AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

The Ring of Gyges

Anonymity and Technological Advance’s Effect on the

Deterrence of Nonstate Actors in 2035

DAVID R. IVERSON

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 70

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

October 2012
2

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other 

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

The Maxwell Papers are available electronically at the Air 

University Press website at http://aupress.au.af.mil.
3

The Ring of Gyges: Anonymity and Technological 

Advance’s Effect on the Deterrence of 

Nonstate Actors in 2035

Lt Col David R. Iverson, USAF

“For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more 

profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as 

I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you 

could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming 

invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was 

another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most 

wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one 

another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another 

from a fear that they too might suffer injustice.”

—Plato's Republic

From the time of Plato, men have pondered how an individual 

would act if they were unidentifiable or anonymous. In The Republic, 

Plato used the story of Gyges of Lydia, who found a ring in a cave and 

put it upon his finger to become invisible to show how a man would act 

when he believed himself to be anonymous. Gyges used the ring to take 

over a kingdom becoming the first in a long history of men who altered 

their actions when they believed themselves to be unidentifiable.1

Twenty-four–hundred years later the problems of anonymity that 

Plato imagined through fiction are becoming reality relative to how they 

affect deterrence strategies. As technology proliferates and more people 

and things become connected through networks, individuals are gaining 

the ability to anonymously become highly disruptive, thereby creating a 

degree of sanctuary no matter where they reside. As the United States 
4

considers its future deterrence strategy for the 2035 timeframe, 

understanding how the rapid increase in technological know-how 

combined with anonymity will affect the behavior of groups and 

individuals is of paramount importance. Without an improved 

understanding of this dynamic among groups and individuals, traditional 

approaches to deterrence may become ineffective by 2035 as anonymity 

and technological advances constrain a state’s ability to use punishment 

and increases the challenge of denial as currently understood and 

practiced.

Accordingly, this paper explores the effects of anonymity and 

technological advances on deterrence theory and recommends ways to 

make today’s deterrence methods more effective in this future 

environment. It begins by examining the main themes of classic 

deterrence in the national security literature as they apply to groups and 

individuals. Next, it presents a basic model of group and individual 

behavior to explain how anonymity creates an ungoverned space that 

traditional deterrence strategies do not address. Finally, it recommends 

two approaches to deter groups and individuals in an anonymous world 

by (1) increasing the degree of transparency in the actions of individuals 

globally to reduce their motivation, capability and opportunity to launch 

attacks; and (2) taking steps to immunize or improve the resiliency of the 

United States and its allies to deny would-be actors the benefit of their 

action.
5

To understand why improved global transparency and 

immunization will become a pressing national security requirement by 

2035, it is first necessary to examine the limitations of current 

deterrence theory when dealing with issues of groups/individuals and 

anonymity.

Why Traditional Deterrence Breaks Down in an Anonymous World

For those not wholly familiar with the strategic deterrence 

literature, deterrence is a strategy designed to prevent an adversary from 

taking a particular action or series of actions. Deterrence, in its classic 

state-on-state view, is achieved through two distinct strategies, 

punishment and denial.2 Punishment strategies threaten attacks against 

a nation’s population and/or industry to dissuade the actions of an 

attacker through increased costs. Denial strategies attempt to thwart 

action by negating the benefits an adversary seeks to gain.3

Punishment

The 

fundamental assumption underpinning both of these strategies is that 

the threat is definable and identifiable. Remove this assumption and 

both strategies run into problems.

Deterrence by punishment is actively holding an adversary 

accountable for its actions by threatening to destroy something it values 

in order to deter its actions.4 This discourages the adversary from 

attacking by raising the cost of the attack beyond what it is willing to 

pay.5 To accomplish this, deterring nations must be able to (1) identify 
6

the adversary; (2) find something the adversary values; and (3) hold it at 

risk in a credible way. Historically, states knew who their adversaries 

were. From ancient times to the Cold War, populations and/or industries 

were easy targets.6

A punishment strategy is difficult to employ against groups and 

individuals. First, attribution is much more difficult as perpetrators are 

difficult to identify. The proliferation of technology complicates this task 

even more, since technological advances allow individuals to gain 

capability and act anonymously without prior detection.7

Executing an effective punishment strategy against individuals and 

groups, therefore, poses challenges and ethical dilemmas for states, 

particularly when actors are nebulously defined or anonymous. The 

burden of proof required to identify individuals, or show that a nationstate or civilians are complicit in terrorist activity, is extremely high. 

Punishing the wrong target is potentially counterproductive, since it may 

build support for terrorist organizations rather than diminish it. From a 

This sanctuary 

precludes a state from identifying specific would-be attackers, 

complicating communication of a retaliatory threat. Even if states 

identify specific actors, they must still find something of value and hold it 

at risk. For many nonstate aggressors, this is a small target set. In rare 

circumstances, it may be the nation state’s population where they live. In 

most cases, it is their family or friends, who may be as difficult to find as 

the actors.
7

moral or legal standpoint, states may not want to target civilians simply 

because a potential terrorist values them. These limitations make 

deterrence by denial a more attractive alternative.

Denial

As opposed to deterrence by punishment, deterrence by denial is 

designed to make it difficult for an adversary to “attain its political 

objectives or territorial goals.”8 It can be implemented by actions that 

minimize or negate the desired effects of an attack, so that the adversary 

is unable to achieve the objective through violence.9

Although deterrence by denial has fewer challenges than 

deterrence by punishment in the context of groups and individuals, 

anonymity decreases its effectiveness. For example, one denial strategy 

might prevent an actor from obtaining attack capabilities while another 

denies an attack opportunity. However, advancing technology and 

knowledge, particularly in the fields of biology and genetics, are 

proliferating rapidly, and along with it, the power of individuals to 

develop state-like capabilities.

