Filed 3/19/14 In re D.A. CA6 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

In re D.A., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

 H040052 

 (Santa Cruz County 

 Super. Ct. No. DP002759) 

SANTA CRUZ COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

M.A., 

Defendant and Appellant. 

 Appellant M.A. is the father of D.A., the girl who is the subject of this dependency 

proceeding. Appellant appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional 

orders, making the following arguments: there was insufficient evidence to support the 

dependency petition’s allegation regarding his substance abuse, the juvenile court erred in 

requiring him to submit to substance abuse assessment and testing as part of his case 

plan, and the juvenile court erred in ordering D.A. removed from his physical custody. 

As set forth below, we will affirm. 
2 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 On May 23, 2013, the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (hereafter 

“the Department”) filed a dependency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 300, subdivision (b). There were four allegations in the petition, all of which 

alleged that 9-year-old D.A. was in danger of physical and emotional harm. Paragraph b1 alleged that appellant repeatedly beat D.A.’s mother, L.G. (hereafter “mother”), in 

D.A.’s presence, and that appellant threatened D.A. on an occasion when D.A. tried to 

stop the violence. Paragraph b-2 alleged that mother had a history of neglecting D.A. 

“due to . . . chronic substance abuse.” Paragraph b-3 alleged that appellant had a “pattern 

of poor impulse control, violent conduct and substance abuse.” Paragraph b-4 alleged 

that mother “minimize[d] the abuse in the home and has failed to take measures to protect 

[D.A.] from the repeated exposure to domestic violence.” The Department’s 

jurisdiction/disposition report recommended that the juvenile court assert jurisdiction, 

place D.A. in out-of-home care, and order family reunification services. 

 On July 12, 2013, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing. At the hearing, the juvenile court admitted the jurisdiction/disposition report and 

an addendum to that report into evidence. 

 The jurisdiction/disposition report stated that mother tested positive for marijuana 

when she gave birth to D.A. in October 2003. The report noted that mother abused 

prescription drugs between 2003 and 2013. 

 The jurisdiction/disposition report stated that appellant engaged in a confrontation 

at D.A.’s school in November 2012. Appellant was angry that D.A. had been removed 

from an afterschool program, and he yelled at a teacher in the presence of students. He 

also yelled at the school principal and threatened her. He shouted obscenities in the 

school’s hallway and parking lot. His conduct resulted in a lockdown of the school, and 

the school superintendent ordered him to stay away from the school for 14 days. 
3 

Appellant later telephoned the principal and left a message stating that “she would pay 

for this.” 

 The jurisdiction/disposition report described another incident at D.A.’s school that 

occurred on May 21, 2013. During this incident, appellant approached a student and 

confronted her about her actions toward D.A. Appellant’s conduct made the student feel 

afraid. The school superintendent determined that appellant’s conduct “disrupted the 

orderly operation of” the school and was likely to cause “negative emotional trauma on 

the part of the student.” Pursuant to Penal Code section 626.4, the superintendent 

ordered appellant to stay away from the school and to refrain from communicating with 

school personnel and students. 

 The jurisdiction/disposition report stated that D.A. spoke with the school principal 

and police officers after the incident on May 21, 2013. D.A. described a long history of 

domestic violence between appellant and mother. She explained that the violence 

occurred “all the time” and had been happening “since [she] was little.” She noted that 

appellant gets very angry, and that appellant hits mother because of her addiction to pills. 

 D.A. told the principal and police officers that appellant beat mother on 

May 18, 2013. During the incident, D.A. was at the family home with appellant and 

mother. D.A. heard mother scream, and D.A. ran into the kitchen to check on mother. 

Mother was crying, and D.A. saw that mother’s face was swollen. It appeared that 

appellant had struck mother in the face. The day after the beating, mother told D.A., 

“[O]ne day he is going to kill me.” Police officers spoke with mother on May 21, 2013, 

and they observed bruising on mother’s cheek and shin. 

 D.A. also told the principal and police officers about an incident that occurred in 

December 2012. During that incident, appellant and mother argued at home, and 

appellant tried to put a rope around mother’s neck. Mother tried to get away, but 

appellant placed the rope over mother’s forehead. It appeared that appellant was 
4 

attempting to hang mother. D.A. hit appellant in order to stop him. Appellant told D.A., 

“If you hit me again, that is the last thing you will ever do.” D.A. told the principal and 

the police officers that appellant’s threat made her feel afraid. She also told the principal 

and the police officers that she feared appellant might hurt her. 

 The jurisdiction/disposition report described appellant’s history of drug-related 

and alcohol-related convictions and arrests. He was convicted of possession of a 

controlled substance and being under the influence of a controlled substance in 1987. In 

1988 and 1998, he was again convicted of being under the influence of a controlled 

substance. He was arrested for being under the influence of a controlled substance in 

1997 and 1999. In 2011, he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, a 

breath test at the hospital following the arrest showed that he had a blood-alcohol content 

of .08 percent, and the arrest resulted in a plea of nolo contendere to the crime of reckless 

driving. 

