February 1942) regarding status of Marine 'Forces

Fourteenth Naval District.

49. "Sailing Directions for the Pacific Islands, Volume

II," H. 0. No. 165, U. S. Hydrographic Office.

50. CNO serial 0470412 to CinCPac regarding garrisons

on Wake and Midway, 23 June 1941.

51. "Midway-The North Pacific's Tiny Pet," Homer C.

Votaw, United States Naval Institute Proceedings,

pp. 1606-07.

52. CO, 6th Defense Battalion, FMF, letter to Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, reporting enemy submarine bombardment, 25 January 1942.

44

53. CO, 6th Defense Battalion, FMF, letter to CG Mar

Forces Fourteenth Naval District, reporting elle

submarine bombardment, 8 February 1942.

54. Commanding Officer, 6th Defense Battalion, DP'

letter to CG, Marine Forces, Fourteenth Naval

trict, reporting enemy submarine bombardment,

February 1942.

55. McGlashan, Robert C., Lt. Col., official reply in ts4°,

parts to Historical Section questionnaire, 12 Angut

1947.

56. CO, VMF-221 letter to CO, MAG-22, report "'

action at Midway, 6 June 1942.

57. CO, VMSB-241 report of combat, 7 June 1942.

58. CO, MAG-21, serial 0111, report of enemy actioil,

Midway, 10 June 1942.

59. JICPOA Report, "Japanese Land Forces No. 2,"

October 1942.

60. CO, MAG-22, preliminary report on battle of Mid

way, 8 June 1942.

61. CO, 6th Defense Battalion, FMF, report to CG,M

tii9n4e2.Forces Fourteenth Naval District, 10 Jo

62. USSBS Interrogation Nav-4, Capt. Aoki, Taiiit°'

IJN, 9 October 1945.

63. USSBS Interrogation Nav-33, Lt. Comdr. Tokult°'

Horishi, IJN, 25 October 1945.

64. USSBS Interrogation Nav-2, Capt. Kawaguchi, Su'

sumu, IJN, 10 October 1945.

65. CG, Marine Forces Fourteenth Naval District, IVIel!'1

orandum to Commandant Fourteenth Naval RI

trict, regarding additional forces for Midway,

May 1942.

66. USSBS Interrogation Nav-83, RAdm Soji, Aldt°'

IJN, 13-14 November 1945.

67. USSBS Interrogation Nav-108, Comdr. Fujirno°

Yasuo, IJN, 23 November 1945.

68. Historical Section Interview with Lt. Col. Custis nu„;r

ton, Jr., regarding reinforcement of Midway,

September 1947.

69. Ship's log, U. S. S. Lexington, December 1941.

70. CinCPac serial 02276 to ComInch, supplementa'

report on the battle of Midway, 25 July 1942.

71. Cable Station Diary, Midway, Commercial Cable 1

72. CNO serial 397 to Commandant Fourteenth Na:,tA,

District regarding establishment of Marines at Mt"

way, 20 December 1939.

73. Annual Report of the Commandant of the Marill°

Corps, 1904. • ql

74. Taxis, Samuel G., Lt. Col., official reply to HistorIc't

Section questionnaire regarding early developitle't

of Midway, 18 August 1947.

75. War Diary, Naval Air Station, Midway.

76. Nimitz, Chester W., Admiral, USN, memorandum

Capt. Milo F. Draemel, USN, regarding defells"

plans for Midway, 23 May 1942.

77. Davis, Arthur C. Capt. USN, memorandum 4

CinCPac, regarding defense plans for Midway,

May 1942.

78. Nimitz, Chester W., Admiral, USN, undated mer°:°

randum (May 1942) to Capt. Arthur C.

USN, regarding employment of aircraft based

Midway.
it)(

o.

601

101

'fit

to

111

to

APPENDIX II

31 May

a

July

29 September

14 Febr a

26 1 August\—

11 September

L19 November

MARINES AT MIDWAY

Midway Chronology

1940

Capt. Samuel G. Taxis was ordered to Midway to perform

initial survey and reconnaissance for defenses.

Capt. Kenneth W. Benner ordered to Midway to relieve

Captain Taxis and continue

survey and reconnaissance.

