i 

Raising the Periscope...

GrabandPoppy:

America’sEarlyELINTSatellites

Robert A. McDonald and 

Sharon K. Moreno 

History Staff 

Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance 

Office of Policy/Directorate of Administration 

National Reconnaissance Office 

Chantilly, Virginia 

Recognition Ceremony Edition, 

September 2005 
ii 

Foreword: Declassification of the 

Grab and Poppy Systems 

With public acknowledgement of the “fact of” signals intelligence (SIGINT) from space in the 1990s, it became imperative to examine historical electronic intelligence (ELINT) 

reconnaissance satellite programs for potential declassification. 

In 1997 the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA), 

and the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO), 

established a team of experts from the NRO, the NSA, the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Department of the 

Navy with co-leads from NRO and NSA to accomplish this 

goal. I had the privilege to serve as the NRO lead of that 

integrated process team (IPT). 

The IPT limited its assessment to two of the earliest ELINT 

satellite systems that the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) 

developed and fielded: Grab and Poppy. In order not to jeopardize national security but to tell the history of the Grab and 

Poppy programs, the IPT rigorously examined the security risk 

of each element to be declassified. Only then did the IPT prepare its declassification recommendations for the Director of 

Central Intelligence (DCI). 

As a result of the IPT’s recommendations, the DCI authorized declassification of limited information about Grab in 

1998—in time for the 75th anniversary of the NRL. Grab, 

“Galactic Radiation and Background,” operated from 1960 to 

1962. 

The second program, Poppy, operated from 1962 to 1977. 

In 2004 the DCI authorized the DNRO to declassify the “fact 

of” the Poppy program along with limited information about it. 

The objectives of this declassification were to let the public 

know about these programs and their major accomplishments 

and, especially, to recognize those key contributors and intelli-
iii 

gence community participants who performed the Grab- and 

Poppy-related research, development, and operations. We recognized Grab alumni during NRL’s 75th anniversary celebration. Now we can recognize the Poppy alumni for their significant contributions to the national security during the Cold War. 

Despite the many security obstacles to declassification of 

these early satellite ELINT programs, we were successful and 

now have an opportunity to both recognize the people and 

share artifacts of the programs with the public. The National 

Air and Space Museum and the National Cryptologic Museum 

both have public displays of the Grab satellite. We plan similar 

displays of Poppy artifacts at the National Cryptologic 

Museum and the NRO. 

For the Grab and Poppy declassification efforts, the Intelligence Community cooperated to lift the veil of secrecy that 

necessarily surrounds the nation’s satellite reconnaissance programs. This history pamphlet from the Center for the Study of 

National Reconnaissance (CSNR) is the first step in sharing the 

Grab and Poppy stories veiled for so long. In this way we are 

able to recognize in a more public way two important historical 

Intelligence Community activities. 

It is our hope that the IPT’s declassification efforts and this 

history pamphlet will provide Americans with an appreciation 

of the importance of satellite reconnaissance programs and the 

value of those who have dedicated their professional lives to 

ensuring that the very best possible intelligence is continuously 

available to keep the nation strong and safe from potential 

adversaries. 

W. J. Breedlove, Jr., Ph.D.

Chair, Poppy Declassification 

Integrated Process Team (IPT) 
iv 

 

Preface 

We offer in this publication a brief history of Grab and 

Poppy—two of the earliest U.S. satellite-based electronic intelligence (ELINT) programs. Our brief history represents the 

scope of programmatic details that former Director of Central 

Intelligence George Tenet authorized the Director of National 

Reconnaissance to declassify.1

 Our goal was to produce a 

consolidated summary of these programs on the occasion of 

DNRO Donald Kerr’s recognition of key contributors to the 

Poppy program.2

 Although security constraints limit how much 

we can say about these programs, we present an overview and 

summary of Poppy’s early contributions to national security. 

Such information can provide current NRO program managers 

with an unclassified historical context for programmatic and 

policy decisions. 