This is typically 

accomplished through defensive measures to improve the resiliency of 

the civilian population or disarming an opponent (i.e., Cold War civil 

defense and missile defense). The theory of deterrence by denial assumes 

the potential opponent and his or her capabilities are known. This 

awareness—this transparency--allows denial efforts to be tailored 

against those capabilities posing a danger.

10 The knowledge and materials to create 
8

these capabilities can be obtained anonymously, making denial efforts, 

such as export or technology controls, problematic.

The size and scale of a denial strategy also make it problematic to 

prevent an attack opportunity, particularly against anonymous actors. A 

military truism from Frederick the Great recognized “he who attempts to 

defend too much defends nothing.”11

In summary, the traditional state-on-state approaches of 

deterrence by punishment and denial run into problems in the 

anonymous world of 2035. Deterrence by punishment seems a 

nonstarter, particularly for western democracies. On the other hand, 

deterrence by denial retains some relevance and offers options, but is not 

sufficient in its current form to deter anonymous groups and individuals. 

Successful deterrence against groups and individuals in 2035 requires 

new models and new tools to augment denial. To explore what these 

solutions might be one must first gain a more indepth understanding of 

why groups and individuals attack and how anonymity and technical 

change impact their reasoning.

Yet group or individual actors, 

armed with high technology and knowledge, have a huge number of 

targets to choose from making it difficult to identify an attack location. 

This large target set makes it difficult to protect everyone from an 

exhaustive list of potential actors and attack methods.
9

Why Groups and Individuals Attack

To carry out planned/premeditated or intended attacks, aggressors 

go through either a four or six step process. John Horgan breaks the 

lifespan of an attack into a four step process: (1) decision and search 

activity-targeting and “preterrorism;” (2) preparation or “preterrorist” 

activity; (3) event execution; and (4) post-event activity and analysis.12

Taking this model one step further, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

uses Calhoun’s six-step model to assess attacks which consists of 

grievance, ideation, research planning, preparation, breach, and 

attack.13

Combining these models produces a three-axis operational 

deterrence model displaying the interaction of capability, motivation, and 

opportunity toward deterring violence. This paper uses the operational 

deterrence model framework (fig. 1) to analyze why groups and 

individuals attack.14 The model consists of three axes: X—motivation 

(grievance, ideation); Z—capability (research/planning, preparation), and 

Y—opportunity (research, breach, attack). Deterrence fails when an actor 

is motivated to attack, has the capability, and gains the opportunity. 

When any or all of the levels of capability, motivation, and/or 

opportunity are decreased, the likely success of deterrence improves. By 

examining each axis and applying the model against groups or 

individuals, specific actions to increase the effectiveness of deterrence 

can be achieved. The design of new stratagems for deterrence of groups 
10

Operational Deterrence Model

Not Deterred

Deterred

Figure 1. Operational Deterrence Model

and individuals in 2035 begins with gaining a deeper understanding of 

these steps, starting with how motivation affects an actor’s decisions and 

the role of anonymity in shaping this motivation.

Figure 1. Operational Deterrence Model. (Adapted from Grant 

Hammond, Center for Science and Technology, Maxwell AFB, AL, 

interview by the author, 11 January 2011.)

Motivation and the Role of Anonymity.

Understanding an attacker’s motivation not only explains the 

veracity of attacks one seeks to deter, but might also signal the risk an 

attacker is willing to take. One of the preeminent scholars on terrorism, 

Brian Jenkins, wrote in the 1970’s, “terrorists want a lot of people 

watching but not a lot of people dead.”15 Jenkins’s reasoning was that 

terrorists, such as the Irish Republican Army, sought modest political 

reform. Therefore, their attacks had to be dramatic enough to undermine 
11

the government and rally people to their cause, but not so dramatic as to 

undermine their popular support and turn people against them.16

The 1990s marked a shift in terrorist thinking for some groups,

based on changes in their underlying motivation.17 While some terrorists 

still adhered to the “lots watching/few dead” strategy, others sought 

bolder, more dramatic shifts than incremental political change.18 Worse, 

the risk of backlash from large-scale civilian deaths did not deter these 

groups.19 This more aggressive strategy opened the door to 9/11 and 

exploration of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) uses by terrorist 

groups.20

Conventional wisdom and initial psychological studies seem to 

support the assumption that anonymous individuals act more 

aggressively and are therefore more likely to carry out attacks.

While this logic is consistent with commentaries on the 

political nature of war, what may be less well known is how anonymity 

affects the motivation of these actors.

21 Anyone 

reading aggressive posts on Internet blogs recognizes the potential 

validity of this argument.22

Modern research highlights de-individuation as a more accurate 

enabler of individual motivation. Deindividuation, of which anonymity is 

a part, is a psychological state “characterized by diminished self 

awareness and self-evaluation and a lessened concern for the evaluation 

However, this conventional wisdom is overly 

simplistic and slightly flawed when considering anonymity’s impact on 

motivation.
12

of others.”23

Under normal conditions, deterrence works when individuals (1) 

share common knowledge of the rules and social logic of the game; (2) 

engage in tacit and explicit communication (the exchange of information 

not efforts at collective understanding); (3) accurately assess risks, costs, 

and gains of strategic games; and (4) control their emotions.

It shows that individuals who believe themselves to be 

anonymous may not be susceptible to the normal psychological effects of 

deterrence under the right conditions.