Midway Detachment, Fleet Marine Force (9 officers and 168

enlisted), under Maj. Harold

C. Roberts, arrives Midway

and commences installation of

3d Defense Battalion materiel.

1941

Remainder of 3d Defense Battalion (28 officers and 556 enlisted), under Col. Robert H.

Pepper, arrives Midway and

continues defensive preparations.

Naval Air Station, Midway, goes

into commission.

6th Defense Battalion (Col. Raphael Griffin) relieves 3d Defense Battalion as the atoll's

garrison.

1st Lt. Loren D. Everton, with

60 enlisted, sent forward to

Midway as ground echelon

from Marine Air Group 21,

to prepare for reception of aircraft.

7 December

'L

17 December

24 December

25 December

26 December

25 January

8 February

10 February

1 March

1941

Japanese destroyers Akebono

and Ushio bombard Midway,

inflicting 14 casualties and

considerable damage to structures.

Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 231 ( Maj. Clarence J.

Chappell) reaches Midway

after executing world's record

single-engine lafid -plane

massed over-water flight (1,-

137 miles) from Hickam Field,

T. H.

Batteries A and C, 4th Defense

Battalion ( Capt. Custis Burton, Jr.) arrive from Oahu to

reinforce Midway.

Marine Fighting Squadron 221

flies in to Midway from U. S. S.

Saratoga.

4th Defense Battalion units and

ground echelon of VMF-211

arrve from fruitless attempt to

relieve Wake, and are assigned

to Midway garrison.

1942

Enemy submarine 1-173 bombards Midway.

Enemy submarine bombards

Midway.

Enemy submarine bombards

Midway.

Marine Air Group 22 is commissioned from squadrons on Midway.

45
1942

10 March Four-plane section of fighters

from VMF-221 shoots down

enemy patrol seaplane southwest of Midway.

2 May Admiral Nimitz visits Midway to

ascertain its defensive readiness and needs.

20 May Admiral Nimitz warns Captain

Simard and Colonel Shannon

of impending Japanese attack.

25 May Companies C and D, 2d Raider

Battalion ( Capt. Donald H.

Hastie) and 37-mm. battery,

3d Defense Battalion ( Capt.

Ronald K. Miller), arrive

Midway.

26 May U. S. S. Kittyhawk arrives at

Midway with crucial air and

ground reinforcements.

28 May Japanese Occupation Force sails

from Saipan for Midway.

46

30 May

4 June

5 June

9 June

1942

Two PBY's of VP-44 sustaill

damage in aerial contact Nv16

twin-engined Japanese boa)

ers to westward.

Battle of Midway commences, iv'

cluding air-strike by VMSB

241 against Japanese Strikill

Force; fighter-defense of Mid"

way by VMF-221; and hos')

anti-aircraft action by 6th De'

fense Battalion ( reinforced)

Midway sustains major daili"

age from Japanese air-raid.

VMSB-241 attacks and damages

Japanese cruisers retiring t°

westward.

Japanese communique states:

"The Midway Occupation aP

erations have been temporarii

postponed."
APPENDIX Ill

MARINES AT MIDWAY

Navy Unit Commendation,

6th Defense Battalion, FMF

For its role in defense of Midway and in preparation for the battle, the 6th Defense Battalion

(reinforced) —which included all the Marine

ground defense forces, received the following

Navy Unit Commendation from the Secretary of the Navy:

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure incom- mending the Sixth Defense Battalion for service as follows:

"For outstanding heroism in support of military operations prior to and during the Battle of Midway, June 1942. Assuming a tremendous operational and service load in preparing defenses of Midway against anticipated Japanese attack, the officers and men of the Sixth Defense Battalion carried on in- tensive night battle training, completed and in- stalled underwater obstacles, unloaded and dis- tributed uted supplies, emplaced guns and constructed facilities for stowing ammunition and for protecting

personnel. Alert and ready for combat when enemy Planes came in to launch high and dive-bombing attacks and low-level strafing attacks on June 4,

they promptly opened and maintained fire against

the hostile targets, downing 10 planes during the

furious 17-minute action which resulted in the

destruction of the Marine galley and mess-hall,

equipment, supplies and communication facilities.