Grab and Poppy were pioneering space reconnaissance 

activities during the 1960s. The intelligence these programs 

collected played a vital role in U.S. national security at the 

1

 On 11 May 2004, DCI Tenet approved an Intelligence Community recommendation to declassify the “fact of” the Poppy ELINT satellite program 

along with limited information about the program. This Poppy information 

now supplements earlier Grab ELINT satellite program information that the 

DCI authorized for release in conjunction with the Naval Research Laboratory’s 75th anniversary celebrations in June of 1998. 2

 On 12 September 2005, DNRO Kerr hosted a closed Intelligence Community recognition event at NRO headquarters for the key contributors to the 

Poppy program as well as other distinguished alumni who participated in 

Poppy development and operation. The key contributors are those whose 

names are so documented in classified NRL and NRO historical records. 

Whereas hundreds of individuals were involved with the Poppy system over 

the life of the program, the September 2005 event highlighted the work of 

those whom the CSNR was able to identify and locate nearly 30 years after 

the program ended. 
v 

height of the Cold War. The programs succeeded only because 

of the creativity and perseverance of key contributors and 

others who participated in Grab and Poppy development and 

operation. It is most appropriate that the Center for the Study of 

National Reconnaissance (CSNR) publish this brief story of the 

Grab and Poppy programs on the occasion of DNRO Donald 

Kerr announcing declassification of the Poppy program and 

recognizing the role of Poppy alumni who contributed to its 

success. 

We prepared this history based in large part on early draft 

manuscripts researched by former NSA historian Dr. Tom 

Johnson, NRL history consultant Dr. Ron Potts, former NRO 

historian R. Cargill Hall, former NSA historian Dr. David 

Hatch, and the late NRL historian Dr. David van Keuren. We 

are grateful to them for their work. We supplemented the work 

of these earlier researchers with additional information from 

the reference collection at the Center for the Study of National 

Reconnaissance. We also received research support from the 

NRO curator, James Rosolanka. Frances Lawson was our 

production editor. 

We especially are indebted to Dr. Ron Potts, whose personal knowledge and extensive historical research of the Grab

and Poppy programs have proved invaluable in documenting 

the programs. He also reviewed our draft manuscript and 

offered suggestions to improve its accuracy. 

Robert A. McDonald, Ph.D.

Director, Center for the Study of 

National Reconnaissance 
vi 

Contents 

Foreword: Declassification of the Grab and Poppy Systems .. ii 

Preface...................................................................................... iv 

Raising the Periscope: Grab and Poppy—America’s Early 

ELINT Satellites................................................................. 1 

Why National Reconnaissance?............................................ 2 

Emerging Technical Means— Origins of National 

Reconnaissance............................................................... 3 

Navy Builds First Reconnaissance Satellite—Grab............. 4 

Poppy—Successor To Grab ................................................. 8 

Grab and Poppy Contributions ........................................... 14 

References............................................................................... 16 

Appendix: Grab, Poppy Launches.......................................... 18 

Figures: 

Figure 1. Naval Research Laboratory, June 1960 .....................2 

Figure 2. Thor Able Star launch vehicle at Cape Canaveral 

with Grab 2 ..........................................................................5 

Figure 3. Piggybacked Grab 2 (top) mated with Injun (middle) 

and Transit 4A (bottom), atop an Able Star.........................6 

Figure 4. Grab 2 with turnstile antennas ...................................7 

Figure 5. Grab radio receiving and control hut in Hawaii with 

yagi antennas........................................................................9 

Figure 6. Interior of Grab hut ....................................................9 

Figure 7. Thor Agena with Poppy 1 at Vandenberg AFB on 

12 December 1962. ............................................................10 

Figure 8. Two Poppy designs—stretched sphere (left); 

multiface (right).................................................................11 

