1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r:

____

____ ____ ___ 3 Fi lin g D at e: Jul y

31, 201 7 4 N O. 34, 518 5 STA TE OF NE W MEX ICO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v
. 8 JOHN F ARISH, 9 D ef

en dant- Appe llant. 10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF BER NA LILLO C OUN TY 11 C hr ist in a P . A rg yr es , D ist ri ctJu dg e 12 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 13 San ta Fe, NM 14 John Kloss, A ssistant Attorney Ge neral 15 Albuquerque, N M 16 for Appellee 17 Bennett J. Ba

ur, C hief Public De fender 18 San ta Fe, NM 19 Sergio V iscoli, Appellate D efender 20 Steven J. F orsberg, A ssistant Appellate D efender 21 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 22 fo r Appe llant1 9 I ti s u n d i s p u t e dt h a tDe f e n d a n t ’s r i g h tt a i l l i g h twa s wo rk i n g p r o p e r l y. 1 1 OPIN ION 2 HAN ISEE, Judge. 3 { 1} De fendant John Far ish appeals from the district court’ s on-record af firm ance 4 of his c onvi ct ion s inm etro pol itan c our t f or dr ivi ng a

ve hic le w ithde fe ct ive 5 equipm ent, pursuant to NMSA1978 , S ection 66-3-801 (A ) (1991), and driving under 6 the inf lue nc e (D U I) , pur suant t o N MS A 197 8, S ec tio n 66 -8 -1 02 ( 2010 ). D ef en dant 7 argues t hat the officer who s topp ed his vehicle lacked reasonable suspi cion to su pport 8 t h e s t o p . We a f

f i rm. 9 BACKGRO UND 10 { 2} A t a

ppr oxi m ate ly

1:3 0 a
. m . on Apr il 13, 201 2, D ef en dant w as sto ppe d by 11 Be rn al ill o C ounty

S he ri ff ’ s D ep uty P eter Mar tinez on M ont añ o R oa d ne ar F ourth 12 Stree t in Albuquerque, N ewMexico. T he basis for the stop was that De putyMartinez 13 be lie ve d D ef

en dant w as vio la tin g S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 01( A ) by dr ivi ng a vehic le w ith 14 de fect ive e qui pm en t, spe ci fi ca lly a n im pr ope rl y f unc tio nin g le ft

ta ill igh t. 1 15 De fendant’ s le ft t ai l l i g ht consis ted of two bulbs: a larger upper bulb, and a sm aller 16 low er bul b. Whil e the low er bul b w as lit , the uppe r bul b w as not . A ft er f ir st o bse rv ing 17 De fendant’ s vehicle, D eputy Martinez f

ollowed Def

endant for approxi m at el yone18 quarter m ile, during which tim e he also “ observed som e d riving behaviors that were2

1 poss ible for som eone who m ight b e under the influence. ” Specif ically , he observed 2 D ef en dant s w er

ve w ith in the lane tw ic e in a m an ne r tha t ne ar ly dr ove ove r the lane 3 m a rk i n g s , t h o u g h h e n e v e r s a wD e f e n d a n tl e a v e t h e l a n e o r

t o u c h t h e m a rk i ngs. 4 D ep uty Mart ine z te sti fi ed

that the re w er e no othe r viol at ion s of law an d th at his onl y 5 ba sis f or sto ppi ng Defen dant w as the pe rc ei ve d ta ill igh t vi ola tio n. Upon m ak ing 6 co nta ct w ithD ef

en dant, D ep uty

Mart ine z not ic ed

that D ef en dant h ad

blo odsh ot, 7 wa tery ey es an d t h e sm ell of alcohol com ing from his facial ar ea. De putyMartinez 8 th en in it ia te d a DUI in ve st ig at io n, an d Defen da nt w as sub se que nt ly charg edwit h DUI 9 (f ir st o ff en se ) an d op er at ing ave hic le w ithde fe ct ive e qui pm en t. 10 { 3} Prior t o trial, D efendant requested and the m etropolitan cou rt held an 11 evidentiary

hearing on the questio n of reasonabl e su spicion . A fter D eputy Martinez 12 te sti fie d to the above -c ite d f ac ts, D ef en dant arg ue d th at

the c harg es a ga ins t hi m 13 shou ld b e dis m iss ed

be ca use the te sti m ony

ind ic at ed that D e f e n d an t h ad tw o ta ill igh ts 14 tha t w er e in “ w orkin g cond iti on, ” m eanin g that D ep uty Mart ine z la ck ed r ea sona ble 15 susp icion of a violation of either S ection 66-3-801 (A ) (provi d i ng, am ong o ther 16 thing s, that it is a m isdem eanor to operate a ve h i cl e “ which . . . is not at all tim es 17 equip pe d w ithsuc h la m ps an d othe r equip m en t i n pr ope r co ndi tio n and a dj ustm en t 18 as is re qui re d by

[ N MS A 197 8, §§ 6 6-3- 80 1 to - 887 (1 978, a s am en de d th ro ugh 19 2017 )] ,” or Sec tion 6 6-3-805(A) ( setting forth specific requirem ents for tail lam ps),3

1 an d th at

the re w as no o the r re as ona ble ba sis f

or the sto p. D ef

en dant arg ue d th at

“ the 2 l i g h t , m ayb e a b u l b , b ei n g o u twa s n o tre as o n en o u g h t o p u l l o v e r[D ef en d an t .]” 3 Alter natively , D efendant argued that the stop was pretextual. T he State argued that 4 D ep uty Mart ine z ha d r ea sona

ble sus pic ionbe ca

use part of D ef en dant’ s lef

t t ai lli ght 5 w as not

li t, m ea nin g it w as not “ in p ro pe r co ndi tio n” a s r equir ed by S ec tio n 66 -3
- 6 801( A ). T he S ta te a lso a rg ue d th at D ef en dant fa ile d to m ee t his bur de n of e sta bli shi ng 7 tha t the sto p w as pr et ex tua l. 8 { 4} T he m etro pol itan c ourt f ound that De puty Mart ine z had r ea sona ble sus pic ion 9 to s top D ef

en dant’ s ve hic le ba se d onD ep uty Mart ine z’ s ob se rv at ionthat part of 10 D ef en dant’ s ta ill igh t w as not il lum ina te d. I t re as on ed that “ [o ne ] li ght not w orkin g 11 out of atw o- part lig ht w oul d sti ll be a de fe ct ive equip m en t [ vio la tio n] ” unde r Se ct ion 12 66-3-8 0 1 , i .e ., it wa s a per se violatio n. T he m etropolitan cou rt further found th at 13 there w as no testim ony elicited to supp ort De fendant’ s argum ent that the stop wa s 14 pr et ex tua l and the re fo re de nie d D ef en dant’ s m oti on t o di sm iss on tha t ba sis a s w el l. 15 D ef en dant w as sub se qu ently c onvi ct ed

of D U I (f ir st o ff en se ) an d dr ivi ng a

ve hic le 16 w ithde fe ct ive e qui pm en t. 17 { 5} In his on-record appeal to the district court, D efendant argued th at the trial 18 co urt m isa

ppl ie d S ec tio n 66 -3 -801 b ec au se “ a pla in r ea din g of [ Se ct ion66- 3- 801] 19 ind ic at es that de fe ct ive e qui pm en t i s de fi ne d in[ S] ec tio ns 6 6- 3- 80 1 th ro ugh 66- 3-4