Working as an effective team for long periods without relief, this Battalion cleared the debris from the

bomb-wrecked galley; reestablished disrupted communications, and serviced planes, thereby contributing greatly to the success of operations conducted

from this base. The high standards of courage and

service maintained by the Sixth Defense Battalion

reflect the highest credit upon the United States

Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with the

SIXTH Defense Battalion Fleet Marine Force, Reinforced, consisting of the SIXTH Defense Battalion, attached personnel of the Third Defense Battalion, 22nd and 23rd Provisional Marine Companies and "C" and "D" Companies of the Second

Raider Battalion are authorized to wear the NAVY

UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JOHN L. SULLIVAN

41
APPENDIX IV

MARINES AT MIDWAY

Events at Battery D,

7 December 1941

The following narrative, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Jean H. Buckner, then in command

of Battery D, a 3-inch antiaircraft unit which

played a leading role in the action on 7 December

1941, is reprnted in full because of ts informatve

account of the enemy raid on that date, and because it describes in considerable detail the typical

sequence of preparations undertaken by Marine

units not only at Midway but at many other

Pacific advanced bases on the day war came:

On Sunday morning, 7 December 1941, I was at

breakfast in the officers' mess with the other officers

of the Battalion when Lt. William R. Dorr, officer

of the day, came into the mess and told us a message

had been received from Pearl Harbor, which stated

that the Japanese had attacked Oahu. * * *

We all thought he was joking and said so, but

Lieutenant Dorr stuck to his story and added that

he had awakened Lieutenant Colonel Shannon and

informed him of the contents of the message.

Shortly afterward Lieutenant Colonel Shannon

and Major Archie O'Neil came into the mess, confirmed Dorr's report, and told all battery commanders to alert their men and have them ready to man

battle stations within the hour.

My feelings at that time, and that of nearly all the

other officers I am sure, was that this was a realistic

war game. I believe that Lieutenant Colonel Shannon also doubted that the warning was a report of

a real attack.

We notified our men to be ready to march to the

batteries in light marching order within an hour and

hurriedly finished breakfast. As I recall, Dorr said

the message from Pearl Harbor had been received

about 0700. The siren sounded for general quarters

at about 0900, at which time all batteries * * *

were marching to their positions.

On 5 December 1941 (it may have been 6 Decem48

ber 1941), a ship had arrived at Midway bringing,

SCR-268 fire control radars and a quantity

3-inch AA ammunition armed with 3-inch Nay)

common, base-detonating projectiles. The 268'

Radars and the ammunition had not been distr'i

buted to the AA batteries, so a major portion of the

daylight hours of the 7th was taken up with th,e

selection of radar positions, installing the sets, aly

distributing the new ammunition to each gun.

Technical data on the Navy base-detonating arn'

munition was not furnished with the shipment. 1,11

order to satisfy myself and the gun captains thatIt

would fit the guns, I had a round placed alongsin,e

a round of our standard antiaircraft HE amrraliw

tion and checked all bearing dimensions. T110

checked, and a few rounds (probably 10) were

placed in each of the four ready-boxes in each guy

pit.

A few days prior to the 7th the range section hnel

started a sand fill to provide an adequate 04 (°I

battery commander's position) next to the directoff

This job was about half complete on the morning °t

the 7th, but by nightfall a small sandbag revel-Den

had been constructed which provided at least sonne

protection.

Another project which was only partially coin:

plete was that of burying the gun-data-transun's

sion cables in 6- by 6-inch wooden conduit. The at'

tempt to place the remainder of the cables in the

conduits was given up, and the cables hastily burie

without protection. This kept the gun crews 1:nis

for most of the day.

The work in progress at the battery was jute

rupted two or three times during the day by fall

air raid alarms caused by returning PBY pat

planes. I remember one of these alarms occurre

while the noon meal of fricasseed chicken was bell

gulped. It was about this time that the members °

the battery reached the conclusion that they were

not playing war games, but were involved in the

real thing.
All personnel were at their stations for Condition I as darkness settled down. Condition III was set after evening twilight had failed to produce an at- tack. During Condition III half of the battery were

allowed to sleep in the gun- or range-section pits, but the entire battery had to be able to fire within

one minute.