Figure 9. Poppy Operations Building, 1970s..........................11 

Figure 10. Poppy receiving console ........................................12 

Figure 11. Poppy analog analysis position..............................13 

Figure 12. One-operator transmitter console...........................14 
1 

 

Raising the Periscope: Grab and 

Poppy—America’s Early ELINT 

Satellites 

The United States was the first nation in space with a 

reconnaissance satellite—and that satellite, designed to intercept Soviet radar signals, was a 20-inch-diameter metal ball 

packed with electronic equipment. The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) developed this electronic intelligence (ELINT) 

satellite in early1958 under the code name Tattletale. Tattletale

is better known as Grab, for Galactic Radiation and Background Satellite (Tattletale’s cover mission).3

 In 1962, NRL 

launched Grab’s successor, Poppy—also designed to collect 

Soviet radar signals. (See Figure 1, Aerial view of NRL) 

Both Grab and Poppy served as valuable national reconnaissance ELINT collectors and made significant contributions 

3

 Multiple nomenclatures are associated with Grab and its follow-on Poppy. 

The project name Grab in this pamphlet refers to the then-classified ELINT 

project, initially called Tattletale in classified channels and later known as 

Canes. (Canes also refers to the project’s security control system.) The 

Navy used the name Dyno for a proposed Grab upgrade (superseded by 

Poppy). At the same time, Grab’s cover mission initially was referred to as 

Galactic Energy Balance-Experiment (Greb-E) and later became known as 

SolRad (for solar radiation). The Greb/SolRad cover mission was a real 

scientific experiment whose purpose was to measure solar radiation 

(Lyman-alpha and X-ray).That mission focused on the effect of solar 

radiation on high frequency (HF) communication propagated via ionospheric reflection. Navy scientists discovered that solar flares produced 

ionospheric disturbances, such as sudden short wave fading and cosmic 

noise absorption. In addition to its value for pure research into the sun’s 

nature, data would be used to predict propagation conditions for HF communications. The NRL eventually built Navy and NASA satellites dedicated to solar radiation measurement and related experiments, and they 

applied the nickname SolRad retroactively to the progenitor, Greb. 
to America’s national security. The NRL had completed its 

development of the Grab satellite system by the time the Soviet 

Union shot down Francis Gary Powers’ high-altitude U-2 

reconnaissance aircraft on 1 May 1960. After the U-2 shootdown, President Eisenhower cancelled all further U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union. Now, in order to access the heartland of the Soviet Union, the U.S. had to turn to space. Grab

and Poppy, along with their imagery cousin, Corona, were 

available to fulfill this need in the 1960s and 1970s.4

Photo courtesy NRL 

 

Figure 1. Naval Research Laboratory, June 1960 

Why National Reconnaissance? 

When World War II ended in 1945, the United States held a 

position of military dominance derived in large part from its 

possession of the atomic bomb. However, by 1949, the Soviet 

4 Corona, a joint CIA and USAF project with its first successful mission on

18 August 1960, was the world’s first imagery satellite reconnaissance 

system. 

2 
3 

 

Union had its own A-bomb. As the Soviet threat appeared to be 

growing, it had become more difficult to gain access to Soviet 

territory. Winston Churchill foresaw this as early as 5 March 

1946, when he observed: 

“From the Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an 

iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that 

line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and 

Eastern Europe. . . . The Communist parties, which were 

very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been 

raised to preeminence and power far beyond their numbers 

and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control.” 

As the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies became 

denied areas, classical espionage became more difficult. 

Increasingly our U.S. Intelligence Community needed to 

explore technical means of collection. 

