### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 21, 200 4 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. HOWA RD LA VEL LE TA TE

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2002-B-1018 Steve Dozier , Judge

No. M2003- 02418-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Dece m ber 16, 2004

The De fenda nt, Howar d L avelle T ate, wa s pulled over by a Metropolitan Police Offic er in Nashville, Tenne ssee for vi olating the noise ordinanc e. The officer asked the Def endant f or conse nt to searc h the De fe nd a nt’ s p e rs on a ndth e D e f e n d an t ’s ve hic le . T he De fe nd a nt r e pli e d “ wh a te ve r” to b oththe se reque sts. The offic er f

ound scale s with a white powde r re s idue in the Def endant’ s vehicle. The De fe nd a nt the n f

le d th e of fi c e r. Th e of

fi c e r an d a sec on d off

ic e r c a ug ht the De fe nd a nt w ho the n to ld the offic ers that they

could find the drug s in his pants leg. The office rs re trieved the drug s and place d the Def

endant unde r ar

rest. The Def

endant f iled a motion to suppress the evidenc e found a s

a re su lt o f the wa

rr a ntl e ss s e arc he s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt de nie d thi s mot ion

. Th e De fe nd a nt ple d g uil ty to possession of over .5 g rams of c ocaine , a Class B f el o n y , b u t reserved a

certified question

c on c e rn ing wh e the r the wa rr a ntl e ss s e arc he s f

e ll w ith in an e xce pti on to the wa rr a nt r e qu ir eme nt. Th e De fe nd a nt n ow app e a ls o n th e ba sis of the c e rt if ie d q ue sti on . We f

indthat th e se arc he s f

e ll wi thi n a n e xce pti on to the wa rr a nt r e qu ir e me nt anda ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J
., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

Dwig ht E. Scott, Nashville, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Howar d L avelle T ate.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. Johnson, District Attorney Gene ral; and Pamela Ander son, Assistant D istrict At torney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.-2- OP IN ION

Fa ctual B ackg round

On Octobe r 14, 2001 at 8:15 p.m., Off icer Shariff Ma llory

had just fi n i s h ed a call on Dicker son Road in Nashville, when he saw a van pass in fr ont of h i m at an int erse ction near Dicker son Road. The va n, driven by the Def endant, wa s in a reside ntial n ei gh b orhood and the volume of the music in the van was so loud that O ffice r Mallory could hear it f rom 150 to 200 fee t

away . Offic er Ma llory

pulled over the Def

endant. Of

fice r Mallory

told the Defe ndant he wa s pu lli ng him

ov e r b e c a us e of the vo lum e of his mus ic a nd a sk e d fo r the De fe nd a nt’ s d ri ve r’ s li c e ns e and reg istration. Offic er Mallory returne d to his police car and ran a check o f t h e D efe ndant’s drive r’ s li c e ns e a nd dis c ov e re d tha t the De fe nd a nt ha d a cou ple of dr ug c ha rg e s, a dr ug pa ra ph e rn a lia char g e and a

misdemeanor c apias that wa s no longe r outstanding . Offic er Ma llory then proc eede d to give the Def

endant a metro citation for violation of a noise ordina nce. While Off icer Mallory was speaking with the Def

endant, the of

fice r noticed that the Def

endant wa s acting very

nervous. Of

fice r M al l o ryas k ed t h e D ef

en d an tt o s t ep o u t o f t h e va n an d t o t h e ba ck o f t h e o ff i ce r’ s p at ro l ca r t o s i gn the citation.