I seriously doubt if anyone in the battery was

actually asleep at about 2130 when the lookouts reported flashes on the horizon in a slightly south by west direction. After a brief observation, the thought

crossed my mind, and stuck there, that Battery A (5- i.nch seacoast, located on the west side of Sand Island in general line between Battery D and the flashes)

thought it had located a target to the west and was firing. I assumed that the flashes we observed close to the beach were caused by Battery A guns, and

those we observed at a distance were caused by BatterY A 

In projectiles striking the water and exploding. view of the fact that no real target was visible, I was quite amused by the antics of Battery A and re- marked as much to Lieutenant Dorr, the range of- ficer. About this time many of the men, including the battery commander, climbed on top of the Parapets to get a better view of what was going on. After a few minutes the flashes to west ceased. I was still standing on top of the 0-1 parapet trying

A

to discover what I still assumed had been Battery 's target when suddenly several guns flashed rela- tively close to the island to the west but at great enough 

range not to be mistaken for Battery A. In addition, my illusions and those of the entire battery ere further shattered when something that sounded

heads

a freight train passed immediately over our heads followed by explosions in the vicinity of the Powerhouse. The tops of the parapets were deserted without order.

d

After several more salvos had been fired I could iscern what appeared to be the mast-heads of a ship in a position apparently in prolongation of the south coast of Sand Island. The range section also Picked up this target, and I asked what the range

but Lieutenant Dorr replied that there was

insufficient light for the range finder to obtain a

reading. Sometime previously word had been re- ce.ived.by 

tain telephone from the AA Group CP ( Cap- Tingle ) to "fire on all enemy targets." A search- light (N-0. 8, I think) , located on the south coast, struck arc and illuminated a ship steaming at high Speed pein nan easterly direction parallel to the south Coast at a range of about 3,000 yards on a bearing

large from Battery D. Through binoculars a

large 

the Japanese flag was plainly visible flying from

foremast.

gave the order to commence firing. The range

,°.emg only about 3,000 yards, the gun angle of eleva- tion was very small. As a matter of fact the gun captains told me afterward that the elevation trans- mitted by the director to the data receivers on the

guns was zero. This was probably because there was

actually a minus angle of sight from the director to

the water line of the target. Gunnery Sergeant M.

C. Pulliman was wearing the telephone for transmitting orders to the gun captains and when he heard

my order to commence firing, realizing the gun

angle of elevation would be low, he passed the word

approximately as follows: "You can commence firing, but check your line of fire and be sure you don't

hit any part of the battery in front of you."

Guns 3 and 4 ( Platoon Sergeant Staid and Sergeant Hurtig) began firing at a very slow rate and

continued firing until the illuminating searchlight

was shot out of action by the ship. I learned afterward that both Platoon Sergeant Staid and Sergeant

Hurtig held the breeches of their guns open after

each round in order to sight through their bores to

determine that the projectiles would clear the dunes

between them and the target. Sergeant Lefert on

Gun 2 loaded his gun but upon checking for safety

of line of fire discovered that it was pointed directly

at the 0-1 pit occupied by Gunnery Sergeant Pulliman and me. He informed Pulliman of this fact over

the gun control phone and wisely held his fire during the entire action. Platoon Sergeant Peel, gun

captain of Gun 1, also made the decision not to fire

because his gun would have delivered fire dangerously close to the heads of the men at Gun 3.

The Japanese ship, which I identified as either a

light cruiser or destroyer, continued on its course as

Gun 3 fired six rounds and Gun 4 fired seven rounds

( all Navy common, base-detonating ammunition) .

Immediately after the battery commenced firing the

ship began to make a black, heavy smoke from its

stack. Many observers assumed that this smoke was

the result of hits in the engine room, but I am convinced it was merely part of the Japanese plan of attack, which probably called for the making of smoke

in order to screen a withdrawal if hostile fire was

received. About the time the searchlight which had

been illuminating from Sand Island went out, the

ship executed a sharp 90° turn to starboard, which

placed it on a course heading south directly away

from the island, and retired behind the smoke

screen. I gave the command to cease fire when the

searchlight ceased illuminating.

The results of Battery D fire appeared to me to

be approximately three hits in the superstructure.

Other observers claimed the bow gun was hit, but I

cannot verify this. I had the feeling that the announced range from the range section was too small

and that our fire would be short. I therefore particularly watched for short splashes which would certainly have been visible in the excellent illumination. However, I observed no splashes whatsoever,

and therefore it can be assumed, provided the angle

of train was correct, that the angle of elevation of

the guns and the range were such that the shells

passed either over the ship, hit the superstructure,

49
or passed directly into the hull before exploding ( in

which case the flash would not have been visible

from the battery) .