1 887[,] ” m aking it n ecessar y to “ analy ze [ S] ection 66-3-805 (A ), which defines 2 func tio nin g ta il la m

ps[
. ] ” Se ct ion66- 3- 805( A ) pr ovi de s th at “ [e ] ve ry m oto r ve hic le 3
. . . shall be equip ped with at least two tail lam ps m ount ed on the rear” and that such 4 l amp s “ s h al l emit a r ed l i g h t p l ai n l y v i s i b l e fr o m a d i s t an ce o f [5 0 0 ] f ee tt o t h e r ea r[ .]” 5 Ac cording to Defendant, D eputy Martinez f

ailed to articulate fa cts that wo ul d su pport 6 re as ona

ble sus pic ionthat D ef

en dant h ad

vio la te d S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 05( A ) be ca use 7 D ep uty Mart ine z co nc ed ed

that he w as , a t a ll tim es , w ithin 500 f ee t of the r ear of 8 De fend an t ’s vehicle, thus m aking any suspected vio lation sp eculative rather than 9 re as ona

ble
. T he dis tr ic t c ourt a gr ee d wi th D ef en dant tha t “ the re ca

n be no vio la tio n 10 of S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 01 w ithr es pe ct to de fe ct ive ta il[ ] lig hts w ith out r ef er en ce to Se ct ion 11 66- 3- 805” a nd c onc lud ed that “ to the e xte nt D ep uty Mart ine z re lie d on Se ct ion [s ] 66- 12 3- 801 [and - 805( A )] f or ape r se vio la tio n, the [d istri ct c] ourt ag re es the of fi ce r m ad e 13 a m i st a ke of l a w . ” H ow e ve r , t he di str i c t c ourt c on str ue d S e c t i on 66
- 3- 80 5( C ) as 14 pr ovi din g an in de pe nde nt b as is s uppo rt ing the e xiste nce o f re as ona ble sus pic ion
. 15 A cc or din g to the di str ic t c ourt, S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 05( C) r equir es that “ if ata il la m

p is 16 w ir ed to be li ght ed , it

m ust be lit w he n it is dark
. ” T hus, re as one d th e dis tr ic t c ourt, 17 because D eputy

Martinez articulated fac ts that would su pport the conclu s i o n that 18 D ef en dant v iol at ed

S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 05( C) be ca use the upp er , larg er

portio n of

one of 19 D ef en dant’ s ta ill igh ts w as not li ght ed a t 1: 30 a
. m . w he n it

wou ld have be endark ,5

1 there wa s reasonable susp icion to stop D efendant. Ac cordingly , the dis t ri ct co urt 2 af fi rm ed D ef en dant’ s c onvi ct ion s. D ef en dant n owappe al s to thi s C ourt. 3 STA ND AR

DS OF RE VIEW 4 St at ut or y In te rp re ta ti on 5 { 6} “ Statutory interpretation is an issue of l aw , which we reviewde novo.” Sta te 6 v. D uhon , 2005-NMC A- 120, ¶ 10, 138 N. M. 466, 122 P. 3 d 50. “ Our prim ary goal 7 w he n in te rp re tin g st at uto ry la ng uage is to g ive e ff ec t t o th e int en t of

the 8 [L ] egislature.” State v. T orres , 200 6- N MC A -1 06, ¶ 8, 140 N
. M. 230, 141 P. 3d 1 284. 9 “ W e be ginthe se ar chf

or le gis la tiv e int en t by

loo kin g f ir st t o th e w or ds c hose n by the 10 Le gislature and the plain m ean i n g o f th e L egislature’ s language.” Sta te v . D av is , 11 2003 -N MS C- 022, ¶ 6, 134 N
. M. 172 , 74 P
. 3d 1 064 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and 12 ci ta tio n om itt ed ). “ If the langua ge of the statut e is c le ar a nd una m

big uous , w e m

ust 13 give effect to that language and refrain f rom further statutory

interpretation.” Sta te 14 v. Chavez , 201 6- N MC A -0 16, ¶ 7, 365 P. 3d 61 (i nte rn al quot at ionm ar ks and c itatio n 15 om it te d) , cert. gran ted , 20 16 -NMCER T-00 1, 3 70 P.3d 47 4. 16 R ea son ab le S us pi ci on 17 { 7} “ [W ] e d et erm ine constitu tional reasonableness d e novo.” Sta te v . D opslaf , 18 20 15 -NMCA- 09 8, ¶ 7 , 35 6 P .3d 55 9, cert. denied , 201 5- N MC E RT -0 08 , 369 P
. 3d 19 368. “ T he appe llate c ourts w ill f ind r ea sona ble sus pic ionif

the of fi ce r is aw ar e of6

1 specific articulable facts, together with rational in fere nces from those facts, that when 2 j udge d ob

j ec tiv el y , w oul d le ad

ar ea sona

ble pe rs on t o be lie ve c riminal a ct ivi ty 3 occurred or w as occurring.” Id

. ¶ 8 (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). 4 “ A police off

icer m ay stop a vehicle if he has an obje ctively rea sonable su spicion that 5 the m otorist h as violated a traff ic law .” Sta te v . V

ande nbe rg , 2002 -N MC A -0 66, ¶ 17, 6 13 2 N.M. 35 4, 4 8 P .3d 92 , re v’d on oth er gro unds , 2003 -N MS C- 030, 134 N
. M. 566 , 7 81 P. 3d 19. “ T he subj ec tiv e bel ie f of the of fi ce r doe s no t i n it se lf

a ff ec t the va lid ity 8 of the stop; it is the evidence known to the officer that c ount s, not the officer ’ s view 9 of the governin g law. ” Sta te v . H ubbl e , 2009 -N MS C- 014, ¶ 8, 146 N
. M. 70, 206 P
. 3d 10 579 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). “ [I ] f anof fi ce r m istak en ly 11 be lie ve s th at

c er ta in c ondu ct vio la te s one sta tut e, but tha t c ondu ct in fa ct vio la te s a 1 2 d i ff er en ts t at u t e, re as o n ab l e s u s p i ci o n ex i s t s t o s t o p th e s u s p ec td es p i t e th e o ff i ce r’s 13 m istake of law. ” State v. M oseley , 2014 -N MCA -033, ¶ 15, 320 P.3d 517. “ [W ] e can 14 igno re [ an officer ’ s] inappropriate refe rence to [the wr ong st atute] in the citation [he] 15 prepare[ s] . I f his observation s provid ed rea sonable grou nds to believe that another 16 statute was being violated, .
. . the stop was val i d , regardless of his incorrect 17 understandi ng of the law. ” Sta te v . M unoz , 199 8- N MC A -1 40, ¶ 9, 125 N
. M. 765, 965 18 P. 2d 3 49.7

1 DISC US SION 2 { 8} D ef

en dant arg ue s th at

both co urts be low er

re d in co nstru ing the r equir em en ts 3 of the N ewMe xic o M oto r V eh ic le Co de , N MS A 197 8, §§ 66- 1- 1 to - 8- 141 (1 978, 4 as a m en de d th ro ugh 2016 ), spe ci fi ca lly S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 05( A ) an d (C ) (t ai l l am ps) , a nd 5 in determ ining whether the fac ts of this case gave rise to rea sonable su spicion that 6 D ef en dant w as ope ratin g ave hic le in vio la tio n th er eo f. T he St at e ar gue s th at D ep uty 7 Mart ine z’ s te st im ony

sup porte d ac onc lus ionthat he ha d r ea sona ble sus pic ionto 8 investig ate a potenti al equ ipm ent violatio n under either Sections 6 6-3-805(A) or (C). 9 T he S ta te a ls o ch al le nge s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ionthat “ the re c anbe no 10 violatio n of Section 66-3-801 with respect to defective tail[] light s without refer ence 11 to S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 05” a nd arg ue s th at Se ct ion 66- 3- 801( A ) pr ovi de d an i nde pe nde nt 12 ba sis f

or avio la tio n bec au se D ef

en dant’ s lef

t tai lli ght w as “ in s uc h un sa fe c ondi tio n 13 as to en dange r an y pe rs on.” W e co nsi de r the part ie s’ a rg um en ts i n turna nd, 14 ult im at el y , w he the r the fac ts i n th e re co rd sup port the c onc lus ionthat D ep uty 15 Mart ine z ha d r ea sona

ble sus pic ionthat De fe ndant w as c om m itt ing atr af

fi c vio la tio n 16 by dr ivi ng a ve hic le w itham al func tio nin g ta ill igh t. 17 Sect io n 6 6- 3- 80 5( A) 18 { 9} De fendant argues that there ar e in sufficient fac ts to su pport a finding that 19 D ep uty Mart ine z ha d re as ona ble sus pic ion tha t D ef

en dant vio la te d Se ct io n 6 6-3-8

1 805( A ) by

dr ivi ng a ve hic le w ithale ft ta ill igh t in whic h th e larg er upp er bul b w as not 2 w orkin g. I n or de r to h av e suc h r ea sona ble su sp ic io n, the of

fi ce r m ust be able to 3 ar t i cu l at e f

ac t s t h at wo u l d

s up p o rt a r ea s o n ab l e i n fe re n ce t h at t h e s ub je ct v eh i cl e’s 4 ta ill igh ts fa ile d to “ em it a re d light pla inl y vis ibl e fr om a dist an ce of [5 00] f ee t t o th e 5 rear . ” Se ct ion66- 3- 805( A ); see D opslaf , 2 0 1 5
- N M C A
- 0 9 8 , ¶