24

Deindividuation interrupts this rule set as individuals no longer apply 

the same social logic and risk assessment. Although many experts 

disagree over the causes of deindividuation and the level of antisocial 

events, a deindividuated state caused by some combination of 

anonymity, group presence, altered responsibility, and autonomic 

arousal appears to increase violence and aggressive acts by individuals.25

This is seen in individual psychological case studies, studies of various 

non-Western cultural groups, and by looking at modern day terrorists.26

Overall, deindividuation reduces self-consciousness and selfinhibition causing individuals to rely on external sources, such as their 

affiliated group, for direction. Downing and Johnson’s 1979 study using 

individuals associating themselves with groups (through anonymous 

costumes) as either the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) or nurses showed a definitive 

group identification effect on aggression.27 Individuals identifying 

themselves with the KKK were more aggressive and violent than those in 
13

the nursing group. The individuals took on the group characteristics with 

which they identified, and aggressiveness either increased or decreased 

depending upon the group identity.28 In addition, a 1998 meta-analysis 

of 60 psychological studies show that individuals tend to act more 

aggressively and violently when they achieve a deindividuated state.

Further, the analysis found when accountability was reduced through 

anonymity, greater antinormative behavior was induced by following 

group norms. The end result shows group circumstances appear to be a 

driving factor for an individual’s actions once they achieve a 

deindividuated condition, either positively or negatively.29

Deindividuation’s effects also appear to be cross-cultural. A 1973 

study based on data from 27 cultures suggested a significant pairing 

between deindividuation (through some type of change to their physical 

appearance) and aggression in warfare. For example, cultures altering 

their appearance through war paint showed an increase in aggression 

and ferocity over those that did not.30

Modern terrorist examples, such as the IRA, show greater 

proclivities toward violence when they achieve a deindividuated state. 31

In the case of the IRA, terrorism expert A. P. Silke demonstrated that 

when IRA terrorists used some type of disguise, the crimes they 

committed showed increased levels and varieties of aggression. This was 

especially seen in the increased severity of the injuries inflicted upon 
14

victims compared to the crimes committed by IRA members not wearing 

disguises.32

In summary, there is convincing evidence that motivation is 

directly affected by the psychology of anonymity and deindividuation 

which, in turn, affects the prospects for deterrence. From a psychological 

perspective, individuals achieving a deindividuated state through a lack 

of perceived personal accountability may be more likely to act violently 

depending upon their group identification.33

Capability and the Sanctuary of Anonymity

Their motivation is 

encouraged and enabled by anonymity making them act on their 

grievances in a violent manner. Therefore, discrediting certain groups’ 

beliefs and establishing a sense of accountability for these groups 

comprises one component of an updated deterrence approach for groups 

and individuals. More clues lie in the second area of the paper’s 

analytical framework, anonymity’s effect on capabilities.

The second area states must consider when deterring groups and 

individuals is how anonymity and technology impact the research, 

planning, and preparation components of an attack. S. Paul Kapur’s 

essay “Deterring Nuclear Terrorists,” explores deterrence against 

nonstate actors in a nuclear weapons context.34 Kapur’s argument 

compares the relative wealth of actors with their goals in analyzing the 

effectiveness of a punishment and denial strategy (table 1).35
15

Table 1. Summary table of S. Paul Kapur’s thesis

Current Actor Rich Poor

Situation

Positive Goals Denial is hard Denial is easy

(seeks to advance the Punishment is possible Punishment is possible

welfare of an existing

population or territory

Negative Goals Denial is hard Denial is easy

(seeks maximal violence Punishment is unlikely Punishment is unlikely

and destruction)

As long as cost remains a barrier to technological access, Kapur is 

correct in differentiating rich and poor actors regarding the ability of a 

deterrence strategy to work against them. However, by 2035 

technological development will lower technological cost and blur the lines 

between rich and poor, calling Kapur’s main arguments into question. As 

the level of technology increases, the cost of acquiring technologies like 

biological weapons capability may no longer be prohibitive. Technological 

advances will enable individuals or groups to access information, 

research, and materials more cheaply and easily than ever before while 

helping to maintain their anonymity. Moreover, falling costs reduce 

financing requirements allowing many groups to participate, making a 

catastrophic attack more difficult to deter.36

This scenario is made worse by the impact of anonymity. As 

previously discussed, deindividuation interrupts the rule set underlying 

deterrence. Instead of a rich versus poor discriminator, technology may 

make an individual’s anonymity a determining factor in his calculus to 
16

carry out an attack, calling into question the effectiveness of deterrence 

strategies (table 2).

Table 2. Technological advances and anonymity’s effects on 

classical deterrence

Future Actor Anonymous Identifiable

Situation

Positive Goals Denial is unlikely Denial is hard

(seeks to advance the Punishment is unlikely Punishment is unlikely

welfare of an existing

population or territory)

Negative Goals Denial is unlikely Denial is hard

(seeks maximal violence Punishment is unlikely Punishment is unlikely

and destruction)

Although groups and individuals may be capable of a wide range of 

WMD attack options to include nuclear, biological, cyber, and chemical, 

biological weapons hold the most potential danger for the United States

in the 2035 timeframe.37 Unlike nuclear weapons, which require 

industrial facilities to produce the fuel, the production of biological 

weapons will be easier for individuals or small groups. In the past, 

nuclear or biological weapons programs required the resources of a state 

and the knowledge of highly educated individuals.38 Countries such as 

the former Soviet Union have invested enormous amounts of resources in 

the research and development of biological weapons.39 With technological 

advances making research and knowledge from the fields of genetics and 

synthetic biology more easily accessible (and able to be acquired 

anonymously), individuals and small groups could gain the ability to 

carry out attacks that can cause mass casualties.40
17

The implications of these developments are grave in today’s terms.