I was aware of two other events taking place

during the firing on the 7th. One was the firing of a

machine gun * * * located on the south coast

between Battery D and the searchlight position ( I

thought at the time that it was a .50 caliber AA

position but later learned that a .30 caliber heavy

Browning had opened up) . A solid stream of tracers

were observed to arch toward the ship. The effect

of this fire I did not observe. The other event, which

occurred, I think, immediately after the Sand Island

searchlight had gone out, was that a searchlight on

Eastern Island struck arc and proceeded to direct

its beam directly on Battery D for a few seconds.

50

This made us feel as if we were in a goldfish bowl

before the eyes of the world and especially those

aboard the Japanese ship. We were all very thank'

ful when the beam was trained out to sea in search

of the enemy.

That concluded the events of the 7th. As for 3

second Japanese ship being present, I do not believe

that during the firing I was aware of it. Immediatel)

afterward, however, reports either from other men'

bers of the battery or nearby searchlight or machw.e

gun positions, revealed that a second Japanese slnP

had followed the one I had observed on the sae'e

course at a position off its starboard quarter. I rr

member hoping at the time that some of our "overs

had possibly hit this ship, but could get no confirrna'

tion that this had occurred.
MARINES AT MIDWAY

APPENDIX V Preparations of MAG-22 for Battle

The following account, written by Brigadier

General Ira L. Kimes, who commanded Marine

Air Group 22 prior to and during the battle of

Midway, describes in detail the stress, strain, impr

ovisation, and ingenuity of MAG-22's preparations for the anticipated battle:

Until the sailing of the Kittyhawk for Honolulu, my staff was composed of Major L. B. Stedman, Jr.,

Grou—p Executive Officer; Major Verne J. McCaul,

Group

Officer;

Operations Officer and Group Intelligence

nications

Captain Robert R. Burns, Group CommuOfficer, Assistant Group Operations Officer, and Group Adjutant. This was a period of intense activity that allowed myself and staff an average of some three to four hours rest during each 24- hour period. A large number of bunkers had to be

constructed for the additional Army, Navy, and Ma- rine Corps planes which we were informed would be sent out to participate in the defense of the islands.

In the end, both sides of all runways were a continuous line of such bunkers and still there weren't

enough. When an Army B-17 or Navy PBY5—A went on dawn patrol, two fighters or dive-bomber

Planes were moved into the vacated bunker for the

,eialr. A large amount of aviation gasoline in 50-gal- lon drums was dispersed and buried near these

.revetments against the possibility of our large tanks

,being destroyed. In the walls of each fighter or divebomber bunker, several drums of gas were buried

except for a small part of the top end. By keeping these filled from the two gas trucks, we always had

a.method of gassing our fighters and dive bombers simultaneously and without having them exposed outside their protective bunkers. Reserve water- supply tanks were buried, and emergency rations were cached in most of the personnel dugouts. This proved fortunate since the evaporating plant and commissary 

stores were destroyed in the bombing,

and some little time elapsed before distribution from Sand b Island could be established. A very large num- of 

rer and 1,000-pound bombs and fuses were eceived and stored. Some of these bombs had to

have their fittings altered before they could be used

on Army bomb racks. Underground shelter for additional personnel expected had to be provided and

slit trenches for all hands constructed near their

quarters and habitual place of employment. Then

there was a stiff training schedule to prepare constant arrivals of new and inexperienced personnel

for their part in the defense. Also frequent and important conferences with Captain Simard and Colonel Shannon. * * *

One addition during this time which did much to

make our infrequent periods of rest more peaceful

was the arrival of Marine Gunner Charles F. Finney, fresh from radar school in the United States

and Canada .He immediately took over our radar

station and did a magnificent job of preparing it and

its personnel for the defense. All hands were very

much radar-conscious, and Finney's fine work in

that department paid large dividends before, during, and after the attack.

During this period ( approximately 1 to 31 May) ,

my administrative staff was greatly strengthened by

the arrival of First Lieutenant Charles F. Hurlbut, a

veteran of World War I, as Group Adjutant; Lt.