8
. H e r e , D ep uty 6 Mart ine z co nc ed ed

that he w as ne ve r 500 fe et or m or e aw ay fr om D ef en dant’ s ve hic le 7 an d th at

his opi nio n th at

D ef en dant’ s ve hic le w oul d not be vis ibl e at adis tanc e of

500 8 feet was “ an as su m

pt io n bas ed of

f of pr io r in ci de n[ ts he ha s] ha d v ie win g v eh ic le s.” 9 Bo t ht h e met ro p o l i t an co u rt an dt h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt ag re ed t h at De p u t y M ar t i n ez ’s 10 testim ony

failed to establish facts that would supp ort reasonable suspicio n of a 1 1 v i o l at i o n b as ed o n Se ct i o n 6 6 -3 -8 0 5 (A ). We, to o , co n cl u d e t h at De p u t y M ar t i n ez ’s 12 spe cu la ti ve te stim ony a s to w he the r D ef

en dant’ s le ft

ta ill igh t w oul d or

w oul d no t 13 ha ve be en vis ibl e fr om 500 f ee t aw ay is ins uf fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh r ea sona

ble sus pic ion
. 14 See State v. Martinez , 201 5- N MC A -0 51, ¶ 15, 348 P. 3d 1 022 (“ T he c onst itu tio na lity 15 of a stop pr em ise d up on r ea sona ble sus pic ionc an not

be ba se d up on s pe cu la tio n or 16 co njec tu re.”) , cert. gran ted , 201 5- N MC E RT -0 05, 367 P
. 3d 4 41. 17 Sect io n 6 6- 3- 80 5( C) 18 { 10} D ef

en dant n ex t arg ue s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt im

prope rl y a ff irm ed his 19 convictio ns based on its interpretation of Section 66-3-805 (C) as p ro v i ding an9

1 alternati v e b as is for finding th at D eputy Martinez had r easonable susp icion that 2 D e f e n d a n twa s v i o l a t i n g t h e l a w . S e c t i o n 6 6
- 3
- 8 0 5 ( C ) p r o v i d e s , i n i t s e n t i r e t y: 3 E ith er

ata il la m

p or ase parate lam

p sh al l be so co nstru ct ed

a nd 4 pla ce d a s to ill um ina te w ithaw hit e lig ht the r ear re gis tr at ionplate a nd 5 re nde r it cl earl y

le gib le f ro m adis tanc e of

[ 50] f ee t t o th e re ar . A ny

ta il 6 la m

p or ta il la m ps, tog ethe r w itha ny

se parate lam

p f or il lum ina tin g th e 7 re ar

r eg istratio n pl at e, sha ll be so w ir ed as to be lig hte d w he ne ve r the 8 he ad la m

ps o r au xil iary

dr ivi ng l am

ps are li ght ed
. 9 Divorcing the provisi on’s sec ond sent ence f rom the first, the district court construed 10 the se co nd s en te nc e to “ m ean th at if ata il la m

p is w ir ed to be lig hte d, it m ust be li t 11 w he n it

is dark
. ” Appl y ing it s in te rp re ta tio n of S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 05( C) to the f ac ts, the 12 dis tr ic t c ourt no te d th at D ep uty Mart ine z “ ar

tic ula te d f

ac ts t o su ppor t a r easo nable 13 sus p i ci on [ tha t] D ef

en dant v iol at ed

S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 01 b ec au se his ta il[ ] lig hts w er e not 14 li t as req ui redby Secti on 66 -3 -8 05 (C).” 15 { 11} W e conclude that the district court erred in interpreting Section 66-3-805(C). 16 “ When expoun ding a st atute, we m ust not be guid ed by a single sentence or m em ber 17 of ase nte nc e, but

loo k to the pr ovi sio ns of th e who le law , a nd t o it s ob j ec t and 18 policy .” Starko, Inc. v. N.M . H uman Servs. D ep’t , 2014 -N MS C- 033, ¶ 35, 333 P
. 3d 19 947 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). Re ad in its e nti re ty , S ec tio n 66 -3
- 20 805( C) de al s pr im ar ily , if not e xc lus ive ly , w ithil lum ina tio n of the r ear re gis tr at ion 21 pla te . T he f

ir st s en te nc e re qui re s th at the li cen se pl at e be vis ibl e 50 f ee t aw ay . T he 22 se co nd s en te nc e, r equir ing a ny ta il la m p or la m ps to “be so w ir ed

a s to be li ght ed ” in10

1 co nj unc tio n w ithhe ad la m ps, c an be st be unde rs too d as furthe r re qui ri ng tha t the ta il 2 la m ps and r ear re gis tr at ionplate a re a illum in at e sim ult an eo usl y

w ithhe ad la m

ps. 3 Be ca u s e t h e g r a v a m e n o f

S e c t i o n 6 6
- 3
- 8 0 5 ( C ) i s d i r e c t e dt o w a r dt h e l i c e n s e pla te 4 be ing ill um ina te d an d the re w as no te sti m ony w ha tso ev er

r eg ar din g w he the r or

not 5 De fendant’ s license plate wa s, or any indication t hat the requisite wiring wa s 6 unl ink ed

to the he ad la m

ps, th e dis tr ic t c ourt i m

pr ope rl y r el ie d up on S ec tio n 66 -3
- 7 805(C) to fin d t h at De p uty Martinez had r easonable susp icion of a violation based 8 solely upon a partial f

ailure of one taillight to fullyillum inate. 9 { 12} At this j uncture of the an al ysi s, D efendant appears to ar gue that our inq uiry 10 en ds an d re ve rs al is re qui re d be ca use D ep uty Mart ine z fa ile d to ar tic ula te facts 11 sufficient to supp ort the existence of re asonable sus pic i o n that De fendant had 12 violated Section 66 -3-805(A) or (C) and because there is no independ ent basis for a 13 ta ill igh t vi ola ti on un de r Se ct ion66- 3- 801( A ). W e dis ag re e an d ne xt c onsi de r the 14 St at e’ s cont en tio n that de fe ct ive ta ill igh ts cou ld con sti tut e a v iol at ionof S ec tio n 66
- 15 3- 801( A ) ev enabse nt a pe r se vio la tio n of

S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 05. 16 Sect io n 6 6- 3- 80 1( A) 17 { 13} T he S ta te dir ec ts u s to M unoz , wh ere t hi s C ou rt c on st ru edSect io n 6 6- 3- 80 1( A) 18 as “ providi ng three alternative way s that a v ehicle would be covered” by the statute: 19 (1) it is in such un safe c ondi tion as to end anger any person, (2) it does 20 not

c ont ai n those part s or

is not a t a ll tim es e qui ppe d w ithsuc h lam ps11

1 and other equipm ent in proper conditi on and a djustm ent as is required 2 by

S ec tio ns 6 6- 3- 801 th ro ugh 66- 3- 887, or ( 3) it is equip pe d ina ny 3 m an ne r tha t i s invio la tio n of tho se se ct ion s. 4 M unoz , 199 8- N MC A -1 40, ¶ 10 ( int er

na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks o m itt ed). Given our 5 pr ev iou s ana ly si s regar din g S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 05—the onl y one of the se ct ion s 6 re fe re nc ed

in the se co nd an d thi rd al te rn at ive s un de r Se ct ion66- 3- 801( A ) ap pli ca ble 7 to t ai lli ght s—w e ne ed onl y e xa m ine w ha t c onst itu te s a viola tio n un de r the f ir st 8 alternative. Discussing the requirem ent that vehicles be safe, the M unoz Court stated 9 th at “ i t i s a m isdem eanor to drive on the high way a vehicle that is in such uns afe 10 conditi on as to endanger any person.” Id

