### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

NO. 03-0 6 -00 550 -CV

Br ian Le e P ope , A ppe lla nt

v. Nancy P ope , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COM AL COUNTY , 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. C2004 -50 3B , HO NORAB LE CHARLES A. STEP HENS II , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Upon consider at i on of appe llant’s motion for rehe aringand motion for re hear ing en banc , we ove rrule the motions; howeve r, we withdraw our opinion and judgme nt dated May 30, 2 0 0 7 , an d s u b s t i tu t e t h e f

o l l o wi n g. Br ian L ee Pope a

ppeals t wo issues pertainingto the final dec ree of divorce from his marria ge t o ap p ellee N ancy Pope. Br ian contends that the district court (i) e rre d in failing to issue findings of

fac t and conc lusions of law and that he was ha rmed b y t h i s failure , and ( i i ) i mp r o p e r l y d i v e s t e d h i m o f h i s s e p ar a t e p r o p e rty b y aw ar d i n g anRV p ar k e n t i r e l y t o N a n c y. Be cause we hold that B rian wa s not harmed by the district court’s f

ailure to issue finding s of fact and2

conclusions of lawand that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its property division, we
a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND

Br ian and Na

ncy wer e marrie d in 1995 and had one child born to the marria g e. Af ter Nanc y sued for divorce in May 2004, she and the child moved out of t he marital residenc e and lived at B ry an’s Country

RV Park, a business located in Guada lupe County that the par

ties had purc hased in J anuar y 2004 from Na

ncy ’s stepfather, E. K. Br

y an. This pr operty consisted of an 11.65-ac re tra ct of land on whic h the RV park was built and an additional adjoining 92-ac re tra ct. Nanc y had lived on this property

since she w as twelve y ear s old. She lived in a trailer home locate d on the par

k and operated the par

k during the pende ncy

of the divorc e. B rian re sided in the m arital residence on Bobo li n k Str e e t in Co ma l Co u n ty th a t h e h a d b o u g h t p r io r to th e ma r r ia g e an d f

r o m which he op e rate d a

bu sin e ss, L a se r G ra

ph ic s. The parties ag ree d to te mporary order s, but N ancy there afte r obtained a p ro t ective order ag ains t Br i an d u e to various harassing acts dire cted at Nancy and her tenants. Afte r Na

ncy filed for divorce , Br ian’s work history beca me sporadic , and he spe nt J anuar y 25 until April 11, 2006 in jail s e r v in g a s e n te n c e f

o r a s s a u lt in g a te n an t at t

h e RVp ar

k
. B r ia na ls o v io late d

an d pleade d g uilty to violation of the protective or der. The parti es accused e ach othe r of va rious acts of mis c on du c t and

re po rt e d e a c h o the r t o v ari ou s a uth or iti e s. Na nc y pa id B ri an’ s mo rt g a g e pa y me nt f ro m O c tob e r 2 00 5 unti l Apr il 2 00 6 to a vo id fore closure of

the house e ven thoug h Br ian was or dere d to make the house p aym en t s under the temporar y order s. Whi le B rian wa s in jail, Nancy did some work for L aser Gra phics and re ceive d3

pa y me nts wh ic h s he g a ve B ri an u po n h is r e le a se . B ri an a c kn ow le dg e d a t tr ia l th a t N anc y ha d p a id the mor tg a g e on the B ob oli nk

re sid e nc e beg inn ingin O c tob e r 2 00 5 a nd that he ha d b e e n h e ld i n contempt for f

ailure to pa

y child support. He c laimed to work in 2004 but made no inc ome. The trial of

the divorce proce eded on Ma y 15, 2006. The de cre e re cites that t h e d i v o r c e w a s “

j u d i c i a l l y p r o n o u n c e d

an d r e n d e r e d i nc o u rta tN e w B r a

u n f e l s , C o m a l C o u n t y, Texas, on May

15, 2006 and further noted on the cour t’s docket she et on the same date, but sig ned on J une 19, 2006.” I n a m o t i o n for new trial, B rian c omplained that the division of the marital pr op e rt y wa s ma nif e stl y un jus t and that th e va lue a ssi g ne d to the re a lty awa rd e d to Na

nc y , e vid e ntl y the RV park, w as incorr ect. A judg ment in f avor of an appra iser-inter venor was signe d on J uly

