Suspended in Time THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Front Cover: The view of a setting sun from the internally displaced 

person Rohingya refugee camps of Sittwe 

(Jonas Gratzer/LightRocket via Getty Images)
DECEMBER 2016

A BURMESE TRANSLATION OF THIS REPORT IS AVAILABLE AT WWW.USCIRF.GOV 

U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Suspended in Time THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA

USCIRF COMMISSIONERS

Thomas J. Reese, S.J.

Chair

Daniel Mark

James J. Zogby

Vice Chairs

Kristina Arriaga de Bucholz

Sandra Jolley

Clifford D. May

John Ruskay

Jackie Wolcott

Ambassador David N. Saperstein, ex officio, non-voting member
USCIRF PROFESSIONAL STAFF

Erin Singshinsuk, Acting Executive Director

Dwight Bashir, Co-Director for Policy and Research

Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Co-Director for Policy and Research

Judith E. Golub, Director of Government and Media Relations

Paul Liben, Executive Writer

Sahar Chaudhry, Senior Policy Analyst

Catherine Cosman, Senior Policy Analyst

Tiffany Lynch, Senior Policy Analyst

Tina L. Mufford, Senior Policy Analyst

Jomana Qaddour, Policy Analyst

Roy Haskins, Manager of Finance and Administration

Travis Horne, Government and Media Relations Specialist

Eric Snee, Travel and Administration Specialist
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Treatment of Rohingya Muslims, 2011–2016. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Recent Developments and Future Trends. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Conclusion and Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
RAKHINE

STATE

CHINA

INDIA

THAILAND

LAOS

• Mandalay

Rangoon • 

Gulf of Thailand

Andaman Sea

Bay of Bengal

BANGLADESH

BHUTAN

Maungdaw Township • 

Sittwe • 

BURMA
SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA 1

PREFACE

The U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom (USCIRF) has monitored religious 

freedom conditions in Burma (also known as 

Myanmar) since the Commission first began its work 

in 1999. The law that created USCIRF, the International 

Religious Freedom Act, instructed the Commission to, 

among other things, recommend U.S. government policies in response to religious freedom violations 

around the world. Based 

on Burma’s systematic, 

egregious, and ongoing 

violations of the freedom of religion or belief, 

USCIRF consistently 

has recommended it be 

designated as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, 

every year since the Department of State first made the 

designation in 2000. USCIRF based this recommendation on its comprehensive assessment of the situation for 

religious minority communities, and also at times the 

ill treatment of majority Buddhists, relative to international human rights standards.

As part of its monitoring, USCIRF in 2016 commissioned a research project to investigate religious 

freedom conditions for Christian communities in 

Burma. The research sought to investigate the facts and 

causes of discrimination, violence, and other abuses 

against Christians. The result of this research, called 

“Hidden Plight: Christian Minorities in Burma,” is available at www.uscirf.gov. 

In seeking to shed light on the little-known 

circumstances of Christians in Burma, USCIRF 

acknowledged the serious humanitarian crisis faced by 

Rohingya and other Muslims—and indeed all people 

in Rakhine State. The deprivation of their rights—by 

both government and societal actors—is one of the 

most profound human rights tragedies of the 21st Century. In recent years, some within and outside Burma 

have argued the Rohingya situation has nothing to do 

with religious freedom. Yet this viewpoint ignores the 

fact that while Rohingya Muslims may not be targeted entirely based on religion, they are singled out 

as different and perceived as a threat because of their 

religion and ethnicity. 

While the lengthy history of the Rohingya Muslim 

crisis is beyond the scope of this paper, an examination 

of the marked deterioration of rights under the 

previous government 

provides insight into ways 

Burma’s government can 

address the crisis and the 

international community 

can encourage and assist. 

The following policy paper 

analyzes religious freedom conditions for Rohingya 

Muslims from 2011, when President Thein Sein’s government took office, to July 7, 2016, the date marking the 

National League for Democracy (NLD) government’s 

first 100 calendar days in office.1

1 In some cases, this paper references significant events that 

occurred before or after this period.

The deprivation of [Rohingya Muslims’] 

rights—by both government and 

societal actors—is one of the most 

profound human rights 

tragedies of the 21st Century.
2 SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA

Buddhist) and ethnic Rohingya (predominantly Muslim) 

have experienced periods of both peaceful coexistence 

and ethno-religious tensions in the geographical area 

known today as Rakhine (or Arakan) State. In the absence 

of clear, well-defined borders, it is difficult to distinguish 

individuals indigenous to the area from those who for 

centuries regularly moved along the fluid western edge 

of Rakhine State. Muslims, including Rohingya Muslims, 

were among both those with organic roots to the land and 

those who commonly flowed across this porous region.