. (i nte rn al quot at ionm ar

ks o m itt ed ). Whil e 11 re fe re nc es to the e qui pm en t r equir em en ts o f Se ct ion s 66 -3 -8 01 t o - 887 in the se co nd 12 an d t h ird alt ern at iv es est ab li sh what co ul d b e co ns id ered pe r se vi ol at io ns , M unoz 13 ex pla ins that the langua ge r ef er ri ng t o ve hic le s “ in s uc h un safe co nditio n a s to 14 endanger any

person” establishes an a l ternative w ay of violating the statute even 15 w he re ave hic le ’ s e qui pm en t i s othe rw ise c om pli an t w ith Se ct ion s 66- 3- 801 to - 887. 16 M unoz , 199 8- N MC A -1 40, ¶ 10 ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks o m itt ed ). T hus, S ec tio n 66
- 17 3- 801 pe na liz es dr ive rs w ho dri ve “ a ve hic le that i s in an unsa fe co ndi tio n, r eg ar dle ss 18 of w he the r it is b ei ng dri ve n un sa fe ly at the t im e. . . . I t i s th e ri sk o f harm , not it s 19 realization[,] that coun t s.” M unoz , 199 8- N MC A -1 40, ¶ 12. W e unde rs tand S ec tio n 20 66- 3- 801( A ) to e ff

ec tiv el y de cl ar e tha t a ve hic le not

e qui ppe d inc om

pli an ce w iththe12

1 re qui re m en ts o f Se ct ion s 66 -3 -8 01 t o - 887 is “ unsa fe ” as a m atte r of law , a nd t o a lso 2 allow for situatio ns where properly -equipped vehi cles m ay n on e the l e ss b e considered 3 “ un sa fe” wh ere s pe ci fic fa c t s es tabl is h t ha t t he ve hi cl e’s “ un sa fe co nd it io n . . . 4 en dange r[ s] a ny

pe rs on. ” Se ct ion66- 3- 801( A ); se e, e . g. , M unoz , 199 8- N MC A -1 40, 5 ¶ 11 ( ex pla ini ng tha t “ not a ll w ind shi el d cr ac ks obsc ur e the dr ive r’ s vi sio n, a t l ea st 6 not e noug h to c onst itu te asa fe ty ha zard
. Bu t w he n th ey

do c onst itu te suc h a ha zard , 7 one w ho dri ve s th e ve hic le cr eate s a dange r to the pub lic that i s pr ohi bit ed by S ec tio n 8 66- 3- 801” ). W e thu s a gr ee w iththe S ta te that th e distri ct c ourt w as inc or

re ct to 9 co nc lud e tha t the re c anbe no v iol at ionof S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 01 (A) w ithr es pe ct to 10 tailligh ts without refe rence to Section 66-3-80 5. T he question then becom es whether 11 the f ac ts i n thi s ca se supp ort an ind ep en de nt fi ndi ng of a vio la tio n of S ec tio n 66 -3
- 12 801( A ) ba se d onthe “ unsa fe c ondi tio n” pr ovi sio n. 13 { 14} T he S ta te a rg ue s that D ep uty Mart ine z ar tic ula te d a“ ge ne ra l sa fe ty c onc er n” 14 tha t othe r dr ive rs w oul d no t be able to se e D ef en da nt’ s ve hic le w he n a

ppr oa ch ing 15 fr om the r ear be ca

use of D ef en dant’ s part ia l t ai lli ght

m al func tio n. T he St ate poi nts 16 to D ep uty Mart ine z’ s tes tim ony tha t he wa s conc er ne d abou t the ta ill igh t no t w orkin g 17 pr ope rl y

“ due to vis ibi lity , ” m eaning tha t he tho ught the ta ill igh t w as “ not

alarg e 18 en oughli ght

to giv e oth er

dr ive rs pr ope r aw ar en es s of the ve hic le
. ” T his , the S ta te 19 cl ai m s, w as suf

fi ci en t e vid en ce to supp ort a fi ndi ng tha t D ef en dant’ s ve hic le w as “ in13

1 suc h un sa fe c ondi tio n a s to e ndange r an y pe rs on ” in vio la tio n of S ec tio n 66 -3
- 2 801( A ), the re by

sup portin g th e co nc lu sio n th at D ep uty Mart ine z ha d r ea sona

ble 3 susp icion to st op Defe ndant. W e disagree. 4 { 15} When asked to describe th e t ra ffic in the ar ea at the tim e, De putyMartinez 5 stated, “ [t] here w ere a fe w other vehicles, not within the im m ediate ar ea, but there 6 we re a fewother vehicles on the road. I t wa s light but very little traff ic, but th ere we re 7 oth er ve hic le s onthe ro adw ay . ” D ep uty Mart ine z ne ith er te sti fi ed that he c oul d no t 8 se e Defendant’ s vehicle nor articulated fac ts from which it could be inferre d that 9 De putyMartinez believed that either he, D efen d an t , o r anyother person was 10 “ en dange re d” by

the c onditi on of

the le ft ta ill igh t. A s w iththe ins uf fi ci en cy of 1 1 De p u t y M ar t i n ez ’s as s u m p t i o n t h at h e w o u l dn o t h av e b ee n ab l e t o s ee De fe n d an t ’s 12 ta ill igh ts had he be en m or e than 50 0 f ee t aw ay , his te sti m ony

r eg ar din g w ha t the S ta te 13 describes to be a “ general safe ty concern” does not m eet the constitutio nal 14 requirem ent of a parti culariz ed su sp ic io n to su pp or t it s re as on ab le ne ss . See State v. 15 Jason L. , 200 0- N MS C- 018, ¶ 20, 129 N
. M. 119, 2 P
. 3d 8 56 ( “ A r ea sona ble sus pic ion 16 is a particularize d susp icion , b as ed on all the circum stances that a particular 17 indiv idual, the one detained, is br eaking, or has broken, the law. ”). While we agree 18 w iththe S ta te that i t i s p os si bl e fo r a ve hic le ’ s part ia lly -m al func tio nin g ta ill igh t t o 19 give rise to reasonable suspi cion of a violation of Sec tion 6 6-3-801(A)’ s “ unsafe14

1 co ndi tion” provi sio n w ith out r ef er en ce to Se ct ion66- 3- 805, w e dis ag re e tha t the 2 fact ua l reco rdof t hi s ca se su pp or ts th atco nc lu si on . See State v . A naya , 20 08 -NMCA3 020, ¶ 1 9 , 1 4 3 N
. M
. 4 3 1 , 1 7 6 P
. 3 d1 1 6 3 ( c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r t h e r e w a s s u f

f i ci en t 4 evidence to supp ort reasonable s uspicio n of a violatio n of New Me xico’ s turn sign al 5 statut e, S ec tio n 66 -7 -3 25( A ), w hic h r equir es the use of a tur n sig na l “ in the e ve nt any 6 other traff

ic m ay be aff ected by [the vehicle’ s] m ovem ent[,] ” an d co ncludin g that 7 while “ there could be cases in w hich the officer’ s v eh icle could be consid ered 8 affe cted traf

fic,
. . . [i] n our case, the fac ts as articulated by the officer do not suppo rt 9 vi ol at io n o f th e tu rnsi gn al law” ), abroga te d on oth er gro unds byD opslaf

, 201 5- 10 N MC A -0 98. 11 Wh ethe r Any Othe r Pro vi si on of t he Mo to r Vehi cl e Cod e Pro vi ded a Reas onab le 12 Ba sis f

or t he S to p 13 { 16} “ Our obligation as a review ing court is to ob j ectively j udge the circum stances 14 known to the of

fi ce r to d eterm in e whe the r fr om the c ir cu m stanc es ar ea sona ble 15 person would believe that cri m i n al ac tivityoccurre d or wa s occurring.” State v. 16 G oodm an , 2017-NMC A- 010, ¶ 14, 389 P. 3d 31 1. As a review ing court, we consider 17 the facts in the re cord, which De fendant does not dispu te, and determ ine whether they 18 could su pport reasonable susp icion of a violatio n of the Motor Vehicle C ode on ot her 19 gr ou nd s. See H

ubbl e , 2009-NMS C-014, ¶ 29 (explainin g that the reviewing court 20 m ust sti ll de te rm ine “ if

the re w er e oth er

f ac ts s ur ro un di ng th e of

fi ce r’ s de ci sio n to15

1 co nduc t t he tra ffic s top that c oul d pr ovi de the obj ec tiv e gr ound s f or r ea sona ble 2 sus pic ion ”) ; Sta te v . G all egos , 200 7- N MS C- 007, ¶ 26, 141 N
. M. 185 , 152 P
. 3d 8 28 3 (h old ing that the appe llate co urt w ill a ff irm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n if it is ri ght 4 fo r an y r ea son, so l ong as it

is not unf ai r to the appell an t); Sta te v . W ils on , 199 8- 5 N MC A -0 84, ¶