Af te r the De fe nd a nt s ig ne d th e c itatio n, Of fi c e r M a llo ry g a ve the c itatio n to the De fe nd a nt. Offic er Ma llory

then asked the Def

endant if he had anything illega l on him, suc h as a knife or a g un. The De fenda nt replied that he did not. Office r Mallory then aske d fo r co n sent to sear ch the Def endant’ s person. The Def endant sa id y es. Off

icer M allory

did a pat down se arc h and found nothing. Of

fice r Mallory

then aske d for pe rmission to search the Defen d an t ’s v eh icle. The Def endant r ep l ied, “Whateve r.” O ffice r Mallory then sea rche d the Def

endant’ s van and f

ound a digital sc ale with a w hite powder substance on it. The offic er did not have a fie ld test kit and was

un able to c omp le te a

fi e ld te st of the wh ite po wd e r. Of fi c e r Ma llo ry app ro a c he d the De fe nd a nt w ith the sca les and told the De fenda nt to turn around. The De fenda nt turned ar ound and then r an aw ay from the of

fice r. Officer Mallory had been j oined byOffic er Clar e and the y proce eded to c hase the Def endant until they caug ht him. After the Def endant a ctively

resisted a rre st, the office rs spray ed the De fe nd a nt with pe pp e r spr a y

. Th e of fi c e rs the n h a nd c uf

fe d th e De fe nd a nt andre turne d h im t o t h e p at ro l ca r. At t h at t i m e, t h e De fe n d an tt o l d t h e o ff i ce rs t h at t h e “ d o p e” wa s i n s i d e h i s p an t s l eg. The off icer s then retrieved c ocaine from the De fenda nt’s l ef t p an t s leg and plac ed the De fenda nt

un de r a rr e st.

On J une 4, 2002, the Def

endant was indicted for evading arr est, resisting arr est, possession of coca ine with intent to sell, and possession of drug para pherna lia with intent to prepare a contr olled substance f

or sale. O n November 1 5
, 2 0 0 2
, t he De fenda nt filed a motion to suppress the dig ital scale s and the c ocaine found during the s ear ches of the Defenda nt’s vehicle and per son. On J anuary 8, 2003, the trial court filed an orde r denying the Def endant’ s motion t o suppress.

Three of the De fenda nt’s char g es we re dismissed, and he pled g uiltyto possession over .5
g rams of coca ine, a Class B Felony

. The Defendant did rese rve an ag ree d-upon ce rtified question of la w u po n w hic h to app e a l.-3-

The c e r ti f ie d q u e s ti o n a g r e e d u p o n b y th e tria l c o u r t a n d th e p ar ti e s is : D id th e c o u rt err or [si c] in de ny ing the Def

endant’ s reque st to suppress the fruits of the se arc h of his vehicle and person by a police of

fice r on October 14, 2001. The Def endant a lleg ed that the se arc hes we re c onducted wi t h o u t b en efit of a

sear ch wa

rra nt and could not be sustained unde r any of the e x ceptions to the

war rant re quirement. Without t he evide nce se ized during t h e s ea rc hes, the State c ould not have continued the De fenda nt’s prosec ution.

STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW

Our standa

rd of r eview f

or a tria l court’s finding s of fact and c onclusions of law on a motion
to s up pr e ss e vid e nce is set forth i n St a te v. Od om, 92 8 S. W.2 d 1 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) . U nd e r this standard, “a trial court’s finding s of fac t in a suppre ssion hearing will be upheld unless the evide nce pr e po nd e rate s o the rw ise .” I d. a t 23

. As is cus to mar y , “ the pr e va ili ng pa rt y in the tr ia l c ou rt

is aff orded the ‘strong est leg itimate view of the evidence and all re asonable and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that evidenc e.’” State v. Carter
, 16 S.W .3d 762, 765 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Keith, 978 S.W .2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998)). Ne verthe less, this Court reviews de novo the
tr ia l c ou rt ’s app lic a tio n of the la w to the fa c ts, wi tho ut a c c or din g a ny pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss t o those conc lusions. S ee State v. Crutc her, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999).