Emerging Technical Means— 

Origins of National Reconnaissance 

In 1946 RAND Corporation5

 published a research study 

that called for a multistage “experimental world-circling spaceship.” During the same period, the U.S. Navy proposed construction of a single-stage earth satellite vehicle; it continued to 

fund a modest satellite research effort until 1948. The War 

Department did not have funds to design and launch satellites 

and in any case showed scant interest in the concept. However, 

it had proposed using satellites as observation platforms and 

5

 RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization with historical ties 

to the Air Force. RAND’s founders initially set it up as Project RAND 

under special contract to the Douglas Aircraft Company with Project 

RAND reporting to the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development. RAND’s 1946 report, Preliminary Design of an Experimental 

World-Circling Spaceship, analyzed the potential to design and engineer an 

earth-orbiting satellite vehicle. (In 1948 the Air Force Chief of Staff 

approved evolution of RAND into a nonprofit corporation.) 
4 

weather reconnaissance vehicles, though this never proceeded 

beyond the concept stage, because rocket development/production lagged. 

The Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of Sputnik, the world’s 

first orbiting artificial satellite, impelled President Eisenhower’s Administration to look more closely at the concept of 

space-based reconnaissance. After the 1960 U-2 shootdown, 

satellite reconnaissance became more compelling. 

Navy Builds First Reconnaissance Satellite—Grab

President Eisenhower approved full development of Grab

on 24 August 1959; four days after the U-2 shootdown, he 

approved the first Grab launch. On 22 June 1960, a Thor AbleStar rocket roared off the launch pad at Cape Canaveral, Florida, carrying Grab 1 into orbit. The U.S. now had a space 

reconnaissance program. 

The Grab concept originated in 1958 with an NRL research 

engineer, Reid D. Mayo, who investigated the problem of intercepting and analyzing radar signals from Soviet air defenses. 

While stranded in a Pennsylvania restaurant during a March 

blizzard, he pondered the application to space reconnaissance 

of crystal video technologies he had developed for submarines. 

Specifically, he wondered if the submarine periscope system 

could be modified so that a solid-state version of this intercept 

system could be mounted in a 20-inch solar-powered Vanguard 

satellite. He penciled range calculations on a paper placemat 

and determined that such a system could in fact intercept 

Soviet radar signals up to an altitude of 600 miles. 

When Mayo returned to Washington, he presented his idea 

for ELINT collection to Howard Lorenzen, chief of NRL’s 

countermeasures branch and in the front rank of the nation’s 

electronic warfare program. Lorenzen agreed it could work and 

championed the idea within the Department of Defense and the 

Intelligence Community. The NRL continued research and 
development in coordination with elements of the U.S. space 

and ELINT programs. The NRL attempted five Grab missions 

between 1960 and 1962; two were successful. 

(Photo courtesy NRL) 

Figure 2. Thor Able Star launch vehicle at Cape Canaveral with Grab 2 

The U.S. Air Force launched Grab 1 from Cape Canaveral, 

Florida using a Thor-Able-Star booster.6 (See Figure 2, Thor 

Able Star.) It launched in “piggyback” fashion with a second 

 6

 The Thor-Able-Star booster, an early US launch vehicle, was succeeded in 

the early 1960s by the Thor Agena series of launch vehicles. 

5 
satellite, Transit 1B.9

 (See Figure 3, Piggybacked Grab.) This 

first Grab satellite operated for 

three months. Its initial collection of data on 5 July 1960 far 

exceeded Mayo’s expectations. 

Grab’s yield provided intelligence analysts at the National 

Security Agency (NSA) with 

ELINT data that kept them busy 

until the next mission. 

Photo courtesy NRL 

Figure 3. Piggybacked Grab 2

(top) mated with Injun7 (middle) and Transit 4A8 (bottom), 

atop an Able Star. 