17, 125 N
. M. 390, 962 P. 2d 636 (“ Appe llate co urts u sua lly appl y the 6 ri ght f or an y reasonba sis of

a ff irm an ce to str ic tly

le ga l qu es tio ns. ”)
. T he ult im at e 7 que sti on i n ar ea so nable sus pic ionc ha lle nge is “ w he the r the f ac ts ava ila

ble to the 8 of fi ce r w ar rant the of

fi ce r, a s ape rs on o f reaso na bl e cauti on, to be lie ve the a ct ion 9 taken was a

ppropriate.” H

ubbl e , 200 9- N MS C- 014, ¶ 8. Thus “ in e va lua tin g th e 10 pr op rie ty of a ve hi cl e st op , th e reas on ab le , ex pe rie nc ed of fic er sta nd ardall ows 11 consideration o f all f

acts that the officer

knew at the tim e, whether or not the officer 12 actually

considered or later ver

balized those f

actors as the rea son for the stop .” Sta te 13 v. V arga s , 199 5- N MC A -0 91, ¶ 13, 120 N
. M. 416 , 902 P
. 2d 5 71. In ot he r w or ds, if 14 there is another statutory basis for suppo rting Dep u t y M ar tinez’ s susp icion that 15 D ef en dant w as vio la tin g th e lawby dr iv in g a veh ic le w ithata ill igh t w hos e l ar ger 16 u p p e r b u lb w a s n o t li t , the stop wa s reasonable. 17 { 17} We b e g i n b y o b s e rv i n g t h a t o p e r a t i n g a mo t o r v e h i c l e up o n p ub l i c h i g h w a ys 18 in New Mex ic o i s a p riv i l e g e , n ot a ri gh t. Se e, e.g ., § 66 -1 -4
. 16( S) ( de fi nin g 1 9 “ s u s p en s i o n ” a s u s ed wi t h i n t h e M o t o r V eh i cl e C o d e a s m ea n i n g t h a t “ a p er s o n ’s16

1 dr ive r’ s li ce nse and p r i v i l e g e t o d r i v e a m o t o r

v e h ic le o n the publ ic highway s are 2 tem porarily withdraw n” (em

phasis add ed)); I

n re Suazo , 199 4- N MS C- 070, ¶ 31, 117 3 N
. M. 785 , 877 P
. 2d 1 088 (B ac a, J. , spe ci al ly c onc ur ri ng) ( ex pla ini ng tha t “ ope ratin g 4 a m otor vehicle in NewMexico i s a p rivilege, not a right”). Our Le gislature has 5 enum erate d in the Motor Ve hicle Code the m any responsibi lities and ob ligation s that 6 acco m pa ny tha t p riv il eg e. See §§ 6 6- 1- 1 to -8 -1 41. A s dis cu sse d ab ove , in Se ct ion s 7 66-3-801 to -8 87 the Legislature set forth specific , te chnical, e quip m ent-relate d 8 requirem ents for all m otor vehicles and provided in S ection 66-3-801 (A ) that failure 9 to com ply with those req

ui r e m e nt s c on st i t

ut e s a m i sd e m eanor. The Le gislature further 10 pr ovi de d th at

dr ive rs m

ust en sur e tha t the equip m en t onthe ir ve hic le is ge ne ra lly

in 11 “ good w orkin g or de r” in or de r to o pe rate the ve hic le on p ubl ic hig hw ay s. S ec tio n 66
- 12 3- 901 (“

N o pe rs on s ha ll dr ive or

m ove on any

hig hw ay a ny m oto r ve hic le
. . . unl es s 13 the equipm ent up o n ev er y vehicle is in goo d working order and adj ustm ent as 14 required in the Motor Vehicle Code.”)
. 15 { 18} W e u nd ers ta nd Sect io n 6 6- 3- 90 1 t o i m po se an a ddi tio na l r eq

uir em ent—

that t he 16 equip m en t ondr ive n ve hic le s f unc tio n pr ope rl y

—a bove a nd b ey ond tho se 17 spe ci fi ca lly

pr ovi de d for in Se ct ion s 66-3 -8 01 to -887
. T he dis se nt’ s c ri tic ism of thi s 18 an al y sis m ist ak es that i t e xpand s uponthe m or e spe ci fi c ta ill igh t e qui pm en t 19 req ui rem en ts of S ect io n 6 6- 3- 80 5. See Dissent ¶ 24. Section 66-3-805 (A ), however,17

1 es ta bli she s sp ec if

ic vis ibi lity

r equir em en ts s ep ar ate an d apar t f ro m S ec tio n 66 -3
- 2 901’ s r equir em en t tha t e qui pm en t onave hic le , inc lud ing w ith in the ve hic le ’ s ta il 3 la m ps, ope rate pr ope rl y . I n othe r w or ds, the statut es re fl ec t dif fe re nt pur pose s, do n ot 4 overlap, opera te independentl y from one another, and neither conflict with nor render 5 a nullity the requirem ents of t he other. Our analy sis is further gu ided by the rule that 6 the statut e or statut es w hose co nstru ct ion is in ques tio n ar e to “ be re ad in c onne ct ion 7 with other statutes concerning the sam e subjec t m att er [.] ” Qua nt um Co rp . v. N.M. 8 Taxation & Re venue D ep’t , 1998 -N MC A -0 50, ¶ 8, 125 N
. M. 49, 956 P
. 2d 8 48. Whil e 9 w e ac know le dge that S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 01( A ) re qui re s th at a ll ve hic le s be e qui ppe d “ in 10 pr ope r co ndi tio n and adj ustm en t as is re qui re d by S ec tio ns 6 6- 3- 801 thr ough66- 3- 11 887[,] ” w e conclude that the Legislature intended for th e “ g ood working o rder” 12 re qui re m en t i n S ec tio n 66 -3 -9 01 t o be un de rs too d di ff er en tly than S ec tio n 66 -3
- 13 80 1( A)’s “ pr op er co nd it io n” pro vi si on . Cf

. A m . F ed ’n of Sta te, Ct

y. & M un. E m ps. 14 (A F SC M E ) v. Ci tyof A lbu que rque , 2013-NMC A- 063, ¶ 5, 304 P.3d 443 (“ Statutes 15 m ust a lso be c onst

ru ed so tha t no part

of the statut e is r en de re d surp lu sage or 16 supe rf luo us [. ] ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ))
. A pla in r ea din g of 17 Se ct ion66- 3- 901 le ad s to the c onc lus ionthat the L eg isl at ur e inten ds tha t a ll 18 equip m en t onave hic le be in not onl y w orkin g or de r but good

working order, which 19 re qui re m en t a

ppl ie s to not

onl y S ec tio ns 6 6- 3- 801 to - 887 but the e nti re Mo tor18

1 Veh ic le Co de , of wh ic h S ect io n 6 6
- 3
- 9 0 1 i ts el f is a pa rt. See D uhon , 2 2005 -N MC A -1 20, ¶ 10 (“ Whe n the langua ge in a statut e is c le ar

a nd una m

big uous , 3 we give effe ct to that language and refrain fr om further statutory

interpretation.”)
. 4 { 19} The uncontroverted fac ts, here , are that De putyMartinez noticed that the left 5 tailligh t on Defe ndant’s vehicle wa s “ not w orking p roperly .” Specific ally , the e ntire 6 upp e r , l a r ge r po rt i on of t he t a i l l i gh t w a s no t l i t . I n hi s st a t e m e nt of app e l l a t e issues 7 to the dis tr ic t c ourt, D ef en dant a cknow le dge d th at he “ ha d one ta il[ lig ht] tha t wa s no t 8 wo rk i n g at 1 0 0 p er []c en t ” a n dd es cr i b ed t h e l ef tt ai l l i g h tas “ n o two rk i n g p er fe ct l y[.]” 9 Bu t a ppl y ing Se ct ion 66- 3- 901, D ef en dant’ s c ont en tio n th at