AN AL YSI S

Th e De fe nd a nt a

rg ue s tw o is su e s in his brie f. He fi rs t arg ue s th a t th e Sta te faile d to c arry its burden at the s uppression hearing that the Def endant ha d violated an or dinance and that the se arc h was incide nt to a valid arr est. The Def endant also arg ues that the stop of the Def endant e x cee ded the scope of its initi al pur p o s e, and the f urther de tention of the De fenda nt ripened into an illeg al

arr e st. Th e De fe nd a nt’ s a pp e a l is bas ed so le ly

on a c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of

la w. Whe n a n a

pp e a l is broug ht by

certified question of law, no iss u e b ey o n d the scope of the c ertified que stion may be considere d by this Court. State v. Penderg rass, 759 S.W .2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988) . There fore , the

o n l y q u e s t i o n w e m a y a d d r e s s i s w h e t h e r t h e w arr a n t l e s s s e ar c h e s o f b o t h t h e D e f e n d a n ta nd his

ve hic le c a n b e su sta ine d u nd e r a ny e xce pti on to thewa

rr a nt r e qu ir e me nt.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

ma de the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s o f f a c t:

Offic er Ma llor y

testified that he wa s finishing a call on Dicke rson Road at approximately

8:15 p.m. when he obse rved a van pass by

wi t h l o u d music in a residential ne ighbor

hood. When he pul l ed o v er the defe ndant’s vehic le, Off icer Mal lory noticed that the de fenda nt seemed ne rvous. The of fice r pre pare d a metro citation for violation of a

noise ordinanc e and a sked the de fenda nt to step to the back of his vehicle to sig n the citation. Afte r the de fenda nt s i gn ed t h e citation, Officer Mallory asked the defe ndant if he w as h o l ding any thing illeg al on his person. Subsequently , O f

f ic e r M a llory asked f or conse nt to searc h the def endant’ s person a nd the def endant a cquiese d. The initial sear ch of the defe ndant’s person did not revea l
any contra band, and O ffice r Mallory proce eded to seek c onsent from the de fenda nt-4-

to searc h his vehicle. The defe ndant conse nted to the s ea rch of his vehicle, a nd Offic er Ma llory

testified this searc h reve aled dig ital scale s c o n ta ining a white powde r residue. When Of

fice r Mallory co n fr o nted the def endant with the sc ales a nd attempted to g rab the defe ndant’s hand he immediately g ave c hase. O ffice r Mallory
appre hended the defe ndant a few blocks later a nd the def endant told Off

icer Mallory that he had c ontraba nd in his pant leg . The Of fice r re trieved thecocaine and plac ed the de fe nd a nt u nd e r a

rr e st.

. . . .

The de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t he ne ve r c on se nte d to the of fi c e r’ s se arc h o f h is
person or vehicle. Specifica lly
, the defendant testified that he responded “w hateve r” when Offi ce r M al l o ryre q u es t ed co n s en tt o s ea rc h t h e d ef en d an t ’s p er s o n and vehic le. The proof indicated that the de fenda nt replied “ whateve r” to e ach r equest to sea rch his person and ve hicle. When evidenc e is seized as the re sult of a war rantless sea

rch of a ve hicle, the state must establish that the sea rch w as conduc ted pursuant to one of the e x ceptions to the wa rra nt require ment. State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 19 98 ). On e su c h exce pti on is a se arc h co nd uc te d pur su a nt to an ind ivi du a l’ s c on se nt. Schneckloth v. B ustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The scope of conse nt is not based on the subjective intentions of the c onsenting party or the subjective inter

preta tions of the sea

rching office r. I nstead the standa rd is that of objec tionable [sic]

rea sonablene ss-what would a typical re asonable person ha ve under stood by the exchang e betwe en the of

fice r and the suspect. F lorida v. Ji meno, 500 U.S. at 251 (1991). See also State v. Troxell, 78 S .W.3d 866 (2002). I f the de fenda nt did not
want to conse nt to the searc h, any rea sonable person would have answere d “no”. [sic] Apply ing a common sense interpretation to the verbal exchang e, the Court is of the opinion that the defe ndant’s re sponse to the offic er’ s reque s t for conse nt was adequate to provide the r equisite consent f or the sea rch.

. . . .