 The addendum to the jurisdiction/disposition report stated that appellant had 

engaged in “pharmacological attempts at pain management.” It also stated that appellant 

engaged in “continued use of marijuana after its use was no longer medically supported.” 

 Mother testified at the hearing. She explained that she and appellant were 

married, that they were still a couple, and that they were “working to get [their] family 

back together.” Mother attended Narcotics Anonymous meetings, and she was willing to 

participate in outpatient treatment for her substance abuse. She moved out of the family 

home before the hearing, and she explained that she would not return to the family home 

until she became stable in her sobriety. She admitted that appellant hit her in the face, 

but she denied that appellant had tried to place a noose around her neck. She testified 

that it was her fault that the family was engaged in dependency proceedings, and that she 

wanted the juvenile court to place D.A. with appellant in the family home. 
5 

 Appellant also testified at the hearing. He testified that he and mother had a 

“tumultuous” relationship and “always” fought about mother’s substance abuse. He 

admitted that he had pushed mother, but he denied that he had ever hit mother. Appellant 

explained, “I have like zero domestic violence on my record.” He also explained, “I 

really don’t get angry that easy.” 

 Appellant testified that he took prescription pain killers due to a medical 

condition. He testified that mother had previously accessed his medications, and that he 

currently locked up his medications so that mother could not access them. 

 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found that all of the allegations 

in the dependency petition were true. It accordingly sustained the dependency petition 

and asserted jurisdiction over D.A. It ordered D.A. to be removed from the physical 

custody of her parents, granted appellant and mother reunification services, and 

scheduled a six-month review hearing. As part of the dispositional order, the juvenile 

court adopted the Department’s recommended case plan, which included terms requiring 

appellant to complete a drug and alcohol assessment and to participate in drug and 

alcohol testing upon reasonable suspicion. 

 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

I. The Dependency Petition’s Allegation Regarding Appellant’s Substance Abuse 

Allegation b-3 of the dependency petition alleged that appellant had a “pattern of 

poor impulse control, violent conduct and substance abuse” that impacted his ability to 

care for D.A. Appellant contends that we must reverse the juvenile court’s true finding 

on the substance abuse component of allegation b-3, arguing that there was no evidence 

that his drug or alcohol consumption affected his ability to care for D.A. Appellant has 

failed to make an argument that warrants our consideration. 
6 

 “When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a 

minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the 

juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for 

jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In 

such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged 

statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 

171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) An “appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary 

support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been found to 

be supported by the evidence.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492.) An 

appellate court will not consider an issue raised by a father if the appellate court “cannot 

render any relief to Father that would have a practical, tangible impact on his position in 

the dependency proceeding.” (Ibid.) 

 Here, appellant concedes that allegations b-1, b-2, and b-4 of the dependency 

petition were supported by substantial evidence, and that the juvenile court properly 

asserted jurisdiction over D.A. based on those allegations. Thus, even if we were to 

conclude that insufficient evidence supported allegation b-3, we would still affirm the 

juvenile court’s jurisdictional order. (In re Alexis E., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 451.) 

Moreover, our reversal of the true finding regarding appellant’s substance abuse would 

have no impact on any other aspect of the dependency proceeding. Contrary to 

appellant’s assertion, reversal of the true finding would not require us to strike the 

substance abuse terms from his case plan. (See In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 

Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006 [dispositional order requiring father to submit to drug and 

alcohol testing was proper, even though dependency petition’s allegation regarding 

substance abuse was not proven].) Although appellant asserts that the true finding 

regarding his substance abuse has the “potential to infect future proceedings,” he fails to 

identify any future consequences of the finding. (See In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 
7 

at pp.1494-1495 [where father argued jurisdictional finding “might have some 

consequence in a future dependency or family law proceeding,” but failed to suggest any 

way in which the finding could actually affect a future proceeding, appellate court 

refused to review sufficiency of evidence supporting finding].) Accordingly, because we 

cannot render any effective relief, we will not consider appellant’s argument regarding 

the substance abuse component of allegation b-3. (See id. at pp. 1487-1488 [“Because 

Father’s contentions, even if accepted, would not justify a reversal of the court’s 

jurisdictional ruling or the grant of any other effective relief, we decline to address 

them . . . .”].) 

II. Substance Abuse Terms in Appellant’s Case Plan 

 A term of appellant’s case plan requires him to complete “a drug and alcohol 

assessment.” Another term of appellant’s case plan requires him to “participate in drug 

and alcohol testing” upon “reasonable suspicion.” Appellant asserts that the juvenile 

court erred in ordering him to comply with the foregoing terms because there was no 

showing that his drug and alcohol consumption “impacted his ability to care for D.A.” 