19
an d f il e d o nA u g u s t 1 5 , 2 0 0 6
. A lt h o u g h B r ia

nti me ly r e qu e s te d

f in d in g s o f

f a c t a n d c o n c lusions of law a nd filed a notice of past due f indings , the district court fa iled to file them. This appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N Fin dings of fact and conclusion s of law

Br ian first complains that the district c ourt err ed by failing to file finding s of fa ct and conclusions of lawin response to his timely reque st. Under the T exas Family Code, in a suit for dissoluti on of marr iag e in wh i ch t h e trial court has re ndere d a judg ment dividing the e state of the part i es an d u p o n a re quest by a par ty , the trial cour

t shall state in writing its finding s of fa ct and conclusions of law . Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6
. 7 1 1 (a ) (W est 2006). A r equest for finding s and conclusions under

section 6.711 must conform to the Te x as Rules of Civil P roce dure. Id. § 6.711(b). Th e tr ia l c ourt ’s du ty

to m a ke su c h f

ind ing s is mand a tor

y , a nd the fa ilure to r e sp on d w he n r e qu e stsWe emphasize that oral dete rminations from the benc h are not subst i t u t es for written 1 finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law. See I n re Doe , 78 S.W .3d 338, 3 4 0 n.2 (Tex. 2002); 4 have be en properly made is presumed harmful unless the r ecor d demonstrates that the complaining party has suffe red no injury
. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 2 96 ; Te ne ry v . Te ne ry , 9 3 2 S
. W
. 2 d 29, 30 (T e x. 19 96 ); Cherne Indus., I nc. v. M agallanes , 7 63 S.W. 2d

76 8, 77 2 ( Te x. 19 89 ); Zeifman

v . M ic he ls , 212 S.W .3d 5 8 2 , 588 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied); Glass v. W illiamson , 13 7 S .W .3 d 11 4, 11 7- 18 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 04 , n o p e t.) . E rr or is h arm fu l if

it preve nts an appe llant from prope rly prese nting a

case on appea l. Te ne ry , 932 S.W .2d at 30. I n Te ne ry , the supreme court found the trial court’ s failure to file finding s of fa ct and
c on c lus ion s o f l aw t o b e ha rm le ss a s it

re la te d to the div isi on

of pr op e rt y be c a us e the re wa s ampl e evidenc e in the re cord to support the judg ment. Id. ; see also Goggins v. Leo , 849 S.W .2d 373, 379 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (only o n e t h eo ry of re cover

y and the implied finding s nece ssary

for r ecove ry

wer e supported by

the evidenc e). Be cause Br ian’s re quest was timely , we must deter mine whether

he wa s harmed by the lack of

finding s and conc lusions. Nancy ar gu es t h at Brian does not have to gue ss the rea sons behind the district cour

t’s order perta ining to its proper ty division, that he raises the issue now ra ised on appea l for the f

irst time and failed to raise it in the court below, a nd that there is ample evidenc e in t he re c or d to dis po se of

th e is su e he no w r a ise s. Mo re ov e r, the dis tr ic t ju dg e ann ounc e d h is ruling s and stated his re asons at the he aring . We ag ree .

Although w e discoura g e trial judg es fr om failing to respond to time l y re q u est s for findings , in this case the r ecor d clea rly establishes the re asons under ly ing the district court’s decisions, and ther e is ample e vidence to sup p o rt t h e court’s de termination. The re cord 1Narvaez v. M aldonado , 127 S.W .3d 313, 316 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). We re ly on the se or a l pr on ounc e me nts so le ly fo r t he purp os e of

c on du c tin g our h arm

ana ly sis
. 5 aff irmatively

shows that Br ian suffe red no harm from the trial court’s failure to issue f indings of f

act and conc lusions of law. Property division

Alth o u gh the cour

t awar ded B rian the B obolink home and the L aser Gra phics bu sin e ss, the RV pa