The de fenda nt’s final conte ntion is that [t he] second sea rch of the def endant’ s person wa s conducte d without the authority of a war rant, and it was not conducte d pursuant to a ny of the sear ch war rant exceptions. When the defe ndant fled fr om the office r s a n d w a s c ap tu r e d a f e w b lo c k s a w a y , O f

f ic e r M a ll o r y c o n d u c te d a

s e c ond

se arc h of the de fe nd a nt’ s pe rs on

. No tw ith sta nd ing the of fi c e r’ s a bil ity to c on du c t a

sear ch incident to ar

rest, the defenda nt volunteere d the s tatement to the offic er tha t the “ do pe wa s in his pa nt le g .” Th us , O ff ic e r M a llo ry

wa s p ro pe r i n r e tr ie vin g thi s contra band fr om the defe ndant’s clothing and plac ing him under arr est. The Court is o f the op ini on the iss ue re g ard ing the se c on d s e arc h o f thede fe nd a nt’ s p e rs on is de vo id o f m e ri t.-5-

The Fo u rt h Am en d ment to the United States Constit ution and Article I , Section 7 of the Tenne ssee Constitution protect individuals from unrea sonable sea rche s and seiz u res by

law enfor ceme nt office rs. A search conducted without a warra nt is presumptively unrea sonable a nd at
a suppre s s io n h e ar in g r e g ar d in g s u c h a s e ar c h th e St a te b e ar s th e b u r d e n o f p r o v in g that the

wa rr a ntl e ss s e arc h w a s r e a so na ble . Stat e v. Cou lte r, 67 S.W. 3d 3, 41 (T e nn . Crim . App . 200 1) . T his means that the State must prove that the war rantless sea

rch or seizure was conducted pur suant to one of the na rrowly define d exceptions to the warr ant re quirement. State v. B inette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000) . One e x ception to the warrant requireme nt for a valid sear ch is that an individual g ives
consent t o t h e wa rrantless searc h. Schneckloth v. B ustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). The

c on se nt mus t how e ve r, be “ ‘u ne qu ivo c a l, s pe c if ic , in te lli g e ntl y

g ive n a ndun c on ta min a te d b y du re ss

or coe rcion.’” State v. Br own, 836 S.W.2d 530, 547 (Tenn. 1992). The sta ndard is “ ‘t h at of ‘objec tive’ re ason ab l en es s – what would the ty pical re asonable person ha ve under stood by the exchang e between the office r and the s uspect.’” State v. Troxell, 78 S .W.3d 866, 872 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Florida

v. J imeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).

As stated above , our standar d of re view re quires that the evidenc e preponde rate s ag ainst the trial court’ s findings of

fac t in this case . When apply ing an objective r easona bleness standa

rd to the exchang e betwee n Offic er Mallory and the Def endant, it is clear that the D efe ndant conse nted to the

se arc he s.

The De fenda nt replied “ whateve r” to the of fice r’ s re quest for c onsent to sear ch both the De fe nd a nt’ s p e rs on a ndthe De fe nd a nt’ s v e hic le . A s the tr ia l c ou rt state d, a re a so na ble pe rs on wo uld have e xp e c te d th e D e f

e n d a n t t o u n e q u iv o c a ll y

s tate h is o p p o s it io n to a

s e ar c h

. T h e D e f

e n d ant’s reply of “w hateve r” w ould le ad a r easona ble per son to conclude that the Def endant ha d no objection
to the se arc he s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s app lic a tio n o f the la w t o th is f a c tua l sc e na

ri o is c or re c t.

The sec ond sear ch of the Def endant’ s person c lear ly

was c onducted pur suant to consent by the Defenda nt. The officer s caug ht the Defenda nt, and he told the officer s where they could find the

cocaine on his person. The Def endant vol u n t ee re d this information. Clearly this is consent to a

sear ch. This e vidence does not pr eponder ate ag ainst the trial court’s finding s of fa ct, and the trial

c ou rt c or re c tly app lie d th e la w t o th e se fa c ts.

CO NC LU SION

Be cause we c onclude that the e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst th e trial court’s finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, we aff irm the trial court’s denial of the Def endant’ s motion to suppress, and a ccor dingly , the judg ment of convic tion.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE