AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

Bureaucracy versus Bioterrorism

Countering a Globalized Threat

STEPHEN G. HOFFMAN

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 69

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

October 2012
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Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other 

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

The Maxwell Papers are available electronically at the Air 

University Press website at http://aupress.au.af.mil.
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Bureaucracy versus Bioterrorism:

Countering a Globalized Threat

Lt Col Stephen G. Hoffman, USAF

Two things are certain—death and taxes! Or maybe just taxes. 

Scientists are attempting to cheat death with rapidly progressing 

technologies capable of constructing and manipulating life synthetically 

from basic chemical elements. While the advancing rates of capability in 

computing speed, genomics, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology have 

the potential to improve and lengthen life for all humans, they also 

enable biological weapons that can destroy wide swaths of humanity or 

attack specific groups of individuals. This confluence of technology is 

advancing at exponential rates and seems to have the advantage over the 

limited detection, protection, and treatment capabilities offered by a

lumbering bureaucracy.

While human nature has not changed, rapidly advancing 

technology is providing new and novel biothreats to our adversaries. 

Globalization and the increasing availability of knowledge required to 

develop biothreats, coupled with declining computing costs, work 

together to dramatically increase the likelihood of biological weapon 

proliferation over the next 25 years. Given a future proliferation of 

biological weapons to terrorist groups, facilitated by globalization and 

rapidly increasing technological advancements, can a bureaucracy 

develop an effective network of countermeasures to bioterrorism?
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Developing a network of credible countermeasures requires a 

consistent demonstration of intent to defeat bioterrorists backed by a 

viable capability. Intent to counter bioterrorism must be communicated 

to both potential terrorists, as well as to scientists who may be 

vulnerable to terrorist propaganda. Scientists considering facilitating 

terrorists with technical support needed to develop biological weapons 

may be deterred through professional pressure by their peers in the life 

science community. The medical profession has long had a concentration 

of knowledge which, if used wrongly, had the capacity of harming the 

very patient needing care. Even with this potentially dangerous

information, trained medical personnel have developed a set of standards 

efficiently applied across their professional community. Perhaps the life 

sciences professions can increase acceptable behavior through adopting 

a similar ethic, code of standards, and self-policing professional 

community.

In addition to efforts to deter individuals through professional peer 

pressure, a credible network of countermeasures will include the ability 

to detect and attribute unacceptable activity. Scientists secretly working 

to develop biological weapons for terrorists may be further influenced to 

return to the mainstream if their work is detected and attributed to them 

directly. Attribution has the effect of removing anonymity from those 

bioterrorists who might otherwise believe they are impervious to 
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retribution. With removal of anonymity through increased attribution,

rogue scientists may be influenced to stop their unprofessional behavior.

Finally, communicating intent to defeat bioterrorists rings hollow if 

there is no capability to deny the potential terrorists their desired end 

state or to coerce them with a believable expectation of punishment. 

Mitigating consequences of biological weapons is one way to deter wouldbe terrorists. A demonstrated ability to quickly react and counteract the 

effects of a biological weapon would remove the reward that a terrorist 

desires. Establishment of quick reaction teams capable of identifying the 

threat and developing treatment with use of nanotechnology for mass 

aerosol inoculation may show how the United States is serious about 

bioterrorism. Furthermore, mitigating consequences can also influence

the terrorist on a personal level. That is, effective international law 

enforcement may increase the risk of incarceration in the same way a 

quick response team may reduce the reward of mass casualties. Effective 

development and enforcement of international law is the final aspect of a

proposed network of countermeasures to aid bureaucracy in combating a 

future proliferation of biological weapons.
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Confluence of Technologies

The convergence of nanotechnology with information 

technology, biology, and social sciences will reinforce 

discoveries and innovation . . . .