rk wa s aw ard e d to N anc y . B ri a n’ s so le c omp la int

a bo ut t he div isi on

of pr op e rt y pe rt a ins to t

he RV pa rk wh ic h, he c la ims , wa s purc ha se d pa rt ia lly wi th f un ds that w e re his se pa

rate proper ty and par tially with “community

cre dit.” That this prope rty was either se parate prope rty or
a “ mixe d c ha

ra c te r a sse t” is r a ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l. The fa mily code r equire s the trial court to divi de the e state of the pa rties in a manne r t h a ti s j u s tan d

r i g h t , h a v i n g d

u e r e g ar d f o r t h e r i g h t s o f e a c h p art y an d t h e i r c h i l dr e n , i f

an y. Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 7 .0 01 (We st 2 00 6) ; see Egge mey er v . Eggeme yer , 554 S.W .2d 137, 139 (Tex. 1977). We revie w property division issues for abuse of discr etion. Schlueter v . Schlueter , 97 5 S. W.2 d 5 84 , 5 89 (T e x. 19 98 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt ha s b ro a d d isc re tio n in div idi ngthe mari ta l e state at divorce
. Mu rff

v . M ur ff , 615 S.W .2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981)
. We must presume that the trial cour t
e xer c ise d it

pr op erl y and may no t a lte r t

he div isi on

un le ss t he c omp la ini ngpa

rt y e sta bli sh e s a clea r abuse of the trial c ourt’s discre tion. Id
. A tr ia l c ourt a bu se s it s d isc re tio n w he n it a c ts arbitra rily or unre asonably

and wit h o u t re fer ence to any g uiding r

ules or princ iples. W

alker v. Pac ker , 8 2 7 S
. W
. 2 d 8 3 3 , 8 3 9
- 4 0 ( T e x. 1 9 9 2 )
. B e c a u s e a t r i a l c o u rt h a s n o d i s c re tio n in deter mining what the law is, which law g overns, or

how to apply

the law, we revie w this categ ory6

of dis c re tio na

ry ru lin g s de novo
. Id . at 840. When we r evi ew a ruling that results from the tria l court’s h av i n g resolved unde rly ing f acts, howe ver, w e must defe r to the trial cour t’s fac tual resolutions and any

cre dibilit y

deter minations that may have aff ecte d those resolutions, and we may not substit ute our judg ment for that of t he trial court in t hose matters. Se e id . at 839-40 (r equiring defe renc e to fa ct-ba sed dete rminations).

Al l pr op e rt

y on hand at the dis so lut ion

of marr ia g e is p re su me d to be c omm un ity proper ty . Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003( a) ( West 2006). This is a rebuttable presumption, requiring a spouse c laiming a ssets as s epar ate pr operty to establish their separ ate c hara cter by clea r and convincingevidenc e. Id. § 3.003(a) -(b) . Property owned be fore marria g e, or a cq u ired during marria g e by g ift, devise or desce nt, is separate prope rty
. Id. § 3.001 (West 2006)
. Where a n asset is pu rc h as ed d u ri ng marria g e with monies trac eable to a spouse’s se parate estate , the asset may appropr iately

be cha rac terized as sepa

ra t e p roperty
. Pace v. Pac e , 160 S.W .3d 706, 711 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pe t. denied).

Th e on ly e vid e nc e a t tria l show e d tha t the RV pa rk wa s par

t of the c omm

un ity e state of the pa rties. The only

inventory

admitted into evidence showed the RV pa rk as pa rt of the community

estate; B rian did not object to the exhibi t or challeng e its c hara cter ization. The pa rties ag ree that the proper

ty was purcha sed from Nanc y ’s stepfathe r in 2004 for $420,000, and that they still owe $365,843. Na

ncy operated the RV par

k, and B rian testified that he did some work of an
un ide nti fi e d n a tur e on

the pr op e rt

y . B oth pa

rt ie s so ug ht awa

rd of the RV pa

rk
. B ri an o bje c te d to the awa rd of the RV pa

rk to Nanc y not be cause it wa s separ ate or “mix ed char acte r” proper ty but on the g round that his daug hter “ oug ht to live in a rea l house” such a s the Bobolink re sidence
.Be cause Br ian’s citations to the re cord a re to te stimony