Sanctuary or safe havens are thought of in geographic terms—

ungoverned space provided by a rogue or failing state.41

Opportunity and the Advantage of Anonymity

In the future, 

technological developments in the biological sciences may provide 

sanctuary in plain view, with would-be attackers anonymously 

developing genetically altered pathogens using inexpensive common 

items and knowledge from the Internet. Those anonymously accessing 

publically available information or purchasing common materials become 

harder to identify and may operate with impunity no matter their 

location, becoming harder to deter. As with motivation, combating this 

threat requires an updated deterrence approach combining elements of 

denial with tools to create the perception of accountability. If 

governments fail to do this, the final chance for deterrence centers on 

denying opportunity.

Once individuals or groups acquire the motivation and capability 

to carry out a catastrophic attack, they move into the breach and attack 

phase. They begin looking for the opportunity to conduct their attack 

with the capability they have acquired. During this phase, they attempt 

to find the best way to carry out an attack, breaching any known 

security.

In many ways, deterring at the opportunity phase is too late. 

Ubiquitous technology and knowledge makes everyone a potential 
18

attacker, requiring elaborate and costly measures to deny an attack 

opportunity. At the same time, anonymity makes it exceedingly difficult 

for governments to discern likely attackers and their potential targets 

without a focused effort. Moreover, capabilities such as biological 

weapons allow the aggressor to attack on the perimeter, unseen, without 

penetrating defensive measures. An attacker only needs to infect 

unsuspecting civilians with an undetectable virus that spreads through 

normal societal interaction, effectively bypassing any security measures 

set in place.42

Deterring Groups and Individuals: Expanded Denial Strategies

Because of insights like this, the next section of the paper 

explores the new tools and techniques states will require to deter 

anonymous actors in 2035.

In order to continue using deterrence as an effective strategy 

against groups and individuals, the United States needs to address the 

challenges of motivation, capability, and opportunity created by technical 

advancements and anonymity (fig. 2). In the near future, given the 

nature of emerging threats, deterrence strategies targeting the motivation 

and capability of actors may have the greatest chance for success. At the 

same time, strategies focused on denying opportunity may become 

increasingly difficult, especially given amorphous threats such as those 

posed by biological weapons.
19

Figure 2. Operational Deterrence Model

Although technological advances threaten traditional deterrence 

strategies, they may also enable a strategy of expanded denial that better 

addresses the threat posed by groups and individuals. Two tools enable 

such a strategy. The first tool, transparency, provides the ability for the 

government to see, scan, and share virtually all available information 

from public and private data. The goal of transparency is to negate the 

effects of anonymity on deterrence. By creating the perception within a 

watched targeted group, a state may be able to diminish the motivation 

of its members and minimize deindividuation, making it more difficult for 

the group to develop harmful capabilities and increase the odds of 

detection during execution.43
20

The second tool, called immunization, envisions creating a resilient 

nation, both physically within its infrastructure and cognitively within its 

population. The goal of immunization mitigates the effects of an attack 

quickly in order to maintain the trust of the population in its 

government. If the government can create the perception that it is 

immunized, successful attacks—one that strikes wide-spread panic or 

overcomes the capability of government to respond—may become so 

difficult that they diminish motivation or increase detection odds as 

groups attempt to develop more elaborate attacks.44

How Transparency Expands Denial Options

A more indepth 

discussion of each of these tools highlights their synergistic interaction 

with one another.

Transparency enhances denial by reducing an actor’s motivation, 

capability, and opportunity. Transparency affects motivation by reducing 

anonymity and deindividuation. As this paper has shown, anonymity 

tends to promote deindividuation which, in turn, tends to increase 

motivation. Removing anonymity reverses the cycle: deindividuated 

individuals become individuated; motivation is reduced, and the “normal” 

deterrence calculus is restored.

Similarly, transparency affects capability and opportunity by 

creating the perception (or reality) of surveillance. This may deter 

suppliers from providing critical components or individuals from 

accessing certain information in the public domain. Moreover, it may 
21

affect opportunity as well, convincing individuals to delay or alter their 

plans prior to execution.

Transparency is operationalized through several lines of operations 

graphically (fig. 3). The first is through the development of a global 

information exchange system that uses all-source public and private 

data to identify and track tens of thousands of individuals who may be 

likely to carry out attacks. The most effective way to prevent an act of 

terrorism may be to reduce the individual’s motivation to carry out the 

attack in the first place. Developing a system that catalogs and tracks 

the electronic interactions of targeted individuals and makes its existence 

known may create enough doubt in the mind of the would-be attacker to 

deter/reduce motivation. Moreover, this degree of transparency aids in 

targeting strategic communications efforts, preventing the first step 

toward intended violence.45 At a tactical level, individuals reindividuated 

through transparency may be persuaded by the social norms of society 

that their actions or the actions of their affiliated groups are not 

acceptable, changing their ideation of violence as an acceptable method 

for attaining their objectives.46
22

Figure 3. Deterrence Chain.

The second line of operation is a focused effort aimed at denying 

harmful actors the required capability to carry out an attack. 