—Pres. George W. Bush

Definitions and Background

Three key developing technologies underlying the biothreat 

environment are genome sequencing, synthetic biology, and 

nanotechnology. The term genome refers to the complete library of 

information contained on an organism's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or 

in the case of some viruses, ribonucleic acid (RNA). Both DNA and RNA 

are constructed with strands (single for RNA and usually double for DNA) 

of simple units called nucleotides which in their complete form are 

referred to as the genomic sequence. The second developing technology, 

synthetic biology, is “the design and construction of new biological parts, 

devices and systems [as well as] the redesign of existing, natural 

biological systems for useful purposes.”1 Funded largely through venture 

capital sources, leading life science experts have already made significant 

strides toward constructing living organisms synthetically from basic 

chemical elements. The third developing technology is nanotechnology. 

“Nanotechnology is a revolutionary technology, growing progressively 

from rudimentary nanostructures toward molecular nanosystems.”2

Genomic mapping or sequencing is the first step in identifying 

sections responsible for disease so that drugs to suppress or counteract 

Nanotechnology is particularly useful in genomic mapping.
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that section of the genome can be developed. Simple organisms typically 

have less complex genomes and higher order organisms have longer 

genome strands. “In 1990 an international, publicly funded effort, 

[called] the Human Genome Project, was launched to map and sequence 

human DNA and make the information freely available to the scientific 

community.”3

Second, synthetic biology has also seen rapid gains in 

development. “Synthetic [biology] comes in two broad classes. One uses 

unnatural molecules to reproduce emergent behaviours from natural 

biology, with the goal of creating artificial life. The other seeks 

interchangeable parts from natural biology to assemble into systems that 

function unnaturally.”

The project was completed two years ahead of schedule in 

2003, and the pace of growth in genome sequencing has continued to 

increase.

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The third technology impacting the biothreat environment is 

nanotechnology, which refers to development of capabilities by scientists 

to manufacture on a molecular level. A nanometer is one-billionth of a 

meter which is about five or 10 times as long as the width of an atom. 

“What is interesting about nanotechnology is that it functions as a 

technological multiplier.”

In July 2002 beginning only with a genomic 

sequence of a single strand RNA, researchers created and activated a 

virus identical in appearance and effect to naturally occurring polio.

5 That is, nanotechnology is merely a facilitator 

of synthetic biology-providing tools and processes required to manipulate 
8

genomic strands. A US Department of Agriculture report identifies 

detection of pathogens as one of many potential applications of 

nanotechnology.6 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory scientists are 

capitalizing on the advancing rate of technology by developing “sensor 

systems that both detect nanoparticles and rely on the formation of 

nanoparticles that have been developed as sensing species.”7

Advancing Rate of Development

Obviously, 

a strategy countering bioterrorism is further complicated by continuing 

advances in these areas. 

The rapid progress in genomics, synthetic biology, and 

nanotechnology has surprised many professionals in the life science 

fields; the overwhelming consensus is that the pace of advancement is 

likely to increase. Beneath all three of these technologies is the 

unmistakable linkage between increasingly powerful computers and 

advances in genomic sequencing, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology.

The synergistic effect of technological advancement, coupled with 

increasingly powerful computers, offer incredible commercial returns on 

investment while simultaneously increasing the risk of biothreat 

proliferation. 

Ray Kurzweil showed in The Singularity is Near how 

microprocessor clock speeds have followed an increasing exponential 

trend line doubling every three years since 1975, while over the same 

period microprocessor costs (per transistor cycle) have followed a 
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declining exponential trend line (fig. 1); cutting their costs in half every 

1.1 years.8

Figure 1. Microprocessor cost per transistor cycle. (Ray Kurzweil, The 

Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, New York, NY:

Viking Penguin Books, 2005, 61.)

This trend affects development of genomic and synthetic biology 

directly as both of these fields are dependent on powerful computers to 

process the enormous DNA sequencing code, and indirectly as a function 

of cost. That is, biotech companies are much more likely to receive 

venture capital where the cost-to-profit ratios are greatest. 

Beginning in 1980 with the Human Genome Project, rates of 

increase in genomic sequencing and synthetic biology (fig. 2) appear to be 

following similarly explosive growth patterns. The Institute of Medicine 
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and National Research Council states, “[t]he accelerating pace of 

discovery in the life sciences has fundamentally altered the threat 

spectrum.”9

Figure 2. Sequencing cost and number of sequenced genomes.

(Michael Snyder, Jiang Du, and Mark Gerstein, “Personal Genome 

Sequencing: Current Approaches and Challenges,” 

http://genesdev.cshlp.org/content/24/5/423.full, figure 1 [accessed 18 

November 2010.])

The dramatic decrease of sequencing costs per pair of nucleotides

is driven by two factors. First, the decreasing cost of computing power is 

making the hardware aspect of the process less expensive. Second, 
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software or process improvements that come as a result of scientific 

discovery raise the baseline across the industry. These two factors are 

complementary in that, as computing costs go down, more sequencing is 

being done by more companies; as the scientists at these companies 

learn, compete, and develop more efficient processes, the overall cost per 

sequenced genome pair plummets aggressively. Similar reasoning applies 

for why the total number of sequenced genes has rapidly increased. The 

economics of computing, genomics and synthetic biology show no sign of 

slowing.

A price performance curve for nanotechnology cannot be displayed 

in a manner similar to microprocessor costs, genomic sequencing costs,

or number of sequenced genomes since nanotechnology refers to the 

molecular scale rather than a specific technology. Figure 3 does, 

however, indicate the rapidly increasing pace of US government funding 

for nanotechnologies across the first 10 years of this century. While the 

increase in funding has followed a relatively linear incline, the average 

annual increase over these 10 years is 23 percent. Cumulatively, this 

results in a 465 percent increase in federal funding for nanotechnology 

between 2000 and 2009.
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Figure 3. Nanotechnology funding, by agency: FY2001–FY2008 and

FY2009 request. (John F. Sargent Jr., The National Nanotechnology 

Initiative: Overview, Reauthorization, and Appropriation Issues,

Congressional Research Service [CSR] Report 7-5700, RL34401

[Washington DC, 6 May 2009], 16.

Given the austerity of federal funding over this period, an average 

annual increase of 23 percent is significant. Of course the federal 

government is not the only funding source for nanotechnology, but this 

data does emphasize the point that along with computing cost 

efficiencies, and genomic and synthetic biology advancements, 

nanotechnology enables exponentially growing advances in life sciences 

by facilitating smaller, cheaper and faster computing.

Shopping List for a Do-It-Yourself Bioterrorist

One consequence of increasingly cost efficient computing power 

coupled with advances in genomics, synthetic biology, and 
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nanotechnology is that do-it-yourself (DIY) genetic engineering is entering 

the realm of the possible. Barry Pallotta and Michael Finnin at the 

Institute for Defense Analyses detailed how DIY biologists can use 

everyday items (fig. 4) to attain rudimentary biological engineering 

capabilities.

Professional Do-It-Yourself

Gel Electrophoresis Drinking Straws, 9V Batteries, Food Grade Agar

Pipettor Coffee Stirrer

Electroporator Ultrasonic Jewelry Cleaner

Centrifuge Dremel-Fuge, Coffee Grinder

Temperature Bath Pot of Warm Water

PCR Thermocycler 3 Pots of Warm Water

Autoclave Pressure Cooker

CO2 Cell Incubator CO2 from Vinegar and Baking Soda

Enzymes and Solvents Household Chemicals

Analytical Balance Jewelry/ food Scale (mg Precision)

Figure 4. DIY biologist laboratory using household items. (Barry S. 

Pallotta and Michael S. Finnin, “DIY Biology: Capabilities Assessment” 

[internal study: CRP-2139, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, 

VA, for government use only, 4 May 2010], slide 9.)

With very little effort searching online auction sites such as eBay, 

the DIY biologists can greatly enhance their basement laboratories with a 

strikingly small financial investment. This proliferation of inexpensive 

technological hardware is an unexpected byproduct of globalization that 

offers alternatives to otherwise prohibitively expensive scientific 
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equipment, previously available only to universities and government 

organizations. Armed with only online access and $1,000, the DIY 

biologists can purchase professional equipment like the following 

recently advertised on eBay: temperature bath–$150, cell incubator–

$230, PCT thermocycler–$200, and centrifuge–$100.

There are, however, limits to the DIY biologists as their learning 

and capabilities are only facilitated by the successes of the professional 

biomedical community. The DIY community has achieved only level 

three, of the nine levels of technical complexity (fig. 5), while PhD level 

professionals in the biomedical community have achieved level seven. 

Even though the capabilities of DIY biologists are significantly lower than 

the professional community, technical advances are making this a viable 

concern for the future. The potential damage of malicious or accidental 

biological pathogen release by biologists outside the professional 

community is becoming more likely with the proliferation of inexpensive 

technology.

Figure 5. Biocapability technical complexity levels 1–9. (Pallotta and 

Finnin, “DIY Biology: Capabilities Assessment,” slide 17.)
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The DIY community has yet to independently sequence or 

synthesize DNA similar to results of the Human Genome Project (1990–

2003). Following the successful Human Genome Project, the professional 

community compiled numerous additional successes for the following 

eight years (2003–11), culminating in viral synthesis. While the 

professional community required 13 years to sequence DNA and eight

additional years to synthesize a virus, the DIY community benefits from a 

dispersion of knowledge through published scientific reports. Estimating 

(very conservatively) a 10–20 year lag behind the professional 

community, DIY biologists are likely to obtain technical complexity level 

seven or eight by 2035. Given the advancing pace of development across 

genomics, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology, an estimated technical 

complexity level nine for the DIY community is not at all unreasonable. 

Failure of bureaucracy to develop a novel network of countermeasures 

against DIY scientists and would-be bioterrorists, who can wage warfare 

from Wal-Mart, is foolhardy.

What Failure Looks Like

Globalization and the Internet have enabled widespread 

distribution of technical knowledge and hardware, and there is no way to 

put the genie back in the bottle. Relying solely on traditional deterrent 

policies against a globally proliferated biothreat will not suffice when 

attempting to counter a technology-empowered bioterrorist. If the 

bureaucracy can ever hope to develop an effective network of 
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countermeasures to bioterrorism, then certainly the first step in that 

development is an accurate assessment of the consequences of what 

failing to do so would have on the United States. Andrew Krepinevich, in 

the “Pandemic” chapter of his 2009 book, 7 Deadly Scenarios, provides a 

glimpse of how that failure might look.

Meanwhile, as the United States increasingly resembles a 

vast collection of semi-ghost towns, to the south literally 

millions of peoples are on the move. . . . This mass of 

Mexicans, now estimated at nearly eight million, has no 

organizing force directing it, yet all its participants are 

unified toward one goal: crossing the border into the United 

States, in hope of gaining access to this country’s medical 

system—which ironically in many ways has simply ceased 

functioning in any meaningful way. This mass migration is . 

. . driving Mexico’s population north—a human tidal wave 

about to crash across America’s borders.10

A bioterrorist attack on the United States could take the form of an 

introduction of a mutated avian flu virus, capable of being passed 

human-to-human into unsanitary villages in Mexico. Poor surveillance 

by the World Health Organization, coupled with typical American 

disbelief of vulnerability to a pandemic, would likely permit early reports 

of 10, 20, or 50 deaths scattered across Mexican villages to go largely 

unnoticed in the United States. One characteristic of viral growth is its 

exponential increase, so these seemingly small and scattered deaths 

could, within weeks, ramp into millions of cases of avian flu. Even 

though the Spanish influenza of 1918 killed 675,000 Americans and 

estimates of an avian flu pandemic are that 2,000,000 could die, the 
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Center for Disease Control (CDC) has failed to develop sufficient antivirus 

stockpiles.

“The combination of the pandemic, the lack of government 

preparedness, and sensationalist media [would diminish American’s] 

confidence and trust in their government.”11 Furthermore, the second 

and third order effects of a pandemic, coupled with global mobility, may 

be increased gang activity, looting, and violent crime worldwide such that 

implementation of martial law may be required. Overwhelmed 

governments may attempt to clamp down on individual rights to free 

speech and assembly if mob violence were to spontaneously erupt 

anywhere social networks indicated medical supplies existed. In the 

United States, the president could nationalize all antiviral treatments 

under the direction of the CDC, Federal Emergency Management Agency 

and the Department of Defense. Since “95 percent of the world’s vaccine 

is produced by countries comprising only about 10 percent of the world’s 

population,”12 minority groups may characterize the president’s 

nationalization of medical supplies as nothing more than opportunistic 

ethnic cleansing. In light of these global implications to bioterrorism, it is 

imperative that the United States show leadership in propagating ethical 

norms of responsible conduct.
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Reinforcing Norms of Responsible Conduct

We will work with domestic and international partners to 

protect against biological threats by promoting global health 

security and reinforcing norms of safe and responsible 

conduct; . . . expanding our capability to prevent, attribute, 

and apprehend those who carry out [bio]attacks. 

—Pres. Barack Obama

Police within Profession

The education, training, and skills of scientists in biology, 

chemistry, and genetics empower life science professionals with 

capabilities that must be used according ethical standards of 

professional peer organizations. Pledging an oath to publically state one’s 

agreement and voluntary self-censorship according to the guidelines of 

the group’s ethical standards is an effective way of bonding a member to 

his or her profession. The very word “profession” in its Latin origin 

means “bound by an oath.”13

“Nearly all medical schools incorporate some form of professional 

medical oath into their graduation ceremonies. The oldest and most 

popular of these oaths is the Hippocratic oath, composed more than 

2,400 years ago.”14 In addition to medical doctors, oaths have been 

adopted in many other professions to build a commitment to the group 

which encourages and polices ethical actions. When these oaths are 

additionally printed and signed, there is an even greater level of buy-in 

on the part of the member. Individuals who profess such an oath are 
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motivated primarily by altruistic desires, but negative reinforcement from 

peer reproach also encourages proper behavior.

Additionally, the professional communities to which members 

pledge an oath provide tangible value to those members in the form of 

certification and peer recognition. The very nature of professions with 

unique education and training necessitates a very precise vernacular not 

often understood by the layman. When a member demonstrates 

proficiency through testing or peer review, a certification may be granted, 

externally validating this member. While outsiders may not understand 

the particular language or nuances of the profession, certification is often 

sufficient for promotion or advancement. It follows then that potential 

loss of a professional certification may also act as a deterrent to 

unapproved activity.

Due to the danger of globalized technological advancements in the 

life sciences arena, even peer review may be insufficient to safeguard 

against biothreats. “Sir Joseph Rotblat, the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize 

laureate, urged in his acceptance speech that ‘the time has come to 

formulate guidelines for the ethical conduct of scientists, perhaps in the 

form of a voluntary Hippocratic Oath’.”15 Developing and implementing 

guidelines in the form of an oath would help fulfill President Obama’s 

mandate of protecting against biothreats while “reinforcing norms of safe 

and responsible conduct.”16
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There are limitations, however, to the effectiveness of professional 

policing. Western professionals are motivated to ethical activity through a 

compelling system of reward and punishment from a linear-active society 

that places great value on both words and deeds. Societies valuing tribal, 

ethnic, or religious relationships more highly than ethical codes will not 

provide the ethical underpinning necessary for professional policing. 

Therefore, a second capability must be added to the proposed 

bureaucratic network against bioterrorism—increased attribution to find 

and expose those who do not follow the professional code.

Increase Attribution

Detection of bioterrorism is a collective activity heavily dependent 

on physical evidence acquired through material sensors, whereas 

attribution demands a higher level of effort as both capacity and intent 

must be shown. Detection is the tool for validating enemy capacity 

toward biothreat development, testing, or use. Attribution demands 

evidence that not only is there an adversary involved in some stage of 

biothreat activity, but that that adversary also intends to use that 

biothreat as a weapon. Researchers at University of Florida are

developing a nanotechnology that may aid with both detection and 

attribution, providing at least one avenue toward removing anonymity. 