On 29 June 1961, a little 

over one year after the first successful Grab mission, the NRL 

launched the second successful 

Grab satellite. It began collecting signals on 15 July and operated for 14 months. Like Grab 

1, it produced a large volume of 

radar intercept data. By October 

1961, NSA had developed an 

automatic system to improve the 

6 

 7

 The University of Iowa designed and built Injun to study natural and

artificial trapped radiation belts, auroras and airglow, and other geophysical

phenomena. 8

 Transit 4A was the first satellite to carry a nuclear power plant, known as 

SNAP-3, for Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power-3. 9

 The Transit 1B navigation satellite is part of the heritage of the global 

positioning system (GPS). This first U.S. Navy navigation satellite, Transit

1B, was designed to meet the Navy’s need for accurately locating ballistic 

missile submarines and other ships by updating shipboard inertial navigation systems. Transit receivers used known characteristics of the satellite 

orbit, and measured the Doppler shift of the satellite’s radio signal to

calculate the receiver’s position on earth. 
time-consuming processing of ELINT data it received from the 

Grab satellites. 

Grab satellites featured ELINT antennas that provided 

reception of radar signals. A larger and separate turnstile 

antenna received commands, transmitted telemetry, and transmitted ELINT data. (See Figure 4, Grab with antennas.)

Photo courtesy NRL 

Figure 4. Grab 2 with turnstile antennas 

When terrestrial radar emitted its pulsed-radar signals 

above the horizon, Grab satellites collected each pulse of a 

radar signal in a specified bandwidth and transponded a corresponding signal to NRL radio receiving and control huts at 

ground sites within Grab’s field of view. The huts’ antenna 

masts contained two upper bays of 10-element yagi antennas 

that received telemetry (108 MHz) and four lower bays of 10-

element yagi antennas that transmitted commands and received

ELINT (139 MHz). (See Figure 5, antennas on Grab hut; and 

Figure 6, interior of Grab hut.)

Personnel at Grab receiving and control huts recorded data 

from the satellites and then dispatched tapes with these data, 

initially to NRL, and then to the National Security Agency 

(NSA) and the Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC). The 

NSA and SAC exploited the data to develop technical intelligence about Soviet radar. The success of the two Grab mis7 
8 

 

sions was encouraging, and the NRL made two unsuccessful 

attempts at a third Grab mission. 

Poppy—Successor To Grab

In 1962, shortly after NRL’s second unsuccessful attempt 

at a third Grab mission, the newly formed National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) assimilated NRL’s ELINT satellite activities and associated multi-agency infrastructure into what became NRO’s Program C.10, 11 Program C continued NRL’s 

satellite ELINT collection by developing Poppy, Grab’s 

successor. 

Following the conclusion of Grab 2’s useful lifespan in 

August 1962, the Air Force used a Thor Agena-D launch 

vehicle on 13 December 1962 to carry Poppy 1 into orbit from 

Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), California. (See Figure 

7, Thor Agena.) 

10 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara formally established the NRO 

under its current name on 6 September 1961. Its mission was to manage the 

newly created National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). The NRP would 

consist of all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects; thus, Navy 

ELINT satellite projects at NRL, and the Air Force and CIA Corona

imagery program, became part of the NRP budget under NRO control. 

11 DNRO Joseph V. Charyk organized NRO functions into four alpha-designated programs areas in July 1962: Program A for Air Force; Program B for 

CIA; and Program C for Navy. Under Program C, the Navy was responsible 

for the design, development, and operation of its reconnaissance satellites, 

and the Air Force was responsible for launching those satellites. Program C 

included the U.S. Navy element of the NRP in association with the Technical Operation Group, which was made up of representatives from the Office 

of Naval Intelligence, National Security Agency, NRO, Naval Security 

Group, Army Security Agency, and Air Force Security Service. 
Photo courtesy NRL 

Figure 5. Grab radio receiving and control hut in Hawaii with yagi 

antennas

Photo courtesy NRL 

Figure 6. Interior of Grab hut

9 
The initial Poppy mission succeeded, as did all six additional missions. The Air Force used three versions of the Thor 

Agena booster for Poppy: Thor Agena-D for Poppy 1, 2, 4, and 

5; a Thrust-Augmented-Thor (TAT) Agena-D for Poppy 3; and 

the Thorad (also know as Long-Tank Thrust-Augmented Thor) 

Agena-D for Poppy 6 and 7. 