“ the li ght , m ay

be abul b, 10 be ing out was not

r ea son en oughto pul l ov er [ D ef en dant] ” is i nc or

re ct . A ta ill igh t 11 bul b be ing bur

ne d ou t m eans t hat no t a ll equip m en t onD ef en dant’ s ve hic le w as in 12 working order, let alone good w orkin g or de r as r equir ed by S ec tio n 66 -3 -9 01. T hus, 13 w hil e a bul b be ing out m ay not ha ve be en en ough to giv e ri se to re as ona ble sus pic ion 14 of ape r se vio la tio n of Se ct ion 66- 3- 805( A ) or ( C) or a n “ unsa fe c ondi tio n” vio la tio n 15 of S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 01( A ), it

w as e noug h to e sta

bli sh r ea sona

ble sus pic ion of a vio la tio n 16 of Sect io n 6 6- 3- 90 1 t o ju st if y t he en su in g s to p. Se e H ubbl e , 2009-NMS C-014, ¶ 9 17 (e xpl ai nin g th at

“ [t ] he de te rm ina tio n of

w he the r [an of

fi ce r] ha d r ea sona ble sus pic ion 18 to m ake [a ] traff

ic stop does not hinge on w hether [the d] efendant actually violated 19 the underly ing
. . . statute”); Moseley , 201 4- N MC A -0 33, ¶ 15; M unoz , 19 98 -NMCA-19

1 140, ¶ 9. Ultim ately , w e conclude that it can hardly be considered unreasonable, as 2 w oul d Ju dge G ar ci a in thi s c ir cu m stanc e, f or a n of fi ce r to h av e re as ona

ble sus pic ion 3 tha t the lawis be ing vio la te d whe n he obse rv es a m al func tio nin g light on a ve hic le 4 th at is be in g dri ve n on a pu bl ic hi gh way at n ig ht
. See D iss en t ¶

¶ 28- 29. Bu t S ec tio n 5 66- 3- 901 doe s no t r equir e tha t an of fi ce r loo k as kanc e in som e ins tanc es in w hic h a 6 ve hic le ’ s e qui pm en t i s no t i n go od w orkin g or de r; r athe r, it re qui re s ve hic le s’ 7 equip m en t t o op er at e pr ope rl y . T o hol d tha t an of fi ce r la ck s re as ona

ble sus pic ionto 8 pul l ov er

ave hic le in N ewMe xic o up on o bser va ti on of ata ill igh t bu lb n ot 9 ill um ina tin g w oul d be m ar ke dly inc onsi ste nt w ith the pur pose of the Mo tor

V eh ic le 10 Co de as app li cab le to th e p riv il eg e th atis d r i v i n g in New Mex ic o. See State v. 11 H erre ra , 197 4- N MS C- 037, ¶ 6, 86 N .M. 22 4, 522 P
. 2d 7 6 ( ex pla ini ng tha t c ourts 12 “ will not construe statutes to achieve an absurd result or to defea t the intended o bje ct 13 of the [ L ] eg isl at

ur e” ). Be ca

use D ep uty

Mart ine z ar

tic ulate d sp ec if

ic f ac ts i ndi catin g 14 tha t the e qui pm en t onD ef en dant’ s ve hic le w as “ not w orkin g pr ope rl y ”— i. e. , w as not 15 in g ood w orkin g or de r— he ha d r ea sona

ble sus pic ionto be lie ve that a tra ffi c la w, 16 ev enif

not the one he ha d inm ind

a t the ti m e or

a t tri al , w as be ing vio la te d. 17 D ef en da nt ’s C lai m U nd er t he N ew M ex ic o C on st it ut ion 18 { 20} In his reply

brief, De fendant rai s es for the fir st tim e a c laim under Article II, 19 Section 10 of the Ne w Mexico Consti tutio n. D efendant couches his new ar gum ent as20

1 re spon din g to the S ta te ’ s c itatio n init s answ er br ie f to H

ei en v . No rth Ca rol ina , ___ 2 U
. S. ___ , 135 S
. Ct
. 530 ( 2014 ), a s su ppor t f or the pr opos iti on t ha t the F ourth 3 A m en dm en t of

the U nit ed

S ta te s C onst itu tio n pe rm its inv es tig at or y tr af fi c sto ps b y 4 of fi ce rs ba se d onm ist ak es of law . W e ini tia lly

not e tha t our ca se law is c le ar that the 5 N ew Me xic o Cons tit

uti on af fo rd s no gr eate r pr ote ct iona ga ins t i nve sti ga tor y tr af fi c 6 st op s th an do es th e Fo ur th Am en dm en t. Se e Sta te v . Yazzi e , 201 6- N MS C- 026, ¶ 38, 7 376 P. 3d 8 58 ( “ A lth oughw e ha ve int er pr et ed A rt ic le I I, S ec tio n 10 to pr ovi de 8 b r o a d e r

p r o t e c t i o n s a g a i n s tu n r e a s o n ab l e s e a r c h a n ds e i z u r e t h a n t h e F our th 9 Am endm ent in som e contexts, w e have never inter p reted th e N ewMexico 10 Constitu tion to require m ore than a rea sonable su spicion that the law is being o r has 11 been broken to cond uct a tem porary , inv estigatory traff ic stop[.] ” (c itation o m itted)). 12 W e ne xt n ote that He ien does not alter the basic reasonable suspicion analy sis un der 13 the F ourth A m en dm en t bu t m er el y pr ovi de s th at an of

fi ce r’ s m ist ak e of

law , if 14 re as ona

ble , doe s no t m ak e a sto p pe r se unr ea sona bl e an d thus a

vio la tio n of

the 15 Fo ur th Am en dm en t. See H eien , 135 S. Ct. at 539 (e xplaini ng that “ the m istake of law 16 re la te s to the a nte ce de nt que sti on o f w he the r it was r ea sona ble f or a n of fi ce r to 17 sus pe ct

that the de fe ndant’ s co nduc t w as ill eg al
. If so, the re w as no vio la tio n of the 18 Fo urth A m en dm en t in the fi rs t pla ce ”)
. D ef en dant a ppe ar s to arg ue that He ien cre ates 19 a novel opp ortunity to c onsid er whether the Ne w Mexico Constitu tion af fords m ore21

1 ex pansi ve pr ote c t i o nth anth e Fo urth A m en dm en t i n th e co nte xt o f inv es tig at or y sto ps 2 ba se d on re as ona

ble m ist ak es of

law , thu s po te nti al ly

e xc usi ng h is f

ai lur e to p re se rv e 3 thi s c ha lle nge be low
. H ow ev er , w e ne ed not r ea chthat i ssu e be ca

use the ba sis f

or our 4 af fi rm an ce is not

that D ep uty

Mart ine z m ad e a re as ona ble m ist ak e of law , m ak ing it 5 unnecessary

for us to consid er whether D efendant should be perm itted to m ake an 6 unpreserved ch al lenge in ligh t of He ien . Mor eover, we note that Def endant does 7 nothin g m or e to d ev el op his ar gum en t than pr ovi de an ex plana tio n re gard ing w hy he 8 did not r ai se thi s is sue be lowa nd c ite a sin gle , dis tin gui sha

ble c as e fo r the 9 pr opos iti on tha t “ the N e w M e x i c o C o n s t i t

u t i o np r o v i de s gr eate r pr ote ct ion[ re gard ing 10 m ist ak es of la w] as the e xc lus ionof e vid en ce il le ga lly

obt ai ne d do es not

r el y upo n 11 deterre nt effec t or j udicial integritybut r at her vindicates the right of the ind ividu al 12 an d e ff

ec tua te s th e lawof

the pe ndi ng c as e. ” A s is w el l- es ta blishe d pr ac tic e in 1 3 ap p el l at e r ev i ew , we d ec l i n e t o s p ec u l at e a s t o wh at t h e s p ec i fi c b as i s fo r D ef en d an t ’s 14 arg um en t m ay

be
. Se e Sta te v . G ue rra , 201 2- N MS C- 014, ¶ 21, 278 P
. 3d 1 031 15 (e xpl ai nin g th at

appe llate c ourts are und er no o bli ga tio n to rev ie wunc le ar or 16 unde ve lop ed

a rg um en ts) ; cf. Elane Photo grap hy, LLC v. W illock , 201 3- N MS C- 040, 17 ¶ 70, 309 P. 3d 53 (“ T o ru le on an ina de qua te ly br ie fe d iss ue , thi s C ourt w oul d have 18 to de ve lo p t he arg um en ts it se lf, effe ct iv el y pe rfo rm in g th e pa rti es ’ wor k fo r th em . . . .22