Specifically, the government must prevent the acquisition of critical 

information or components by removing the sanctuary of anonymity 

through a two-tiered approach. The first tier leverages tracking the 

activities of potentially hostile groups and individuals. By monitoring the 

electronic activities of these individuals, illicit behavior can be quickly 

identified and acted upon.47 The second tier involves tracking 

information and things: who accesses critical information, who 

manufactures items of interest, and who purchases items of interest. For 

example, individuals accessing critical information for the construction of 

nuclear or biological weapons need to be identified and vetted. Likewise, 

critical components or materials that create “chokepoints” for the 
23

manufacture of these weapons need to be identified and tracked when 

they are acquired. The results of these efforts connect the dots when 

actors of concern come into contact with information and materials of 

concern.

The third line of operation is focused on curtailing opportunity, 

when it is possible. In this line, traditional “at the wire” physical security 

measures are enhanced through active shaping efforts aimed at creating 

a sense of surveillance. If a group can be led to believe that their identity 

is known, then their perceived risk level in carrying out an attack is 

heightened and may deter. These enhanced efforts to deny opportunity 

also work in conjunction with previous efforts to influence and alter the 

motivation of an actor.48

The fourth and final line of operation is focused on physical 

enforcement. The United States must be ready to deny an attack by 

arresting or killing hostile actors. Transparency will make this happen 

more easily. Not only may this stop a specific act but denying specific 

opportunities in this manner will have an effect on the motivation of 

other actors bringing deterrence full circle.49 The best example of 

targeting individuals is evidenced in Israeli Defense Force operations.50

These operations have been arguably successful and Israeli governments 

as well as academics, such as Stephen David and Daniel Byman, argue 

that terrorist targeting deters future attacks.51 While transparency uses 
24

technology and actions to reduce the perception of anonymity, 

immunization aims to make it less relevant.

How Immunization Expands Denial Options

In addition to transparency, immunization is another tool 

enhancing denial. It is most effective when focused against an actor’s 

motivation and opportunity. Mitigating the effects of attacks by 

immunizing the population and high value infrastructure may deter 

individuals and groups from acting by denying them the desired results 

of their attack. This will reduce their ideation of violence as an effective 

way to attain their goal. Specifically, the United States should build a 

more resilient, immunized society by creating the ability to prevent or 

mitigate catastrophic attacks as well as desensitize its citizens to smaller 

scale terrorist attacks.

By building a national immunization system to deal with a 

catastrophic terrorists attack, the government practices deterrence 

through denial by taking away the terrorists’ motivation to paralyze the 

population through a sensational event and prepares Americans to deal 

with a smaller attack. To do so, the government must change the public 

perception about attacks by nonstate actors and prevent overreactions.52

The current emphasis of the United States on the prevention of all 

terrorist attacks regardless of scale is an admirable goal, but perhaps not 

the correct approach. In the future, it may not be possible for both fiscal 

and operational reasons. In order to accomplish the thwarting of all 
25

terrorist attacks, the government will have to be right 100 percent of the 

time, an impossible task. Therefore, the American public needs to be

educated to accept the possibility of small scale terrorist attacks, while at 

the same time preparing to survive a catastrophic attack if it occurs. This 

denial effort will affect the motivation of nonstate actors by denying them 

their motivation and potentially preventing future grievances of perceived 

actions against them, their families, or affiliated groups.53

The United States must further immunize against an actor’s 

motivation by significantly increasing its capability to detect, identify,

and counteract attacks such as a biological threat. Advanced detection 

systems need to be designed to monitor air and water contaminants 

across America. Medical facilities should be networked to recognize the 

signs of a biological outbreak. This must be done with the 

implementation of sensors everywhere, such as in cell phones or motor 

vehicles,54 and the sharing of information through a transparent 

network. Here the synergy of transparency and immunization work 

together. Once identified, the American government should be able to 

decode, prototype, manufacture, and distribute a vaccine within 72–96 

hours of detection.55

Research should focus on how to detect, decode, and prototype a 

biological agent vaccine, while coordination with pharmaceutical 

companies will enable efficient vaccine mass production once it is 

prototyped. At the same time, designing a logistics system that is 
26

organized and rehearsed to distribute a vaccine will save vital hours. 

With this capability in place and publicized through transparent strategic

communications, terrorists’ motivation will be deterred because their 

attacks may not succeed and may only kill those that the United States 

decided not to inoculate with a cure, a possibility that should be 

communicated as part of transparent strategic communications.

While lessening individuals’ motivations, an expanded denial 

strategy should also lessen actors’ opportunities to carry out an attack, 

bringing its success into question. Opportunity will be thwarted through 

direct security measures enacted to stop an attack, such as preventing 

weapons from being brought into an area or blocking viruses from 

infecting a network. Due to the expense, this form of denial may require 

it to be used to protect only the most critical targets and may require 

supplemental government financing of commercial companies. In 

addition, publishing real or imaginary defenses, at times specifically and 

others vaguely, may cause an increase in an individual’s uncertainty,

bringing into question their ability to breach those defenses.56

More research and studies are needed to answer questions for 

policy makers as they contemplate deterrence through expanded denial 

against individuals and groups. Scholars must consider the legal 

During the 

opportunity phase, the synergistic combination of a transparency system 

with immunization effects of security measures creates a greater chance 

for deterrence.
27

limitations, such as the Fourth Amendment, and what limitations the 

ideas of transparency have within the US Constitution. In addition, 

studies must be accomplished to better understand what response times 

are required to prevent a biological disease from killing millions. Greater 

research is also required to determine the effectiveness of terrorist 

targeting in the long run.