( jg) Joseph O'Connell, ( MC ) USN; Lt. ( jg) Raymond L. Cullen, (DC) , USN; Marine Gunner William L. Staph, Quartermaster Clerk Willis R. Lucius, and enlisted personnel for Group Headquarters

in the categaries of clerical, supply, hospital, mess

personnel, and radio operators. These additions lessened the burdens of the two squadrons, who prior

to this time had been required to furnish a bare

minimum to meet the requirements.

With the sailing of the U. S. S. Kittyhawk, however, went any executive officer, Major L. B. Stedman, with no relief furnished. Major McCaul, already "out on his feet" from overwork and lack of

adequate rest, took on the additional job of executive officer. I tried to lighten his burden as much as

possible by performing some of the normal duties of

this office myself, but neither Captain Burns nor

I was in noticeably better condition for the same

reason. Some few days prior to this Major J. K.

Warner, Air Corps, AUS, was sent out from Army

51
Headquarters in Honolulu as a liaison officer. Not

only did he do an outstanding job in that capacity,

but before many days had passed we had practically

made a Marine of him. Taking advantage of his

capabilities and willingness, we assigned many tasks

that would properly fall within the duties of an assistant executive and assistant operations officer. He

was indeed a life-saver. Just as it seemed McCaul,

Burns, and myself were completely exhausted

( Major Warner had returned to Honolulu), Major

Raymond C. Scollin, arrived by air on 2 June 1942.

He was immediately handed enough work for six

men, and I don't believe he touched his bunk until

the night of 4 June, and then only for about three

hours when I awakened him about 0400 to tell him

that at about 0200 I had received a message that the

Jap transports were about 70 miles away and headed

toward Midway, and that I thought it would be well

52

to alert the reserves (ground crews of VMF-221

and VMSB-241) . I never saw as sleepy a man wake

up as quickly!

So far nothing has been said about the work all

performance of duty of the officers and men of the

two squadrons, reinforced. The simple truth is that

it beggars description, and to even attempt such 3

description would require days and days and fill

hundreds of typewritten pages. Some of the young

pilots who came out with the SBD's and F4F3's 011

the U. S. S. Kittyhawk had not had as much as four

hours' flying time since completing the final stages

of flight training. They arrived on Midway on 26

May, and on 4 June were called upon to face the

cream of Japanese naval aviation. How theY

answered this call has been attested to by manY

more able than I.
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APPENDIX VI

MARINES AT MIDWAY

Dive-Bomber Pilot's Narrative,

Battle of Midway

The following individual narrative, submitted to the Historical Section by Major Allan H. Ring- blorn, then a second lieutenant and pilot in

VMS13-241 during the battle of Midway, is reprinted in entirety as a vivid personal-experience

account of the attack by Major Norris's SB2U-3's

OU the Haruna, 4 June 1942, and as an excellent

Picture of the hazards of aerial warfare for a

Young and relatively inexperienced pilot. Major

Ringblorn, who also served as war diarist of

VMSB-241, was a member of the draft of nine

new pilots who joined MAG-22, in late May

1942, within a few days prior to the enemy

attack:

Upon arrival, May 27, at the island, we were greeted by remarks indicating that we were just in

time for the "party." These remarks didn't bother Us; had just left the States two weeks before. Next morning, May 28, at squadron briefing when Major

Henderson also let us know that the Japs were

overdue, we did a little more thinking on the matter.

. The "greenest" group ever assembled for combat

1n,cluded Second Lieutenants George Lumpkin, E. P.

ty11.1ompson, George Koutdas, D. L. Cummings, A. . 

Ringblom, Jack Cosley, Ken Campion, Orvin

fi amlo, and James Marmande. None of us had ever

?wn the SB2U, so we immediately checked out

With no more trouble than a couple of ground loops.

Before the fateful day we all had made two or

ttlree hops with practice bombs—mighty little

Preparation for the job at hand. Gasoline was at a gpareumorsiul m, and our planes were only allowed 190

(Which was suddenly raised to 230 gallons

" 3 June). Plotting boards were also so rare that

out CL f our flight of 12, only four had plots. This was

attack

mighty

awkward to one who found himself on the

with neither plot nor chart ( and had only a

few quick glances at a chart of the area including

Midway, Kure and Pearl and Hermes reefs) .

On the morning of 4 June, after an 0200 reveille

we were all at standby and had warmed up the

planes. Around 0515 the radio message was received

to go on attack. Confusion was the order then as I

had just cut off the engine. By the time I had started

again I thought that the order was changed. Finally

a runner came by in a jeep and verified the attack

order. By 0605 we were all in the air. Captain

Prosser returned with a loose fuselage panel so I assumed his lead position in the second box. By the

time we were rendezvoused, the Jap's attack had

fired a fuel storage tank, which served as a guiding

mark throughout the day and night.

It was a quiet, uneventful trip to meet the enemy.

Such young second lieutenants never realized their

predicament. It became quite apparent, however,

when we were intercepted at least 10 to 15 minutes

before contact with fleet units. The• amazing nonchalance of Zero pilots who did vertical rolls right

through our formation was a good show—very good

for us since more attention to business might easily

have wiped out 11 of the slowest and most obsolete

planes ever to be used in the war.

With the interception at 13,000 feet, the clouds

became our haven and Major Norris led us without

loss to the target. He radioed instructions to dive

straight ahead on to target, through the broken

clouds. Upon breaking out at 2,000 feet, the major,

being short of the target, a BB, straight ahead,

whipped to the right onto a heavy cruiser. We all

followed his lead. Even in the dive Major Norris

gave instructions as to course home: 140°; time due

0900. The AA was heavy—but to one so ignorant of

its destructive powers—not too bothersome; just

curious. I received identical holes, about 6 inches in

diameter, in each aileron. I imagine the shells were

incorrectly fused for our altitude at the moment and

so passed through with little damage.

53
On release at 400 feet, I pulled out right over the

cruiser and was headed for the center of the fleet.

One turn to join on two buddies at 240 knots convinced me that was no place to circle; a Zero passed

right behind as I whipped into a tight turn. Then,

at course 140°, I headed home, passing just behind

a destroyer. I stayed below 50 feet for about 20

minutes, in a straight course, only luck making

harmless the numerous passes made by the Zeros.

My gunner later told me he was too busy shooting

to even inform me of the situation, and I was too

scared and ignorant to turn around and look.

Following the major's instructions, I flew a compass course of 140°, not bothering to compensate for

wind, variation, nor compass. At the appointed time

of 0900 I sighted a lagoon which I took to be Midway and let down, made my recognition approach

and was greeted by fire from a PT. I immediately

left the area and regained altitude to continue on

course. ( Woe was me! That was Kure reef, just 50

miles west of home.)

The radio had failed, as radios were wont to do,

54

so radio navigation was out of the question ( as was

good sense in this instance) . By 1015 I had gatil'

ered that my navigation or Major Norris was wrong.

I used good judgment then, for the first time in tile

day, and turned 180°, figuring on finding that

minute speck of land, about one hour behind "Tier;

As luck and poor navigation would have it, by 110u

I had sighted two lagoons in the offing and, mentallY

flipping a coin, chose the one to the right—how right

I was! Within 10 miles of the reef I ran out of gais

so I immediately set all tabs to glide at 90 knots arid

almost sat on my hands to resist lifting the nose t°

stretch my glide. I attempted to get the life raft loose

to no avail. Then I found I could not replace the

pins holding the bucket seat. So I was faced with a

water landing in a loose seat. I chose to land righit

in front of a PT boat and all went so well that

even forgot to inflate my life jacket, the pick-up was

made so readily. So by 1115 I was back on Easter"'

Island to be greeted by Captain Prosser, who said,

"Well, never expected to see you again."—"Hel1.

neither did I. * * *"
MARINES AT MIDWAY

Staff and Command List, Marine

APPENDIX VII 

Corps Units Participating in

Battle of Midway

Senior Marine officer present Col. Harold D. Shannon.

6TH DEFENSE BATTALION (REINFORCED)

,0 Con, n .

anding Officer 

11._1rnand1ng Officer, Eastern Island

------------------------

Surgeon

Col. Harold D. Shannon.

Group Maj. William W. Benson.'

-------------- Capt. William P. Spencer.

Capt. Robert C. McGlashan.

QM Clerk Avard W. Ostrom.

Second Lt. Dorn E. Arnold.

----- Lt . C om d r. R o bert I. A Coo P er (MC) , USN•

Seacoast Artillery Group

c'ounanding Officer 

_044/landing Officer, Battery A i

nianding Officer Battery B_ kjonunanding 

Officer, 

, Battery C 

,ecarornanding Officer Sand Island 7-inch Battery 

‘-ornmanding Office; Eastern Island 7-inch Battery („C°11-nnanding Officer,Sand Island 3-inch Navy Battery 

'cam/landing Officer, Eastern Island 3-inch Navy Battery 

Lt. Col. Lewis A. Hohn.

Maj. Loren S. Fraser.

Capt. Rodney M. Handley.

Capt. Donald N. Otis.

Capt. Ralph A. Collins, Jr.

Capt. Harold R. Warner, Jr.

Capt. Jay H. Augustin.

Capt. William R. Dorr, Jr.

3-inch Antiaircraft Group

Commanding Officer 

Commanding Officer, Battery D 

Commanding Officer, Battery E 

Commanding Officer, Battery F_

Maj. Charles T. Tingle.

Capt. Jean H. Buckner.

Maj. Hoyt McMillan.

Capt. David W. Silvey.

Special Weapons Group

Conunanding Officer 

Commanding Officer, Battery H 

Commanding Officer, Battery I 

Commanding Officer 

Capt. Robert E. Hommel.

Maj. William E. Boles.

Capt. Edwin A. Law.

Searchlight Battery (G)

Capt. Alfred L. Booth.

55
3-inch Antiaircraft Group, 3d Defense Battalion

Commanding Officer Maj. Chandler W. Johnson.

Commanding Officer, Battery D Maj. William S. McCormick.

Commanding Officer, Battery E Maj. James S. O'Halloran.

Commanding Officer, Battery F First Lt. Arnold D. Swartz.

Separate Batteries, 3d Defense Battalion

Commanding Officer, Battery K (37-mm.) Capt. Ronald K. Miller.

Commanding Officer, Battery L (40/20-mm.) Capt. Charles J. Seibert, II.

2d Raider Battalion Detachment

Commanding Officer Capt. Donald H. Hastie.

Commanding Officer, Company C Capt. Donald H. Hastic.

Commanding Officer, Company D First Lt. John Apergis.

Provisional Marine Companies

Commanding Officer, 22d Provisional Marine Company First Lt. Thomas E. Clarke.

Commanding Officer, 23d Provisional Marine Company Capt. Boyd 0. Whitney.

MARINE AIR GROUP 22

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Ira E. Kimes.

Executive Officer Maj. Verne J. McCaul.

Operations Officer Maj. Alexander G. Bunker.

Communications Officer_ Capt. Robert R. Burns.

Commanding Officer 

Executive Officer 

Marine Fighting Squadron 221

f Maj. Floyd B. Parks.'

1Capt. Kirk Armistead.

Capt. William C. Humberd.

Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241

Maj. Lofton R. Henderson.'

Commanding Officer Maj. Benjamin W. Norris.'

Capt. Marshall A. Tyler.

Executive Officer Capt. Marshall A. Tyler.

'Killed or missing in action, battle of Midway.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1948

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office,

Washington 25, D. C.—Price 50 cents.

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TABLE OF DISTANCES FROM MIDWAY

In Nautical Miles

Pearl Harbor 1140

Kauai, T. H. 1046

French Frigate Shoal, T. H 1003

Dutch Harbor, Alaska 1651

Wake 1034

Marcus 1556

Guam 2301

Tokyo 2250

Saipan 2214

San Diego, California# 3097

785018 0-1948 (Inside back cover)
SEMPE

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in

presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-TWO

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For conspicuous courage and heroism in combat

at Midway Island during June, 1942. Outnumbered five

to one, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-TWO

boldly intercepted a heavily escorted enemy bombing

force, disrupting their attack and preventing serious

damage to island installations. Operating with half of

their dive-bombers obsolete and in poor mechanical

condition which necessitated vulnerable glide bombing

tactics, they succeeded in inflicting heavy damage on

Japanese surface units of a large enemy task force.

The skill and gallant perseverance of flight and ground

personnel of MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-TWO,

fighting under tremendously adverse and dangerous

conditions, were essential factors in the unyielding

defense of Midway."

For the President,

Secretary of the Navy,