Following the 1962 coup led by General Ne Win, 

Burma’s military government maintained power 

in part through a divide-and-conquer strategy that 

pitted Buddhists, Christians, and Muslims against 

each other, and, in Rakhine State, ethnic Rakhine 

against their Rohingya 

neighbors. Reflecting 

this strategy, the government in 1982 stripped 

the Rohingya of citizenship and subsequently 

allowed violence, discrimination, and human 

rights abuses against 

Rohingya Muslims to occur with impunity.

This ill treatment continues today. For several 

reasons, however, conditions for Rohingya Muslims 

deteriorated during the presidency of Thein Sein, who 

took office following the 2010 general elections—the 

first since 1990. First, the government legislated 

new discriminatory measures—the four “race and 

religion laws”—that target Rohingya Muslims and 

other religious minorities. Second, some individuals, 

including within the government and monkhood, took 

advantage of greater freedom to advance anti-Muslim 

hatred, using Facebook and other online media to fabricate and spread rumors that incited and legitimized 

discrimination and violent acts. Third, the government rarely held accountable perpetrators or inciters 

of violence. 

INTRODUCTION

More than four years ago, two waves of sectarian violence struck Rakhine State. In the time 

since, Rohingya Muslims, Rakhine Buddhists, and individuals of other ethnicities and beliefs 

throughout the state have suffered grievous deprivations 

of basic rights, including inadequate access to food, 

water, shelter, education, and health care; restrictions 

on freedom of movement; denial of needed humanitarian aid; limited opportunities to obtain an education or 

earn a living; egregious human rights abuses resulting 

in death, injury, and displacement; and, in the case of 

Rohingya Muslims, the denial of the right to a nationality and citizenship. 

Severe poverty across Rakhine State has exacerbated the situation for all who live there. Moreover, 

ongoing attacks by Burma’s Army, the Tatmadaw, 

against the Arakan 

Army (an ethnic armed 

group) and civilians have 

displaced hundreds of 

people and condemned 

countless children into 

forced labor. It is critical 

that all affected communities in Rakhine State receive 

both domestic and international humanitarian aid to lift 

them out of poverty and neglect.

All of this has occurred under intense international 

scrutiny that—paradoxically—imposed on Burma few 

practical consequences for such a serious escalation of 

abuses. Indeed, the situation is so dire for many individuals that some have called the violations crimes against 

humanity, or even genocide. Meanwhile, Burma’s government directly and indirectly fomented a groundswell 

of sometimes violent ethnoreligious nationalism with 

strong anti-Muslim undertones, and at the same time 

shunned international criticism of its growing human 

rights abuses.

The full scale of this crisis has been decades in the 

making. Historically, ethnic Rakhine (predominantly 

It is critical that all affected 

communities in Rakhine State 

receive both domestic and international 

humanitarian aid to lift them out of 

poverty and neglect.
SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA 3

Fourth, and perhaps most significant, is the overall 

political framework in which abuses against Rohingya 

Muslims occurred. Before Thein Sein took office, the 

military-controlled government characterized the 

elections as Burma’s return to civilian rule and a critical 

element in the so-called “seven-step roadmap to democracy,”2

 which originated in 2003. The roadmap primarily 

centered around the drafting of a new national charter 

that ultimately resulted in the 2008 Constitution, still 

in effect today. That constitution, however, further 

entrenched the military’s power, and the military 

government proceeded with the national referendum 

vote shortly after the devastating Cyclone Nargis. 

Although the military outwardly stepped aside, the new 

quasi-civilian government3

 under President Thein Sein 

portrayed a façade that in practice made only nominal 

progress toward democratic norms. 

2 The seven steps, in brief, are: 1) Reconvene the National Convention to write a new constitution; 2) Implement a “genuine and 

disciplined” democratic system of government; 3) Draft a new constitution; 4) Adopt the constitution through a national referendum; 

5) Hold free and fair parliamentary elections; 6) Convene the parliament; and 7) Build a “modern, developed, and democratic nation.”

3 The resulting government was only quasi-civilian given the 

military’s enduring role in several key ministries, its embedded 

position in the parliament, and the fact that many former military 

officials merely shed their uniforms for civilian business attire. 
4 SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA

TREATMENT OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS, 2011–2016

The following chronology catalogs religious freedom violations against Rohingya Muslims and 

related political developments beginning in 2011 

with the start of the nominally civilian government, and 

ending on the 100th calendar day of the NLD government in 2016.