Finally, policy makers need to recognize that denial is the 

dominant strategy against individuals and groups. In order to be 

successful an enhanced denial strategy using the tools of transparency 

and immunization must focus on motivation and capability. This will 

require a “whole nation” approach, implemented simultaneously by all 

parts of the government and selected corporations. As one example, the 

Department of Defense must use its expertise in systems integration, 

command and control, mobility/logistics, and crisis response to collect 

and integrate information creating greater transparency and prepare 

attack responses, creating greater national immunization.

Conclusion

Technological advances over the next 25 years and the anonymity 

they will allow have the capacity to make deterrence theory ineffective in 

the 2035 timeframe. Individual or small group nonstate actors may have 

the technological capability and the psychological frame of mind to carry 

out catastrophic attacks. To successfully deter these attacks, the United

States must work against hostile actors’ motivation, capability, and 
28

opportunity by using transparency and immunization. Transparency 

must identify an actor or make an adversary believe that he or she has 

been identified; altering his or her motivation, preventing the capability 

to carry out an attack, and calling into question the opportunity for a 

successful attack. At the same time, an immunization strategy must 

deter motivation by reducing grievances and the ideation of violence as 

the answer. An immunization strategy during the opportunity phase, 

working in conjunction with transparency, may reduce the likelihood of a 

successful attack and may lessen the motivation of an actor. If states 

incorporate these ideas, deterrence theory will still hold a prominent 

place among the strategies the United States uses against individuals 

and groups.

Notes

1. Plato, Republic, 2nd ed. and trans. G. M. A. Grube and C. D. C.

Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub Co, 1992), 34–38.

2. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 1983), 14–16.

3. Ibid., 14–15.

4. Glen H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Toward a Theory of 

National Defense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 14–

16.

5. Ibid.
29

6. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex 

Warner (London, UK: Penguin Books Ltd, 1972), 400–407; and Frank 

Miller, “Disarmament and Deterrence: A Practitioner’s View,” in 

Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, ed. George Perkovich and James 

M. Acton (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

2009), 149–55, 

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_

debate.pdf. The History of the Peloponnesian War contains the first 

recorded historical example of an adversary holding a population at risk 

to achieve its objectives. The Melian dialogue between the Athenians and 

the Melians of Melos offered the Melians the choice to either surrender 

and join their alliance or be destroyed. The Melians were just a pawn in 

the Athenian strategy of deterring other allies from rebellion or joining 

with the Spartans by using them as an example. During the Cold War 

nuclear weapons were used at the core of a deterrent strategy by the 

United States. They proved useful in creating a stable world order which 

deterred the great powers of the United States and the Soviet Union from 

unrestrained conflict.

7. William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger, “Israeli 

Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay,” New York Times, 15 

January 2011, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.ht
30

ml. Individuals and groups acting anonymously can best be seen in the 

cyber world. The Stunex attack against the Iranian nuclear program and 

multiple denial of service attacks against international corporations are 

examples of what individuals and groups can do anonymously.

8. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 12–17.

9. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 14–15; and Glenn 

Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 14–16.

10. Barry S. Pallotta and Michael S. Finnin, “DIT Biology: 

Capability Assessment” (briefing, Institute for Defense Analysis,

Alexandria, VA, 4 May 2010), 2–26.

11. Frederick the Great, Frederick the Great on the Art of War, ed. 

and trans. Jay Luuvas (New York, NY: Da Capo Press Inc., 1966), 120.

12. John Horgan, Psychology of Terrorism (New York, NY: 

Routledge, 2005), 109–20.

13. Frederick Calhoun and Stephen Weston, “Managing Threats; 

Reducing the Risk of Violence” (seminar, Specialized Training Services, 

San Diego, CA, 2009), 6–11.

14. Grant Hammond (Center for Science and Technology, Maxwell 

AFB, AL), adapted from interview by the author, 11 January 2011.

15. Brian M. Jenkins (RAND Corp, Santa Monica, CA), interview by 

the author, 29 November 2010.
31

16. Ibid.

17. Brian Michael Jenkins and Paul K. Davis, Deterrence and 

Influence in Counterterrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 4, 39–43.

18. Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 23–46; and Jenkins,

interview. Psychological research into nonstate groups/individuals using 

terrorism has created no definitive profile for who is most likely to carry 

out violent acts in order to achieve their political objectives but has given 

clues as to what motivates them. Some fascist groups such as al-Qaeda 

desire to carry out catastrophic attacks against the United States and its 

allies. Such fascist groups have a grievance against the United States 

and have arrived at the idea that violence is the only way to achieve their 

goals. The United States is seen as the cause of injustice and the root of 

all that is wrong with their countries, their ethnic group, or their 

personal situation. In turn, some individuals and groups believe that if 

they can impose severe damage against the United States, thereby 

raising the costs to an unbearable level, they will be able to achieve their 

political goal of creating a new ruling order.

19. Jenkins, interview.

20. “Al-Qaeda Cell Killed by Black Death was Developing Biological 

Weapons,” Telegraph.co.uk, 20 January 2009, 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/alg

eria/4287469/Black-Death-kills-al-Qaeda-operatives-in-Algeria.html. In
32

January 2009, 40 terrorists were found dead in a training camp in 

Algeria. The al-Qaeda group is suspected to have been killed by a plague 

as they were attempting to develop biological weapons. 

21. Jamie Madigan, “The Psychology of Anonymity,” GamePro, 28 

October 2010, http://www.gamepro.com/article/features/217085/thepsychology-of-anonymity.

22. Julie Zhuo, “Where Anonymity Breeds Contempt,” New York 

Times, 29 November 2010, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/opinion/30zhuo.html?nl=todays

headlines&emc=a212.