These researchers are developing a “smart dust” that changes color when 

exposed to precursor elements of biological weapons.17
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Attribution can continue to be an effective aspect of the national 

security strategy even for individual bioterrorists if the strategy is applied 

with understanding from the perspective of the adversary. Deterrence 

through attribution requires the capability to detect and attribute 

bioterrorist activity coupled with credibility to deny or punish 

adversaries’ efforts. Attribution has the effect of removing anonymity 

from bioterrorists who might otherwise believe they are impervious to 

retribution. An experiment validating this conclusion by psychologists 

Chen-Bo Zhong, Vanessa Bohns, and Francesca Grino showed how 

volunteers in a dimly lit room were decidedly more likely to lie, cheat,

and steal than volunteers in a brightly lit room. In this experiment, 

darkness provided the anonymity which facilitated criminal activity.18

Use of smart dust as a nanotaggant may, as an example, serve as a 

means of removing anonymity of those working with precursor elements 

of biological weapons. That is, a rogue scientist experimenting with the 

building blocks of biological weapons may be deterred from further effort 

if his tools, workplace, hands, and clothing all fluoresce—letting the 

scientist know that he or she is not as anonymous as he or she may have 

thought. Should the color-changing smart dust not deter the wayward 

scientist, then policing from the professional community may discourage 

continued development of biological weapons.

A broad array of collection tools and techniques add flexibility to 

detection capabilities which, in turn, enhances the ability to attribute 
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developing threats from would-be bioterrorists. In cases where both loss 

of anonymity and professional policing fail to dissuade rogue scientists, 

then the use of nanoparticles may mitigate the consequences as tagging 

identifiers for criminal apprehension and prosecution. Mitigation of 

consequences is the third capability necessary for the proposed 

bureaucratic network against bioterrorism. This capability is comprised 

of a two-prong effort to counter bioterror activity—effective counteraction 

of biothreats and technology enhanced enforcement of international law.

Mitigate Consequences

Aggressively working to mitigate the consequences of a bioterrorist 

act may deter the act in the first place. One method of mitigating 

consequences is to develop quick response teams with the proper 

training and expertise to rapidly counter the effects of a biological 

weapon. Three essential capabilities of such a quick response team are 

the ability to: (1) rapidly identify a pathogen used in a bioattack; (2) 

develop an effective treatment; and (3) administer treatment and 

inoculation to the appropriate populations. Quick response teams would 

mitigate the terrorist’s desired reward of causing mass American 

casualties. Additional mitigation may result through achieving an

increased likelihood of capture and punishment to the potential 

bioterrorist through improved international law and treaties pertaining to 

life sciences.
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Key technologies essential to a quick response team are nanovector 

therapy and nanosurface technology. In nanovector therapy, an ideal 

drug dosage is delivered at full concentration to the intended tissue only. 

This optimal method of delivery reduces the amount of drug required for 

treatment while diminishing undesired side effects in tissue or organs 

where the drug is unnecessary but might have been absorbed. Another 

benefit to the efficacy of this style of drug delivery is that the body’s 

natural defenses can be purposefully bypassed, further reducing 

collateral damage.19

While these nanotechnologies are still in development, their utility 

to quick response teams would be invaluable in identifying, treating, and 

inoculating against a biothreat. Using nanotechnology is a necessary 

technique if any bureaucracy hopes to keep pace with rapidly advancing 

technologies. Linear thinking about medical treatment delivery will not 

suffice when adversaries demonstrate a willingness to use every 

nonlinear attack technique at their disposal. That is, preparations must 

be made to dispense care using nanotechnologies in a very short period 

This technique is partially made possible by 

nanosurface technologies where drug treatments are covered by 

protective nanocoatings. The nanosurface technology enables application 

of coatings that are programmable to dissolve when and where desired. 

This technique is an adaptation of a naturally occurring coating where 

pathogens or germs are either repelled or attracted based on the host

organisms requirement.
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of time with mass aerosol delivery of nanosurface encapsulated 

antibiotics or inoculation to effectively mitigate a terrorist’s desired 

outcome. Nanotechnologies may even aid in improved international law 

application through single molecule detecting sensors. If smart dust 

nanosensors were available in the hunt for forensic evidence of a 

bioterrorist act, this smart dust may actually deter terrorism through 

increased risk of capture and punishment.

Recommended Additional Air Force Study

The Air Force can contribute to President Obama’s biothreat 

strategy through increased emphasis on attribution and detection. 

Therefore, technological developments in genomics, synthetic biology,

and nanotechnology will be important as the Air Force strives to fully 

understand the capability and intent of US adversaries; and when 

punitive actions are necessary, use of nanotaggant identifiers for 

targeting of kinetic weapons. There are, however, a few unanswered 

questions about pragmatic implementation of a bureaucratic network of 

biothreat countermeasures.

How Many Life Science Officers are Enough?

As of January 2010, the total number of active duty officers in the 

Air Force was 65,515 with only 108 (or .17 percent) identified as 

biologists or chemists. These scientists were assigned primarily to 

acquisition organizations supporting programs instrumental to 

development of biological weapon analysis or detection tools. Near-term 
25

increases in life sciences personnel resources may contribute 

significantly toward leading-edge detection capabilities facilitated by the 

same technology that is increasing biothreat likelihood. While .17 percent

of all active duty officers trained and employed as life scientists seems 

paltry, the correct number of truly necessary life science officers is 

currently unknown. A full investigation of the life sciences personnel 

requirement is recommended to determine the appropriate number of 

chemists and biologists required in the scientist officer core.

How Should Information Cross-Flow Occur?

Acquisition and intelligence units currently have no mandated flow 

of information ensuring the scientific efforts to improve biocollection are 

broadly included into future acquisition programs. Likewise, there is no 

institutionalized flow of information from medical officers to the 

intelligence and acquisition communities to capitalize on their knowledge 

of medically related advances in synthetic biology. Developing a 

mechanism for cross-functional communication between the intelligence, 

medical, scientific, and acquisition communities may increase the 

likelihood that the latest developments in life science fields are relayed 

back to acquisition program offices. Institutionalizing this feedback may 

also formalize the communication with the goal of ensuring the most 

relevant detection techniques are considered for incorporation into 

developing programs. It is recommended that the intelligence, 

acquisition, medical, and scientific career fields’ functional communities 
26

investigate an institutionalized cross-flow mechanism for efficient 

distribution of the most current life science information.

Is Life Science Certification Necessary?

All three aspects of the proposed network of countermeasures—

professional policing, increasing attribution, and consequence 

mitigation—may be facilitated by a well-documented professional life 

science community. In some instances, scientists may self-police if they 

believe a sanctioning body might remove a professional license if they are

caught breaking an ethical code or professional oath. An increased 

awareness of scientists’ professional activity, resulting from a 

certification process, may increase attribution capabilities. Additionally, 

international life science laws and treaties may be more effectively 

enforced by a cadre of externally certified life science professionals. It is 

therefore recommended that an industry-accepted certification plan for 

life sciences officers be developed and implemented.

Conclusion—A Network of Countermeasures

Genetics, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology are established 

technologies that have shown incredible rates of advancement. These 

rates of advancement in the life sciences are anticipated to accelerate 

even faster, facilitating further developments which make proliferation of 

biological threats by 2035 almost certain. However, even in a future 

where biological weapons are proliferated to terrorists through 
27

globalization and technological advancements, a bureaucracy can 

develop an effective network of countermeasures to bioterrorism.

The first aspect of this network is professional policing among life 

science professionals through development of an oath of ethical actions. 

A life science oath would “reinforce norms of safe and responsible 

conduct”20 while creating ethical standards within the profession. The 

second aspect in this network is a nanotechnology detection capability to 

permit unambiguous attribution of bioterrorist activity. For example, this 

attribution capability may strip anonymity from bioterrorists and coerce

them toward civil behavior through the use of fluorescing nanotaggants. 

Knowledge of terrorist actions, once communicated in the light of day, 

will increase American credibility and deterrent effectiveness through 

either denial or punishment. The third aspect of this network is 

mitigation of the consequences of terrorists’ desires though development 

of quick response teams capable of rapidly identifying pathogens, 

treating the infected, and inoculating the masses through nanovector 

delivery techniques. Through the use of nanotechnology and improved 

implementation of international life science laws and treaties, an 

increased likelihood of punishment to bioterrorists may be realized. 

Neither the reduction of reward nor increase of risk must be perfect; 

merely disincentivizing the economics of biological weapon use may 

discourage would-be terrorists from investing effort in this area.
28

Developing this network of countermeasures will allow the US

bureaucracy to combat bioterrorism by transforming some scientific 

competitors into collaborators through professional policing. Those who 

cannot be co-opted by peer pressure may be deterred through a removal 

of anonymity brought about with technologically enhanced detection and 

attribution. Finally, bioterrorists undeterred by the loss of anonymity 

may be compelled to halt their behavior through a two-pronged effort to 

mitigate biothreat consequences. This consequence mitigation effort 

would: (1) decrease a terrorist’s motivation by developing quick response 

teams capable of preventing mass American casualties with nanovector

treatment and inoculation; and (2) increase the terrorist’s personal 

jeopardy through nanotechnology-enhanced international law 

enforcement.

Effective Air Force participation in this proposed bureaucratic 

network of countermeasures requires a few foundational questions be 

answered. To reduce risks of a 2035 biothreat and better support the 

2010 National Security Strategy, the Air Force must (1) determine the 

proper level of scientific personnel required; (2) institutionalize crossfunctional communication across the intelligence, scientific, acquisition,

and medical functional communities; and (3) develop an industryaccepted certification program for life science officers. Amid a rapidly 

changing technological environment, accomplishing these actions now 

will decrease future risk in the president’s overall biothreat strategy by 
29

systematically increasing American credibility, capability, and 

communication.

Notes

 

1. Synthetic Biology, http://syntheticbiology.org/ (accessed 27 

September 2010).

2. David M. Burube, Nano-Hype: The Truth Behind The 

Nanotechnology Buzz (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006), 17.

3. John Sulston and Georgina Ferry, The Common Thread: A Story 

of Science, Politics, Ethics, and the Human Genome (Washington, DC:

Joseph Henry Press, 2002), viii.

4. Steven A. Brenner and A. Michael Sismour, “Synthetic Biology,” 

Nature Reviews: Genetics 6, no. 6 (July 2005): 533.

5. Burube, Nano-Hype, 22.

6. Ibid., 193.

7. Sensors Group, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 

“Nanoparticle Sensors and Nanoparticle-Based Detector Systems,” 

http://sensors.lbl.gov/sf_nano.html (accessed December 2010).

8. Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend 

Biology (New York, NY: Viking Penguin Books, 2005), 61–62.

9. Institute of Medicine and National Research Council of the 

National Academies, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of Life 

Sciences (Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2006), 5.
30

 

10. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Seven Deadly Scenarios: A Military 

Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century (New York, NY: Bantam Dell, 

2009), 92.

11. Ibid., 99.

12. Ibid., 113.

13. Daniel Fu-Chang Tsai and Ding-Shinn Chen, “An Oath for 

Bioscientists,” Journal of Biomedical Science, 2003, 

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14576458 (accessed 18 

November 2010), 571. 

14. Raphael Hulkower, “The History of the Hippocratic Oath: 

Outdated, Inauthentic, and Yet Still Relevant,” The Einstein Journal of 

Biology and Medicine 25 and 26, no. 1 (2009–10): 41.

15. Tsai and Chen, “An Oath for Bioscientists,” 569.

16. Pres. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, 24.

17. Lynn E. Foster, Nanotechnology: Science, Innovation, and 

Opportunity (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2006), 218.

18. Chen-Bo Zhong, Vanessa K. Bohns, and Francesca Gino,

“Good Lamps Are the Best Police: Darkness Increases Dishonesty and 

Self-Interested Behavior,” Psychological Science, 29 January 2010, 

http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/01/28/095679760936075

4.abstract (accessed 18 November 2010).

19. M. Farrari, “Nanovector Therapeutics,” Current Opinion in 

Chemical Biology, August 2005, 
31

 

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15967706 (accessed 18 

November 2010). 

20. Obama, National Security Strategy, 24.