AOC Comments (Administrative Oder of Consent) 

Signing the present AOC will not result in significant improvements in protecting drinking water.

The Hawaii State Legislature requested a Task Force to examine: 1. Short and long term effects, 2. 

Strategies to mitigate, 3. Ways to improve communication and 4. Implications of closing.

The Task Force report to the Legislature revealed varied opinions and recommendations among the

parties. 

The Task Force recommends that the Legislature encourage the parties to negotiate an agreement to 

cover the following objectives: to protect drinking water resources, appropriately respond to reported 

releases of petro, and minimize the threat of potential future releases. 

This proposed AOC does not address the Legislature requests or the Task Force objectives. It only agrees

to continue tests, monitoring and additional studies which was always done to some extent. It basically

keeps the status quo.

All parties to the AOC know that past studies indicate that once the water is declared unsafe no 

reasonable/immediate corrective action is possible. There is no emergency plan. Mitigation is difficult, 

costly and may not be possible. 

Unsafe drinking water will affect the entire island populaces and the economy.

Our Congressional delegation should be well aware of this potential problem.

Recommendation to EPA and DOH: Do not sign the proposed AOC in its present state. 

Items of interest

It states that chronic exposure can be harmful to human health. It is..........

EPA states that Red Hill may present imminent and substantial endangerment to health and 

environment. It presents...... At another time it was labeled “critical” 

It states that actions in the AOC may be necessary. It is...... this is the reason for this agreement.

It does not acknowledge the 27K spill as a threat to health.

It does not discuss/address mitigation and remediation.

It does not provide for any meaningful protection for health and environment.

It does not mention that past studies indicate remediation is difficult and costly.
It lacks immediate action.

It is not transparent as to funding and that any A&E studies, all work or fines are subject to the 

availability of funds.

Does the EPA and DOH agree to this AOC version as signed off by the Navy? 

Besides the public’s comments what are EPA and DOH’s comments if any since the Task Force

recommendations and concerns are not addressed?

Additional Items of Interest

Past records show that 30K+ fuel was lost on two occasions. Most tanks have experienced leaks in the 

past.

Red hill is deferred from some Federal and state UST regulations due to the fact that they are field 

constructed tanks.

The policy is to conduct routine maintenance on a tank at least within a 20 year period. Once in 20 

years? 

Other past tank routine maintenance repairs have resulted in a similar failures were welds failed and 

had to be drained and repaired again.

Lacking is the technology, skill and physical ability and equipment to perform proper maintenance on 

the largest, aging tanks in the United States. This is uncharted waters.

Present detection system can detect a 1/16” drop in tank. How many gals does 1/16” equate to? Maybe 

300 gals.

Various detection systems in the past have failed due to various reasons and have been removed. The 

present system may not be sufficient.

It would be interesting to know what triggered the first alarm in the EST 27K spill and subsequent time 

line of events.

In the EST 27K release it took 5 days just to empty the tank. 

Once a detection alarm goes off what are the procedures.

Different products and size of the failure may result in different volume released. Past failures were 

probably due to only pin holes which are difficult to detect.

After the verbal announcement of the spill was given it took many days just to confirm. 
Any free product located will be removed only to the “maximum amount practical”?

Only a token $50K per year is allowed for reimbursement to DOH?

Believe the only method to check the 250 ft. tall tanks are from interior with hand held instruments 

while standing on scaffolds. 

There is no intention to consider secondary containment or any other option.

Additional concern

The underground piping infrastructure below the tanks and transmission line is a concern.

Not addressed is the danger of the aging underground piping infrastructure.

The underground transmission pipes from Red Hill travels 2.5 miles to Hickam and Pearl Harbor are just 

as old.

Are there maintenance/repair records for the underground transmission pipes? 

Any past breaks noted? Is there presently a cathodic/maintenance program in place?