23. P. G. Zimbardo, “The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, 

and Order versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos,” in Nebraska 

Symposium on Motivation, eds. W. J. Arnold and D. Levine (Lincoln, NE: 

University of Nebraska Press, 1969), 237–307.

24. Emanuel Adler, “Complex Deterrence in the AsymmetricWarfare Era,” in Complex Deterrence, Strategy in the Global Age, eds. T.

V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago, IL: University 

of Chicago Press, 2009), 85–104.

25. Tom Postmes and Russell Spears, “Deindividuation and 

Antinormative Behavior: A Meta-Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 123, no. 

3 (May 1998): 238–59.
33

26. Zimbardo, “The Human Choice.” Zimbardo’s findings were 

supported by other studies which found that altered responsibility leads 

to increased antisocial behavior. These studies concluded “subjects were 

almost twice as aggressive if they did not feel responsible as were those 

who were made to feel responsible for their actions” According to the 

studies of Zimbardo, one of the leading researchers in the psychological 

field of deindividuation, individuals are more likely to carry out antisocial 

acts when they achieve a deindividuated state. In a 1969 study, 

Zimbardo used students to “administer” shocks to subjects in order to 

test his hypothesis. The experiments showed that individuals who 

achieved a deindividuated state appeared to act more aggressively than 

those who did not. Specifically his findings tended to suggest the 

combination of anonymity within a group dynamic increased aggressive 

behavior.

27. Leslie L. Downing and Robert D. Johnson, “Deindividuation 

and Valence of Cues: Effects on Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior,” 

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, no. 9 (September 1979): 

1,532–38.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.
34

30. Robert I. Watson, “Investigation into Deindividuation Using A 

Cross-Cultural Survey Technique,” Journal of Personality and Social 

Psychology 25, no. 3 (March 1973): 342–45.

31. Fox News, “Militants Behead American Hostage in Iraq,” Fox 

News.com, 11 May 2004, 

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,119615,00.html. In addition to 

the IRA, throughout the Middle East acts of terrorism and many attacks 

on civilians and military targets are marked by a common thread, the 

masking of the perpetrators identity. One of the most glaring acts of 

violence was the beheading of Nicolas Berg by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 

2004. Zarqawi and his men beheaded Berg while taping the act, and did 

so with their identities masked by head coverings. Another example is 

the beheading of journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002.

32. A. P. Silke, “Deindividuation, Anonymity, and Violence: 

Findings from Northern Ireland,” Journal of Social Psychology 143, no. 4 

(April 2003): 493–99.

33. Postmes and Spears, “Deindividuation and Antinormative 

Behavior,” 238–59.

34. While Kapur’s study is focused on nuclear threats, it is 

arguably applicable to a broader set of threats including biological, 

chemical, and cyber.
35

35. S. Paul Kapur, “Deterring Nuclear Terrorists,” in Complex 

Deterrence, Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan,

and James J. Wirtz (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009) 109–

25.

36. Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Human Transcend 

Biology (New York, NY: Viking Press, 2005). Small groups and individuals 

may become capable of producing weapons that previously were 

accessible only to financially successful nation-states. Even today, an 

ever-increasing level of scientific knowledge has allowed mankind to 

advance technology to amazing levels. Many technology advances are 

following along the basic theory of Moore’s Law. What would have taken 

100 years and the resources of a major nation-state to accomplish in the 

past, now takes approximately 25 years and the resources of a regional 

power. As technology continues to advance and individuals can access 

information that in the past was beyond their data gathering and 

economic resources, that 25-year time frame may be compressed into 14 

years and then further into seven, while the investment required 

decreases to that which an individual or small group can afford.

37. Center for Strategy and Technology, “Blue Horizons IV:

Deterrence in the Age of Surprise” (briefing, Air War College, Maxwell 

AFB, AL, 2010), 1–39.
36

38. Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New 

World: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, vol. 1, 

1939/1946 (Oak Ridge, TN: US AEC Technical Information Center, 

1972), 723–24. A case in point is the Manhattan Project undertaken by 

the United States to produce the first atomic weapon. A huge national 

effort was required to create the first atomic weapon in 1945. The United 

States invested $1.89 billion ($21.6 billion in 1996 constant dollars), 

built many research laboratories, and employed thousands of scientist 

and engineers to construct four weapons by 1945. This includes capital 

and operations costs from 1942 through 1945. Costs adjusted using a 

base year of 1944 (the year of highest Manhattan Project expenditures).

39. David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold 

War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy (New York, NY: Random House, 

2009), 101–03. Hoffman goes into great detail of the Soviet’s secret 

development of genetically altered biological weapons against the 

prohibitions of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The 

Soviets were attempting to create a new generation of germs resistant to 

antibiotic under Projects Factor and Bonfire. Even today, the Russian 

government has never fully admitted to nor opened up its archives on the 

successful state run biological weapons program. 

40. Pallotta and Finnin, “DIT Biology,” 2–26; Michael Snyder, Jiang 

Du, and Mark Gerstein, “Personal Genome Sequencing: Current 
37

Approaches and Challenges,” Genes and Development, 1 November 2010, 

http://genesdev.cshlp.org/content/24/5/423.full; and Dr. Beth Perry 

(Los Alamos National Lab), interview by the author, 18 January 2010. 