2011

For the 2011 calendar year, reports from both the U.S. 

Department of State and USCIRF noted ethnoreligious 

tensions between Buddhists and non-Buddhists, difficulties for Muslims in obtaining permission to build 

or repair mosques, the military’s abuse of ethnic and 

religious minorities, and the government’s restrictions 

on Rohingya Muslims, including the denial of economic, educational, and social opportunities available 

to Buddhists and the denial of citizenship. Police often 

restricted the number of Muslims allowed to gather in 

one place, and in some areas Muslims were only allowed 

to gather for worship and religious training during 

major holidays. Police and border guards continued 

inspecting mosques in Rakhine State; Na Sa Ka, Burma’s 

notorious border security force, arrested those found 

building or repairing mosques. Reportedly, Na Sa Ka 

also arrested Rohingya Muslims suspected of associating with alleged rebel groups based in Bangladesh. 

Dozens of Rohingya Muslims fled Burma by boat trying 

to reach Malaysia and Indonesia, and more than one 

thousand reportedly were arrested by Bangladeshi 

authorities when trying to cross into that country.

2012

The year 2012 was a turning point, with decades-long 

tensions turning violent. In early June 2012, violence 

broke out in Rakhine State following the rape and 

murder of a Buddhist woman by three Muslim men. In 

response, Rakhine Buddhists killed 10 Muslims; the 

violence then spread more broadly between Buddhists 

and Rohingya Muslims across four townships throughout the state. In total, dozens died (exact numbers are 

disputed), and the clashes destroyed more than 2,000 

buildings, including Rohingya and Rakhine homes and 

both Muslim mosques and Buddhist monasteries. Local 

police did not stop the initial violence; instead, they supported Rakhine groups’ ongoing attacks on Rohingya 

villages and denied international humanitarian access 

to Rohingya areas and camps. President Thein Sein 

imposed curfews and declared a state of emergency, 

placing the military in control.

In October 2012, sectarian violence reignited in 

dozens of coordinated attacks that resulted in beatings, deaths, the destruction of entire villages, and 

additional displacement of Rohingya in Rakhine State. 

Once again, witnesses reported that security forces 

failed to stop and prevent violence. Anti-Rohingya, 

anti-Muslim protestors also demonstrated both within 

and outside Rakhine State.

Together, the June and October 2012 violence in 

Rakhine State had three devastating consequences: 1) 

hundreds of people, predominantly Rohingya Muslims, 

died at the hands of aggressors, who largely have never 

been held accountable; 2) an estimated 100,000 people 

(later increasing to at least 140,000)—the vast majority 

of whom were Rohingya Muslims—became internally 

displaced in Rakhine State; and 3) the en masse flight of 

A Myanmar policeman and soldier provide security as Muslims 

gather near their refugee camp in Sittwe, capital of Rakhine 

state in western Myanmar. (AP Photo/Khin Maung Win)
SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA 5

destroyed. Other episodes of violence also occurred in 

Rangoon Region, Shan State, and Sagaing Region.

The government did hold a few perpetrators 

accountable (both Muslims and Buddhists), including 

25 individuals in connection with the violence in Meiktila and two for violence in Okkan. However, police 

and security forces who 

reportedly participated 

in anti-Muslim violence 

were not held responsible. Moreover, witnesses 

videotaped police in 

Meiktila who stood by 

as Buddhists ransacked 

and destroyed Muslims’ 

shops, and failed to intervene when several Buddhists 

chased and attacked a Muslim boy, beating and ultimately killing him with a sword. 

2014

In January 2014, violence in Du Chee Yar Tan village in 

Maungdaw Township, Rakhine State, resulted in more 

than 40 deaths. Reportedly, the violence began when 

ethnic Rakhine villagers killed eight Rohingya Muslims 

they believed were illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. 

According to reports, Rohingya villagers retaliated by 

killing a local police officer.

Intercommunal violence in Mandalay in July 2014 

resulted in the deaths of two men—one Muslim and 

one Buddhist—as well as several injuries and property damage, including the burning of a mosque and 

Rohingya Muslims from Burma—often by attempting 

the dangerous journey by sea—markedly increased. 

In November 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama 

visited Burma. In remarks at the University of Yangon, 

President Obama expressed concern about the violence 

in Rakhine State and used the term “Rohingya.”4

 Following President Obama’s visit, President Thein Sein made 

11 commitments to improve his country’s human rights 

conditions, which he reiterated when visiting the White 

House in 2013. Most human rights advocates consider 

the majority of these commitments unfulfilled by the 

time he left office on March 30, 2016. Notably, he failed 

to meet his self-imposed deadline to release all political 

prisoners by the end of 2013. 