Photo courtesy NRL 

Figure 7. Thor Agena with Poppy 1 at Vandenberg AFB on 

12 December 1962.

The first Poppy missions featured a stretched spherical 

satellite design, initially 20 x 24 inches (at 55 pounds), which 

10 
ultimately became 24 x 32 inches (at 129 pounds). Poppy also

featured a 12-sided multiface design, initially 27 x 32 inches 

(at 162 pounds), which ultimately became 27 x 34 inches (at 

282 pounds). (See Figure 8, two Poppy designs.)

Photos courtesy NRL 

Figure 8. Two Poppy designs—stretched sphere (left); multiface (right)

During 1965-67, Program C phased out the earlier receiving and control huts used for Grab; the program also upgraded 

data quality by installing equipment in buildings provided by 

host installations. This upgrade also augmented manual analysis in the field. By the 1970s, the Poppy program used prefabricated buildings in the field for its Siss Zulu operations.12 (See 

Figure 9, Poppy operations building.)

Photo courtesy NRL 

 

Figure 9. Poppy Operations Building, 1970s 

At the field sites, a pair of receiving consoles collected 

ELINT data downlinked from Poppy satellites. One operator 

12 By this time, the Navy referred to the Poppy program with the unclassified term “Siss Zulu.” 

11 
tracked the pass in azimuth/elevation and selected polarization 

for recording. A second operator logged signals of interest. 

(See Figure 10, Poppy Receiving Console.) An analog analysis 

operator performed post-pass measurements for signals that the 

collection operators detected, incorporating signals of interest 

into daily logs. (See Figure 11, Analog Position.) The analysts 

reported information on signals of interest to NSA and others, 

using the nation’s critical communications channels. 

Photo courtesy NRL 

Figure 10. Poppy receiving console 

One-operator transmitter consoles used over the life of the 

program included three receiver groups for telemetry readout 

and two transmitter groups for payload commands. The operator would tune the receiver groups to radio frequencies for 

scheduled satellites, and the groups would operate as the satellites rose above the field site’s radio horizon. (See Figure 12,

One-operator Transmitter Console.)

12 
Photo courtesy NRL 

Figure 11. Poppy analog analysis position

The Naval Security Group (NSG), Air Force Security Service (AFSS), and Army Security Agency (ASA) staffed the 

Poppy field sites. Their cryptologic technicians operated and 

maintained Poppy equipment. A Poppy Technical Operations

Group, composed of representatives from participating organi13 
zations, held monthly meetings. The NSG coordinated all field 

operations for the Poppy program. The field sites collected 

radar data and forwarded intercepted signals to the National 

Security Agency (NSA). The NSA analyzed the signals and 

produced reports for the Intelligence Community. 

Photo courtesy NRL 

Figure 12. One-operator transmitter console 

Grab and Poppy Contributions 

Early NRO ELINT satellite reconnaissance programs constituted a critical component of our U.S. technical reconnaissance operations during the 1960s and into the 1970s. Before 

development of these satellite systems, technical intelligence

about Soviet air defense radars was limited to that which could 

be collected by airborne and ground-based collection platforms, often limiting collection to radar sites less than 200 

miles inside the Soviet Union. Grab and Poppy dramatically 

increased the capability of U.S. intelligence to acquire ELINT

data deep within the Soviet Union. 

14 
15 

 

Intelligence derived from data that Grab and Poppy collected went to support a wide range of intelligence applications. It provided cues to the location and capabilities of radar 

sites within the Soviet Union; it provided SAC with characteristics and locations of air defense equipment to support building the U.S. Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP)13; it provided ocean surveillance information to Navy operational commanders; and, with data from the Corona imaging reconnaissance satellite, it provided a more complete picture of the 

Soviet military threat. We can credit these systems with helping the U.S. win the Cold War. At the same time they extended 

their impact into the future as they laid the foundation for 

future national reconnaissance capabilities. The NRO’s 21stcentury SIGINT reconnaissance capabilities grew out of Grab

and Poppy innovations in the 1960s and 1970s. 