For example, over the last 10 years an exponential increase in DNA 

knowledge and corresponding exponential decrease in the costs required,

as well as the number of genomes sequenced, has allowed genetically 

altered biological weapon manufacturing to start its descent from the 

nation-state level to the individual. Basic genetic research and 

development can be broken into nine different levels. Ten years ago, work 

on any of the nine levels required an advanced degree (PhD) and the 

resources of a large laboratory. However, as of May 2010, the first three 

levels of genetic work can be done by an individual without a degree or 

specialized training, with equipment and instructions retrieved from the 

Internet or at a local store. In 10–15 years, graduate-level individuals will 

have the capability to create a new biological weapon. It is postulated 

that in 25 years all nine levels may be available to an individual with 

knowledge and equipment cheaply acquired from public sources that are 

difficult to trace. While the ability to make synthetic biological weapons 

currently still resides at the industrial level, the same advancements in 

technology that allow genetic research to be done by individuals and 

small groups are also beginning to allow individuals to work in the 

synthetic biology field. Where previously only scientists working for a 
38

nation could create new weapons, technological advances over the next 

quarter century will more than likely give anonymous individuals or 

small groups the technological capability to develop/use the same 

weapons. Many predict that in 25 years, an individual or nonstate group 

may easily create a synthetic biological weapon to attack specific human 

characteristics within a population, creating a mass casualty event.

41. Michael A. Innes, “The Social Construction of Militant 

Sanctuary,” research paper (London: Crisis State Research Center, 

London School of Economics & Political Science, 21 Oct 2009), 2–4, 

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/50526966/Innes-Militant-Sanctuary.

42. Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 126–42.

43. Benjamin Franklin, Memoirs of the Life and Writings of 

Benjamin Franklin, ed. William Franklin (Philadelphia, PA: T. S. Manning, 

1818), 270; and Johnny Kilman and George Costello, eds., The 

Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, 

GPO Access, 2008, 1,281–356, 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/pdf2002/022.pdf. However a 

major impediment to the transparency initiative may well be the citizens 

of the country it is attempting to protect. This is especially true in 

democracies such as the United States. The feelings of many Americans 

are summed up by Benjamin Franklin when he wrote, “They who can 

give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve 
39

neither liberty nor safety”. Much like the limited expectation to privacy 

when in public (US Constitution, Fourth Amendment), all electrons sent 

via the public domain may need to become part of the public record. 

Whatever level of transparency is achieved, it will not be 100 percent

effective. Therefore the United States will also need to build a societal 

immunization system against attacks that will deny nonstate actors the 

capability and opportunity to launch attacks.

44. Kapur, “Deterring Nuclear Terrorists,” 111–16, discusses 

effects of strategies designed to affect motivation, opportunity and 

capability.

45. Jerrold M. Post, Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of 

Terrorism from the IRA to AL-Qaeda (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 

2007), 219–41, 254–56. Strategic communications capabilities are 

another part of creating a transparent system. Today’s modern media 

proliferates scenes of violence and spreads stories with questionable facts 

around the world creating or magnifying grievances. A robust strategic 

communications program should focus on the reduction of grievances 

and the ideation that violence solves problems, making deterrence more 

likely to be successful.

46. Ibid., 254–56. Many studies of terrorism have discussed the 

fact that most individuals committing terrorist acts do care about family 

and have their own set of moral values. By influencing the social norms 
40

of the groups individuals associate with the negative results from 

deindividuation may be nullified. In the case of families, terrorists need 

to be deterred from acting by understanding and believing that a nuclear 

or biological attack may be harmful to themselves or their families 

through radiation/fallout or the spread of infections throughout the 

world. At the same time some individuals, such as those following Islam, 

may be deterred by persuading them to look at different reading of the 

Koran that focus on the teachings against “mass casualties, including 

the killing of innocents, and the requirement to not poison the earth and 

living things.”

47. Future MAP Program (futures markets applied to prediction), 

“A Market in the Future of the Middle East,” 

http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/tia/futuremap-program.htm; and 

Business Wire, “Singapore Develops Risk Assessment and Horizon 

Scanning (RAHS) System to Anticipate Future,” Allbusiness.com, 1 March 

2007, www.allbusiness.com/services/business.../4539437-1.html.

Singapore is creating a transparent network of information used to 

identify potential nonstate threats through its risk assessment and 

horizon scanning (RAHS) algorithm. The RAHS attempts to detect weak 

signals and accomplish pattern analysis which can be applied to 

numerous areas to include prediction of terrorist attacks. This program 

appears to be similar to the aborted 2003 Department of Defense and 
41

Defense Advanced Research Agency initiative. As a result of information 

garnered from a transparent information system, groups likely to act 

could be identified, communicated with, and deterred. By engaging these 

groups and influencing the mindset of the membership, the effects of 

deindividuation can be mitigated and thus attacks may not occur. In 

order to gather more data, the United States likewise needs to invest in 

technology capable of data storage, sensor capability and integration, 

and automatic threat assessment. Quantum computing may be required 

to bring all of these capabilities together on a global scale. This process 

may actually identify those likely to act or, through phishing, at least 

make them believe they have been discovered.

48. Many types of individuals using terrorism, even hardcore 

“terrorists,” do not like to take operational risks and may be deterred by 

any uncertainty in their chances for success. See Jenkins and Davis, 

Deterrence and Influence, xi–xiii, for a more detailed discussion.

49. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 14–16.

50. Avery Plaw, Targeting Terrorists: A License to Kill? (Hampshire, 

UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), 173–76.

51. Ibid., 165–97.

52. David Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the 

Midst of a Big One (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 263–

89.
42

53. Ibid.

54. Dr. Kim (Bell Laboratories), interview by the author, 28 

January 2011.

55. Center for Strategy and Technology, “Blue Horizons IV,” 38.

56. Ibid.