1 T his c re at es astr ai n onj udi ci al r es our ce s and a s ubst an tia l r isk of e rr or . ” (c itatio n 2 om itted)). 3 CON CLU SION 4 { 21} Be ca u s e D ep u t y M ar t i n ez h ad re as o n ab l e s u s p i ci o n t o s t o p De fe n d an t ’s 5 ve hic le , w e af

fi rm his c onvi ct ion s. 6 { 22} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

7

____ ______ __ __ __ __ __ ____ ____ ____ _ 8 J. M IL ES HA N IS EE , Ju dg e
9 I CONCUR:
10

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 11 ST EP HE N G. F R EN C H, Ju dg e
12 TIMOT HY L. GAR CIA , Jud ge (dissent ing).23

1 GAR CIA , Jud ge (dissent ing). 2 { 23} I re spectfully

dissent in this case. Section 66-3-901 d id not provide an 3 ad dit ion al , ind ep en de nt c ri m ina l basi s to viola te the Mo tor V eh ic le Co de a nd the re by 4 establish reasonable sus picion for Deputy Martinez to sto p De fend ant’ s vehicle. 5 Beca use the m aj ority ’ s ruling is one of “ first im p ress ion” and focuses on statutory 6 co nstru ct ionto ar

ri ve a t a r igh t f or a ny r ea son de te rm ina tion, my an al y sis sha ll 7 a d d r e s s e a c h d i s t i n c ti s s u e s e p a r a t e l y. 8 { 24} Fi rs t , b o t h t h e m a j o r i t y a n d I c o u l d f

i n d n o N e w M e x i c o c a s e t o s up p or t t he 9 posit ion th at Sec tion 6 6-3-901 prov ides an independ ent basis to establi sh a “ crim inal 10 vio la tio n” of the Mot or V eh ic le Co de , ei the r in gen er al or spe ci fi ca lly , a nd tha t the 1 1 present state of ou r ju d i ci al p re ce d en to n l y re co g n i ze s cr i m i n al l i g h t i n g v i o l at i o ns that 12 ar e ba se d up on the spe ci fi c lig hti ng r equir em en ts s et f orth i n S ec tio ns 6 6- 3- 801 to - 13 80 5. See Ma

j or ity O pin ion , ¶

¶ 16- 19. T he or igi na l pr ed ec es sor to S ec tio n 66 -3 -9 01 14 w as N MS A 195 3, S ec tio n 64
- 21- 1( a) ( 1953 ). H ist or ic al ly , astatut or y r equir em en t f

or 15 sa fe ty ins pe ct ion s and c er

tif ic at es a lso e xis te d and

r e q u i r e d a s t at e a p p r ova l c er

tif ic at e 16 fo r al l m ot orve hi cl es . See NMS A 1953, § 64-21-2 to -4 (1953 ). 17 { 25} U nde r the statut or y sc he m e inv olv ing an of

fi ci al ce rt if

ic at e of ins pe ct iona nd 18 ap pr ova l, our

S upr em e Co urt r ec ogni ze d th at c ivi l l ia bil ity c oul d e xis t a ga ins t the 19 owner of an uncertified vehicle in order to establish a presum ption of civil negligence24

1 ba se d upon the “ de fe ct ive co ndi tio n of the br ak es ” an d the re qui re m en ts of S ec tio ns 2 64 -2 1
- 1 t o - 8 ( 1 95 3)
. See F erran v. Jacquez , 196 1- N MS C- 072, ¶ ¶ 5, 7, 12- 18, 68 3 N. M. 367, 362 P. 2d 51 9 (rec ogni zing the potential for civil liability against the owner 4 of an u ncertified vehicle, a m isdem eanor offe nse under NMSA1953 , S ection 64-20 -1 5 (1 953) , w h e n t h e o w n e r ’ s s o n l e n t t h e u n c e rt i f i e d v e h i c l e t o a n o t h e r p e r s o n a n d it 6 qui ck ly c au se d an acc ide nt due to def ec tiv e con dit ion of

the br ak es ). H ow ev er , our 7 appellate c o u rt s h ave never r ecognized Section 64-21-1 (195 3) and its present-day 8 s u c c e s s o r , S e c t i o n 6 6
- 3
- 9 0 1 , a s t h e b a s i s f o r e s t ab l i s h i n g ami s d e me a n o r c r i me 9 arising from a li ghtin g equipm ent violatio n that is m ore sp ecifica lly addressed under 10 the oth er pr ovi sio ns of the Mot or V eh ic le Co de
. Ma j or ity O pin ion ¶¶

17- 18; se e Sta te 11 v. Creech , 1991-NMC A- 012, ¶ 12, 11 1 N. M. 490 , 806 P. 2d 1080 (rec ogni zing that 12 the d et en ti on o f a m oto r ve hic le “ is f or bid de n” unl es s th e of

fi ce rs ha ve pr oba

ble 1 3 c au s e , o r

a tl e a s tr e a s o n ab l e s u s p i c i o n , t o b e l i e v e t h a tt h e v e h i c l e i s “ s ub j e c tto 14 seizure un der applicable criminal laws ” (e m pha sis a dde d) ( int er

na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks 15 an d c itatio n om itt ed ))
. A s e m pha siz ed be low , the m aj or ity ’ s s u a s p o nte cr i m inal 16 ex pansi on o f Se ct ion 66- 3- 901 on a righ t for any re as on b as is a ppe ar s to be a n e rr or 17 be ca use it pr ior iti ze s th is g en er al statut e ove r co nf lic tin g w or din g c ont ai ne d inthe 18 m or e spe ci fi c lig hti ng e qui pm en t st at ute s.25

1 { 26} Se co nd, the r igh t f or a ny r ea son doc tr ine onl y

appl ie s w he n it is not

unf ai r to 2 th e ap pe ll an t. Se e G all egos , 200 7- N MS C-00 7, ¶ 26 ( re co gni zi ng tha t the appe llate 3 courts “ will af

firm the trial court’ s decision if it wa s right for any rea son so long as 4 it is n ot unf

ai r to the appe llant” ). I n th is c as e of f ir st i m pr es sio n, it

w oul d be unf

ai r 5 to D ef en dant t o ex pand Se ct ion66- 3- 901 to e sta bli sh an in de pe nde nt c ri m ina l ba sis 6 fo r lia bil ity und er the Mo tor

V eh ic le Co de w he n D efend an t ha d no opp ortun ity to 7 re spon d to the m aj or ity ’ s ne wa rg um en t a ddr es sin g th e ap pl ic ationof vari ous 8 pr in ci pl es o f s t a tu to ry co ns tru ct io n. Se e F

re em an v . F

air ch ild , 201 5- N MC A -0 01, 9 ¶ 29, 340 P. 3d 610 (r ec ogni zi ng tha t it is unf ai r to ap ply the righ t fo r an yr ea son 10 doctrin e where the appellant “ had no op portuni ty . . . to respond to the unasserted 11 argum ent”). 12 { 27} T hir d, by

appl y ing the appr opr ia te r ule of statut or y co nstru ct ion , S ec tio n 66 -3
- 13 901 w oul d no t e sta

bli sh an in de pe nde nt cr im ina l ba sis f or ve hic le li ght ing vio la tio ns 14 un de r th e Mo to r Veh ic le Co de
. Se e Sta te v. B le vi ns , 1936-NMS C-052, ¶ 12, 40 N. M. 15 367, 60 P
. 2d 2 08 ( ag re ei ng “ tha t al l of the c an ons of int er pr et at ionthat a

ppl y to ci vil 16 statut es appl y

to cr im ina l st at

ute s, . . . [ inc lud ing ] the c an on tha t the y a re to be str ic tly 17 co nstru ed [, the re fo re ]
. . . the spe ci al statut e co ntr oll ed the ge ne ra l a ct , a nd the 18 gove rn m en t ha d no e le ct ion as to w hic h it w oul d pr oc ee d [ to p ro se cu te ] und er , the 19 questio n being a judicial one”). The critical language in Sect ion 66 -3-901 is very26