13 The SIOP was the U.S. war plan that governed targeting of U.S. strategic 

weapons employed by the Air Force, Army, and Navy, including the triad 

of SAC’s strategic bombers, land-based ballistic missiles, and Polaris 

submarines. 
16 

References 

“Conceiving the World’s First Signals Intelligence Satellite” 

(2002). In R.A. McDonald (Ed.), Beyond Expectations—

Building an American National Reconnaissance Capability: Recollections of the Pioneers and Founders of National 

Reconnaissance (pp. 129-138). Bethesda, MD: American 

Society for Photogrammetry & Remote Sensing. 

Churchill, W. (1946). “Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain)” 

Speech, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 1946. 

Corddry, C. (1960). “Piggy-Back Satellites Hailed As Big 

Space Gain for U.S.,” Washington Post, 23 June. 

Haines, G. (c. 1996). The National Reconnaissance Office—Its 

Origins, Creation, & Early Years. Chantilly, VA: National 

Reconnaissance Office. 

Johnson, T., Potts, R., Hall, R. C., van Keuren, D., and Hatch, 

D. (2001). The Story of Poppy [unpublished draft manuscript]. Washington, DC: Naval Research Laboratory. 

Laurie, C. D. (2001). Congress and the National Reconnaissance Office. Chantilly, VA: National Reconnaissance 

Office. 

McDonald, R.A. (Ed.) (1997). Corona: Between the Sun & the 

Earth—The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space.

Bethesda, MD: American Society for Photogrammetry & 

Remote Sensing. 

Rand Corporation (2005). “About RAND—History and Mission,” RAND Corporation. Retrieved on 25 August 2005 

from http://www.rand.org/about/history/#origin
17 

U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA 

(2005a). “Injun 1.” In National Space Science Data Center 

(NSSDC) Master Catalog—Spacecraft. Retrieved on 

28 August 2005 from http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/tmp/1961-

015B-traj.html

U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA 

(2005b). “Transit 4A.” In National Space Science Data 

Center (NSSDC) Master Catalog—Spacecraft. Retrieved 

on 28 August 2005 from http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/database/MasterCatalog?sc=1961-015

U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, NRL (2000). GRAB—

Galactic Radiation and Background [NRL pamphlet]. 

Washington, DC: Naval Research Laboratory. 

U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, NRL (2003a). The Poppy 

System. Unpublished draft brochure, 30 April. 

U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, NRL (2003b). Proposed 

Poppy Display Panels 1 to 4 (preliminary draft display), 

23 July. 
Appendix: Grab, Poppy Launches 

Date Vehicle Site14 Mission Remarks

GRAB 

22 Jun 1960 Thor Able Star CC GRAB 1 

30 Nov 1960 Thor Able Star CC Failure 

29 Jun 1961 Thor Able Star CC GRAB 2 

24 Jan 1962 Thor Able Star CC Failure 

26 Apr 1962 Scout NMFPA Failure 

POPPY

13 Dec 1962 Thor Agena D VAFB POPPY 1 

15 Jun 1963 Thor Agena D VAFB POPPY 2 

11 Jan 1964 TAT Agena D VAFB POPPY 3 

9 Mar 1965 Thor Agena D VAFB POPPY 4 

31 May 1967 Thor Agena D VAFB POPPY 5 

30 Sep 1969 Thorad Agena D VAFB POPPY 6 

14 Dec 1971 Thorad Agena D VAFB POPPY 7 

Grab – 22 June 1960 Poppy – 14 December 1971

U.S. Air Force photos 

 14 Launch Sites: CC = Cape Canaveral, Florida; NMFPA = Naval Missile 

Facility, Point Arguello, California; VAFB = Vandenberg Air Force Base, 

California. 

18 
Grab (Photo courtesy NRL)

Poppy (Photo courtesy NRL)