He accordingly requests that we strike the terms from his case plan. We find no error and 

will not strike the terms. 

 “At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court must order child welfare services 

for the minor and the minor’s parents to facilitate reunification of the family.” (In re 

Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006, citing Welf. and Inst. Code, § 361.5, 

subd. (a) [“whenever a child is removed from a parent’s . . . custody, the juvenile court 

shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services” to the child and the 

parents].) The juvenile court “has broad discretion to determine what would best serve 

and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this 

discretion.” (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006.) “We cannot 
8 

reverse the [juvenile] court’s determination in this regard absent a clear abuse of 

discretion.” (Ibid.) 

 “Our courts have recognized that severe measures are necessary to prevent drug 

usage from undermining the prospect of the successful reunification of families.” (In re 

Neil D. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 219, 225.) Where the record demonstrates that a father 

has a substance abuse problem, a dispositional order requiring drug and alcohol testing is 

proper. (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1007-1008.) Such an order is 

appropriate even if a dependency petition allegation regarding substance abuse has not 

been proven and the substance abuse has “not yet affected [the father’s] ability to care 

for” the child. (Id. at p. 1006, 1008.) 

 Here, the record demonstrates that appellant had a substance abuse problem. He 

was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and a breath test showed that he 

had been driving with a blood alcohol content of .08 percent. He used marijuana, even 

though the drug was not medically required. He had several convictions and arrests for 

being under the influence of a controlled substance, and he had a conviction for 

possession of a controlled substance. At the time of the jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing, he was taking prescription pain medications. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, it 

is of no consequence that there was no evidence showing the effect of his drug and 

alcohol consumption on his ability to care for D.A. (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1008.) Accordingly, because the record shows that appellant had a 

substance abuse problem, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering him to 

complete a drug and alcohol assessment and to participate in drug and alcohol testing. 

(See generally id. at pp. 1006-1008 [no abuse of discretion in ordering father to submit to 

drug and alcohol testing where father had arrests and convictions for driving under the 

influence and a blood test showed that father had used methamphetamine].) 
9 

III. Order Removing D.A. From Appellant’s Physical Custody 

 Appellant asserts that the juvenile court erred in ordering D.A. removed from his 

physical custody because there was “no substantial evidence . . . that D.A. needed to be 

removed from [his] custody to be protected.” He accordingly requests that we reverse the 

order removing D.A. from his physical custody. We conclude that substantial evidence 

supports the removal order, and that reversal of the removal order is not required. 

 As part of the dispositional order in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court 

must direct where the child will live. (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169.) To 

order a child physically removed from her parent’s custody, the juvenile court “must find, 

by clear and convincing evidence, the child would be at substantial risk of harm if 

returned home and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected 

without removal.” (In re R.V., Jr. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 849.) “The parent need 

not be dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed before removal is 

appropriate.” (Ibid.) “The focus . . . is on averting harm to the child.” (In re T.V. (2013) 

217 Cal.App.4th 126, 136.) 

 We review the juvenile court’s dispositional order for substantial evidence. (In re 

R.V., Jr., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 849.) “ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence, our review requires that all reasonable inferences be given to support the 

findings and orders of the juvenile court and the record must be viewed in the light most 

favorable to those orders.’ ” (In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733.) 

 Here, the evidence showed that appellant had an anger management problem and 

was prone to violent and threatening conduct. When he became angry about D.A.’s 

removal from an afterschool program, he shouted at a teacher and the principal, yelled 

obscenities on the school campus, and threatened the principal. He frequently beat 

mother, prompted by mother’s use of prescription pills. When D.A. attempted to prevent 

appellant from hanging mother, appellant threatened to physically harm D.A. 
10 

Appellant’s threat to D.A. made D.A. feel scared, and D.A. feared that appellant might 

hurt her. Despite the evidence showing appellant’s tendency to engage in domestic 

violence and angry outbursts, appellant denied engaging in domestic violence and denied 

that he angered easily. Appellant’s threat to D.A., combined with his history of violence 

and inability to recognize his anger problem, demonstrated that D.A. was at substantial 

risk of physical harm in appellant’s presence. We therefore conclude that there was 

sufficient evidence that D.A. would be at substantial risk of harm if placed in appellant’s 

custody and sufficient evidence that D.A. could not be protected without removal from 

appellant’s custody. We accordingly must affirm the dispositional order removing D.A. 

from appellant’s physical custody. (See In re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 136-

137 [substantial evidence supported dispositional order removing child from father’s 

physical custody where the father engaged in a pattern of domestic violence and “had not 

successfully addressed his anger issues”].) 
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

 ______________________________________ 

 RUSHING, P.J. 

WE CONCUR: 

____________________________________ 

PREMO, J. 

____________________________________ 

MÁRQUEZ, J.