1 ge ne ra l and bro ad ly

w or de d, in tha t i t r es tr ic ts the dr ivi ng o f an y m oto r ve hic le on 2 an y hig hw ay “ unl es s th e equip m en t upon ev er y ve hic le is in good

w orkin g or de r an d 3 ad j ustm en t as requi red in the Motor Vehicle Code [ Section 66 -1-1 ]
. ” (E m phasi s 4 ad de d. ) T he m aj or ity

doe s no t di sput e tha t the re a re num ero us vehic le e qui pm en t 5 pr ovi sio ns s et

f orth i n th e Mot or

V eh ic le Co de thata ddr es s th e spe ci fi c co ndi tio ns 6 and function ality

of v arious equipm ent on a vehicle, and the on ly specific statutory 7 ba sis fo r m isd em ea

nor li ght ing vio la tio ns a

ppl ic ab le in the pr es en t c as e ar e se t f orth 8 in Sect io ns 66 -3 -8 01 to -80 5. See Ma j or ity O pin ion¶

¶ 8- 18. 9 { 28} Whe n a

ppl y ing the ge ne ra l/s pe ci fi c ru le of stat ut ory

c onstru ct ionto the 10 co nf lic tin g langua ge be tw ee n Se ct ion s 66- 3- 801 to -8 05 (the m or e spe ci fi c statut es ) 11 an d Sect ion66- 3- 901 (the ge ne ra l st at ute ), the m or e spe ci fi c statut or y pr ovi sio ns 12 w oul d take pr ec ed en ce ove r the ge ne ral statut e so tha t the tw o st at ute s w ill be 13 ha rm on iz edan d e a c h i s g iv en effe ct . Se e A lbu que rque Co m m ons P ’s hip v . Ci ty 14 Co unc il of Cit

y of A lbu que rque , 2011 -N MS C- 002, ¶ 23, 149 N
. M. 308, 248 P. 3d 8 56 15 (“ When faced w ith two provisi ons addressing the sam e topic, we resort to the f am iliar 16 pr inc ipl e of

statut or y c onstru ct ion : a

statute de al in g w ithaspe ci fi c subj ec t w ill be 17 considered an exception to , and giv e ef fect over, a m ore genera l statute.” ( internal 18 quot at ion m ar

ks and c itatio ns o m itt ed )) ; State v. Santilla nes , 200 1- N MS C- 018, ¶ 18, 19 130 N .M. 464, 27 P .3d 456 (r ecognizing the general/specific rule o f s t atutory27

1 construction to apply

in circum stances where “ co nduct in one group o f statutes 2 r e s u l t e di n a n i rr e c o n c i l ab l e c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e ap p a r e n tc r i mi n a l i z a t i o n o f t h e s a me 3 co nduc t i n anothe r statut e” ); State v. Cleve , 1999 -N MS C- 017, ¶ 25, 127 N
. M. 240 , 4 980 P.2d 23 (acknowledging that “ the general/specific statute rule dete rm ines 5 w he the r the L eg isl at

ur e int ended to li m it the dis cr et ionof the pr ose cu tor

in its 6 selection of charges”). He re , the two statutes are f actually in conflict because a 7 ve hic le w it h a ta ill igh t bu lb tha t i s no t “ in g ood w orkin g or de r” in vio la tio n of 8 Se ct ion66- 3- 901 can st ill e m it suf fi ci en t li ghting fr om

oth er bul bs t o be “ pla inl y 9 vis ibl e fr om

adis tanc e of

f ive hun dr ed

f ee t t o th e re ar ” pur suant to Sect io n 66 -3
- 10 80 5( A). Se e Sta te e

x re l. M adri d v

. U U Bar R anc h L dt. P ’s hip , 200 5- N MC A -0 79, 11 ¶ 20, 137 N
. M. 719 , 114 P.3d 399 (r ec ogni zi ng tha t “ the ge ne ra l/s pe ci fi c ru le of 12 statut or

y c onstru ct ionis onl y

appl ic ab le w he n th e tw o st at ute s are in co nf

lic t” ); Sta te 13 ex re l. Stratt on v . G url eyM oto r C o. , 1987 -N MC A -0 63, ¶ 9, 105 N
. M. 803 , 737 P
. 2d 14 1180 ( em

pha siz ing that the “ spe ci fi c statut e cont rols ove r a ge ne ra l st at ute de al ing 15 w iththe sam e subj ec t m atte r [and]
. . . the sam e co nduc t . . . [ w he re ] c onf lic tin g 16 statut or

y pr ovi sio ns [ ex ist

a nd the ]
. . . r ep ugnanc y

c an not pos sib ly be harm oni ze d” 17 (citations om itted)). 18 { 29} Be ca

use D ep uty

Mart ine z ne v e r

d e t e r m i n e d wh e th e r D e f e n dant’ s r igh t t ai lli ght 19 wa s sufficiently

illum inated by the other bulb to be visib le from a distance of 500 feet28

1 to the r ear, the m aj or ity ha s a lr ea dy

de te rm ine d th at

avio la tio n of

the m or e spe ci fi c 2 statute, S e c t i on6 6- 3- 80 5( A ) , c a nn ot s t a nd e ve n i f av i ol a t i ono f

t he m or e g eneral 3 statut e, S ec tio n 66-3 -901 c anbe r ec ogni ze d. Ma j or ity O pin ion¶

¶ 9, 18- 19. A s a 4 re sul t, the m aj or ity ’ s “ ri ght f or a ny r ea son” de te rm in at io n re co gni zi ng an a bil ity to 5 pr ose cu te D ef

en dant unde r Se ct ion66- 3- 901 cl earl y vio la te s th e ge ne ra l / s pe ci fi c ru le 6 of statut or y c onstru ct ion an d e ff

ec tiv el y m ak es S ec tio n 66 -3 -8 05( A ) ir re le vant and 7 in cap ab le of h arm on iz at io n wi th Sect io n 6 6- 3- 90 1 i n t hi s ca se . See Clev e , 199 9- 8 NMS C-017, ¶ 18 (recognizing that th e L egislatu re did no t intend for the general 9 crim inal statute protecting cruelty to anim als to applyto hun ting ac tivities g overned 10 by spe ci fi c ga m e an d f

ishstatut es ); B le vi ns , 193 6- N MS C- 052, ¶ ¶ 7, 13 ( re ve rs ing the 11 de fe ndant’ s c onvi ct ionund er the m or e ge ne ra l st at

ute by appl y ing “ the r

ule [ tha t] is 12 state d a s f

oll ow s: W

he re the re is one statut e de al ing w ith a su bjec t in g en er al a nd 13 com prehensive term s, and another dealing with a part of the sam e subject in a m ore 14 m inute and definite way , the tw o shou ld be read together and harm onized, if possible, 15 w ithavie wto giv e ef fe ct to a co nsi ste nt l eg isl at ive po lic y ; bu t t o th e ex te nt o f an y 16 ne ce ssary

r ep ugnanc y

be tw ee n th em , the spe ci al statut e, or the one de al ing w iththe 17 co m m on s ubj ec t m atte r in a m inu te w ay , w ill pr ev ai l ov er the ge ne ra l st at

ute , unl es s 18 it ap pe ar s th at the [L ] eg isl at ur e int en de d to m ak e the ge ne ra l a ct c ontro lli ng” ); Sta te 19 v. P ars on , 200 5- N MC A -0 83, ¶ ¶ 14- 19, 137 N
. M. 773 , 115 P
. 3d 2 36 ( ad dr es sin g th e29

1 co nti nui ng v al id it y of

the ge ne ra l/s pe ci fi c ru le appl ie d in Cleve a nd i ts c ont inu ing 2 ap pli catio n to c ri m es inv olving fr ee -r oa m ing , w ild a nim al s)
. A s ar es ult , the 3 D ef en dant w as not

sub j ec t t o c ri m ina l pr ose cu tio n un de r Se ct ion66- 3- 901 of the 4 Mot or V eh ic le Co de
. T his ge ne ra l st atut e, re qui ri ng e qui pm en t i n go od w orkin g 5 or de r, w as not a pr ope r “ ri ght fo r an y r ea son” a lte rn at ive ba sis to es ta bli sh r ea sona

ble 6 sus pic ionthat a cr im e w as be ing co m m itt ed a nd a uth or iz e D ep uty

Mart ine z to s top 7 De fendant’ s vehicle. 8 { 30} I n c o n c l u s i o n , I d o n o t c o n c u r w i t h t h e r e s u l t r e a c h e d b y th e m a j o r ity , a nd 9 D ef en dant’ s c onvi ct ionsho uld be r ev er se d.
10

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