and ther e ar e no for

mal stipulations 2 c on c e rn ingthe su

bje c t of thi s te sti mony , w e a ssume t he referenc e to s tip ulatio ns is t o th e pa rt ie s’ uncontrove rted testimony th at the B obolink house was ac quired by Br ian bef

ore the marria g e. L ike wi se , B ri an d oe s n ot d isp ute that th e or ig ina l de bt on the B ob oli nk ho us e wa s p a id w ith c omm un ity fu nd s. Pay ments made out of t h e co m m u n i ty estate f or the be nefit of a

separ ate e state, either 3 to pay off a debt of the se parat e es t at e o r to make improveme nts, give rise to a c laim for reimburse ment. Penick

v. Pe nick, 783 S.W .2d 194, 196 (Tex. 1988).

7 On re hear ing, B rian urg es that the trial c ourt and this Court in its orig inal opinion
err ed in d en y ing him his separ ate pr operty “whe n the par

ties stipulated that the proper ty was Appellant’s se parate prope rty .” Th e pa rt ie s a g re e —a

nd Na nc y te sti fi e d—

that th e B ob oli nk

ho me 2
wa s a c qu ir e d b y

B ri an s ho rt ly

be fo re the ir

marr ia g e , th e de bt o n th e B ob oli nk ho us e wa s p a id w ith
c omm un ity fu nds, an d th a t, a ft e r t

he ir marr ia g e , a

ho me e qu ity

loa n o f $ 91 ,0 00 wa s ma de a g a ins t the home with $5 0 , 0 0 0 from the loan used as a dow n pay ment on the RV park pur chase d by the parties a nd the re mainder use d for ope rating expenses of the pa rk. At the time of trial, the par ties owed $88,000 on the home equity note. B eca

use the orig inal loan on the house w as paid for during the marr ia g e wi th c omm

un ity fu nd s, Na nc y so ug ht a n e c on omi c c on tr ibut i o n

t o t h e c o mm u n i t y e s t a te of $109,000. I n addition to awar ding N ancy the RV park, the court orde red N ancy to pay off the 3 $88,000 home equity

note that had f

unded the initial purcha se of the park. The cour t then awa

rded the B obolink house fre e of the home equity debt. The court c oncluded that two loans inc urre d by B ri an a ft e r t

he c ou ple ’s se pa ratio n w ou ld b e B ri an’ s li a bil iti e s. That the Bob o l i n k h ouse wa s acquire d befor e their ma rriag e does not c onvert the RV pa rk int o his se pa

rate pr op e rt

y . B a se d on the e vid e nc e (i ) that th e c ou ple a c qu ir e d c omm

un ity de bt o n th e ho us e to t

he n a c qu ir e the RV pa

rk wi th c omm

un ity c re dit , ( ii) that c omm

un ity pr op e rt y8

was used to make pay

ments on Br ian’s sepa

rate proper

ty , and (iii) that B rian fa iled to adduce any pr oo f t hat any po rt ion of the RV pa

rk wa s p a id f

or wi th f un ds that c an b e tr a c e d to his se pa rate pr op e rt y rathe r t ha n th e c ou ple ’s c omm

un ity c re dit or that the re wa s any int e nt t o r e pa y the pa rk no te wi th h is s e pa

rate pr op e rt

y , w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr or a bu se its dis c re tio n in finding that the par

k was c ommunity

proper ty , and aw ardingthe pa rk and notes on the pa rk and Bobolink house to Na

ncy and the B obolink house fre e of home equity debt to Br ian.
CO NC LU SION We hold that Brian w as not ha rmed by the district c ourt’s failure to issue findings of fac t and conc lusions of law and that the district co u rt d i d not abuse its discretion in awa rding the RV pa rk to N anc y . H a vin g ov e rr

ule d B ri an’ s is su e s, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med on Motion for Rehea ring Filed: Jul y

12, 2007