2013

In 2013, Burma saw increasing activity by extremist 

nationalist groups, such as the 969 Movement, which 

supported anti-Muslim campaigns, including a “Buy 

Buddhist” effort that targeted Muslim-owned businesses. 

Buddhist monks and laypeople who identified with 

969’s objective to protect 

Buddhism from threats, 

including the perceived 

threat of Islam’s expansion in Burma, turned to 

anti-Muslim rhetoric and, 

at times, violence.

For example, in March 

2013, violence in Meiktila 

reportedly was sparked by an argument in a gold shop and 

the retaliatory killing of a Buddhist monk, which triggered 

violence there and elsewhere in the country as some 

Buddhists struck back. Over three days, armed mobs, 

including some Buddhist monks, burned more than 

1,500 Muslim homes in Meiktila, damaged or destroyed 

three Islamic schools and more than a dozen mosques, 

displaced thousands of people, and killed more than 100 

people. Buddhists also began targeting Muslims who were 

not Rohingya; for example, in October 2013, Buddhists 

attacked ethnic Kaman Muslims in Thandwe, resulting in at least six deaths and approximately 100 homes 

4 For more in-depth discussion of the controversy surrounding 

this term, see “Recent Developments and Future Trends” later in 

this paper.

Muslims worship in a refugee camp near Sittwe, capital of 

Myanmar’s western state of Rakhine, in June 2013, where 

Rohingya Muslim people started to live after a conflict with 

Buddhists in June 2012. (Kyodo via AP Images)

In 2013, Burma saw increasing activity 

by extremist nationalist groups, 

such as the 969 Movement, which 

supported anti-Muslim campaigns. . . .
6 SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA

several Qur’ans inside. A blog post about an alleged rape 

sparked the incident; the post was circulated online 

and posted to nationalist Buddhist monk U Ashin 

Wirathu’s Facebook page, though it was later proven 

to be fabricated. Notably, the violence could have been 

much worse had it not been for the government-imposed city-wide curfew and the efforts of the Mandalay 

Peace Keeping Committee, a non-governmental group 

comprising religious and community leaders of various 

faiths, and others who intervened during the riots.

President Obama 

again visited Burma in 

November 2014, coinciding with the annual 

meetings of the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN), 

which Burma chaired in 

2014. Ahead of President 

Obama’s visit, the Administration announced it 

was placing parliamentarian Aung Thaung on the list of “specially designated 

nationals” for his role in undermining reforms in 

Burma, including actions that inflamed religious and 

ethnic tensions, such as violence against Muslims. Aung 

Thaung died of natural causes in July 2015.

In late 2014, Burma’s government introduced the 

Rakhine State Action Plan, which, among other things, 

called for a verification process to determine Muslims’ 

eligibility for citizenship pursuant to the 1982 Citizenship Act. Rohingya Muslims, as well as other Muslims 

whom officials alleged to be Rohingya, were forced to 

identify as “Bengali” to apply for citizenship. Under 

the plan, Muslims unwilling to reclassify their identity 

as Bengali or unable to produce required documents 

would be confined indefinitely in camps with limited 

rights, mobility, and access to services. A pilot program 

in Myebon Township resulted in more than 1,000 applications, with more than 200 applicants (most of whom 

reportedly were Kaman Muslim) deemed eligible for full 

citizenship, and more than 160 eligible for naturalized 

citizenship after identifying as Bengali. Following protests from some Rakhine Buddhists, the pilot program 

was suspended, though the government did attempt to 

revive it on several occasions.

2015

In 2015, as elections approached, the government enacted 

a package of “race and religion” laws,5

 each of which 

discriminates against and restricts the religious freedom 

of non-Buddhists, particularly Muslims, and diminishes women’s rights. The laws—regulating religious 

conversions, marriages, and births—were advanced by 

a network led by nationalist Buddhist monks from the 

Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion, also 

known as Ma Ba Tha. Each of the four measures intentionally was signed into 

law before Election Day to 

garner Buddhist support at 

the polls.

There were other ways 

in which extreme nationalists capitalized on the 

election season to stoke 

religious tensions. Some 

political and Buddhist 

leaders expressed intolerance toward Muslims, 

labeling candidates and political parties “pro-Muslim” as 

a means to siphon away support and votes. 

The elections also provided the government justification to deny Rohingya Muslims their political rights. 

First, the government revoked voting rights for individuals with temporary ID cards, also known as “white 

cards.” The majority of the estimated 700,000–800,000 

white card holders were Rohingya Muslims, most of 

whom had voting rights in previous elections. President 

Thein Sein announced all white cards would expire at 

the end of March 2015 and ordered them turned over to 

authorities by the end of May. This not only revoked the 

voting rights of white card holders, but also eliminated 

many individuals’ only form of identification. 

Additionally, officials in Rakhine State and at the 

Union Election Commission denied Rohingya Muslims 

the right to run for office in the 2015 elections. The then 

opposition NLD chose not to field any Muslim candidates. A small handful of other Muslim candidates, none 

Rohingya, ran nationwide. None were successful in 

5 The four laws are: Religious Conversion Law, Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law (also known as the Interfaith Marriage 

Law), Monogamy Law, and Population Control Healthcare Law.

In 2015, as elections approached, 

the government enacted a package 

of “race and religion” laws, each of 

which discriminates against and 

restricts the religious freedom of 

non-Buddhists, particularly Muslims, 

and diminishes women’s rights.
SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA 7

winning a seat, marking the first time Muslims have no 

representation in the national parliament.

In 2015, the Rohingya Muslim refugee crisis drew 

international attention. Following the discovery in May 

2015 of mass graves in Thailand and Malaysia, a regionwide crackdown on trafficking and people-smuggling 

routes left stranded countless boats carrying at least 

5,000 individuals, many 

of whom were Rohingya 

Muslims fleeing Burma. 

Thousands eventually 

landed in Malaysia and 

Indonesia, though many 

died during the journey, 

and the whereabouts of 

many others have never 

been determined. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a combined 31,000 

Rohingya Muslims and Bangladeshis fled Burma and 

Bangladesh by boat during the first half of 2015, a 34 percent increase over 2014. 

JANUARY–JULY 7, 2016

The first part of 2016 marked the transition from Thein 

Sein’s government to the new NLD government. However, the ill treatment of Rohingya Muslims continued 

unabated. In January, nationalist Buddhist monk and 

Ma Ba Tha figurehead Ashin Wirathu posted a video 

on Facebook reenacting the tragic rape and murder 

of a woman whose death sparked the June 2012 violence in Rakhine State; Facebook blocked the video on 

February 1, 2016. Wirathu reportedly stated the video 

was intended to warn the new NLD government that it 

should prioritize race and religion, by which he meant 

Burman Buddhists.

On March 21, 2016, UNHCR reported that some 

Rohingya Muslims had returned to the communities 

from which they escaped following the 2012 violence in 

Rakhine State. Approximately 25,000 out of more than 

140,000 are believed to have returned. However, this 

means 120,000–125,000 Rohingya Muslims remain in 

deplorable camps, and some human rights advocates 

contend that not all those who returned did so voluntarily. UNHCR also reported fewer Rohingya Muslims 

and other asylum seekers departing Burma in the first 

few months of 2016. 

On March 17, 2016, the U.S. Department of State 

issued the “Atrocities Prevention Report” mandated 

by P.L. 114-113 to describe violence against religious 

and ethnic groups in the Middle East and Burma. With 

respect to Rohingya Muslims in Burma, the report 

underscored pervasive 

governmental discrimination and the role 

of nonstate actors in 

perpetrating violence. 

The report also noted the 

imperative for Burma’s 

government to address 

the myriad human rights 

abuses in Rakhine State. 

The same day, the UN 

Human Rights Council adopted the report from Burma’s 

second Universal Periodic Review, though Burma’s 

government rejected every recommendation pertaining 

to Rohingya Muslims. 

On March 29, 2016, outgoing President Thein Sein 

lifted the state of emergency in Rakhine State that had 

been in place since the first wave of violence in June 2012. 

However, reports indicate local authorities in many locations continue to restrict the movements of those forced 

to live in camps for internally displaced persons.

On April 19, 2016, a boat traveling from Pauktaw 

Township in Rakhine State sank off the coast of Sittwe, 

the state capital, killing more than 20 people, including nine children. Most of the individuals on the boat 

reportedly came from a camp for internally displaced 

Muslim Rohingya people in the Myebon Internally Displaced 

Persons (IDP) camp in Myebon township in the western Myanmar Rakhine state. (AFP PHOTO/ Soe Than WIN)

With respect to Rohingya Muslims 

in Burma, the [U.S. Department of 

State’s Atrocities Prevention Report] 

underscored pervasive governmental 

discrimination and the role of nonstate 

actors in perpetrating violence.
8 SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA

persons in Sin Tet Maw, where state authorities restrict 

their movement and limit access to basic necessities. In 

response to the accident, the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon 

issued a statement expressing concern and sadness about 

the tragic loss of life and extending “condolences to the 

families of the victims, who local reports state were from 

the Rohingya community,” as was believed at the time. 

Subsequent reports suggested those aboard the boat 

may have been Kaman, a distinct, largely Muslim ethnic 

group. Both ethnic Rohingya and ethnic Kaman primarily reside in Rakhine State and experience harassment, 

discrimination, and other forms of ill treatment based 

on their ethnoreligious identity. Notwithstanding the 

identity of the victims of the April 19 accident, some in 

Burma took umbrage with the U.S. Embassy’s use of the 

term “Rohingya.” On April 28, 2016, hundreds of nationalist protestors, including Buddhist monks and supporters 

of the extreme nationalist group Ma Ba Tha, staked out 

the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon. On May 3, 2016, Burma’s 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated publicly that it preferred 

the U.S. Embassy avoid using the term. 

On May 31, 2016, the President’s Office announced 

the Central Committee for Implementation of Peace and 

Development in Rakhine State, led by State Counsellor 

Aung San Suu Kyi and tasked with developing plans to 

address that state’s poverty. Members of the committee 

soon visited Rakhine State to assess conditions.

On June 7, 2016, state-level officials commenced a 

revised citizenship verification plan in three townships 

of Rakhine State: Ponnagyun, Kyaukphyu, and Myebon. 

Earlier in the year, a Rakhine member of parliament, 

Khin Saw Wai, urged the legislative body to address 

the citizenship issue in order to document Rohingya 

Muslims, who she and others believe are illegal immigrants, and restrict their return to Burma should they 

leave. Unlike the 2014 citizenship verification process 

that forced Rohingya and many Kaman Muslims to 

identify as Bengali, this process eliminated ethnicity 

and religion identifiers. However, Rohingya Muslims 

in Ponnagyun refused to participate unless allowed to 

identify as Rohingya Muslim. Individuals who enroll in 

the verification program are issued blue identity cards 

known as National Verification Certificates, or NVCs, 

and are then scrutinized at the township, state, and 

central government levels to determine their eligibility 

for citizenship.

In June 2016, Burma’s Ministry of Information 

instructed state media to refer to Rohingya Muslims as 

“the Muslim community in Rakhine State” during the 

visit of UN Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee.

A group of Buddhist monks protest against the United States 

for its use of the term Rohingya to describe Myanmar’s stateless Muslim community outside the U.S. Embassy in Yangon, 

Myanmar. (REUTERS/Soe Zeya Tun)
SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA 9

S

everal key events occurred after the period covered 

by this paper that bear mentioning. First, following 

comments by Rangoon Chief Minister Phyo Min 

Thein questioning the necessity of Ma Ba Tha, on July 

12, 2016, the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (the 

official monk-led association, also known by the acronym Ma Ha Na) publicly declared it had never endorsed 

Ma Ba Tha and asserted its own position as the only 

sangha association that represents all of Burma’s Buddhists. This position was echoed by government officials 

whom USCIRF staff met in Naypyidaw in August 2016. In 

addition, a charity organization called Thet Daw Saunt 

filed a defamation lawsuit against Wirathu over his 2015 

insults targeting UN Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee 

after she criticized Burma’s four race and religion laws.

Second, on July 21, 2016, the Ministry of Labor, 

Immigration and Population released the long-delayed 

religion data from the 2014 national census. Despite many 

predictions, the country’s Muslim population did not 

dramatically increase, even when accounting for the estimated 1.09 million people in Rakhine State who were not 

counted and are presumed to be Muslim. Over the years, 

some within the Buddhist community who sought to 

deny rights to Rohingya Muslims pointed to a presumed 

increase in the country’s Muslim population to justify 

their brutal words and actions. However, the government’s own census figures discredited these claims.

Third, on August 23, 2016, the State Counsellor’s 

Office under the direction of Aung San Suu Kyi announced 

it would establish a nine-member Advisory Commission 

on Rakhine State led by former UN Secretary General 

Kofi Annan. The Advisory Commission, which made a 

preliminary visit to Rakhine State in September, is tasked 

with reviewing the development and humanitarian needs 

in the state and making recommendations to the government. Some in Rakhine State, including members of the 

Arakan National Party and civil society, have expressed 

strong dissatisfaction with the Advisory Commission, 

largely because it includes three foreigners, including 

Annan. In response to critics, Annan publicly clarified 

that the commission’s mandate will not include a human 

rights investigation or report. By excluding Rohingya 

Muslims from the commission (as well as from the Union 

Peace Conference-21st Century Panglong) and by excluding human rights from the Advisory Commission’s review, 

it seems unlikely the community’s concerns and plight 

will be adequately addressed.

Lastly, on October 9, 2016, a large group of assailants 

believed to be Rohingya Muslims carried out a series of 

attacks in and around Maungdaw Township in Rakhine State, targeting Border Guard Police and other law 

enforcement facilities. Several dozen people—including 

police officers—were killed in the attacks and lingering 

violence and thousands more displaced. Media reports 

documented retaliatory attacks against Rohingya 

Muslims, including allegations of arbitrary arrests, 

extrajudicial killings, arson, and rape; Burma’s government has raised doubts about several of these reports. In 

early November, an international delegation, including 

U.S. Ambassador Scot Marciel, visited northern Rakhine 

State, though did not visit all the affected areas. At the 

time of this writing, the government’s investigations 

into the attacks were ongoing. If individuals identifying 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE TRENDS

Armed Myanmar army soldiers patrol a village in Maungdaw 

located in Rakhine State as security operations continue following the October 9, 2016 attacks by armed militant Muslims. The 

United Nations called for an investigation into claims Myanmar 

troops have been killing civilians and torching villages in northern Rakhine, as reports emerged thousands of Rohingya had 

been forced from their homes. (STR/AFP/Getty Images) 
10 SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA

as Rohingya Muslims are found to be responsible, then 

the Union and Rakhine State governments should look 

closely at their policies of repression that likely have 

fueled resentment, and in this case possible extremism, 

among some Rohingya Muslims. Perpetrators of any 

subsequent violence—whether civilian or military/law 

enforcement—must be held accountable. Thus far, the 

governments’ responses appear to tighten restrictions 

and further deny rights, particularly access to humanitarian aid; at the time of this writing, humanitarian 

assistance was just beginning to resume.

One hurdle neither the Union or Rakhine State 

government can sidestep is the controversy over using 

the terms Rohingya and Bengali. Thus far, much of the 

focus regarding Rohingya Muslims has been about the 

terms—perhaps an intentional maneuver by those who 

seek to inflame tensions and avoid addressing the crisis’ 

root causes. 

The dispute over terminology has come to symbolize increasingly sharp divisions between tolerance and 

intolerance. The international community’s use of the 

term Rohingya is highly 

controversial within 

Burma, and in June 2016, 

Burma’s Ministry of Information instructed state 

media to refer to the group 

as “the Muslim community in Rakhine State” 

rather than Rohingya. The 

previous government referred to the community as Bengali, implying they are foreigners and illegal immigrants 

who moved to Burma post-independence. The current 

government avoids the terms Rohingya and Bengali 

altogether. These positions reflect the central and state 

governments’ existing policies and practices that either 

specifically target Rohingya and other Muslims for discrimination, violence, or other crimes, or fail to address 

the actions of nonstate actors perpetrating these abuses.

USCIRF recognizes the strong sentiments tied 

to the use of the terms Rohingya and Bengali and the 

historical significance associated with each term. Those 

who do not believe Rohingya are true inhabitants of 

Burma eligible for citizenship refer to them as Bengali, 

which is considered an inflammatory and derogatory 

term. On the other hand, many, including USCIRF, 

strongly believe in the right of Rohingya Muslims to 

individually and collectively identify as they choose, 

even though doing so upsets those who believe the term 

infers indigeneity upon a community not legally recognized among Burma’s ethnic groups. 

The use of the term Rohingya, however, should not 

distract from the underlying challenges at the root of 

the humanitarian crisis facing this community. Identity—and the factors that contribute to an individual’s or 

group’s relationship to an identity—are complicated and 

fluid. Those who oppose or challenge the identity of a 

group do not by that act diminish or terminate anyone’s 

ability or right to associate with that identity. Removing 

certain terminology from the lexicon may appear to be a 

diplomatically cautious way to avoid provoking tensions, but it is also a form of compulsory censorship that 

violates the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights’ Article 19. 

Using or not using divisive terms such as Rohingya 

and Bengali is one thing; exploiting them for political gain 

or to deny individuals or communities basic freedoms 

and rights is inhumane 

and unconscionable. 

Imposing perpetual statelessness and depredation 

upon the Rohingya community, for example, is not 

only cruel but also in clear 

violation of international 

human rights standards. 

Regardless of the terms it uses, Burma’s government must 

address the dire conditions for all in Rakhine State swiftly 

and impartially, to end not only the widespread and devastating poverty affecting all residents but also what some 

have called an apartheid-like situation, ethnic cleansing, 

or genocide against Rohingya Muslims. Over the last 

five-and-a-half years, two successive governments have 

allowed the already deplorable conditions for Rohingya 

Muslims to deteriorate to the point of dehumanization. 

Terminology cannot be the excuse that further delays 

immediate action.

One hurdle neither the Union or 

Rakhine State government can 

sidestep is the controversy over using 

the terms Rohingya and Bengali.
SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA 11

The new government notwithstanding, Burma’s 

ongoing transition to democracy is imperiled 

by previous governments’ repeated failures on 

human rights, including religious freedom and tolerance. The country also remains the scene of unrelenting 

ethnic conflicts and pervasive discrimination against 

religious and ethnic minorities. 

Rohingya Muslims are at the epicenter of this ill 

treatment: government-directed abuses and/or government indifference to riots and mob violence against 

Rohingya and other Muslims have killed hundreds, 

displaced thousands, and destroyed hundreds of religious properties, including religious sites, since 2012. 

Burma’s transition, both between different 

governing parties and to a more democratic form of 

government, presents many priorities that require 

urgent attention. In any society, competing interests 

can cause tensions; 

whereas some disagreements may snarl the 

legislative and policy 

process, others can turn 

violent, particularly 

when persons or groups 

seek to elevate by force 

one ideology and/or faith 

over all others. In the 

case of the latter, political 

or societal forces often 

appeal to sectarianism to achieve political ends or 

amass more power. USCIRF has seen such political 

aspirations motivate and enable extremist and nationalist groups to target other religious communities, 

leading to greater intolerance in society, including 

grave violations of religious freedom. Extremist and 

nationalist elements achieve this by stoking underlying antipathies toward or divisions between religious 

communities. Ultimately, such political and societal 

drivers can prompt mass movements of people fleeing 

persecution. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In short, the Rohingya crisis exists not just because 

Rohingya Muslims in Burma are being denied their 

rights, including religious freedom; there also is a strategic and malicious political dynamic at play, one that 

has not vanished simply because the 2015 elections are 

over. If the NLD government aspires to a true democratic form of government that respects and protects 

universal human rights, it must take bold, decisive, 

and immediate steps to change the current trajectory 

for Rohingya Muslims. 

This includes: signing and ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; improving 

access to humanitarian aid in Rakhine State where 

Rohingya Muslims and others are displaced, restricted 

from movement, or denied basic services; inviting 

the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief to visit and allowing the UN High Commissioner 

for Human Rights to 

open a country office to 

assess the human rights 

violations against all 

individuals in Rakhine 

State; ceasing the criminalization of the peaceful 

exercise or expression 

of religion or belief; and 

doing away with discriminatory policies, practices, 

and laws – especially the 

1982 Citizenship Law that marginalizes and excludes 

Rohingya Muslims. In addition, the government should 

consider ways to formally include Rohingya Muslims 

in governing processes, such as by engaging them in 

the 21st Century Panglong discussion about national 

reconciliation. 

The U.S. government, in turn, must continue to raise 

with Burma’s government concerns about Rohingya 

Muslims’ human rights. Efforts should include supporting interfaith collaborations, in which Rohingya 

Muslims also participate, especially at the grassroots 

If the NLD government aspires to a 

true democratic form of government 

that respects and protects 

universal human rights, 

it must take bold, decisive, and 

immediate steps to change the current 

trajectory for Rohingya Muslims.
12 SUSPENDED IN TIME THE ONGOING PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA

level; advocating for improved access to humanitarian 

aid in Rakhine State; encouraging religious freedom 

advocacy among non-traditional audiences, such as the 

business community and the media; urging the government of Burma to cease punishing expression deemed 

blasphemous, defamatory of religion, or contemptuous 

or insulting to religion; and using the term Rohingya, 

both publicly and privately, which respects the right of 

Rohingya Muslims to identify as they choose. Additionally, in lieu of sanctions, the U.S. government should 

apply section 604(a) of the International Religious 

Freedom Act to deny visas to or admission into the 

United States to individuals responsible for or known to 

have directly carried out particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom. 

Rohingya Muslims face a difficult day-to-day existence with little ability to honor their past, prosper in the 

present, or make plans for their future. They are suspended in time, largely unable to create a better life for 

themselves or their children. It is a moral imperative for 

the United States and the international community to 

impress upon Burma through every appropriate point of 

leverage that neither time, nor the judgment of history, 

will reflect kindly on the new government if it chooses to 

procrastinate in addressing this ever-growing crisis.

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite A714

Washington, D.C. 20401

www.uscirf.gov

Telephone: (202) 523–3240, Fax: (202) 523–5020

email: media@uscirf.gov